THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

RIVERSIDE 


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Dr.  Kate  Gordon  Moore 


MODERN    EGYPT 


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ts2><i^° 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK    •    BOSTON    •    CHICAGO 
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THE  MACMILLAN  CO.   OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

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E.VcW"'^^'^^'^^^'^  L.Y6  X>A  €.  r 

MODERN  EGYPT 


BY 


THE    EARL   OF   CROMER 


In  his  first  intewieiv  tvitJi  the  Go'vernor  of  St.  Helena, 
Napoleon  said  emphatically  :  '■^  Egypt  is  the  most  important 
country  in  the  ivorlJ." 

Rose,  Life  of  Napoleon,  vol.  i.  p.  356. 

Earum  proprie  rerum  sit  historia,  quibus  rebus  gerendis 
interfuerit  is  qui  narret. 

Gellius,  Noctes  Atticae,  v.  18. 

Ttt  S  ipya.  Twv  irpa'^devTMV  kv  rw  TroXejuo  oi'/c  (k 
Tou  TTapaTvxovTos  Trvvdavofievos  ^y^toxra  ypdcjieLv,  ov8' 
ws  ijiol  eSoKd,  aX\  ots  Te  ai'rbs  Traprjv,  kul  Trapa  Tuiv 
akXcov  6(rov  Svvaroi'  aKpLfSeia  irepl  iKaa-rov  iire^eXdMV. 

Thucydides,  i.  22. 


TWO    VOLUMES    IN    ONE 
VOL.   I 


THE    MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

1916 

./ill  righti   reser-veJ 


/O^' 


Copyright,  1908, 
By  the  MACMILLAN   COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  March,  1908.     Reprinted 
April,  May,  August,  1908  ;  January,  1909;  March,  1916. 


Torino  otr  ^ress 

J.  S.  Gushing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


PKEFACE 

I  AM  wholly  responsible  for  the  contents  of 
this  book.  It  has  no  official  character  what- 
soever. 


London, 
December  31,  1907. 


CROMER. 


EXPLANATORY  NOTE 


P.T.  1  (Piastre  Tariff) 
J&£.  1  (Egyptian  pound) 
1  kantar     . 
I  ardeb 
1  feddan     . 


=  2ld.  =  26  centimes. 
=  PT.  100  =  £1  :  0  :  6  =  25-9  ft. 
=  99-05  lbs.  =  about  45  kilog. 
=  about  5^  bushels  =  198  litres. 
=  1038  acres  =  about  '42  hectare. 


(A  feddan  and  an  acre  are  so  nearly  equal  that  in  this  work 
the  two  measures  have  been  considered  equivalent. ) 


Vll 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   T 

Introductory 

PAOI 

Objects  of  this  book — The  narrative  portion — The  effects  on  Egypt 
of  the  British  occupation — Chief  point  of  interest  in  Egyptian 
reform — Difficulty  of  ascertaining  Eastern  opinion         .  ,  1 

PART    I 
ISMAIL    PASHA 

1863-1879 

CHAPTER   H 

The  Goschen  Mission 
November  1876 

Financial  position  in  1863 — And  in  1876 — Suspension  of  payment  of 
Treasury  BiUs — Creation  of  the  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt 
— Decree  of  May  7,  1876 — The  Goschen  Mission— Decree  of 
November  18,  1876 — Appointment  of  Controllers-General — Sir 
Louis  Mallet  —  I  am  appointed  Commissioner  of  the  Public 
Debt  —  Ismail's  predecessors  —  Crisis  in  the  career  of  Ismail 
Pasha — Accounts  Department      .  .  .  .  .         U 

CHAPTER  HI 

The  Commission  of  Inquiry 
November  1876-April  1878 

Condition  of  Egypt — The  law  of  the  Moukabala — Petty  taxes — The 
Egyptian  public  service — The  fiscal  system — Floating  debt — 

ix 


MODERN  EGYPT 


PAoa 


Efforts  to  pay  interest  on  the  funded  debt  —  Famine  — The 
coupon  of  Maj'  1,  1878— The  Coniniissioners  of  the  Debt— The 
Commission  of  Inquiry  — The  Khedive  proposes  a  partial  in- 
quiry—The  Commissioners  decline  to  take  part  in  it  — The 
Khedive  accepts  a  full  inquiry      .  .  .  •  •        29 


CHAPTER   IV 

The  Nubar-Wilson   Ministry 
April  1878-No\  ember  1878 

Difficulty  of  the  task  assigned  to  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  — 
Cherif  Pasha  declines  to  appear  as  a  witness — Defec-ts  in  the 
system  of  administration — The  floating  debt — The  Rouznameh 
Loan— Loans  from  the  Wakf  and  Beit-el-Mal  Administrations 
— Ultimate  reforms  proposed  by  the  Commissioners  —  Imme- 
diate reforms  necessary — Enforcement  of  Ministerial  responsi- 
bility— The  Khedive's  Civil  List— Cession  to  the  State  of  the 
Khedivial  properties — The  Khedive  accepts  the  proposals  of  the 
Commissioners  —  Nubar  Pasha  forms  a  Ministry  —  Sir  Rivers 
Wilson  and  M.  de  Blignieres  named  Ministers — Loan  authorised 
on  the  security  of  the  Khedivial  estates  .  ,  ,  .        46 

CHAPTER    V^ 

The  Fall  of  Nubar  Pasha 
November  1878-Febkuary  1879 

Difficult  position  of  the  new  Ministry— Support  of  the  British  and 
French  Governments— The  Khedive  declines  all  responsibihty 
— Convocation  of  the  Chamber  of  Notables— The  principle  of 
Ministerial  responsibility — Contest  between  the  Khedive  and 
Nubar  Pasha — The  Khedive  intrigues  against  the  Ministry — 
Mutiny  of  the  officers — It  is  quelled  by  the  Khedive — Nubar 
Pasha  resigns  —  Immediate  consequences  —  Remote  conse- 
quences—  State  of  discipline  of  the  army  —  The  Khedive's 
•responsibility  for  the  mutiny         .  .  •  .  .        64 


CHAPTER   VI 

The  Coup  d'Etat 
April  1879 

Triumph  achieved  by  Ismail   Pasha — His  parliamentary  projects 
— Necessity   of    maintaining   the    reformed   adniiiiislmtion  — 


CONTENTS  .       xi 


Attempts  to  reinstate  Nubar  Pasha — Relations  between  the 
Khedive  and  the  new  Ministry — Position  of  the  British  and 
French  Governments — Common  policy— Different  methods  of 
executing  the  policy — Dissensions  at  Cairo — Position  of  Prince 
Tewfik — Mistaken  principles  of  the  new  Ministry — The  pay- 
ment of  the  coupon  on  the  1864-  loan — The  Khedive  prepares  a 
separate  financial  scheme — Dismissal  of  the  Ministers — Pro- 
posal to  revive  the  Control — Letter  of  the  Khedive  to  Cherif 
Pasha  —  Character  of  the  new  Ministers  —  Cimimcnts  on  the 
Khedive's  proceedings       ......         82 


CHAPTER   VII 

The   Report  of  the  Commission 
April  1879 

Declaration  of  bankruptcy  —  Principles  of  the  settlement  —  The 
Khedive's  Civil  List — The  Ouchouri  land-tax — The  Rouznameh 
loan — The  law  of  the  Mouktibala — Reductions  of  taxation — 
Composition  with  the  creditors — Comments  on  the  report — The 
Commissioners  resign  —  The  Khedive's  counter -proposals  — 
Revival  of  the  practices  of  the  old  regime — The  Connnissioners 
of  the  Debt  institute  legal  proceedings  against  the  Egyptian 
Government — My  departure  from  Egypt  .  .  .110 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The   Fall  of  Ismail  Pasha 
April-June  1879 

Embarrassment  of  the  European  Powers  —  Turkey  —  England  — 
France — Italy — Russia — Germany  and  Austria — The  French 
and  British  Governments  demand  the  reinstatement  of  the 
European  Ministers — The  Khedive  declines  to  reinstate  them 
—  Question  of  re  -  establishing  the  Control  —  The  German 
Government  protest  against  the  proceedings  of  the  Khedive — 
The  British  and  French  Governments  advise  abdication  —The 
Khedive  appeals  to  the  Sultan  —  The  Sultan  deposes  the 
Khedive — Inauguration  of  Prince  Tewfik — Ismail  Pasha  leaves 
Egypt — Remarks  on  his  reign       •  ,  .  .  .       128 


xii  MODERN  EGYPT 

PART   II 
THE   ARABI   REVOLT 

August  1879-August  1883 

CHAPTER  IX 

The  Inauguration  of  Tewfik 

August-November  1879 

PAoa 
State  of  the  country  —  Cherif  Pasha's  Ministry — The  Khedive 
assumes  the  Presidency  of  the  Council  —  Ministry  of  Riaz 
Pasha — Relations  between  the  Khedive  and  his  Ministers — 
The  Sultan  cancels  the  Firman  of  1873 — Objections  of  France 
and  England — The  Mohammedan  law  of  succession — The  right 
to  make  Commercial  Conventions,  and  to  contract  loans — The 
Army — The  Khedive's  investiture — Appointment  of  Controllers 
— Relations  between  the  Government  and  the  Controllers — 
Division  of  work  between  the  Controllers— The  Commission  of 
Liquidation  .......      149 

CHAPTER  X 

The  Dual  Control 
November  1879-December  1880 

Working  of  the  Control — Relations  between  the  two  Controllers — 
And  between  the  Controllers  and  the  Egyptian  Government — 
Delay  in  paying  the  Tribute — Interest  on  the  Unified  Debt 
paid  at  4  per  cent — Financial  scheme  proposed  by  the  Con- 
trollers— The  Budget  for  1880 — Reforms  in  the  fiscal  system — 
Confidence  inspired  by  the  Control — Reports  on  the  state  of 
the  country — The  Law  of  Liquidation — The  military  danger    .       164 

CHAPTER   XI 

The  Mutiny  of  the  Egyptian  Army 

January-September  1881 

Discontent  amongst  the  officers  —  They  petition  Riaz  Pasha  — 
Mutiny  of  February  1 — Dismissal  of  the  Minister  of  War — 
Imprudent  conduct  of  the  Khedive — Conduct  of  the  French 
Consul-General — Increase  of  discontent  in  the  army — Mutiny 
of  September  9 — Sir  Auckland  Colvin — Demands  of  the  muti- 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAOK 

neers — Dismissal  of  the  Ministers — Reluctance  of  Ch^rif  Pasha 
to  accept  office — Nomination  of  the  Cherif  Ministry — Ch^rif 
Pasha  supports  the  European  Control — Arabi  is  the  real  ruler 
of  Egypt — His  conduct  due  to  fear — Situation  created  by  the 
mutiny        •.....•>       175 

CHAPTER   XII 

The  Cherif  Ministry 
September-December  1881 

The  Porte  wishes  to  interfere — Objections  of  France  and  England 
— Despatch  of  Turkish  Commissioners  to  Cairo — Effect  of  their 
mission— British  and  French  ships  sent  to  Alexandria — Ardbi 
leaves  Cairo  with  his  regiment — Remarks  on  Turkish  inter- 
ference— Divergent  views  of  France  and  England — Despond- 
ency of  the  Khedive  —  Cherif  Pasha's  policy — Sir  Auckland 
Colvin's  views — Arabi's  policy — Insubordination  in  the  army — 
Violence  of  the  local  press — Attitude  of  the  civil  population — 
Summary  of  the  situation  at  the  end  of  1881       ...       194 

CHAPTER  XIII 

The  Joint  Note 
January  1882 

Proposal  to  establish  an  Anglo-French  Military  Control — Change  of 
Ministry  in  France — M.  Gambetta  proposes  joint  action — Lord 
Granville  agrees — Sir  Edward  Malet  consulted — Sir  Auckland 
Colvin's  recommendations — M,  Gambetta  prepares  a  draft  note 
— Lord  Granville  agrees — Instructions  sent  to  Cairo — Proposed 
increase  in  the  army  —  Reorganisation  of  the  Chamber  of 
Notables  —  Effect  produced  by  the  Note  —  Remarks  on  the 
Note  ........      214 


CHAPTER   XIV 

The  Effects  of  the  Joint  Notb 
January-February  1882 

The  British  Government  wish  to  explain  the  Joint  Note — The 
French  Government  object — The  Chamber  of  Notables  claims 
the  right  to  vote  the  Budget — Proposals  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment— Objections  of  the  French  Government — The  Consuls- 
General  instructed  to  oppose  the  Chamber  —  The  Chamber 


xiv  MODERN  EGYPT 


TAom 


demands  a  change  of  Ministry — Appointment  of  a  National 
Ministry— The  French  Government  press  for  an  Anglo-French 
occupation — The  British  Government  favour  a  Turkish  occupa- 
tion—Resignation of  M.  Gambetta— Remarks  on  his  poUcy     .      236 

CHAPTER  XV 

The  ArAbi  Ministry 
February-May  1882 

Proposal  to  revise  the  Organic  Law— Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt— M.  de 
Blignieres  resigns  —  Concessions  made  to  the  army  —  Disor- 
ganisation in  the  provinces— The  Porte  protests  against  the 
Joint  Note— The  Powers  are  invited  to  an  exchange  of  views — 
M.  de  Freycinet  wishes  to  depose  the  Khedive — Lord  Granville 
proposes  to  send  Financial  Commissioners  to  Egypt— Alleged 
conspiracy  to  murder  Arabi — The  Ministers  resign,  but  resume 
oflBce— M.  de  Freycinet  assents  to  Turkish  intervention — Arabi 
requested  to  leave  Egypt— He  refuses  to  do  so— The  Ministers 
again  resign — The  Khedive  reinstates  Arabi — And  asks  for  a 
Turkish  Commissioner       ......       254 

Appendix. — Note   on   the   relations   between   Mr.   Gladstone  and 

Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt 279 

CHAPTER   XVI 

The  Bombardment  of  Alexandria 
May- July  1882 

State  of  the  country— Vacillation  of  the  Porte — A  Conference  pro- 
posed— Dervish  Pasha  and  Essad  Effendi  sent  to  Egypt — The 
Alexandria  massacres  —  Failure  of  Dervish  Pasha's  Mission — 
Panic  in  Egypt— The  Conference  meets— The  Ragheb  Ministry 
—  The  British  Admiral  demands  that  the  construction  of 
batteries  at  Alexandria  shall  cease  —  The  French  decline  to 
co-operate  —  The  bombardment  of  Alexandria  —  The  town 
abandoned  and  burnt         ......       281 

CHAPTER   XVH 

Tel-el-Kebir 
July-September  1882 

State  of  the  country— British  policy — Vote  of  credit — Negotiations 
with  France — Fall  of  the  Freycinet  Ministry — France  declines 
to  co-operate-   Negotiations  with   Italy — Italy  declines    to 


CONTENTS  XV 


PAQE 


co-operate— Negotiations  with  Turkey — Tel-el-Kebir — General 
remarks      ........      300 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Dufferin  Mission 
September  1882-August  1883 

British  policy — Trial  of  Arabi — Resignation  of  Riaz  Pasha — Exile 
of  political  prisoners — Courts-martial — The  Alexandria  Indem- 
nities—  The  abohtion  of  the  Dual  Control  —  Rupture  of  the 
Anglo-French  understanding  —  Lord  Dufferin's  Report  —  My 
arrival  in  Egypt      .....*.      331 


PART    III 
THE    SOUDAN 

1882-1907 

CHAPTER  XIX 

The  Hicks  Expedition 
January-November  1883 

Extent  of  Egyptian  territory  —  Misgovernment  in  the  Soudan  — 
Slave-hunting — Said  Pasha's  views — Colonel  Stewart's  Report 
— The  Mahdi — Military  and  financial  situation — Interference 
from  Cairo — Attitude  of  the  Bi'itish  Government — Destruction 
of  General  Hicks's  army  ......       349 

CHAPTER   XX 

The  Abandonment  of  the  Soudan 
November  1883-January  1884 

My  position  —  I  press  the  British  Government  to  depart  from  a 
passive  attitude — ^  Lord  Granville's  reply  —  The  Egyptian 
Government  decide  to  hold  Khartoum  —  Colonel  Coetlogon 
recommends  a  retreat  on  Berber  —  Opinions  of  the  military 
authorities  at  Cairo  —  The  Egyptian  Government  wish  to 
invoke  the  aid  of  the  Sultan  —  The  British  Government 
recommend  withdrawal  from  the  Soudan  —  The  Eg}'ptian 
Ministers  resign — Nubar  Pasha  takes  office — Observations  on 
the  policy  of  withdrawal  from  the  Soudan  .  .  .       37 1 


xvi  MODERN  EGYPT 

CHAPTER  XXI 

The  Rebellion  in  the  Eastern  Soudan 
August  1883-March  1884 

PAOI 

Prevailing  discontent — Annihilation  of  a  force  sent  to  Sinkat — And 
of  one  sent  to  Tokar — Defeat  of  the  Egjptians  at  Tamanieb — 
It  is  decided  to  send  the  Gendarmerie  and  some  black  troops 
under  Zobeir  Pasha  to  Suakin — Instructions  to  General  Baker 
— He  arrives  at  Suakin — His  instructions  are  modified — Zobeir 
Pasha  retained  at  Cairo — General  Baker  advances  to  Tokar — 
His  defeat — Fall  of  Sinkat — It  is  decided  to  send  a  British  force 
to  Tokar — FaU  of  Tokar — General  Graham  advances — Action  at 
El  Teb— The  British  troops  return  to  Suakin— Battle  of  Tamai 
— Results  of  the  operations  .  .  .  .  •      396 

CHAPTER   XXn 

The  Gordon  Mission 
December  1883-January  1884 

The  situation  in  Egypt — Sir  Frederick  Stephenson — General  Earle 
— Sir  Edgar  Vincent  —  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  —  Foreign  Ofi&ce 
support — First  and  second  proposals  to  send  General  Gordon 
— They  are  rejected — Third  proposal  to  send  General  Gordon 
— It  is  accepted — No  British  officer  should  have  been  sent  to 
Khartoum — General  Gordon  should  not  in  any  case  have  been 
chosen— The  responsibility  of  the  British  press — And  of  the 
British  Government — General  Gordon's  optimism — My  regret 
at  having  assented  to  the  Gordon  Mission  .  .  ,417 

CHAPTER   XXm 

Gordon  at  Cairo 
January  24-26,  1884 

General  Gordon  wishes  to  go  to  Suakin — He  goes  to  Cairo — Con- 
sequences which  resulted  from  the  change  of  route — General 
Gordon's  views  as  to  the  Soudan — His  London  instructions 
—Instructions  issued  at  Cairo — General  Gordon  appointed 
Governor-General  of  the  Soudan — And  furnished  with  certain 
Proclamations — Reasons  why  General  Gordon's  instructions 
were  changed — The  Darfour  Sultan — General  Gordon  proposes 
that  Zobeir  Paslia  should  accompany  him — Interview  between 
General  Gordon  and  Zobeir  Pasha — It  is  decided  not  to  employ 
Zobeir  Pasha — General  Gordon  leaves  Cairo       .  •  .      440 


CONTENTS  xvii 

CHAPTER  XXIV 

Gordon's  Journey  to  Khartoum 
January  26-Febbuary  18,  1884 

FAOC 

Contradictory  nature  of  General  Gordon's  proposals — The  Darfour 
Sultan — General  Gordon  proposes  to  visit  the  Mahdi — Or  to 
retire  to  the  Equator — He  issues  a  Proclamation  announcing 
the  independence  of  the  Soudan — The  Slavery  Proclamation — 
General  Gordon  arrives  at  Khartoum  —  He  is  sanguine  of 
success — Colonel  Stewart's  warning         .  .  ,  .461 

CHAPTER   XXV 

ZoBEiR  Pasha 

•  February  18-March  16,  1884 

The  turning-point  of  General  Gordon's  Mission — General  Gordon's 
Memorandum  of  February  S^Change  in  General  Gordon's 
views — He  asks  for  Zobeir  Pasha— I  advise  that  Zobeir  Pasha 
should  be  General  Gordon's  successor — The  Government  reject 
this  proposal — General  Gordon  proposes  to  "smash  up"  the 
Mahdi — Conflicting  policies  advocated  by  General  Gordon — 
His  Proclamation  stating  that  British  troops  were  coming  to 
Khartoum — General  Gordon's  neglect  of  his  instructions — I 
again  urge  the  employment  of  Zobeir  Pasha — Difficulty  of  under- 
standing General  Gordon's  telegrams — Colonel  Stewart  recom- 
mends that  Zobeir  Pasha  should  be  sent^I  support  this  view 
— General  Gordon  recommends  that  the  Berber-Suakin  route 
should  be  opened — The  Government  object  to  the  employ- 
ment of  Zobeir  Pasha  —  I  again  urge  the  employment  of 
Zobeir  Pasha  —  General  Gordon's  communications  to  the 
Times  correspondent  —  The  tribes  round  Khartoum  waver — 
The  Government  reject  the  Zobeir  proposal  —  I  instruct 
General  Gordon  to  hold  on  to  Khartoum — I  again  urge  on 
the  Government  the  necessity  of  employing  Zobeir  Pasha — 
The  proposal  is  rejected — I  remonstrate — Final  rejection  of  the 
Zobeir  proposal — Were  the  Government  right  in  their  decision  ?      479 

CHAPTER   XXVI 

The  Proposed  Dash  to  Berber 

March  16-April  21,  1884 

Sir  Gerald  Graham  proposes  to  move  on  Sinkat — Lord  GranviUe 
approves — The  proposed  movement  on  Wadi  Haifa— Proposal 


xviii  MODERN  EGYPT 


rAOB 


to  send  a  British  expedition  to  Berber— It  is  rejected— The 
order  to  move  on  Sinkat  is  cancelled — Remarks  on  this  decision 
— Proposal  to  despatch  a  force  to  Wadi  Haifa  —  General 
Gordon  recommends  the  employment  of  a  Turkish  force — The 
Government  reject  the  proposal — Necessity  of  preparing  for  a 
Relief  Expedition  .......      635 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

The  Relief  Expedition 
April  21-Ootober  5,  1884 

General  Gordon's  motives — Spirit  in  which  the  question  should  be 
approached — Did  General  Gordon  try  to  carry  out  the  policy 
of  the  Government? — The  situation  at  Berber — Messages  to 
General  Gordon  and  his  replies — Sir  Frederick  Stephenson  in- 
structed to  report  on  the  Relief  Expedition — The  Suakin-Berber 
Railway— The  fall  of  Berber— The  vote  of  credit— Lord  Wolseley 
appointed  to  command  the  Nile  expedition  —  He  arrives  at  Wadi 
Haifa — Remarks  on  the  above  narrative  .  .  .       559 

Appendix. — Note  on  the  Khedive's  telegram  to  General  Gordon 

of  September  14,  1884 593 


Portrait  of  the   Author   after   a   PHorocnArH    hy   G.   C. 

Beresford  .  .  .  .  '  .  .    Frontispteee 

Map  or  the  Soudaw  .  .  .  .  At  the  end  of  Volums 


CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTORY 

Objects  of  this  book — The  narrative  portion — The  effects  on  Egypt  of 
the  British  occupation — Chief  point  of  interest  in  Egyptian  refonn 
— Difficulty  of  ascertaining  Eastern  opinion. 

My  object  in  writing  this  book  is  twofold. 

In  the  first  place,  I  wish  to  place  on  record  an 
accurate  narrative  of  some  of  the  principal  events 
which  have  occurred  in  Egypt  and  in  the  Soudan 
since  the  year  1876.^ 

In  the  second  place,  I  wish  to  explain  the 
results  which  have  accrued  to  Egypt  from  the 
British  occupation  of  the  country  in  1882. 

The  accidents  of  my  public  life  have  afforded 
me  special  opportunities  for  compiling  certain 
chapters  of  Egyptian  history.  From  March  1877 
to  June  1880,  and  again  from  September  1883  up 
to  the  present  time  (1907),  I  have  been  behind  the 
scenes  of  Egyptian  affairs.  Besides  those  sources 
of  information  which  are  open  to  all  the  world,  I 
have  had  access  to  all  the  documents  in  the  archives 
of  the  Foreign  Offices  of  both  London  and  Cairo, 
and  I  have  been  in  close  communication  with,  I 
think,  almost  every  one  who  has  taken  a  leading 

^  I  have  dealt  fully  and  unreservedly  with  the  whole  of  the  principal 
historical  events  which  occurred  in  E}i;'ypt  from  1876  up  to  the  time 
of  Tewfik  Pasha's  death  (January  7,  1892)  ;  also  with  Soudan  history 
up  to  the  end  of  1907.  It  would,  in  my  opinion,  he  premature  to 
deal  similarly  with  events  in  Egypt  suhsequeut  to  the  accession  of  the 
present  Khedive. 

VOL.    II  B 


2  MODERN  EGYPT  ch. 

part  in  Egyptian  affairs  during  the  period  the 
history  of  which  I  have  attempted  to  write.  Thus, 
I  think  I  may  fairly  lay  claim  to  be  in  a  position 
of  exceptional  advantage  in  so  far  as  the  attainment 
of  accuracy  is  concerned. 

Now,  accuracy  of  statement  is  a  great  merit. 
Sir  Arthur  Helps  once  said  that  half  the  evils 
of  the  world  come  from  inaccuracy.  My  personal 
experience  would  lead  me  rather  to  agree  with 
him.  I  cannot  say  that  what  I  have  seen  and 
known  of  contemporaneous  events,  with  which  I 
have  been  well  acquainted,  has  inspired  me  with 
any  great  degree  of  confidence  in  the  accuracy  of 
historical  writing.  The  public,  indeed,  generally 
end,  though  sometimes  not  till  after  a  considerable 
lapse  of  time,  in  getting  a  correct  idea  of  the 
general  course  of  events,  and  of  the  cause  or  effect 
of  any  special  political  incident.  But,  speaking 
more  particularly  of  the  British  public,  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  even  this  result  is  fully  achieved, 
save  in  respect  to  questions  of  internal  policy.  In 
such  matters,  a  number  of  competent  and  well- 
informed  persons  take  part  in  the  discussions  which 
arise  in  Parliament  and  in  the  press.  Inaccuracy 
of  statement  is  speedily  corrected.  Fallacies  are 
exposed.  In  the  heat  of  party  warfare  the  truth 
may  for  a  time  be  obscured,  but  in  the  end  the 
public  will  generally  lay  hold  of  a  tolerably  correct 
appreciation  of  the  facts. 

In  dealing  with  the  affairs  of  a  foreign  country, 
more  especially  if  that  country  be  in  a  semi-civilised 
condition,  these  safeguards  to  historical  truth  exist 
in  a  relatively  less  degree.  English  opinion  has  in 
such  cases  to  deal  with  a  condition  of  society  with 
which  it  is  unfamiliar.  It  is  disposed  to  apply 
arguments  drawn  from  English,  or,  it  may  be,  from 
European  experience  to  a  state  of  things  which 
does  not  admit  of  any  such  arguments  being  applied 


I  INTRODUCTORY  3 

without  great  qualifications.  The  number  of 
persons  who  possess  sufficiently  accurate  informa- 
tion to  instruct  the  public  is  limited,  and  amongst 
those  persons  it  not  unfrequently  happens  that 
many  have  some  particular  cause  to  advance,  or 
some  favourite  political  theory  to  defend.  Those 
who  are  most  qualified  to  speak  often  occupy  some 
official  position,  which,  for  the  time  being,  imposes 
silence  upon  them.  There  is,  therefore,  no  certain 
guarantee  that  inaccuracies  of  statement  will  be 
corrected,  or  that  fallacies  will  be  adequately  ex- 
posed. Thus,  even  if  the  general  conclusion  be 
correct,  there  is  a  risk  that  an  erroneous  apprecia- 
tion in  respect  to  important  matters  of  detail  will 
float  down  the  tide  of  history.  The  public  often  seize 
on  some  incident  which  strikes  the  popular  imagina- 
tion, or  idealise  the  character  of  some  individual 
whose  action  excites  sympathy  or  admiration.  It 
would  appear,  indeed,  that  democracy  tends  to 
develop  rather  than  to  discourage  hero-worship. 

The  first  stage  on  the  road  to  historical  in- 
accuracy is  that  some  half-truth  is  stated,  and,  in 
spite  of  contradiction,  obtains  a  certain  amount  of 
credence.  It  may  be,  indeed,  that  the  error  is 
corrected ;  but  it  sometimes  happens  that,  as  time 
goes  on,  the  measure  of  fiction  increases,  whilst 
that  of  fact  tends  to  evaporate.  A  series  of  myths 
cluster  round  the  original  idea  or  statement.  In 
India,  as  Sir  Alfred  Lyall  has  shown,  the  hero 
passes  by  easy  stages  of  transition  into  a  demi-god.^ 
In  sceptical  Europe,  the  process  is  different.  All 
that  happens  is  that  an  incorrect  fact  or  a  faulty 
conclusion  is  graven  into  the  tablets  from  which 
future  historians  must  draw  their  sources  of  in- 
formation. 

Turning  to  the  second  point  to  which  allusion 
is  made  above,  I  wish  to  explain  the  results  which 

*  Asiatic  Studies. 


4  MODERN  EGYPT  ca 

accrued  to  Egypt  from  the  British  occupation  of 
the  country  in  1882. 

On  March  23,  1876,  Mr.  Stephen  Cave,  who 
had  been  sent  to  Cairo  to  re])ort  on  the  financial 
condition  of  Egypt,  expressed  himself  in  the  follow- 
ing terms : — 

Egypt  may  be  said  to  be  in  a  transition  state,  and  she 
suffers  from  the  defects  of  the  system  out  of  which  she  is 
passing,  as  well  as  from  those  of  the  system  into  which  she 
is  attempting  to  enter.  She  suffers  from  the  ignorance,  dis- 
honesty, waste,  and  extravagance  of  the  East,  such  as  have 
brought  her  suzerain  to  the  verge  of  ruin,  and  at  the  same 
time  from  the  vast  expense  caused  by  hasty  and  inconsiderate 
endeavours  to  adopt  the  civilisation  of  the  West. 

An  attempt  will  be  made  in  the  following  pages 
to  give  some  account  of  the  measures  adopted  since 
Mr.  Cave  wrote  his  report,  to  arrest,  and,  as  I  hope 
and  would  fain  believe,  to  remedy  the  disease, 
whose  main  features  are  described  with  accuracy 
in  the  passage  quoted  above. 

I  trust  that  such  an  account  will  not  be  devoid 
of  interest  to  the  general  reader,  and  that  it  will 
be  of  some  special  interest  to  those  of  my  fellow- 
countrymen  who  are,  or  who  at  some  future  time 
may  be  engaged  in  Oriental  administration.  It  is 
to  this  latter  class  that  I  would  more  especially 
address  myself,  for  they  can  appreciate  the  nature 
of  the  problems  which  have  presented  themselves 
for  solution,  and  the  difficulty  of  solving  them, 
more  fully  than  those  who  are  devoid  of  special 
administrative  experience  in  the  East. 

I  would  at  the  outset  state  where,  as  I  venture 
to  think,  the  chief  point  of  interest  lies. 

Egypt  is  not  the  only  country  which  has  been 
brought  to  the  verge  of  ruin  by  a  persistent  neglect 
of  economic  laws  and  by  a  reckless  administration 
of  the  finances  of  the  State.  Neither  is  it  the 
only  country  in  which  undue  privileges  have  been 


I  INTRODUCTORY  5 

acquired  by  the  influential  classes  to  the  detriment 
of  the  mass  of  the  population.  Nor  is  it  the  only 
country  in  whose  administration  the  most  element- 
ary principles  of  law  and  justice  have  been  ignored. 
Although  the  details  may  differ,  there  is  a  great 
similarity  in  the  general  character  of  the  abuses 
which  spring  up  under  Eastern  Governments  where- 
soever they  may  be  situated.  So  also,  although 
the  remedies  to  be  applied  must  vary  according  to 
local  circumstances  and  according  to  the  character, 
institutions,  and  habits  of  thought  of  the  European 
nation  under  whose  auspices  reforms  are  initiated, 
the  broad  lines  which  those  reforms  must  take  are 
traced  out  by  the  commonplace  requirements  of 
European  civilisation,  and  must  of  necessity  present 
some  identity  of  character,  whether  the  scene  of 
action  be  India,  Algiers,  Egypt,  Tunis,  or  Bosnia. 

The  history  of  reform  in  Egypt,  therefore,  does 
not  present  any  striking  feature  to  which  some 
analogy  might  not  perhaps  be  found  in  other 
countries  where  European  civilisation  has,  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  been  grafted  on  a  backward 
Eastern  Government  and  society. 

But,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  no  counterpart  can 
be  found  to  the  special  circumstances  which  have 
attended  the  work  of  Egyptian  reform.  Those 
circumstances  have,  in  truth,  been  very  peculiar. 

In  the  first  place,  one  alien  race,  the  English, 
have  had  to  control  and  guide  a  second  alien  race, 
the  Turks,  by  whom  they  are  disliked,  in  the 
government  of  a  third  race,  the  Egyptians.  To 
these  latter,  both  the  paramount  races  are  to  a 
certain  extent  unsympathetic.  In  the  case  of  the 
Turks,  the  want  of  sympathy  has  been  mitigated 
by  habit,  by  a  common  religion,  and  by  the  use 
of  a  common  language.^  In  the  case  of  the 
English,    it    has    been    mitigated    by    the   respect 

*  All  the  Egyptian  officials  of  Turkisli  origin  now  speak  Arabic. 


6  MODERN  EGYPT  ca 

due  to  superior  talents,  and  by  the  benefits 
which  have  accrued  to  the  population  from  British 
interference. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  to  be  observed  that 
for  diplomatic  and  other  reasons,  on  which  it  is 
unnecessary  for  the  moment  to  dwell,  the  Egyptian 
administration  had  to  be  reformed  without  any 
organic  changes  being  effected  in  the  conditions 
under  which  the  government  had  been  conducted 
prior  to  the  British  occupation.  Those  conditions 
were  of  an  exceptionally  complicated  character. 
A  variety  of  ingenious  and  elaborate  checks  had 
been  invented  with  a  view  to  preventing  a  bad 
Government  from  moving  in  a  vicious  direction. 
These  checks,  when  brought  into  action  under  a 
wholly  different  condition  of  affairs,  were  at  times 
applied,  under  the  baneful  impulse  of  international 
jealousy,  to  hamper  the  movements  of  an  improved 
Government  in  the  direction  of  reform.  "  Je  suis 
sans  credit,"  said  the  "plumitif  "  in  Voltaire's  IngmUy 
"  pour  faire  du  bien ;  mon  pouvoir  se  borne  a  faire 
du  mal  quelquefois.'*  The  phrase  may  rightly  be 
applied  to  the  working  of  international  government 
in  Egypt  since  1882.  It  is,  indeed,  certain  that 
whatever  success  has  attended  the  efforts  of 
reformers  in  Egypt  has  been  attained,  not  in 
virtue  of  the  system,  but  in  spite  of  it.  Those 
who  hold,  with  the  English  poet,  that  "  Whate'er 
is  best  administered  is  best,"  may  perhaps  find 
some  corroboration  of  their  theory  in  the  recent 
history  of  Egypt.  An  experiment  under  some- 
what novel  conditions  has,  in  fact,  been  made  in 
Eastern  administration,  and,  in  spite  of  many 
shortcomings,  this  experiment  has  been  crowned 
with  a  certain  degree  of  success.  It  is  this  which 
gives  to  Egyptian  reform  its  chief  claim  to  the 
interest  of  the  })()litical  student. 

I  have  lived   too  long  in  the  East  not  to  be 


I  INTRODUCTORY  7 

aware  that  it  is  difficult  for  any  European  to 
arrive  at  a  true  estimate  of  Oriental  wishes,  aspira- 
tions, and  opinions. 

Those  who  have  been  in  the  East  and  have  tried  to  mingle 
with  the  native  population  know  well  how  utterly  impossible 
it  is  for  the  European  to  look  at  the  world  with  the  same 
eyes  as  the  Oriental.  For  a  while,  indeed,  the  European 
may  fancy  that  he  and  the  Oriental  understand  one  another, 
but  sooner  or  later  a  time  comes  when  he  is  suddenly 
awakened  from  his  dream,  and  finds  himself  in  the  presence 
of  a  mind  which  is  as  strange  to  him  as  would  be  the  mind 
of  an  inhabitant  of  Saturn.^ 

I  was  for  some  while  in  Egypt  before  I  fully 
realised  how  little  I  understood  my  subject ;  and 
I  found,  to  the  last  day  of  my  residence  in  the 
country,  that  I  was  constantly  learning  something 
new.  No  casual  visitor  can  hope  to  obtain  much 
real  insight  into  the  true  state  of  native  opinion. 
Divergence  of  religion  and  habits  of  thought;  in 
my  own  case  ignorance  of  the  vernacular  language  ; ' 
the  reticence  of  Orientals  when  speaking  to  any  one 
in  authority  ;  their  tendency  to  agree  with  any  one 
to  whom  they  may  be  talking  ;  the  want  of  mental 
symmetry  and  precision,  which  is  the  chief  dis- 
tinguishing feature  between  the  illogical  and 
picturesque  East  and  the  logical  West,  and  which 
lends  such  peculiar  interest  to  the  study  of  Eastern 
life  and  politics ;  the  fact  that  religion  enters  to  a 
greater  extent  than  in  Europe  into  the  social  life 
and  laws  and  customs  of  the  people ;  and  the 
further  fact  that  the  European  and  the  Oriental, 
reasoning  from  the  same  premises,  will  often  arrive 
at  diametrically  opposite  conclusions, — all  these 
circumstances  place  the  European  at  a  great  dis- 
advantage when   he   attempts   to   gauge   Eastern 

*  Professor  Sayce,  The  Higher  Criticism  and  the  Monuments,  p.  558. 

•  I  have  a  fair  acquaintance  with  Turkish,  but  I  do  not  speak 
Arabic 


8  MODERN  EGYPT  ch.i 

opinion.  Nevertheless,  the  difficulty  of  arriving  at 
a  true  idea  of  the  undercurrents  of  native  opinion  is 
probably  less  considerable  in  Egypt  than  in  India. 
Notably,  the  absence  of  the  caste  system,  and  the 
fact  that  the  social  and  rehgious  fabric  of  Islamism 
is  more  readily  comprehensible  to  the  European 
mind  than  the  comparatively  subtle  and  mystical 
bases  of  Hinduism,  diminish  the  gulf  which  in 
India  separates  the  European  from  the  native, 
and  which,  by  placing  a  check  on  social  inter- 
course, becomes  a  fertile  source  of  mutual  mis- 
understanding. On  the  whole,  though  I  should  not 
like  to  dogmatise  on  the  subject,  I  am  inclined 
to  think  that  by  constantly  seeing  people  of  all 
classes,  and  by  checking  the  information  received 
from  different  sources,  a  fair  idea  of  native  opinion 
in  Egypt  may  in  time  be  formed. 

I  would  add  that  it  is  not  possible  to  live  so 
long  as  I  have  lived  in  Egypt  without  acquiring 
a  deep  sympathy  for  the  Egyptian  people.  The 
cause  of  Egyptian  reform  is  one  in  which  I  take 
the  warmest  personal  interest.  A  residence  of  half 
a  lifetime  in  Eastern  countries  has  made  me  realise 
the  force  of  Rudyard  Kipling's  lines — 

If  you've  heard  the  East  a'calling. 
You  won't  ever  heed  aught  else. 


PART  I 

ISMAIL   PASHA 

1863-1879 


It  were  good  that  men  in  their  Innovations  would  Jbllow 
the  example  of  Tim£  itself,  which,  indeed,  innovateth  greatly, 
hut  quietly,  and  by  degrees  scarce  to  be  perceived.  .  .  .  It  is 
good  also  not  to  try  experivietds  in  States  except  the  necessity 
be  urgent,  or  the  utility  evident ;  and  well  to  beware  that  it  be 
the  reformation  that  draweth  on  the  change,  and  not  the  desire 
of  change  that  pretendeth  the  reformation. 

Bacon,  On  Innovations. 

It  is  singidar  how  long  the  rotten  inll  hold  together  pro- 
vided you  do  not  handle  it  roughly  .  .  .  so  loth  are  men  to  quit 
their  old  ways ;  and  conquering  indolence  and  inertia,  venture 
on  new.  .  .  .  Rash  enthusiast  of  change,  beivare !  Hast  thou 
well  considered  all  that  Habit  does  in  this  life  of  ours? 

Carlyle,  French  Revolution. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   GOSCHEN   MISSION 
November  1876 

Financial  position  in  1863 — And  in  1876 — Suspension  of  payment  of 
Treasury  Bills — Creation  of  the  Commission  of  tlie  Public  Debt — 
Decree  of  May  7, 1876 — The  Goschen  Mission — Decree  of  November 
18,  1876 — Appointment  of  Controllers-General — Sir  Louis  Mallet 
— I  am  appointed  Commissioner  of  the  Public  Debt — Ismail's 
predecessors — Crisis  in  the  career  of  Ismail  Pasha — Accounts 
Department. 

The  origin  of  the  Egyptian  Question  in  its  present 
phase  was  financial. 

In  1863,  when  Said  Pasha  died,  the  public  debt 
of  Egypt  amounted  to  £3,293,000.  Said  Pasha 
was  succeeded  by  Ismail  Pasha,  the  son  of  the 
celebrated  Ibrahim  Pasha,  and  the  grandson  of  the 
still  more  celebrated  Mehemet  Ali. 

In  1876,  the  funded  debt  of  Egypt,  including 
the  Daira  loans,  amounted  to  £68,110,000.  In 
addition  to  this,  there  was  a  floating  debt  of  about 
£26,000,000. 

Roughly  speaking,  it  may  be  said  that  Ismail 
Pasha  added,  on  an  average,  about  £7,000,000  a 
year  for  thirteen  years  to  the  debt  of  Egypt.  For 
all  practical  purposes  it  may  be  said  that  the  whole 
of  the  borrowed  money,  except  £16,000,000  spent 
on  the  Suez  Canal,  was  squandered.^ 

^  Mr.  Cave,  after  making  out  a  balance-sheet  for  the  years  from 
1864  to  1875,  adds :  ''  Two  striking  features  stand  out  in  this  balance- 
sheet,  namely,  that  the  sum  raised  by  revenue,  £94,281,401,  is  little 

11 


12  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

For  some  while  prior  to  the  general  breakdown, 
it  had  been  apparent  that  Ismail  Pasha's  reckless 
administration  of  the  finances  of  the  country  must, 
sooner  or  later,  bring  about  a  financial  collapse. 
Towards  the  latter  part  of  1875  and  the  beginning 
of  1876,  money  was  raised  at  ruinous  rates  of  in- 
terest by  the  issue  of  Treasury  bills.  On  April  8, 
1876,  the  crash  came.  The  Khedive  suspended 
payment  of  his  Treasury  bills. 

Previous  to  the  suspension  of  payment,  some 
discussion  had  taken  place  with  reference  to  the 
creation  of  an  Egyptian  National  Bank,  which  was 
to  be  under  the  control  of  three  European  Com- 
missioners. France  and  Italy  each  agreed  to  select 
a  Commissioner,  but  Lord  Derby,  who  then  pre- 
sided at  the  Foreign  Office,  was  unwilling  to 
interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Egypt,  and 
declined  to  nominate  a  British  Commissioner. 

The  project,  therefore,  dropped,  but  was  shortly 
afterwards  revived  in  a  different  form.  On  JMay  2, 
1876,  a  Khedivial  Decree  was  issued  instituting  a 
Commission  of  the  Public  Debt.  Certain  specific 
duties  were  assigned  to  the  Commissioners,  who 
were  to  act  generally  as  representatives  of  the 
bondholders.  On  ^lay  7,  a  further  Decree  was 
issued  consolidating  the  debt  of  Egypt,  which 
then  amounted  to  £91,000,000. 

M.  de  Blignieres,  Herr  von  Kremer,  a  dis- 
tinguished Orientalist,  and  M.  Baravelli  were 
nominated  to  be  Commissioners  of  the  Debt  at 
the  instance,  respectively,  of  the  French,  Austrian, 
and  Italian  Governments.  The  British  Govern- 
ment declined  to  select  a  Commissioner. 

less  than  that  spent  on  administration,  tribute  to  the  Porte,  works  of 
unquestionable  utility,  and  certain  expenses  of  questionable  utility  or 
policy,  in  all  amountins^  to  £97,240,966,  and  tliat  for  the  present  large 
amount  of  indebtedness  there  is  absolutely  nothing  to  show  but  the 
Suez  Canal,  the  whole  jjroceeds  of  the  loans  and  floating  debt  having 
been  absorbed  in  payment  of  interest  and  ^inking  funds,  with  the 
exception  of  the  sum  debited  to  that  great  worlv." 


can  THE  GOSCHEN  MISSION  13 

The  financial  arrangements  embodied  in  the 
Decree  of  May  7,  1876,  caused  much  dissatisfac- 
tion, especially  in  England,  with  the  result  that 
Mr.  (subsequently  Lord)  Goschen  undertook  a 
mission  to  Egypt  with  a  view  to  obtaining  some 
modifications  which  the  bondholders  considered 
necessary. 

Lord  Goschen,  with  whom  M.  Joubert  was 
associated  to  represent  French  interests,  arrived 
in  Egypt  in  October  1876. 

The  arrangement  negotiated  by  Messrs.  Goschen 
and  Joubert  was  embodied  in  a  Decree,  dated 
November  18,  1876.  The  chief  financial  features 
of  this  arrangement  were  as  follows  : — 

The  loans  of  1864,  1865,  and  1867,  which  had 
been  contracted  before  the  financial  position  of 
the  Khedive  had  become  seriously  embarrassed, 
and  the  capital  of  which  amounted  in  all  to 
about  £4,293,000,  were  taken  out  of  the  Unified 
Debt,  into  which  they  had  been  incorporated 
under  the  Decree  of  May  7,  and  formed  the  subject 
of  a  special  arrangement. 

A  5  per  cent  Preference  Stock,  intended  to 
attract  bona- fide  investors,  w^as  created,  with  a 
capital  of  £17,000,000. 

The  Daira  debts,  amounting  to  about  £8,815,000, 
which  had,  under  the  Decree  of  INIay  7,  been 
mcluded  in  the  Unified  Debt,  were  again  deducted, 
and  ultimately  formed  the  subject  of  a  separate 
arrangement. 

The  capital  of  the  Unified  Debt  was  thus 
reduced  to  £59,000,000.  The  rate  of  interest 
was  fixed  at  6  per  cent,  to  which  a  sinking  fund 
of  1  per  cent  was  added. 

So  far  as  the  effect  produced  on  the  future  of 
Egypt  was  concerned,  the  purely  financial  arrange- 
ments negotiated  by  Lord  Goschen  were  less 
productive  of  result  than  the  changes  which,  under 


14  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.i 

his  advice,  the  Khedive  introduced  into  the 
administration  of  the  country.  It  was  clear  that, 
however  rational  any  Egyptian  financial  combina- 
tion might  be,  it  would  present  but  little  hope 
of  stability  unless  the  fiscal  administration  of  the 
country  was  improved.  It  was,  therefore,  decided 
to  appoint  two  Controllers-General,  one  of  whom 
was  to  supervise  the  revenue,  and  the  other  the 
expenditure.  The  railways  and  the  port  of 
Alexandria,  the  revenues  of  which  were  to  be 
applied  to  the  payment  of  interest  on  the 
Preference  Stock,  were  to  be  administered  by  a 
Board  composed  of  two  Englishmen,  a  Frenchman, 
and  two  Egyptians. 

Mr.  Romaine  was  appointed  Controller-General 
of  the  Revenue  and  the  Baron  de  Malaret 
Controller  -  General  of  Expenditure.  General 
Marriott  was  appointed  President  of  the  Railway 
Board.  Lord  Derby  instructed  Lord  Vivian,  who 
was  at  this  time  British  representative  in  Egypt, 
to  inform  the  Khedive  that  "  Her  Majesty's 
Government  could  not  accept  any  responsibility 
for  these  appointments,  to  which,  however,  they 
had  no  objection  to  offer." 

About  the  same  time,  the  Khedive  applied  to 
Lord  Goschen  to  nominate  an  English  Commis- 
sioner of  the  Public  Debt,  the  British  Government 
having  again  declined  to  assume  the  responsibility 
of  nomination. 

In  May  1876,  I  returned  from  India,  where  I 
had  for  four  years  occupied  the  post  of  Private 
Secretary  to  the  Viceroy,  Lord  Northbrook. 
I  had,  in  connection  with  Indian  affairs,  been 
brought  much  in  contact  with  the  late  Sir  Louis 
Mallet,  who  was  then  Under-Secretary  of  State  at 
the  India  Office. 

I  cannot  pass  by  the  mention  of  Sir  Louis 
Mallet's  name  without  paying  a  tribute  of  respect 


cH.n  THE  GOSCHEN  MISSION  15 

to  his  memory.  To  myself  his  death  was  an 
irreparable  loss.  Whenever  I  visited  England 
during  the  last  few  years  of  his  life,  I  always 
discussed  with  him  the  difficulties  of  the  situation 
in  which  I  was  placed  in  Egypt,  'i'hey  were  at 
one  time  very  great.  Sir  Louis  Mallet  was  not 
personally  acquainted  with  the  details  of  Egyptian 
affairs,  but,  besides  the  intimate  knowledge  which 
he  possessed  of  economic  science,  of  which  he  had 
made  a  special  study,  his  high-minded  attachment 
to  principle  and  his  keen  insight  into  the  forces 
in  motion  in  the  political  world  rendered  his 
advice  of  the  utmost  value.  He  was  the  best 
type  of  the  English  civil  servant ;  a  keen  poli- 
tician but  not  a  political  partisan,  a  trained  official 
without  a  trace  of  the  bureaucratic  element  in 
him,  and  a  man  of  really  liberal  aspirations 
without  being  carried  away  by  the  catchwords 
which  sometimes  attach  themselves  to  what,  from 
a  party  point  of  view,  is  called  liberal  policy  in 
England. 

Lord  Goschen  consulted  Sir  Louis  Mallet  as 
to  whom  he  should  nominate  as  Commissioner 
of  the  Debt  in  Egypt.  Sir  Louis  Mallet  re- 
commended me.  Lord  Goschen  offered  me  the 
post,  which  I  accepted.  I  arrived  in  Egypt  on 
March  2,  1877. 

I  would  here  pause  in  order  to  make  some 
observations  which  are  suggested  by  these  appoint- 
ments. 

This  period  constituted  the  turning-point  of 
Ismail  Pasha's  career.  The  system  of  government 
which  existed  in  Egypt  during  the  pre-reforming 
days  was  very  defective,  but  it  possessed  some 
barbaric  virtues,  and  was  perhaps  more  suited  to 
the  country  than  Europeans,  judging  from  their 
own  standpoint,  are  often  disposed  to  admit. 

Tlie  manufacturers   of  myths  have,  of  course. 


16  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.i 

been  at  work  at  IMehemet  Ali's  career.  They  often 
credit  him  with  ideas  and  intentions  which  were 
absolutely  foreign  to  his  nature.  Nevertheless, 
the  Egyptians  are  right  to  venerate  the  memory 
of  this  rough  man  of  genius,  if  only  for  the 
reason  that  to  him  belonos  the  credit  of  having 
amputated  their  country  from  the  decaying  body 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  thus  giving  it  a  separate 
administrative  existence.  INIoreover,  there  was 
much  in  JMehemet  Ali's  character  which  was  really 
worthy  of  admiration.  He  was  a  brave  and 
capable  soldier.  He  had  some  statesmanlike 
instincts,  and,  though  his  lights  were  rude,  never- 
theless he  used  them  to  the  best  of  his  ability  in 
furthering  the  interests  of  his  adopted  country,  as  he 
understood  those  interests.  He  proceeded  tenta- 
tively along  the  path  of  reform.  He  summoned 
to  Egypt  a  few  Europeans,  mostly  Frenchmen,  of 
high  professional  merit.^  He  founded  the  Poly- 
technic School,  the  School  of  Medicine,  and  some 
other  similar  institutions.  Under  the  direction  of 
JNI.  Jumel,  the  cotton  plant  was  introduced  into 
the  country. 

Sir   John    Bowring,   in    a    report   addressed   to 
Lord  Palmerston  in  1840,  said  : — ^ 

^  One  of  the  predominating  ideas  in  Mehemet  Ali's  mind  was  to  use 
French  as  a  counterpoise  to  British  influence  in  Egypt,  not  because  he 
had  any  particular  love  for  the  French  or  dislike  of  the  English^  but 
because,  with  the  instinct  of  a  true  statesman,  he  foresaw  that  the 
force  of  circumstances  might,  and  probably  would  drive  England 
into  an  aggressive  policy  against  Egypt.  Mr.  Cameron  {Rfn/pt  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century,  p.  105)  says  that  when  the  celebrated  traveller, 
Burckhardt,  visited  Egypt  in  1814,  Mehemet  Ali  "asked  him  about 
England  and  our  plans  in  the  East.  He  dreaded  lest  Wellington 
should  invade  Egypt  with  the  Peninsular  Army.  'The  great  fish 
swallow  the  small,'  he  said  ;  '  1  am  afraid  of  the  English,  and  hope 
they  will  not  attack  Egypt  in  my  absence.  .  .  .  England  must  some 
day  take  Egypt  as  her  share  of  the  spoil  of  the  Turkish  Empire.'" 

2  The  whole  of  this  report,  which  is  but  little  known,  is  well  worthy 
of  perusal  by  any  one  who  takes  an  interest  in  Egyptian  affairs.  The 
history  of  the  early  part  of  Mehemet  Alls  reign  has  been  written  by  a 
contemporary,  Sheikh  Abdul-llahman  ol-Jabarti.  The  Sheikh  wrote 
from  a  strongly  Egyptian,  that  is  to  say  anti-'I'urkish  point  of  view. 


OH.  II  THE  GOSCHEN  MISSION  17 

Egypt  has,  indeed,  received  immense  benefit  from  the 
presence  of  Europeans.  They  have  not  onlv  rendered  direct 
services  by  the  knowledge  they  have  communicated,  but  the 
circumstance  of  their  having  been  so  much  associated  with 
all  the  improvements  which  have  been  introduced  has 
diffused  a  great  respect  for  their  superior  acquirements,  and 
a  toleration  for  their  opinions,  whose  influence  has  been 
spreading  widely  among  the  people. 

But,  although  Mehemet  Ali  dallied  with 
European  civilisation  in  a  manner  which  was  by 
no  means  unintelligent  and  was  far  less  hurtful 
to  his  country  than  that  adopted  by  Said  and 
Ismail,  his  methods  of  government  were,  in  reality, 
wholly  Oriental.  Those  methods  may  be  illustrated 
by  the  following  anecdote,  which  I  give  on  the 
authority  of  Nubar  Pasha. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  which  Mehemet 
Ali  waged  against  the  Porte,  the  Admiral  in 
command  of  the  Turkish  Fleet  in  Egyptian  waters, 
who  was  a  man  of  noted  courage  and  ability,  was 
summoned  to  Constantinople.  He  probably  had 
more  to  gain  than  to  lose  by  deserting  the  Egyptian 
cause.  He  decided,  however,  to  throw  in  liis  lot 
with  Mehemet  Ali.  His  decision  contributed 
materially  to  the  eventual  victory  of  Egypt.  After 
the  war  was  over,  the  Admiral  was  again  summoned 
to  Constantinople.  To  have  obeyed  at  that  time 
would  have  meant  certain  death.  The  Admiral, 
therefore,  remained  at  Cairo,  and,  for  four  years, 
enjoyed  Mehemet  Ali's  protection,  which  he  had 
so  well  deserved.  At  the  end  of  that  period — 
whether  it  was  that  Mehemet  Ali  wished  to 
ingratiate  himself  with  the  Sultan,  who  continued 
to  press  his  request,  or  whether  he  had  for  other 

He  does  justice  to  Mehemet  Ali's  military  qualities,  but  he  gives  an 
unfavourable  account  of  the  condition  of  the  country  and  of  the  system 
of  government  adopted  during  Mehemet  Ali's  time.  See  also  St.  John's 
Egypt  under  Mohammed  All,  published  in  1834,  and  Cameron's  Egypt  in 
the  Nineteenth  Century,  1898. 

VOL.   I  C 


18  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

reasons  become  estranged  from  the  Admiral — he 
determined  to  withdraw  his  protection.  He  sent 
one  of  his  confidential  agents  to  visit  the  Admiral. 
A  short  conversation,  which  it  would  be  difficult 
to  rival  in  pathos  and  dramatic  effect,  ensued.  The 
agent,  after  the  usual  Oriental  compliments,  merely 
said,  '  Life,  O  Admiral,  is  uncertain.  We  must 
all  be  prepared  to  meet  our  death  at  any  moment." 
The  Admiral  at  once  took  the  hint.  He  knew 
what  those  fatal  words  meant.  The  tenets  of  his 
religion  had  taught  him  not  to  resist  the  decrees 
of  fate.  Like  many  a  Stoic  philosoplier  of  Ancient 
Rome,  he  had  probably  at  times  reflected  that  a 
self-inflicted  death  was,  as  a  last  resource,  a  sure 
refuge  from  earthly  tyranny  and  injustice,  however 
galling.  He  merely  asked  for  time  to  say  his 
prayers,  and,  when  these  were  completed,  drank, 
without  complaint  or  remonstrance,  the  poisoned 
cup  of  coffee  which  was  offered  to  him.  On  the 
following  day,  it  was  announced  that  he  had  died 
suddenly  of  apoplexy. 

Ibrahim,  the  son  and  successor  of  JVIehemet  Ali, 
was  a  distinguished  soldier,  and  a  man  of  great 
personal  courage.  It  must  be  added  that  he  was  a 
half-lunatic  savage.  He  it  was  who  commanded 
the  expedition  sent  to  Nejd  against  the  Wahabis. 
A  number  of  orthodox  JNIollahs  accompanied  the 
expedition.  When  the  military  operations  had 
been  terminated  by  the  success  of  the  Egyptian 
arms,  Ibrahim  arranged  that  his  INIollahs  and  the 
religious  leaders  of  the  Wahabi  sect  should  meet 
and  discuss  the  dogmatic  and  ceremonial  points  of 
difference  which  separated  them.  After  the  lapse 
of  three  days,  Ibrahim  inquired  what  had  been  the 
result  of  their  discussions.  He  was  informed  that 
neither  party  had  been  able  to  convert  the  other  to 
its  special  views.  Ibrahim  then  said  that  under  the 
circumstances,  although  he  was  no  theologian,  he 


OH.  II         THE  GOSCHEN  MISSION  19 

must  decide  the  matter  for  himself.  He  ordered  all 
the  religious  leaders  of  the  Wahabi  sect  to  be  killed.^ 

Nubar  Pasha  once  related  to  me  an  episode  in 
his  relations  with  Ibrahim,  which  did  great  credit 
to  his  own  remarkable  conversational  powers.  He 
and  others  were  on  board  a  steamer,  which  was 
conveying  Ibrahim  and  his  suite  from  Constan- 
tinople to  Egypt.  On  nearing  Alexandria,  Nubar 
learnt  that  Ibrahim  had  suddenly  decided  that  the 
members  of  his  suite,  including  Nubar  himself, 
should  be  thrown  overboard.  Thereupon,  Nubar 
went  to  Ibrahim's  cabin,  entirely  ignored  the  fate 
which  awaited  himself  and  his  comrades,  and  began 
to  talk  to  Ibrahim  of  his  campaigns.  Ibrahim  was  so 
much  pleased  at  the  flattery  which  was  abundantly 
administered  to  him,  and  also  so  much  interested  in 
all  that  Nubar  said,  that  for  the  moment  he  forgot 
his  recent  decision.  The  conversation  continued 
until  the  ship  arrived  at  Alexandria.  Thus,  Nubar 
and  his  companions  were  saved. 

Ibrahim  died,  very  shortly  after  his  accession, 
of  pneumonia,  brought  on,  it  is  said,  by  drinking 
two  bottles  of  highly  iced  champagne  at  a  draught 
when  he  was  very  hot.^ 

Abbas,  the  next  Khedive,  was  an  Oriental  despot 
of  the  worst  type.  The  stories  of  his  revolting 
cruelty  are  endless.  There  does  not  appear,  as 
in    the    case    of  his    predecessors,    to    have   been 

'  Palgrave,  Central  and  Easte7~n  Arabia,  vol.  ii.  p.  68. 

2  Mr.  Pickthall,  writing  of  Ibrahim  Pasha's  adminisiration  of  Syria, 
says  :  **The  radicalism  of  Ibrahim  made  his  rule  offensive  to  the  con- 
servative notables  of  Syria.  Still,  he  was  the  kind  of  tyrant  to  appeal 
most  strongly  to  Orientals,  heavy-handed  but  humorous,  knowing  how 
to  impart  to  his  decisions  that  quaint  proverbial  savour  which  dwells  in 
the  mind  of  the  people,  and  makes  good  stories  ;  and  his  fame  among 
the  fellaheen  is  that  of  a  second  Solomon." — Folk-Lore  of  the  Holy  Land, 
Preface,  p.  xvi. 

My  earliest  connection  with  Egyptian  affairs  was,  as  a  child,  being 
one  of  a  large  crowd  waiting  in  St.  tJames's  Park  to  see  Ibraliim  Pasha 

Eass.  This  must  have  been  in  184:6  or  1847.  The  Londoners  called 
im  "Abraham  Parker." 


20  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

any  redeeming  feature  in  his  character.  It  was 
altogether  odious. 

The  main  defects  of  Said  Pasha,  who  succeeded 
Abbas,  were  excessive  vanity  and  hopeless  in- 
capacity in  the  art  of  government.  His  follies 
were  duly  chronicled  by  Mr.  Senior,  who  visited 
Egypt  during  his  reign.  Although  less  ferocious 
than  his  immediate  predecessor,  he  occasionally 
committed  acts  which  would  be  considered 
extremely  cruel,  had  their  iniquity  not  been  out- 
rivalled  by  the  deeds  of  Abbas. 

I  hesitate  to  relate  the  numerous  stories  which 
have  been  handed  down  to  posterity  about  Abbas 
and  Said.  At  this  distance  of  time,  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  say  how  far  they  are  true,  and 
inasmuch  as  most  of  them  bring  out  the  characters 
of  both  of  these  princes  in  a  highly  unpleasant 
light,  it  is  merely  an  act  of  posthumous  justice  to 
their  memories  not  to  relate  them,  unless  their 
truth  can  be  substantiated  by  absolutely  trust- 
worthy evidence.  The  following,  however,  sup- 
posing it  to  be  true— and  it  is  not  at  all  im- 
probable— is  relatively  innocuous,  and,  moreover, 
is  so  highly  illustrative  of  the  manner  in  which 
Oriental  despots  occasionally  jump  from  an  extreme 
of  injustice  to  a  prodigality  of  generous  munificence 
that  I  need  not  refrain  from  relating  it.  On  one 
occasion.  Said  was  coming  in  a  steamer  from 
the  Barrage  to  Cairo.  The  Nile  was  low,  and  the 
steamer  stuck  in  the  mud.  Said  ordered  the  i'eis 
(steersman)  to  receive  a  hundred  blows  Avith  the 
courbash.  These  were  administered.  The  steamer 
was  got  off  the  mud,  and  proceeded  on  her  journey. 
Shortly  afterwards,  she  stuck  again.  Said  roared 
out:  "Give  him  two  hundred,"  whereupon  the 
unfortunate  rels  made  a  rush,  and  jumped  over- 
board. A  boat  was  put  off,  and  he  was  brought 
back  to  the  steamer.     Said  asked  him  why  he  had 


OH.  II         THE  GOSCHEN  MISSION  21 

jumped  overboard.  The  man  explained  that  he 
preferred  to  run  the  risk  of  death  by  drowning  to 
the  agony  caused  by  another  flogging.  "  Fool," 
exclaimed  Said,  "when  I  said  two  hundred,  I  did 
not  mean  lashes,  but  sovereigns."  And,  accord- 
ingly, the  man  received  a  bag  containing  that 
amount  of  money.  Eastern  history  abounds  with 
episodes  of  this  sort.  Moreover,  the  minds  of 
Orientals  are  so  peculiarly  constituted  that  many 
of  them  would  probably  be  far  more  struck  with 
the  generosity  of  the  gift  than  with  the  cruelty 
and  injustice  of  the  flogging. 

Said  occasionally  indulged  in  the  most  insane 
freaks.  Thus,  in  order  to  prove  his  courage,  which 
had  been  called  in  question  by  the  European  press, 
it  is  said  that  he  caused  a  kilometre  of  road  to  be 
strewn  a  foot  deep  with  gunpowder.  He  then 
walked  solemnly  along  the  road  smoking  a  pipe, 
and  accompanied  by  a  numerous  suite,  all  of  whom 
were  ordered  to  smoke, — severe  penalties  being 
threatened  against  any  one  whose  pipe  was  not 
found  alight  at  the  end  of  the  promenade. 

It  was  Said  who  first  invited  European  adven- 
turers to  prey  on  Egypt.  Nubar  Pasha,  who  could 
speak  with  authority  on  this  subject,  used  to  say : 
"C'est  au  temps  de  Said  qie  le  commencement  de 
la  debacle  a  eu  lieu."  Intelligent  observers  on  the 
spot  were  already  able  to  foretell  the  storm  which 
was  eventually  to  burst  over  Egypt.  In  1855, 
Mr.  Walne,  the  British  Consul  at  Cairo,  said  to 
Mr.  Senior: — 

Said  Pasha  is  rash  and  flighty  and  conceited,  and  is  spoilt 
by  the  flattery  of  the  foreigners  who  surround  him.  They 
tell  him,  and  he  believes  them,  that  he  is  a  universal  genius. 
He  undoes  everything,  does  very  Httle,  and,  I  fear,  is  pre- 
paring for  us  some  great  catastrophe.^ 

*  Senior's  Conversations  and  Journals  in  Egypt,  vol.  i.  p.  181.  An 
account  of  Egypt  under  Said  F-isha  is  given  in  Dr.  Stacquey's  work 
published  in  1865,  and  entitled  L'Egypte,  La  Basse  Nubie  et  le  iinai 


22  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

These,  and  many  other  similar  anecdotes  which 
might  be  related,  serve  to  illustrate  the  methods 
of  government  which  prevailed  in  Egypt  im- 
mediately prior  to  the  accession  of  Ismail  Pasha. 
The  drastic  nature  of  those  methods,  and  more 
especially  of  the  punishments  which  the  rulers  of 
Egypt  were  in  the  habit  of  awarding  during  the 
first  half  of  the  last  century,  and  even  at  a  later 
period,  did  not,  indeed,  differ  very  materially  from 
those  of  their  Pharaonic  predecessors.  Herodotus 
says : — 

King  Amasis  .  .  .  established  the  law  that  every 
Egyptian  should  appear  once  a  year  before  the  governor 
of  his  canton,  and  show  his  means  of  living ;  or,  failing  to 
do  so,  and  to  prove  that  he  got  an  honest  livelihood,  should 
be  put  to  death. ^ 

If  the  general  principles  adopted  by  Mehemet 
Ali  had  continued  to  be  applied,  and  especially  if 
recourse  had  not  been  made  to  European  credit, 
it  is  just  possible  that  the  Egyptian  system  of 
administration  would  have  been  gradually  reformed 
in  a  manner  suitable  to  the  requirements  of  the 
country.  But  it  is  one  of  the  commonplaces  of 
political  science  that  the  most  dangerous  period 
for  a  radically  bad  system  of  government  is  the 
moment  when  some  reformer,  himself  inexperi- 
enced in  the  art  of  government,  has  laid  a  rash 
hand  on  the  old  fabric,  and  has  shaken  it  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  make  it  totter  to  its  fall, 
but  when  sufficient  time  has  not  yet  elapsed  to 
admit  of  an  improved  system  of  government 
taking  root. 

In    the    endeavours,    possibly   well-intentioned, 

*  Book  ii.  p.  177.  After  remarking  that  Solon  the  Athenian 
borrowed  this  law  from  the  Egyptians  and  imposed  it  on  his  country- 
men— a  statement  which,  according  to  a  note  given  by  llawlinson, 
is  incorrect — Herodotus  naively  adds,  **It  is  indeed  an  excellent 
custom." 


CH.II         THE  GOSCHEN  MISSION  23 

but  certainly  misdirected,  that  Ismail  Pasha  made 
to  introduce  European  civilisation  at  a  rapid  rate 
into  Egypt,  he  was  necessarily  obliged  to  have 
recourse  to  European  assistance.  The  only  chance 
of  introducing  the  new  wine  of  European  ideas 
into  the  old  bottles  of  Eastern  conservatism,  with- 
out producing  a  dangerous  fermentation,  lay  in 
proceeding  with  caution,  and  notably  in  selecting 
with  the  utmost  care  the  European  agents  through 
whose  instrumentality  the  changes  might  gradually 
have  been  effected.  Unfortunately,  no  such  care  was 
taken.  The  Europeans  into  whose  hands  Ismail 
Pasha  threw  himself,  were  but  too  often  drawn  from 
the  very  class  which  he  should  most  of  all  have 
avoided.^  Many  were  adventurers  of  the  type 
represented  in  fiction  by  M.  Alphonse  Daudet's 
**  Nabab,"  ^  whose  sole  object  was  to  enrich  them- 
selves at  the  expense  of  the  country.  Moreover, 
few  of  those  who  exercised  any  influence  in  matters 
connected  with  the  government  of  Egypt  possessed 
sufficient  experience  of  the  East  to  enable  them 
to  apply  wisely  the  knowledge,  which  they  had 
acquired  elsewhere,  to  the  new  conditions  under 
which  they  were  called  upon  to  work. 

The  result  was  that  Europeans  acquired  a  bad 
name  in  Egypt,  from  which,  after  years  of  patient 
labour  and  instructive  example  on  the  part  of  the 
many  high-minded  Europeans  of  divers  nationalities 
who  were  subsequently  engaged  in  Egyptian  work, 
they  only  gradually  recovered.  It  was,  moreover, 
impossible  that  constant  association  with  the  classes 
to  which  allusion  is  made  above  should  not  have 
produced  a  marked  effect  on  the  views  of  an  astute, 

^  A  hifi^hly  qualified  authority,  who  wrote  under  the  pseudonym  of 
"Odysseus,"  saj^s  :  "  From  tlieir  first  appearance,  the  Turks  displayed 
a  strange  power  of  collecting  togetlier  apostates,  renegades,  and  people 
who  had  more  ability  than  moral  qualities." — Turkey  in  Europe,  p.  02. 

2  It  is  well  known  tliat  the  character  of  the  Nabab  was  drawn  from  an 
individual  who  existed  in  Egjpt  not  many  jears  ago. 


24  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

but  superficial  cynic  such  as  Ismail  Pasha.  He 
has  often  been  credited  with  having  systematically 
based  his  conduct  on  the  assumption  that  no 
man  living  was  honest,^  and,  looking  at  the 
personal  experience  through  which  he  passed,  it 
cannot  be  a  matter  for  surprise  that  he  should 
have  entertained  such  an  opinion. 

The  result  of  Lord  Goschen's  mission  was  that 
Ismail  Pasha  had,  for  the  first  time,  to  deal  with  a 
small  body  of  European  officials,  who  were  not  only 
invested  with  more  ample  powers  than  any  which 
had  previously  been  conferred  on  European  function- 
aries in  Egypt,  but  who  were  also  of  a  different 
type  from  those  Europeans  with  whom  he  had 
heretofore  been  generally  brought  in  contact.  I 
do  not  claim  for  the  European  officials  who,  at  or 
about  this  time,  came  to  Egypt  any  special  qualities 
which  are  not  to  be  found  in  abundance  amongst 
other  members  of  the  civil  services  of  France  and 
England.  We  displayed,  I  conceive,  the  ordinary 
variety  of  capacity  and  character  which  was  to  be 
anticipated  from  our  previous  training,  and  from 
the  manner  in  which  we  had  been  selected.  But 
we  all  possessed  some  characteristics  in  common. 
We  were  all  honest.  We  were  all  capable  of 
forming  and  of  expressing  independent  opinions, 
and  we  were  all  determined  to  do  our  duty  to  the 
best  of  our  abilities  in  the  discharge  of  the  functions 
which  were  respectively  assigned  to  us.  In  one 
respect,  the  position  of  the  British  differed  from 
that  of  the  French  officials.  The  latter  had  been 
selected,  and  were  more  or  less  avowedly  supported 
by  their  Government.     The  British  officials  could 

1  Macaulay  says  of  Charles  II.  :  "  According-  to  him,  every  person 
was  to  he  hought ;  hut  some  people  haggled  more  about  their  price 
than  others ;  and  when  this  haggling  was  very  obstinate  and  very 
skilful,  it  was  called  by  some  fine  name.  The  chief  trick  by  which 
clever  men  kept  up  the  price  of  their  abilities  was  called  'integrity'" 
(Work.'i,  vol.  i.  p.  132).  Tiiis  passage  probaldy  describes  Ismail  Pasha's 
habit  of  thought  with  tolerable  accuracy. 


CH.II  THE  GOSCHEN  MISSION  25 

not  count  on  any  such  support.  But  the  distinction 
was  of  less  practical  importance  than  might  at  first 
sight  appear.  It  was  well  understood  that,  if  the 
British  officials  found  that  their  advice  was  system- 
atically neglected,  and  that  they  could  not,  with 
a  proper  sense  of  what  was  due  to  their  own  self- 
respect,  carry  on  their  duties  in  a  fairly  satisfactory 
manner,  they  would  resign  their  appointments,  a 
course  which  would  not  only  have  caused  a  good 
deal  of  embarrassment,  but  would  also  have 
strengthened  the  hostile  public  opinion  then 
clamouring  against  the  existing  regime  in  Egypt  in 
terms  which  were  daily  becoming  more  menacing. 

Ismail  Pasha  failed  to  recognise  the  importance 
of  the  changes  to  which  he  had  assented.  Had  he 
succeeded  in  acquiring  the  confidence  of  this  small 
body  of  European  officials,  and  in  enlisting  their 
services  on  his  side,  it  is  not  only  possible,  but  even 
probable,  that  he  would  have  remained  Khedive  of 
Egypt  till  the  day  of  his  death.  But,  for  a  variety 
of  reasons,  which  will  appear  more  fully  in  the 
sequel  of  this  narrative,  he  failed  to  do  so.  Perhaps 
the  difficulties  of  tlie  situation  were  sucli  that  it 
was  impossible  for  him  to  do  so.  The  result  was 
that  the  officials  in  question  were  necessarily  thrown 
into  an  attitude  of  hostility.  And  the  further  result 
was  that  a  series  of  events  took  place  which  in  the 
end  led  to  the  downfall  of  the  Khedive.  In  fact, 
an  opportunity,  such  as  sometimes  presents  itself 
in  politics,  then  occurred,  which,  had  it  been  skil- 
fully used  with  a  true  insight  into  the  main  facts 
of  the  situation  and  into  the  direction  to  which 
affairs  were  drifting,  might  not  impossibly  have 
turned  the  current  of  Egy})tian  history  into  anotlier 
channel,  and  might  have  saved  the  Khedive  from 
the  disaster  which  was  impending  over  him.  Such 
opportunities,  if  they  are  not  grasped  at  the  uK^ncnt, 
rarely  recur.     As  it  was,  the  causes  which  were 


26  MODERN  EGYPT  rr.  i 

tending:  towards  the  downfall  of  the  Khedive  con- 
tinned  to  operate  unchecked,  and  the  new  European 
element  introduced  into  the  administration,  far 
from  impeding,  hastened  the  advent  of  the  crisis. 

One  of  the  appointments  made  at  this  time, 
namely,  that  of  Sir  Gerald  Fitzgerald  to  the  head 
of  the  Accounts  Department,  calls  for  some  special 
remarks. 

It  is  possible  for  the  finances  of  a  country  to  be 
badly  administered,  whilst,  at  the  same  time,  the 
accounts  may  be  in  good  order.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  impossible  for  the  statesman  or  the 
financier  to  commence  the  work  of  fiscal  and 
administrative  reform  seriously  until,  by  the  organ- 
isation of  a  proper  Department  of  Accounts,  he  is 
placed  in  possession  of  the  true  facts  connected 
with  the  resources  at  his  disposal  and  the  State 
expenditure. 

In  1876,  the  Egyptian  accounts  were  in  a  state 
of  the  utmost  confusion.  The  main  reason  why 
the  financial  settlement  made  in  1876  broke  down 
was  that  the  materials  out  of  which  to  construct 
any  stable  financial  edifice  were  wanting.  The 
Finance  Minister,  Ismail  Pasha  Sadik,  who  was 
exiled  in  November  1876,  and  who,  shortly  after- 
wards, met  with  a  tragic  death,^  boasted  that  in 
one  year  he  had  extracted  £15,000,000  from 
the  people  of  Egypt.  The  revenue  collected  in 
1875  is  said  to  have  amounted  to  £10,800,000. 
The  financial  combination  of  November  18,  1876, 
was  based  on  the  collection  of  a  revenue  amounting 
to  £10,500,000.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this 
estimate  was  excessive.  Twenty  years  later,  after 
a  long  period  of  honest  and  careful  administra- 
tion, the  Egyptian  revenue  was  only  about 
£11,000,000. 

*  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Ismail  Paaha  Sadik  was  murdered  in  a 
boat  whilst  proceeding  up  the  Nile. 


CH.  II         THE  GOSCHEN  MISSION  27 

In  1876,  it  was,  indeed,  impossible  to  arrive  at 
a  true  estimate  of  the  revenue.  The  inquiries  of 
Messrs.  Goschen  and  Joubert,  Lord  Vivian  reported, 
"  soon  disclosed  false  accounts,  glaring  discrepancies, 
and  evident  suppressions  of  sources  of  revenue."  It 
was  this  which,  more  than  anything  else,  hampered 
Lord  Goschen's  proceedings.  He  saw  that  until 
more  light  was  thrown  on  the  facts  connected 
with  Egyptian  finance,  any  arrangement  which 
could  be  made  would  have  to  be  of  a  provisional 
character. 

I  give  one  instance  of  the  difficulties  which  at 
that  time  had  to  be  encountered  in  arrivhig  at  a 
true  estimate  of  the  Egyptian  revenue.  Relying 
on  the  only  figures  which  were  at  the  time  avail- 
able, Lord  Goschen  took  the  net  railway  receipts  at 
£900,000  a  year.  Some  time  afterwards,  it  was  dis- 
covered that,  to  the  extent  of  £300,000  a  year,  these 
receipts  were  fictitious.  In  the  first  place,  a  con- 
siderable sum  was  paid  every  year  for  the  movement 
of  troops,  an  item  which,  under  a  well-regulated 
system  of  accounts,  would  have  been  shown  as  an 
inter  -  departmental  transaction.  In  the  second 
place,  it  was  discovered  that  any  of  the  Khedivial 
family  or  the  friends  and  boon  companions  of  the 
Khedive  who  wished  to  travel  by  rail,  rarely  went 
by  the  ordinary  trains.  They  frequently  ordered 
special  trains,  for  which  they  paid  nothing,  merely 
signing  a  document,  termed  a  "  ragaa,"  intimating 
that  the  train  had  been  ordered  by  the  Khedive, 
and  that  its  cost  was  to  be  charged  to  him.  Tiie 
money  was,  of  course,  never  paid  to  the  Railway 
Administration.  Nevertheless,  these  book  entries 
were  treated  as  real  receipts  in  the  figures  furnished 
to  Lord  Goschen. 

It  was  obvious  that,  under  such  circumstances  as 
these,  the  first  elementary  requirement,  which  would 
have  to  precede  any  attempt  to  reform  the  fiscal 


28  MODERN  EGYPT  it.  i 

system,  was  to  introduce  order  into  the  Accounts 
Department.  Tliis  work  was  undertaken  by  Sir 
Gerald  Fitzgerald,  who,  by  dint  of  untiring  industry 
and  perseverance,  overcame  all  the  very  formidable 
obstacles  which  he  had  to  encounter.  The  Egyptian 
Accounts  Department  is  now  thoroughly  well 
organised.  It  would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate 
the  importance  of  this  achievement.  Of  the  many 
Englishmen  who,  by  steady  and  unostentatious  work, 
have  rendered  good  service  to  the  cause  of  Egyp- 
tian reform,  there  is  no  one  to  whom  greater  merit 
can  be  assigned  than  Sir  Gerald  Fitziierald.  He 
did  not  take  any  personal  part  in  the  reforms  them- 
selves, but  he  performed  work  which  was  indis- 
pensable to  others  if  the  reforms  were  to  be  carried 
out.  The  kind  of  work  which  Sir  Gerald  Fitzgerald 
and  his  successors  performed  in  Egypt  does  not 
attract  much  public  attention,  but  those  who  have 
themselves  filled  responsible  positions  will  appre- 
ciate its  value. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    COMMISSION    OF    INQUIRY 
November  1876-April  1878 

Condition  of  Egypt — The  law  of  the  Moukabala— Petty  taxes — The 
Egyptian  public  service — The  fiscal  system  —  Floating  debt — 
Efforts  to  pay  interest  on  the  funded  debt — Famine — The  coupon 
of  May  1,  1878 — The  Commissioners  of  the  Debt— The  Commis- 
sion of  Inquiry  —  The  Khedive  proposes  a  partial  inquiry — 
The  Commissioners  decline  to  take  part  in  it  —  The  Khedive 
accepts  a  full  inquiry. 

The  state  of  Egypt  at  this  time  was  deplorable. 
Estates,  representing  about  one-fifth  of  the  arable 
lands  of  the  country,  had  passed  into  tlie  hands  of 
the  Khedive ;  and  these  estates,  instead  of  being 
farmed  out  to  the  dispossessed  proprietors,  were 
administered  direct  by  the  Khedive  and  cultivated 
to  a  great  extent  by  forced  labour.  No  single 
measure  contributed  more  than  this  to  render  the 
existing  regime  as  intolerable  to  the  people  of 
Egypt  as  it  was  rapidly  becoming  to  the  foreign 
creditors.^ 

In  1872,  the  law  of  the  Moukabala  had  been 
passed.  By  this  law,  all  landowners  could  redeem 
one-half  of  the  land-tax  to  which  they  were  liable 
by  payment  of  six  years'  tax,  eitlier  in  one  sum  or 

'  ''  It  is  certain,  so   many  overthrown  estates,  so  many  votes  for 
troubles.      Lucan  noteth  w  ell  the  state  of  Rome  before  the  Civil  War  : 
Hinc  usura  vorax,  rapidumque  in  tempore  foenus, 
Hinc  concussa  tides,  et  multis  utile  bellum." 

Bacon's  E.s.sai/x,  "  Of  Seditious  and  Troubles." 
•29 


30  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

in  instalments  spread  over  a  period  of  twelve  years. 
'*  The  operation  of  the  law  of  the  Moukabala," 
Mr.  Cave  said,  "is  perhaps  the  most  striking 
instance  of  the  reckless  manner  in  wliich  the  means 
of  the  future  have  been  sacrificed  to  meet  the 
pressing  needs  of  the  present." 

This  is  quite  true,  but  the  explanation  is  also 
very  simple.  There  was  never  the  least  intention  to 
adhere  to  the  engagements  taken  towards  the  land- 
owners. When  the  proper  time  arrived,  it  was 
intended  to  find  means  for  re-imposing  taxation 
in  some  other  form,  and  thus  recoup  the  loss  to 
the  Treasury  incurred  by  the  partial  redemption  of 
the  land-tax. 

Besides  the  land  -  tax,  which  was  the  main 
resource  of  the  country,  a  number  of  petty  taxes 
of  the  most  harassing  nature  were  levied.  I  gave 
Lord  Vivian  a  list  of  thirty-seven  of  such  taxes, 
and  I  doubt  if  the  list  was  complete. 

The  evil  consequences,  which  would  in  any  case 
have  resulted  from  a  defective  fiscal  system,  were 
enhanced  by  the  character  of  the  agents  through 
whose  instrumentality  the  taxes  were  collected. 
It  can  be  no  matter  for  surprise  that  they  were 
corrupt  and  oppressive,  and  scarcely,  indeed,  a 
matter  for  just  blame;  for  the  treatment,  which 
they  received  at  the  hands  of  the  Government 
whom  they  served,  was  such  as  to  be  almost  pro- 
hibitive of  integrity  in  the  performance  of  official 
duties.  The  picture,  which  Mr.  Cave  gave  of  the 
position  held  by  the  Egyptian  officials  at  this  time, 
was  certainly  not  overdrawn.  "  One  of  the  causes," 
he  said,  "  which  operates  most  against  the  honesty 
and  efficiency  of  native  officers  is  the  precarious 
tenure  of  office.  From  the  Pasha  downwards, 
every  office  is  a  tenancy  at  will,  and  experience 
shows  that  while  dishonesty  goes  wholly  or  par- 
tially  unpunished,  independence   of  thought   and 


CH.III      COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY  31 

action,  resolution  to  do  one's  duty  and  to  resist 
the  peculation  and  neglect  which  pervade  every 
department,  give  rise  to  intrigues  which,  sooner 
or  later,  bring  about  the  downfall  of  honest  officials; 
consequently,  those  who  begin  with  a  desire  to  do 
their  duty  give  way  before  the  obstructiveness 
which  paralyses  every  effort.^  The  public  servant 
of  Egypt,  like  the  Roman  Proconsul,  too  often 
tries  to  make  as  much  as  he  can  out  of  his  office 
while  it  lasts ;  and  the  scandal  takes  place  of  the 
retirement,  in  a  few  years  with  a  large  fortune,  of 
a  man  whose  salary  is  perhaps  £40  a  month,  and 
who  has  plundered  the  Treasury  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  peasant  on  the  other." 

In  fact,  the  fiscal  system  of  Egypt  at  this  time 
violated  at  every  point  and  in  a  flagrant  degree  the 
four  well-known  general  principles  laid  down  by 
Adam  Smith  and  adopted  by  subsequent  econo- 
mists,^ as  those  on  which  a  sound  fiscal  policy 
should  be  based.  Glaring  inequalities  existed  in 
the  incidence  of  taxation.  The  sums  demanded 
from  the  taxpayers  were  arbitrarily  fixed  and  were 

^  I  can  give  a  remarkable  illustration,  the  facts  of  which  are  within 
my  personal  knowledge,  in  support  of  Mr.  Cave's  statement.  Shortly 
after  the  Commission  of  the  Debt  was  established  in  1876,  it  was  noticed 
that  the  Custom-House  receipts  at  Suez,  which  were  applied  to  the  service 
of  the  debt,  fell  off  in  a  most  unaccountable  manner  ;  also,  that  a  new 
local  director  had  been  appointed.  Under  the  iJecree  signed  by  the 
Khedive  on  November  18, 1876,  the  whole  of  the  Custom-House  revenue 
was  to  be  paid  direct  to  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt.  No  other  receipt 
than  that  signed  by  one  of  the  Commissioners  was  legally  valid.  The 
suspicions  of  the  Commissioners  were  aroused,  lliey  asked  why  the 
director  had  been  changed.  They  received  evasive  and  very  unsatis- 
factory answers.  They  insisted,  therefore,  on  the  dismissed  official  being 
produced,  dead  or  alive.  A  somewhat  acrimonious  correspondence  took 
place,  with  the  result  that  after  a  delay  of  several  months  the  official  in 
question  made  his  appearance  at  the  office  of  the  Commissioners  of  the 
Debt.  It  then  appeared  that  he  had  received  an  order  from  the  Khedive 
to  pay  the  Suez  Custom-House  receipts  direct  to  His  Highness.  He 
demurred,  on  the  very  legitimate  ground  that  he  would  thus  be  com- 
mitting an  illegal  act.  He  was  at  once  arrested  and  sent  to  one  of  the 
most  remote  parts  of  the  Soudan,  whence  he  would  certainly  never  hava 
returned,  had  it  not  been  that  the  Commissioners  took  up  his  case. 

*  Adam  Smith,  Wealth  oj'  Nations,  bk.  v.  chap.  ii. 


32  INIODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

uncertain  in  amount.  Tlie  taxes  were  levied  with- 
out any  reference  to  tlie  time  and  manner  in  which 
it  was  most  convenient  for  the  contributor  to  pay, 
and  the  system  of  collection,  so  far  from  being 
"  contrived  so  as  to  keep  out  of  the  pockets  of  the 
people  as  little  as  possible  over  and  above  what  the 
tax  brings  into  tlie  public  treasury,"  was  sucli  as  to 
ensure  results  of  a  diametrically  opposite  descrip- 
tion. Under  such  circumstances,  financial  policy, 
instead  of  being  used  as  a  powerful  engine  of 
political  and  social  improvement,  had  become 
merely  a  means  for  first  extorting  the  maximum 
amount  of  revenue  from  unwilling  contributors, 
and  then  spending  tlie  money  on  objects  from 
which  the  contributors  themselves  derived  little 
or  no  benefit. 

A  system  such  as  that  described  above  would  at 
any  time  have  been  oppressive.  At  the  particular 
moment  of  which  this  history  treats,  it  weighed  on 
the  people  of  Egypt  with  exceptional  severity. 

The  interest  on  the  funded  debt,  heavy  as  it 
was,  was  not  the  only  extraordinary  charge  which 
the  Khedive  had  to  meet.  Large  sums  of  money 
were  due  to  contractors  and  others  for  goods 
supplied  to  the  Egyptian  Government.  In  default 
of  payment,  "  orders  h;id  been  given  by  all  foreign 
houses  trading  with  Egypt  to  refuse  to  furnish  the 
Government  with  any  supplies  except  for  payment 
in  cash  on  delivery."  The  claims  themselves  were 
*'  being  hawked  about  for  sale  at  a  depreciation  of 
50  per  cent." 

In  August  1877,  Lord  Vivian  warned  the 
Egyptian  Government  that  the  creditors  "would 
certainly  fall  back  upon  their  indisputable  right 
to  attack  the  Government  before  the  Tribunals." 
"The  Government,"  he  added,  "will  thus  find 
themselves  confronted  with  a  mass  of  legal 
sentences   against   them,  which   they  must  either 


OH.  Ill       COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY  33 

satisfy  in  full  and  at  once,  or  it  must  inevitably 
attract  the  serious  attention  of  the  Powers  who 
contributed  to  establish  the  Courts  of  the  Reform." 

But  the  Egyptian  Government  had  no  money 
with  which  to  settle  the  claims ;  neither,  in  the 
then  exhausted  state  of  their  credit,  could  money  be 
borrowed.  Lord  Vivian  prophesied  correctly.  The 
creditors  had  recourse  to  the  law-courts.  Many  of 
them  obtained  judgments  against  the  Government, 
and  the  non-execution  of  the  judgments  led  to  the 
interference  of  the  Powers  under  whose  auspices 
the  Mixed  Courts  had  but  recently  been  estab- 
lished. Notably,  the  German  Government  **  con- 
sidered that  the  Khedive  was  acting  in  a  manner 
which  should  not  be  allowed  in  refusing  to  pay 
claims  when  required  to  do  so  by  the  Courts  of 
Law."  The  German  Ambassador  in  London  in- 
formed Lord  Derby  that  *'  Prince  Bismarck  wished 
for  united  action  on  the  subject  by  all  the  Powers, 
if  only  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  separate  action 
on  the  part  of  some  of  them." 

In  the  meanwhile,  everything  was  being  sacri- 
ficed in  the  attempt  to  pay  the  interest  and  sinking 
fund  on  the  funded  debt.  A  sum  of  £1,579,000  was, 
in  1877,  devoted  to  the  extinction  of  debt.  The 
nominal  capital  paid  off  amounted  to  £3,110,000, 
but,  as  both  Lord  Vivian  and  the  Commissioners 
of  the  Debt  pointed  out,  the  operation  of  the  sink- 
ing fund  was  of  a  delusive  character,  for  a  debt, 
at  least  equal  in  amount  to  that  which  was  ex- 
tinguished, was  being  created  by  the  non-payment 
of  the  employes  and  the  other  creditors,  whose 
claims  had  not  been  funded.  On  January  6, 
1877,  Lord  Vivian  wrote:  "The  Government  em- 
ployes are  many  months  in  arrears  of  pay,  so  much 
so  that  the  cashiers  of  the  Caisse  are  actually  being 
paid  out  of  the  private  means  of  the  Commissioners 
(although  their  own  salaries  have  not  been  paid), 

VOL.  I  D 


34  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

in  order  not  to  expose  tliem  to  the  temptation  of 
handling  large  sums  of  money  whilst  actually  with- 
out the  means  of  subsistence." 

While,  on  the  one  hand,  the  employes  were 
unpaid,  on  the  other  hand,  the  taxes  were  being 
collected  with  merciless  severity.  Lord  Vivian, 
whose  despatches  throughout  this  period  do  credit 
alike  to  his  humanity  and  his  foresight,  felt  keenly 
on  this  subject.  *'I  hear,"  he  wrote,  "reports  that 
the  peasantry  are  cruelly  treated  to  extract  the 
taxes  from  them,  the  fact  probably  being,  partly 
that  the  taxes  are  being  collected  in  advance,  and 
partly  that,  as  the  date  of  the  coupon  falls  so  soon 
after  the  harvest,  insufRcient  time  is  given  to  the 
peasantry  to  realise  fair  prices  for  their  grain,  and 
that  they  are  unwilling  to  make  the  ruinous  sacri- 
fice of  forced  sales."  The  Khedive,  in  conversation 
with  Lord  Vivian,  "  admitted  that,  in  order  to  pay 
the  coupon,  the  taxes  were  being  collected  for  nine 
months,  and  in  some  places  for  a  year  in  advance." 

In  spite  of  the  rigour  used  in  collecting  taxes, 
the  non-payment  of  the  Goverimient  employes,  and 
the  neglect  of  the  judgment  creditors,  it  was  with 
the  utmost  difficulty  that  sufficient  money  could 
be  obtained  to  pay  the  interest  on  the  funded  debt. 
During  the  year  ending  on  July  15,  1877,  the 
revenue  pledged  to  the  service  of  the  Unified  Debt, 
which  had  been  estimated  to  yield  £4,800,000, 
only  yielded  £3,328,000. 

It  is  well-nigh  certain  that  the  financial  arrange- 
ment made  in  1876  would,  in  any  case,  have  broken 
down.  As  it  was,  an  exceptionally  bad  Nile,  the 
Russo-Turkish  War  with  its  attendant  expenditure, 
and  the  depression  of  trade,  hastened  the  crisis. 

Bad  as  was  the  state  of  affairs  in  1877,  it  was 
worse  in  1878,  for  the  full  effect  of  the  low  Nile 
of  1877  was  only  felt  in  the  following  year.  In 
Upper  Egypt  there  was  a  famine.     Sir  Alexander 


OH.  Ill      COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY  35 

Baird,  who  had  been  a  frequent  visitor  to  Egypt 
during  the  winter  months,  was  asked  by  the 
Government  to  assist  in  the  rehef  of  the  popula- 
tion. In  the  report  which  he  subsequently 
addressed  to  the  Minister  of  Finance,  he  said  : — 

It  is  almost  incredible  the  distances  travelled  by  women 
and  children,  begging  from  village  to  village.  ...  It  is  not 
possible  to  state  how  many  died  from  actual  starvation,  for 
in  no  instance  does  the  death -register  show  a  death  by 
starvation,  but  I  am  satisfied  that  the  excessive  mortality 
during  the  period  of  scarcity  was  caused  by  dysentery  and 
other  diseases  brought  on  by  insufficient  and  unwholesome 
food.  The  poor  were  in  some  instances  reduced  to  such 
extremities  of  hunger  that  they  were  driven  to  satisfy  their 
cravings  with  the  refuse  and  garbage  of  the  streets. 

The  nadir  both  of  financial  chaos  and  of  popular 
misery  was  reached  in  the  summer  and  autumn  of 
1878.  On  May  1,  1878,  a  sum  of  about  £2,000,000 
was  due  for  interest  on  the  Unified  Debt.  On 
March  31,  only  about  £500,000  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt.  The  balance, 
amounting  to  about  £1,500,000,  had,  therefore,  to 
be  collected  in  the  space  of  one  month. 

The  Commissioners  of  the  Debt  were  of  opinion 
that  it  would  have  been  better  not  to  pay  this 
coupon.  We  should  have  preferred  to  allow  the 
financial  collapse,  which  was  manifestly  inevitable, 
to  come  at  once  as  a  preliminary  to  the  establish- 
ment of  a  better  order  of  things.  We  were  aware 
that  the  money  could  not  be  paid  without  taking 
the  taxes  in  advance,  a  course  to  which  we  were 
opposed  as  being  oppressive  to  the  peasantry,  and 
also  contrary  to  the  true  interests  of  the  bondholders. 
Not  only,  therefore,  did  we  abstain  from  putting  any 
pressure  on  the  Khedive  to  pay,  but  we  even  dis- 
cussed the  desirability  of  protesting  against  payment. 

Unfortunately,  the  French  Government  did  not 
share  this  view.     French  public  opinion  held  that 


86  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

the  Khedive  could  pay  his  debts  if  he  chose  to  do 
so,  that  the  distress  alleged  to  exist  in  Egypt  was 
fictitious,  and  that  the  arguments  based  on  the 
impoverishment  of  the  country  were  fabricated  in 
order  to  throw  dust  in  the  eyes  of  the  public  and 
to  excite  humanitarian  sympathy  where  no  sym- 
pathy was  deserved.  An  opinion  was  also  enter- 
tained by  a  large  body  of  the  French  public  that 
the  Khedive  had  hidden  stores  of  wealth  on  which 
he  could  draw  if  he  thought  fit  to  do  so.  Subse- 
quent events  showed  that  this  story  had  no  founda- 
tion in  fact.  But  there  were  at  the  time  some 
reasonable  grounds  for  believing  it  to  be  true.  On 
December  8,  1876,  Lord  Vivian  reported  that  "it 
was  impossible  to  account  for  the  disposal  of  the 
very  large  sums  of  money  over  which  the  Egyptian 
Government  have  had  control  during  the  last  year ; 
£4,000,000  for  the  Suez  Canal  shares,  £5,000,000 
advance  from  the  French,  and  nearly  a  year's 
revenue  have  disappeared,  while  the  payment  of 
the  coupon  of  the  Unified  Debt  has  been  deferred, 
all  the  public  employes  are  in  arrears  of  pay,  and 
heavy  debts  remain  unsettled."  The  same  idea 
was  developed  more  fully  in  a  petition  presented 
by  the  French  colony  of  Alexandria  to  M. 
Waddington,  who  was  then  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  What,  they  asked,  had  become  of  the 
money  which  had  been  of  late  years  poured  into 
Egypt?  The  Custom -House  statistics  showed 
that  a  great  part  of  it  had  remained  in  the 
country. 

Comment  alors  parler  de  la  detresse  du  pays,  et  de 
rimpuissance  de  payer  ses  charges  ?  Que  le  Gouvernement 
explique  ce  qu'est  devenu  tout  cet  or !  II  est  done  bien 
evident  que  le  Gouvernement  Egyptien  est  inexcusable  de 
ne  pas  remplir  les  engagements  qu'il  a  pris  solennellement  k 
la  face  de  TEurope,  et  c'est  sur  lui  que  retombe  la  lourde 
responsabilite  des  ruines  qu'il  accumule  en  Egypte  et  qui 
frappent  pour  la  plus  grande  partie  la  colonic  Europeenne. 


CH.III      COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY  37 

The  cause  of  the  bondholders  was  warmly 
espoused  by  the  French  diplomatic  representative 
at  Cairo,  Baron  des  Michels,  who  turned  a  deaf  ear 
to  all  arguments  based  either  on  the  necessities  of 
the  Khedive  or  the  misery  of  the  Egyptian  people. 
The  result  was  that,  on  April  16,  1878,  the  French 
Government,  through  their  Ambassador  in  London, 
informed  Lord  Salisbury,  who,  on  April  2,  1878, 
succeeded  Lord  Derby  at  the  Foreign  OfRce,  that 
there  was  "  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  Khedive 
could  pay  the  coupon,  which  falls  due  in  May,  if 
he  chose  to  do  so."  M.  Waddington  expressed  a 
hope  that  the  British  Government  would  join  the 
French  Government  in  pressing  for  payment. 
Lord  Vivian  was  accordingly  instructed  to  act  in 
concert  with  Baron  des  Michels  on  this  subject. 

The  British  Government  thus  became  in  a 
certain  degree  responsible  for  the  oppression  which 
necessarily  accompanied  the  collection  of  the  taxes. 
JNIoreover,  the  step  taken  at  this  moment  involved 
a  departure  both  from  the  local  Egyptian  policy, 
which  the  British  Government  had  hitherto 
pursued,  and  also  from  their  general  policy  in  such 
matters.  As  regards  local  policy,  the  British 
had  never  espoused  the  cause  of  the  bondholders 
so  warmly  as  the  French  Government.  On  the 
contrary,  a  just  consideration  for  the  interests  of 
the  Egyptian  people  had  always  tempered  any 
support  given  to  the  foreign  creditors.  As  regards 
general  policy,  it  had  for  years  been  the  tradition 
of  the  London  Foreign  Office  that  British  subjects, 
who  invested  their  money  in  a  foreign  country,  must 
do  so  at  their  own  risk.  They  could  not  rely  on 
any  energetic  support  in  the  enforcement  of  their 
claims.  There  was  evidently  some  special  reason 
for  so  brusque  a  departure  from  the  principles 
heretofore  adopted.  The  reason  is  not  far  to  seek. 
The    Berlin    Congress  was   then  about   to    sit   to 


88  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

regulate  the  situation  arising  from  the  recent 
Russo- Turkish  war.  Egyptian  interests  had  to 
give  way  to  broader  diplomatic  considerations.  It 
was  necessary  to  conciliate  the  French.  The 
French  initiative  was,  therefore,  followed. 

Steps  were  taken  to  collect  the  money 
necessary  to  pay  the  coupon.  Two  of  the  most 
iron-fisted  Pashas  who  could  be  found  were  sent 
into  the  provinces.  They  were  accompanied  by  a 
staff  of  money-lenders  who  were  prepared  to  buy 
in  advance  the  crops  of  the  cultivators.  Thus,  the 
low  Nile  having  diminished  the  quantity  of  the 
crop,  the  peasantry  of  Egypt  were  deprived  of 
such  benefits  as  some  of  them,  at  all  events,  might 
have  derived  from  the  higJi  prices  consequent  on 
the  scarcity.  "In  some  cases,"  Sir  Alexander 
Baird  wrote,  "perfectly  authenticated,  corn  was 
sold  to  the  merchants  for  50  piastres  an  ardeb, 
which  was  delivered  in  one  month's  time  when  it 
was  worth  120  piastres  an  ardeb." 

The  money  was,  however,  obtained.  The  last 
instalment  was  paid  to  the  Commissioners  of  the 
Debt  a  few  hours  before  the  coupon  fell  due.  The 
great  diversity  of  currency,  and  the  fact  that  many 
of  the  coins  were  strung  together  to  be  used  as 
ornaments,  bore  testimony  to  the  pressure  which 
had  been  used  in  the  collection  of  the  taxes. 

The  only  result  of  paying  this  coupon  was  that 
the  crisis  was  delayed  for  a  short  time.  The 
sufferings  of  the  peo])le  of  Egypt  were  increased, 
whilst  the  position  of  the  foreign  creditors,  so  far 
from  being  improved,  was  rendered  rather  worse 
than  it  was  before. 

Amidst  this  clash  of  conflicting  interests,  the 
main  question  which  presented  itself  was,  what 
could  be  done  to  place  the  finances  of  Egypt  on  a 
sound  footin^j.  It  was  clear  that  the  arran<]i;ements 
made  in  1870  would  have  to  be  modified,  but,  to 


cH.  Ill      COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY  39 

what  extent  were  they  to  be  modified  ?  By  what 
procedure  were  the  modifications  to  be  introduced  ? 
What  guarantees  could  be  obtained  that  any  new 
arrangement  would  acquire  a  greater  degree  of 
stability  than  those  which  had  gone  before  ? 

The  discussion  of  these  questions  necessitates 
some  observations  on  the  relations  between  the 
Egyptian  Government  and  the  Commissioners  of 
the  Debt,  upon  which  the  main  interest  of 
Egyptian  affairs  centred  at  this  moment. 

The  position  of  the  Commissioners  was  one  of 
great  difficulty.  They  were  the  representatives  of 
the  bondholders.  An  obligation,  therefore,  rested 
on  them  to  support  the  just  claims  of  the  bond- 
holders by  every  legitimate  means  in  their  power. 
Apart,  however,  from  the  fact  that  it  was 
impossible  for  any  one  of  ordinary  humanity  and 
common  sense  to  ignore  the  pitiable  condition  in 
which  the  people  of  Egypt  were  then  placed,  it 
was  clear  that  the  interests  of  the  bondholders  and 
of  the  Egyptian  taxpayers,  if  properly  understood, 
were  far  from  being  divergent.  On  the  contrary, 
they  were  in  a  great  measure  identical.  Both  were 
interested  in  being  relieved  from  a  system  of 
government  which  was  ruinous  to  the  interests  of 
one  class  and  in  the  highest  degree  oppressive  to 
the  other.  Would  it  not  be  possible  to  use  the 
bondholding  interest  as  a  lever  to  improve  the 
Egyptian  administration,  and  thus  both  relieve 
the  lot  of  the  peasantry  and,  at  the  same  time, 
afford  some  substantial  guarantee  to  the  foreign 
creditors  that  whatever  fresh  financial  obligations 
were  taken  would  be  respected  ?  That  was  the 
important  question  of  the  moment. 

In  view  of  the  relatively  large  political  and 
financial  interests  of  France  and  Great  Britain 
in  Egypt,  it  was  natural  that  tlie  French  and 
British  representatives  should  take  the  lead  in  the 


40  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

proceedings  of  the  Commission  of  the  Debt.  I 
was  fortunate  in  being  associated  with  a  French 
colleafjue  who  took  a  broad  view  of  the  situation. 
M.  de  Blignieres  was  a  French  official,  and  the 
tendencies  of  most  French  officials  are  somewhat 
more  bureaucratic  than  those  of  their  counterparts 
in  England ;  but  he  was  a  French  official  of  the 
best  type,  loyal,  straightforward,  intelligent,  and 
endowed  with  a  high  degree  of  moral  courage.  On 
all  essential  points,  we  worked  in  complete  harmony. 
We  were  both  determined  that  the  petty  inter- 
national rivalries,  which  had  been  the  bane  of 
Egypt,  and  which  were  skilfully  used  by  Ismail 
Pasha  to  avert  the  possibility  of  common  action 
on  the  part  of  France  and  England,  should  not 
be  allowed  to  separate  us.  That  we  succeeded  in 
sinking  any  minor  differences  of  opinion  in  the 
pursuit  of  a  common  object,  was  sufficiently  proved 
by  the  fact  that  each  of  us  was  at  times  blamed  for 
sacrificing  the  interests  of  his  own  country  to  tliat 
of  the  other.  In  later  days,  when  the  relations 
between  France  and  England  became  unfortunately 
embittered,  I  often  looked  back  with  regret  to  the 
time  when  I  was  able  to  co-operate  heartily  with  a 
French  colleague,  such  as  M.  de  Blignieres,  for 
whom  I  entertained  a  sincere  respect  and  a  warm 
personal  friendship.^ 

The  position  of  INI.  de  Blignieres  was  in  some 
respects  more  difficult  than  my  own.  I  had  not 
been  ap])ointed  by  the  British  Government,  and 
was,  therefore,  free  to  act  according  to  the  dictates 
of  my  own  conscience  and  to  the  best  of  my  own 

1  M.  de  Blif^nieres  died  iu  1900.  He  was  a  brilliant  aud  also  very 
voluble  conversationalist.  In  1879,  I  accompanied  him  on  a  visit  to 
Lord  Salisbury,  who  was  then  residing  at  Dieppe.  In  1887,  Lord 
Salisbury  wrote  to  me  :  "The  other  day  the  gentleman  who  described 
himself  at  my  house  at  Dieppe  as  a  '  pemonnage  viuet' — M.  de  Blignieres 
— called  on  me.  He  had  not  aciiuired  any  fresh  claim  to  that  designa- 
tion. But  he  was  very  agreeable,  and  more  friendly  than  I  had  been 
led  to  expect." 


CH.  Ill      COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY  41 

judgment.  The  tendencies  and  traditions  of  the 
British  Government,  moreover,  ran  counter  to  any 
endeavour  to  enforce  the  claims  of  the  foreign 
creditors  at  whatsoever  cost  to  the  population  of 
Egypt.  The  personal  influence  of  Lord  Vivian  was 
exerted  on  the  side  of  justice  and  moderation.  The 
British  bondholders  were  also,  as  a  body,  perfectly 
reasonable.  They  naturally  objected  to  any  arbitral  }■ 
infringement  of  their  legal  rights,  but  there  could  be 
little  doubt  that  if  a  statement  of  facts  and  figures 
could  be  put  before  them,  the  accuracy  of  which 
could  be  guaranteed  by  their  own  trustees,  there 
would  not  be  any  insuperable  difficulty  in  obtaining 
their  acquiescence  to  an  equitable  settlement  of 
all  pending  questions.  Moreover,  the  influence  of 
the  bondholders  in  England  was  limited.  A 
strong  body  of  public  opinion  existed  which  was 
hostile  to  their  presumed  interests,  and  which,  in 
its  anxiety  to  do  justice  to  the  people  of  Egypt, 
was  inclined  sometimes  even  to  err  on  the  side  of 
doing  less  than  justice  to  the  foreign  creditors. 
Those  who  represented  this  aspect  of  British  public 
opinion  criticised,  more  frequently  than  not  in  a 
hostile  spirit,  the  action  of  the  European  officials 
who  were  at  that  time  employed  in  prominent 
positions  in  Egypt.  A  good  deal  of  this  criticism 
was  based  on  an  erroneous  appreciation  of  the 
facts  of  the  case,  but  I  never  regarded  it  as  really 
hostile.  On  the  contrary,  I  esteemed  it  an  ad- 
vantage to  be  able  to  strengthen  my  position  in 
case  of  need  by  an  appeal  to  a  body  of  general 
opinion  which,  even  when  misled  on  points  of 
detail,  was  pursuing  praiseworthy  and  very  legiti- 
mate objects. 

M.  de  Blignieres,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
nominated  by  the  French  Government,  ai  d  the 
French  Government  were  greatly  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  bondliclding  interest.     The  French 


42  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

bondliolders  were  inclined  to  be  far  less  reasonable 
than  the  English,  neither  did  there  apparently 
exist  any  body  of  public  opinion  in  France,  which 
could  act  as  a  check  on  any  extreme  views  advanced 
by  the  foreign  creditors  of  Egypt. 

Both  M.  de  Blignieres  and  myself  saw  from  an 
early  date  that  the  financial  arrangements  of  1876 
would  have  to  be  modified,  but  we  also  held  that 
an  arbitrary  reduction  in  the  rate  of  interest  would 
be  unjust  to  the  bondholders  and  of  doubtful 
benefit  to  the  taxpayers.  Before  we  could  ap- 
prove of  any  fresh  financial  combination,  it  was 
evident  that  more  liffht  would  have  to  be  thrown 
on  the  situation.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
idea  of  holding  a  General  Inquiry  into  the  financial 
condition  of  the  country,  which  was  originated 
about  this  time,  took  root,  and  obtained  some 
support  amongst  the  more  moderate  of  those  who 
were  interested  in  the  solvency  of  the  Egyptian 
Government.  "But,"  Lord  Vivian  reported,  "the 
bondholders  ask  that  any  inquiry  into  the  financial 
position  should  be  impartial  and  exhaustive,  leav- 
ing nothing  behind  it  uninvestigated  in  the  shape 
of  debt,  nor  any  pretext  for  further  resettlement. 
On  these  conditions,  they  are  prepared  to  make 
such  a  fair  sacrifice  of  interest  as  may  be  found 
absolutely  necessary." 

It  would  have  been  wise  on  the  part  of  the 
Khedive  if,  at  this  moment,  he  had  on  his  own 
initiative  invited  a  full  inquiry  into  the  financial 
situation  of  Egypt.  But  he  was  not  disposed  to 
do  so.  He  hoped  to  obtain  an  arbitrary  reduction 
in  the  rate  of  interest  on  the  debt  without  any 
inquiry.  Eventually,  the  Commissioners  of  the 
Debt  took  the  initiative.  In  a  letter  addressed  to 
the  Minister  of  Finance  on  January  9,  1878,  they 
dwelt  on  the  gravity  of  the  situation  and  suggested 
an  inquiry.    The  Khedive  replied  at  length,  declin- 


OH.  Ill      COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY  43 

ing  to  institute  a  general  inquiry  into  the  financial 
situation,  but  stating  that  he  was  willing  to  appoint 
a  Commission  whose  sole  duty  it  would  be  to 
ascertain  the  true  amount  of  the  Egyptian  revenue. 
The  Commissioners  of  the  Debt  were  invited  to 
take  part  in  this  inquiry. 

A  partial  inquiry  of  this  sort  would  have  been 
worse  than  useless.  The  Commissioners  of  the 
Debt,  therefore,  addressed  a  further  letter  to  the 
Egyptian  Government,  in  which  they  again  urged 
the  necessity  of  a  full  inquiry,  and  declined  to 
take  part  in  any  inquiry  of  a  partial  nature. 

No  attention  was  paid  to  this  remonstrance, 
and,  on  January  27,  1878,  a  Khedivial  Decree  was 
issued  instituting  a  Commission  of  Inquiry  into 
the  revenue  only.  A  further  Decree  was  to  be 
issued  nominating  the  Commissioners. 

The  issue  of  this  Decree  caused  an  explosion  of 
European  public  opinion  in  Egypt,  A  meeting 
was  held  at  Alexandria  at  which  the  more  extreme 
of  those  who  advocated  the  claims  of  the  foreign 
creditors  expressed  themselves  in  terms  condemna- 
tory of  any  inquiry,  as  they  considered  that  the 
Egyptian  Government  could  meet  all  its  engage- 
ments. A  petition  was  sent  to  the  representatives 
of  the  Powers,  but  it  was  couched  in  language  so 
insulting  to  the  Egyptian  Government  that  Lord 
Vivian  refused  to  notice  it. 

The  Khedive  did  not,  however,  immediately 
abandon  the  idea  of  instituting  a  partial  inquiry. 
The  main  difficulty  was  to  find  any  qualified 
persons  to  conduct  it.  General  (then  Colonel) 
Gordon  was  at  that  time  returning  from  the 
Soudan.  The  idea  occurred  to  the  Khedive  that 
his  services  might  be  utilised.  His  high  character, 
the  weight  that  his  name  carried  with  the  British 
public,  and  his  known  sympathy  with  the  sufferings 
of  the    Egyptian   people,  all  pointed  him  out  as 


44  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

a  useful  instrument ;  whilst  his  inexperience  in 
financial  questions  would,  it  was  thought,  lead  him 
to  accept  the  accuracy  of  any  facts  and  figures 
which  were  laid  before  him  by  the  Egyptian 
Government.  T^ord  Vivian  pointed  out  that 
"  Colonel  Gordon,  with  all  his  eminent  qualities 
and  abilities,  had  no  experience  in  finance."  The 
Khedive,  however,  held  to  his  idea.  General 
Gordon  was  invited  to  conduct  a  financial  inquiry, 
and  was  at  first  inclined  to  accept  the  invitation. 
M.  de  Lesseps  was  also  asked  to  serve  on  the 
proposed  Commission,  and  intimated  his  willingness 
to  do  so.  The  negotiation  with  General  Gordon, 
however,  soon  broke  down,  and  he  left  Egypt. ^ 

It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  in  detail  the 
tedious  negotiations  which  then  ensued.  The 
British  Government  consistently  supported  "a  full 
and  complete  inquiry  "  into  the  financial  situation 
as  the  only  possible  solution  of  existing  difficulties. 
The  German,  Austrian,  and  Italian  Governments 
also  supported  the  proposal.  So  also  did  the 
French  Government,  although  as  it  became  daily 
more  and  more  clear  that  the  result  of  any 
impartial  inquiry  must  be  that  the  rate  ot  interest 
on  the  debt  would  be  reduced,  their  support  was 
rather  lukewarm. 

After  long  and  wearisome  discussions  over  the 
scope  of  the  inquiry  and  the  persons  to  whom  it 
should  be  entrusted,  the  Khedive  eventually  yielded. 
On  March  15,  I  was  able  to  write  to  Lord  Goschen  : 
"  At  last  T  really  think  that,  after  five  months  of 
incessant    labour,    the    inquiry    is    settled."      On 

^  These  proceeding's  have  formed  the  subject  of  much  misrepre- 
sentation. Tlie  account  of  tliein  iriven  in  Sir  William  Butler's  Charles 
George  Gordon  (pp.  138-139)  is  incorrect  llie  sole  reason  why  the 
negotiation  broke  down  was  that  it  was  evident  to  every  one  concerned, 
including  General  Gordon  himself,  that  lie  was  not  fitted  to  conduct 
any  financial  inquiry.  He  wrote  at  the  ti  ne  that  he  felt  sure  that  he 
"was  only  to  be  a  figurehead." — Colonel  Gordon  in  Central  Africa, 
p.  310. 


CH.  Ill      COMMISSION  OF  INQUIRY  45 

April  4,  1878,  a  Khedivial  Decree  was  issued 
appointing  a  Commission  with  the  most  extended 
powers  of  inquiry.  M.  Ferdinand  de  I^esseps  lent 
the  weight  of  his  name  to  the  Commission.  He 
was  appointed  President,  but  did  not  take  any 
active  part  in  the  proceedings,  and  left  Egypt  on 
May  9.  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  and  Riaz  Pasha  were 
named  Vice-Presidents.  The  four  Commissioners 
of  the  Debt  were  appointed  members.  A  capable 
Frenchman,  M.  Liron  d'AiroUes,  was  chosen  to  act 
as  Secretary. 

Some  opposition  had  been  offered,  especially  by 
the  French,  to  the  nomination  of  any  Egyptian  to 
be  a  member  of  the  Commission.  It  was  feared, 
with  some  reason,  that  no  Egyptian  would  be 
sufficiently  independent  to  express  views  which 
might  be  displeasing  to  the  Khedive.  These  fears 
proved  groundless.  At  a  time  when  any  show  of 
independent  opinion  on  the  part  of  an  Egyptian 
was  accompanied  with  a  good  deal  of  personal  risk, 
Riaz  Pasha  displayed  a  high  degree  of  moral 
courage.  His  presence  on  the  Commission  was  of 
material  help  to  his  colleagues,  whose  confidence 
he  fully  deserved  and  obtained. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   NUBAR-WILSON    MINISTRY 

April  1878-November  1878 

Difficulty  of  the  task  assigned  to  the  Commission  of  Inquiry — Cherif 
Pasha  declines  to  appear  as  a  witness — Defects  in  the  system  of 
administration — The  floating  debt — The  Rouznanieh  Loan — Loans 
from  the  W'akf  and  Beit-el-Mal  Administrations — Ultimate  reforms 
proposed  by  the  Commissioners — Immediate  reforms  necessary — 
Enforcement  of  Ministerial  responsibility — The  Khedive's  Civil 
List  —  Cession  to  the  State  of  the  Khedivial  properties  —  The 
Khedive  accepts  the  proposals  of  the  Commissioners — Nubar  Pasha 
forms  a  Ministry — Sir  Ki\  ers  A\'^ilson  and  M.  de  Blignieres  named 
Ministers  —  Loan  authorised  on  the  security  of  the  Khedivial 
estates. 

The  Egyptian  Verres^  was  at  last,  therefore, 
obliged  to  render  an  account  of  his  stewardship  to 
a  body  of  men  who  were  determined  to  arrive  at 
the  truth.  The  Commissioners,  however,  soon 
found  that,  in  the  confusion  which  then  existed, 
the  mere  discovery  of  the  accurate  facts  of  the 
situation  was  a  task  which  presented  no  inconsider- 
able difficulties,  whilst  the  abuses  which  had 
grown  up  in  the  Egyptian  administrative  system 
were  so  general  and  so  deep-rooted  as  to  defy  the 
application  of  any  remedy  which  would  be  effectual 

^  There  is  certainly  a  somewhat  close  analogy  between  Verres  and 
Ismail  Pasha  ;  e.g.  "  Hoc  piaetore  Siculi  neque  suas  leges,  neque  nostra 
senatuscousulta,  neque  com munia  jura  tenuerunt  .  .  .  Nulla  res  .  .  . 
nisi  ad  nutum  istius  judicata  est ;  nulla  res  tarn  patria  cujusquam  atqr.e 
avita  fuit  quae  non  ab  eo  imperio  istius  abjudicaretur.  Innumerabiles 
pecuniae  ex  aratorum  bonis  novo  nefarioque  instituto  coactae,"  etc.  — 
Cicero,  In  C.   Verrcm,  Actio  I'rima,  iv.  et  v. 

46 


OH.  IV     NUBAR-WIl.SON  MINISTRY         r 

and  at  the  same  time  speedy.  We  had  to  deal  not 
with  a  patient  suffering  from  a  single  specific 
malady,  but  with  one  whose  constitution  was 
shattered  and  whose  every  organ  was  diseased. 
"II  s'agit,  en  effet,"  we  said,  "de  creer  tout 
un  systeme  fiscal,  et  cela  avec  un  personnel  tr^s 
restreint ;  a  present  presque  rien  n'existe  de  ce 
qui  doit  exister." 

At  the  outset  of  the  inquiry,  a  preliminary  diffi- 
culty of  a  somewhat  serious  nature  occurred.  Cherif 
Pasha  was  at  that  time,  next  to  the  Khedive,  the 
leading  man  in  Egypt.  No  one  thought  that  he 
was  in  any  degree  responsible  for  the  confusion 
which  then  existed,  but,  inasmuch  as  he  was 
Minister  of  Justice,  it  was  to  him  that  the  Com- 
missioners were  obliged  to  turn  for  information  as 
to  the  working  of  the  judicial  system  in  so  far  as^ 
fiscal  matters  were  concerned.  Under  the  Decree 
instituting  the  Commission,  all  Egyptian  officials 
were  bound  to  furnish  such  information  as  might 
be  demanded  of  them.  Cherif  Pasha,  on  receiving 
a  summons  to  attend  before  the  Commission, 
offered  to  answer  questions  in  writing,  but  his 
proud  nature  resented  —  and  not  unnaturally 
resented — the  idea  of  appearing  in  person  before 
the  Commissioners.  On  the  other  hand,  had  the 
latter  yielded,  all  chance  of  extracting  the  truth 
from  other  witnesses  would  have  been  shipwrecked 
at  the  outset  of  the  inquiry.  The  Commissioners, 
therefore,  insisted  on  Cherif  Pasha  appearing  in 
person.  Under  these  circumstances,  Cherif  Pasha 
could  only  yield  or  resign.  He  chose  the  latter 
course. 

The  first  step  taken  by  the  Commissioners  was 
to  provide  for  the  payment  of  the  arrears  due  to 
the  Government  employes  and  pensioners.  They 
then  set  to  work  to  examine  into  the  system  of 
administration    of    the    country,    more    especially 


48  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

into  the  fiscal  system.  It  is  unnecessary  to  give 
the  results  of  their  inquiries  at  any  length.  It  was 
found  that  public  rumour  had  not  exaggerated  the 
nature  of  the  prevailing  abuses.  Certain  laws  and 
regulations  existed  on  paper,  but  no  one  ever 
thought  of  obeying  them.  The  principal  officials 
concerned  were,  indeed,  often  ignorant  of  their 
existence.  New  taxes  were  levied,  old  taxes  were 
increased,  and  changes  introduced  without  any 
formal  authority.  The  vilkge  Sheikh  executed  the 
orders  of  the  JNIoudir,  the  latter  those  of  the  In- 
spector-General, who,  again,  acted  under  "  superior 
order."  This  "superior  order,"  in  fact,  constituted 
the  law.  The  officials  obeyed  it,  even  though  it 
were  only  communicated  verbally ;  and  no  tax- 
payer ever  dreamt  of  challenging  it  or  of  protesting 
against  it.  The  Inspector-General  of  Upper  Egypt, 
on  being  asked  to  whom  the  taxpayer  could  address 
himself  if  he  had  any  complaint  to  make,  answered, 
with  a  naivete  arising  without  doubt  from  long- 
familiarity  with  a  system  which  he  considered  both 
just  and  natural,  "  Pour  les  impots,  le  fellah  ne  pent 
se  plaindre ;  il  salt  qu'on  agit  par  'ordre  superieur.' 
C'est  le  Gouvernement  lui-meme  qui  les  reclame ; 
a  qui  voulez-vous  qu'il  se  plaigne?"^  The  In- 
spector-General unconsciously  indicated  the  main 
difficulty  in  the  path  of  the  Egyptian  reformer. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  people  had  from  time 
immemorial  been  accustomed  to  yield  implicit 
obedience  to  tlie  Government.  On  the  other  hand, 
inasmuch  as  the  Government  were  themselves  the 
chief  cause  of  all  the  mischief  in  the  country,  the 

*  This  answer  is  alive  with  the  spirit  of  the  ancient  Oriental  despot- 
isms. 'VhiiA  \^uck\e  (Histon/ of  Ciri/i.sadon,  vol.  i.  p.  80)  records  that 
the  Institutes  of  Menu  laid  down  that  any  native  of  India  helonging  to 
the  Sudra  caste  must  always  remain  a  slave  for  ever,  altliough  his  master 
granted  him  his  freedom.  "  For,"  said  the  lawgiver,  "  of  a  state  whic'u 
is  natural  to  him,  by  whom  can  he  be  divested.'*"  Paterson  (The 
Nemesis  of  Nations ,  p.  60)  also  alludes  to  the  same  point. 


CH.IV      NUBAR-WILSON  MINISTRY         40 

direction  reform  had  necessarily  to  take  was  that  of 
putting  some  restraint  on  the  exercise  of  arbitrary 
power.  How  were  abuses  to  be  reformed  without 
shaking  the  props  which  had  so  far  held  Egyptian 
sjciety  together,  and  on  which  the  whole  edifice 
rested  ?  That  was  a  question  which,  at  a  later 
period,  gave  cause  for  much  anxiety. 

Another  characteristic  answer  was  given  by  a 
high  Egyptian  official  who  was  examined  before 
the  Commission.  A  professional  tax  was  at  that 
time  levied  in  Egypt.  Nothing,  in  fact,  can  be 
fairer  than  that,  in  an  agricultural  country  such  as 
Egypt,  the  non -agricultural  classes  should  bear 
their  share  of  taxation.  It  was,  however,  perhaps 
going  rather  far  to  levy  the  tax  on  the  humblest 
of  the  artisan  class.  But  the  Government  went 
much  farther.  Agricultural  labourers  paid  the  tax  ; 
in  fact,  it  had  become  a  poll-tax,  which  was  paid 
by  all  the  poorer  classes,  whether  or  not  they  exer- 
cised anything  w^hich  could  be  called  a  profession. 
The  witness  in  question  was  asked  whether  he  did 
not  think  it  rather  hard  that  a  man  who  exercised 
no  profession  should  be  called  upon  to  pay  a  pro- 
fessional tax.  He  expressed  great  and,  without 
doubt,  genuine  astonishment.  Was  it,  he  said,  the 
fault  of  the  Government  that  the  man  did  not 
exercise  any  profession  ?  He  could  engage  in  any 
profession  he  chose.  The  Government  did  not 
prevent  him  from  doing  so.  But,  of  course,  if  he 
chose  not  to  engage  in  any  profession,  he  must 
none  the  less  pay  the  tax ;  otherwise  an  injustice 
would  be  done  to  those  who  were  engaged  in  pro- 
fessions !  Of  the  many  specious  arguments  which 
have  been  from  time  to  time  advanced  in  Egypt 
to  make  the  worse  appear  the  better  cause,  this  is 
certainly  one  of  the  most  remarkable. 

The  Commissioners  did  not  confine  their  re- 
searches to  the  methods  adopted  for  the  collection 

voi>.  I  E 


50  MODERN  EGYPT  fp.  i 

of  the  revenue.  The  corvee,  they  found,  was  a 
*'  fruitful  source  of  extortion  and  injustice."  It  was 
ascertained,  notwithstanding  positive  official  asser- 
tions to  the  contrary,  that  the  Khedive's  private 
estates  were  cultivated  by  means  of  forced  labour. 
The  recruitment  for  the  army  was  managed  in  an 
irregular  and  very  cruel  manner.^  It  often  happened 
that  a  recruit  first  paid  a  heavy  sum  to  obtain  exemp- 
tion from  military  service,  and  was  after  all  obliged 
to  serve  without  the  money  being  refunded  to  him. 
In  the  vital  question  of  the  distribution  of  water 
for  purposes  of  irrigation,  the  interests  of  the 
poorer  cultivators  were  sacrificed  to  those  of  the 
rich  proprietors.  No  courts  of  justice,  worthy  of 
the  name,  existed. 

Herr  von  Kremer  and  myself  were  delegated  by 
our  colleagues  to  inquire  into  the  outstanding  claims 
against  the  Egyptian  Government.  JNlany  a  weary 
hour  did  we  pass  in  the  broiling  heat  of  an  Egyptian 
summer  afternoon  in  endeavouring  to  unravel  the 
tangled  meshes  of  some  of  the  most  astounding 
financial  operations  in  which  any  Government  in 
the  world  has  ever  been  engaged.  The  waste  had 
been  fearful.  The  head  of  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment, if  he  heard  that  some  new  description  of 

*  One  of  the  Inspectors  of  the  Antiquities  Department  (Mr.  Howard 
Carter),  in  the  course  of  some  excavations  made  at  Dendera  in  the 
month  of  August  1904,  came  across  tlie  corpse  of  a  man  who  had 
been  tortured  and  put  to  death  by  Daoud  Pasha,  a  former  notorious 
Moudir  of  the  Province^  for  trying  to  evade  conscription  for  the 
army.  Mr.  Carter  reported  :  "  The  corpse  presented  a  ghastly 
sight ;  the  liead  was  turned  towards  the  left,  the  chin  resting  on  the 
shoulder,  the  features  distorted  in  agony,  and  the  tongue  between  the 
teeth.  The  body  was  in  a  contorted  position,  with  the  legs  bent  and 
widely  open.  The  hands  were  held  at  the  wrists  in  rough  wooden 
.stocks,  made  apparently  out  of  two  rowlocks  from  a  native  boat,  fixed 
together,  extremely  tight,  by  means  of  two  large  iron  native  nails, 
wliich  pierced  the  wrists,  and  were  clamped  below.  Tied  round  the 
arms,  high  up  near  the  arm-pits,  was  a  lialter,  which  had  evidently 
been  used  to  drag  the  man  along,  either  dead  or  alive,  the  back  show- 
ing distinct  signs  of  laceration.  It  was  even  possible  to  detect  that  the 
hands  had  l)een  much  swollen  from  the  pressure  of  the  stocks." — Egypt, 
No.  1  of  190o,  p.  104. 


CH.IV     NUBAR-WILSON  MINISTRY  51 

cannon  had  been  invented,  would  order,  not  one  as  an 
experiment,  but  a  couple  of  dozen,  on  the  ground,  as 
was  explained  to  us,  that  Egypt  "  could  not  remain 
behind  other  nations  in  miUtary  matters."  Names 
familiar  throughout  Europe  during  the  Napoleonic 
era  turned  up  as  recipients  of  the  Khedivial  largesse. 
The  accounts  also  showed  that  the  eulogies  poured 
at  one  time  on  Ismail  Pasha  by  a  portion  of  the 
European  press  were  not  altogether  due  to  dis- 
interested motives.  Money  was  due  to  contractors 
and  tradesmen  of  all  sorts.  An  Egyptian  princess 
had  run  up  an  account  of  £150,000  with  a  French 
dressmaker.  Large  sums  had  been  spent  at  Con- 
stantinople, as  to  which  it  was  stated  "  on  n'a  pas 
pu  rendre  compte."  One  financial  operation  was  of 
so  complicated  a  nature  that  it  almost  defied  the 
ingenuity  of  man  to  get  to  the  bottom  of  it.  It 
appeared,  however,  that  the  Khedive  had  been 
engaged  with  his  late  Finance  Minister  in  an 
operation  on  the  Stock  Exchange,  the  basis  of 
which  was  that  he  was  to  "  bear "  his  own  stock. 
In  some  cases,  extravagant  sums  had  been  paid 
for  work  done  or  for  goods  furnished.  Thus,  the 
harbour  works  at  Alexandria  cost  over  £2,500,000. 
According  to  a  trustworthy  estimate,  they  should 
have  cost  about  £1,400,000.  In  this  case,  how- 
ever, the  work  was  one  of  real  utility,  and  it  was 
well  executed,  although  at  a  high  price.  In  a 
number  of  other  cases,  large  sums  were  owing 
without  the  Egyptian  Government  having  any- 
thing to  show  for  their  money.  Interest  at 
exorbitant  rates,  bonuses  on  the  renewal  of  bills, 
differences  between  the  real  and  nominal  value  of 
securities,  and  other  financial  juggleries,  consti- 
tuted almost  the  whole  of  the  claim. 

There  was  one  series  of  operations,  termed 
"  operations  d'extourne,"  which  are  worth  describ- 
ing in  some  detail.     The  operation  was  after  this 


52  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

fashion.  The  Egyptian  Government,  being  in 
want  of  ready  money,  sold  to  some  Levantine  firm 
a  quantity  of  grain  wliich  they  did  not  possess,  and 
vvhicli,  for  the  most  part,  they  were  never  Hkely 
to  possess.  The  purchase  money  was  paid  at 
once ;  the  grain  had  to  be  dehvered  to  the  pur- 
chasers a  few  months  later.  When  the  time  for 
its  delivery  arrived,  a  certain  amount  was  in  some 
cases  delivered,  as  it  was  then  the  practice  of  the 
Egyptian  Government  to  collect  a  portion  of  the 
taxes  in  kind.  The  remainder  was  bought  back 
by  the  Government  at  a  price  of  25  per  cent 
above  that  which  had  been  paid  by  the  original 
purchasers.  In  other  cases,  the  Government 
never  delivered  any  grain,  neither  was  any  money 
repaid  at  the  time.  The  Government,  however, 
still  went  through  the  form  of  repurchase,  and  the 
original  purchasers  received  Treasury  bills,  bear- 
ing interest  at  the  rate  of  18  or  20  per  cent,  not 
for  the  amount  which  they  had  in  the  first  instance 
advanced,  but  for  the  far  larger  sum  for  which  the 
Government  eventually  effected  the  nominal  re- 
purchase of  the  grain.  It  is  impossible  to  say 
what  rate  of  interest  the  Egyptian  Government 
really  paid  in  the  end  for  money  advanced  under 
this  system.  It  must  have  been  something 
enormous. 

Instances  might,  in  fact,  be  multiplied  to  show 
the  ruinous  nature  of  the  financial  operations  to 
which  the  Government  were  at  that  time  reduced 
in  order  to  obtain  money.  In  one  case,  which 
may  be  cited  by  way  of  example,  the  Govern- 
ment, in  part  payment  of  a  debt  due  to  a  local 
bank,  handed  over  £230,000  worth  of  Unified 
Stoak  at  a  price  of  31 1 ;  in  other  words,  in  order 
to  pay  £72,000,  the  Government  saddled  the 
country  permanently  with  a  debt  of  £230,000, 
bearhig  interest  at  the  rate  of  6  per  cent  per  annum. 


CH.  IV     NUBAR- WILSON  MINISTRY  53 

We  also  found,  in  the  course  of  our  researches, 
that  in  1874  a  forced  loan,  entitled  the  "Empruiit 
Rouznameh,"  had  been  raised  in  the  provinces. 
Subscriptions  had  been  invited  for  a  loan  of 
£5,000,000  bearing  interest  at  the  rate  of  9  per 
cent.  About  £1,800,000  was  actually  paid  into  tlie 
Treasury.  We  obtained  from  some  of  the  villages 
a  list  of  the  subscribers  to  the  loan  ;  each  list  was 
accompanied  by  a  declaration  signed  by  tlie  Notables 
of  the  village  stating  that  the  subscriptions  were 
"perfectly  voluntary."  They  were,  of  course,  in 
no  sense  voluntary.  No  bonds  were  ever  delivered 
to  the  subscribers  and,  up  to  the  date  of  our  in- 
quiry, one  instalment  of  interest  only  had  been 
paid  to  a  few  favoured  individuals. 

We  further  discovered  that  the  Government 
had  laid  their  hands  upon  the  money  belonging  to 
the  Wakfs,  that  is  to  say,  the  Department  which 
deals  with  Mohammedan  religious  endowments. 

There  was  also  at  that  time  in  Egypt  an  institu- 
tion termed  the  Beit-el-Mal,^  which  administered 
the  estates  of  orphans  and  minors.  The  duty  of 
the  director  of  this  establishment  was  to  invest  the 
money  of  which  he  was  trustee  in  the  manner  best 
suited  to  the  interests  of  the  cestuis-que  trust. 
"  En  vertu  d'ordre  superieur,"  the  Director-General 
lent  tlie  money  to  the  Government  at  10  per 
cent  interest,  but  he  was  never  repaid  the  capital, 
neither  did  he  receive  any  interest.  The  Director- 
General,  on  being  asked  whether  the  Minister  of 
Finance  gave  him  any  security  for  the  trust  money 
which  he  lent  to  the  Government,  replied  that, 
inasmuch  as  the  Khedive  had  given  an  order,  no 
security  was  necessary.  "  La  garantie,  c'est  Tordre 
du  Khedive."  "Dans  le  cours  de  nos  recherches," 
we  said,  "  nous  avons  ete  frappes  de  I'usage  pres- 
qu'universel  qui  semble  regner  chez  les  fonction- 

»  Ut.  "The  House  of  Property." 


54  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

naires  du  Gouvernement  Egyptien,  et  qui  consiste 
dans  I'affectation  des  fonds  particuliers  qui  passent 
par  leurs  mains  aux  besoins  du  service  gouverne- 
mental.  Las  faits  que  nous  avons  racontes  a 
propos  de  Tadrninistration  du  Wakf,  du  Beit-el- 
Mal,  de  la  Caisse  des  Orphelius,  et  des  Ecoles 
Nationales,  peuvent  servir  d'exemple  du  syst^me. 
Nous  pourrions  en  citer  d'autres." 

Besides  the  sums  due  to  bankers  and  contractors, 
we  found  that  there  were  numerous  claims  from 
such  humble  individuals  as  camel-drivers,  barbers, 
donkey-boys,  etc.,  all  of  which  had  to  be  included 
in  the  floating  debt. 

It  is  a  pity  that  these  claims  could  not  have 
been  submitted  to  a  court  of  arbitration  with  full 
powers  to  deal  with  them.  The  result  would 
probably  have  been  that  a  few  would  have  been 
admitted  in  full ;  others  would  have  been  re- 
duced in  various  proportions,  some  very  largely ; 
whilst  some  would  perhaps  have  been  rejected 
altogether.  Unfortunately,  the  Commissioners  had 
no  such  powers.  We  could  only  decide  what 
claims  were  admissible  from  a  strictly  legal  point 
of  view,  leaving  any  doubtful  cases  to  be  decided 
by  the  law-courts.  When  the  list  came  to  be 
made  out,  it  was  found  that  the  outstanding  claims 
amounted  to  £0,276,000.  The  deficit  for  1878  was 
estimated  at  £2,587,000,^  and  that  of  1879  at 
£381,000.  In  all,  therefore,  a  new  floating  debt, 
amounting  to  £9,244,000,  had  accrued,  wliich  in 
one  form  or  another  had  to  be  added  to  the 
funded  debt  of  the  country. 

It  was  easy  to  frame  a  crushing  indictment 
rtgainst  the  system  of  government  under  which 
Egypt  had  of  late  years  been  administered.  It 
was  more  difficult  to  indicate  what  measures  could 

1  Tliis  was  an   under-estimate.      The   actual  deficit   amounted    to 
£3,440,000. 


CH.IV     NUBAR- WILSON  MINISTRY         55 

be  taken  to  ensure  any  speedy  improvement  in  the 
system.  The  Commissioners,  however,  pointed  out 
the  general  directions  which  reforms  should  take. 
No  tax  should  be  levied  save  in  virtue  of  a  law  which 
should  be  officially  published.  The  collection  of  taxes 
should  be  really,  as  well  as  nominally,  under  the 
JNIinister  of  Finance.  The  Accounts  Department 
should  be  reformed,  and  a  system  of  annual  budgets 
adopted.  A  Reserve  Fund  should  be  instituted  to 
provide  for  any  extraordinary  expenses  incurred 
whenever  the  Nile  was  exceptionally  high  or  low. 
The  taxes  should  no  longer  be  taken  in  advance. 
A  judicial  system  should  be  organised  which  would 
protect  the  people  against  an  arbitrary  abuse  of 
authority.  A  number  of  small  and  vexatious  taxes 
should  be  suppressed.  A  cadastral  survey  should 
be  made.  Reforms  should  be  introduced  into  the 
methods  of  collecting  the  salt  and  tobacco  duties. 
Proper  regulations  should  be  made  for  the  distribu- 
tion of  water  and  the  execution  of  public  works. 
Forced  labour  should  only  be  employed  on  public 
works  of  acknowledged  utility.  The  terms  of 
military  service  should  be  defined  and  limited,  whilst 
at  the  same  time  some  equitable  system  should 
be  adopted  for  obtaining  recruits  for  the  army. 

These  proposed  reforms  were  excellent  in  their 
way.  But  they  all  required  time  to  inaugurate ; 
eapable  administrators  to  give  effect  to  them ;  ex- 
perience to  show  in  what  particular  form  portions 
of  the  European  system  of  government  could,  with 
advantage,  be  transplanted  to  an  Eastern  country ; 
and  above  all,  a  gradual  change  in  the  habits  of 
thought,  both  of  the  Egyptian  officials  and  of  the 
people  themselves,  which  would  enable  them  in 
some  degree  to  assimilate  a  system  of  administra- 
tion, based  on  principles  which,  since  the  days  of 
the  Pharaohs,  had  been  unfamiliar  to  the  people 
of  Egypt. 


56  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

In  the  meamvlnle,  the  pressing  questions  were. 
What  could  be  done  at  once  to  enable  the  machine 
of  the  State  to  work,  however  inefficiently  ?  What 
was  to  be  the  first  step  towards  the  inauguration 
of  an  improved  system  of  government  ?  How 
were  the  claims  which  had  on  all  sides  surged  up 
against  the  Egyptian  Treasury  to  be  met  ? 

There  was  but  little  difficulty  in  stating  the 
main  defect  of  the  existing  system,  or  in  indicating 
in  general  terms  the  nature  of  the  remedy  which 
ought  to  be  applied.  "  On  ne  saurait  meconnaitre," 
the  Commissioners  said,  "que  le  Chef  de  I'Etat 
dispose  d'une  autorite  sans  limites."  Manifestly, 
that  was  the  main  blot.  The  celebrated  maxim 
attributed  to  Louis  XIV.  has  never  been  more 
thoroughly  carried  out  in  practice  than  in  Egypt 
under  the  reign  of  Ismail  Paslia.  He,  in  his  own 
person,  was  the  State.  He  disposed  of  the  lives 
and  properties  of  all  his  subjects.  He  constituted 
the  sole  and  final  court  of  appeal  in  all  affairs, 
great  or  small.  He  administered  in  person  every 
Department  of  the  State.  His  will  was  law.  His 
subordinates  obeyed  his  every  word  impHcitly. 
Ancient  tradition  and  personal  interest  alike  for- 
bade an  Egyptian  official  to  question  the  wisdom 
of  a  decision  emanating  from  a  ruler,  wlio  could  at 
pleasure  dispose  of  the  life  and  make  or  mar  the 
fortune  of  any  one  of  his  subjects.  All  inde- 
pendence of  thought  and  action  was  crushed  out. 
Moreover,  Ismail  Pasha  did  more  than  rule.  He 
afforded  in  his  own  person  a  striking  example  of 
what  may  result  from  concentrating  in  the  hands  of 
the  ruler  of  the  State  functions  which  may  more 
advantageously  be  left  to  private  enterprise.  He 
was  the  largest  landed  proprietor  in  Egypt.  He 
was  the  only  sugar  manufacturer.  He  was  a  large 
shipowner.  In  fact,  he  was  omnipresent.  The 
task  whicli   lie  bad  undertaken  would  have  taxed 


CH.  IV     NUBAR-WILSON  MINISTRY         57 

administrative  abilities  of  the  highest  order.  Ismail 
Pasha  was  a  man  of  some  natural  ability,  but  he 
possessed  neither  the  knowledge,  nor  the  experience, 
nor  the  power  of  application  necessary  to  govern 
successfully  on  his  own  principles.^ 

The  result  was  that  a  state  of  affairs  was  pro- 
duced such  as  that  described  in  the  report  of  the 
Commissioners.  At  the  time  they  wrote,  the 
whole  machine  of  government  was  in  danger  of 
collapsing.  It  was  useless  to  elaborate  any  minor 
reforms  on  paper,  until  steps  had  been  taken  to 
remedy  the  main  defect  of  the  system.  It  was 
clearly  necessary  to  place  some  check  on  the 
arbitrary  power  of  the  Khedive.  The  principle 
of  ministerial  responsibility  had  to  be  enforced. 

Another  fundamental  reform  was  also  necessary 
before  the  foundations  of  an  improved  system  of 
administration  could  be  laid.  So  long  as  the 
revenues  of  the  country  remained  at  the  disposal 
of  a  despotic  and  spendthrift  ruler,  no  trustworthy 
forecast  could  be  made  of  the  liabilities  of  the 
State,  and  no  reliance  could  be  felt  that  revenues, 
which  were  intended  by  the  Finance  Minister  to 
defray  certain  expenses,  might  not  suddenly  escape 
his  grasp  and  be  devoted  to  some  wholly  different 
object.  Neglect  to  distinguish  between  the  public 
revenues  of  the  State  and  the  private  income  of  the 
Sovereign  is  a  rock  on  which  the  Governments  of 

^  Compare  Taine,  Ancien  Regime,  p.  101.  Speakiug  of  the  duties 
imposed  on  the  King,  he  says :  "  En  efFet,  par  sa  complication,  son 
irregularite,  et  sa  grandeur,  la  machine  echappe  a  ses  prises.  Uu 
Frederic  II.,  leve  a  quatre  heures  du  matin,  un  Napoleon  qui  dicte 
une  partie  de  la  nuit  dans  sou  bain  et  travaille  dix-huit  heures  par  jour, 
y  suffiraient  a  peine.  Un  tel  re'gime  ne  va  point  sans  une  attention 
toujours  tendue,  saus  une  euergie  infatigable,  sans  un  discernement 
iufaillible,  sans  une  seve'rite'  niilitaire,  sans  un  genie  superieur  ;  a  ces 
conditions  seulement  on  pent  clianger  vingt-cinq  millions  d'hommes  en 
automates,  et  substituer  sa  volonte  partout  lucide,  partout  coherente, 
partout  presente,  a  leurs  volontes  que  Ton  abolit." 

What  Louis  XVI.  was  expected  to  do  on  a  large  scale  in  Fraiice, 
Ismail  Pasha  attempted  to  do  on  a  small  scale  iu  Egypt.  He  naturally 
failed. 


58  JSIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

other  countries  have  foundered  before  the  days  of 
Ismail  Pasha.  Such  a  system  must,  in  fact,  lead  to 
confusion  in  any  country.  Under  a  primitive  and 
semi-barbarous  Government,  however,  it  may  con- 
tinue for  a  long  while  without  producing  a  collapse 
of  the  whole  machinery  of  the  State.  Unless 
resort  be  had  to  credit,  a  certain  limit  is  of 
necessity  imposed  on  the  harm  which  can  be 
inflicted  by  the  most  capricious  despot.  He  can- 
not spend  more  money  than  he  can  obtain,  and 
if  he  is  unable  to  obtain  more  than  the  annual 
revenue  which  his  country  yields,  with  })erhaps 
a  certain  limited  amount  taken  in  advance,  the 
harm  which  can  be  done  is  not  irremediable. 
Agriculture  is  the  principal  and,  indeed,  almost 
the  only  resource  of  most  Asiatic  States.  Neither 
the  devastation  caused  by  war  nor  the  evils  result- 
inoj  from  the  most  gross  forms  of  mis<>overnment 
can  altogether  ruin  the  agriculture  of  any  country.^ 
The  vis  medicatrix  naturae  soon  repairs  the  harm 
which  has  been  done,  and  leaves  a  fair  field  open 
for  the  future  labours  of  some  more  intelligent 
ruler.  But  the  maximum  amount  of  harm  is 
probably  done  when  an  Oriental  ruler  is  for  the 
first  time  brought  in  contact  with  the  European 
system  of  credit.  He  then  finds  that  he  can 
obtain  large  sums  of  money  with  the  utmost 
apparent  facility.  His  personal  wishes  can  thus  be 
easily  gratified.  He  is  dazzled  by  the  ingenious 
and  often  fallacious  schemes  for  developing  his 
country  which  European  adventurers  will  not  fail 
to  lay  before  him  in  the  most  attractive  light.  He 
is  too  wanting  in  foresight  to  appreciate  the  nature 
of  the  future  difficulties  which  he  is  creating  for 
himself.     The  temptation  to  avail  himself  to  the 

^  See  Mill's  well-known  remarks  as  to  why  agricultural  countries 
recover  so  quickly  from  the  effects  of  war  {Political  Economy,  vol.  i. 
p.  94). 


CH.  IV     NUBAR- WILSON  MINISTRY         59 

full  of  the  benefits,  which  a  reckless  use  of  credit 
seems  to  offer  to  him,  are  too  strong  to  be  resisted. 
He  will  rush  into  the  gulf  which  lies  open  before 
him,  and  inflict  an  injury  on  his  country  from  which 
not  only  his  contemporaries  but  future  generations 
will  suffer.  This  is  what  Ismail  Pasha  did.  During 
the  early  years  of  his  rule,  Egypt  must  have  been 
an  earthly  paradise  for  all  who  had  money  to  lend 
at  usurious  rates  of  interest,  or  third-rate  goods  of 
which  they  wished  to  dispose  at  first-rate  prices.  I 
was  not  acquainted  with  Egyptian  affairs  in  those 
halcyon  days.  I  only  arrived  in  Egypt  at  the 
moment  when  the  second  and  inevitable  stage  on 
the  road  to  ruin  had  been  reached,  and  when  it 
was  no  longer  a  question  of  spending  money,  but 
of  repaying  the  money  already  borrowed  and 
spent.  Manifestly,  the  first  step  to  avert  further 
disaster  was  to  prevent  more  wanton  expenditure 
being  incurred,  and  to  obviate  fresh  abuses  accruing 
from  a  system  which  had  already  inflicted  such 
terrible  injury  on  both  the  present  and  future 
generations  of  Egyptians.  Egypt,  it  would  appear, 
was  to  be  civilised  on  a  European  model.  So  far, 
it  had  assimilated  but  too  often  those  portions  of 
the  European  system  which  were  least  suitable  to 
an  Oriental  community,  and  least  worthy  of  being 
copied.^  It  was  now  necessary  that  at  least  one 
cardinal  principle  of  sound  European  administration 
should  be  enforced.  The  Khedive  must  accept  a 
Civil  List.^     It  should  be  fixed  at  a  liberal  rate, 

*  Mr.  Stanley  Lane-Poole  says  with  truth,  "  The  Eastern  mind  has 
an  unequalled  aptitude  for*assimilating  the  bad  and  rejecting  the  good 
in  any  system  it  meets." — Studies  in  a  Mosque,  p.  106. 

2  The  acceptance  of  a  Civil  List  by  tlie  Ruler  of  a  misgoverned 
Oriental  State  is  the  first  preliminary  condition  which  must  precede 
all  other  reforms.  It  would  be  difficult  to  insist  too  strongly  on  this 
point.  In  this  connection,  I  may  mention  that  Sir  Edward  Malet 
{Shifting  Scenes,  p.  95)  states  that,  when  he  was  in  charge  of  the  Hritish 
Embassy  at  Constantinople  in  1879,  the  Sultan  liad  some  idea  of 
appointing  an  Englislnnan  to  be  his  Minister  of  Finance.     Sir  Edward 


60  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

such  as  would  harmonise  with  the  pomp  and  hixury 
with  which  custom  has  surrounded  Oriental  rulers ; 
but,  when  once  fixed,  it  should  be  unalterable. 
The  residue  of  the  State  revenues  must  for  the 
future  be  applied  by  responsible  ministers  to  objects 
in  which  the  State,  as  distinguished  from  the  ruler, 
possessed  an  evident  interest. 

As  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  adoption  of 
this  system,  the  estates  which  had  accumulated  in 
the  hands  of  the  Khedive  had  to  be  handed  over 
to  the  State.  It  was  an  abuse  of  words  to  call 
them  private  property.  They  had  been  bought 
with  public  money.  It  was  impossible  that  any 
one  individual  could  administer  them  efficiently. 
By  ceding  them,  an  asset  would  be  obtained  to 
satisfy  the  outstanding  claims  of  creditors,  whilst 
by  the  adoption  of  a  system  under  which  the 
estates  could  be  gradually  sold  or  farmed,  great 
benefit  would  ultimately  accrue  to  the  country. 

The  Khedive  and  his  family  possessed  916,000 
acres  of  land  in  Egypt.  Of  these,  485,000  acres 
were  already  mortgaged  to  the  Daira  creditors. 
The  Khedive,  anticipating  the  demand  which  was 
to  be  made  on  him,  took  the  initiative  during  the 
course  of  the  inquiry,  and  offered  to  cede  to  the 
State  289,000  acres  of  the  431,000  which  remained 
to  him.  The  estimated  revenue  of  the  lands 
which  he  proposed  to  cede  amounted  to  £167,000 

Malet  communicated  with  me.  He  states,  quite  accurately,  that  I 
sent  ''a  conditional  acceptance,  which  enabled  him  to  go  so  far  as  to 
submit  my  name  to  the  ISultan."  1  may  now  add  that  the  principal  of 
my  conditions  was  that  the  Sultan  should  accept  a  Civil  List.  I  did 
not  for  one  moment  think  that  this  condition  would  be  accepted.  My 
anticipations  were  realised.  1  never  heard  anything  more  of  tlie  matter. 
Scarcely  less  important  than  the  acceptance  of  a  Civil  List  is  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Crown  Domains  from  the  personal  administration 
of  a  despotic  ruler.  No  one  with  any  knowledge  of  the  government 
of  backward  States  could  have  imagined  that  the  system  adopted  by 
King  Leopold  in  connection  with  the  administration  of  the  Congo, 
would  succeed.  All  the  world  now  knows  the  results  which  that  system 
has  produced. 


CH.IV     NUBAR- WILSON  MINISTRY         61 

a  year.  That  of  the  142,000  acres  which  he  pro- 
posed to  retain  amounted  to  £224,000  a  year. 
The  best  lands  would  therefore,  under  this  arrange- 
ment, have  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Khedivial 
family. 

The  Commissioners  were  not  satisfied  with  this 
proposal.  They  demanded  the  cession  of  the  whole 
of  the  property,  rural  as  well  as  urban,  belonging 
to  the  Khedivial  family,  of  which  the  estimated  net 
revenue  was  about  £423,000  a  year. 

Such,  therefore,  were  the  conclusions  to  which 
four  months  of  laborious  inquiry  had  led.  The  con- 
fusion existing  in  the  State  accounts  was  so  great, 
and  the  system  of  taxation  so  irregular,  that  it 
was  as  yet  impossible  to  estimate  accurately  the 
resources  of  Egypt.  Neither,  indeed,  could  any 
general  financial  arrangement  be  proposed  with 
advantage  until  the  preliminary  questions  of  prin- 
ciple, to  which  allusion  is  made  above,  were  satis- 
factorily settled.  These  were,  first,  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  principle  of  ministerial  responsibility ; 
and  secondly,  the  acceptance  by  the  Khedive  of  a 
fixed  Civil  List  in  lieu  of  the  revenues  derived 
from  the  properties  which,  it  was  demanded,  should 
be  yielded  to  the  State. 

The  Commissioners  sent  in  their  report  early 
in  August.  The  Khedive  was  in  doubt  as  to 
the  line  of  conduct  he  should  adopt.  He  was 
pressed  by  Nubar  Pasha  to  accept  the  conclusions 
of  the  Commission.  After  a  sliort  period  of 
hesitation,  the  Khedive  yielded.  In  a  speech 
addressed  to  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  on  August  23, 
he  expressed  himself  in  the  following  terms : 
**  Quant  aux  conclusions  auxquelles  vous  etes 
arrive,  je  les  accepte ;  c  est  tout  naturel  que  je 
le  fasse ;  c'est  moi  qui  ai  desire  ce  travail  pour  le 
bien  de  mon  pays.  II  s'agit  actuellement  pour  moi 
d'appliquer  ces  conclusions.     Je  suis  resolu  de  la 


62  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

faire  s^rieusement,  soyez-en  convain^u.  INIoti  pays 
n'est  ])lus  en  Afrique ;  nous  faisons  partie  de 
1  Europe  actuellement.  II  est  done  naturel  pour 
nous  dabandonner  les  errements  anciens  pour 
adopter  un  systeme  nouveau  adapte  a  notre  etat 
social.  Je  crois  que  dans  un  avenir  pen  eloign^ 
vous  verrez  des  changements  considerables.  lis 
seront  amenes  plus  facilement  qu'on  ne  le  croit. 
Ce  n'est  au  fond  qu'une  simple  question  de  legalite, 
de  respect  a  la  loi.  II  faut  surtout  ne  pas  se  payer 
de  mots,  et  pour  moi  je  suis  decide  a  chercher  la 
rdalit^  des  choses.  Pour  commencer  et  pour 
montrer  a  quel  point  je  suis  decide,  j'ai  charge 
Nubar  Pacha  de  me  former  un  Ministere.  Cette 
innovation  pent  paraitre  de  pen  d'importance ; 
mais  de  cette  innovation,  serieusement  con^ue, 
vous  verrez  sortir  I'independance  ministdrielle,  et 
ce  n'est  pas  pen  ;  car  cette  innovation  est  le  point 
de  depart  d'un  changement  de  systeme,  et,  d'apres 
moi,  la  meilleure  assurance  que  je  puisse  donner  du 
serieux  de  mes  intentions  relativement  a  I'applica- 
tion  de  vos  conclusions."  ^ 

A  few  days  later  (August  28),  the  Khedive 
addressed  a  letter  to  Nubar  Pasha  authorising  him 
to  form  a  Ministry.  In  this  letter,  the  principle  of 
Ministerial  responsibility  was  reaffirmed.  "Dor^- 
navant,"  the  Khedive  said,  "je  veux  gouverner 
avec  et  par  mon  Conseil  des  JNIinistres.  .  .  .  Les 
membres  du  Conseil  des  Ministres  devront  etre 
tons  solidaires  les  uns  des  autres ;  ce  point  est 
essentiel."  The  voice  of  the  majority  was  to 
decide  upon  any  question  brought  before  the 
Council.  The  chief  officials  of  the  State  were  to 
be  named  by  the  Khedive  acting  on  the  advice  of 
his  Council  of  Ministers. 

Nubar  Pasha  undertook  the    direction    of  the 

*  This  speech  had,  of  course,  been  prepared  by  Nubar  Pasha  for 
the  Khedive. 


CH.1V     NUBAR- WILSON  MINISTRY         63 

Departments  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  of  Justice. 
Riaz  Pasha  was  named  Minister  of  the  Interior. 

It  was,  at  the  same  time,  decided  to  introduce 
an  important  change  into  the  form  in  which  Euro- 
pean agency  should  be  employed  in  the  direction 
of  Egyptian  affairs.  Only  very  limited  executive 
functions  had  been  vested  in  the  two  Controllers. 
It  was  now  decided  to  appoint  European  INIinisters. 
Thus,  the  European  element  was  brought  into  direct 
contact  with  the  population  of  the  country,  instead 
of  acting,  as  heretofore,  through  the  agency  of 
Egyptian  Ministers.  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  was  named 
Minister  of  Finance,  and  M.  de  Blignieres  Minister 
of  Public  Works. 

On  October  29,  a  Khedivial  Decree  was  issued 
ceding  to  the  State  most  of  the  properties  which 
had  heretofore  belonged  to  the  Khedivial  family, 
and  authorising  a  loan  of  £8,500,000  to  be  raised  on 
the  security  of  those  properties.  They  were  to  be 
administered  by  a  Commission  composed  of  an 
Egyptian,  an  Englishman,  and  a  Frenchman.  Tiie 
two  latter  were  to  be  selected  by  the  British  and 
French  Governments  respectively. 

The  negotiations  which  were  undertaken  with 
Messrs.  Rothschild  with  a  view  to  tlie  issue  of  tlie 
new  loan,  delayed  the  arrival  of  Sir  Rivers  Wilson 
and  M.  de  Blignieres  in  Egypt.  It  was  not  till 
towards  the  close  of  November  1878  that  they 
took  up  their  duties. 


CHAPTER   V 

THE    FALL   OF   NUBAR   PASHA 

November  1878-February  1879 

Difficult  position  of  the  new  Ministry — Support  of  the  British  and 
French  Governments — The  Khedive  declines  all  responsibility — ■ 
Convocation  of  the  Chamber  of  Notables — The  principle  of 
Ministerial  responsibility — Contest  between  the  Khedive  and 
Nubar  Pasha — The  Khedive  intrigues  against  the  Ministry — 
Mutiny  of  the  officers — It  is  quelled  by  the  Khedive — Nubar 
Pasha  resigns — Immediate  consequences — Remote  consequences — 
State  of  discipline  of  the  army — The  Khedive's  responsibility  for 
the  mutiny. 

The  new  Ministers  had  undertaken  a  heavy  task. 
They  had  to  deal  not  only  with  difficulties  arising 
from  a  long  course  of  niisgovernment,  but  also 
with  those  due  to  the  special  circumstances  of  the 
moment.  These  latter  were  of  a  serious  nature. 
The  country  was  staggering  under  a  load  of  debt 
which  would,  under  normal  circumstances,  have 
taxed  its  resources  to  the  utmost.  Unfortvmately, 
at  this  particular  moment  its  resources  fell  below 
the  normal  level.  The  usual  Nile  flood  had  failed, 
and  the  failure  produced  the  maximum  amount 
of  evil  consequences,  for  the  system  of  irrigation 
was  conducted  on  unscientific  principles;  neither, 
although  a  contingency  of  this  sort  was  of  period- 
ical recurrence,  had  any  preparations  been  made 
to  meet  it.  Moreover,  the  country  had  been 
exhausted  by  the  endeavours  made  to  pay  the 
interest    on    the    debt    in    the    previous    spring. 

64 


CH.  V         FALL  OF  NUBAR  PASHA  65 

Further  heavy  payments  were  about  to  fall  due. 
On  October  15, 1878,  the  interest  on  the  Preference 
Stock,  amounting  to  £443,000,  and  on  November  1, 
the  interest  of  the  Unified  Debt,  amounting  to 
nearly  £2,000,000,  had  to  be  paid.  To  meet  these 
engagements  there  was,  at  the  end  of  August,  only 
£442,000  in  the  hands  of  the  Commissioners  of 
the  Debt.  The  revenue  of  the  first  eight  months 
of  the  year  fell  short  of  the  receipts  during  the 
corresponding  period  of  1877  by  £1,143,000. 

The  sinking  fund  of  the  Unified  Debt  was,  with 
the  consent  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt, 
temporarily  suspended.  The  relief  afforded  by 
this  measure  was,  however,  but  slight.  A  sum 
of  £1,260,000  had  to  be  taken  from  the  proceeds 
of  the  loan  recently  negotiated  with  Messrs. 
Rothschild  in  order  to  pay  the  interest  on  the 
Unified  Debt.  No  sooner  had  the  November 
coupon  been  paid,  than  attention  w^as  attracted 
to  the  difficulties  of  meeting  the  engagements 
falling  due  in  the  following  spring.  In  fact,  at 
this  time  the  Egyptian  Government  lived  from 
coupon  to  coupon.  Large  sums  on  account  of 
land  revenue  are  generally  collected  in  Egypt 
during  the  months  of  November  and  December ; 
yet  by  the  end  of  the  year,  only  £302,000  was  in 
hand  to  meet  a  payment  of  nearly  £2,000,000  fall- 
ing due  on  May  1,  1879.  To  meet  the  coupon 
on  the  Preference  Stock  due  on  April  15,  1879, 
and  amounting  to  £443,000,  only  £117,000  was 
received  from  the  Railway  Administration  duiing 
the  last  two  and  a  half  months  of  1878,  although 
this  period  embraced  the  season  which  was  usually 
the  most  productive  of  revenue.  AA^ell  might 
Lord  Vivian  write :  "  These  gloomy  returns  speak 
for  themselves ;  they  show  that  the  financial  posi- 
tion of  the  country  is  as  bad  as  it  can  well  be." 

From    one   point    of  view,    however,    the   new 

VOL.  I  F 


66  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

Ministry  began  work  under  auspices  which  augured 
well  for  its  success.  It  was  warmly  supported 
by  both  the  British  and  French  Governments. 
Nevertheless,  two  points  were,  from  the  first, 
clear.  The  first  was  that  the  new  administra- 
tion could  not  hope  to  work  successfully  unless 
it  were  cordially  supported  by  the  Khedive.  The 
second  was  that  the  Khedive  had  reluctantly 
assented  to  the  new  order  of  things,  and  was 
inclined  to  afford  a  very  lukewarm  support  to,  his 
JNIinisters.  It  was  essential  to  do  all  that  was 
possible  to  ensure  his  hearty  co-operation.  The 
following  instructions  were,  therefore,  addressed 
by  Lord  Salisbury  to  Lord  Vivian :  "  In  the 
opinion  of  Her  Majesty's  Government  a  very 
grave  responsibility  will  rest  with  His  Highness 
the  Khedive  for  the  success  or  failure  of  the  new 
regime,  especially  as  regards  the  collection  of  taxes. 
Rumours  have  already  reached  Her  Majesty's 
Government  which,  if  well  founded,  might  cause 
them  to  apprehend  that,  under  cover  of  the  inter- 
ference of  foreign  Governments,  attempts  will  be 
made  in  high  quarters  to  throw  off  all  responsi- 
bility, a  state  of  things  that  would  soon  be  under- 
stood throughout  the  country  generally.  .  .  . 

"Her  Majesty's  Government  have  full  confi- 
dence in  the  resources  of  the  country,  and  enter- 
tain no  doubts  as  to  the  result  of  the  new  system, 
if  it  is  only  allowed  to  have  a  fair  trial.  But  if  it 
be  opposed  by  those  in  power,  or  should  they  even 
show  a  disposition  to  throw  discredit  upon  it,  the 
difficulties  of  Nubar  Pasha  and  his  advisers  will  be 
enormously  increased,  and  the  responsibility  for 
their  failure  will  involve  its  promoters  in  the 
disastrous  consequences  that  must  result." 

M.  Godeaux,  who  had  taken  Baron  des  Michels' 
place  in  Egypt,  gave  a  similar  warning  to  the 
Khedive  on  behalf  of  the  Frencii  Government. 


CH.  Y        FALL  OF  NUBAR  PASHA  67 

When  these  messages  were  delivered  to  the 
Khedive,  he  "showed  evident  signs  of  great 
annoyance,  and  regretted  that  Her  Majesty's 
Government  sliould  have  thought  it  necessary 
to  hold  language  to  him  which  he  thought  was 
undeserved  and  unjust."  The  responsibility  which 
it  was  sought  to  throw  on  him  was,  the  Khedive 
thought,  neither  just  nor  logical.  What  was  his 
position  in  Egypt  ?  He  had  deliberately  accepted 
the  position  of  a  constitutional  ruler.  A  respons- 
ible Ministry  had  been  formed  to  advise  him. 
'*  If  he  rightly  understood  the  first  principles  of 
constitutional  government,  it  was  that  Ministers, 
and  not  the  chief  of  the  State,  were  made  respons- 
ible." He  must  decline  to  meddle  with  the 
functions  of  his  Ministers.  His  advice  or  opinion 
was  at  their  disposal  if  they  chose  to  ask  him  for 
it,  but  he  could  not  thrust  it  upon  them  unasked. 
If  the  Ministers  were  not  responsible  for  their  own 
acts,  what  was  the  meaning  of  a  responsible 
Ministry  ?  Responsibility,  he  thought,  would  only 
attach  to  him  if  he  attempted  to  interfere  in  the 
government  of  the  country.  Otherwise,  he  must 
disclaim  it. 

To  all  this  sophistry  Lord  Vivian  replied,  with 
obvious  good  sense,  that  "His  Highness  must 
remember  that,  although  he  had  surrendered  his 
personal  power,  and  a  constitutional  regime  was 
established  in  Egypt,  the  new  order  of  things  was 
in  its  infancy,  and  it  was  rather  too  early  for  the 
strict  application  of  the  doctrines  of  constitutional 
government  as  understood  in  Europe.  His  High- 
ness had  still  all  the  prestige  and  influence  of  the 
chief  of  an  Eastern  State,  combined  with  greater 
knowledge  and  experience  of  Egypt  than  those  of 
any  other  person.  What  Her  JNIajesty's  Govern- 
ment desired  was  that,  instead  of  showing  indiffer- 
ence, coldness,  or  even  dislike  to  the  new  order  of 


68  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

things,  he  should  place  all  his  knowledge,  influence, 
and  experience  at  the  disposal  of  his  Ministers,  and 
loyally  and  cordially  co-operate  with  tliem  within 
the  proper  sphere  of  his  prerogative,  A  moral 
responsibility  devolved  on  him  for  any  hostile 
action  that  might  tend  to  thwart  the  new 
Ministry." 

The  Khedive's  words  were  ominous.  They 
gave  the  keynote  of  what  was  to  follow.  The 
British  and  French  Governments  had  wished  for 
constitutional  government  in  Egypt.  He  had 
complied  with  their  wishes.  He  would  now  stand 
aside  whilst  the  game  of  constitutional  government 
was  being  played  out.  It  would  soon  be  found 
that,  without  his  powerful  aid,  the  country  could 
not  be  governed  at  all.  If,  however,  constitu- 
tional government  was  to  be  tried,  he  would  be 
thoroughly  constitutional.  He  would  leave  his 
Ministers  to  their  own  devices,  but  he  could  not 
consent  to  the  imposition  of  any  fresh  taxes  with- 
out ascertaining  the  will  of  the  people.  In  18G6, 
a  Chamber  of  Notables  had  been  created,  mainly 
with  a  view  to  throwing  dust  in  the  eyes  of 
Europe.  The  Khedive  was  fully  alive  to  the  fact 
that,  in  the  then  existing  condition  of  affairs  in 
Egypt,  the  mediaeval  Italian  })roverb — chi  dice  par- 
lamento,  dice  guastamento — applied  with  full  force. 
He  had,  therefore,  maintained  the  Chamber  in 
a  condition  of  perfect  subserviency  to  himself 
At  the  time  about  which  I  am  writing,  it  had 
fallen  into  complete  obscurity.  It  was  now  to 
be  convoked  with  a  view  to  the  consideration  of 
certain  financial  proposals,  notably  the  increase  in 
the  Ouchouri  land-tax,^  "by  which  the  richer  class 
of  proprietors  are  assessed  at  rates  below  the 
present  value   of    their    lands,    which   have   been 

*  The  Ouchouri  landowners  answered,  to  a  great  extent,  to  the  Indian 
jaghirdars.     They  held  fiefs  at  low  rents. 


CH.  V         FALL  OF  NUBAR  PASHA  69 

much  improved  by  cultivation."  This  was  con- 
stitutionalism with  a  vengeance,  for  the  Ouchouri 
landov/ners  were  strongly  represented  in  the 
Chamber,  and  they  would  not  fail  to  throw  on 
the  new  Ministry  the  odium  resulting  from  an 
increase  of  taxation,  which  would  fall  on  the  class 
to  which  they  mainly  belonged.  Neither  would 
they  be  pleased  by  a  measure  then  under  discussion 
and  subsequently  adopted,  under  which  cultivators 
residing  on  Ouchouri  lands  would  no  longer,  as 
heretofore,  be  exempted  from  their  share  of  the 
corvee. 

As  has  been  already  explained,  the  principle 
of  ministerial  responsibility  had  been  accepted  by 
the  Khedive.  There  were,  however,  two  different 
methods  of  giving  effect  to  that  principle. 

One  was  to  exclude  the  Khedive  altogether 
from  the  meetings  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  to 
treat  him  as  a  cipher,  and  to  endeavour  to  govern 
the  country,  not  only  without  his  co-operation, 
but  often  in  a  manner  which  was  diametrically 
opposed  to  his  personal  wishes  and  opinions.  This 
system,  which  involved  pushing  the  principle  of 
ministerial  responsibility  to  its  extreme  logical 
limit,  was  advocated  by  Nubar  Pasha,  who  was 
supported  by  Sir  Rivers  Wilson.  Arguments  not 
wanting  in  weight  could  be  advanced  in  its  favour. 
The  presence  of  the  Khedive  at  the  Council  of 
Ministers  was,  it  was  maintained,  incompatible 
with  free  discussion,  which  often  turned  either 
upon  questions  affecting  His  Highness  personally, 
o:-  upon  the  errors  and  abuses  of  the  past,  for 
which  he  was  principally  responsible.  Even  the 
appearance  of  restoring  to  him  any  part  of 
the  power  of  which  he  had  been  shorn  would, 
it  was  argued,  have  a  bad  effect  in  the  country, 
and  induce  the  Egyptians  to  think  that  he  was 
still  all-powerful. 


70  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

This  position  was  perfectly  logical ;  neither,  in 
explaining  the  causes  of  Nubar  Pasha's  attitude, 
is  it  necessary  to  assume  that  personal  ambition 
and  love  of  power  were  the  motives  which 
prompted  him.  Without  doubt,  in  attempting 
to  put  the  Khedive  altogether  aside,  Nubar  Pasha 
thought  that  he  was  rendering  a  real  service  to  his 
adopted  country.  Nubar  Pasha,  altliough  some- 
what of  a  doctrinaire,  was  an  earnest  reformer. 
Moreover,  his  versatile  intellect  was  capable  of 
grasping  a  principle.  In  this  case,  he  had  got  hold 
of  a  principle  which  was  unquestionably  sound. 
His  French  education,  which  tended  to  engender 
in  his  mind  a  somewhat  uncompromising  attitude 
on  matters  of  theory,  coupled  with  a  certain  inapti- 
tude to  seize  the  springs  of  action  which  move 
individuals  as  well  as  Governments,  conspired  to 
convince  him  that  the  principle  should  be  driven 
home  to  its  logical  conclusion.  Loyalty  to  a 
colleague,  personal  friendship,  respect  for  Nubar 
Pasha's  abilities,  consideration  for  his  superior 
local  knowledge,  and  a  vivid  realisation  of  the 
harm  done  by  Ismail  Pasha's  abuse  of  personal 
power,  all  rendered  it  natural  that  Sir  Rivers 
Wilson  should  follow  in  the  same  track. 

The  alternative  system,  which  was  supported 
by  Lord  Vivian,  was  less  theoretically  perfect, 
but  was  in  a  greater  degree  based  on  the  actual 
circumstances  then  existing  in  Egypt.  Lord 
Vivian  thought  that  Nubar  Pasha  had  overrated 
his  own  strength  and  underrated  the  power  of 
the  Khedive.  That  power  was  still  an  important 
factor  in  the  government  of  a  country  which  he 
and  his  predecessors  had  ruled  for  so  long  and  in 
so  absolute  a  fashion.  The  Khedive  was  the  only 
authority  recognised  and  obeyed  by  all  classes  in 
the  land.  There  was  no  middle  course  between 
deposing  him   or  counting  with  his  power.     The 


CH.V         FALL  OF  NUBAR  PASHA  71 

only  system  which  presented  a  chance  of  success 
was  not  to  put  the  Khedive  on  one  side  altogether, 
but  to  invite  his  co-operation,  whilst  at  the  same 
time  the  exercise  of  his  authority  would  be 
controlled. 

My  own  views  were  expressed  on  February  17, 
1879, — the  day  before  the  mutiny  of  the  officers 
to  which  allusion  will  presently  be  made, — in  the 
following  terms  :  "  The  transition  from  a  purely 
personal  government  by  the  Khedive  to  a  govern- 
ment by  an  executive  council,  whose  leading 
members  are  aliens  and  Christians,  has  been  too 
rapid.  For  some  time  to  come,  it  will  be  impossible 
not  to  take  into  account  the  personal  authority  of 
the  Khedive  as  an  element  in  the  government 
of  the  country ;  he  will  always  possess  a  large 
influence,  which,  if  it  be  not  used  for  good,  will 
almost  certainly  be  used  for  bad  ;  I  therefore  think 
it  desirable  to  consider  the  best  method  of  giving 
the  Khedive  some  practical  share  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  country." 

Whatever  defects,  however,  may  have  existed 
in  the  methods  of  giving  effect  to  a  policy  of 
reform,  it  was  certain  that  the  Ministry  of  Nubar 
Pasha  represented  the  cause  of  progress  and  civilisa- 
tion. The  ultimate  consequences  of  its  fall  might, 
and  probably  would  be  serious  in  so  far  as  the 
Khedive  was  personally  concerned.  But  the  Khedive, 
true  to  the  traditions  of  his  previous  life,  took  little 
heed  of  ultimate  consequences.  In  the  meanwhile, 
the  immediate  issue  of  the  struggle  between  the 
Khedive  and  Nubar  Pasha  could  scarcely  be 
do.ibtful.  Nubar  Pasha  was  at  a  great  dis- 
advantage. On  the  one  side,  was  a  ruler  who  was 
feared  and  obeyed,  who  disposed  absolutely  of 
the  lives  and  fortunes  of  his  subjects,  and  who 
could  readily  divert  the  rising  tide  of  popular 
discontent  from  his  own  person  and  turn  it  against 


72  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.i 

his  Ministers.  On  the  other  side,  was  a  Minister 
who  was  not  only  a  Christian  and  associated  with 
other  European  Christians,  but  who  also  belonged 
to  a  nationality  against  which  the  Mohammedan 
population  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  is  greatly 
prejudiced.  "  When  an  Armenian  rules,"  says 
the  Turkish  proverb,  "  tlie  State  decays."  ^  Nubar 
Pasha  carried  but  little  weight  with  the  Egyptian 
population,  with  whom,  moreover,  owing  to  his 
ignorance  of  Arabic,  he  was  unable  to  communi- 
cate in  their  own  language.  He  could  only  rely  on 
persuasion  and  on  the  support  of  two  foreign  Govern- 
ments. This  support,  although  heartily  accorded,^ 
did  him  in  some  respects  more  harm  than  good. 
Under  these  circumstances,  his  eventual  fall  from 
power  was  almost  a  foregone  conclusion. 

The  crisis  did  not,  however,  arise  at  once.  For 
a  few  months,  the  new  machine  of  government 
worked,  although  with  great  friction.  The 
Khedive  frequently  complained  that  the  anomalous 
position  in  whicli  it  was  sought  to  place  him  was 
daily  becoming  more  and  more  intolerable,  and 
that,  whilst  he  was  not  consulted  about  the 
measures  of  his  Ministers,  at  the  same  time 
the  British  and  French  Governments  held  him 
responsible  for  their  result.  On  the  other  hand, 
Nubar  Pasha  was  "evidently  discouraged  and 
dissatisfied."  "  Nous  tournons,"  he  said,  "  dans  un 
cercle  vicieux.     Nous  ne  marchons  pas." 

In  the  meanwhile,  there  was  good  reason  for 
believing  that  the  Khedive  was  actively  intriguing 
against  his  Ministers.      "There  is,"   Lord  Vivian 

'  Ermeni  vizir,  devlet  dilsher.  Some  of  the  more  superstitious 
followers  of  Islam  are  said  to  derive  a  certain  amount  of  consolatiou 
from  the  fact  that  Armenians  have  occasion;illy  occupied  high  posts  in 
the  service  of  tiieir  hereditary  enemy,  Russia. 

2  It  has  been  occasionally  stated  that  if  Lord  Vivian  had  supported 
Nubar  Pasha  more  cordially,  he  might  have  l)een  maintained  in  power. 
Such  is  not  my  o])inion.  Lord  Vivian's  instructions  were  clear,  and  be 
acted  loyally  upon  them. 


CH.V         FALL  OF  NUBAR  PASHA  73 

wrote  on  January  11,  **a  certain  amount  of 
fermentation  in  the  country  as  evidenced  by  the 
arrival  of  large  deputations  of  Sheikhs  from  the 
provinces  to  protest  against  any  pressure  for  the 
payment  of  taxes  at  this  moment,  and  I  am 
told  that  there  is  a  probability  of  opposition  in 
the  Chamber  of  Delegates  to  the  proposition  that 
is  to  be  submitted  to  them  by  the  Government 
for  an  increase  of  the  Ouchouri  tax,  which  falls 
especially  upon  the  richer  class  of  proprietors. 
If  this  fermentation  were  natural,  it  would  not  be 
an  unhealthy  symptom,  but  I  have  good  reason 
to  suspect  that  it  has  been  secretly  fomented 
by  agents,  probably  employed  by  the  Khedive ; 
and  I  hear  from  a  reliable  source  that  the  leading 
men  of  the  Chamber  of  Notables  have  been 
secretly  convoked  and  told  that  the  Khedive 
would  not  be  displeased  to  see  them  oppose  the 
measures  of  an  administration  which  was  imposed 
upon  him,  and  which  was  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  Europeans. 

"Thus,  in  addition  to  their  serious  financial  diffi- 
culties, and  to  the  task  of  attempting  to  create 
order  out  of  chaos,  the  new  Ministry  have  to 
struggle,  not  only  with  open  enemies,  but  with 
internal  treachery  of  the  most  dangerous  description, 
carried  on  in  spite  of  serious  warning." 

Under  circumstances  such  as  these,  it  only 
required  the  occurrence  of  some  adventitious 
incident  to  bring  about  a  crisis.  No  long  delay 
intervened  before  such  an  incident  occurred.  It 
was,  however,  unfortunate  that  it  happened  in 
that  branch  of  the  State  administration  which, 
perhaps  less  than  any  other,  can  be  infected  with 
disease  without  producing  after-effects  of  a  serious 
nature.  Hitherto,  Egypt  had  suffered  mainly  from 
fiscal  misgovernment.  The  only  sound  ])art  of 
the  system  was  that  public  tranquillity  had  been 


74  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

preserved,  and,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  the 
methods  by  which  it  had  been  preserved,  every  one 
but  a  devotee  of  the  sacred  right  of  revolution 
would  prefer  order  of  some  sort  to  complete 
anarchy.  The  security,  which  had  so  far  reigned, 
was  now  to  be  disturbed.  The  financial  embarrass- 
ments of  Egypt  were  great.  To  these  was  now 
to  be  superadded  the  disquietude  produced  by  a 
mutinous  army. 

Great  discontent  had  been  produced  amongst 
the  officers  of  the  army  owing  to  the  non-payment 
of  their  salaries.  The  new  Ministry  decided  to 
pay  a  portion  of  the  arrears  due.  At  the  same 
time,  a  large  number  of  officers  were  placed  on 
half- pay.  This  measure  would,  under  any  cir- 
cumstances, have  been  considered  harsh,  however 
necessary  it  might  have  been  in  view  of  the 
straitened  condition  of  the  Egyptian  Treasury. 
It  was,  however,  especially  harsh  and  impolitic 
to  dismiss  so  large  a  body  of  officers  without, 
in  the  first  place,  fully  liquidating  the  arrears  of  pay 
due  to  them.  The  result  was  that  many  officers  and 
their  families  were  reduced  to  a  state  of  complete 
destitution. 

When  this  measure  was  adopted,  there  were 
about  500  officers  in  Cairo  ;  but  at  this  moment, 
Lord  Vivian  reported,  "  by  an  unparalleled  act  of 
folly,  the  Minister  of  War  summoned  the  remaining 
2000  ofKcers  up  to  Cairo  from  various  parts  of  the 
country  to  receive  a  portion  of  their  arrears  of  pay 
and  to  deposit  their  arms  wi+h  the  authorities. 
He  thus  grouped  together  a  seething  mass  of  2500 
discontented  officers,  the  garrison  of  Cairo  con- 
sisting only  of  2600  troops,  a  large  proportion  of 
whom  had  undoubted  sym[)athy  with  the  grievances 
of  the  mutineers." 

On  the  morning  of  February  18,  as  Nubar 
Pasha  and  Sir  Kivers  Wilson  were  driving  to  their 


CH.V         FALL  OF  NUBAR  PASHA  75 

offices,  they  were  mobbed  by  a  crowd  of  officers 
armed  with  swords,  and  taken  out  of  their  carriages. 
After  being  subjected  to  some  rough  treatment, 
they  were  dragged  to  the  JNIinistry  of  Finance, 
which  was  close  to  the  scene  of  the  outrage,  where 
they  were  shut  in  by  the  mutineers,  who  cut  the 
telegraph  wires.  Means  were,  however,  found  to 
communicate  with  Lord  Vivian,  who  at  once  had 
an  interview  with  the  Khedive.  What  followed 
may  best  be  related  in  Lord  Vivian's  words.  "  The 
Khedive,"  he  reported,  "  drove  with  me  to  the 
Ministry  of  Finance,  which  we  found  besieged  by  a 
large  crowd,  who,  however,  made  way  res])ectfully 
for  the  Khedive's  carriage,  and  cheered  him.  In  a 
room  on  the  upper  floor,  surrounded  by  the  rioters, 
we  found  Nubar  Pasha,  Sir  Rivers  Wilson,  and 
Riaz  Pasha,  none  of  them  really  hurt,  although  the 
two  former  had  received  very  rough  treatment 
while  they  were  being  forced  from  the  street  into 
the  building.  The  Khedive,  having  assured  him- 
self of  their  safety,  turned  to  the  rioters  and 
ordered  them  to  leave  the  building  on  his  promise 
that  their  just  demands  should  be  satisfied.  'If,' 
he  said,  *you  are  my  officers,  you  are  bound  by 
your  oath  to  obey  me ;  if  you  refuse,  I  will  have 
you  swept  away.'  They  obeyed  him,  although 
reluctantly  and  with  some  murmuring,  begging 
him  to  leave  them  to  settle  their  accounts  in  their 
own  way.  There  were  also  cries  of  '  Death  to  the 
dogs  of  Christians.'  His  Highness  got  them  down 
the  stairs  and  into  and  beyond  the  courtyard, 
where  they  fell  back  on  the  larger  body  who  were 
besieging  the  gates.  The  Khedive  commanded  all 
of  them  to  disperse  and  go  to  their  homes,  and  on 
their  refusal  to  do  so,  he  ordered  up  tlie  troops. 
They  fired  in  the  air,  but  a  few  soldiers  were 
wounded  by  the  mutineers'  revolvers,  and  a  few 
of   the    rioters    received    bayonet    wounds.      The 


76  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

Khedive's  chamberlain  was  wounded  while  at  His 
Highness's  side  by  a  sabre -cut  from  one  of  the 
mutineers,  and  the  Khedive  himself  ran  consider- 
able risk.  The  whole  affair  lasted  about  half-an- 
hour,  and  the  Khedive,  after  providing  for  the  safe 
escort  of  the  Ministers,  returned  to  the  Palace. 
Sir  Rivers  Wilson  behaved  well  throughout  the 
affair,  which  he  might  have  avoided  had  he  net 
gone  to  Nubar  Pasha's  assistance,  when  he  saw  him 
surrounded  by  the  mob." 

On  the  following  morning  (February  19),  a 
meeting  took  place  at  Lord  Vivian's  house,  at 
which  JNI.  Godeaux,  Sir  Rivers  Wilson,  ]M.  de 
Blignieres,  and  myself  were  present.  Lord  Vivian 
stated  that  the  Khedive  had  on  the  previous  day 
made  a  declaration  to  the  Consular  body  to  the 
effect  that  his  position  must  be  changed,  and  his 
proper  share  of  power  restored  to  him,  or  he  would 
not  be  answerable  for  the  maintenance  of  public 
order.  It  was  decided  to  ask  the  Khedive  to  state 
in  what  respects  he  wished  his  position  to  be 
modified. 

We  then  drove  to  the  Palace.  Nubar  Pasha, 
Sir  Rivers  Wilson,  M.  de  Blignieres,  and  myself 
remained  in  a  room  on  the  ground  floor,  while 
Lord  Vivian  and  M.  Godeaux  had  an  interview 
with  the  Khedive  upstairs.  In  a  short  while,  they 
reappeared  and  communicated  the  Khedive's  reply. 
His  Highness  stated  "  unequivocally  that  he  would 
not  be  responsible  for  public  tranquillity  unless  he 
were  given  his  proper  share  in  the  government  of 
the  country,  and  was  allowed  either  to  preside  at 
the  Council  of  Ministers  himself,  or  to  select  a 
President  in  whom  he  could  have  confidence.  He 
further  required,  as  a  sine  qua  non  condition,  that 
Nubar  Pasha,  whom  he  accused  of  sapping  and 
undermining  his  authority,  should  immediately 
retire  from  the  Ministry."    Nubar  Pasha  was  asked 


OH.  V         FALL  OF  NUBAR  PASHA  77 

whether,  in  the  event  of  the  Consuls -General 
msisting  on  his  remaining  in  office,  he  would 
guarantee  the  public  safety.  He  naturally  declined 
to  give  any  such  guarantee.  "  The  only  course," 
he  said,  "  left  open  to  him  under  the  circumstances 
was  to  tender  his  resignation,  which  he  begged 
Lord  Vivian  and  M.  Godeaux  as  a  favour  to  place 
in  the  Khedive's  hands,  with  a  request  that  he 
should  be  allowed  to  live  unmolested  as  a  private 
individual  in  Egypt."  To  this  request,  the  Khedive 
consented,  "  on  the  condition  that  Nubar  Pasha  did 
not  intrigue  or  meddle  in  politics." 

Thus  the  struggle  between  the  Khedive  and 
Nubar  Pasha  was  brought  to  a  close.  The  attempt 
to  govern  Egypt  whilst  Ismail  Pasha  was  Khedive, 
without  allowing  him  any  participation  in  the 
government  of  the  country,  had  signally  failed. 
Tried  in  the  manner  which  has  been  described 
above,  the  failure  of  the  experiment  was  certain. 
Indeed,  looking  back  on  the  events  of  that  time 
after  an  interval  of  many  years,  my  principal 
feeling  is  one  of  surprise  that  any  one  should  for 
a  moment  have  thought  that,  under  these  condi- 
tions, the  experiment  could  possibly  have  succeeded. 
Nubar  Pasha's  fall  from  power  was  inevitable. 

The  circumstances  narrated  in  this  chapter 
produced  important  changes,  some  immediate 
and  others  more  remote. 

The  immediate  consequence  was  that  the  posi- 
tion of  the  European  Ministers  was  shaken,  and 
that  before  long  they  were  dismissed  from  office. 

The  remote  consequences  were  of  even  greater 
importance.  The  officers  of  the  army  had,  in  the 
first  instance,  been  unjustly  treated.  They  were 
not  paid  the  money  which  was  due  to  them.  So 
long  as  their  complaints  were  put  forward  in  a 
manner  to  which  no  exception  could  be  taken, 
they  remained  unheeded.     At  last,  they  mutinied. 


78  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

They  then  obtained  what  they  wanted.^  A  public 
apology  was  tendered  to  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  by 
Prince  Hassan,  the  Kliedive's  son  and  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Egyptian  army,  for  the 
insults  and  ill  -  treatment  to  which  he  had  been 
subjected.  But,  although  the  ringleaders  of 
the  mutiny  were  arrested,  and  some  inquiry 
into  their  conduct  was  instituted,  they  were 
speedily  released.  Indeed,  under  the  circum- 
stances which  til  en  existed,  it  would  have  been 
difficult  to  have  subjected  them  to  any  punish- 
ment without  incurring  serious  risks.  It  is 
impossible  to  treat  any  armed  body  of  men  after 
this  fashion  with  impunity.  The  discipline  of  the 
Egyptian  army  was  profoundly  shaken.  The 
most  humble  private  soldier  discovered,  for  the 
first  time,  probably  to  his  own  exceeding  astonish- 
ment, that  he  and  his  comrades  were  masters  of 
the  situation,  if,  with  muskets  in  their  hands,  they 
exerted  themselves  to  coerce  the  civil  elements  of 
society.  History  affords  abundant  proofs  of  the 
ease  with  which  this  lesson  is  learnt.  It  was  not  to 
be  unlearnt  until  a  stronger  race  of  soldiers  appeared 
on  Egyptian  soil.  The  mutiny  of  1879  was  the 
direct  precursor  of  the  Arabi  revolt.  It  would  be 
going  too  far  to  say  that  from  this  moment  a  foreign 
occupation  of  Egypt  became  inevitable,  but  it  is 
certainly  a  fact  that  the  mutiny  which  led  to  the 

*  At  the  time  of  tlie  mutiny,  the  Treasury  chest  was  empty.  It  was 
imperative  to  pay  the  officers,  who  then  held  the  town  of  Cairo  at 
tlieir  mercy,  but  cousideral)le  difficulty  was  experienced  in  obtaining 
the  money.  I  remember  being  present  at  an  interview  between  Sir 
Rivers  Wilson  and  the  representative  of  a  local  bank,  who  offered  to 
advance  money  at  an  exorbitant  rate  of  interest.  Sir  Rivers  Wilson 
showed  a  moral  courage  after  the  riot  as  conspicuous  as  the  physical 
courage  he  had  displayed  whilst  the  riot  was  taking  place.  He  declined 
to  accept  tlie  offer  wliich  was  made  to  him,  and  he  also  refused  to  revert 
to  tlie  pernicious  system  of  taking  the  taxes  in  advance,  although  the 
adoption  of  this  measure  was  pressed  upon  him.  Eventually,  Messrs. 
Rothschild  advanced  £400,000^  which  was  repaid  from  the  loan  fund% 
and  the  officers  were  paid. 


CH.V         FALL  OF  NUBAR  PASHA  79 

downfall  of  Nubar  Pasha  greatly  increased  the 
difficulties  of  governing  the  country,  and  brought 
the  pros})ects  of  foreign  intervention  of  a  decisive 
nature  appreciably  nearer. 

There  is  one  further  point  which  calls  for  remark 
before  leaving  the  history  of  this  period.  An 
opinion  was  at  the  time  generally  entertained  that 
Ismail  Pasha  was  privy  to  the  mutiny  of  the 
officers,  and,  in  fact,  that  the  whole  affair  was  an 
intrigue  got  up  by  the  Khedive  himself  It  is  a 
dangerous  thing  for  a  despotic  ruler,  who  depends 
wholly  on  force  for  the  maintenance  of  his  power, 
to  encourage  a  mutiny  in  his  own  army,  even 
although  he  may  himself  sympathise  with  the 
objects  of  the  mutineers.  The  spirit  of  mutiny, 
when  once  raised,  may  not  improbably  turn  against 
the  individual  who  raised  it.  Nevertheless,  unwise 
though  a  policy  of  this  sort  would  have  been,  there 
is  no  inherent  improbability  in  such  a  dangerous 
agency  as  a  mutinous  soldiery  being  used  by  an 
Eastern  ruler,  who,  in  spite  of  an  acute  and  subtle 
intellect,  was  singularly  lacking  in  foresight,  who 
was  smarting  under  the  humiliation  of  a  loss  of 
power,  and  who  had  unbounded  confidence  in  his 
ability  to  rule,  by  his  own  drastic  methods,  the 
generally  docile  races  who  inhabit  the  valley  of 
the  Nile.  Any  opinion,  however,  of  the  degree  to 
which  Ismail  Pasha  was  privy  to  the  mutiny  must 
be  little  more  than  conjecture.  It  is  impossible 
to  adduce  positive '  proof  that  he  knew  anything 
precise  of  the  intended  outrage  on  Nubar  Pasha 
and  Sir  Rivers  Wilson.  The  alarm  he  displayed 
at  the  spirit  of  disorder  which  had  been  evoked 
was  perhaps  genuine.  It  is,  indeed,  more  than 
probable  that,  when  the  officers  assembled  near  the 
Ministry  of  Finance  on  the  morning  of  February 
18,  they  had  not  devised  amongst  themselves  any 
very   definite    plan    of    action.      Nevertheless,   it 


80  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

would  in  any  case  be  incorrect  to  say  that  the 
responsibility  for  the  outrage  does  not  rest  on 
Ismail  Pasha.  On  the  contrary,  he  was,  without 
doubt,  morally  responsible  for  it.^  It  does  not 
require  either  a  very  vivid  imagination  or  any 
great  acquaintance  with  Eastern  politics  to  form 
a  fairly  accurate  idea  of  what  must  have  taken 
place.  I  can  best  describe  my  own  conjecture  on 
the  subject  by  an  analogy  drawn  from  a  well- 
known  incident  in  English  history. 

When  Henry  II.  wished  to  get  rid  of  Thomas  a 
Becket  he  said,  in  the  presence  of  his  court,  "  Will 
no  one  rid  me  of  this  turbulent  priest  ? "  and  forth- 
with four  knights  were  found  who  possibly  went 
beyond  their  master's  wishes,  and  rid  him  of  the 
Archbishop  in  the  rude  but  effectual  manner  of 
the  twelfth  century.  Ismail  Pasha's  language  and 
intentions  were,  without  doubt,  more  in  conformity 
with  the  civilised  age  in  which  we  live  than  those 
of  Henry  II.,  but  his  procedure  was  based  on  the 
same  principles  as  those  of  the  English  king.  He 
spoke  openly  of  the  dislike  which  he  entertained 
towards  Nubar  Pasha  and  his  Euro])ean  Ministers. 
He  represented  his  position  as  intolerable.  In  an 
Eastern  country,  this  was  enough  to  focus  on  the 
Ministry  the  responsibility  for  all  the  evils  which 
then  afflicted  Egypt.  The  officers  of  the  army 
were  discontented.  They  attributed  the  miserable 
condition  in  which  they  were  placed  to  the  action 
of  Nubar  Pasha  and  his  colleagues,  who  were 
aliens  and  Christians.  They  learnt  that  their  ruler, 
who  was  of  their  own  race  and  faith,  and  to  whom 
they  had  been  accustomed  to  yield  implicit 
obedience,  was  as  hostile  as  they  were  to  the  new 

^  It  has  been  stated  on  good  authority  that  a  few  days  before  the 
mutiny,  Shahin  Pasha  spoke  to  the  Khedive  about  the  grievances  of 
the  officers,  and  that  the  latter  replied:  'Tourquoi  les  officiers 
restent-ils  tranquilles?"  If  this  be  true,  it  is  quite  sufficient  to 
account  for  the  outbreak. 


CH.  V         FALL  OF  NUBAR  PASHA  81 

Ministry,  and  would  be  pleased  if  means  could  be 
found  to  bring  about  its  downfall.  That  was 
enough.  They  naturally  mutinied,  and  in  doing  so 
they,  without  doubt,  thought  that  they  were  not 
only  furthering  their  own  interests,  but  also  that 
they  were  acting  in  a  manner  which  would  obtain 
the  commendation  of  their  Sovereign. 

This  is  a  sufficient  and  highly  probable  explana- 
tion of  the  causes  which  led  to  the  mutiny.  It  is 
scarcely  worth  while  to  seek  for  any  other. 


VOL.  1 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    COUP   d'j^TAT 

April  1879 

Triumph  achieved  by  Ismail  Pasha — His  parliamentary  projects  — 
Necessity  of  maintaining  the  reformed  administration — Attempts 
to  reinstate  Nuhar  Pasha — Relations  between  the  Khedive  and  the 
new  Ministry — Position  of  the  British  and  French  Governments — 
Common  policy  —  Different  methods  of  executing  the  policy  — 
Dissensions  at  Cairo  —  Position  of  Prince  Tevvfik  —  Mistaken 
principles  of  the  new  Ministry — The  payment  of  the  coupon  on 
the  18(34:  loan — The  Khedive  prepares  a  separate  financial  scheme — 
Dismissal  of  the  Ministers — Proposal  to  revive  the  Control — Letter 
of  the  Khedive  to  Cherif  Pasha — Character  of  the  new  Ministers — 
Comments  on  the  Khedive's  proceedings. 

The  Khedive  had  obtained  a  considerable  triumph. 
He  had  got  rid  of  a  JNIinister  who  was  distasteful 
to  him,  although  the  latter  had  been  supported  by 
two  powerful  foreign  Governments.  He  had  shown 
all  the  world  that,  without  his  co-operation,  Egypt 
could  not  be  governed.  The  theory  of  ministerial 
res})onsibility  might  be  sound,  but  the  personal 
power  of  a  despotic  ruler  in  an  Oriental  State  was 
a  practical  fact,  which  had  to  be  taken  into  account 
in  the  application  of  the  best  of  theories. 

If  Ismail  Pasha  had  been  content  with  what  he 
had  achieved,  and  had  from  this  time  forth  worked 
loyally  with  his  European  Ministers,  he  might 
possibly  have  died  Khedive  of  Egypt.  But  it  was 
one  of  the  characteristics  of  this  singular  man  that, 
although  he  had  a  quick  perce])tion  in  dealing  with 
points  of  minor  importance,  he  erred  at  almost  every 

82 


cH.  VI  THE  COUP  D'ETAT  83 

important  crisis  of  his  career.  He  was  unable  to 
frame  a  correct  estimate  of  the  main  factors  in  a 
general  political  situation.  He  was  wanting  in  the 
power  described  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  as 
"guessing  at  what  is  going  on  on  the  other  side 
of  the  hill."  His  political  forecasts  were  singularly 
faulty.  He  would  frequently  show  great  acuteness 
in  deciding  on  some  matter  of  detail,  but  would 
generally  make  a  mistake  on  a  broad  question  of 
principle.  Lord  Palmerston  once  said  that  if  a 
little  learning  was  a  dangerous  thing,  no  learning 
at  all  was  much  more  dangerous,  and  so,  without 
doubt,  it  generally  is.  But  Ismail  Pasha  was  a 
living  proof  that  there  is  a  good  deal  of  truth  in 
the  words  of  the  English  poet.  He  would  probably 
have  fared  better  if  he  had  never  made  any  attempt 
either  to  understand  European  politics  or  to  gauge 
European  public  opinion.  As  it  was,  he  had  just 
sufficient  knowledge  of  these  subjects  to  lead  him 
astray.  He  knew  that  Europeans  laid  much  stress 
on  the  will  of  the  people.  They  had  large  talking 
assemblies,  termed  Parliaments,  to  whose  will  Kings 
and  Emperors  were  obliged  to  conform.  Such  in- 
stitutions were,  of  course,  wholly  unsuitable  to 
Egypt.  Nevertheless,  would  it  not  be  possible  to 
hoist  these  Franks  with  their  own  petard  ?  It  was, 
indeed,  difficult  to  deal  with  the  French.  They 
scarcely  made  a  pretence  of  caring  for  anything  but 
the  interests  of  the  French  creditors.  It  was  true 
that,  but  a  short  time  previously,  he  had  declared 
that  the  country  was  bankrupt,  but  circumstances 
altered  cases.  Egypt  had  vast  resources.  Huge 
sums  had  before  now  been  screwed  out  of  the 
unfortunate  peasantry.  Let  him  regain  his  personal 
power,  and  ado])t  his  own  rude  methods  for  collect- 
ing the  revenue.  A  few  extra  blows  of  the 
courbash  would  produce  financial  equilibrium. 
Thus  would  he  conjure  French  opposition. 


84  MODERN  EGYPT  pi.  i 

The  case  of  the  Enghsh  was  different.  They 
cared,  or  at  all  events  they  pretended  to  care  for 
the  welfare  of  the  fellaheen.  They  disliked  to 
hear  of  oppression  even  in  the  cause  of  the 
bondholders.  Lectures  on  this  subject  had  been 
frequently  delivered  to  him  by  meddling  Consuls- 
General  and  by  the  misguided  humanitarian  press 
of  England.  13 ut  the  English  were  an  essentially 
gullible  race.  They  had,  at  a  recent  period 
of  their  history,  got  embroiled  with  the  half  of 
Europe  because  they  sympathised  with  oppressed 
nationalities,  and  believed  that  parliamentary  insti- 
tutions, trial  by  jury,  and  the  like,  were  certain 
remedies  for  all  the  maladies  with  which  States,  in 
whatsoever  part  of  the  world,  were  afflicted.^  They 
were  easily  carried  away  by  phrases  such  as  the 
popular  will,  constitutional  government,  and  so  on. 
Moreover,  the  English  were  a  stiff-necked  people 
who  would  not  easily  be  led  by  officials.  On  the 
contrary,  they  as  often  as  not  thought  that,  when 
they  had  paid  their  officials  high  salaries  for  looking 
after  their  interests  in  a  foreign  country,  they  had 
done  enough.  They  were  under  no  obligation  to 
accept  as  correct  what  their  representatives  said. 
Indeed,  they  were  at  that  time  rather  inclined 
to  disbelieve  their  officials  because  they  were 
officials,  and,  therefore,  presumably  devoid  of  popular 
sympathies.^  With  a  ])eople  such  as  this,  a  great 
deal  mioht  be  done.     Mi^ht  not  an  acute  ruler  so 

o  o 

*  "  Lord  Palmerston,  in  the  most  insolent  manner,  told  the  Greek 
Minister  that  he  might  tell  the  King  of  Greece  that  he  never  should 
have  a  moment's  peace  or  quiet  until  he  gave  his  subjects  a  constitu- 
tion ;  that  he,  Lord  I'almerston,  would  tiike  care  that  neither  he  nor 
any  other  Sovereign  who  governed  witliout  a  constitution  should  have 
any  peace  ;  tliat  all  people  so  governed  had  a  right  to  '  insurger,'  and 
he  took  good  care  to  let  them  know  that  such  was  his  opinion  "  (Sir 
Robert  Peel's  Mentoirs,  vol.  ii.  p.  1  ?!'')•  "'®  passage  is  contained  in  a 
letter  written  in  IB-'JIJ  by  "a,  lady  unnamed  in  the  VVhig  camp." 

2  It  must  be  l)orne  in  mind  that  1  am  speaking  of  a  period  before 
the  birth  of  modern  Imperialism,  Since  1557'),  the  general  tone  ol 
British  public  opinion  has  undergone  many  notable  changes. 


CH.  VI  THE  COUP  D'ETAT  85 

adapt  his  language  as  to  suit  a  foreign  public,  whilst 
his  acts  would  be  in  strict  conformity  witli  his  own 
wishes  and  personal  interests  ?  The  British  Govern- 
ment must  not  be  openly  defied.  That  would  be  a 
proceeding  both  clumsy  and  attended  with  some 
risk.  Belial  was  a  wiser  councillor  than  Moloch, 
But  surely  if  a  scheme  were  devised  which  would 
present  matters  to  the  British  Government  and 
jniblic  in  a  form  to  which  they  were  accustomed,  if 
their  most  cherished  institutions  were  apparently 
copied  in  Egypt,  if  the  Egyptian  people  were  to 
express  their  own  views  through  their  own  repre- 
sentatives, then  the  bait  would  take.  An  Egyptian 
Parliament  should,  therefore,  be  assembled.  The  re- 
presentatives of  tlie  Egyptian  people  should  express 
their  devotion  to  the  Khedive,  and  their  satisfaction 
with  his  system  of  government.  They  would  reject 
as  insulting  the  imputation  that  the  country  was 
bankrupt.  They  would  demur  to  the  changes  in 
the  system  of  taxation  proposed  by  the  European 
advisers  of  their  Sovereign.  Those  changes  were 
unjust,  and,  moreover,  it  was  an  incidental  point 
of  some  importance  that,  under  the  European 
proposals,  the  fresh  taxation  would  fall  on  the  re- 
presentatives themselves  rather  than  on  the  people 
whom,  by  a  bold  flight  of  the  imagination,  they 
were  presumed  to  represent.  But  they  would 
devise  another  system  which  would  be  more 
equitable.  The  representatives  of  the  people,  who 
were  rich,  should  preserve  their  former  privileges, 
but  tliey  would  make  large  sacrifices  in  order  to 
enable  Egypt  to  meet  its  financial  engagements. 
It  was  true  that  those  sacrifices  would  fall,  not  on 
themselves,  but  on  their  fellow-countrymen  in  more 
humble  classes  of  society.  But  the  result  would  be 
the  same.  The  interest  of  the  debt  would  be  paid. 
The  members  of  the  Egyptian  Parliament  must  be 
left  to  devise  their  own  scheme.    That  was  essential. 


86  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

Otherwise,  constitutional  government  would  be  a 
mere  farce.  Their  patriotism  would  revolt  at  the 
idea  of  any  foreign  interference.  For  the  future, 
it  must  cease.  The  European  Ministers  must  be 
dismissed. 

When  all  this  was  done,  it  would  not  be  necessary 
to  talk  any  more  of  Parliaments  or  of  popular 
representation.  The  necessity  for  their  existence 
would  have  passed  away.  An  intelligent  despot 
ruling  over  a  docile  people  would  easily  find  some 
means  for  preventing  parliamentary  institutions 
from  taking  any  solid  root  in  the  country.  The 
personal  rule  of  the  Khedive  would  be  restored. 
The  people,  who  had  before  been  scourged  with 
rods,  would  in  future  be  scourged  with  scorpions. 
The  bondliolders  would  be  paid,  and  no  one  would 
be  able  to  complain. 

Thus  Ismail  Pasha  pondered  over  things  which 
were  never  destined  to  be  accomplished. 

The  idea  was  ingenious,  but  the  circumstances 
under  which  the  experiment  was  tried  were  un- 
favourable to  success.  Ismail  Pasha  was  too  well 
known  in  Europe  to  play  the  part  of  an  ultra- 
constitutional  monarch.  The  most  ardent  partisan 
of  parliamentary  institutions,  however  ill-informed 
about  Eastern  politics,  whilst  yielding  a  ready  assent 
to  the  principles  involved,  would  not  be  able  to 
refrain  from  some  scepticism  as  regards  the  inten- 
tions of  the  principal  character  in  the  piece. 
Moreover,  there  were  at  the  time  in  Cairo  a 
number  of  European  officials  of  inconveniently  in- 
dependent characters,  who  had  some  knowledge  of 
the  country,  and  who  would  certainly  make  tlieir 
voices  heard.  They,  at  least,  would  be  thrown  into 
strong  op])osition.  They  knew  too  much  to  be 
taken  in  by  this  flimsy  travesty  of  free  institutions. 
Indeed,  had  not  the  interests  involved,  both  Euro- 
pean and   Egyptian,   been   so  serious,  they  would 


CH.  VI  THE  COUP  D'ETAT  87 

almost  certainly  have  regarded  the  w^hole  proceed- 
ing not  merely  as  a  comedy,  but  as  a  screaming 
farce.  Further,  the  whole  project  was  tainted  by 
one  irremediable  defect.  It  was  based  on  the 
assumption  that  money  would  be  forthcoming  to 
satisfy  the  claims  of  the  foreign  creditors.  Now, 
in  supposing  that,  by  whatsoever  means,  he  could 
meet  all  his  financial  engagements,  Ismail  Pasha 
erred.  He  forgot  to  make  sure  of  his  foundations 
before  erecting  his  superstructure. 

When  Nubar  Pasha  was  forced  to  resign.  Lord 
Vivian  pointed  out  that  "the  incident  would 
become  still  more  serious  if  it  were  to  shake  the 
experiment  of  reformed  government  in  Egypt, 
which  should  certainly  be  maintained,  only  with 
far  more  consideration  than  has  been  shown  for  the 
feelings,  rights,  and  prejudices  of  the  natives." 

Lord  Vivian  had  indicated  the  main  danger  of 
the  moment.  The  reformed  administration  must 
be  supported.  Lord  Vivian  was,  therefore,  in- 
structed "  to  state  to  the  Khedive  that  the  French 
and  British  Governments  were  determined  to  act 
in  concert  in  all  that  concerned  Egypt,  and  that 
they  could  not  lend  themselves  to  any  modification 
in  principle  of  the  political  and  financial  arrange- 
ments recently  sanctioned  by  His  Highness.  It 
was  to  be  clearly  understood  that  the  resignation 
of  Nubar  Pasha  had,  in  the  eyes  of  both  Govern- 
ments, only  importance  so  far  as  the  question  of 
persons  was  concerned,  but  that  it  could  not  imply 
a  change  of  system."  Similar  instructions  were 
sent  by  the  French  Government  to  their  repre- 
seniative  in  Cairo. 

On  the  Khedive  behig  informed  of  the  tenor 
of  these  instructions,  he  replied  "  that  he  would 
pledge  himself  to  maintain  intact  the  engagements 
he  had  taken  in  August  last,  and  which  constituted 
the  charter  of  the  new  scheme  of  administrative 


88  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

reform.*  With  respect  to  his  financial  engage- 
ments, he  could  assure  the  two  Consuls-General 
of  his  sincere  desire  to  observe  them,  but  he  could 
not  prejudice  tl  e  decisions  of  his  Council  of 
Ministers  on  this  point." 

Nothing  could  be  fairer  or  more  constitutional. 
The  principles  of  the  reformed  administration  were 
to  be  maintained.  As  regards  the  financial  engage- 
ments, the  Khedive  could  obviously  give  no  promise. 
All  the  world,  in  fact,  knew  by  this  time  that  the 
arrangements  made  in  November  1876  would  have 
to  be  modified.  A  month  previously.  Lord  Vivian 
liad  reported  that  "frequent  meetings  were  being 
held  between  Sir  Rivers  Wilson,  M.  de  Blignieres, 
and  Sir  Evelyn  Baring,  with  the  object  of  arriving 
at  some  joint  conclusions  as  to  the  basis  upon  which 
a  general  and  equitable  arrangement,  amounting 
to  a  composition  of  the  present  financial  difiiculties 
of  the  Egyptian  Government,  was  possible." 

Two  important  questions  then  had  to  be  decided. 
The  first  was,  who  was  to  be  the  new  Prime 
Minister.  The  second  was  the  nature  of  the  rela- 
tions between  the  Khedive  and  his  new  INIinistry. 

Sir  Rivers  Wilson  pressed  for  the  reinstatement 
of  Nubar  Pasha.  He  was  su])ported  by  the  British 
Government.  "  Her  Majesty's  Government,"  Lord 
Salisbury  said,  "  are  of  opinion  that  the  position 
of  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  will  be  extremely  difficult, 
if  not  impossible  to  maintain,  unless  Nubar  Pasha 
is  readmitted  to  the  Cabinet  in  some  form  or 
other." 

Lord  Vivian,  however,  did  not  concur  in  this 
opinion.  "  I  desire,"  he  wrote,  "  to  place  on  record 
my  strong  conviction  that  Nubar  Pasha's  idea  of 
maintaining  two  distinct  and  probably  antagonistic 
powers  in  the  State  (the  Kliedive  and  the  Council 
of  Ministers)   will   prove  im})racticable  as  long  as 

'    ri(/e  ante,  pp.  (51 -(53. 


CH  n  THE  COUP  D'ETAT  89 

the  present  Khedive  remains  in  power.  .  .  .  Any 
proposal  for  the  re-entry  of  Nubar  Pasha  into  the 
Cabniet,  after  what  has  happened,  would  be,  I  fear, 
in  every  respect  a  serious  mistake  that  might  lead  to 
difficulties  and  complications,  which  Her  Majesty's 
Government  would  wish  to  avoid." 

When  the  Khedive  was  addressed  on  the 
subject,  he  said  that  "he  could  not  do  otherwise 
than  bow  to  the  will  of  the  English  and  French 
Governments,  which  he  had  no  power  to  resist, 
if  they  persisted  in  their  demand  for  the  re-entry 
of  Nubar  Pasha ;  but  he  felt  bound  to  warn  them 
beforehand  of  the  consequences,  so  that  they  might 
not  blame  him  hereafter  if  the  new  order  of  things 
should  break  down,  or  if  disturbances  should  again 
arise." 

It  was  clear  that,  if  Nubar  Pasha  were  forced 
upon  the  Khedive,  another  and  perhaps  more  seri- 
ous breakdown  would  ensue.  The  French  Govern- 
ment, therefore,  suggested  that  it  might  not  be 
advisable  to  insist  on  his  readmission.  The  British 
Government  assented,  but  they  "accompanied  the 
concession  with  a  warning  to  the  Khedive  that 
they  considered  His  Highness  responsible  for  the 
recent  difficulties  in  Egypt,  and  that  if  similar 
difficulties  should  occur  again,  the  consequences 
would  be  very  serious  to  him." 

Concurrently  with  the  discussion  of  the  question 
of  Nubar  Pasha's  readmission  to  the  Cabinet, 
the  relations  which  were  to  subsist  between  the 
Khedive  and  his  JNIinisters  were  considered  afresh. 
The  Khedive  made  certain  proposals.  The  Euro- 
pean Ministers  made  counter-proposals.  Eventually, 
the  British  and  French  Governments  decided  on 
the  following  programme  : — (1)  The  Khedive  was 
not  in  any  case  to  be  present  at  Cabinet  Councils. 
(2)  Prince  Tewfik,  the  heir  -  apparent  to  the 
Khedivate,  who  had  been  proposed  by  the  Khedi\e 


90  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

himself,  was  to  be  appointed  President  of  the 
Council.  (3)  The  English  and  French  members 
of  the  Cabinet  were  to  have  a  rioht  of  veto  over 

o 

any  proposed  measure. 

On  these  proposals  being  laid  before  the  Khedive, 
he  said  that  "  he  unreservedly  subscribed  to  all  the 
conditions  imposed  by  the  Governments  of  England 
and  France,  more  especially  as  they  had  listened 
to  his  objections  against  the  re-entry  of  Nubar 
Pasha  into  the  Cabhiet,  for  which  he  expressed  his 
gratitude.  He  fully  acknowledged  the  very  serious 
responsibility  that  now  devolved  upon  him  for  the 
success  of  the  new  order  of  things  and  for  the  pre- 
vention of  disorder,  and  he  pledged  his  cordial  and 
loyal  support  to  his  JNlinisters  if,  as  he  hoped,  they 
would  meet  him  in  the  same  conciliatory  spirit." 

It  appeared,  therefore,  that  the  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  the  formation  of  a  new  JNIinistry  were  at 
an  end.  On  March  10,  Prince  Tewfik  was  nomi- 
nated President  of  the  Council.  When,  however, 
the  question  arose  of  filling  up  the  remaining 
places  in  the  Cabinet,  fresh  dissensions  broke 
out  between  the  Khedive  and  his  European 
Ministers.  Under  the  JNIinistry  of  Nubar  Pasha, 
Riaz  Pasha  had  been  in  charge  of  the  Departinent 
of  the  Interior.  The  Khedive  now  wished  to 
transfer  Riaz  Pasha  to  the  JNIinistry  of  Foreign 
Affairs  and  of  Justice.  The  European  JNlinisters 
objected  to  this  transfer,  on  the  ground  that 
the  Khedive's  object  was  to  regain  his  hold  over 
tlie  provinces,  which  would  be  impossible  so  long 
as  a  man  of  such  independent  character  as 
Riaz  Pasha  was  JNIinister  of  the  Interior.  Lord 
Vivian  and  JNI.  Godeaux,  on  tlie  other  hand,  con- 
sidered that  it  would  be  inconsistent  Avith  the 
personal  responsibility  thrown  on  the  Kliedive 
to  dictate  to  him  the  choice  of  his  Ministers 
and  the  posts  they  should  occupy.     The  British 


CH.  VI  THE  COUP  D'ETAT  91 

and  French  Governments,  however,  more  especially 
the  former,  supported  the  views  of  Sir  Rivers 
Wilson  and  M.  de  Blignieres.  The  Khedive  was 
pressed  to  maintain  Riaz  Pasha  at  the  JNIinistry  of 
the  Interior.  He  at  first  declined  to  do  so,  but 
eventually  gave  a  reluctant  assent.  On  March 
22,  after  the  country  had  remained  for  a  month 
without  a  Ministry,  Riaz  Pasha  was  named  Minister 
of  the  Interior  and  of  Justice.  The  remaining 
places  in  the  Cabinet  were  easily  filled  up, 

At  the  same  time,  a  letter  was  addressed  by  the 
Khedive  to  Prince  Tewfik,  embodying  the  principles 
which  were  to  regulate  the  relations  between  the 
Khedive  and  his  Ministers.  "  J'espere,"  the  Khedive 
added,  "que  ces  nouveaux  arrangements  assure- 
ront  la  marche  de  la  nou\elle  organisation,  dont  la 
reussite  doit  amener  un  grand  bien  pour  I'Egypte. 
Le  Cabinet  pent  etre  assure  qu'en  toutes  circon- 
stances  il  pent  compter  de  ma  part  sur  le  concours 
le  plus  complet  et  le  plus  loyal,  comme  je  compte 
moi-meme  sur  son  devouement  a  I'oeuvre  que  nous 
poursuivons  en  commun." 

During  these  discussions,  the  British  and  French 
Governments  had  been  in  a  difficult  position.  The 
general  political  interest  of  England  was  clear. 
England  did  not  want  to  possess  Egypt,  but  it  was 
essential  to  British  interests  that  the  country  should 
not  fall  into  the  hands  of  any  other  European 
Power.  British  policy  in  respect  to  Egypt  had 
for  years  past  been  based  on  this  principle.  In 
1857,  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III.  made  overtures 
to  the  British  Government  with  a  view  to  the 
partition  of  the  northern  portions  of  Africa. 
Morocco  was  to  fall  to  France,  Tunis  to  Sardinia, 
and  Egypt  to  England.^     On  this  proposal  being 

'  The  accuracy  of  this  statement  is  confirmed  by  M.  Eniile  Ollivier, 
who  speaks  with  authority  on  the  subject.  See  his  L'Enipire  Liberal, 
vol.  iii.  p.  418. 


92  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

submitted  to  Lord  Palmerston,  he  stated  his  views  in 
a  letter  to  Lord  Clarendon.  "  It  is  very  possible," 
he  said,  "that  many  parts  of  the  world  would  be 
better  governed  by  France,  England,  and  Sardinia 
than  they  are  now.  .  .  .  We  do  not  want  to  have 
Egypt.  What  we  wish  about  Egypt  is  that  it  should 
continue  to  be  attached  to  the  Turkish  Empire, 
which  is  a  security  against  its  belonging  to  any 
European  Power.  We  want  to  trade  with  Egypt, 
and  to  travel  through  Egypt,  but  we  do  not  want 
the  burthen  of  governing  Egypt.  .  .  .  Let  us  try 
to  improve  all  those  countries  by  the  general 
influence  of  our  commerce,  but  let  us  abstain 
from  a  crusade  of  conquest  which  would  call  down 
upon  us  the  condemnation  of  all  other  civilised 
nations."  ^ 

The  general  aims  of  British  policy  in  1879  were 
much  the  same  as  they  had  been  when  Lord 
Palmerston  wrote  these  lines  twenty  -  two  years 
previously  ;  but,  with  a  change  of  circumstances, 
the  method  of  giving  effect  to  the  policy  had 
necessarily  to  be  modified.  It  was  no  longer 
possible  to  stand  aside  and  neglect  the  internal 
affairs  of  Egypt.  The  only  European  Power  which 
was  likely  to  obtain  a  footing  in  Egypt  was  France. 
The  attempt  liad  already  been  made  once,  and  the 
misgovernment  of  Egypt  might  well  lead  to  its 
being  renewed,  more  especially  as  large  French 
financial  interests,  to  which  the  French  Govern- 
ment were  prepared  to  afford  support,  were  con- 
cerned.     Even  admitting,  as  was  without  doubt 

'  Ashley's  Life  of  Lord  Palmerston,  vol.  ii.  p.  125.  I  cannot  refrain 
from  adding  the  following  characteristic  passage:  "On  one  occasion 
to  Lord  Cowley,  he  (Lord  Palmerston)  used  a  very  homely  but  apt 
illustration.  *  VVe  do  not  want  Egypt,'  he  said,  *or  wish  it  for  our- 
selves, any  more  than  any  rational  man  with  an  estate  in  the  north  of 
England  and  a  residence  in  the  south  would  liave  wished  to  possess  the 
inns  on  the  north  road.  All  he  could  want  would  have  been  tliat  the 
inns  should  he  well-kept,  always  accessible,  and  furnishing  him,  when 
he  came,  with  mutton-chups  and  jio.-t-liorses.' " 


CH.  VI  THE  COUP  D  ETAT  93 

the  case,  that  the  French  Government  had  at  that 
time  no  designs  involving  the  annexation  of  Egypt, 
the  pressure  of  public  opinion  was  so  great  that  it 
would  liave  been  scarcely  possible  for  France  to 
have  adopted  a  policy  of  complete  non-intervention. 
If  the  British  Government  would  not  act  with 
them,  the  French  Government  would  have  been 
obliged  to  act  alone. 

French  policy  in  respect  to  Egypt  was,  in  most 
essential  points,  the  counterpart  of  the  policy  of  the 
British  Government,  It  was  impossible  to  adopt 
a  policy  of  annexation,  even  had  there  been  any 
disposition  in  that  direction,  without  incurring  the 
risk,  amounting  almost  to  a  certainty,  of  a  serious 
quarrel  with  England.  But  France  regarded  the 
exclusive  action  of  England  in  Egypt  with  the 
same  jealousy  as  that  with  which  England  would 
have  regarded  exclusively  French  action.  Any 
extension  of  Turkish  influence  ran  counter  to  the 
traditional  policy  of  France.  It  was  clearly  in 
the  interests  of  botli  Governments  to  prevent 
the  affairs  of  Egypt  from  becoming  a  cause  of 
serious  dissension  between  them.  Both  had  equal 
interests  in  the  maintenance  of  the  peace  of 
Europe.  It  was  obviously  undesirable  that  the 
misgovernment  of  an  Oriental  state  should  threaten 
a  disturbance  of  the  peace.  The  best  way  to  pre- 
vent any  risk  of  dissension  was  for  both  Govern- 
ments to  co-operate  in  Egypt  with  a  view  to 
the  establisliment  in  that  country  of  a  system 
of  administration,  which,  although  possibly  de- 
fective, would  be  sufficient  to  check  the  worst 
of  the  existing  abuses,  and  thus,  by  obviating 
the  necessity  for  further  interference,  prevent 
the  Egyptian  Question  from  becoming  European 
rather  than  local. 

In  the  execution  of  this  policy,  occasional  dis- 
agreements   occurred.     The    French    Government 


94  MODERN  EGYPT  't.  i 

dwelt  strongly  on  the  interests  of  the  foreign 
creditors.  The  British  Government  leant  to  the 
cause  of  the  Egyptian  peasantry.  But  in  spite  of 
some  differences  of  opinion,  the  principle  of  common 
action  was  maintained.  Moreover,  the  harmony 
which  existed  between  London  and  Paris  was  re- 
produced in  Cairo.  In  spite  of  occasional  jars,  the 
local  representatives  of  the  two  Governments,  as 
also  their  countrymen  who  were  employed  in  the 
Egyptian  service,  worked  fairly  well  together. 

Every  one  recognised  that  the  anarchical  condi- 
tion of  affairs  then  existing  in  Egypt  was  due  to 
the  misgovernment  of  one  individual,  the  Khedive 
Ismail  Pasha.  Of  that,  there  could  not  be  any 
doubt.  But,  as  has  been  already  pointed  out,  there 
were  two  methods  of  checking  the  continuance  of 
misgovernment.  One  was  to  place  Ismail  Pasha 
under  such  stringent  control  as  to  reduce  him 
almost  to  a  cipher.  The  other  was  to  impose  on 
him  a  modified  form  of  control,  to  recognise  the 
impossibility  of  governing  the  country  without  his 
co-operation  so  long  as  he  remained  Khedive  of 
Egypt,  and  to  endeavour  to  guide  him  in  the  path 
of  reform  rather  than  to  exercise  extreme  compul- 
sion in  forcing  him  along  it. 

It  was  a  most  unfortunate  circumstance  that  at 
this  moment  the  principal  Europeans  concerned  in 
the  administration  of  Egypt  were  not  agreed  as  to 
which  of  these  two  systems  should  be  adopted. 
The  official  world  was  divided  into  two  opposing 
camps,  each  honestly  believing  that  its  own  system 
was  the  best.  Lord  Vivian  supported  the  system 
which  involved  counting  with  Ismail  Pasha's  per- 
sonal power.  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  supported  the 
rival  system,  which  involved  the  reduction  of  the 
Khedive  to  a  political  nullity. 

Neither  Lord  Vivian  nor  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  had 
had  any  previous  experience  in  dealing  with  Eastern 


DH.  VI  THE  COUP  D'ETAT  95 

affairs.  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  had  passed  his  life  in 
the  service  of  the  English  Treasury,  where  he  had 
acquired  a  sound  financial  training,  which,  added 
to  much  natural  quickness  and  ability,  proved  of 
great  service  to  him  in  dealing  with  the  technical 
portions  of  the  Egyptian  financial  situation.^  In 
some  respects,  however,  this  training  was  a  dis- 
advantage to  him.  The  fiscal  system  in  an  Eastern 
country  differs  widely  from  that  which  exists  in 
England ;  neither  does  the  technically  sound  but 
somewhat  narrow  school  of  the  English  Treasury 
afford  an  ideal  training  for  an  Englishman  who 
has  to  deal  with  Eastern  affairs.  It  often  en- 
genders a  somewhat  inelastic  frame  of  mind,  and 
a  tendency  to  ignore  political  considerations  which 
no  European  financier  in  the  East  can  afford  to 
neglect. 

Lord  Vivian,  on  the  other  hand,  had  had  no 
experience  in  dealing  with  financial  affairs.  This 
was  a  disadvantage  to  him  at  a  time  when  the 
pecuniary  embarrassments  of  the  country,  in  which 
he  was  the  Britisli  representative,  had  become  the 
chief  subject  for  diplomatic  action.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  had  been  dealing  with  foreign  affairs  all 
his  life.  He  had  had  a  sound  diplomatic  training. 
He  possessed  a  calm  judgment,  great  moral  courage, 
and  a  clear  insight  into  the  political  forces  at  work 
around  him. 

I  was  a  spectator  of  these  unfortunate  dissensions, 
and  was  thus  in  a  position  to  hear  both  sides  of 
the  question.  My  belief  is  that,  in  view  of  Ismail 
Pasha's  personal  character,  neither  the  adoption  of 
the  system  advocated  by  Lord  Vivian,  nor  the 
adoption  of  that  of  which  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  was 
the  leading  representative,  would  have  materially 

*  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  was  employed  in  Egypt  for  a  couple  of  months 
in  1876,  and  had  thus  learnt  something  of  the  local  financial  situation, 
but  the  period  was  too  short  to  enable  him  to  acquire  any  real  experi- 
ence of  Orientals  or  of  Eastern  forms  of  government. 


96  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

altered  the  course  of  Egyptian  history.  No  con- 
fidence could  be  placed  in  Ismail  Pasha's  promises 
Whatever  he  might  say,  he  was  determined  to  re- 
main the  absolute  ruler  of  Egypt.  He  might  appear 
to  yield  for  the  moment,  but  he  trusted  to  his 
resource  and  to  his  remarkable  power  of  intrigue 
to  nullify  any  concessions  which  might  be  extorted 
from  him,  and  thus  ultimately  regain  his  previous 
position.  This,  however,  is  mere  conjecture.  It 
is  possible  that  I  may  be  doing  an  injustice  to 
Ismail  Pasha,  though  I  do  not  think  that  I  am. 
What  is  more  certain  is  that  the  system  advocated 
by  Lord  Vivian  gave  him  a  fair  chance  if  he  wislied 
to  act  up  to  the  engagements  which  he  had  taken. 
It  presented  some  hope  of  success.  Sir  Rivers 
Wilson's  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  was  fore- 
doomed to  failure.  It  was  based  on  an  incorrect 
appreciation  of  what  was  and  what  was  not  pos- 
sible under  the  political  circumstances  then  existing 
in  Egypt. 

In  the  meantime,  the  British  Government  were 
bewildered  by  the  conflicting  accounts  \\  hich  they 
received  from  Egypt.  One  point,  however,  was 
clear.  The  disagreements  between  Lord  Vivian 
and  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  were  doing  a  great  deal  of 
harm.  Ismail  Pasha  would  gladly  play  the  con- 
genial pai-t  of  a  tertius  gaudeiis.  He  would  not 
be  slow  to  turn  the  position  to  his  own  advantage. 
On  March  15,  therefore.  Lord  ^''ivian  was  sum- 
moned to  London.  On  INIarch  20,  Sir  Frank 
Lascelles  arrived  to  take  over  Lord  Vivian's  duties. 
He  was  instructed  "to  give  his  cordial  support 
to  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  in  his  dealings  with  the 
Khedive." 

Prince  Tewfik,  at  the  time  of  his  assuming  the 
presidency  of  the  Egyptian  Council  in  1879,  was 
twenty-seven  years  of  age.  He  was  desirous  to  do 
all  in  his  power  to  help  in  the  crisis  which  then 


CH.VI  THE  COUP  D'ETAT  97 

existed  in*  Egyptian  affairs.  On  March  24,  he 
had  an  interview  with  Sir  Frank  Lascelles.  The 
mutinous  officers,  he  said,  had  been  paid.  "  Tout 
rentrera  dans  le  calme."  The  Khedive  was  deter- 
mined to  act  in  harmony  with  his  JNIinisters. 
"  There  were,  no  doubt,  great  difficulties  to  be 
overcome,  but  with  the  cordial  co-operation  of  all 
parties,  they  might  be  surmounted." 

Nevertheless,  the  experiment  which  was  made 
at  this  time  failed.  The  Khedive  had,  indeed,  got 
rid  of  Nubar  Pasha,  but  the  principle  that  he  was 
himself  to  be  reduced  to  the  condition  of  a  political 
nullity  had  not  undergone  any  serious  modifications. 
The  terms  imposed  upon  him  were  so  onerous  and 
humiliating  that,  even  had  he  been  animated  with 
better  intentions  than  those  with  which,  I  fear,  he 
must  be  credited,  it  would  have  been  difficult  to 
make  the  machine  of  government  work  smoothly. 
It  was  especially  a  mistake  to  insist  on  giving 
precision  in  detail  to  the  relations  which  were  to 
subsist  between  the  Khedive  and  his  Ministers. 
A  man  like  Ismail  Pasha  was  not  to  be  bound  by 
these  ropes  of  diplomatic  sand.  Either  he  meant 
to  act  loyally  with  his  European  Ministers,  or  he 
had  no  such  intention.  Either  they  could  acquire 
a  personal  influence  over  him,  or  they  would  be 
unable  to  do  so.  In  the  one  case,  the  machine 
could  have  been  worked  without  any  very  precise 
definition  of  the  relations  which  were  to  exist 
between  the  Khedive  and  his  Ministers.  In  the 
other  case,  those  definitions  were  insufficient  to 
prevent  a  collapse  of  the  system.  Under  the  exist- 
ing circumstances,  personal  influence  was  of  greater 
importance  than  any  powers  based  on  the  text  of 
a  Khedivial  letter  or  Decree. 

Scarcely  had  the  new  Ministry  been  formed, 
when  an  incident  occurred  which  gave  a  correct 
indication  of  what  was  to  follow.     The  interest  on 

VOL.  I  H 


98  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

the  loan  of  1864,  which  was  secure'd  on  the 
JNIoukabala  tax,  fell  due  on  April  1,  1879.  It 
amounted  to  £240,000.  On  March  28,  the  amount 
of  money  in  the  hands  of  the  Commissioners  of  the 
Debt  fell  short  of  this  sum  by  £196,000.  The 
Commission  of  Inquiry  was  at  that  time  preparing 
a  project  for  a  settlement  of  the  financial  situation. 
It  was  known  that  the  Commissioners  contemplated 
the  repeal  of  the  law  of  the  JNIoukabala.  This  pro- 
posal was  unpopular  amongst  the  wealthier  classes 
in  Egypt.  The  Ministers,  acting  in  concert  with 
the  Commissioners  of  Inquiry,  considered  that  the 
best  plan  would  be  to  postpone  the  payment  of  the 
coupon  due  on  April  1  to  Alay  1.  A  draft  Decree 
giving  effect  to  this  proposal  was  submitted  to  the 
Kliedive  by  Sir  Rivers  Wilson.  The  Khedive  at 
first  refused  to  simi  it.  It  was,  he  said,  nothing 
less  than  a  declaration  of  bankruptcy.  He  did 
not  consider  that  the  country  was  bankrupt.  He 
believed  that  all  the  financial  engagements  of  the 
Egyptian  Government  could  be  met.  He  could 
not  sign  such  a  Decree  in  the  face  of  the  political 
and  financial  engagements  imposed  on  him  by  the 
British  and  French  Governments.  Ultimately, 
some  changes  were  made  in  the  wording  of  the 
preamble,  and  the  Khedive  was  induced  to  sign. 

Inasmuch  as  the  Khedive  had  for  a  long  time 
past  been  insisting  on  his  inability  to  meet  all  his 
financial  engagements,  it  was  evident  that  some 
stron<y  motive  must  have  existed  to  make  him 
reject  a  proposal,  which  was  submitted  to  him 
by  his  European  advisers,  to  postpone  payment  of 
the  interest  on  a  portion  of  the  debt.  The  reason 
for  this  change  of  policy  was  abundantly  clear. 
The  Khedive,  in  spite  of  his  recent  promises,  was 
actively  engaged  in  intrigues  having  for  their 
object  the  overthrow  of  the  Ministry.  He  was 
preparing  a  financial  plan  of  his  own  in  opposition 


CH.VI  THE  COUP  D'ETAT  99 

to  the  scheme  then  being  evolved  by  the  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry.  This  plan  he  intended  to 
submit  to  the  Powers. 

On  April  1,  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  reported  to 
Lord  Salisbury  as  follows  :  "  Considerable  agitation 
exists  here  at  the  present  moment.  ...  It  appears 
that  the  Sheikh-el-Bekri  ^  holds  meetings  with  the 
Notables  and  Ulemas,  with  the  object  of  exciting 
religious  animosity  against  the  European  Ministers, 
and  that  Riaz  Pasha  has  been  denounced  in  the 
Mosques  as  a  friend  of  the  Christians.  There  is 
danger  that  Riaz  Pasha,  who  has  been  warned  by 
the  Prefect  of  the  Police  that  his  life  is  in  peril, 
may  be  forced  into  resigning." 

Three  days  later  (April  4),  Sir  Frank  Lascelles 
wrote :  "  It  appears  that  there  is  no  doubt  about 
the  meetings  having  been  held,  and  that  there  is 
constant  communication  between  the  Khedive  and 
the  more  influential  persons  who  attended  them. 
Their  object,  however,  is  to  obtain  support  to  the 
financial  plan,  which  the  Khedive  is  preparing  in 
opposition  to  that  of  Sir  Rivers  Wilson,  and  also 
to  get  up  petitions  to  His  Highness  to  put  into 
force  the  Turkish  Constitution,  which  was  pro- 
mulgated here  in  1877,  but  which  has  hitherto 
remained  a  dead  letter.  ...  I  have  been  told  that 
the  arguments  addressed  to  the  wealthy  portion  of 
the  population  in  order  to  obtain  signatures  to  the 
petition  were  that,  if  Sir  Rivers  Wilson's  plan  were 
to  come  into  force,  the  taxes  on  the  Ouchouri 
lands  would  be  largely  increased,  and  that  the 
benefits  conferred  by  the  Moukabala  law  would  be 
lost,  and  that  the  Ulema  have  been  led  to  believe 
that  it  is  the  intention  of  the  European  Ministers 
to  hand  over  the  country  entirely  to  Europeans, 

*  The  Sheikh-el-Bekri  was  the  Nekib-el-Ashraf,  or  representative  of 
all  the  descendants  of  the  Proijliet  in  Egypt.  He  was  also  the  head  of 
the  religious  Corporations. 


100  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

and  thus  seriously  jeopardise  the  Moslem  faith,  but 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  chief  incentive 
to  sign  the  petition  was  the  knowledge  that  the 
signatures  would  be  agreeable  to  the  Khedive. 

*'  Riaz  Pasha  has  informed  me  that  some  of  the 
employes  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  had  been 
called  upon  for  their  signatures,  and  had  not  dared 
to  refuse." 

On  April  6,  the  European  Ministers  placed  in 
the  hands  of  the  Khedive  a  formal  protest  against 
the  line  of  conduct  which  he  was  pursuing,  and 
which,  as  they  rightly  pointed  out,  was  in  opposition 
to  his  former  pledges.  The  Khedive  paid  no 
attention  to  this  protest.  His  plans  were  now 
matured.  He  was  ready  to  strike  a  decisive  blow 
with  a  view  to  regaining  his  personal  power. 

On  April  9,  the  Khedive  convoked  the  members 
of  the  diplomatic  corps  and  delivered  an  address  to 
them  in  the  presence  of  a  number  of  Egyptian 
Notables,  who  had  been  assembled  for  the  occasion. 
He  said  that  the  discontent  in  the  country  had 
reached  such  a  pitch  that  he  felt  bound  to  allay  it 
by  adopting  radical  measures.  A  financial  project, 
which  expressed  the  true  wishes  of  the  country,  had 
been  submitted  to  him  signed  by  all  classes  of  the 
population.  In  this  project,  copies  of  which  would 
be  at  once  communicated  to  the  representatives  of 
the  Powers,  "the  nation  protested  against  the 
declaration  of  bankruptcy,  which  was  contemplated 
by  Sir  Rivers  Wilson,  and  demanded  the  formation 
of  a  purely  Egyptian  Ministry,  which  would  be 
responsible  to  the  Chamber  of  I3eputies." 

Prince  Tewfik,  "yielding  to  the  will  of  the 
nation,"  had  tendered  his  resig!iation.  He  would 
be  replaced  by  Cherif  Pasha.  The  Khedive  would 
continue  to  govern  in  accordance  with  the  Rescript 
of  August  28,  which  sanctioned  the  principle  of 
ministerial  responsibility.    The  Decree  of  November 


cH.ri  THE  COUP  DETAT  101 

18,  1876,  which  had  been  negotiated  by  Messrs. 
Goschen  and  Joubert,  would  be  strictly  observed. 

Cherif  Pasha  then  added  a  few  words.  *'  The 
nation  "  thought  that  the  Ministers  had  behaved  in 
a  manner  which  was  hisulting  to  its  representatives. 
A  declaration  of  bankruptcy  would  be  dishonour- 
able. The  country  was  determined  to  make  any 
sacrifices  to  avoid  it.  The  contemplated  repeal  of 
the  law  of  the  Moukabala  had  given  rise  to  great 
dissatisfaction.  "  It  would  have  been  impossible 
for  the  Khedive  to  have  put  himself  in  opposition 
to  the  will  of  the  nation,  which  had  been  so 
positively  expressed." 

The  Consuls -General  listened  to  these  remark- 
able declarations  "in  complete  silence."  The 
Austrian  Consul- General,  however,  asked  a  some- 
what pertinent  question.  Would  the  persons 
who  had  signed  tlie  project  be  prepared  to  mort- 
gage their  own  properties  as  a  guarantee  for  the 
execution  of  the  financial  plan  ?  To  this  the 
Khedive  replied  that  there  would  be  no  necessity 
for  the  adoption  of  any  such  course.  "  It  would 
be  impossible  to  give  a  stronger  guarantee  than 
the  determination  of  the  whole  country,  from  the 
head  of  the  State  to  the  humblest  individual,  to 
submit  to  any  sacrifices  rather  than  to  the  disgrace 
of  national  bankruptcy." 

Three  documents  were  communicated  to  the 
Consuls-General  immediately  after  the  meeting. 

The  first  of  these  was  an  address  from  the 
Chambei  of  Notables.  It  stated  that  the  new 
INlinisters  had  frequently  violated  the  rights  of 
the  Chamber.  No  explanation  was,  however, 
given  as  to  the  precise  nature  of  these  alleged 
violations.  As  regards  the  idea  of  a  declaration 
of  bankruptcy,  and  the  proposed  repeal  of  the  law 
of  the  JNloukabala,  the  Notables  expressed  them- 
selves in  the   following;   terms :    "  Tons  ces  actes 


'& 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

WVERSIOE 


102  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

sont  nuisibles  h  nos  int^rets  et  contraires  h  nos 
droits.  Jamais  nous  n'en  accepterons  Texecution." 
They  begged  the  Khedive,  therefore,  to  take  the 
situation  into  his  consideration,  "afin  d'^viter  les 
serieuses  difficultes  qui  pourraient  naitre  a  Tavenir 
si  nos  droits  et  ceux  de  la  nation  continuaient  k 
^tre  ainsi  meconnues  ;  de  graves  dangers  pourraient 
meme  en  rdsulter." 

The  second  document  submitted  to  the  Consuls- 
General  was  an  address  presented  to  the  Khedive 
by  a  number  of  delegates  chosen  from  amongst 
the  Ulema,  the  highest  officials  of  the  State,  both 
civil  and  military,  and  other  Notables.  In  this 
address  it  was  stated  that  the  petitioners  had 
examined  the  financial  scheme  prepared  by  Sir 
Rivers  Wilson.  They  considered  that  the  pro- 
posals contained  in  that  scheme  were  contrary  to 
the  interests  of  the  country ;  they  were  of  opinion 
that  the  revenues  of  Egypt  were  sufficient  to  dis- 
charge all  the  debts  due  by  the  State ;  they  had, 
therefore,  prepared  a  counter-project,  which  they 
asked  should  be  submitted  to  the  Chamber  of 
Notables.  They  begged  that  the  Khedive  would 
give  to  the  Chamber  "les  attributions  et  les 
pouvoirs  dont  jouissent  les  Chambres  des  Deputes 
Europeennes  en  ce  qui  concerne  les  questions 
interieures  et  financieres."  The  Council  of  Ministers 
was  to  be  independent  of  the  Khedive,  and  was  to 
be  responsible  to  the  Chamber. 

The  third  document  was  a  plan  for  the  settle- 
ment of  the  financial  situation. 

These  documents  were  sent  by  the  Consuls- 
General  to  their  respective  Governments  by  the 
mail  which  was  then  about  to  leave  for  Europe. 
The  same  mail  should  have  carried  a  number  of 
copies  of  the  report,  which  the  Commissioners  of 
Inquiry  had  just  completed.  Tliese  latter  were, 
however,  stopped  in  the  Post-office  by  order  of  the 


'»!?; 


CH.  VI  THE  COUP  D'ETAT  103 

Khedive  in  the  hope  that  "  the  plan  submitted  to 
the  Klicdive  might  be  approved  of  before  the 
report  of  the  Commissioners  was  generally  known." 

Letters  were  written  by  the  Khedive  to  Sir 
Rivers  Wilson  and  M.  de  Blignieres  stating  that 
"  in  obedience  to  the  positive  wishes  of  the  nation 
he  had  entrusted  Cherif  Pasha  with  the  formation 
of  a  new  Cabinet,  which  was  to  be  composed 
entirely  of  Egyptians." 

When  the  European  Ministers  were  appointed 
to  the  Egyptian  Cabinet,  the  British  and  French 
Governments  stipulated  "that  the  Commission  of 
Control  over  the  Egyptian  finances  appointed 
under  the  Decree  of  November  1876,  should  be 
ipso  facto  revived  in  case  either  the  English  or 
French  member  of  the  Egyptian  Cabinet  should 
be  dismissed  without  the  consent  of  his  Govern- 
ment." In  order  to  fulfil  the  engagement  thus 
taken  by  the  Egyptian  Government,  Cherif  Pasha 
wrote  to  M.  Bellaigues  de  Bughas,  who  had  been 
appointed  Commissioner  of  the  Debt  in  succession 
to  M.  de  Blignieres,  and  myself,  requesting  us  to 
assume  the  ofTices  of  Controllers-General  of  the 
expenditure  and  of  the  recei})ts.  We  stated  in 
our  reply  that  we  must  decline  to  associate  our- 
selves with  a  financial  plan  which  in  our  eyes  was 
impracticable,  or  with  a  change  of  system  which 
was  in  contradiction  to  the  engagements  recently 
taken  by  the  Khedive  towards  the  British  and 
I'rench  Governments.  Cherif  Pasha  thereupon 
informed  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  that  he  considered 
our  refusal  to  take  ofKce  freed  the  Egyptian 
Government  from  any  responsibility  as  regards 
the  immediate  re -establishment  of  the  Control. 
The  French  and  British  Governments  were, 
however,  asked  to  name  Controllers. 

Sir  Gerald  Fitzgerald,  Blum  Pasha,  the  Secretary 
of  the  Financial  Department,  and   Sir  Auckland 


104  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

Colvin,  who  was  head  of  the  Cadastral  Survey,  also 
resigned  their  appointments. 

A  Decree  was  issued  naming  Ch^rif  Pasha 
President  of  the  Council,  and  charo;in":  him  with 
the  formation  of  a  INIinistry.  A  letter  was  at  the 
same  time  addressed  to  Cherif  Pasha  by  the 
Khedive,  setting  forth  the  principles  which  were 
for  the  future  to  guide  the  Government  of  the 
country.  This  letter  began  in  the  following 
terms  :  "  Comme  Chef  d'Etat  et  comme  Egyptien, 
je  considere  un  devoir  sacre,  pour  moi,  de  suivre 
Topinion  de  mon  pays  et  de  donner  une  satisfaction 
entiere  a  ses  legitimes  aspirations."  The  Khedive 
then  went  on  to  say  that  the  financial  plan  pre- 
pared by  the  JNIinister  of  Finance,  which  declared 
the  country  in  a  state  of  bankruptcy  and  which 
violated  vested  interests,  had  "achev^  de  soulever 
contre  le  Cabinet  le  sentiment  national."  Public 
opinion  had  found  expression  in  the  address  which 
had  been  presented  to  him.  Yielding  to  the  wishes 
expressed  in  this  address,  he  requested  Cherif 
Pasha  to  form  a  Cabinet  composed  "d'el^ments 
v^ritablement  Egyptiens."  As  regards  the  demand 
for  parliamentary  institutions,  the  Khedive  said 
that  a  Chamber  would  be  formed,  *'dont  les 
modes  d'election  et  les  droits  seront  regies  de 
fa^on  a  repondre  aux  exigeances  de  la  situation 
interieure  et  aux  aspirations  nationales."  The  new 
Cabinet  was  to  prepare  electoral  laws  upon  the 
model  of  those  which  existed  in  Europe,  "tout  en 
tenant  compte  des  moeurs  et  des  besoins  de  la  popu- 
lation." The  Khedive  expressed  his  approval  of  the 
financial  ])lan  which  had  been  submitted  to  him 
by  the  Notables.  The  Cabinet  was  to  carry  out 
that  ])lan  in  its  integrity.  The  letter  concluded  in 
the  following  terms  :  "  Connaissant  votre  devoue- 
ment  au  pays,  je  ne  doute  pas  que  Votre  Excel- 
lence, s'entourant  d'hommes  jouissant  comme  Elle 


c^  VI  THE  COUP  D':^TAT  105 

de  la  confiance  et  de  Testime  publique,  ne  mene 
h  bonne  fin  Toeuvre  civilisatrice  a  laquelle  je  veux 
attacher  mon  nom." 

Immediately  afterwards,  the  other  JNIinisters, 
those  who  were  to  "enjoy  the  public  confidence 
and  esteem,"  were  nominated.  They  were  all 
men  who  were  under  the  absolute  control  of  the 
Khedive,  and  who  did  not  in  the  smallest  degree 
represent  the  national  party,  supposing  there  to 
have  been  one.  Shahin  Pasha  was  named  Minister 
for  War,  and  Omar  Pasha  Lutfi  Inspector-General 
with  a  seat  in  the  Cabinet.  Both  had  gained  un- 
enviable reputations  by  the  unscrupulous  methods 
which  in  former  capacities  they  had  adopted  for 
collecting  the  revenue. 

History  records  several  instances  of  free  institu- 
tions which  have  foundered  under  the  influence  of 
one  commanding  mind.  The  Emperors  Augustus 
and  Napoleon  were  the  great  high -priests  of  a 
policy  having  for  its  object  a  transfer  of  power 
from  the  people  to  their  ruler.  All  students  of 
history  are  familiar  with  the  procedures  which 
they  adopted.  But,  so  far  as  my  historical  know- 
ledge goes,  the  clumsy  experiment  made  by  Ismail 
Pasha  was  of  a  somewhat  novel  character.  This 
was  not  a  case  in  which  existing  free  institutions 
had,  by  a  combination  of  force  and  diplomacy,  to 
be  bent  to  suit  the  wishes  of  a  despotic  ruler.  On 
the  contrary,  the  Khedive  was  already  an  absolute 
ruler.  Scared)^  a  trace  of  independent  thought  or 
action  could  be  found  in  the  whole  body  politic  of 
Egypt.  Ismail  Paslia  endeavoured  to  call  free 
institutions  temporarily  into  existence  as  an  instru- 
ment through  whose  agency  he  miglit  regain  his 
personal  power,  which  was  threatened  by  foreign 
interference.  It  was  a  curious  sight  to  see  Ismail 
Pasha,  who  was  the  living  embodiment  of  despotic 


106  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

government  in  its  most  extreme  form,  posing  as 
an  ultra-constitutional  ruler  who  could  not  con- 
scientiously place  himself  in  opposition  to  the 
national  will.  It  was  a  still  more  curious  sight  to 
see  the  same  man,  who  had  but  recently  pro- 
tested that  he  could  not  pay  his  debts,  suddenly 
turn  round  and  reject  with  disdain  the  proposals, 
made  to  him  by  those  who  represented  his  creditors, 
that  he  should  declare  himself  insolvent.  But 
perhaps  the  highest  point  of  interest  in  this 
strange  comedy  was  reached  when  the  unfortunate 
peasantry  of  Egypt,  who  were  groaning  under 
Ismail  Pasha's  rule  and  who  only  asked  to  be 
relieved  of  taxation  without  inquiring  into  the 
effect  such  a  relief  would  exercise  on  other  in- 
terests, were  represented  as  being  willing  to  incur 
any  sacrifice  rather  than  submit  to  the  disgrace 
of  national  bankruptcy.  It  may  be  asserted  with 
absolute  confidence  that  the  mass  of  the  Egyptian 
people  understood  nothing  of  what  was  going  on 
at  the  time.  The  Notables,  however,  understood 
something.  In  the  first  place,  they  understood 
that  the  Khedive,  for  reasons  of  his  own  into 
which  it  was  no  business  of  theirs  to  inquire, 
wished  them  to  say  that  they  ardently  desired  the 
establishment  of  certain  institutions  of  the  nature 
of  which  they  only  had  a  vague  idea,  but  which 
were  said  to  have  produced  excellent  effects  in 
other  countries.  Whether  or  not  the  same  bene- 
ficial results  would  ensue  from  their  adoption  in 
Egypt  might  be  doubtful,  but  in  any  case  it  was 
clear  that  the  Khedive  must  be  obeyed.  In  the 
second  place,  they  understood  in  a  general  way 
that  all  the  difficulties  of  the  moment  were  due 
to  the  fact  that  large  sums  of  money  were  owing 
to  Europeans.  They  had  seen  the  worst  side  of 
European  interference.  That  it  should  be  exer- 
cised in  the  true  interests  of  the  Egyptian  people 


OH.  VI  THE  COUP  D'ETAT  107 

was  not  credible.  When,  therefore,  it  was  repre- 
sented to  them  that  the  last  phase  of  European 
interference  was  that  the  privileges  of  the  classes 
to  which  they  belonged  were  threatened,  it  needed 
no  great  amount  of  persuasion  to  enlist  their  sym- 
pathies on  the  side  of  opposition  to  the  new  order 
of  things.  Religious  antipathy  would  also  drive 
them  in  the  same  direction. 

It  is,  indeed,  probable  that,  from  the  purely 
Egyptian  point  of  view,  Ismail  Pasha's  plan  would 
have  been  more  attractixe  if  the  proposal  to  es- 
tablish an  Egyptian  Parliament  had  been  dropped 
out  of  the  programme,  and  if  he  had  taken  his 
stand  on  the  general  feeling  of  dislike  to  Euro- 
peans, and  on  "religious  fanaticism.  Appeals  to 
either  of  these  sentiments  would  have  been  more 
comprehensible  to  his  followers,  and  would  have 
met  with  a  more  hearty  response,  than  arguments 
based  on  the  establishment  of  institutions  which 
were  foreign  to  the  national  traditions.  Save  to 
a  very  few,  such  arguments  were  probably  incom- 
prehensible. 

But  Ismail  Pasha  was  debarred  from  using  arms 
of  this  description,  save  to  a  very  limited  extent. 
In  the  first  place,  he  was  not  a  fanatic,  and  re- 
ligious fanaticism  was  a  matter  of  which  he  had 
had  some  experience.  He  knew  its  danger,  and 
when  it  had  appeared  he  had  on  several  occasions 
adopted  summary  methods  for  stamping  it  out. 
He  did  not  enjoy  the  reputation  of  being  a  devout 
Mohammedan,  and,  had  not  material  interests  and 
the  fear  of  disobedience  to  a  despotic  ruler  been 
brought  into  play,  he  would  have  exercised  but  little 
influence  over  those  classes  who  honestly  repre- 
sented ]Mohammedan  devotion.  In  the  second  place, 
it  was  a  necessity  of  his  position  that  he  should 
not  go  far  in  appealing  to  sentiments  of  this 
description.     He  understood  enough  of  European 


108  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

opinion  to  appreciate  the  fact  tliat  any  such  ap- 
peals would  forfeit  the  sympathies  and  evoke  the 
fears  of  Europe.  This  might  be  dangerous.  From 
every  point  of  view  it  would  be  safer,  and  in 
all  probability  more  productive  of  result,  if  the 
revolution  were  carried  out  in  the  name  of 
civilisation  and  progress,  and  under  the  banner  of 
constitutionalism.  His  followers  could  not,  indeed, 
be  prevented  from  acting  in  some  degree  according 
to  tlieir  own  imperfect  lights.  "Large  numbers  of 
the  fanatical  population  "  were  summoned  to  Cairo. 
Sir  Frank  Lascelles  thought  they  "  might  become 
a  source  of  real  danger."  Provided  proceedings  of 
this  sort  were  kept  within  proper  bounds,  the}' 
might  afford  powerful  aid  to  the  cause.  But  it 
would  be  impolitic  if  the  Khedive  were  too  openly 
associated  with  the  crude  ideas  and  ill-judged  pro- 
ceedings of  his  ignorant  followers.  It  would  be 
wiser  to  pose  as  an  enlightened  ruler,  following  the 
popular  will  and,  at  the  same  time,  standing  as  a 
guardian  angel  between  Moslem  fanaticism  and 
modern  civilisation. 

Ismail  Pasha  was  employing  dangerous  instru- 
ments. First,  he  encouraged  mutiny  in  his  own 
army.  Then  he  played  with  the  uncongenial  idea 
of  introducing  free  institutions  into  the  country. 
This  was  perilous  work  for  a  despotic  ruler.  The 
soldiers  had  learnt  their  power,  and  even  amongst 
the  poor  ignorant  people,  who,  at  their  master's 
behest,  asked  for  things  of  which  the  large  majority 
were  completely  ignorant,  there  might  be  some 
few  who  would  take  him  at  his  word.  The  seed 
then  sown  did,  in  fact,  bring  forth  some  fruit  at  a 
later  period  of  Egyptian  history. 

For  the  moment,  however,  the  success  of  the 
mancEUvre  appeared  complete.  Europe  must 
surely  see  that  the  Egyptian  people  were  singularly 
unanimous,    and    that    an    enlightened   ruler   was 


CH.  VI  THE  COUP  D'ETAT  109 

about  to  confer  on  them  the  blessings  of  a 
constitutional  form  of  government,  which  they 
ardently  desired.  The  Khedive  had  defied  two 
powerful  Governments ;  he  had  got  rid  of  his 
European  advisers ;  and  he  had  appointed  in  their 
places  a  number  of  men  who  would  implicitly  obey 
his  orders,  and  who,  albeit  free  institutions  were  to 
be  introduced,  would  have  no  scruples  in  acting  on 
the  most  approved  ])rinciples  of  personal  govern- 
ment. European  Governments  might  perhaps 
lecture  him,  but  international  rivalry  was  so 
intense  that  no  common  action  of  a  serious  nature 
was  to  be  feared.  He  had,  indeed,  drawn  a  heavy 
draft  on  the  credulity  of  Europe.  Even  those  who 
were  not  conversant  with  Eastern  affairs  might  not 
unnaturally  think  that  when  an  Oriental  Gracchus 
complained  of  sedition  his  arguments  were  not 
to  be  accepted  without  some  reserve.  Nevertheless, 
the  scheme  would  probably  have  been  successful  if 
the  financial  plan,  which  the  Khedive  had  pledged 
himself  to  carry  out,  had  been  based  on  any  solid 
foundation.  If  he  had  been  able  to  pay  his  debts, 
no  excuse  would  have  existed  for  further  interfer- 
ence from  abroad.  Unfortunately  for  the  Khedive, 
his  financial  plan  was  impossible  of  execution. 
The  entire  scheme  crumbled  to  the  ground  and,  in 
falling,  overwhelmed  its  author. 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE    REPORT    OF   THE    COMMISSION 
April  1879 

Declaration  of  bankruptcy — Principles  of  the  settlement — The 
Khedive's  Civil  List — The  Ouchouri  land-tax — The  Rouznameh 
loan — Ihe  law  of  the  Moukabala — Reductions  of  taxation — Com- 
position with  the  creditors — Comments  on  the  report — The  Com- 
missioners resign — The  Khedive's  counter-proposals — Revival  of  the 
practices  of  the  old  regime — The  Commissioners  of  the  Debt 
institute  legal  proceedings  against  the  Egyptian  Government — My 
departure  from  Egypt. 

During  all  this  period,  the  Commission  of  Inquiry- 
had  been  sitting  with  a  view  to  the  preparation  of 
a  plan  for  the  settlement  of  the  financial  situation. 
It  is  unnecessary  to  enter  into  all  the  complicateci 
details  of  the  questions  which  came  under  the 
consideration  of  the  Commissioners.  But  it  will 
be  desirable  to  state  the  main  conclusions  at  which 
they  arrived. 

The  Commissioners  began  their  report^  by  stating 
that  the  Egyptian  Government  were  bankrupt,  and, 
moreover,  that  the  state  of  bankruptcy  had  really 
commenced  on  April  6,  1876,  on  whicli  day  tiie 
Khedive  suspended  payment  of  the  Treasury  bills 
fallintr  due.  It  was  true  that  since  that  date  not 
only  had  the  interest  on  the  debt  been  ])aid,  but  a 
sum  of  £2,645,000  had    been    devoted  to  sinking 

*  Tlie  first  draft  of  this  report  was  prepared  by  myself.  It,  of  course, 
underwent  a  good  many  modifications  lu'fore  a  final  text  wass  approved. 
The  French  was  revised  by  M.  do  IMignicres. 

110 


CH.  VII       REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  111 

fund.  As  purchases  of  stock  were  made  in  the 
market  at  prices  varying  from  31 J  to  43,  nominal 
capital  to  the  extent  of  £4,858,000  had  been  ex- 
tinguished. On  the  other  hand,  the  actual  deficits 
of  the  two  years,  1877  and  1878. amounted  to  no  less 
than  £4,822,000.  The  floating  debt  had,  therefore, 
been  increased  by  an  amount  of  £2,177,000  in 
excess  of  the  money  applied  to  sinking  fund. 
"Payer  les  coupons,"  the  Commissioners  said, 
"dans  ces  conditions,  c'est  distribuer  des  dividendes 
fictifs,  et  Ton  sait  a  quels  resultats  arrivent  les 
societes  qui  perseverent  dans  cette  voie.  Leur 
situation  parait  brillante  jusqu'au  jour  ou  la  mine 
est  irremediable."  In  truth,  the  taxpayers  and 
the  creditors  had  alike  suffered  from  the  delay 
which  had  occurred  in  recognising  the  true  fiicts  of 
the  case.  The  only  sound  starting-point  for  the 
establishment  of  a  better  order  of  things  was  to  be 
found  in  facing  the  facts  boldly.  "  Le  pays,"  M.  de 
Blignieres  said,  "est  saigne  a  blanc."  JNIeasures 
such  as  those  which  had  been  heretofore  adopted 
to  produce  a  fictitious  appearance  of  solvency,  must 
be  discarded.  The  annual  expenditure  must  be 
brouii'ht  down  to  the  limits  of  the  annual  revenue. 
It  was  a  great  point  gained  that  these  preliminary 
truths  should  be  officially  recognised  by  a  trust- 
worthy body  of  Europeans,  amongst  whom  were 
included  the  representatives  of  the  bondholders. 

Having  ascertained  beyond  doubt  that  the  Egyp- 
tian Government  could  not  meet  all  their  financial 
engagements,  the  Commissioners  proceeded  to  lay 
down  the  principles  which  should  form  the  basis  of 
a  composition  with  the  creditors  of  the  State.  It 
was  impossible  to  do  justice  to  all  the  interests 
involved.  "Le  systeme  de  gouverner  le  pays," 
we  said,  "jusqu'a  present  en  vigueur  a  rendu 
impossible  de  rendre  justice  a  tons  les  interets 
engages.      Le    seul    r^sultat    auquel    le   nouveau 


112  MODERN  EGYPT  pr.  i 

regime  pourra  aspirer,  c'est  de  partager  I'injustice 
aussi  equitablement  que  possible." 

The  Commissioners  then  laid  down  three 
principles. 

The  first  of  these  was  that  no  sacrifice  shduld 
be  demanded  from  the  creditors  until  every  reason- 
able sacrifice  had  been  made  by  the  debtors.  '*  On 
n'a  pas,"  the  Commissioners  said,  "a  insister  sur 
I'equit^  de  ce  principe."  It  was,  in  fact,  perfectly 
just  and  logical.  But  in  its  application,  a  sub- 
sidiary question  naturally  arose.  Who  in  this  case 
were  the  debtors  ?  Morally  speaking,  the  real 
debtor  was  the  Khedive.  He  had  for  years  past 
disposed  absolutely  of  the  revenues  of  Egypt. 
He  had  contracted  the  debts  without  reference  to 
the  wishes  or  true  interests  of  the  people  over 
whom,  by  the  accident  of  birth,  he  had  been  called 
to  rule.  Unfortunately,  he  had  dragged  his  people 
along  with  him.  No  moral  responsibility  whatso- 
ever attached  to  them,  for  they  had  never  been 
consulted  as  regards  the  measures  which  had  been 
taken  by  the  Khedive.  But,  however  hard  the 
conclusion  might  appear,  it  was  inevitable  that 
they  should  suffer  from  the  faults  of  their  ruler. 
Considerations  of  equity  and  sound  financial  policy, 
however,  alike  dictated  moderation  in  the  applica- 
tion of  the  principle  enunciated  above.  The  people 
of  Egypt  would  have  to  make  certain  sacrifices, 
but,  the  Commissioners  added,  *'  il  serait  assur^- 
ment  contraire  aux  interets  gen^raux  de  leur  imposer 
des  sacrifices  au-dessus  de  leurs  forces.  On  verra 
meme  dans  la  suite  de  ce  rapport  que  nous  pro- 
posons  de  leur  accorder  immediatement  des  sou- 
lagements  sensibles." 

The  second  principle  laid  down  by  the  Com- 
missioners was  that,  in  deciding  on  the  degrees  of 
sacrifice  which  should  be  imposed  on  tiie  different 
classes  of  creditors,  it  was  desirable  to  conform  as 


cH.vii       REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  113 

much  as  possible  to  the  procedure  indicated  by  the 
Egyptian  code  as  that  which  should  be  followed  in 
dealing  with  the  estate  of  a  private  individual  who 
was  bankrupt. 

In  the  third  place,  it  was  necessary  that  any 
general  arrangement  which  might  be  adopted 
should  be  made  obligatory  on  all  the  persons  who 
were  interested.  The  number  of  creditors  was 
so  large,  and  their  claims  were  of  such  various 
natures,  that  it  was  hopeless  to  expect  unanimity  in 
the  acceptance  of  any  voluntary  arrangement.  A 
small  minority  might,  therefore,  prevent  the  adop- 
tion of  any  general  scheme.  The  only  way  to  avoid 
this  inconvenience  was  to  pass  a  law,  which  would 
have  to  be  accepted  by  all  the  Powers,  and  which 
would  thus  become  binding  on  the  Mixed  Tribunals 
and  on  all  the  parties  concerned. 

Having  laid  down  these  principles,  the  Com- 
missioners proceeded  to  deal  with  the  personal 
position  of  the  Khedive. 

His  Highness  had  given  up  most  of  the  estates 
of  the  Khedivial  family,^  upon  the  security  of  which 
a  loan  had  been  raised.  The  proceeds  of  this  loan 
were  about  to  be  applied  to  the  liquidation  of  the 
floating  debt.  It  was  now  necessary  to  fix  the 
amount  of  the  Khedive's  Civil  List.  "Assur^- 
ment,"  the  Commissioners  said,  "au  moment  de 
demander  de  nouveaux  sacrifices  de  la  part  de  ses 
creanciers.  Son  Altesse  ne  voudra  pas  que  ses 
dotations  soient  fixees  k  un  chiffre  trop  devd" 
The  Civil  List  was,  therefore,  fixed  at  £E.300,000 
a  year. 

The  question  of  the  sacrifices  to  be  imposed 
on  the  Egyptian  taxpayers  presented  greater 
difficulties.      Three   important   points   had   to   be 

*  The  residue  which  remained  over  eventually  acquired  great  value. 
Quite  recently,  a  plot  of  land  in  the  town  of  Cairo  belonging  to  eome  of 
the  Khedivial  prince*>  sold  for  no  less  than  £600,000. 

VOL.  I  I 


114  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

decided.  The  first  was  whether  the  tax  on  the 
Ouchouri  lands  should  be  increased.  The  second 
was  whether  the  Rouznameh  loan  was  to  be  in- 
cluded amongst  the  debts  of  the  State.  The  third 
was  how  to  deal  with  the  law  of  the  Moukabala. 
The  financial  future  of  the  country  depended  more 
especially  on  whether  any  satisfactory  solution  could 
be  found  to  the  third  of  these  questions. 

Without  going  into  any  lengthy  description  of 
the  system  of  land-tenure  existing  in  Egypt,  it 
will  be  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  the  present 
arscument  to  state  that  the  land  was  at  that  time 
divided  into  two  main  categories,  Ouchouri  and 
Kharadji.^  Ouchouri  lands,  as  their  name  implies, 
are  supposed  to  pay  a  tithe  to  the  State.  They 
were  originally,  for  the  most  part,  fiefs  granted  by 
the  ruler  of  the  country  to  his  followers.  The 
assessment  on  the  Kharadji  was  much  higher  than 
in  the  case  of  the  Ouchouri  lands,  and  moreover 
it  was,  in  theory  at  all  events,  variable  at  the 
will  of  the  Government.  At  the  time  the  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry  sat,  1,823,000  acres  of  land 
were  held  under  Ouchouri,  and  3,487,000  acres 
under  Kharadji  tenure.  In  1877,  the  total  amount 
of  land-tax  paid  on  Kharadji  lands  amounted 
to  £E.3,143,000,  as  against  £E.333,000  paid  by 
the  Ouchouri  landowners.  In  Lower  Egypt,  the 
Kharadji  lands  were  assessed  at  from  P.T.  120 
to  170  an  acre.  In  exceptional  cases,  the  tax 
was  as  much  as,  and  occasionally  even  in  excess 
of  P.T.  200.  The  average  rate  paid  on  Kharadji 
lands  throughout  Egypt  was  P.T.  116-2.  Tlie 
maximum  rate  payable  on  Ouchouri  lands  was 
P.T.  83-5  an  acre.  In  many  cases,  they  paid  a 
mere   quit-rent.       The    average    rate    throughout 

1  "Ouchouri"  is  derived  from  the  Arabic  word  "Ushr,"  meaning 
the  tenth  part.  "  Kharaj "  was  the  word  orii;:iiially  applied  to  the 
tribute  paid,  for  the  most  part,  by  tlio  inliabitauts  of  uoQ-Moslem 
countries  to  their  Moslem  coiitiuerors. 


-^H.  VII       REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  115 

Egypt  was  P.T.  30*30  an  acre.  The  quality  of 
the  Oiichouri  lands  varied  greatly.  They  included 
some  of  the  best  and  also  some  of  the  worst  land 
in  the  country.  The  best  qualities  of  land  were 
largely  held  by  the  Khedivial  family.  All  the 
Ouchouri  lands  were  in  the  possession  of  persons 
of  wealth  and  importance. 

Before  the  first  report  of  the  Commission  of 
Inquiry  was  sent  in,  tlie  Khedive  had  ex{)ressed 
his  willingness  to  raise  the  tax  on  the  Ouchouri 
lands.  The  Commissioners  had  now  to  consider 
in  what  manner  effect  should  be  given  to  this 
proposal.  They  recommended  that  a  cadastral 
survey  should  be  made  with  the  least  possible 
delay,  and  that,  on  reassessing  the  land-tax,  the 
distinction  between  Ouchouri  and  Kharadji  lands 
should  disappear.  As,  however,  a  cadastral  survey 
would  take  a  long  time,  they  proposed  that  the 
Ouchouri  land-tax  should  be  at  once  increased  by 
£E.  150,000  a  year,  to  be  distributed  ratably. 

Turning  to  the  question  of  the  Rouznameh  loan, 
the  Commissioners  pointed  out  that  the  Govern- 
ment had  considered  it  as  a  tax,  and  that  there 
was  manifestly  never  any  intention  of  paying  in- 
terest, and  still  less  of  repaying  the  capital  to  the 
subscribers.  Of  the  truth  of  these  statenients  there 
could  be  no  manner  of  doubt.  In  1877,  the  Chamber 
of  Notables  agreed  to  a  proposal  that  the  payment 
of  interest  on  the  loan  should  be  suspended.  At 
the  same  time,  "  il  fut  ordonne  qu'aussitot  que 
I'integralitd  de  la  Moukabala  aurait  cte  perdue,  on 
devrait  proceder  a  la  perception  des  £3,000,000, 
solde  des  £5,000,000  originairement  fixees  connne 
le  montant  total  de  Temprunt  Rouznameh."  Tliis 
decision  threw  a  strong  light  on  the  complete 
subserviency  of  the  Chamber  of  Notables,  as  also 
on  the  manner  in  which  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment regarded  their  engagements  both  towards  the 


116  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

Rouznameh  bondholders  and  towards  those  who 
had  paid  the  Moukabala. 

There  could,  of  course,  be  no  question  of 
collecting  any  further  sums  on  account  of  the 
Rouznameh  loan.  The  only  point  to  be  decided 
was  what  was  to  be  done  as  regards  the  money 
already  collected.  After  full  consideration,  the 
Commissioners  embodied  their  recommendations 
in  the  following  words :  "  Nous  croyons  devoir 
proposer,  conform^ment  aux  intentions  primitives 
du  Gouvernement  Egyptien,  de  considerer  comme 
un  impot  la  somme  per9ue  a  valoir  sur  I'emprunt 
Rouznameh  et  de  la  rayer  du  montant  des  dettes 
de  I'Etat." 

This  proposal  of  the  Commissioners  was  based 
on  two  grounds. 

In  tlie  first  place,  it  was  thought  that  the  non- 
recognition  by  the  State  of  the  Rouznameh  loan 
was  a  fiiir  sacrifice  to  demand  of  the  debtors,  more 
especially  as,  in  connection  with  other  matters,  the 
Commissioners  proposed  measures  which  would 
afford  a  sensible  relief  to  the  taxpayers  of  Egypt. 

In  the  second  place,  if  the  loan  had  been 
recognised  as  a  State  debt,  great  practical  diffi- 
culties would  have  arisen  in  giving  effect  to  the 
decision.  It  was  clear  that  no  one  could  be  recog- 
nised as  a  State  creditor  unless  he  could  afford 
proof  of  having  lent  money  to  the  Government. 
It  would  have  been  necessary  to  insist  on  this 
point.  Otherwise,  fictitious  claims  would  have 
cropped  up  on  all  sides.  In  the  majority  of  cases, 
no  proofs  would  have  been  forthcoming.  No 
bonds  or  scrip  were  ever  delivered  to  the  sub- 
scribers to  the  loan.  Even  simple  receipts  for 
the  money  paid  into  the  Treasury  had  only  been 
given  to  a  few  favoured  individuals.  Under  these 
circumstances,  it  would  have  been  practically 
impossible  to  do  justice  to  all  the  subscribers,  more 


CH.  VII      REPORT  OF  COMMISSION         117 

especially  to  those  in  the  humblest  classes  of  society 
who  were  most  deserving  of  sympathy. 

Considering  the  financial  situation  which  then 
existed,  the  decision  of  the  Commissioners  on  this 
subject  was  perfectly  justifiable. 

The  most  difficult  question  of  all,  however,  was 
how  to  deal  with  the  Moukabala.  It  is  unneces- 
sary to  dwell  any  further  on  the  ruinous  nature 
of  this  transaction  in  so  far  as  the  State  was  con- 
cerned. The  only  procedure  which,  from  a  fiscal 
point  of  view,  could  in  any  way  have  justified  it, 
would  have  been  to  have  applied  the  whole  of 
the  money  paid  in  virtue  of  the  law  of  the  Mouka- 
bala either  to  the  extinction  of  debt,  or  to  the 
execution  of  public  works  which  would  have 
yielded  a  direct  revenue  to  the  State.  Un- 
fortunately, nothing  of  this  sort  was  done.  The 
financial  arrangements  of  November  1876  did, 
indeed,  contemplate  the  application  of  a  portion 
of  the  Moukabala  funds  to  the  extinction  of  debt, 
but  before  that  period  the  money  had  been  applied 
to  current  expenditure,  and  even  after  November 
1876  the  greater  portion  of  the  Moukabala  money 
was  devoted  to  the  payment  of  interest  on  the  debt. 

It  was  certain  that  the  Egyptian  Government 
never  had  any  intention  of  respecting  the  engage- 
ments which  they  had  taken  towards  those  who  had 
paid  the  Moukabala.  It  was  discovered  in  the 
course  of  the  inquiries  made  by  the  Commissioners 
that  the  draft  of  a  law  had  been  prepared,  under 
instructions  received  from  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment, in  virtue  of  which  an  "impot  sur  la  pro- 
priety "  was  to  be  imposed  on  the  expiration  of  the 
law  of  the  Moukabala.  It  was  estimated  that  :his 
new  tax  would  yield  £900,000  a  year.  The  inten- 
tions, as  also  the  bad  faith  of  the  Government 
were,  therefore,  sufficiently  clear. 

It  was  equally  certain  that  the  optional  character 


118  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

of  the  Moukabala  payments  was  delusive.  "On 
ne  pent  pas  douter,"  the  Commissioners  said, 
"que  le  caractere  facultatif  de  cette  taxe  n'existait 
pas  en  reahte.  Les  contribuables  I'ont  toujours 
consid^ree  comme  aussi  obligatoire  que  toutes  les 
autres  taxes.  Le  fait  qua  peine  la  nouvelle 
administration  ^tablie,  ils  refusent  de  tous  les  cotes 
de  continuer  le  paiement  de  la  Moukabala,  en  se 
referant  a  son  caractere  facultatif,  prouve  I'exacti- 
tude  de  cette  assertion." 

It  was  clear  that,  if  the  reformed  administration 
continued  to  collect  the  Moukabala,  they  would 
have  to  do  so  in  a  very  different  spirit  from  that 
which  had  heretofore  animated  the  Egyptian 
Government.  The  engagements  taken  towards  the 
landowners  would  have  to  be  respected.  When 
once  the  Moukabala  payments  had  ceased,  the  land- 
tax  would  have  to  be  reduced  to  one-half  of  its 
original  amount.  No  violation  of  the  law  or 
evasion  of  its  spirit  could  be  permitted.  But,  the 
Commissioners  asked,  "la  nouvelle  administration 
peut-elle  remplir  les  engagements  pris  par  ses 
predecesseurs  ?" 

There  could  be  but  one  answer  to  this  question. 
"Nous  n'avons  pas,"  the  Commissioners  said,  "la 
moindre  hesitation  a  affirmer  que,  quel  que  puisse 
etre  le  desir  du  Gouvernement  actuel  de  remplir 
les  engagement  pris  par  ses  predecesseurs,  les 
necessites  imperieuses  de  la  situation  ne  lui  per- 
mettront  pas  de  le  faire." 

Obviously,  the  only  honest  course  was  to  state 
the  truth  boldly.  The  Commissioners  held  that 
the  new  INIinistry  should  not  render  itself  re- 
sponsible for  the  continuance  of  a  system  which 
was  "  radicalement  vicieux  et  d'une  ap])lication 
impossible."  They  therefore  reconnnended  that 
no  further  collections  should  be  made  on  account 
of  the  Muukabala. 


cfl.vii       REPORT  OF  COMMISSION         119 

It  remained  to  be  determined  what  should  be 
done  as  regards  those  persons  who  had  ah'eady 
paid  the  Moukabala  in  whole  or  in  part.  It 
appeared  from  the  accounts  furnished  by  the 
Egyptian  Government  that  about  £16,000,000  had 
already  been  paid  on  account  of  Moukabala,  but 
when  the  figures  came  to  be  examined,  it  was  found 
that  the  Government  had  not  in  reality  received 
nearly  so  large  a  sum  as  this. 

In  the  first  place,  considerable  sums  had  been 
paid  in  "ragaas  "  ;  that  is  to  say,  certificates  acknow- 
ledging a  debt  due  by  the  Government  to  the  tax- 
payer. "  On  ne  pent  guere  douter,"  the  Commis- 
sioners said,  "  que  I'acceptation  de  ces  '  ragaas '  par 
le  Tresor  n'ait  donne  lieu  a  de  nombreux  abus  ;  car, 
par  suite  de  ce  systeme  quelques  proprietaires 
puissants  ont  pu  arriver  au  degrevement  dune 
moitie  de  leur  impot  foncier  sans  rien  payer  en 
especes."  The  procedure,  in  fact,  was  after  this 
fashion.  Some  favoured  person  obtained  from  the 
Finance  Ministry  an  acknowledgment  of  a  fictitious 
debt  due  to  him  by  the  Government.  This  docu- 
ment was  paid  into  the  Treasury  in  discharge  of  the 
sum  due  by  the  same  person  on  account  of  Mouka- 
bala. His  land-tax  was  then  reduced  by  one-half, 
without  his  having  expended  a  farthing.  It  was 
impossible  to  state  with  precision  the  extent  to 
which  this  practice  had  been  carried  on,  but  there 
could  be  no  doubt  that  it  had  occasioned  a  heavy 
loss  to  the  Treasury. 

Another  point  had  to  be  considered.  Many  of 
the  payments  made,  even  in  money,  on  account  of 
the  Moukabala  were  fictitious.  They  had  only 
been  possible  because  sums  due  on  account  of  other 
taxes  were  allowed  to  remain  unpaid.  A  single 
example  will  suffice  to  show  how  the  system  worked 
in  practice.  The  amount  of  land-tax  due  by  four 
villages,    chosen    at    hazard    in    the    province    of 


120  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  i 

Galioubieh,  was  £1640.  The  amount  due  on 
account  of  Moukabala  in  these  vilhiges  was  £1472. 
The  total  amount  due  was,  therefore,  £3112.  In 
the  year  1878,  £2251  was  collected  in  these  four 
villages.  Of  this  amount,  £1472,  that  is  to  say  the 
total  sum  due,  was  credited  to  JNloukabala,  leaving 
only  £779  available  for  ordinary  land -lax.  The 
latter,  therefore,  remained  unpaid  to  the  extent  of 
£861. 

When,  however,  all  the  deductions  based  on  the 
above  facts  were  made,  there  still  remained  a  large 
sum  due  by  the  Government  to  those  persons  who 
had  really  paid  the  Moukabala.  The  most  equit- 
able course  to  have  pursued  would  have  been  to 
have  raised  a  loan  and  to  have  repaid  this  money  ; 
but  in  the  then  exhausted  state  of  Egyptian  credit, 
the  adoption  of  this  course  was  impossible. 

It  may  be  convenient  if,  passing  over  the  recom- 
mendations made  by  the  Commissioners  of  Inquiry, 
the  course  eventually  pursued  as  regards  those 
persons  who  had  really  paid  the  Moukabala  is  here 
stated.  It  was  found  that,  when  all  legitimate 
deductions  had  been  made,  the  sum  really  due  was 
£9,500,000.  Under  the  law  of  Liquidation  of  July 
17,  1880,  an  annual  sum  of  £150,000  was  allotted 
for  fifty  years  to  those  who  had  ])aid  the  Mouka- 
bala. They  are  thus  now  receiving  interest  at  the 
rate  of  about  1^  per  cent  on  the  capital  sums  which 
they  paid. 

In  1876,  the  Egyptian  Government  estimated 
the  annual  receipts  from  the  Moukabala  at 
£1,650,000.  The  amount  paid  in  1877  was 
£1,337,000,  and  in  1878,  £1,000,000.  For  the 
future,  the  country  was,  of  course,  relieved  of  these 
payments.  On  the  other  hand,  the  land-tax  was 
raised  by  £1,130,000. 

The  results  of  this  change  affected  the  Ouchouri 
and  Kharadji  proprietors  in  different  proportions. 


en.  VII       REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  121 

Out  of  3,487,000  acres  of  Kharadji  land,  only 
240,000  acres  had  paid  the  Moukabala  in  full.  For 
the  most  part,  therefore,  the  Kharadji  landowners 
were  slightly  relieved  of  taxation. 

The  case  of  the  Ouchouri  landowners  was 
different.  There  were  1,323,000  acres  of  Ouchouri 
land  in  Egypt.  On  about  480,000  acres,  the 
Moukabala  had  been  paid  in  full,  but  most  of  the 
payments  had  been  made  in  "ragaas,"  and  were, 
therefore,  fictitious.  The  changes  in  the  law  fell 
most  severely  on  this  class.  Not  only  did  they 
have  to  pay  the  amount  of  land-tax,  as  it  stood 
previous  to  the  enactment  of  the  law  of  the 
Moukabala,  but  they  also  had  to  bear  their  share 
of  the  increase  of  £150,000  which  was  placed  on 
the  Ouchouri  lands.  Even,  then,  however,  they 
paid  much  less  than  the  Kharadji  landowners. 

The  Moukabala  had  been  paid  in  part  on 
725,000  acres  of  Ouchouri  land.  On  these  lands, 
tlie  immediate  increase  of  taxation,  if  any,  was 
slight. 

Finally,  no  Moukabala  payments  had  been  made 
on  118,000  acres  of  Ouchouri  land.  The  owners 
of  these  lands  were  not,  of  course,  affected  by  the 
repeal  of  the  law  of  the  Moukabala,  but  they  had 
to  pay  their  share  of  the  £150,000  increase  on  all 
Ouchouri  lands. 

In  order  to  compensate  for  the  withdrawal  of 
the  privileges  accorded  by  the  law  of  the  Moukd- 
bala,  the  Commissioners  proposed  several  measures, 
from  the  adoption  of  which  great  benefits,  it  was 
rightly  thought,  would  accrue  to  the  population. 
The  arrears  due  for  land-tax  prior  to  January  1, 
1876,  and  amounting  to  about  £30,000,  were  to  be 
remitted.  All  agriculturists  were  to  be  relieved 
from  payment  of  the  professional  tax.  It  was 
estimated  that  the  adoption  of  this  measure  would 
involve  a  relief  of  taxation  amounting  to  £80,000 


122  JMODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

a  year.  The  poll-tax,  yielding  £205,000  a  year, 
was  to  be  abolished  ;  so  also  were  the  octroi  dues 
in  the  villages,  yielding  £21,000  a  year  ;  tlie  "  droits 
de  voirie"  in  the  vilhiges,  yielding  £8000  a  year; 
the  market  dues  in  the  villages,  yielding  £10,000 
a  year ;  the  weighing  dues  in  the  villages,  yielding 
£17,000  a  year;  the  dues  on  stamping  mats  and 
tissues,  yielding  £23,000  a  year ;  the  dues  on  the 
sale  of  cattle,  yielding  £1500  a  year ;  and  some 
other  minor  taxes.  In  all,  a  remission  of  taxation 
to  the  extent  of  about  £400,000  a  year  was 
proposed.^ 

On  the  whole,  although  it  is,  in  my  opinion,  to 
be  regretted  that  no  higher  rate  of  interest  was 
allowed  to  those  to  whom  money  was  really 
due  on  account  of  Moukabala,  it  may  be  said 
that  the  proposals  of  the  Commissioners  were  as 
just  to  the  people  of  Egypt  as  the  very  difficult 
circumstances  of  the  case  admitted. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  at  any  length  on 
the  proposals  made  by  the  Commissioners  in 
respect  to  the  creditors  of  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment. Those  proposals  underwent  considerable 
modifications  before  a  final  settlement  was  eventu- 
ally made  in  July  1880.  It  will  be  sufficient 
to  say  that  the  general  principle  on  which  the 
Commissioners  based  their  recommendations  was 
that  the  special  security  held  by  each  class  of 
creditor  was  to  be  respected  as  far  as  possible. 
No  change  was*  proposed  in  the  position  of  the 
Preference  bondholders.  The  Commissioners  were 
of  opinion  that  for  the  moment  it  was  impossible 
to  state  definitely  what  should  be  the  rate  of 
interest  on  the  Unified  Stock.  They  proposed, 
therefore,    that    the    rate   should    be   temporarily 

*  The  relief  was  in  reality  much  greater,  for  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  far  larger  sums  were  collected  than  were  paid  into  the  Goverumeut 
Treasury. 


CH.  VII       REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  123 

reduced  from  6  to  5  per  cent.  The  rate  of  interest 
on  the  Daira  Sanieh  and  Daira  Khassa  loans  was 
also  reduced  to  5  per  cent.  As  regards  the 
creditors  who  held  no  special  securities,  a  sum  of 
about  £6,301,000  was  available  to  liquidate  claims 
amounting  to  about  £8,210,000.  After  discharging 
certain  debts  which  had  to  be  paid  in  full,  tiie 
Commissioners  recommended  that  the  balance  left 
over  should  be  distributed  ratably  amongst  the 
creditors.  It  was  estimated  that  sufficient  money 
would  be  available  to  pay  the  creditors  52  per  cent 
of  their  claims. 

Finally,  the  Commissioners  prepared  a  Budget 
for  the  year  1879.  The  revenue  was  estimated  at 
£'.),067,000,  and  the  expenditure  at  £8,803,000,  thus 
leaving  a  surplus  of  £204,000.  A  sum  of  £3, 130,000 
was  included  in  the  estimates  for  administrative 
expenditure. 

Such,  therefore,  were  the  general  conclusions  at 
which  the  Commissioners  arrived.  Fifteen  months 
were  to  elapse  before  their  recommendations,  in  a 
modified  shape,  took  the  form  of  law.  Subse- 
quently, important  political  events  ensued.  The 
work  of  fiscal  reform  had  to  be  recommenced  under 
different  auspices  from  those  which  existed  in  1879. 
Many  years  were  to  pass  before  the  crisis  in 
Egyptian  financial  affairs  could  be  said  to  ha^e 
terminated.  Some  errors  were,  without  doubt, 
made  by  the  Commissioners.  Nevertheless,  the 
work  performed  by  the  Commission  of  Inquiry 
has  stood  the  test  of  time  as  well  as  could  be 
expected,  looking  to  the  difficult  circumstances  of 
the  situation  with  which  they  had  to  deal.  It 
afforded  a  sound  starting-point  for  further  reforms. 
For  the  first  time,  an  earnest  effort  had  been  made 
to  grapple  with  the  difficulties  of  the  Egyptian 
financial  situation.  Tlie  inquiries  of  the  Commis- 
sioners threw  a  flood  of  lii»ht   on  the  extent   of 


124  MODERN  EGYPT  n.  x 

Egy})tian  liabilities,  the  resources  available  to 
meet  those  liabilities,  and  the  system  under  which 
the  Government  had  heretofore  been  conducted. 
Ad  consilium  de  republicd  dandum,  caput  est,  tiosse 
rempublicam.  This  elementary  truth  had  been  too 
much  forgotten  in  dealing  with  Egyptian  affairs. 
Now  that  the  true  facts  of  the  situation  were  more 
accurately  known,  although  mistakes  might  be 
made  in  subsidiary  matters,  it  was  no  longer  pos- 
sible to  draw  erroneous  conclusions  as  to  tlie  main 
questions  at  issue.  The  Egyptian  Treasury  was 
insolvent.  The  system  of  government  had  been 
as  bad  as  possible.  Both  the  people  of  Egypt  and 
the  creditors  of  the  Egyptian  Government  were 
alike  interested  in  the  adoption  of  an  improved 
system.  It  was  futile  to  attempt  to  impose  fresh 
burthens  on  the  country.  On  the  contrary,  certain 
taxes  should  be  abolished. 

Even  if  the  Connnissioners  had  done  nothing 
more  than  bring  home  the  main  facts  of  the  situa- 
tion to  all  concerned,  they  would  have  deserved 
well  both  of  the  Egyptian  people  and  of  all  who 
were  interested  in  the  prosperity  of  Egypt. 

The  report  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  was 
signed  on  April  8.  On  the  previous  day,  the 
Khedive  dismissed  his  European  Ministers,  and 
charged  Chdrif  Pasha  with  the  formation  of  a  new 
Ministry.  The  situation  was  thus  completely 
changed.  All  hopes  of  introducing  a  reformed 
system  of  administration  had  for  the  time  to  be 
abandoned ;  and,  without  reforms,  the  scheme  pro- 
posed by  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  was  incapable 
of  execution.  The  Commissioners,  therefore, 
tendered  their  resignations  to  the  Khedive.  They 
were,  of  course,  accepted. 

The  counter  project  which  ^  was  prepared  by  the 
Khedive  in  concert  with  the  Chamber  of  Notables 

>  Vide  ante,  p.  102. 


OH.  VII      REPORT  OF  COMMISSION         125 

was  published  on  April  23.  Little  need  be  said 
of  this  plan.  It  was  open  to  the  most  serious 
objections. 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  impossible  of  execution. 
The  revenue  for  1879  was  estimated  at  £9,837,000. 
This  was  nearly  £800,000  in  excess  of  the  estimate 
made  by  the  Commissioners  of  Inquiry,  which  was 
£9,067,000.  Even  this  latter  estimate  erred  on  the 
side  of  optimism,  and  it  was  certain  that  the  collec- 
tion of  such  a  sum  as  that  named  in  the  scheme  of 
the  Chamber  of  Notables  was  impossible  without 
resorting  to  the  oppressive  methods  of  the  past, 
and  without  again  sacrificing  the  future  to  the 
present. 

In  the  second  place,  although  both  the  Khedive 
and  his  advisers  had  rejected  the  idea  of  national 
bankruptcy  as  dishonourable,  the  settlement  which 
they  proposed  did,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  constitute 
an  act  of  bankruptcy.  The  interest  on  the  Unified 
Debt  was  to  be  reduced  from  6  to  5  per  cent, 
although  hopes  were  held  out  that  payment  of 
interest  at  a  higher  rate  would  be  resumed  at  some 
later  period.  In  fact,  as  the  Commissioners  of 
Inquiry  pointed  out  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the 
Khedive,  the  scheme  "protestait  contra  toute 
declaration  de  faillite,  mais  en  consacrait  la  realite." 

These  objections  would  alone  have  been  fatal 
to  the  scheme.  Moreover,  there  was  one  very 
significant  omission  in  the  project.  There  could 
be  no  hope  for  reforms  in  Egypt  unless  a  fixed 
sum  were  assigned  for  the  private  expenditure  of 
the  Khedive  and  his  family.  The  scheme  of  the 
Chamber  of  Notables  made  no  mention  of  any 
Civil  List.  In  fact,  the  basis  of  the  plan  was 
that  the  Khedive  should  regain  his  personal  power, 
and  that  the  upper  classes  should  preserve  their 
privileges  intact. 

The  effect  of  the  change  of  policy  inaugurated 


126  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i 

by  the  Khedive  made  itself  immediately  felt. 
On  April  19,  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  reported  that 
"  Shahin  Paslia,  the  Minister  of  War,  had  gone 
to  Behera,  probably  for  the  purpose  of  collecting 
money;  his  former  position  as  Insjjector-General  in 
Lower  Egypt  having  secured  for  him  an  unenviable 
notoriety  as  one  of  the  harshest  and  most  successful 
tax-gatherers  in  the  country." 

A  few  days  later,  the  British  Vice- Consul  at 
Zagazig  wrote  :  "  You  ask  how  is  the  new  regime 
working  ?  Worse  than  before.  Three-fourths  of 
the  taxes  and  one-half  of  the  Moukabala  are  now 
exacted  by  means  of  the  usual  oppressions.  The 
fellah,  having  no  crop  of  cotton  or  grain  to  realise, 
is  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  usurers  for  money, 
which  he  gets  at  some  4  to  5  per  cent  per  month. 
He  has  no  alternative  if  he  would  avoid  the 
*  courbash.'  The  *  Zawats '  (aristocracy),  mean- 
while, only  pay  the  '  Mai '  (land-tax  proper)  at 
their  pleasure,  and,  therefore,  see  everything 
couleur  de  rose.  .  .  .  Omar  Pasha  Lutfi,  Inspector- 
General  of  Lower  Egy})t,  has  been  here  of  late, 
and  has  given  stringent  orders  for  the  collection  of 
money  by  all  possible  means." 

In  a  word,  all  the  abuses  of  the  old  regime 
returned  immediately  the  new  Mmistry  came  into 
power. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  Commissioners  of  the 
Debt  were  considering  what  action  they  should 
take.  Under  the  changed  circumstances  of  the 
situation,  there  was  but  one  course  left  for  them  to 
pursue.  They  commenced  a  lawsuit  against  the 
Government  in  the  Mixed  Tribunals. 

For  some  while  previous  to  these  events,  I  had 
been  wishing  to  leave  Egypt.  I  had,  however, 
become  interested  in  the  work.  So  long  as  there 
appeared  any  hope  of  placing  Egyptian  financial 
affairs  on  a  sound  footing,  I  hesitated  whether  to 


CH.VII       REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  127 

go  or  to  remain.  All  hopes  of  this  sort  seemed, 
however,  to  be  dashed  to  the  ground.  Under  the 
circumstances,  I  did  not  care  to  remain  any  longer 
in  the  country.  I  therefore  resigned  my  appoint- 
ment and  left  Egypt  on  May  24,  1879.  From 
that  date  until  I  returned  as  Controller-General 
after  the  abdication  of  Ismail  Pasha,  I  cannot 
speak  from  personal  experience  of  what  occurred 
in  Egypt.  Sir  Auckland  Colvin  was  appointed 
to  be  Commissioner  of  the  Debt  in  my  place. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   FALL   OF   ISMAIL   PASHA 

April-June  1879 

Embarrassment  of  the  European  Powers — Turkey — England — France 
— Italy — Russia — Germany  and  Austria — The  French  and  British 
Governments  demand  the  leinstatement  of  the  European  Min- 
isters— The  Khedive  declines  to  reinstate  them — Question  of  re- 
establishing the  Control — The  German  Government  protest  against 
the  proceedings  of  the  Khedive — The  British  and  French  Govern- 
ments advise  abdication — The  Khedive  appeals  to  the  Sultan — 
The  Sultan  deposes  the  Khedive — Inauguration  of  Prince  Tewfik 
— Ismail  Pasha  leaves  Egypt — Remarks  on  his  reign. 

The  action  taken  by  the  Khedive  in  dismissing  his 
European  Ministers  embarrassed  the  various  Powers 
who  were  interested  in  the  affairs  of  Egypt.  More- 
over, all  the  most  important  Governments  in  Europe 
claimed  a  right  to  make  their  voices  heard  in  any 
general  settlement  of  Egyptian  questions.  The 
local  difficulties  of  the  situation  were  great.  They 
were  rendered  greater  by  the  fact  that  no  serious 
step  could  be  taken  without  producing  a  clash  of 
conflicting  international  interests. 

The  Sultan  was  concerned  lest  his  suzerain 
rights  should  be  endangered.  Turkish  policy  was, 
as  usual,  vacillating  and  inconsistent.  Should  not 
the  Khedive  be  deposed  ?  Nay,  did  not  an  oppor- 
tunity now  present  itself  to  realise  the  pernicious 
dream  which  had  haunted  the  minds  of  Turkish 
statesmen  since  the  days  when  Mehemet  Ali  won 
by  the  power  of   the  sword    a    quasi-independent 

128 


CH.  VIII     FALL  OF  ISMAIL  PASHA  129 

position  for  himself  and  his  dynasty  ?  His  de- 
scendant had  shamefully  abused  his  power.  The 
people  of  Egypt  were  groaning  under  his  yoke. 
Europe  was  dissatisfied  with  him.  Could  not  all 
this  be  rectified  by  cancelling  the  Firmans  and  by 
the  despatch  of  a  Turkish  Governor,  with  a  few 
sturdy  Ottoman  battalions  at  his  back,  to  rule  the 
country  ?  Truly,  whispered  interested  diplomacy 
in  the  garb  of  a  candid  friend,  but  is  not  all 
this  European  interference  somewhat  dangerous  ? 
Might  not  the  principle  of  deposition  by  reason  of 
misgovernment  be  applied  elsewhere  ?  Was  it  not 
possible  that  public  opinion,  which  was  now  so 
powerful,  might  apply  the  Horatian  maxim  and 
contend  that  many  of  those  things,  which  in- 
quisitive Commissioners  of  Inquiry  had  said  of 
Egypt,  might,  with  a  change  of  name,  be  applied 
to  other  parts  of  the  Ottoman  dominions  ?  This 
argument  was  not  without  its  weight.  From  this 
point  of  view,  perhaps  it  would  be  better  to  con- 
gratulate the  Khedive  on  his  defiant  attitude,  and 
to  encourage  him  in  his  opposition  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  European  JNIinisters.  But  then  came  rival 
diplomatic  mutterings.  What  would  be  the 
position  of  the  Sultan  if  the  two  Western  Powers, 
with  a  mere  appearance  of  consultation  with  Con- 
stantinople, deposed  the  Khedive  on  their  own 
initiative  ?  If  that  were  to  happen,  the  world 
would  see  that  Turkish  suzerainty  over  Egypt  was 
nothing  more  than  a  mere  diplomatic  expression. 
Would  it  not,  therefore,  be  better  to  act  at  once  so 
as  to  prevent  others  from  taking  action  ?  Under 
all  these  circumstances,  perhaps  the  best  plan  of  all 
for  a  bewildered  ruler,  who  was,  perforce,  obliged  to 
speak  the  language  of  civilisation,  but  whose  prin- 
ciples of  civil  government  were  very  similar  to  those 
of  his  warlike  ancestors,  when  they  planted  their 
horse-tails  on  the  banks  of  the  Bosphorus,  was  to 

VOL.   I  K 


130  MODERN  EGYPT  rr.  i 

foil  back  on  the  reflection  that  the  times  were  out 
of  joint,  to  await  events,  and  to  take  no  decisive 
action  of  any  kind. 

The  difhculties  of  the  British  Government  were 
also  great.  Their  pohtical  interests  in  Egypt  were 
of  a  nature  which  precluded  total  inaction.  Indeed, 
there  was  manifestly  a  danger  that  a  policy  would 
be  forced  upon  them  which  it  had  always  been  one 
of  the  objects  of  British  statesmanship  to  avoid. 
"  The  Enghshman,"  a  man  of  literary  genius  had 
said  some  thirty  years  previously,  "  straining  far 
over  to  hold  his  loved  India,  will  plant  a  firm  foot 
on  the  banks  of  the  Nile  and  sit  in  the  seats  of  the 
faithful."^  Unless  care  were  taken,  the  prophecy 
might  be  on  the  point  of  fulfilment,  and  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  race,  in  addition  to  responsibilities  which 
were  already  world-wide,  would  have  thrust  upon 
it  the  burthen  of  governing  Egypt. 

British  diplomacy,  which  may  at  times  have 
been  mistaken,  but  which  was  certainly  honest,  did 
its  best  to  throw  off  the  Egyptian  burden.  But 
circumstances  were  too  strong  to  be  arrested  by 
diplomatic  action.  Egypt  was  to  fall  to  Kinglake's 
Englishman.  Moreover,  it  was  to  fall  to  him, 
although  some  were  opposed  to  his  going  there, 
others  were  indifferent  as  to  whether  he  went  or 
not,  none  much  wished  him  to  go,  and,  not  only  did 
he  not  want  to  go  there  himself,  but  he  struggled 
strenuously  and  honestly  not  to  be  obliged  to  go. 
The  Moslem  eventually  accepted  the  accomplished 
fact,  and  muttered  "  Kismet "  ;  but  the  European, 
blinded  by  international  jealousy,  not  unfrequently 
attributed  the  whole  affair  to  a  dee})-laid  })lot,  and 
found  in  British  policy  as  regards  Egypt  another 
convincing  proof  of  the  perfidy  of  Albion. 

French  diplomacy,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
mainly    interested   in  preventing   the   Englishman 

1  King-lake's  EoUien,  p.  286. 


OH.  VIII     FALL  OF  ISMAIL  PASHA  l31 

from  planting  his  foot  firmly  on  the  banks  oi  the 
Nile,  and  was,  moreover,  hampered  by  the  financial 
necessities  of  "Great  Paris  Syndicates,"  and  the 
like.  A  Turkish  occupation  was  undesirable,  the 
remedy  being,  in  French  opinion,  worse  than  the 
disease,  whilst  the  French  Government  of  the  day 
had  the  wisdom  to  see  that  a  joint  Anglo-French 
occupation  would  probably  become  a  fertile  source 
of  disagreement  between  France  and  England. 
Had  not  Prince  Bismarck  been  credited  with  the 
blunt  epigrammatic  saying  that  Egypt  would  be  to 
France  and  England  even  as  Schleswig-Holstein 
to  Prussia  and  Austria  ? 

Italy  hovered  around,  clamorous  to  satisfy  the 
restless  ambition,  which  might  perhaps  have 
better  been  employed  in  improving  the  lot  of 
the  Tuscan  or  Neapolitan  peasant,  by  obtaining 
some  share  of  government  on  the  cosmopolitan  soil 
of  Egypt. 

Russia  had  no  local  interests  to  serve,  and  stood 
aloof.  Possibly,  however,  as  events  developed, 
something  might  occur  which  could  be  turned  to 
the  advantage  of  INIuscovite  interests.  It  was  to 
be  observed,  moreover,  that  the  shipwreck  of  a 
Mohammedan  Government  afforded  an  additional 
proof  that  Orientals  could  not  manage  their  own 
affairs.  It  behoved,  therefore,  any  one  who  claimed 
to  be  heir -apparent  to  any  part  of  the  Ottoman 
dominions  to  be  on  the  watch.  In  the  meanwhile, 
perhaps  a  little  diplomatic  capital  might  be  made 
out  of  the  affair  by  posing  as  the  protector  of 
Turkey  against  foreign  encroachments.  "  Nous 
avons,"  said  a  well  -  known  Russian  diplomatist, 
"tellement  ^corchd  ces  pauvres  Turcs  au  nord, 
c'est  bien  le  moins  que  nous  pourrons  faire  de  les 
protdger  un  peu  au  sud." 

Germany,  which  connoted  Austria,  had  so  far 
interfered  but  little  in,  Egyptian  affairs.      Never- 


132  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

theless,  the  co-operation  of  France  and  England 
in  the  execution  of  a  common  policy  was  perliaps 
regarded  with  no  very  friendly  eye  at  Berlin. 
There  were,  moreover,  certain  German  creditors 
of  the  Egyptian  Government  who  had  obtained 
judgments  in  the  INIixed  Courts.  Were  they  not 
to  be  paid  ?  Prince  Bismarck  would  shortly  ask 
that  question,  and  when  the  master  of  many 
legions  asked  a  question,  it  was  understood  that 
he  expected  some  satisfactory  reply. 

The  responsibility  of  taking  the  initiative  de- 
volved on  the  British  and  French  Governments. 
It  was  evidently  desirable,  if  possible,  to  avoid 
the  extreme  step  of  deposing  Ismail  Pasha, 
Supposing  he  refused  to  abdicate,  it  might  become 
necessary  to  use  force.  In  that  case,  both  Govern- 
ments might  be  obliged  to  adopt  the  policy  which 
each  honestly  wished  to  avoid.  INIoreover,  the 
summary  dismissal  of  the  European  Ministers, 
though  an  unwise  act,  and  one  which  constituted  a 
grave  discourtesy  to  both  the  British  and  French 
Governments,  was  not  a  violation  of  any  positive 
engagement  taken  by  the  Khedive.  On  every 
ground,  therefore,  it  was  desirable  to  see  what 
could  be  done  by  remonstrance  before  resorting  to 
extreme  measures.  After  the  matter  had  been 
discussed  in  London  and  Paris,  the  two  Govern- 
ments agreed  on  a  common  line  of  action.  In  a 
despatch  addressed  to  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  on 
April  25,  Lord  Salisbury  expressed  himself  in  the 
following  terms  : — 

"  The  Khedive  is  well  aware  that  the  con- 
siderations which  compel  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment to  take  an  hiterest  in  the  destinies  of  Egypt 
have  led  them  to  pursue  no  other  policy  than  that 
of  developing  the  resources  and  securing  the  good 
government  of  the  country.  They  have  hitherto 
considered     the     independence    of    the    Khedive 


cii.viii      FALL  OF  ISMAIL  PASHA  133 

and  the  maintenance  of  his  dynasty  as  important 
conditions  for  the  attainment  of  these  ends  ;  and 
the  same  sentiments  have,  they  are  Avell  assured, 
animated  the  Government  of  France.  .  .  .  We 
would  rather  assume  that  the  decision  thus  hastily 
taken  by  His  Highness,  both  with  respect  to  the 
future  conduct  of  the  reform  and  the  attitude  he 
proposes  to  maintain  towards  the  two  Governments, 
is  not  final.  We  prefer  to  look  to  his  future  action 
for  a  favourable  interpretation  of  the  conduct  he 
has  lately  pursued.  But  if  he  continues  to  ignore 
the  obligations  imposed  upon  him  by  his  past 
acts  and  assurances,  and  persists  in  declining  the 
assistance  of  European  Ministers  whom  the  two 
Powers  may  place  at  his  disposal,  we  must  conclude 
that  the  disregard  of  engagements  which  has 
marked  his  recent  action  was  the  result  of  a  settled 
plan,  and  that  he  deliberately  renounces  all  pre- 
tension to  their  friendship.  In  such  a  case,  it  will 
only  remain  for  the  two  Cabinets  to  reserve  to 
themselves  an  entire  liberty  of  appreciation  and 
action  in  defending  their  interests  in  Egypt,  and 
in  seeking  the  arrangements  best  calculated  to 
secure  the  good  government  and  prosperity  of  the 
country." 

When  the  Khedive  dismissed  his  European 
Ministers,  he  was  well  aware  of  the  serious  nature 
of  the  step  which  he  had  taken.  His  first  intention 
was  to  adopt  a  defiant  attitude.  An  oath  was 
administered  to  the  superior  officers  of  the  army 
pledging  them  "to  bear  true  allegiance  to  the 
Khedive,  and  to  resist  all  the  enemies  of  the 
country,  of  himself,  and  of  his  family."  The 
strength  of  the  army  was  at  the  same  time  increased. 
A  few  days,  however,  sufficed  to  show  that  the 
Khedive  could  not  count  on  the  loyalty  of  his  own 
troops.  Writing  on  April  26,  Sir  Frank  Lascelles, 
after  dwelling  on  the  misery  and  discontent  caused 


134  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

by  the  harsh  measures  of  the  new  Ministry,  added: 
"The  discontent  caused  by  such  a  state  of  things 
exists,  I  am  informed,  to  a  large  extent  in  the 
army,  and  has  given  rise  to  a  feehng  of  hostility 
against  the  Khedive,  not  only  among  the  private 
soldiers,  who  are  recruited  from  among  the  suffer- 
ing classes  of  the  population,  but  also  among 
the  officers,  who,  although  they  may  be  strongly 
opposed  to  European  interference,  regard  the 
Khedive  as  being  responsible  for  the  disasters  that 
have  fallen  upon  the  country." 

When  the  British  and  French  Consuls-General 
communicated  to  the  Khedive  the  views  expressed 
in  Lord  Salisbury's  despatch  of  April  25,  he  depre- 
cated any  idea  that  he  should  have  been  guilty 
of  intentional  discourtesy  towards  the  British  and 
French  Governments,  but  he  declined  to  reinstate 
the  European  Ministers.  It  was,  indeed,  obvious 
to  every  one  in  Egypt  that  their  reinstatement  was 
undesirable,  even  if  it  had  been  possible. 

Some  discussion  then  took  place  as  to  the  form 
in  which  Europeans  should  be  associated  with  the 
government  of  Egypt.  There  could  be  but  little 
hope  that  the  revival  of  the  Control  would  lead  to 
any  satisfactory  results.  With  whatever  nominal 
authority  the  Controllers  might  have  been  invested, 
they  would  have  had  no  real  power.  They  would 
not  have  been  supported  by  any  external  force,  or 
by  the  willing  assistance  of  the  Khedive,  or  by  the 
sympathy  of  the  peo})le.  They  would  have  been 
associated  with  Ministers  belonging  to  the  retro- 
grade Turkish  ])arty,  with  whose  ideas  they  would 
have  been  unable  to  sympathise.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances, their  control  would  have  been  illusory, 
whilst,  had  they  been  nominated,  the  Governments 
of  England  and  France  would,  at  least  in  ap})ear- 
ance,  have  assumed  some  responsibility  for  the 
financial  catastrophe  which  was  evidently  impending. 


CH.  VIII     FALL  OF  ISMAIL  PASHA  135 

The  idea  of  reviving  the  Control  was,  therefore, 
wisely  set  aside. 

In  truth,  every  day  it  was  becoming  more 
apparent  that  no  satisfactory  solution  of  Egyptian 
difficulties  was  possible  so  long  as  Ismail  Pasha 
remained  at  the  head  of  affairs.  The  action  of  the 
German  Government  hastened  the  decision  which 
would  probably  in  any  case  have  been  taken, 
though  perhaps  somewhat  later.  The  German 
Consul-General  in  Cairo  was  instructed  to  declare 
to  the  Khedive  "that  the  Imperial  Government 
looks  upon  the  Decree  of  April  22,  by  which  the 
Egyptian  Government  at  their  own  will  regulate 
the  matters  relating  to  the  debt,  thereby  abolishing 
existing  and  recognised  rights,  as  an  open  and 
direct  violation  of  the  international  enoaorements 
contracted  at  the  institution  of  the  judicial  reform  ; 
that  it  must  declare  the  Decree  to  be  devoid  of 
any  legally  binding  effect  in  regard  to  the  com- 
petency of  the  JNIixed  Courts  of  Justice  and  the 
rights  of  the  subjects  of  the  Empire,  and  must  hold 
the  Viceroy  responsible  for  all  the  consequences 
of  his  unlawful  proceedings."  The  other  Great 
Powers  of  Europe  joined  in  this  protest,  although 
the  form  of  communication  to  the  Khedive  under- 
went some  modifications. 

The  end  was  evidently  approaching.  On  June  19, 
Sir  Frank  Lascelles,  acting  under  Lord  Salisbury's 
instructions,  made  the  following  communication  to 
the  Khedive : — 

"The  French  and  English  Governments  are 
agreed  to  advise  your  Highness  officially^  to 
abdicate  and  to  leave  Egypt.  Should  Your 
Highness  follow  this  advice,  our  Governments 
will  act  in  concert  in  order  that  a  suitable  Civil 
List  should  be  assigned  to  you,  and  that  the  order 

'  A  private  communication  to  the  same  effect  had  been  made  some 
days  previously. 


136  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

of  succession,  in  virtue  of  which  Prince  Tewfik  will 
succeed  Your  Highness,  should  not  be  disturbed. 
We  must  not  conceal  from  Your  Highness  that  if 
you  refuse  to  abdicate,  and  if  you  compel  the 
Cabinets  of  London  and  Paris  to  address  them- 
selves directly  to  the  Sultan,  you  will  not  be  able 
to  count  either  upon  obtaining  the  Civil  List  or 
upon  the  maintenance  of  the  succession  in  favour 
of  Prince  Tewfik."  It  was  necessary  to  give  a 
warning  as  to  the  possibility  of  the  succession 
passing  away  from  Prince  Tewfik.  According  to 
Mohammedan  law,  Prince  Abdul  Halim  was  the 
rightful  heir,  but  the  Firman  of  June  8,  1873,  laid 
down  that  the  succession  was  to  proceed  by  right 
of  primogeniture.  The  Khedive  had  obtained  this 
concession  from  the  Sultan  by  the  expenditure 
of  large  sums  of  money.  There  was  now  some 
danger  that  his  efforts  to  keep  the  succession  for 
his  children  would  have  been  made  in  vain.  It 
was  known  that  the  candidature  of  Prince  Halim 
found  favour  at  Constantinople. 

Simultaneously  with  the  transmission  of  orders 
to  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  that  he  should,  in  con- 
junction with  his  French  colleague,  advise  the 
Khedive  to  abdicate,  a  despatch  was  written  by 
Lord  Salisbury  stating  the  reasons  why  the  British 
Government  had  been  led  to  take  this  decision. 
"  It  is  not  possible,"  Lord  Salisbury  said,  "  to 
review  the  events  which  ended  in  the  dismissal 
of  the  European  Ministers  without  the  conviction 
that  the  Khedive  never  sincerely  accepted  the 
limitations  of  his  power  proposed  by  the  Com- 
mission, and  was  quite  resolved  to  resume  his 
full  prerogative  as  soon  as  the  immediate  pur- 
poses of  his  a})p;uent  concession  should  have  been 
answered. 

"Tlie  two  Powers  have  given  to  His  Higlmess 
ample  time  to   recall   any  luisty  step,  and  to   re- 


CH.VIII     FALL  OF  ISMAIL  PASHA  137 

enter,  if  he  had  been  willing  to  do  so,  upon  the 
path  of  reform  marked  out  by  the  International 
Commission.  He  has  refused  to  avail  himself  of 
any  such  opportunity,  and  has  only  employed  the 
interval  of  delay  in  renewing  the  extortion  and 
cruelty  by  which  his  Treasury  had  formerly  been 
filled.  It  therefore  remains  for  the  two  Govern- 
ments, in  accordance  with  the  warning  addressed 
to  His  Highness  by  them  in  their  despatches  of 
the  25th  of  April,  to  consider  the  course  which 
is  necessary  for  defending  their  interests  in  Egypt, 
and  securing  the  good  government  of  the  country. 

"  It  is  evident  that  the  remedies  for  misgovern- 
ment  hitherto  proposed  have  been  tried  and  have 
wholly  failed.  .  .  .  Any  further  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  Powers  to  assist  the  Khedive  in  avert- 
ing the  consequences  of  his  own  misgovernment 
can  have  no  other  effect  than  to  make  them 
responsible  for  it  in  the  future.  His  power  to 
frustrate  all  projects  of  reform,  and  his  resolve  to 
use  it,  have  been  sufficiently  demonstrated  by  events. 

*'  If  Egypt  were  a  country  in  whose  past  history 
the  Powers  had  no  share,  and  to  whose  future 
destiny  it  was  possible  for  them  to  be  indifferent, 
their  wisest  course  would  be  to  renounce  at  this 
point  all  further  concern  with  the  relations  between 
the  Egyptian  Ruler  and  his  subjects.  But,  to 
England  at  least,  this  policy  is  impossible.  The 
geographical  situation  of  Egypt,  as  well  as  the 
responsibility  which  the  English  Government  have 
in  past  times  incurred  for  the  actual  conditions 
under  which  it  exists  as  a  State,  make  it  impossible 
to  leave  it  to  its  fate.  They  are  bound,  both  by 
duty  and  interest,  to  do  all  that  lies  in  their  power 
to  arrest  misgovernment,  before  it  results  in  the 
material  ruin  and  almost  hicurable  disorder  to 
which  it  is  evident  by  other  Oriental  examples 
that  such  misgovernment  will  necessarily  lead. 


138  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  i 

"In  tlie  case  of  Egypt,  the  evil  has  not  yet  gone 
so  far  but  that  it  may  be  arrested  by  changes  of 
small  scope  and  immediate  operation.  The  sole 
obstacle  to  reform  appears  to  lie  in  the  character 
of  its  Ruler.  His  financial  embarrassments  lead 
almost  inevitably  to  oppression,  and  his  bad  faith 
frustrates  all  friendly  efforts  to  apply  a  remedy. 
There  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  a  change  of  policy 
can  only  be  obtained  by  a  change  of  Ruler. 

"It  may  be  the  duty  of  the  Western  Powers  to 
submit  these  considerations  to  the  Sultan,  to  whose 
Firman  the  Khedive  owes  his  power.  But  before 
taking  a  step  so  grave,  and  which,  in  its  results, 
may  possibly  be  disastrous  not  only  to  the  Khedive 
but  to  his  family,  it  is  right,  in  the  first  instance,  to 
intimate  to  the  Khedive  the  conclusion  at  which 
the  two  Powers  have  arrived,  and  to  give  him  the 
opportunity  of  withdrawing,  under  favourable  and 
honourable  conditions,  from  a  position  which  his 
character  and  his  past  career  have  unfitted  him  to 
fill." 

When  the  British  and  French  Consuls-General 
communicated  to  the  Khedive  the  views  enter- 
tained by  their  Governments,  he  asked  that  time 
should  be  given  to  him  to  consider  the  matter.  On 
June  21,  he  informed  them  that  he  had  referred 
the  question  to  the  Sultan.  There  was,  in  fact, 
some  hope  of  support  from  Constantinople.  The 
Khedive  had  sent  a  special  agent  to  the  Sultan. 
Money  had  been  spent  in  bribes.  Moreover,  the 
jealousy  of  the  Sultan  had  been  excited  by  repre- 
sentations that  the  two  Western  Powers  intended 
to  disregard  his  sovereign  rights.  The  Khedive, 
therefore,  felt  confident  of  su]>port,  and  for  a 
moment  it  appeared  probable  that  support  would 
be  accorded  to  him.  The  European  Powers  were, 
however,  now  all  combined.  Germany,  Austria, 
Russia,  and  finally  Italy,  advised  the  Khedive  to 


CHviii     FALL  OF  ISMAIL  PASHA  139 

abdicate.  Italian  adhesion  was,  however,  some- 
what tardily  given.  Italy  had  throughout  shown 
some  disposition  to  support  Ismail  Pasha. 

It  required  some  strong  remonstrances  on  the 
part  of  the  Ambassadors  at  Constantinople  to 
prevent  encouragement  being  given  to  the  Khedive 
by  the  Sultan.  If,  however,  the  Khedive  were  to 
be  deposed,  the  Sultan  preferred  that  the  act  of 
deposition  should  emanate  from  himself,  rather 
than  that  it  should  result  from  any  independent 
action  taken  by  the  two  ^Vestern  Powers.  On 
the  night  of  June  24,  M.  Tricou,  the  French 
Consul -General,  received  information  from  Con- 
stantinople to  the  effect  that  the  Porte  had  de- 
cided upon  the  deposition  of  the  Khedive  and 
the  appointment  of  Halim  Pasha  as  his  suc- 
cessor. Although  it  was  past  midnight,  Sir  Frank 
Lascelles,  M.  Tricou,  and  Baron  de  Saurma,  the 
German  Consul- General,  went  at  once  to  the 
Khedive's  palace.  *'  I  have  been  informed,"  Sir 
Frank  Lascelles  wrote,  "  that  when  it  was  known 
in  the  harem  that  the  Europeans  demanded  to  see 
the  Khedive  at  that  hour  of  the  night,  there  was 
a  scene  of  indescribable  confusion.  The  Princess 
Mother,  fearing  the  existence  of  a  plot  to  assas- 
sinate her  son,  implored  His  Highness  not  to 
receive  us,  but  on  hearing  that  the  Europeans  con- 
sisted of  the  representatives  of  Germany,  France, 
and  England,  and  were  accompanied  by  Clierif 
Pasha,  the  Khedive  himself  pointed  out  that  there 
could  be  no  danger  for  his  life,  and  consented  to 
receive  us.  His  Highness,  who  was  evidently  in  a 
state  of  great  excitement,  gave  me  the  impression 
of  scarcely  knowing  what  was  passing.  He,  how- 
ever, remained  perfectly  firm  in  his  intention  not 
to  abdicate." 

On  the  morrow,  June  25,  there  was  a  last 
flicker  of  resistance.      A   Khedivial    Decree   was 


140  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

prepared  under  which  the  army  was  to  be  increased 
to  150,000  men.  Some  wild  proposals,  having  for 
their  object  the  inundation  of  the  country  round 
Alexandria,  were  also  discussed.  But  the  Khedive 
was  conscious  that  the  game  was  played  out. 
Many  of  his  valuables  had  already  been  embarked 
on  board  his  yacht  at  Alexandria. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  diplomatic  pressure 
brought  to  bear  at  Constantinople  had  produced  its 
effect.  The  Powers  of  Europe  were  evidently 
determined  that  Prince  Tewfik,  and  not  Prince 
Halim,  should  be  Khedive  of  Egypt.  On  June  26, 
the  Sultan  sent  a  telegram  to  Cairo  addressed  "  to 
the  ex-Khedive  Ismail  Pasha,"  in  which  the  follow- 
ing passage  occurred : — 

*'  II  est  prouve  que  votre  maintien  au  poste  de 
Khedive  ne  pouvait  avoir  d'autre  resultat  que  de 
multiplier  et  d'aggraver  les  difficultes  pr^sentes. 
Par  consequent,  Sa  JNIajest^  Imperiale  le  Sultan,  a 
la  suite  de  la  decision  de  son  Conseil  des  INIinistres,  a 
decide  de  nommer  au  poste  de  Khedive  Son  Excel- 
lence Mehemet  Tewfik  Pacha,  et  ITrad^  Imperial 
concernant  ce  sujet  vient  d'etre  promulgud  Cette 
haute  decision  est  communiquee  a  Son  Excellence 
par  une  autre  depeche,  et  je  vous  invite  a  vous 
retirer  des  affaires  gouvernementales,  conforme- 
ment  a  I'ordre  de  sa  Majesty  Imperiale  le 
Sultan." 

At  the  same  time,  another  telegram  was  sent 
to  Prince  Tewfik  nominating  him  Khedive  of 
Egypt. 

It  was  clear  that  further  resistance  was  useless. 
The  last  hope  of  support  had  disappeared.  The 
Khedive  sent  for  Prince  Tewfik,  and,  in  the  pre- 
sence of  his  JNlinisters,  made  over  his  power  to  him. 
The  scene  is  said  to  have  been  affecting.  Both 
father  and  son  showed  signs  of  emotion. 

It  was  desirable  that  there  should  be  no  delay 


CH.  VIII     FALL  OF  ISMAIL  PASHA  141 

in  the  inauguration  of  the  new  Khedive.  It  took 
place  at  once.  At  6.30  p.m.,  on  .June  26,  1879, 
Sir  Frank  Lascelles  telegraphed  to  Lord  Salisbury  : 
— "A  royal  salute  on  Prince  Tevvfik's  accession  was 
fired  this  evening  from  the  citadel,  where  His 
Highness  held  an  official  reception,  which  was 
attended  by  the  whole  diplomatic  and  consular 
corps,  the  Ministers,  and  Government  officials, 
and  a  large  number  of  people."  A  crowd  had 
collected  in  the  streets  of  Cairo,  but  the  whole 
transaction  had  been  so  expeditiously  concluded 
that  the  mass  of  the  population  were  unaware  of 
the  deposition  of  Ismail  Pasha  until  they  heard  the 
guns  of  the  citadel  thundering  in  honour  of  his 
successor. 

One  further  scene  remained  to  be  enacted.  It 
was  undesirable  that  the  ex-Khedive  should  remain 
in  Egypt.  There  was  some  question  of  his  going 
to  Constantinople,  and  also  to  Smyrna.  He  even- 
tually decided  to  seek  an  asylum  at  Naples,  where 
the  King  of  Italy  had  placed  a  residence  at  his 
disposal.^  At  11.30  a.m.  on  June  30,  Ismail 
Pasha  left  Cairo  for  Alexandria.  He  gave  it  to 
be  understood  that  he  did  not  wish  any  official 
notice  to  be  taken  of  his  departure.  None  of 
the  foreign  representatives  were,  therefore,  present 
at  the  railway  station.  A  large  crowd,  how- 
ever, assembled  to  witness  his  departure.  The 
ladies  of  the  liarem,  dressed  in  black,  were 
present  in  carriages  outside  the  station  and  were 
loud  in  their  lamentations.  Before  enterinff  his 
carriage,  Ismail  Pasha  addressed  a  few  words  to  the 
people  who  were  present,  telling  them  that  on  leav- 
ing Egypt  he  confided  his  son,  the  Khedive,  to 
their  care.  The  latter  then  took  leave  of  his  father 
and  of  his  brothers,  who  accompanied  Ismail  Pasha. 

*  At  a  later  period^  Ismail  Pasha  went  to  Constantinople.     He  died 
oa  March  2,  1895. 


142  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

An  eye-witness  stated  that  "the  scene  was  so  affect- 
ing that  there  were  few  among  the  spectators  who 
were  able  to  refrain  from  tears." 

On  arrival  at  Alexandria,  Ismail  Pasha  embarked 
on  board  his  yacht,  the  Maliroussa.  JNIr.  Calvert, 
the  British  V^ice-Consul  at  Alexandria,  reported 
that  "the  deck  of  the  Mahroussa  was  crowded 
with  officials  and  European  residents  who  had 
come  to  take  leave  of  Ismail  Pasha.  His  High- 
ness met  everywhere,  both  on  shore  and  on  board, 
with  marked  respect  and  consideration.  Though 
his  features  bore  the  traces  of  strong  recent  emo- 
tion, he  bore  up  manfully,  and  was  quite  cheerful, 
addressing  a  pleasant  word  and  thanks  to  every  one 
who  took  leave  of  him,  and  shaking  hands." 

If  Ismail  Pasha's  rule  had  been  bad,  his  fall  was 
at  least  dignified.  His  worst  enemies  must  have 
pitied  a  man  in  the  hour  of  his  distress  who  had 
stood  so  high  and  who  had  fallen  so  low.  "  Who," 
says  Bacon,  "  can  see  worse  days  than  he  that,  yet 
living,  doth  follow  at  the  funeral  of  his  own  repu- 
tation?" Any  chance  moralist  who  may  have 
watched  the  Mahroussa  steaming  out  of  Alexandria 
harbour  on  that  summer  afternoon  must  perforce 
have  heaved  a  sigh  over  one  of  the  most  striking 
instances  that  the  world  has  ever  known  of  golden 
opportunities  lost. 

It  may  be  that  the  events  of  Ismail  Pasha's 
reign  in  Egypt  are  too  recent  for  an  impartial 
verdict  to  be  passed  upon  them.  Neither  perhaps 
do  I  possess  all  tlie  qualifications  necessary  to 
strict  impartiality.  At  the  same  time,  I  am  quite 
unconscious  of  any  bias  in  the  matter.  In  the 
course  of  this  narrative,  I  have  criticised  Ismail 
Pasha's  conduct,  but  I  never  felt  any  personal 
dislike  to  the  man.  My  feelings  throughout  all 
these  struggles  were  inspired  by  pity  rather  than 


CH.  VIII     FALL  OF  ISMAIL  PASHA  li3 

by  anger.  I  always  felt  that  if  Ismail  Pasha 
had  fallen  into  better  hands  in  the  early  part  of 
his  career,  the  recent  history  of  Egypt  might  have 
been  changed.  Probably  few  individuals  ever 
experienced  more  fully  than  Ismail  what  has  aptly 
been  termed  "the  lonely  friendlessness  of  selfish 
power."  ^  The  conduct  of  those  who  flattered 
him,  and  then  preyed  upon  him,  cannot  be  too 
strongly  condemned.  But  as  regards  himself, 
however  severe  may  be  the  censure  inflicted  on 
him,  it  must  be  admitted  that  there  are  some 
extenuating  circumstances.  He  wished  to  intro- 
duce European  civilisation  into  Egypt  at  a  rapid 
rate,  but  he  had  little  idea  of  how  to  set  about 
the  work.  He  had  neither  the  knowledge  nor 
the  experience  necessary  to  carry  out  the  task. 
It  should  be  remarked  that  Ismail  was  utterly 
uneducated.  When  JNIr.  Nassau  Senior  was 
returning  to  Europe  in  1855,  he  found  that  an 
English  coachman,  who  had  been  in  Ismail's 
service,  was  his  fellow  -  passenger.  The  man's 
account  of  Ismail's  private  life  is  worth  quoting. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  of  its  accuracy. 
"  Ismail,"  he  said,  "  and  his  brother  Mustapha, 
when  they  were  in  Paris,  used  to  buy  whatever 
they  saw ;  they  were  like  children,  nothing  was 
fine  enough  for  them ;  they  bought  carriages  and 
horses  like  those  of  Queen  Victoria  or  the 
Emperor,  and  let  them  spoil  for  want  of  shelter 
and  cleaning.  .  .  .  The  people  he  liked  best  to 
talk  to  were  his  servants,  the  lads  who  brought 
him  his  pipes  and  stood  before  him  with  their 
arms  crossed.  He  sometimes  sat  on  his  sofa 
and  smoked,  and  talked  to  them  for  hours,  all 
about  women  and  such  things.  ...  I  have  known 
him  sometimes  try  to  read  a  French  novel,  but 
he  would  be  two  hours  getting  through  a  page. 

1  Dill's  Roman  Society  from  Nero  to  Marcus  Aurelius,  p.  379. 


144  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

Once  or  twice,  I  saw  him  attempt  to  write.  His 
letters  were  half  an  inch  high,  like  those  of  a 
child's  copybook.  I  don't  think  that  he  ever 
finished  a  sentence."  ^ 

JNIy  personal  relations  with  Ismail  Pasha  were 
of  a  friendly  nature,  a  fact  which  redounds  to 
his  credit,  for  if  there  was  one  person  in  Egypt 
against  whom  he  had  a  right  to  bear  a  grudge, 
it  was  myself.  I  took  a  prominent  part  in 
the  events  which  brought  about  his  deposition, 
and  especially  in  the  nomination  of  the  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry,  a  blow  from  which  he  never 
recovered.  Ismail  Pasha  was  not  a  man  who  bore 
malice. 

Whenever  and  by  whomsoever  the  verdict  on 
his  rule  in  Egypt  is  passed,  it  can  scarcely  be 
anything  but  unfavourable.  Few  people  have 
enjoyed  a  more  enviable  position  than  that  of 
Ismail  Pasha  when  he  became  Khedive  of  Egypt. 
He  was  absolute  ruler  over  a  docile  people, 
inhabiting  one  of  the  most  fertile  spots  in  the 
world.  He  had  power,  rank,  and  a  degree  of 
wealth  such  as  has  been  given  to  few  individuals. 
With  reasonable  prudence  he  could  have  satisfied 
every  legitimate  ambition,  and  left  a  name  which 
posterity  would  have  revered.  All  this  he  threw 
away.  He  fell  a  victim  to  {//S/^i?,  the  insolent 
abuse  of  power.  A  great  Nemesis  fell  upon  the 
Egyptian  Crcesus.  He  squandered  his  wealth, 
and  when,  finally,  he  was  deposed  at  the  behests 
of  the  Powers  of  Europe,  there  were  not  a  dozen 
of  his  own  countrymen,  albeit  they  disliked  the 
interference  of  the  foreigner,  who  did  not  think 
that  he  had  merited  his  fate. 

It  is  frequently  the  habit  of  deposed  Sovereigns 
to  think  that  their  former  subjects  long  for  their 
return  to  power.     I  do  not  know  if  Ismail  Pasha 

*  Conversations,  etc.,  vol.  ii.  p.  228. 


CH.VIII      FALL  OF  ISMAIL  PASHA  145 

ever  cherished  thoughts  of  tiiis  description.  If 
so,  he  was  wrong.  From  the  date  of  his  deposition, 
he  was  politically  defunct,  and  his  former  subjects 
would  now  regard  his  rei<]^n  as  a  bad  dream  were 
it  not  that  they  still  suffer,  and  that  their  children's 
children  must  continue  to  suffer,  from  the  effects 
of  his  misrule. 

The  centenary  of  Mehemet  Ali's  birth  has 
recently  been  celebrated  in  Egypt.  National  fetes 
are  reasonable  enough  when  they  call  to  mind 
the  occurrence  of  some  event  for  which  the 
gratitude  of  posterity  is  due.  Thus,  it  is  not 
unnatural  that  the  French,  forgetful  of  the  horrors 
which  accompanied  the  fall  of  the  Bastille,  should 
recognise  that  event  as  symbolical  of  the  dawn 
of  a  new  era,  and  should,  therefore,  have  raised 
the  date  on  which  it  occurred  to  the  dignity  of 
a  national  anniversary.  It  is  also  perfectly  natural 
that  the  Egyptians  should  commemorate  the  birth 
of  the  remarkable  man  who  gave  their  country 
a  separate  administrative  existence.  Nevertheless, 
another  very  suitable  anniversary  for  the  modern 
Egyptians  to  celebrate  would  be  the  day  on 
which  Ismail  Pasha,  under  pressure  from  the 
Powers  of  Europe,  abdicated.  That  day  marked 
the  advent  of  a  new  era.  It  should  be  borne  in 
grateful  remembrance  by  the  present  and  future 
generations  of  Egyptians.  Ismail  Pasha's  abdica- 
tion sounded  the  death-knell  of  arbitrary  personal 
rule  in  Egypt.  It  may  be  hoped  and  believed 
that  that  rule  can  never  be  revived ;  but  in  spite 
of  the  strongest  guarantees  which  can  be  recorded 
on  paper,  there  would  unquestionably  be  a  con- 
siderable risk  of  its  revival  in  some  form  or 
another  if  tlie  British  occupation  of  the  country 
were  allowed  to  terminate  prematurely.  When 
it  is  quite  clear  that  this  risk  has  ceased  to  exist, 
the  question  of  the  cessation  of  the  occupation 

VOL.  I  L 


U6  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i 

will  assume  a  new  aspect.  In  the  minds  of  all 
well-informed  and  calm  observers  it  seems,  how- 
ever, probable  that  some  long  while  must  elapse 
before  they  can  feel  assured  that  this  political 
transformation  has  really  taken  place. 


PART   II 
THE  AKABI    revolt 

August  1879-August  1883 


The  daughter  of  Egypt  shall  he  confoiinded ;  she  shall  be 
delivered  into  the  hands  of  the  people  of  the  north. 

Jeeemiah  xlvi.  24. 


U7 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    INAUGURATION    OF   TEWFIK 
August-November  1879 

State  of  the  country — Cherif  Pasha's  Ministry — The  Khedive  assumes 
the  Presidency  of  the  Council — Ministry  of  Riaz  Pasha — Relations 
between  the  Kliedive  and  his  Ministers — The  Sultan  cancels  the 
Firman  of  1873  —  Objections  of  France  and  England  —  The 
Mohammedan  law  of  succession  —  The  right  to  make  Commercial 
Conventions,  and  to  contract  loans — 'Hie  Army — The  Khedive's 
investiture — Appointment  of  Controllers — Relations  between  the 
Government  and  the  Controllers — Division  of  work  between  the 
Controllers — The  Commission  of  Liquidation. 

With  the  deposition  of  Ismail  Pasha,  the  main 
obstacle  which  had  heretofore  stood  in  the  way  of 
Egyptian  reform  was  removed.  His  sinister  in- 
fluence was,  however,  felt  for  long  after  his  abdica- 
tion. He  had,  indeed,  left  a  damnosa  hereditas  to 
his  successor.  The  Treasury  was  bankrupt.  The 
discipline  of  the  army  had  been  shaken.  Every 
class  of  Egyptian  society  was  discontented  ;  the 
poor  by  reason  of  the  oppressive  measures  of 
their  ruler ;  the  rich  because  the  privileges  which 
they  enjoyed  were  threatened ;  the  Europeans 
because  the  money  owing  to  them  was  not 
paid,  and  because,  in  the  general  confusion  which 
existed,  trade  was  natin-ally  depressed.  The 
Powers  of  Europe  had,  for  a  while,  combined  in 
the  presence  of  a  common  danger,  but  the  ceaseless 
jar  of  petty  international  rivalries  was  sure  to  make 
itself  felt  whenever  any  question  of  local  interest 

149 


150  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

was  discussed.  The  Arab  hated  and  mistrusted 
the  Turk.  The  Turk  hated  and  mistrusted  the 
European.  European  assistance  was  necessary,  but 
it  was  difficult  to  decide  in  what  form  it  should  be 
iriven.  Reforms  dictated  in  the  best  interests  of 
the  country  would  be  misunderstood  and  misrejire- 
sented.  It  was  well-nigh  impossible  that  they 
should  bear  immediate  fruit,  whilst  any  temporary 
unpopularity  which  might  arise  from  their  adoption 
would  of  necessity  devolve  mainly  on  the  alien  and 
Christian  elements  in  the  Government.  Time 
would  have  to  elapse  before  the  sorely-tried  people 
of  Egypt  would  begin  to  see  dimly,  through  a 
thick  mist  of  ignorance  and  misrepresentation,  that 
some  material  benefits  might  accrue  to  them  from 
foreign  interference.  At  the  head  of  affairs  was  a 
young  Prince  animated  with  the  best  intentions, 
but  wanting  in  experience.  His  own  predisposi- 
tion, as  well  as  the  censures  which  his  father's 
oppressive  system  of  government  had  evoked,  alike 
led  him  to  favour  a  reign  of  law  and  order.  But 
the  proper  administration  of  justice  was  impossible 
until  law-courts  had  been  established  and  qualified 
judges  appointed.  The  period  of  transition  from 
an  arbitrary  to  a  legal  system  of  government  was 
to  be  not  only  painful  but  dangerous.  The  minds 
of  the  people  had  been  unsettled  by  frequent  dis- 
cussions about  organic  changes.  "  It  is  unwise," 
said  one  of  England's  greatest  political  thinkers, 
"  to  make  the  extreme  medicine  of  the  constitution 
its  daily  bread."  ^  The  habits  of  obedience,  which 
the  Egyptians  had  inherited  from  their  forefathers, 
had  been  rudely  shaken.  All  this  ferment  was  not 
to  settle  do^vn  at  once.  A  more  serious  collapse 
of  the  State  machinery  than  any  which  had  yet 
taken  ])lace  was  to  occur  before  the  calm  waters  of 
peaceful  progress  could  be  reached.     A  well-known 

*  Burke,  Ileflections  on  the  French  Revolution, 


cH.  IX    INAUGURATION  OF  TEWl  IK    151 

Conservative  statesman  in  conversation  with  me 
once  gave  utterance  to  an  opinion  which  involves 
the  ne  plus  ultra  of  anti-conservative  principles. 
"  The  East,"  he  said,  "  is  languishing  for  want  of 
a  Revolution."  This  statement  is  true ;  for  the 
violent  changes  from  one  Amurath  to  another, 
which  Oriental  history  has  frequently  recorded,  have 
generally  been  the  result,  not  of  revolution,  but  of 
palace  intrigue.  The  Egyptians  were  now  to  try 
whether  their  lot  could  be  improved  by  a  move- 
ment, whose  leading  feature  was  that  it  combined 
some  vague  national  aspirations,  which  were  in- 
capable of  realisation,  with  the  time-honoured 
tactics  of  a  mutinous  preetorian  guard.  In  the 
meanwhile,  the  machine  of  State  worked  laboriously, 
but  apparently  with  some  fair  prospect  of  success. 
It  was  not  till  the  Egyptian  Sisyphus  had  got  his 
stone  some  little  way  up  the  hill  that  it  escaped 
from  his  grasp  and  rolled  back  again  into  the 
slough  of  anarchy.  Then  all  the  work  had  to  be 
begun  again,  but  under  new  conditions  which 
augured  better  for  the  final  result. 

Before  the  new  State  machine  could  be  got  to 
work,  the  various  parts  of  the  machinery  had  to  be 
adjusted.  A  Ministry  had  to  be  formed.  The 
degree  to  which  the  Khedive  was  to  take  an  active 
part  in  the  administration  had  to  be  settled.  The 
relations  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Khedive  had 
to  be  regulated.  The  form  in  which  Europeans 
should  be  associated  with  the  government  of  the 
country  had  to  be  decided.  It  was  also  essential 
to  adopt  measures  which  should  place  the  new 
relations  between  the  Egyptian  Government  and 
their  creditors  on  a  legal  footing. 

The  Khedive  charged  Cherif  Pasha  with  the 
formation  of  a  Ministry.  He  at  once  submitted 
to  the  Khedive  a  project  for  a  constitution  of 
which  His  Highness  disapproved.     On  August  18, 


152  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

therefore,  he  tendered  his  resignation,  which  was 
accepted.  The  Khedive  resolved  to  retain  the 
Presidency  of  the  Council  of  INIinisters  in  his  own 
hands  for  the  present.  His  Highness  explained 
to  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  the  reasons  why  he  had  dis- 
approved of  Cherif  Pasha's  proposals.  "  He  was 
aware,"  Sir  Frank  Lascelles  wrote,  "  that  it  would 
be  said  that  his  action  was  an  attempt  to  return  to 
the  old  system  of  personal  government.  He  could 
assure  me  that  he  had  no  wish  to  do  so  ;  but  that 
at  present  liberal  institutions  were  utterly  un suited 
to  the  country,  and  the  constitution  which  had 
been  submitted  to  him  was  nothing  more  than  a 
decor  de  theatre.  .  .  .  He  was  himself  responsible 
for  the  government  of  the  country,  and  had  deter- 
mined to  take  his  share  of  the  labour,  and  not  to 
shelter  himself  behind  an  unreal  and  illusory  con- 
stitution." Cherif  Pasha,  on  the  other  hand,  told 
Sir  Frank  Lascelles  that,  though  he  was  personally 
glad  to  be  relieved  of  his  duties,  "  as  an  Egyptian, 
he  regretted  the  return  to  personal  power.  There 
were  many  persons  both  in  and  outside  the  palace 
who  would  be  glad,  for  their  own  ends,  to  see  the 
absolute  powder  of  the  Khedive  re-established,  but 
it  was  a  real  misfortune  for  the  country  if  it  should 
again  fall  under  the  rule  of  an  absolute  Sovereign." 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  Khedive  acted 
wisely  in  declining  the  proposals  submitted  to  him 
by  Cherif  Pasha.  Any  Egyptian  constitution  must 
of  necessity  at  that  time  have  been  a  mere  decor  de 
thedti'e}     The  only  form  of  government  suitable  to 

•  The  methods  of  government  which  found  favour  about  this  time 
amouf^st  many  of  those  who  favoured,  or  pretended  to  favour  constitu- 
tional government,  may  be  judged  from  a  statement  made  in  1903  by 
Sheikh  Moliammed  AI)dou  to  Mr.  Wilfrid  Bhnit  {Secret  llufforij, etc.,  p. 
493).  Sultan  Pasha,  tlie  Sheikh  said,  "had  promised  to  bring  petitions 
from  every  Notable  in  Kgypt  in  favour  of  the  Constitution.  This  was  true, 
for  all  the  Omdehs  were  angry  with  Riaz  for  having  put  down  their 
habit  of  employing  forced  labour."  In  other  words,  Riaz  I'asha,  who 
was  supposed   to  be  a  somewhnt  extreme  representative  of  persona] 


CH.  IX    INAUGURATION  OF  TEWFIK    153 

Egypt  was  a  despotism,  but  it  would  have  to  be  a 
benevolent  despotism,  which  would  be  under  some 
effective  control.  The  control  was  to  be  sought 
more  in  the  careful  selection  of  the  individuals  to 
whom  power  was  confided  than  in  any  endeavour  to 
copy  European  institutions,  which  were  uncongenial 
to  the  manners  and  customs  of  the  people  and  to  the 
condition  of  society  which  then  existed  in  Egypt. 
Nevertheless,  the  attitude  assumed  at  this  moment 
by  Cherif  Pasha  merits  a  word  of  sympathy.  He 
was  a  perfectly  honest  man.  He  was  convinced 
of  the  harm  done  by  the  absolute  rule  of  the 
eX'Khedive.  He  was  slow  to  believe  that,  with 
a  change  of  despot,  the  character  of  the  despotism 
would  undergo  any  material  alteration.  Although, 
therefore,  his  views  as  to  the  best  system  of  govern- 
ing the  country  appear  to  have  been  unsuited  to 
the  circumstances  of  the  time,  both  his  proposals 
and  his  resignation  did  him  credit  personally. 

The  arrangement  under  which  the  Khedive  was 
to  be  his  own  Prime  Minister  was  of  doubtful 
wisdom.  Fortunately,  it  did  not  last  long.  Riaz 
Pasha  was  summoned  to  Egypt,  and  on  September 
22  was  charged  with  the  formation  of  a  Ministry. 
The  principles  of  Ismail  Pasha's  Rescript  of  August 
28,  1878,  were  maintained.  Riaz  Pasha  was  named 
President  of  the  Council,  but  the  Khedive  reserved 
to  himself  the  right  to  preside  at  the  meetings  of 
the  Council  whenever  he  thought  it  desirable  to 
do  so. 

The  duration  of  the  new  Ministry  was  much 
longer  than  that  of  its  predecessors.  One  of  the 
reasons  why  it  acquired  a  certain  character  of 
stability  was  that  the  relations  between  the  Khedive 
and  his  Mhiisters  were  at  last  placed  on  a  foothig 

government,  was  endeavouring  to  abolish  the  iniquitous  corvee  system, 
wliilst  the  constitutionalists  hoped  that,  through  the  introduction  of 
free  institutions,  it  would  be  found  possible  to  ensure  its  continuance. 


154  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  ii 

which  was  adapted  to  the  actual  requirements  of 
the  country.  A  compromise  was  effected  between 
the  system  of  exckiding  the  Khedive  altogether 
from  the  exercise  of  any  real  power  and  that  under 
which  his  authority  would  be  absolute.  It  was 
essential  to  associate  the  Khedive  with  the  govern- 
ment of  the  country.  This  was  secured  by  accord- 
ing to  him  the  right  to  preside  at  the  Council 
whenever  he  thought  fit  to  do  so.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  was  undesirable  that  the  Khedive  should 
be  his  own  Prime  Minister.  Apart  from  the  risk 
of  a  return  to  the  old  regime,  which  the  adoption 
of  this  system  would  have  involved,  there  was  the 
further  objection  that  the  ruler  of  the  State  would 
have  become  personally  responsible  for  every  act  of 
the  administration.  The  natural  remedy  for  any 
serious  defect  in  the  government  of  a  State  is  a 
change  of  Ministry.  If  the  Khedive  had  become 
his  own  Prime  Minister,  this  safety-valve  would 
have  been  removed.  A  case  might  have  arisen  in 
which  a  change  of  policy  would  have  been  well- 
nigh  impossible  without  a  change  of  Khedive.  Of 
course,  much  depended  upon  the  spirit  in  which 
the  compromise  was  to  be  worked.  Had  the 
Khedive  meant  to  evade  the  spirit  of  the  Rescript 
of  August  1878  he  might  have  done  so.  On  the 
contrary,  however,  he  loyally  accepted  the  principle 
of  ministerial  responsibility.  The  system  worked 
well,  and  although  many  difficulties  of  a  different 
nature  were  in  store  for  Egypt,  the  question  of  the 
part  which  Tewfik  Pasha  was  to  take  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  country  was  finally  set  at  rest  by  the 
arrangement  made  in  September  1879. 

The  settlement  of  the  relations  between  Turkey 
and  Egypt  gave  rise  to  considerable  difficulties, 
which  were  only  arranged  after  a  somewhat  stormy 
diplomatic  negotiation.  The  Porte  made  a  deter- 
mmed  effort  to  tighten  its  hold  on  Egypt. 


OH.  IX    INAUGURATION  OF  TEWFIK     155 

Simultaneously  with  the  issue  of  the  order 
deposing  Ismail  Pasha,  an  Imperial  Irade  was 
signed  repealing  the  Firman  of  1873.  The  issue 
of  a  new  Firman  was  necessary  in  consequence  of 
this  action  of  the  Sultan.  The  Porte  showed  great 
disinclination  to  submit  the  terms  of  the  Firman 
before  issue  to  the  British  and  French  Govern- 
ments. The  result  was  that  peremptory  orders 
had  to  be  sent  to  the  Ambassadors  at  Constan- 
tinople. The  Sultan  and  his  advisers  were  made 
to  understand  that,  in  their  endeavour  to  tighten 
their  hold  on  Egypt,  they  ran  a  risk  that  the 
country  would  escape  from  their  grasp  altogether. 
They  therefore  yielded.  The  principle  that  the 
terms  of  the  Firman  must  be  discussed  with  the 
French  and  British  Governments  was  accepted. 
A  discussion  then  commenced  as  to  the  stipula- 
tions which  were  to  be  incorporated  into  the  new 
Firman. 

In  1873,  Ismail  Pasha,  in  return  for  large  sums 
of  money  lavished  at  Constantinople,  had  obtained 
four  concessions  from  the  Sultan.  In  the  first 
place,  the  Mohammedan  law  of  succession  was  set 
aside.  Primogeniture  was  for  the  future  to  be  the 
principle  under  which  succession  to  the  Khedivate 
was  to  be  regulated.  In  the  second  place,  the 
right  to  conclude  Commercial  Conventions  with 
other  Powers  was  conceded  to  Egypt.  In  the 
third  place,  full  power  was  given  to  the  Khedive 
to  contract  foreign  loans.  In  the  fourth  place,  the 
Khedive  obtained  the  right  to  fix  the  strength  of 
the  Egyptian  army  at  any  figure  he  might  consider 
necessary  without  reference  to  Constantinople. 
The  Sultan  now  wished  to  cancel  these  con- 
cessions. 

The  views  entertained  by  the  British  and  French 
Governments  upon  the  points  at  issue  were  not 
altogether    identical.       The    traditional    policy    of 


156  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  n 

France  favoured,  if  not  an  independent  Egypt,  at 
all  events  the  relaxation  of  the  bonds  which  united 
the  suzerain  and  his  feudatory.  The  French 
Government  were,  therefore,  opposed  to  the  re- 
strictive measures  which  the  Sultan  wished  to 
ado})t.  jNIore  especially  M.  Fournier,  who  was 
then  French  Ambassador  at  Constantinople,  insisted 
strongly  upon  opposition  being  offered  to  them. 
Successive  British  Governments,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  for  a  long  time  past  been  averse  to 
any  measures  which  tended  towards  the  dis- 
memberment of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Except 
in  the  matter  of  the  succession,  Lord  Salisbury 
did  not  consider  the  proposals  made  by  the  Sultan 
as  open  to  any  great  objections  on  their  own 
merits.  Moreover,  the  spokesman  of  the  British 
Government  at  Constantinople  was  Sir  Austen 
Layard,  a  strong  Turcophile. 

On  the  question  of  the  succession,  however, 
the  two  Governments  were  agreed.  Under  the 
Mohammedan  law  of  succession  the  eldest  member 
of  the  family  is  Heir -Apparent.  This  practice 
has,  during  the  whole  course  of  Ottoman  history, 
been  a  fertile  source  of  intrigue,  and  has  often 
led  to  much  bloodshed.  The  maxim  of  Bajazet 
I. — "  Better  the  death  of  a  Prince  than  the 
loss  of  a  province " — is  still  inscribed  over  one 
of  the  inner  gates  of  the  old  Imperial  Palace  at 
Constantinople.  The  slaughter  of  collateral 
branches  of  the  family  is,  in  fact,  a  means  of 
protection  against  conspiracy  which  the  rulers  of 
Oriental   States   have   not    unfrequently  adopted.^ 

*  It  cannot  be  doulited  tliat  the  practice  of  murdering  or  keeping  in 
confinement  the  heir  to  the  throne,  more  especially  if  he  showed  any  signs 
of  ability,  has  been  one  of  the  many  causes  of  Ottoman  decay.  For 
instance,  Sultan  Ibrahim  (l(!40-48)  was  the  sole  surviving  brother  of 
Amurath  IV.,  the  remainder  having  ])eeii  ]>ut  to  death  at  the  time  of 
the  latter's  succession.  On  his  deathbed,  Amnrath  ordered  Ibrahim, 
who  had  Ijeen  kept  for  elglit  years  in  inivon.  to  In-  killed,  Ijut  the  ordef 


CH.  IX    INAUGURATION  OF  TEWFIK    157 

The  British  and  French  Governments,  therefore, 
insisted  that  the  principle  of  primogeniture  should 
be  ratified  in  the  new  Firman.  On  this  point,  the 
Porte  yielded. 

"With  regard,"  Lord  Salisbury  wrote,  "to  the 
limit  to  be  assigned  to  the  military  and  naval  forces 
which  the  Khedive  may  maintain,  and  his  power  to 
negotiate  Commercial  Conventions,  Her  Majesty's 
Government  will  not  object."  The  French 
Government,  on  the  other  hand,  attached  great 
importance  to  the  question  of  the  right  to  make 
Commercial  Conventions,  with  the  result  that  the 
Porte  yielded.  The  new  Firman  was  on  this  point 
substantially  a  reproduction  of  the  Firman  of  1873. 

The  Porte,  however,  gained  its  point  as  regards 
the  restrictions  which  it  wished  to  place  on  the 
strength  of  the  Egyptian  army.  The  new  Firman 
laid  down  that  in  time  of  peace  the  army  was  not 
to  exceed  18,000  men. 

As  regards  the  power  of  borrowing  money, 
Lord  Salisbury  wrote :  "  The  power  to  contract 
loans  has  been  so  grievously  abused,  and  with  such 
disastrous  results  to  the  prosperity  of  Egypt,  that 
it  might  advantageously  be  withdrawn  altogether, 
for  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  country  can  bear  no 
further  attempts  to  bolster  up  its  credit  by  such 
means."  The  Frencli  Government  would  have 
been  glad  to  preserve  the  Firman  of  1873  intact, 
but  seeing  that  the  British  Government  were 
lukewarm  on  the  subject,  and  that  they  had 
already  achieved  a  diplomatic  victory  on  the  two 

was  not  executed.  When  Amurath  died.  Creasy  says  {Ottoman  Turks, 
p.  259),  "Ibrahim  came  forth  and  mounted  the  Turkish  throne,  which 
received  in  him  a  selfish  voluptuary,  in  whom  long'  imprisonment  and 
protracted  terror  had  debased  whatever  spirit  nature  mif^ht  have  origin- 
ally bestowed,  and  who  was  as  rapacious  and  bloodthirsty  as  he  was 
cowardly  and  mean." 

The  practice  is  of  very  ancient  date.  Jehu,  on  obtaining  possession 
of  the  throne,  killed  the  seventy  sous  of  Ahab.  —  2  Kings  x. 
1-11. 


158  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

important  questions  of  the  succession  and  the  right 
to  make  Commercial  Conventions,  they  agreed  to 
the  withdrawal  from  the  Khedive  of  the  right  to 
contract  loans. 

It  is  difficult  to  prophesy,  especially  in  politics. 
No  one  could  foresee  that,  a  few  years  later,  the 
British  Government  would  find  the  work  of  reform 
in  Egypt  to  some  extent  hindered  by  the  re- 
strictions which,  in  1879,  were  considered  un- 
objectionable and  even  beneficial.  That,  however, 
is  what  actually  happened.  French  diplomacy  had, 
in  fact,  unconsciously  worked  to  facilitate  the 
future  task  of  the  British  Government,  whilst  the 
latter,  with  equal  unconsciousness,  had  used  their 
influence  to  place  obstacles  in  their  own  path. 

On  August  14,  the  ceremony  of  reading  the 
Firman  of  Investiture  took  place  in  Cairo. 

The  next  question  which  had  to  be  decided  was 
the  form  in  which  Europeans  should  be  associated 
with  the  government  of  Egypt.  Immediately 
after  the  Khedive's  accession,  a  letter  was  addressed 
by  Cherif  Pasha  to  the  representatives  of  England 
and  France  in  Egypt,  expressing  a  hope  that,  if 
Controllers  were  nominated  under  the  Decree  of 
November  18,  1876,  their  functions  would  be 
limited  to  investigation  and  verification,  and  that 
they  would  not  be  invested  with  any  administrative 
or  executive  powers.  In  reply  to  this  communica- 
tion, the  Consuls-General  were  authorised  to  state 
that  "the  two  Governments  accepted  in  principle  His 
Highness's  offer  to  re-establish  the  ofBce  of  Con- 
trollers-General, and  that  the  details  respecting  their 
powers  and  functions  would  form  the  subject  of  a 
further  communication." 

Three  questions  had  then  to  be  decided.  In  the 
first  place,  who  were  to  be  the  Controllers  ?  In 
the  second  place,  what  were  to  be  the  relations 
between  them  and  the  Egyptian  Government  ?     In 


CH.  IX    INAUGURATION  OF  TEWFIK     159 

the  third  place,  how  was  the  work  to  be  divided 
between  them  ? 

Perhaps  the  first  of  these  questions  was  the 
most  important  of  the  three.  More  depended  on 
the  character  and  personal  influence  of  the  in- 
dividuals who  were  chosen  than  on  the  special 
functions  which  might  be  assigned  to  them  by  a 
Khedivial  Decree.  The  situation  of  the  European 
advisers  of  the  Khedive  would,  necessarily,  be  one 
of  great  difficulty.  They  would  have  to  guide  with 
as  little  appearance  of  guiding  as  possible.  They 
could  not  hope  to  succeed  unless  two  conditions 
were  fulfilled.  The  first  was  that  they  should 
be  to  some  extent  in  sympathy  with  the  Egyptian 
Government.  The  second  was  that  they  should  be 
in  sympathy  with  each  other.  If  the  more  dis- 
tasteful aspects  of  European  interference  were 
constantly  being  presented  to  the  Egyptian 
Ministers  without  any  compensatory  advantages 
being  derived  from  European  assistance  in  the 
defence  of  Egy})tian  interests,  another  breakdown 
was  sure  to  ensue  before  long.  Further,  the 
selection  of  a  Gallophobe  Englishman,  or  of  an 
Anglophobe  Frenchman,  would  have  ensured  the 
failure  of  the  experiment  which  was  about  to  be 
made. 

The  choice  of  the  French  Government  fell  on 
M.  de  Blignieres.  Lord  Salisbury  offered  the  post 
of  English  Controller  to  me.  After  some  hesita- 
tion,^ I  accepted  the  offer. 

As  regards  the  relations  which  were  to  exist 
between  the  Egyptian  Government  and  the  Con- 

*  My  intention  at  this  time  had  been  to  stand  for  East  Norfolk  at 
the  next  General  Election.  The  acceptance  of  Lord  Salisbury's  offer 
made  me  abandon  the  idea  of  entering  Parliament.  I  think  that  it 
was  in  1880  tliat,  happening-  to  meet  Mr.  Gladstone  at  Sandringham, 
I  spoke  to  him  on  this  subject.  He  told  me  that  he  thought  I  was 
quite  right  not  to  enter  Parliament  as  all  the  principal  questions  which 
interested  Liberals  had  been  solved.  Very  shortly  afterwards,  tba 
Home  Rule  project  was  launched  on  an  astonished  world. 


160  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  u 

trollers,  there  was  no  difficulty  in  meeting  the 
Khedive's  wishes.  INI.  de  Bhgnieres  and  myself, 
who  were  consulted  on  the  subject,  were  of  opinion 
that  the  system  of  direct  govermnent  by  Europeans 
was  unsuitable  to  the  circumstances  which  then 
existed  in  Egypt,  and  that  it  would  be  preferable 
to  give  us  general  powers  of  supervision  and 
inspection,  trusting  to  the  exercise  of  personal 
influence  to  do  the  rest.  The  Decree,  which  was 
eventually  issued,  laid  down  that  the  most  ample 
powers  of  investigation  were  to  be  conferred  on 
the  Controllers,  but  that  they  were  not  to  be  in- 
vested with  any  administrative  functions.  They 
could  only  make  suggestions.  They  were  to  have 
seats  in  the  Council  of  Ministers,  with  voix  con- 
sultatives ;  that  is  to  say,  they  might  give  their 
opinions,  but  they  had  no  right  to  vote. 

It  was  further  provided  that  the  Controllers 
could  not  be  dismissed  without  the  consent  of 
their  respective  Governments.  When,  three  years 
later,  Egypt  was  occupied  by  British  troops,  a  dis- 
cussion took  place  as  to  whether  the  Liberal  or  the 
Conservative  Government  was  res})onsible  for  the 
events  which  led  up  to  the  occupation.  The  point 
is  now  one  of  purely  historical  interest,  and  at 
no  time  was  it  of  much  interest  save  to  party 
politicians.  It  may,  however,  be  observed  that, 
in  the  discussions  which  took  place  in  1882,  the 
politicians  on  the  Liberal  side  of  the  House  of 
Commons  maintained  that  the  necessity  for  British 
interference  was  mainly  due  to  tlie  fact  tliat  in  1879 
the  Control,  which  was  formerly  financial,  became 
political.  Mr.  Gladstone,  speaking  on  July  27, 
1 882,  said  :  *'  What  is  a  political  control  ?  I  assert 
that  this  was  not  a  political  control  then  {i.e.  prior 
to  1879)  because  the  Government  were  not  con- 
cerned in  it.  The  fact  that  the  Egyptians  chose 
to   establish    foreign   Controllers,  an  arrangement 


CH.  IX    INAUGURATION  OF  TEWFIK    161 

attended  with  great  benefits  to  the  people  of  Eng- 
land ( ?  Egypt),  was  not  necessarily  an  arrangement 
entailing  foreign  interference,  because  they  retained 
the  right  to  dismiss  the  Controllers,  but  in  the 
year  1879,  in  depriving  them  of  that  right,  you 
brought  foreimi  intervention  into  the  heart  of  the 
country,  and  established,  in  the  strictest  sense  of 
the  phrase,  a  'political  control.'"  There  is  some 
force  in  this  argument.  Nevertheless,  as  will 
appear  at  a  later  portion  of  this  narrative,  the 
main  responsibility  for  the  British  occupation,  in 
so  far  as  it  was  due  to  events  which  were  in  any 
way  capable  of  control,  would  appear  to  lie  with 
the  Government  of  Mr.  Gladstone  rather  than  with 
that  of  Lord  Salisbury  which  preceded  him. 

A  further  question,  which  had  to  be  decided, 
was  how  the  work  was  to  be  divided  between  the 
two  Controllers. 

Under  the  Decree  of  November  18,  1876,  the 
Englishman  was  Controller- General  of  Receipts, 
and  the  Frenchman  Controller-General  of  Expen- 
diture. Subsequently,  when  European  Ministers 
were  appointed,  the  Englishman  was  placed  in 
charge  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  and  the  French- 
man of  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works.  Under 
both  these  arrangements,  the  preponderating  influ- 
ence was  in  the  hands  of  the  Englishman.  The 
French  chafed  at  their  position  of  inferiority,  and 
it  appeared  both  unwise  and  unnecessary  to  insist 
upon  a  position  of  marked  superiority  being  given 
to  the  Englishman.  Either  ^1.  de  Blignieres  and 
1  could,  or  could  not  work  together.  If  we  could 
do  so,  any  distinction  between  us  was  unnecessary, 
and  would  only  serve  to  wound  the  amour  propre 
of  the  French  without  producing  any  useful  result. 
If  we  could  not  do  so,  the  collapse  of  the  system 
was  inevitable,  and  could  not  be  averted  by  any 
definition  of  our  respective  functions.  V^arious 
VOL.  I  M 


162  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

proposals  were  made  with  a  view  to  precise  defini- 
tion, such  as  that  one  Controller  should  deal  with 
Upper  and  the  other  with  Lower  Egypt.  But 
in  the  end  it  was  wisely  decided  to  leave  the 
matter  to  the  discretion  of  the  Controllers  them- 
selves. 

The  last  point  which  had  to  be  settled  was  the 
method  under  which  legal  effect  should  be  given 
to  the  relations  about  to  be  established  between 
the  Egyptian  Government  and  their  creditors.  In 
other  words,  the  bankruptcy  of  Egypt  had  to  be 
sanctioned  by  law.  The  two  reports  of  the  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry  had  prepared  the  way  for  a 
settlement,  but  it  was  essential  that  it  should  be 
made  binding  on  all  the  parties  concerned.  On 
April  2,  1880,  after  some  long  and  tedious  dis- 
cussions, a  Khedivial  Decree  was  issued  instituting 
a  Commission  of  Liquidation  with  full  powers  to 
regulate  the  financial  situation.  The  Great  Powers 
bound  themselves  by  anticipation  to  accept  the 
conclusions  at  which  the  Commissioners  might 
arrive.  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  was  named  President 
of  the  Commission.  The  four  Commissioners  of 
the  Debt  were  named  members.  An  additional 
French  member  (M.  Liron  d'AiroUes)  was  named 
so  as  to  give  France  the  same  degree  of  representa- 
tion as  England.  Germany  was  represented  by 
M.  de  Trescow.  The  new  Commission  of  Liquida- 
tion was,  in  fact,  the  old  Commission  of  Inquiry 
"  writ  large  " — that  is  to  say,  with  extended  powers 
and  with  the  addition  of  a  German  representa- 
tive. The  Controllers  were  not  appointed  members 
of  the  Commission.  The  interests  of  the  creditors 
were  strongly  represented,  and  it  was  thought  both 
just  and  politic  that  the  Controllers  should  stand 
outside  and  represent  the  interests  of  the  Egyptian 
Government  and  people,  rather  than  those  of 
the  creditors.     Without  European  assistance,  the 


OH.  IX    INAUGURATION  OF  TEWFIK    163 

Egyptian  Ministers  would  scarcely  be  able  to 
resist  the  pressure  which  the  Commission  was 
almost  certain  to  bring  to  bear  on  them  in  the 
bondholding  interest. 

The  various  essential  parts  of  the  State  machine 
were  thus  adjusted.  A  new  Khedive  ruled.  The 
relations  between  the  Khedive  and  his  JNlinisters 
were  placed  on  a  satisfactory  footing.  A  Prime 
Minister  had  been  nominated  who  had  taken  an 
active  part  in  opposing  the  abuses  prevalent  during 
the  reign  of  Ismail  Pasha.  The  relations  between 
the  Sultan  and  the  Khedive  had  been  regulated  in 
such  a  way  as  to  ensure  the  latter  against  any 
excessive  degree  of  Turkish  interference.  The 
system  which  had  been  devised  for  associating 
Europeans  with  the  Government  held  out  good 
promise  of  success,  inasmuch  as  it  was  in  accordance 
with  the  Khedive's  own  views.  Lastly,  an  Inter- 
national Commission  had  been  created  with  full 
powers  to  arrange  matters  between  the  Egyptian 
Government  and  their  creditors. 

It  now  remained  to  be  seen  how  the  machine 
would  work.  There  were  great  difficulties  still  to 
be  overcome,  but  on  the  whole  the  prospect  was 
brighter  than  at  any  previous  moment  during  recent 
times. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   DUAL   CONTROL 
November  1879-December  1880 

Working  of  the  Control — Relations  between  the  two  Controllers — And 
between  the  Controllers  and  the  Egyptian  Government — Delay  in 
paying  the  Tribute — Interest  on  the  Unified  Debt  paid  at  4  per 
cent — Financial  scbeme  proposed  by  the  Controllers — The  Budget 
for  1880 — Reforms  in  the  fiscal  system — Confidence  inspired  by  the 
Control — Reports  on  the  state  of  the  country — The  Law  of  Liquida- 
tion— The  military  danger. 

On  November  30,  1879,  I  wrote  to  Sir  Edward 
Malet,  who  had  been  appointed  Consul -General 
in  Egypt :  "  On  the  whole,  I  think  the  start 
has  been  favourable.  If  we  can  only  sit  tight 
for  six  months,  I  believe  we  may  pull  the  thing 
through.  But  I  devoutly  hope  that  there  will  be 
no  change  of  INIinistry,  or  any  unexpected  event, 
such  as  often  happens  in  the  East,  to  upset  every- 
thing and  to  oblige  a  new  beginning  to  be  made." 
Time,  and  a  stable  political  situation, — these  were 
the  two  principal  conditions  which  were  essential 
to  success.  Only  the  first  of  these  conditions  was, 
to  a  very  limited  extent,  fulfilled. 

The  Ministry  of  Riaz  Pasha  lasted  for  nearly 
two  years,  and  an  acute  observer  wlio  was  on  the 
spot  subsequently  wrote  that  "with  all  its  faults 
it  was  the  best  administration  which  Egypt  has 
enjoyed  before  or  since."  ^ 

*  Khedives  and  Pashas,  p.  134.  Tliis  was  written  in  1884,  that  is  to 
Bay,  before  the  i*eforms  introduced  subsequent  to  the  Rritish  occupation 
bad  produced  much  result. 

164 


CH.  X  THE  DUAL  CONTROL  165 

The  main  reasons  why  the  machine  of  Govern- 
ment worked  fairly  well  for  a  time  were  twofold. 

In  the  first  place,  the  best  relations  existed 
between  the  two  Controllers.  In  the  second  place, 
a  modus  Vivendi  was  found  between  the  Controllers 
and  the  Egyptian  Government. 

It  has  been  mentioned  in  the  previous  chapter 
that  before  the  Controllers-General  were  appointed, 
some  discussion  took  place  as  to  how  the  work 
should  be  divided  between  them.  Eventually, 
M.  de  Blignieres  and  I  were  left  to  settle  the 
matter  between  ourselves.  The  solution  which  we 
adopted  was  a  simple  one.  We  never  attempted 
to  solve  the  question  at  all.  We  were  in  constant 
communication  with  each  other,  and  we  worked  in 
common.  Any  precise  definition  of  our  respective 
functions  would  have  been  difficult,  and  was  quite 
unnecessary. 

It  was  a  more  difficult  matter  to  establish 
friendly  relations  with  the  Egyptian  Government. 
Riaz  Pasha  was  thoroughly  honest  and  well-inten- 
tioned, but  he  was  incapable  of  dealing  unaided  with 
the  perplexing  financial  questions  which  at  that  time 
presented  themselves  for  solution.  He  saw  the 
necessity  for  European  assistance,  but,  at  the  same 
time,  in  whatever  form  it  was  given,  it  v\'as  distaste- 
ful to  him.  He  was  himself  a  reformer,  and  had 
courageously  protested  against  the  abuses  of  Ismail 
Pasha's  time,  but  he  was  slow  to  accept  the  inevit- 
able conclusion  that  no  reforms  were  possible 
without  European  guidance  and  assistance.  Qui 
veut  la  fin  veut  les  moyeus,  formed  no  part  of  Riaz 
Pasha's  politic3,l  creed.  It  was  clear  that,  under 
these  circumstances,  the  best  hope  of  success  lay  in 
the  Controllers  submitting  themselves  to  a  self- 
denying  ordinance.  They  would  have  to  pull  the 
strings  behind  the  scenes,  but  appear  on  the  stage 
as  little  as  possible. 


166  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

Another  essential  requisite  to  success  was  tliat 
both  the  Egyptian  Ministers  and  the  Egyptian 
people  should  see  that  the  Controllers  were  of 
some  use  to  them.  Duty  and  justice  alike  pointed 
to  the  necessity  of  standing  as  a  buffer  between 
the  Egyptian  Government  and  their  creditors.  The 
Ministers  had  neither  the  strength  to  oppose  the 
pressure  which,  in  European  interests,  was  brought 
to  bear  on  them,  nor  the  knowledge  requisite  to 
resist  it  with  effect.  The  policy  adopted  by  M. 
de  Blignieres  and  myself  was  to  associate  ourselves, 
as  much  as  possible,  with  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment, and  to  defend  them  against  any  excessive 
demands  and  encroachments  on  their  rights.  By 
adopting  this  line  of  conduct,  we  hoped  soon  to 
inspire  confidence,  and  gradually  to  disabuse  the 
minds  both  of  the  Ministers  and  of  the  Egyptian 
people  of  the  prejudices  which  were  entertained 
against  ICuropeans.  If  once  we  could  inspire  con- 
fidence, our  advice,  we  thought,  would  generally 
be  followed,  and  our  influence  could  be  used  to  the 
benefit  both  of  the  country  and  of  the  creditors. 

Opportunities  for  giving  effect  to  these  prin- 
ciples were  not  slow  to  present  themselves.  Heavy 
instalments  of  the  Tribute,  as  also  the  half-yearly 
interest  on  the  Unified  Debt,  had  to  be  paid. 
Money  was  not  forthcoming  to  meet  these  en- 
gagements. M.  de  Blignieres  and  I  had  not  yet 
arrived  in  Egypt.  Our  advice  was  requested  by 
telegraph.  The  Egyptian  Government  flinched 
at  the  responsibility  of  committing  an  act  of 
insolvency.  They  asked  us  whether  they  ought 
to  borrow  money  in  order  to  meet  their  engage- 
ments. The  reply  could  not  be  doubtful.  If  the 
Tribute  could  not  be  paid,  so  much  the  worse  for 
the  Tribute.  The  same  was  to  be  said  as  regards 
the  interest  on  the  Unified  Debt.  The  main 
thing  was,  once  and  for  all,  to  abandon  the  ruinous 


CH.X  THE  DUAL  CONTROL  167 

expedients  of  the  past.  The  employes  of  the 
Government  must,  m  the  first  instance,  be  paid ; 
then  the  Tribute,  whenever  there  was  money  enough 
to  pay  it.  As  for  the  Unified  Debt,  the  taxes  should 
on  no  account  be  taken  in  advance.  If,  when  the 
interest  fell  due,  the  revenues  pledged  to  the 
service  of  the  debt  were  insufficient  to  meet  the 
whole  charge,  a  dividend  should  be  distributed. 

The  letter  which  we  wrote  from  Paris  on  this 
subject  was  published.  One  result  of  our  advice 
was  that  the  Tribute  due  to  the  Porte  remained 
unpaid  for  some  little  while.  A  further  result 
was  that  the  full  interest  on  the  Unified  Debt 
was  never  paid.  The  amount  due  on  November  1 
was  £1,989,000.  The  rate  of  interest  fixed  by  the 
Decree  of  November  18,  1876,  viz.  6  per  cent, 
had  not  as  yet  been  legally  changed.  When  the 
1st  of  November  arrived,  only  £1,147,000  was  in 
the  hands  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt. 
Interest  at  the  rate  of  4  per  cent  was  distributed 
to  the  bondholders. 

Directly  after  we  arrived  in  Egypt,  another 
step  of  importance  was  taken.  Difficulties  were 
being  encountered  in  arranging  for  a  Commission 
of  Liquidation  to  make  a  final  settlement  of 
Egyptian  financial  affairs.  In  the  meanwhile,  both 
the  country  and  the  creditors  were  suffering.  We 
therefore  recommended  the  Egyptian  Government 
to  cut  the  diplomatic  knot  by  preparing  their  own 
scheme,  which  could  be  submitted  to  the  Com- 
mission of  Liquidation,  if  one  were  appointed,  and 
which  could  be  put  into  operation  without  the 
sanction  of  any  law,  in  the  event  of  no  agreement 
being  arrived  at  as  regards  a  Commission.  The 
suggestion  was  accepted,  and,  in  concert  with  the 
Egyptian  authorities,  we  proceeded  to  prepare  a 
scheme. 

On  January  1,  1880,  we  submitted  our  report 


108  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

to  the  Khedive.  "  Experience,"  we  said,  "  has 
shown  tb.'it  the  main  detect  of  all  former  attempts 
to  regulate  the  Egyptian  financial  situation  has 
been  that  they  have  been  too  optimistic."  It  was 
essential  to  steer  clear  of  that  danger.  The  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry  had  recommended  that  the 
interest  on  the  Unified  Debt  should  be  fixed  at 
5  per  cent.  INI.  de  Blignieres  and  I  thought  that 
rate  too  high.  We  recommended  that  only  4  per 
cent  interest  should  be  guaranteed.  The  public 
had  become  accustomed  to  the  idea  that  the  rate 
of  interest  would  have  to  be  reduced  to  4  per  cent. 
When  our  proposals  were  made  known,  so  far  from 
producing  a  bad  effect,  Unified  Stock  rose  from  51 
to  56.  A  sum  of  £l, 084,000  was  due  to  the  bond- 
holders for  back  interest  on  coupons  which  had 
only  been  partially  paid.  "  We  cannot,"  we  said, 
*'  hold  out  the  least  hope  that  these  sums  will  ever 
be  paid." 

The  next  thinsf  was  to  frame  a  Budo^et  for 
the  year  1880.  The  Commission  of  Inquiry  had 
estimated  the  Egyptian  revenue  at  £9,067,000. 
We  considered  this  estimate  too  high.  We 
reduced  it  to  £8,562,000.  A  sum  of  £4,323,000 
was  required  to  pay  the  Tribute  and  to  carry  on 
the  administration  of  the  country,  thus  leaving 
£4,239,000  available  for  the  creditors  of  the 
Egyptian  Government. 

The  reforms  proposed  by  the  Commission  of 
Inquiry  were  at  the  same  time  taken  in  hand. 
On  January  6,  1880,  the  law  of  the  JMoukabala 
was  repealed.  On  the  18th,  an  additional  tax  of 
£E.  150,000  a  year  was  placed  on  the  Ouchouri 
lands.  On  January  17,  the  poll-tax  was  abolished. 
It  yielded  a  revenue  of  £205,000  a  year.  Persons 
whose  sole  employment  was  agriculture  were, 
at  the  same  time,  relieved  from  the  payment 
of  the  professional  tax.     Octroi  duties,  highway. 


CH.X  THE  DUAL  CONTROL  169 

market,  and  weighing  dues  were  suppressed  in 
the  villages,  while  in  the  towns,  octroi  duties  were 
abolished  on  105  articles,  mostly  agricultural  pro- 
duce. Twenty -four  petty  taxes  of  a  vexatious 
nature  were  abolished  by  a  stroke  of  the  pen. 

An  important  reform  was  also  made  in  the 
method  of  levying  the  salt  tax.  Under  a  law 
passed  in  1873,  every  individual  in  Egypt  was 
supposed  to  consume  a  certain  amount  of  salt  a 
year.  The  population  of  each  village  was  roughly 
calculated  at  the  time  the  law  was  passed,  and  the 
tax  divided  amongst  the  villagers.  The  salt  tax 
had,  in  fact,  become  a  poll-tax,  which  was  paid 
equally  by  those  who  consumed  a  great  deal  of 
salt,  and  by  those  who  consumed  little  or  none. 
No  account  was  taken  of  changes,  which  might 
have  occurred  since  1873,  in  the  population  of 
each  village.  The  defects  of  this  system  were 
obvious.  It  was  abolished,  and,  in  substitution  for 
it,  salt  was  constituted  a  Government  monopoly. 

The  system  of  paying  the  land-tax  in  kind, 
which  had  hitherto  existed  in  some  parts  of  Upper 
Egypt,  had  given  rise  to  numerous  abuses.  It 
was  suppressed.  For  the  future,  only  payment  in 
money  was  allowed. 

The  dates  at  which  the  instalments  of  land-tax 
were  to  fall  due  were  fixed  in  a  manner  which  was 
convenient  to  the  cultivators.  At  the  same  time, 
the  names  of  the  taxpayers  belonging  to  each 
village  were  inscribed  in  one  register.  An  extract 
from  this  register  was  given  to  each  taxpayer, 
showing  the  total  of  the  sums  which  were  due 
from  him  under  the  several  heads  of  account,  and 
the  dates  on  which  he  would  be  called  upon  to 
pay.  Of  all  the  reforms  which  were  introduced, 
this  was  perhaps  the  most  important  and  the 
most  beneficial.  It  was  not  so  much  the  amount 
of  the   land-tax    which    had    heretofore   weighed 


170  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  n 

heavily  on  the  country,  as  the  fact  that  the 
dates  of  collection  had  been  regulated  without 
any  reference  to  the  convenience  of  the  taxpayers. 
Further,  inasmuch  as  none  of  the  taxpayers  knew 
with  any  degree  of  certainty  how  much  they  had 
to  pay,  a  wide  door  was  opened  for  extortion  and 
illegal  taxation. 

At  the  same  time,  an  improved  system  was  in- 
troduced for  the  payment  of  the  village  accountants. 
Hitherto  they  had  received  no  fixed  salaries,  but 
were  allowed  to  retain  a  certain  proportion  of  the 
sums  which  they  collected. 

The  main  reason  why  these  and  other  reforms 
w^ere  carried  into  execution  was  that  the  Con- 
trollers and  the  Egyptian  Ministers  worked 
cordially  together.  The  Control  had,  in  fact, 
inspired  confidence. 

I  remember  one  incident  which  contributed  in 
no  small  degree  to  the  establishment  of  this  con- 
fidence. A  British  syndicate,  on  the  list  of  which 
some  influential  names  figured,  was  formed  with  a 
view  to  the  purchase  of  the  Egyptian  Railways. 
The  representatives  of  the  syndicate  laid  their 
proposals  before  the  Egyptian  Government.  The 
Ministers  were  anxious  as  to  the  attitude  which 
the  Controllers,  and  particularly  the  British  Con- 
troller, would  take  up  on  this  subject.  It  scarcely 
occurred  to  them  that  any  foreigner  would  do 
otherwise  than  push  the  presumed  interests  of  his 
own  countrymen.  Great,  therefore,  was  their  sur- 
prise when,  directly  the  question  was  mooted  in 
the  Council,  I  said  that  I  considered  that  it  was 
for  the  Ministers  to  decide  whether  they  would 
entertain  any  proposal  to  purchase  the  railways; 
that  if  they  wished  to  reject  the  offer  which  had 
been  made  to  them,  I  had  no  wish  to  press  them  to 
accept  it ;  but  that  if,  on  the  other  liand,  they  chose 
to  accept  the  princi})le,  I  was  ready  to  go  into 


CH.  X  THE  DUAL  CONTROL  171 

the  details  and  see  that  they  obtained  reasonable 
terms.  They  at  once  decided  not  to  sell  the 
railways.  I  had  anticipated  this  decision.  From 
that  time  forth,  I  never  had  any  serious  difficulty 
in  getting  my  advice  accepted.  Shortly  after  the 
occurrence  of  this  incident,  I  was  asked  to  see 
if  terms  could  be  arranged  with  INIessrs.  Green- 
field, the  contractors  for  the  construction  of  the 
harbour  works  at  Alexandria,  to  whom  a  large 
sum  of  money  was  due.  The  subject  was  full  of 
difficulties.  However,  in  forty-eight  hours  I  had 
made  an  arrangement  which  seemed  reasonable. 
The  contract  had  to  be  signed  by  Riaz  Pasha.  It 
was  prepared  by  about  three  o'clock  one  afternoon. 
Messrs.  Greenfield's  representatives  wished  to  leave 
Cairo  by  a  train  at  five  o'clock  the  same  afternoon 
in  order  to  catch  a  steamer  at  Alexandria.  I 
thought  this  difficult,  as  Riaz  Pasha  had  not  yet 
had  the  matter  explained  to  him.  But  I  said  that 
I  would  do  my  best.  I  took  the  contract  to  Riaz 
Pasha  and  explained  its  provisions  to  him.  He  said 
that  if  I  was  satisfied  he  was  ready  to  accept  my 
conclusions,  and  accordingly  signed  the  contract 
without  reading  it. 

On  April  30,  Sir  Edward  INIalet  wrote  to  the 
Foreign  Office  that  the  Controllers  had  never  been 
obliged  to  apply  for  diplomatic  support. 

In  the  course  of  the  summer  of  1880,  Sir 
Edward  Malet  asked  the  British  Consular  officers 
in  Egypt  to  report  on  the  condition  of  the  country. 
All  the  Consuls  told  the  same  tale.  A  "general 
feeling  of  satisfaction  "  prevailed.  The  taxes  were 
being  regularly  collected.  The  rate  of  interest 
charged  by  the  village  money-lenders  had  fallen 
by  50  per  cent.  The  value  of  land  had  risen,  in 
some  cases  as  much  as  100  per  cent.  The  use  of 
the  courbash  was  greatly  diminished. 

Whilst    these   reforms   were   in    progress,    the 


172  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

difficulties  connected  with  the  appointment  of  a 
Commission  of  Liquidation  had  been  overcome. 
After  discussions  which  histed  some  three  montlis, 
the  Commissioners  agreed  on  a  law  which  was 
submitted  to  the  Khedive  and  signed  by  him  on 
July  17,  1880.  The  Commissioners  never  sent  in 
any  report  explanatory  of  the  provisions  of  the 
law.  In  a  letter  addressed  by  Sir  Rivers  Wilson 
to  Lord  Granville,  w^ho  succeeded  Lord  Salisbury 
at  the  Foreign  Office  on  April  28,  1880,  it  was 
stated  that  there  "was  an  apprehension  lest  the 
divergencies  of  opinion  which  manifested  them- 
selves on  certain  points  among  the  Commissioners 
should  render  impossible  a  unanimous  report,  and 
lead  to  reservations  or  even  protests  detracting 
from  the  authority  of  the  official  decisions  of  the 
Commission." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  allude  at  any  length  to 
these  differences  of  opinion.  It  w^ill  be  sufficient 
to  say  that  some  members  of  the  Commission,  who 
were  supported  by  the  Controllers,  were  in  favour 
of  a  cautious  estimate  of  revenue,  and  an  estimate 
of  administrative  expenditure  which  would  have 
left  a  mari^in  to  be  applied  to  the  benefit  of  the 
country,  whilst  others  took  a  more  optimistic  view 
of  the  revenue  and  endeavoured,  in  the  bondholding 
interest,  to  keep  the  administrative  expenditure 
down  to  the  lowest  possible  figure.  Eventually, 
a  compromise  was  effected.  The  revenue  was 
taken  at  £E.8,362,000  for  1880  and  1881,  and  at 
£E.8,41 2,000  for  subsequent  years.  The  adminis- 
trative expenditure  was  fixed  at  £E.4,520,000. 
Tiie  rate  of  interest  on  the  Unified  Debt  was 
fixed  at  4  per  cent.  The  outstanding  portions 
of  the  short  loans  were  absorbed  into  the  Unified 
Debt.  A  fresh  issue  of  Preference  Stock  to  the 
extent  of  £E.5,600,000  was  made  in  order  to 
assist  in  paying  the  Floating  Debt.     The  Floating 


CH.X  THE  DUAL  CONTROL  173 

Debt  ci  editors  were  divided  into  three  categories, 
viz.  privileged  creditors,  creditors  holding  special 
securities,  and  ordinary  creditors.  The  privileged 
creditors  were  paid  in  full.  Special  arrangements 
were  made  with  the  creditors  holding  special 
securities.  Their  claims  were  reduced  by  about 
7|-  per  cent.  The  ordinary  creditors  received  30 
per  cent  in  cash  and  70  per  cent  in  Preference 
Stock.  At  the  price  then  current,  they  lost  8^ 
per  cent  on  the  capital  of  their  claims.  On  the 
whole,  it  may  be  said  that  the  arrangement  was  a 
fair  one.  Its  main  defect  was  that  too  large  a 
proportion  of  revenue  (66  per  cent)  was  mortgaged 
to  the  bondholders,  whilst  the  balance  left  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Government  was  insufficient. 

Thus,  matters  were  improving  in  Egypt. 
Several  beneficial  reforms  had  been  carried  out. 
Some  of  the  worst  features  of  the  old  oppressive 
system  of  government  had  disappeared.  The  rela- 
tions between  the  Government  and  their  creditors 
were  established  on  a  legal  basis,  and  the  charge 
on  account  of  debt,  although  still  very  heavy,  had 
been  brought  more  into  conformity  than  heretofore 
with  the  resources  of  the  country.  There  were, 
however,  some  dark  specks  on  the  horizon.  For 
instance,  a  petition  was  circulated  amongst  the 
officers  of  the  army,  couched  in  language  which 
was  intended  to  incite  the  Moslem  population 
against  the  European  Control.  It  concluded  with 
a  threat  that  the  petitioners  might  have  recourse 
to  the  sword  to  attain  their  ends. 

In  June  1880,  I  was  appointed  Financial  Mem- 
ber of  the  Governor- General's  Council  in  India. 
Sir  Auckland  Colvin  succeeded  me  as  Controller- 
General  in  Egypt. 

In  December  1880,  I  visited  Cairo  on  my  way 
to  India.  At  tliat  time,  it  was  manifest  that  the 
only  serious  danger  which  threatened  Egypt  arose 


174  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

from  the  ftict  that  the  ciiscipHne  of  the  army  had 
betii  profoundly  shaken  by  the  events  of  1878.  1 
warned  Riaz  Pasha  of  this  danger,  and  urged  liini 
to  remedy  any  grievances  of  which  the  army  could 
justly  complain,  but  at  the  same  time  to  treat 
severely  any  signs  of  insubordination.  Riaz  Pasha 
said  that  my  warning  was  unnecessary,  for  that  not 
the  smallest  danger  was  to  be  apprehended  from 
the  army. 

For  the  moment,  therefore,  it  appeared  that 
Egy])t  had  at  last  fairly  entered  the  path  of 
reform,  and  that  all  that  was  required  was  time 
to  complete  the  superstructure  of  which  the 
foundations  had  been  so  laboriously  laid. 


CHAPTER   XI 

THE    MUTINY   OF   THE    EGYPTIAN    ARMY 

January-September  1881 

Discontent  amongst  the  officers — They  petition  Riaz  Pasha — Mutiny  of 
February  1 — Dismissal  of  the  Minister  of  VV^ar— Imprudent  con- 
duct of  the  Khedive — Conduct  of  the  French  Consul-General — 
Increase  of  discontent  in  the  army  —  Mutiny  of  September  9 — 
Sir  Auckland  Colvin — Demands  of  the  mutineers — Dismissal  of 
the  Ministers  —  Reluctance  of  Cherif  Pasha  to  accept  office — 
Nomination  of  the  Cherif  Ministry — Cherif  Pasha  supports  the 
European  Control — Arabi  is  the  real  ruler  of  Egypt — His  conduct 
due  to  fear — Situation  created  by  the  mutiny. 

Sir  John  Bowring  wrote  in  1840:  "The  situa- 
tion of  the  Osmanlis  in  Egypt  is  remarkable  ;  they 
exercise  an  extraordinary  influence,  possess  most 
of  the  high  offices  of  state,  and,  indeed,  are  the 
depositories  of  power  throughout  the  country.  .  .  . 
They  are  few,  but  they  tyrannise ;  the  Arabs  are 
many,  but  obey." 

After  Sir  John  Bowring  wrote  these  lines,  the 
Egyptians,  properly  so  called,  gradually  acquired  a 
greater  share  in  the  administration  of  the  country, 
but  in  1881,  as  in  1840,  the  Turks  were  the  "  para- 
mount rulers."  In  the  army,  however,  the  number 
and  influence  of  the  Turks  sensibly  diminished  as 
time  went  on.  During  the  reigns  of  Abbas,  Said, 
and  Ismail,  the  Egyptian  element  amongst  the 
officers  had  increased  to  such  an  extent  as  to 
jeopardise  the  little  that  remained  of  the  still 
dominant  Turco-Circassian  element. 

176 


176  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  ii 

The  large  number  of  officers  who  were  placed 
on  half- pay  in  1878  were,  for  the  most  part, 
Egyptians.  The  discontent  due  to  this  cause  was 
hicreased  by  the  fact  that,  whilst  great  and  in  some 
degree  successful  efforts  were  made  to  improve  the 
civil  administration  of  the  country,  nothing  was 
done  to  improve  the  condition  of  the  army.  The 
prevailing  discontent  eventually  found  expression 
in  a  petition  addressed  by  certahi  officers  of  the 
army  to  lliaz  Pasha  on  January  15,  1881. 

Ahmed  Arabi,  an  Egyptian  of  fellah  origin, 
who  was  colonel  of  the  4th  Regiment,  soon  took 
the  lead  in  the  movement  which  was  thus  begun. 
But  the  prime  mover  in  the  preparation  of  the 
petition  was  Colonel  Ali  Bey  Fehmi,  who  com- 
manded the  1st  Regiment.  His  regiment  had 
been  the  object  of  special  attention  on  the  part  of 
the  Khedive.  It  guarded  the  palace.  For  some 
time  previously,  however,  there  had  been  a  marked 
cessation  of  friendly  relations  between  the  Khedive 
and  Ali  Bey  Fehmi.  In  the  East,  to  be  in  disgrace 
is  to  be  in  danger.  Ali  Bey  Fehmi  determined 
to  strengthen  his  position  by  showing  that  the 
Egyptian  portion  of  the  army  could  no  longer 
be  treated  with  neglect,  and  that  he  himself  could 
not  with  impunity  be  dismissed  or  exiled. 

The  petition  set  forth  that  the  INlinister  of  War, 
Osman  Pasha  Rifki,  had  treated  the  Egyptian 
officers  of  the  army  unjustly  in  the  matter  of 
promotions.  He  had  behaved  "  as  if  they  were  his 
enemies,  or  as  if  God  had  sent  him  to  venge  His 
wrath  on  the  Egyptians."  Officers  had  been  dis- 
missed from  the  service  without  any  legal  inquiry. 
The  petitioners,  therefore,  made  two  demands. 
The  first  was  that  the  Minister  of  War  should  be 
removed,  "as  he  was  incompetent  to  hold  such  a 
high  position."  The  second  was  that  an  inquiry 
should  be  held  into  the  qualifications  of  those  who 


CH.  XI        MUTINY  OF  THE  ARMY  177 

had  been  promoted.  "Nothing,"  it  was  said,  "but 
merit  and  knowledge  should  entitle  an  officer  to 
promotion,  and  in  these  respects  we  are  far  superior 
to  those  who  have  been  promoted." 

This  petition  was  presented  by  the  two  Colonels 
in  person  to  Riaz  Pasha.  Riaz  Pasha  was  ignorant 
of  military  affairs,  and  had  never  interfered  with 
the  administration  of  the  army,  which  he  con- 
sidered to  be  a  prerogative  of  the  Khedive.  He 
endeavoured  unsuccessfully  to  induce  the  Colonels 
to  withdraw  their  petition,  promising  at  the  same 
time  that  inquiry  should  be  made  into  their  griev- 
ances. A  fortnight  was  allowed  to  elapse,  during 
which  time  further  unsuccessful  efforts  were  made 
in  the  same  direction.  In  the  meanwhile,  the 
Colonels  had  learnt  that  their  petition  was  viewed 
with  disfavour  by  the  Khedive  and  his  Turkish 
surroundings.  Riaz  Pasha  received  a  hint  from 
the  palace  that  the  dilatory  manner  in  which  he 
was  treating  the  question  was  calculated  to  throw 
some  doubts  on  his  loyalty.  He  determined, 
therefore,  to  provoke  an  immediate  decision.  The 
matter  was  discussed  at  a  meeting  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers  held  under  the  presidency  of  the  Khedive 
on  January  30,  from  which  Sir  Auckland  Colvin 
and  M.  de  Blignieres  were  most  unwisely  excluded. 
All  idea  of  compromise  was  rejected.  It  was 
resolved  to  arrest  the  Colonels,  and  to  try  them  by 
Court-martial.  Subsequently,  an  inquiry  would  be 
made  into  their  grievances.  An  order  was  drawn 
up  and  countersigned  by  the  Khedive,  summoning 
the  Colonels  to  the  Ministry  of  War  on  February  1. 

One  peculiarity  of  Egyptian  official  life  is  that 
no  secrets  are  ever  kept.  The  Colonels  were  im- 
mediately informed  of  tlie  decision  at  which  the 
Council  of  Ministers  had  arrived.  Everything 
was,  therefore,  arranged  for  the  action  which 
followed.     It  was  settled  that,  in  the  event  of  the 

VOL.  1  N 


178  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  ii 

Colonels  not  returning  in  two  hours,  the  officers 
and  men  of  their  regiments  should  go  to  the 
INIinistry  of  War  and  deliver  them  if  they  were 
under  arrest.  At  the  same  time,  a  message  was 
sent  to  Toura,  about  ten  miles  distant  from  Cairo, 
with  a  view  to  securing  concerted  action  on  the 
part  of  the  regiment  quartered  there.  This  pro- 
gramme was  faithfully  executed.  The  Colonels 
were  summoned  to  the  JNlinistry  of  War  on  the 
pretext  that  certain  arrangements  had  to  be  made 
for  a  procession  which  was  to  accompany  one  of 
the  princesses  on  the  occasion  of  her  marriage. 
They  obeyed  the  summons.  On  their  arrival  at 
the  Ministry  of  War,  they  were  arrested  and 
placed  on  their  trial.  Whilst  the  trial  was  pro- 
ceeding, the  officers  and  men  of  their  regiments 
arrived,  and  broke  into  the  room  where  the  Court 
was  sitting.  They  treated  the  INIinister  of  War 
roughly,  destroyed  the  furniture,  and  delivered 
the  Colonels,  who  then  marched  with  their  troops 
to  the  Khedive's  palace,  and  demanded  the  dis- 
missal of  the  Minister  of  War.  The  Ministers 
and  other  high  functionaries  soon  gathered  round 
the  Khedive.  Some  counselled  resistance,  but  the 
practical  difficulty  presented  itself  that  no  force 
was  available  with  which  to  resist.  The  only  sign 
of  fidelity  given  by  any  of  the  troops  belonging  to 
the  Cairo  garrison  was  that  the  regiment  quartered 
at  Abbassieh,  two  miles  distant  from  the  town, 
refused  to  join  the  mutineers,  but  the  most  their 
Turkish  officers  could  do  was  to  keep  them  where 
they  were.  They  would  not  have  defended  the 
Khedive  against  the  mutinous  regiments.  The 
regiment  stationed  at  Toura  marched  to  Cairo, 
according  to  previous  arrangement,  and  insisted  on 
continuing  its  march,  although  messengers  were 
sent  to  dissuade  the  men  from  advancing  after  the 
obnoxious  Minister  had  been  dismissed. 


CH.  XI        MUTINY  OF  THE  ARMY  179 

Under  these  circumstances,  resistance  was  im- 
possible. After  some  hesitation,  tiie  Khedive  sent 
for  the  Colonels  and  informed  them  that  Osman 
Pasha  Rifki  was  dismissed  and  Mahmoud  Pasha 
Baroudi^  named  Minister  of  War  in  his  place. 
This  announcement  was  received  with  cheers. 
The  troops  dispersed  and  tranquillity  was  for 
the  time  being  restored.  The  mutinous  Colonels 
were  allowed  to  remain  in  command  of  their 
regiments.  They  waited  on  the  Khedive,  asked 
his  pardon  for  their  past  misconduct,  and  gave 
assurances  of  unalterable  fidelity  and  loyalty  to 
his  person. 

This  was  the  second  mutiny  of  the  Egyptian 
Army.  It  had  followed  the  same  course  as  the 
first.  It  originated  with  legitimate  grievances  to 
which  no  attention  was  paid.  The  next  stage  was 
mutiny.  The  final  result  was  complete  submission 
to  the  will  of  the  mutineers.  The  whole  affair 
was  mismanaged,  and  for  this  mismanagement  tlie 
Khedive  appears  to  have  been  largely  responsible. 
Two  courses  were  from  the  first  open  to  the 
Khedive.  Either  he  should  have  endeavoured  to 
rally  to  his  side  a  sufficient  force  to  crush  the 
mutineers,  or,  if  that  was  impossible,  he  should 
have  made  terms  with  the  officers  before  discontent 
developed  into  mutiny.  Unfortunately,  he  adopted 
neither  of  these  courses.  The  attempt  to  decoy 
the  Colonels  away  from  their  troops  and  to  punish 
them  without  any  trustworthy  force  behind  him  to 
ensure  effect  being  given  to  the  decisions  of  the 
Court-martial,  was  probably  the  most  unwise  course 
which  could  have  been  adopted.  Sir  Edward  JMalet 
expressed  his  opinion  tliat  the  officers  were  treated 
**in  the  way  best  calculated  to  destroy  all  con- 
fidence   in    the    Khedive    and    his    Government, 

'  Baroudi  was  the  family  name.     He  was  also  frequently  called 
Mahmoud  Pasha  Sami. 


180  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

although  it  was  in  harmony  with  the  traditions  of 
Oriental  statesmanship." 

The  Egyptian  officers  and  soldiers  now  learnt 
for  the  second  time  that  they  had  only  to  assert 
themselves  in  order  to  obtain  all  they  required. 
With  this  encouragement,  they  would  not  be  slow 
to  mutiny  a  third  time,  should  the  necessity  for 
doing  so  arise. 

For  the  moment,  however,  a  truce  was  estab- 
lished between  the  Khedive  and  his  mutinous 
officers ;  but  suspicions  and  fears  were  rife  on  both 
sides.  The  Khedive  and  his  Ministers  were  afraid 
to  disband  the  disaffected  regiments,  or  even  to 
remove  them  from  Cairo.  The  officers,  on  the 
other  hand,  although  their  victory  had  been  com- 
plete, were  fearful  of  the  consequences  of  their 
own  action.  They  mistrusted  the  Khedive  and 
thought  that,  should  an  opportunity  occur,  the 
reluctant  pardon  which  they  had  received  would 
be  cancelled,  and  that  they  would  be  visited  with 
condign  punishment.  They  felt  even  greater  re- 
sentment against  Riaz  Pasha  than  against  the 
Khedive,  and  began  a  series  of  intrigues  with  a 
view  to  bringing  about  a  change  of  Ministry. 

These  intrigues  were  encouraged  by  Baron  de 
Ring,  the  French  Consul-General,  who  had  fre- 
quent interviews  with  the  mutinous  Colonels, 
The  action  of  Baron  de  Ring  increased  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  situation.  If,  in  addition  to  financial 
embarrassments,  defective  administration,  and  a 
mutinous  army,  there  was  to  be  superadded  hostile 
intrigue  on  the  part  of  the  representative  of  the 
French  Government,  the  position  of  the  Egyptian 
Ministry  would  clearly  become  untenable.  Riaz 
Pasha  wished  to  resign,  but  was  dissuaded  from 
doing  so.  The  Khedive  eventually  wrote  to  the 
President  of  the  French  Republic  to  complain  of 
Baron  de   Ring's   conduct.      The   result   was  that 


CH.XI         MUTINY  OF  THE  ARMY  181 

he  was  recalled.  He  left  Egypt  on  February  28. 
The  Khedive  then  summoned  the  prmcipal  officers 
of  the  army  to  the  palace,  and  expressed  the 
confidence  he  entertained  in  Riaz  Pasha,  of 
whom  he  spoke  in  eulogistic  terms.  Ah-eady 
the  pay  of  the  unemployed  Egyptian  officers 
had  been  increased,  and  a  public  declaration  had 
been  made  by  the  Khedive  to  the  effisct  that  for 
the  future  every  class  of  officer,  wliether  Turk, 
Circassian,  or  Egyptian,  would  be  treated  on  the 
same  footing.  These  measures  somewhat  improved 
the  position  of  the  Ministry.  When  Sir  Edward 
Malet  left  in  May  on  a  short  leave,  he  "had  reason 
to  believe  that  confidence  was  being  restored  ;  that 
the  officers  had,  in  fact,  nothing  to  fear  from  in- 
trigue ;  that  they  were  gradually  relaxing  measures 
for  their  own  protection,  and  beginning  to  feel  that 
the  Khedive  and  the  Ministers  no  longer  aimed  at 
their  lives." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  give  the  detailed  history  of 
the  next  few  months.  The  officers  still  entertained 
a  deep-rooted  mistrust  of  the  intentions  of  the 
Khedive  and  his  Ministers.  "The  traditions  of 
the  days  of  Ismail  Pasha,"  Sir  Edward  Malet 
wrote,  "  stalked  like  spectres  across  tlieir  paths." 
They  thought  that  their  lives  were  in  danger.  In- 
subordination increased  daily.  A  Commission  was 
appointed  to  inquire  into  the  grievances  of  the 
army.  Arabi  Bey  was  one  of  its  members.  His 
language  to  the  INIinister  of  War  was  very  dis- 
respectful. In  the  month  of  July,  an  artilleryman 
was  run  over  by  a  cart  and  killed  in  the  streets  of 
Alexandria.  His  comrades  bore  his  dead  body  to 
the  palace,  and  forced  an  entrance  in  defiance  of 
the  orders  of  their  officers.  They  were  tried  and 
the  ringleaders  condemned  to  punishment.  About 
the  same  time,  nineteen  officers  brought  charges 
against  their  Colonel  (Abdul-Al).     These  charges 


182  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

formed  the  subject  of  inquiry.  They  were  found 
to  be  groundless.  The  officers  were  in  consequence 
dismissed  from  the  active  hst  of  the  army,  but 
were  shortly  afterwards  restored  to  their  former 
positions  by  the  Khedive.  The  Colonels  were 
greatly  offended.  They  believed  that  the  Khedive's 
action  had  been  taken  with  the  intention  of  en- 
couraging the  insubordination  of  their  junior 
officers  towards  them.  About  the  same  time, 
JNIahmoud  Pasha  Baroudi,  the  INIhiister  of  War, 
who  sympathised  with  the  officers  concerned  in 
the  mutiny  of  February  1,  was  dismissed,  and 
the  Khedive's  brother-in-law,  Daoud  Pasha,  was 
appointed  in  his  place.  This  measure  also  caused 
great  dissatisfaction. 

W^ithin  the  Ministerial  circle,  a  good  deal  of 
dissension  reigned.  The  relations  between  Riaz 
Pasha  and  M.  de  Blignieres  became  strained.  The 
Khedive's  confidence  in  Riaz  Pasha  was  impaired. 
It  was  whispered  that  His  Highness  favoured  the 
return  to  power  of  Cherif  Pasha. 

It  was  clear  that  another  crisis  was  not  far  off, 
but  at  the  moment  it  was  about  to  occur,  the 
Government  were  hopeful  that  their  main  difficulties 
had  been  overcome.  "  At  no  period,"  Sir  Edward 
Malet  wrote,  "since  February  1  had  the  confi- 
dence of  the  Khedive  and  his  Government  been  so 
complete  as  immediately  before  the  outbreak  of 
September  9.  On  the  very  eve,  and  on  the 
morning  itself  of  that  day,  Riaz  Pasha  assured 
those  with  whom  he  conversed  that  the  Govern- 
ment were  masters  of  the  situation,  and  that  the 
danger  of  a  military  movement  had  passed  away. 
But,  in  fact,  all  the  terrors  of  the  Colonels  for 
their  personal  safety  had  been  again  aroused.  A 
story  had  got  abroad  that  the  Khedive  had  obtained 
a  secret  Fetwa,  or  decree  from  the  Sheikh-ul-Islam, 
condemning  them  to  death  for  high  treason.    There 


cH.xi        MUTINY  OF  THE  ARMY  183 

was  absolutely  no  foundation  for  this  story,  but  it 
is  currently  believed,  and  at  this  moment  the 
position  of  the  Sheikh-ul-Islam  is  precarious  in 
consequence  of  it.  Spies  were  continually  hovering 
about  the  residences  of  the  Colonels,  and  on  the 
night  of  the  8th  September  a  man  presented  him- 
self at  the  house  of  Arabi  Bey,  was  refused  admit- 
tance, and  was  afterwards  followed  and  seen  to 
return  to  the  Prefecture  of  Police.  There  was  no 
doubt  in  the  mind  of  Arabi  Bey  that  he  was  to  be 
murdered;  he  left  his  house  and  went  to  that  of 
the  other  Colonels,  to  whom  a  similar  incident  had 
just  occurred.  It  is  my  belief  that  then  only  were 
measures  taken  for  immediate  action,  that  it  was 
concerted  and  planned  that  night,  as  it  was  executed 
on  the  following  day." 

On  September  9,  the  3rd  Regiment  of  Infantry, 
which  was  stationed  at  Cairo,  was  ordered  to 
Alexandria.  This  order  produced  a  mutiny.  Arabi 
Bey,  with  2500  men  and  18  guns,  marched  to  the 
square  in  front  of  the  Abdin  Palace.  The  Khedive 
was  at  the  Ismailia  Palace,  distant  about  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  from  Abdin.  He  did  the  wisest  thing 
possible  under  the  circumstances.  He  sent  for  Sir 
Auckland  Colvin. 

Sir  Auckland  Colvin  was  a  member  of  the 
Indian  Civil  Service.  In  the  hour  of  trial  he  did 
not  belie  the  proud  motto.  Mens  aequa  in  arduis, 
inscribed  under  the  picture  of  Warren  Hastings 
which  hangs  in  the  Calcutta  Council  Chamber.  It 
is  one  which  might  fitly  apply  to  the  whole  of  that 
splendid  body  of  Englishmen  who  compose  the 
Indian  Civil  Service.  The  spirit  of  the  English- 
man rose  high  in  the  presence  of  danger.  It  was 
not  the  first  time  he  had  heard  of  mutiny.  He 
knew  how  his  own  countrymen  had  met  dangers  of 
this  sort.  The  example  of  Lawrence  and  Outram, 
of  Nicholson  and  Edwards,  pointed  the  w^ay  to  the 


184  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.ii 

Indian  Civilian.  His  duty  was  clear.  He  must 
endeavour  at  the  risk  of  his  own  life  to  impart 
to  the  Khedive  some  portion  of  the  spirit  which 
aiiimated  his  own  imperial  race.  He  spoke  in  no 
uncertain  terms.  "The  \"iceroy,"  he  subsequently 
wrote,  "  asked  my  opinion  on  what  should  be  done. 
I  advised  him  to  take  the  initiative.  Two  regi- 
ments in  Cairo  were  said  by  Riaz  Pasha  to  be 
faithful.  I  advised  him  to  summon  them  to  the 
Abdin  Square,  with  all  the  military  police  avail- 
able, to  put  himself  at  their  head,  and,  when  Arabi 
Bey  arrived,  personally  to  arrest  him.  He  replied 
that  Arabi  Bey  had  with  him  the  artillery  and 
cavalry,  and  that  they  might  fire.  I  said  that  they 
would  not  dare  to,  and  that  if  he  had  the  courage 
to  take  the  initiative,  and  to  expose  himself  person- 
ally, he  might  succeed  in  overcoming  the  mutineers. 
Otherwise,  he  was  lost.  Stone  Pasha  ^  warmly 
supported  me.  .  .  .  While  his  carriage  was  coming 
Sir  Charles  Cookson  ^  arrived,  expressed  to  the 
Viceroy  his  concurrence  in  my  views,  and  returned 
to  the  Agency  to  telegraph  to  his  Government." 

What  followed  may  best  be  told  in  Sir  Auckland 
Colvin's  words.  "  I  accompanied  the  Viceroy,"  he 
wrote,  "  in  a  separate  carriage ;  the  Ministers  also, 
and  some  five  or  six  native  officers  of  rank,  with 
Stone  Pasha.  We  went  first  to  the  Abdin  barracks, 
where  the  regiment  of  the  guard  turned  out,  and 
with  the  warmest  protestations  swore  loyalty. 
Thence  we  drove  to  the  Citadel,  where  the  same 
occurred ;  but  we  learnt  that  this  regiment,  pre- 
vious to  our  arrival,  had  been  signalHug  to  the 
regiment  (Arabi  Bey's)  in  the  Abbassieh  barrack. 
The  Viceroy  then  announced  his  intention  of  going 
to  the  Abbassieh  barrack.     It  was  already  3.30 ;  I 

'  An  American  officer  in  the  Egyptian  army. 

'  Sir  Charles  Cookson  was  acting  as   Consul-General   during  the 
temporary  absence  of  Sir  Edward  Malet. 


CH.  XI         MUTINY  OF  THE  AKMY  185 

urged  him  to  return  to  the  Abdin  Square  taking 
with  him  the  Citadel  Regiment,  and  when  he 
arrived  at  the  square  to  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  that  regiment,  the  regiment  of  the  guard  and 
the  mihtary  pohce.  He  drove  off,  however,  to 
Abbassieh.  It  was  a  long  drive,  and  when  we  got 
there  about  4  (the  Ministers  having  left  us  at  the 
Citadel  and  returned  direct)  we  found  Arabi  Bey 
had  marched  with  the  regiment  to  Cairo.  We 
followed,  and  on  entering  the  town  the  Viceroy 
took  a  long  detou7\  and  arrived  at  the  Abdin 
Palace  by  a  side  door.  I  jumped  out  of  my 
carriage,  and  urged  him  on  no  account  to  remain 
in  the  palace,  but  to  come  into  the  square.  He 
agreed  at  once,  and  we  went  together,  followed  at 
a  considerable  distance  by  four  or  five  of  his  native 
officers.  Stone  Pasha,  and  one  or  two  other  Euro- 
pean officers.  The  square  was  entirely  occupied 
by  soldiers  drawn  up  round  it,  and  keeping  all 
spectators  at  a  distance.  The  Viceroy  advanced 
firmly  into  the  square  towards  a  little  group  of 
officers  and  men  (some  mounted)  in  the  centre.  I 
said  to  him,  'When  Arabi  Bey  presents  himself,  tell 
him  to  give  you  his  sword,  and  to  give  them  the  order 
to  disperse.  Then  go  the  round  of  the  square  and 
address  each  regiment  separately,  and  give  them  the 
order  to  disperse.'  Arabi  Bey  approached  on  horse- 
back ;  the  Viceroy  called  out  to  him  to  dismount. 
He  did  so,  and  came  forward  on  foot,  with  several 
otliers  and  a  guard  with  fixed  bayonets,  and  saluted. 
I  said  to  the  Viceroy,  'Now  is  your  moment.' 
He  replied,  'We  are  between  four  fires.'  I  said, 
*  Have  courage.'  He  took  counsel  of  a  native 
officer  on  his  left,  and  repeated  to  me :  '  What  can 
I  do  ?  We  are  between  four  fires.  We  shall  be 
killed.'  He  then  told  Arabi  Bey  to  sheathe  his 
sword.  The  order  was  obeyed  ;  and  he  then  asked 
Arabi  Bey  what  all  this  meant ;  Arabi  Bey  replied 


186  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

by  enumerating  three  points,  adding;  tliat  the  army- 
had  come  there  on  the  part  of  the  Egyptian  people 
to  enforce  them,  and  would  not  retire  till  they 
were  conceded.  The  Viceroy  turned  to  me  and 
said,  'You  hear  what  he  says.'  I  replied  that  it 
was  not  fitting  for  the  Viceroy  to  discuss  questions 
of  this  kind  with  Colonels,  and  suggested  to  him 
to  retire  into  the  Palace  of  Abdin,  leaving  me  to 
speak  to  the  Colonels.  He  did  so,  and  I  remained 
for  about  an  hour  till  the  arrival  of  Sir  Charles 
Cookson,  explaining  to  them  the  gravity  of  the 
situation  for  themselves,  and  urging  them  to  retire 
the  troops  while  there  was  yet  time." 

The  three  points  to  which  Sir  Auckland  Colvin 
alluded  as  constituting  the  demands  of  Arabi  were  : 
(1)  that  all  the  Ministers  should  be  dismissed ;  (2) 
that  a  Parliament  should  be  convoked  ;  and,  (3), 
that  the  strength  of  the  army  should  be  raised  to 
18,000  men. 

Sir  Charles  Cookson  then  entered  into  negotia- 
tions with  the  mutineers.  The  Khedive  consented 
to  dismiss  his  Ministers  on  the  understanding  that 
the  other  points  demanded  by  the  officers  should  be 
left  in  suspense  until  reference  could  be  made  to 
the  Porte.  Arabi  agreed  to  these  terms.  The 
question  then  arose  of  who  should  be  President 
of  the  Council.  One  or  two  names  were  put 
forward  by  the  Khedive,  and  rejected  by  Arabi 
and  his  followers.  The  Khedive  then  intimated 
that  he  would  be  prepared  to  nominate  Cherif 
Pasha.  This  announcement  "was  received  with 
loud  and  universal  shouts  of  '  Long  live  the 
Khedive ! '  .  .  .  Arabi  Bey  then  asked  to  be 
allowed  to  see  the  Khedive  and  make  his  sub- 
mission. This  favour  was  granted  to  him  and  the 
other  Colonels,  and  then  the  troops  were  drawn  off 
in  perfect  quietness  to  their  respective  barracks." 

Some   difficulty   was   encountered    in    inducing 


CH.  XI        MUTINY  OF  THE  ARMY  187 

Chdrif  Pasha  to  accept  office.  He  objected  to 
becomincjc  Prime  JNIinister  as  the  nominee  of  a 
mutinous  army.  Sir  Charles  Cookson,  M.  Sien- 
kievvicz  (the  P'rench  Consul -General),  and  Sir 
Auckland  Colvin  endeavoured  to  overcome  this 
reluctance,  which  was  in  no  degree  feigned.  They 
so  far  succeeded  that  Cherif  Pasha  consented  to 
enter  into  negotiations  with  the  leaders  of  the 
military  movement.  At  first,  there  appeared  but 
little  prospect  of  an  arrangement.  Cherif  Pasha 
asked  that,  on  condition  of  his  undertaking  the 
government,  and  guaranteeing  the  personal  safety 
of  the  leaders  of  the  movement,  the  mutinous 
regiments  should  withdraw  to  the  posts  assigned 
to  them.  The  more  violent  amongst  the  officers 
had,  however,  got  the  upper  hand.  They  did  not 
fear  Turkish  intervention,  the  probability  of  which 
now  began  to  be  discussed.  Indeed,  there  was 
some  reason  to  suppose  that  the  mutineers  had 
received  encouragement  from  Constantinople. 
Cherif  Pasha's  terms  were  rejected,  and  he  de- 
clared that  he  would  not  undertake  to  form  a 
Ministry. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  Khedive 
intimated  that  he  was  "  ready  to  yield  everything 
in  order  to  save  public  security."  Suddenly, 
however,  on  September  13,  things  took  a  turn 
for  the  better.  The  relief  came  from  an  un- 
expected quarter.  Arabi  had  summoned  to  Cairo 
the  members  of  the  Chamber  of  Notables.  When 
they  arrived,  "they  proved  more  capable  of 
appreciating  the  true  situation  than  their  military 
allies.  Informed  of  the  negotiations  going  on  with 
Cherif  Pasha,  they  in  a  body  went  to  him,  and 
entreated  him  to  agree  to  form  a  Ministry,  offering 
him  their  personal  guarantee  that,  if  he  consented, 
the  army  should  engage  to  absolute  submission  to 
his  orders.     The  military  leaders  seem  to  have  been 


188  MODERN  EGVrT  n.  n 

more  struck  by  this  conduct  than  by  all  the 
previous  representations  made  to  them."  Seeing 
that  public  opinion  was  not  altogetlier  witli 
them,  Arabi  and  his  followers  moditied  their  tone. 
They  tendeitd  their  "absolute  submission  to  the 
autliority  of  Cherif  Paslia  as  the  Khedive's 
Mhiister."  They  only  made  two  conditions.  One 
was  that  Mahmoud  Pasha  Sami  should  be  reinstated 
in  office.  The  second  was  that  the  INIilitary  Law 
recommended  by  the  Commission,  which  had  been 
recently  sitting,  should  be  put  into  immediate 
execution.  "To  both  of  these  demands,"  Sir 
Charles  Cookson  wrote,  "  Cherif  Pasha,  most 
reluctantly,  was  compelled  to  yield,  but  as  to  the 
latter,  he  expressly  reserved  to  himself  the  liberty 
of  omitting  the  most  important  article,  which 
proposed  to  raise  the  army  to  18,000  men." 

This  incident  was  significant.  It  showed  that 
there  were  two  parties  in  opposition  to  the  Khedive. 
These  were,  first,  a  mutinous  army  half-mad  with 
fear  of  punishment,  and  secondly,  a  party,  the 
offspring  of  Ismail  Pasha's  dalliance  with  con- 
stitutionalism, who  had  some  vague  national 
aspirations,  and  who,  as  representing  the  civil 
elements  of  society,  shunned  the  idea  of  absolute 
military  government.  Under  statesmanlike  guid- 
ance, this  tendency  to  separation  between  the  two 
parties  might  perhaps  have  been  turned  to  account. 
The  main  thing  was  to  prevent  amalgamation.  If 
the  national  party  were  once  made  to  believe  that 
the  only  hope  of  realising  its  aspirations  lay  in 
seeking  the  aid  of  the  soldiers,  not  only  would  the 
authority  of  the  Khedive  disappear  altogether, 
but  all  hope  of  establishing  a  regime  under  which 
the  army  would  be  subordinate  to  the  civil 
Government  would  have  to  be  abandoned. 

One  of  the  many  political  apophthegms 
attributed  to  Prince   Bismarck   is   the  following: 


OH.  XI         MUTINY  OF  THE  ARMY  189 

'*La  politique  est  I'art  de  s'aceommoder  aux  circon- 
stances  et  de  tirer  parti  de  tout,  meme  de  ce  qui 
deplait."  It  would  have  been  wise  for  the  Khedive 
at  this  moment  to  have  acted  on  the  principle  set 
forth  in  this  maxim.  The  military  party  and  the 
national  j^arty  were  alike  distasteful  to  him.  The 
interests  both  of  his  dynasty  and  of  his  country 
pointed,  however,  to  the  necessity  of  conciliating 
the  latter  in  order  to  keep  in  check  the  former  of 
these  two  parties.  Unfortunately,  the  Khedive 
did  not  possess  sufficient  political  insight  to 
grasp  whatever  opportunities  the  situation  offered 
to  him. 

The  new  Ministry  was  nominated  on  September 

14.  Cherif  Pasha  was  assured  of  the  support  of 
the  British  and  French  Governments.  At  his  own 
request,  he  was  further  assured  that  "  in  case  the 
army  should  show  itself  submissive  and  obedient, 
the  Governments  of  England  and  France  would 
interpose  their  good  offices  with  the  Sublime  Porte 
in  order  to  avert  from  Egypt  an  occupation  bv  an 
Ottoman  army."  The  usual  exchange  of  letters 
took  place  between  the  Khedive  and  his  Prime 
Minister  setting  forth  the  principles  which  were  to 
guide  the  new  Ministry.  These  letters  contained 
only  one  remark  which  is  noteworthy.  Cherif 
Pasha  was  no  friend  to  European  interference  in 
Egypt.  But  he  had  learnt  that  it  might  be 
productive  of  some  good.  His  letter  to  the 
Khedive,  therefore,  contained  the  following 
passage:  "The  institution  of  the  Control,  at  first 
criticised  from  different  points  of  view,  has  greatly 
assisted  towards  the  re -establishment  of  the 
finances,  at  the  same  time  that  it  has  been  a  real 
support  for  the  Government  of  Your  Highness. 
In  this  twofold  capacity,  it  is  important  to  main- 
tain it  as   instituted  by  the  Decree  of  November 

15,  1879."        To    this,   the    Khedive    rephed    as 


190  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

follows :  **  A  perfect  understanding  between  the 
Control  and  my  Government  is  necessary ;  it  must 
be  maintained  and  strengthened."   • 

The  new  jMinistry,  therefore,  began  work  with 
such  props  from  without  as  were  possible  under  the 
circumstances.  But  for  all  tliat,  it  was  clear  that 
the  real  masters  of  the  situation  were  the  leaders 
of  the  mutinous  army.  Arabi  had  already  treated 
on  equal  terms  with  the  representatives  of  the 
Powers.  He  had  issued  a  Circular  on  Sep- 
tember 9  signed  "  Colonel  Ahmed  Arabi,  repre- 
senting the  Egyptian  army,"  in  which  he  assured 
the  Consuls-General  that  he  and  those  actiu";  in 
concert  with  him  "  would  continue  to  protect  the 
interests  of  all  the  subjects  of  friendly  Powers." 
There  could  be  no  mistakins:  this  lano-uao'e.  It 
was  that  of  a  ruler  who  disposed  of  power  to  assert 
his  will,  and  who  intended  to  use  his  power  with 
that  object. 

Yet,  whilst  Arabi  was  heading  a  mutiny  against 
his  Sovereign,  and  employing  language  which  could 
only  lawfully  proceed  from  the  Khedive  or  from 
one  of  his  Ministers,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
his  conduct  was  mainly  guided  by  fear  of  the 
Khedive's  resentment  and  vengeance.  Sir  Charles 
Cookson  thought  that  the  officers  had  "  exclusively 
regarded  their  own  safety  and  interest  throughout 
the  ao-itation."  Sir  Edward  INIalet  entertained  a 
similar  opinion.  Every  word  and  deed  of  the 
mutineers  showed,  indeed,  that  fear  was  the  pre- 
dominating infiuence  at  work  amongst  them.  In 
the  Circular  which  Arabi  addressed  to  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Powers,  he  said :  *'  Since  the 
Khedive's  returti  to  Cairo,  intrigues  have  been  on 
the  hicrease,  while  we  have  been  threatened  both 
o])enly  and  secretly  ;  and  they  have  culminated  in 
an  attempt  to  create  disunion  among  the  military, 
in  order  to  facilitate  the  object  in  view,  namely, 


cH.  XI        MUTINY  OF  THE  ARMY  191 

to  destroy  and  avenge  themselves  upon  us.  In  this 
state  of  things,  we  consider  it  our  duty  to  protect 
our  lives  and  interests."  Sir  Edward  Malet  was 
informed  by  "a  Musulman  gentleman,  who  had 
had  long  and  frequent  conversations  "  with  Arabi, 
that  the  latter  thought  that  action  had  become 
absolutely  necessary  in  self-defence.  At  a  later 
period,  Arabi  said  that  he  believed  that  a  party  of 
Circassians  agreed  together  to  kill  him,  as  well 
as  every  native  Egyptian  holding  a  high  appoint- 
ment, on  October  1,  1881.  "We  heard,"  he  said, 
"that  three  iron  boxes  had  been  prepared  into 
which  to  put  us,  so  that  we  might  be  dropped 
into  the  Nile."^  ]Men  in  this  frame  of  mind 
would  probably  not,  at  an  early  stage  of  the 
proceedings,  have  been  uncontrollable.  But,  in 
order  to  control  them,  one  condition  was  essential. 
They  might  have  been  treated  with  severity, 
or,  if  that  was  impossible  or  undesirable,  with 
leniency,  but  in  either  case  it  was  essential  that 
they  should  be  treated  in  a  manner  which  would 
leave  no  doubt  in  their  minds  as  to  the  good  faith  of 
their  rulers.  Moreover,  the  practices  which  until 
a  recent  period  had  existed  in  Egypt,  notably  the 
fate  of  Ismail  Pasha's  Finance  Minister,^  the  natu- 
rally suspicious  character  of  Orientals,  and  their 
belief,  which  is  often  'well  founded,  that  some 
intrigue  lies  at  the  bottom  of  every  action  of  the 
Government,  should  have  rendered  it  clear  to  the 
Khedive  that  the  slightest  whisper  imputing  bad 
faith  would  be  fatal  to  his  reputation  for  loyalty. 
The  utmost  caution  was,  in  fact,  necessary.  A 
bold,  straightforward  conduct,  and  a  stern  repres- 
sion of  all  palace  intrigues,  might  perhaps  have 
quieted  the  fears  of  the  officers.  Riaz  Pasha, 
although    he   may   not   have    grasped    the    whole 

*  "  Instructions  to  my  Counsel,"  Nineteenth  Century,  December  1882. 
2  Vide  ante,  p.  26. 


192  MODERN  EGYPT  vr.  ii 

situation,  liad  sufficiently  statesmanlike  instincts 
to  appreciate  the  true  nature  of  the  danger.  He 
warned  the  Kliedive  frequently  not  to  do  or  say 
anything  which  could  give  rise  to  the  least  sus- 
picion as  to  his  intentions.  It  is  improbable  tliat 
the  Khedive  had  any  deliberate  plan  for  wreaking 
vengeance  on  the  mutineers.  It  is  certain  that  his 
humane  nature  would  have  revolted  at  any  idea  of 
assassination,  such  as  was  attributed  to  him.  At 
the  same  time,  if  he  had  considered  himself  suffi- 
ciently powerful  to  act,  he  would  not  improbably 
have  made  his  dis])leasure  felt  in  one  form  or 
another,  in  spite  of  the  pardon  which  had  been 
reluctantly  wrung  from  him.  Like  Macbeth,  he 
would  not  play  false,  but  yet  would  wrongly  win. 
It  would  be  in  harmony  with  the  inconsistency 
even  of  an  honest  Oriental  to  pardon  fully,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  make  a  mental  reserve,  which 
would  enable  him  at  some  future  time  to  act  as 
though  the  pardon  had  only  been  partial.  He 
allowed  his  surroundings,  which  almost  always 
exercise  a  baneful  influence  in  an  Oriental  court, 
to  intrigue  and  to  talk  in  a  manner  which  was 
calculated  to  excite  the  fears  and  suspicions  of  the 
mutineers.  Arabi,  in  his  Circular  to  the  Consuls- 
General,  made  special  allusion  to  the  intrigues  of 
Yousuf  Pasha  Kemal,  the  Khedive's  agent,  and 
Ibrahim  Aga,  the  Khedive's  Tutunji  (Pipe-bearer), 
who,  he  said,  "  had  been  sowing  discord."  National 
proclivities  and  foreign  intrigue  may,  therefore, 
have  had  something  to  do  with  the  mutiny  of 
September  9,  but  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
the  main  cause  was  truly  stated  by  Arabi.  It  was 
fear. 

This  was  the  third  mutiny  of  the  Egyptian 
army.  On  each  occasion,  the  mutineers  gained 
confidence  in  tlieir  strength.  On  each  occasion,  the 
submission  of  the  Government  was  more  complete 


CH.XI         MUTINY  OF  THE  ARMY  193 

than  previously.  The  first  mutiny  was  quelled 
by  the  sacrifice  of  an  unpopular  Minister  (Nubar 
Pasha),  whom  the  ruling  Khedive  did  not  wish  to 
maintain  in  office.  On  the  second  occasion,  the 
War  Minister  (Osman  Pasha  Rifki)  was  offered  up 
to  appease  the  mutineers.  On  the  third  occasion, 
the  mutineers  dictated  their  own  terms  attlie  point 
of  the  bayonet ;  they  did  not  rest  satisfied  without 
a  complete  change  of  Ministry.  "  Things  bad 
begun  make  strong  themselves  by  ill."  No  rem- 
nant of  military  discipline  was  now  left.  The 
Khedive  was  shorn  of  all  real  authority.  Tiie 
smallest  incident  would  suffice  to  show  that  tlie 
Ministers  only  held  office  on  sufferance  from 
the  mutineers.  No  long  time  was  to  elapse  before 
such  an  incident  occurred. 


VOL.  I 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE    CHERIF    MINISTRY 
September-December  1881 

The  Porte  wishes  to  interfere — Objections  of  France  and  England- 
Despatch  of  Turkish  Commissioners  to  Cairo  —  Effect  of  their 
mission  —  British  and  French  ships  sent  to  Alexandria — Arabi 
leaves  Cairo  with  his  regiment — Remarks  on  Turkish  interference 
— Divergent  views  of  Finance  and  England — Despondency  of  the 
Khedive — Che'rif  Pasha's  policy — Sir  Auckland  Colvin's  views — 
Arabi's  policy  —  Insubordination  in  the  army — Violence  of  the 
local  press — Attitude  of  the  civil  population — Summary  of  the 
situation  at  the  end  of  1881. 

One  of  the  first  results  of  the  events  related  in 
the  last  chapter  was  to  stimulate  the  ambition 
of  the  Sultan,  who  saw,  in  the  confusion  with  whicli 
Egypt  was  threatened,  another  opportunity  for 
reasserting  Turkish  supremacy  over  the  country. 

There  was,  indeed,  a  good  deal  to  cause  anxiety 
to  a  ruler  whose  o^vn  tenure  of  power  was  so  far 
precarious  in  that  it  was,  and  still  is  mainly  based 
on  the  jealousies  of  the  different  heirs  to  his 
succession.  Arabi  had  sent  a  petition  to  Con- 
stantinople stating  that  Egypt  was  falling  into  the 
hands  of  foreigners  and  being  Christianised,  and 
tliat,  unless  the  Sultan  intervened,  the  country 
would  soon  share  the  fate  of  Tunis.  From  the 
Sultan's  point  of  view,  it  was  not  desirable  to 
discourage  Arabi  too  much,  and  accordingly  some 
slight  encouragement  was  given  to  him.  But, 
whilst  running  with  the  hare,  it  was  also  necessary 

194 


cH.  XII        THE  CHERIF  MINISTRY  195 

to  hunt  with  the  hounds.  Heterodox  political 
views  were  in  the  air.  There  was  some  vague  talk 
of  an  Egyptian  constitution.  Now,  the  Sultan 
objected  strongly  to  the  introduction  of  constitu- 
tional government  into  any  part  of  the  Ottoman 
dominions.  Then,  again,  tliere  had  been  whispers 
of  a  secret  movement  which  was  on  foot  with  a 
view  to  the  establishment  of  an  Arab  kingdom  in 
Egypt  and  Syria.  If  this  were  done,  what  would 
become  of  the  homogeneity  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  and,  indeed,  of  the  House  of  Osman  itself? 
From  the  days  when  Sobieski  repulsed  the  Turks 
from  the  walls  of  Vienna,  the  Ottoman  Empire 
had  been  steadily  declining.  One  province  after 
another  had  been  torn  from  its  flank.  For  the 
moment,  the  onward  march  of  European  civilisation 
took  no  very  militant  form ;  but  it  was  probable 
that  the  combat,  which  had  been  going  on  for  a 
couple  of  centuries  or  more,  would  sooner  or  later 
be  renewed,  and,  if  it  were  renewed,  it  might  well 
be  that,  although  the  Christian  Powers  might 
quarrel  over  the  heritage,  the  fate  of  the  rightful 
heir  would  be  sealed.  The  House  of  Osman  might 
have  to  abandon  its  European  possessions.  In 
that  case,  the  only  refuge  left  would  be  to  establish 
the  Khalifate  somewhere  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Bosphorus,  notably  at  Baghdad,  which,  according 
to  ancient  tradition,  was  to  be  the  Dar-el-Selam 
(the  House  of  Peace)  of  the  dynasty  of  Osman. 
The  establishment  of  an  Arab  kingdom,  more 
especially  if  it  was  to  be  encumbered  with  new- 
fangled ideas  of  constitutions  and  the  like,  would 
materially  interfere  with  the  execution  of  a  policy 
of  this  sort.  Any  such  proposal  was,  therefore,  to 
be  resisted  as  strongly  as  possible. 

The  first  idea  of  the  Sultan  was  to  occupy  the 
country  with  Turkish  troops.  Early  in  September 
1881,    preparations   were    made    to    transport   an 


196  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  ii 

Ottoman  force  to  Egypt.  The  French  Govern- 
ment, liowever,  true  to  their  traditional  policy, 
entertained  strong  objections  to  any  Turkish  inter- 
ference in  Egypt.  The  British  Government  were 
also  of  opinion  that  "  it  would  not  be  desirable  that 
any  active  measures  of  repression  should  be  taken 
by  the  Sultan  until,  at  all  events,  the  necessity  for 
them  had  been  clearly  demonstrated,  and  the 
method  to  be  adopted  had  been  discussed  and  agreed 
upon.  But  they  saw  no  objection  to  the  Sultan, 
if  His  Majesty  should  be  so  disposed,  sending,  with 
the  consent  of  England  and  France,  a  Turkish 
General  to  Egypt  to  support  the  Khedive's 
authority,  and  aid  His  Highness  with  his  advice." 

The  French  Government,  however,  thought 
that  "  even  the  despatch  of  a  Turkish  General  to 
Egypt  might  lead  to  further  steps,  resulting, 
perhaps,  in  a  permanent  occupation  of  the  country 
by  Turkish  troops."  The  British  Government 
yielded  to  the  French  representations  on  this 
subject,  and  on  September  18,  Lord  Dufferin,  who 
was  at  the  time  Ambassador  at  Constantinople, 
was  instructed,  in  the  event  of  the  Sultan  pro- 
posing to  send  a  Turkish  General  to  Cairo,  "to 
endeavour  to  dissuade  His  Majesty  from  adopting 
this  course."  The  French  Ambassador  at  Con- 
stantinople had  already  received  instructions  "to 
protest  against  any  sort  of  intervention  on  the 
part  of  Turkey  in  Egyptian  affairs." 

If,  however,  Turkish  troops  could  not  be  sent 
to  Egypt ;  if  the  deposition  of  Tewfik  Pasha  in 
favour  of  Halim  Pasha,  which  was  also  con- 
templated, was  ini})ossible  by  reason  of  British 
opposition  ;  if,  moreover,  the  idea  of  despatching  a 
Turkish  General  to  Egypt  had  to  be  abandoned, 
at  all  events  a  sort  of  shadowy  supremacy  would 
be  asserted  if  a  Turkish  official  were  sent  in  some 
kind  of  capacity  to  Egypt,  even  although  neither 


CH.  XII        THE  CHERIF  MINISTRY  197 

the  envoy  nor  the  Sultan  had  any  very  clear  idea  of 
what  functions  he  would  perform  on  arrival.  The 
Sultan,  therefore,  informed  the  French  Ambassador 
"that  he  considered,  in  view  of  Turkey's  enormous 
interests  both  in  Egypt  and  the  Hedjaz,  that  he 
had  a  perfect  right  to  despatch  an  emissary  with 
his  compliments  and  advice  to  the  Khedive,  and 
this  he  intended  to  do,  though  the  person  would 
not  have  the  character  of  a  Commissioner."  Ali 
Fuad  Bey  and  Ali  Nizami  Pasha  were,  therefore, 
sent  to  Egypt,  and  arrived  at  Alexandria  on 
October  6. 

The  effect  of  the  despatch  of  these  envoys 
was  instantaneous  on  all  the  parties  concerned. 
Every  one  recognised  that  the  Sultan  had  S(ime  sort 
of  technical  right  to  interfere.  Some  recognised 
that,  in  an  extreme  case,  his  interference  would  be 
the  least  of  many  evils.  Others  were  anxious  to  play 
with  Turkish  suzerain  rights  in  order  to  subserve 
their  own  interests.  But  there  was  one  point  on 
which  Lord  Granville,^  M.  Barthelemy  St.  Hilaire, 
Cherif  Pasha,  Arabi,  the  Egyptian  military  party,  the 
Egyptian  national  party,  the  bondholding  interest, 
and  the  public  opinion  of  Europe,  appeared  to  be 
agreed.  It  was  that  Turkish  interference  in  Egypt 
would  do  a  great  deal  of  harm,  and  was  to  be 
avoided  if  possible. 

The  British  and  French  Governments  informed 
the  Sultan  that  they  had  "learnt  with  surprise  and 
regret "  of  the  decision  to  send  envoys.  Sir  Edward 
Malet  and  M.  Sienkiewicz  were  instructed  "to 
receive  the  Turkish  envoys  with  all  the  honours 
due  to  their  rank,  but  to  firmly  oppose  any  inter- 
ference on  their  part  in  the  internal  administration 
of  Egypt."  Moreover,  both  the  British  and  French 
Governments   suddenly   found   out  that,   "with  a 

^  Lord  Granville  assumed  charge  of  the  Foreiffn  Office  on  April 
28,  1880. 


198  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.ii 

view  to  diminishing  the  danger  of  a  panic  amongst 
tlie  foreign  popuhition  in  Cairo  and  Alexandria, 
which  tlie  absence  of  a  phice  of  refuge  might 
occasion  amongst  them  in  the  event  of  disturb- 
ances," it  would  be  desirable  to  send  a  couple  of 
ships  to  Alexandria,  a  measure  which  gave  con- 
siderable umbrage  at  Constantinople.  It  was 
calculated,  the  Sultan  thought,  "  to  cause  agitation 
and  disturbance  among  the  whole  Arab  population, 
and  it  was  not  improbable  that  it  might  lead  to  a 
general  revolution." 

To  the  Khedive,  the  intelligence  that  two  Turkish 
envoys  were  to  come  to  Cairo  was  "  altogether  un- 
expected," and  he  asked  Sir  Edward  Malet  and 
]M.  Sienkiewicz  whether  they  "could  throw  any  light 
upon  it";  to  which  question,  Sir  Edward  Malet 
reported,  *'  we  replied  in  the  negative."  As  regards 
Cherif  Pasha,  he  was  of  opinion  that,  as  two 
Turkish  envoys  were  to  come,  the  main  thing  was 
to  get  rid  of  them  as  soon  as  possible.  Accordingly, 
at  the  request  of  the  Egyptian  Government,  the 
British  and  French  Ambassadors  at  Constantinople 
were  instructed  to  "  urge  upon  the  Porte  that  they 
should  shorten  as  much  as  possible  the  stay  of  the 
Turkish  envoys  in  Egypt." 

A  considerable  effect  was  also  produced  on 
Arabi.  He  was  willing  enough  to  strengthen  his 
own  cause  against  Circassians  and  Europeans  by 
an  appeal  to  the  Sultan,  but  he  never  intended  that 
the  appeal  should  be  taken  seriously.  There  was, 
indeed,  something  strangely  inconsistent,  not  to 
say  comical,  m  asking  the  Sultan  to  countenance 
a  movement  which  was  avowedly  directed  against 
Turkish  supremacy  in  Egypt.  Arabi,  therefore, 
made  no  further  difficulties  about  moving  his 
mutinous  regiment  from  Cairo  to  Suez.  "  He  had 
always  said,"  Sir  Edward  Malet  reported,  "  that  he 
was  ready  to  go,  but  no  date  liad  been  fixed  for 


CH.XII        THE  CHERIF  MINISTRY  199 

his  departure,  and  he  himself  had  spoken  about 
leaving  perhaps  in  three  weeks,  but  I  have  little 
doubt  that  there  would  have  been  considerable 
difficulty  in  inducing  him  to  fix  a  day  had  it  not 
been  for  the  unexpected  announcement  of  the 
advent  of  the  envoys." 

Under  all  these  circumstances,  it  was  clear  that 
the  Turkish  mission  could  not  be  productive  of 
much  practical  result.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  all  that 
the  Turkish  envoys  did  was  to  inspect  the  troops 
at  Cairo.  After  the  inspection,  Ali  Nizami  l^asha 
harangued  the  officers.  He  reminded  them  that  the 
Khedive  was  the  representative  of  the  Sultan,  and 
that  therefore  disobedience  to  the  Khedive  wan 
disobedience  to  the  Sultan.  After  that,  nothing- 
more  was  done.  The  pressure  exerted  from  all 
sides  on  the  Turkish  envoys  with  a  view  to 
getting  them  out  of  the  country  was  too  great 
to  be  resisted.  The  question,  however,  arose 
as  to  which  were  to  leave  first,  the  British  and 
French  ships,  or  the  Turkish  envoys.  Musurus 
Pasha,  the  Turkish  Ambassador  in  London, 
told  Lord  Granville  "that  it  would  be  im- 
possible for  the  Sultan  to  withdraw  his  mission 
until  after  the  departure  of  the  ships."  Lord 
Granville,  on  the  other  hand,  said  that  the  ships 
had  already  left  Malta  for  Alexandria,  but  would 
not  arrive  till  October  19,  "by  Mhich  time  it 
was  to  be  presumed  that  the  Turkish  Commis- 
sioners would  be  taking  their  departure."  Lord 
Dufferin  was  instructed  to  tell  the  Sultan  that  the 
ships  would  leave  on  the  same  day  that  the  Turkish 
Commissioners  embarked.  M.  Barthelemy  St. 
Hilaire  also  told  Lord  Lyons  that  when  once  the 
Turkish  envoys  had  gone,  both  ships  might  (juit 
Alexandria  without  delay,  and  simultaneously. 
Both  Governments  were  of  opinion  that,  after  the 
departure  of  the  envoys,  there  was  no  longer  any 


200  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  n 

necessity  to  provide  a  place  of  refuge  for  Europeans 
in  the  event  of  disturbance.  The  result  of  all  this 
diplomatic  skirmishing  was  that  H.M.S.  Invincible 
arrived  at  Alexandria  on  October  19.  Twenty- 
four  hours  before  her  arrival,  the  Turkish  envoys 
had  left  Cairo  for  Alexandria  with  a  view  to 
embarkation  at  that  port,  and  twenty-four  hours 
after  her  arrival  both  the  British  and  French  ships 
left  Alexandria  harbour. 

This  episode  has  been  narrated  at  some  length, 
because  an  important  principle  was  involved  in 
the  discussion  connected  with  the  mission  of  the 
Turkish  envoys.  Who,  as  a  last  resort,  was  to  be 
responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  order  in  Egypt  ? 

It  is  a  most  unfortunate  thing  that  at  no  stage 
of  the  Egyptian  Question  has  it  been  possible  to 
make  any  suggestion  against  which  valid  objec- 
tions might  not  be  urged.  Turkish  intervention 
in  Egypt  was  open  to  obvious  objections;  but 
could  any  alternative  and  less  objectionable  policy 
be  suggested  ?  The  British  Government  thought 
not;  they,  therefore,  from  the  first  leant  towards 
the  idea  that,  as  a  last  resort,  the  Sultan  should  be 
used  as  the  Deus  ex  machina^  who  should  restore 
order.  They  were,  however,  so  hampered  by  their 
partnership  with  the  French  as  to  be  unable  to 
give  effect  to  their  own  views. 

Both  the  British  and  French  Governments 
were  honestly  desirous  of  acting  together.  M. 
Barthelemy  St.  Hilaire  said  that  "his  policy  with 
reference  to  Egypt  was  well  known,  and  never 
varied ;  it  was  summed  up  in  the  absolute  necessity, 
as  in  the  past,  so  in  the  future,  of  perfect  frank- 
ness between  the  two  Governments,  and  joint  action 
on  every  occasion."  There  cannot  be  the  least 
doubt  that  these  words  honestly  represented  the 
views  of  the  French  Government  at  this  time, 
and  that  the  desire  to  co-operate  was  as  honestly 


cH.xii        THE  CHERIF  MINISTRY  201 

reciprocated  by  the  British  Government.  Un- 
fortunately, the  views  of  the  British  and  French 
Governments  were  divergent  on  one  impoitant 
point  of  j)rinciple.  The  French  Government 
regarded  Turkish  intervention  in  Egypt  as  the 
worst  possible  solution  of  the  Egyptian  Question. 
M.  Bartlielemy  St.  Hilaire  told  the  British  Charge 
d' Affaires  that  he  would  prefer  an  Anglo-French 
to  a  Turkish  occupation  of  Egypt.  Moreover,  the 
French  Government  feared  tliat,  if  Turkish  inter- 
vention were  allowed,  the  pretensions  of  the 
Sultan  would  be  raised  and  his  prestige  increased 
amongst  the  Mohammedan  population  of  Northern 
Africa.  Thus,  a  spirit  of  fanaticism  might  be 
aroused  in  Tunis. 

The  objections  of  the  British  Government  to 
Turkish  intervention,  on  the  other  hand,  were  far 
less  strong  than  those  of  the  French.  This  was 
evidenced  by  their  willingness  to  allow  the  Sultan 
to  send  a  Turkish  General  to  Egypt,  although, 
at  the  instance  of  the  French  Government,  they 
ultimately  withdrew  their  su})port  to  this  measure. 
If  any  armed  occupation  became  necessary,  the 
British  Government  preferred  that  it  should  be 
Turkish  rather  than  Anglo  -  French.  But  they 
allowed  French  diplomacy  to  take  the  lead,  and  the 
main  end  of  French  diplomacy  was  to  prevent  any 
Turkish  interference  in  Egypt. 

When  the  Egyptian  Question  was  subsequently 
(July  24,  1882)  discussed  in  Parliament,  Lord 
Salisbury  said :  "  There  were  two  modes  of  going 
to  work  with  the  Government  of  Egypt.  You 
might  have  used  moral  force  as  you  have  made  use 
of  material  force. ^  Your  only  mode  of  acting  by 
moral  force  is  by  means  of  the  hearty  co-operation 
of  the  Sultan  of  Turkey.     But  you  took  the  best 

*  This  was  in  allusion  to  the  bombardment  of  Alexandria^  which, 
when  Lord  Salisbury  spoke,  had  recently  taken  place. 


202  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

means  of  alienating  that  hearty  co-operation.  If 
you  had  gone  to  him  from  the  first,  taken  him  into 
your  counsels,  and  made  him  the  instrument  of 
what  you  desired,  and  indicated  from  the  first  that 
you  wished  to  take  no  steps  without  his  concurrence 
and  co-operation,  there  might  iiave  been  objections 
to  such  a  plan ;  but,  at  least,  you  would  have  had 
him  heartily  with  you."  Lord  Salisbury  then  indi- 
cated various  steps  which  had  been  taken,  and 
which,  in  his  opinion,  must  "in  themselves  have 
resulted  in  setting  any  Sultan  of  Turkey  in 
opposition." 

There  was  much  force  in  Lord  Salisbury's  criti- 
cism. In  October  1881,  the  necessity  for  armed 
foreign  intervention  of  any  kind  had  not  yet  arisen. 
Lord  Granville  was,  witlu)ut  doubt,  acting  wisely  in 
deprecating  measures  of  repression  on  the  part  of  the 
Sultan  until  their  necessity  had  been  clearly  demon- 
strated. On  the  other  hand,  it  was  apparent  that 
Egypt  was  threatened  with  a  degree  of  confusion 
against  which  moral  force,  persuasion,  or  even 
threats  would  be  employed  in  A^ain.  It  was,  there- 
fore, necessary  at  the  outset  to  have  a  clear  idea  as 
to  the  method  by  which  physical  force  was  to  be 
employed  in  case  of  need.  There  were  but  two 
alternative  courses  possible.  One  was  an  Anglo- 
French  occupation,  for  at  that  time  no  one  thought 
of  an  occupation  by  France  or  by  England  alone. 
The  other  was  a  Turkish  occupation.  The  French 
preferred  an  Anglo  -  French  occupation  as  the 
lesser  evil  of  the  two.  Their  views  were  ])erfectly 
logical  and  consistent,  and,  for  a  time  at  all  events, 
the  French  Government  acted  upon  them.  Whether 
the  policy  they  advocated  was  the  best  in  the  true 
interests  of  France  or  England  is  a  matter  of 
opinion. 

The  British  Government,  on  the  other  hand, 
contemplated  the  possibility  of  a  'J'urkish  occupa- 


cH.  XII        THE  CHERIF  MINISTRY  203 

tion,  and  preferred  this  solution  to  any  other.  In 
a  despatch  addressed  to  Sir  Edward  JNJalet  on 
November  4,  1881,  Lord  Granville  laid  down  the 
general  lines  of  British  policy  in  connection  with 
Egyptian  affairs.  He  deprecated  the  idea  that 
either  the  French  or  the  British  Government 
entertained  any  "  self  -  aggrandising  designs  "  as 
regards  Egypt.  "  The  Khedive  and  his  Ministers," 
he  added,  "  may  feel  secure  that  Her  Majesty's 
Government  contemplate  no  such  deviation  from 
the  policy  which  they  have  traced  for  themselves." 
He  set  forth  the  British  view  of  the  Turkish  con- 
nection with  Egypt.  It  was  that  the  status  quo 
should  be  maintained.  The  tie  with  Turkey  should 
not  be  severed.  At  the  same  time,  Lord  Granville 
pointed  out  that  the  British  Government  "  desired 
to  maintain  Egypt  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  measure 
of  administrative  independence  which  has  been 
secured  to  her  by  the  Sultan's  Firmans.  The 
Government  of  England  would  run  counter  to  the 
most  cherished  traditions  of  national  history  were 
it  to  entertain  a  desire  to  diminish  that  liberty  or 
tamper  with  the  institutions  to  which  it  has  given 
birth."  Lord  Granville  then  went  on  to  say  that 
"the  only  circumstance  which  would  force  Her 
Majesty's  Government  to  depart  from  the  course 
of  conduct  which  he  had  mentioned  would  be  the 
occurrence  in  Egypt  of  a  state  of  anarchy."  These 
were  wise  words.  They  indicated  that  Turkish 
intervention  was  undesirable,  but  that,  if  material 
force  had  to  be  employed,  a  Turkish  was  to  be 
preferred  to  an  Anglo-French  occupation. 

Unfortunately,  while  the  British  Government 
contemplated  using  the  Turk,  with  all  his  obvious 
defects,  as  the  instrument  by  which  order  was  as  a 
last  resort  to  be  maintained  in  Egypt,  they  allowed 
themselves  to  be  led  away  by  the  objections 
which  could  be  urged  against  Turkish  intervention 


204  MODERN  EGYPT  it.  ii 

considered  exclusively  on  its  own  merits.  They  fol- 
lowed the  French  Government  in  a  line  of  conduct 
which  irritated  and  discouraged  the  Sultan.  As 
the  Sultan's  military  forces  might  eventually  have 
to  be  used  for  the  preservation  of  order,  it  would 
have  been  wise  to  have  encouraged  the  exercise  of 
his  authority  by  viewing  with  a  friendly  eye  the 
despatch  of  a  Turkish  mission  to  Egypt,  in  spite  of 
the  objections  urged  from  Cairo  in  deprecation  of 
the  mission.  But  this  was  not  done.  The  Sultan 
was  discouraged  and  opposed  in  the  exercise  of  his 
authority.  The  British  Government  thus  entered 
a  groove  hostile  to  Turkish  intervention,  with  the 
result  that  British  intervention  became  eventually 
a  necessity. 

It  is,  of  course,  true  that  this  subject  presents 
another  aspect.  So  far  as  the  welfare  of  the 
Egyptian  people  and  of  all  Europeans  interested  in 
the  affairs  of  Egypt  is  concerned,  European  inter- 
vention, whether  British,  French,  or  Anglo-French, 
was  to  be  preferred  to  Turkish  intervention.  But, 
on  the  assumption  that  it  was  desirable  to  avoid 
the  occupation  of  Egypt  by  British  or  French 
troops,  it  would  appear  that  Turkish  intervention, 
in  spite  of  its  acknowledged  drawbacks,  should, 
from  the  first,  have  been  less  totally  discouraged. 

It  is  curious,  in  reading  over  the  correspond- 
ence after  a  lapse  of  many  years,  to  observe  how 
heartily  the  French  Government  worked  to  bring 
about  the  solution  which  eventually  occurred,  and 
which  was  probably  more  distasteful  to  them  than 
any  other,  namely,  a  British  occupation  of  Egyp:. 
The  British  Government,  on  the  other  hand,  acted 
throughout  on  the  principle  of  J'^ideo  meliora,  pro- 
boque,  deteriora  sequor.  They  saw  the  objections 
to  any  European  occupation.  They  preferred  a 
Turkish  occupation.  Yet,  although  they  appear 
to  have  shown  greater  political  foresight  than  the 


CH.XII        THE  CHERIF  MINISTRY  205 

French,  they  failed  to  act  in  a  manner  which 
would  have  enabled  effect  to  be  given  to  their  own 
principles.  The  more  unreasonable  amongst  the 
French  eventually  said  that  England,  with  her 
habitual  perfidy,  was  merely  playing  a  part  with  a 
view  ultimately  to  bring  about  a  British  occupation. 
They  were  quite  wrong.  The  British  Govern- 
ment acted,  as  they  always  act,  with  perfect  honesty, 
but,  at  the  same  time,  with  so  little  consistency  in 
the  pursuit  of  political  aims,  that  it  can  be  no 
matter  for  surprise  that  their  motives  should  have 
been  subsequently  misrepresented.  Their  vacilla- 
tion was,  without  doubt,  due  to  a  desire  to  ensure 
French  co-operation,  and  also  probably  in  part  to 
an  excessive  deference  to  English  public  opinion. 
The  idea  of  handing  over  Egypt,  even  temporarily, 
to  the  rule  of  the  Sultan  would  unquestionably 
have  met  with  much  hostile  criticism  in  England, 
probably  from  the  same  classes  who  were  eventu- 
ally most  strongly  opposed  to  a  British  occupation. 
But  it  can  scarcely  be  held  that  this  argument 
constituted  a  sufficient  plea  for  discarding  the 
policy.  No  one  would  have  been  able  to  pro- 
pose any  alternative  policy  which  would  have 
been  preferable.  The  duty  of  a  Government 
is  to  take  the  lead,  especially  as  regards  foreign 
affairs,  and  to  stand  criticism  even,  when  matters 
of  the  first  importance  are  concerned,  at  the  risk 
of  bringing  about  its  own  downfall. 

Shortly  after  the  mutiny  of  September  9,  Sir 
Edward  Malet  reported  that  the  "general  tone 
of  the  Khedive  with  regard  to  the  future  was 
despondent.  His  Highness  said  that  he  could  no 
longer  believe  in  any  professions  of  fidelity  made 
by  the  officers  of  the  army."  These  observations 
gave  the  keynote  to  the  Khedive's  conduct  during 
the  next  few  months.  He  resented  the  humilia- 
tion  to   which    he    had    been    subjected    by   the 


206  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

mutinous  conduct  of  his  officers.  It  rankled  in 
his  mind,  and  led  him  to  nurture  schemes  for 
revenge.  He  constantly  expressed  his  opinion  that 
there  could  be  no  tranquillity  in  the  country  until 
the  army  was  mastered.  It  can  be  no  matter  for 
surprise  that  the  Khedive  entertained  views  of  this 
description,  but  it  would  have  been  wiser  and  more 
statesmanlike  if  he  had  sunk  all  personal  feelings 
of  resentment  against  the  army.  As  it  was,  the 
breach  between  the  Khedive  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  army  and  the  national  party  on  the  other  hand, 
continued  to  widen  every  day. 

Cherif  Pasha  took  a  broader  view  of  the  situa- 
tion. He  appreciated  the  desirability  of  separating 
the  national  party  from  the  army.  He  told  Sir 
Edward  Malet  on  September  21  "that  it  was  his 
intention  later  on  to  convoke  the  Chamber  of 
Notables,  which  he  hoped  would  by  degrees 
become  the  legitimate  exponent  of  the  internal 
wants  of  the  country,  and  by  this  means  deprive 
the  army  of  the  character  which  it  had  arrogated 
to  itself  in  the  late  movement.  .  .  .  The  Notables 
would  be  a  representative  body  on  which  the 
Khedive  and  his  Government  would  be  able  to 
lean  for  popular  support  against  military  dictation." 
On  October  8,  a  Decree  was  issued  convoking  the 
Chamber  of  Notables  for  December  23.  The 
functions  and  composition  of  the  Chamber  were 
regulated  by  Ismail  Pasha's  law  of  1866.  Arabi 
pressed  for  the  adoption  of  a  law  giving  greater 
power  to  the  Chamber,  but  eventually  yielded. 
Sir  Edward  JNIalet  reported  on  October  2  that 
Arabi  once  more  "professed  confidence  in  Cht^rif 
Pasha,  and  stated  his  intention  of  leaving  the 
matter  entirely  in  his  hands." 

The  situation  at  this  time  was  well  described  in 
a  Memorandum  written  by  Sir  Auckland  Colvin 
on  September  19.     "As  to  the  position,"  he  said, 


CH.XII       THE  CHERIF  MINISTRY  207 

*'  my  view  of  it  is  that  it  is  essentially  an  armistice. 
The  arrangement  we  have  been  able  to  come  to 
gives  us  a  little  breathing-time,  during  which  we 
can  take  count  of  the  forces  that  are  at  work 
around  us,  and  endeavour  to  guide  or  repress  them. 
There  should  be  no  illusions  on  this  point.  That 
we  are  entering  on  a  fresh  period  of  order  and 
regularity,  there  seem  to  be  no  grounds  for  believ- 
ing. The  army  is  elated  by  what  it  has  achieved, 
and  its  leaders  are  penetrated  with  the  conviction 
that  their  mission  is  to  give  Egypt  liberty.  The 
Notables,  who  are  now  in  large  numbers  in  Cairo, 
though  they  have  taken  into  their  own  hands  the 
right  to  ask  for  an  extension  of  civil  liberties,  and 
deny  the  officers  any  right  of  petition  or  of  inter- 
ference in  the  matter,  are  at  one  with  them  in  the 
desire  to  obtain  some  solid  concessions.  All  is 
being  done  in  an  orderly  and  everj  exemplary 
manner :  but  the  chance  of  any  final  settlement 
depends : — 

"(1)  On  the  army  dispersing  to  the  several 
quarters  assigned  to  it. 

"  (2)  On  the  moderation  shown  by  the  Notables 
in  their  demands. 

*'  (3)  On  the  tact  and  firmness  of  the  Ministers 
in  dealing  with  the  army  and  the  Notables.  .  .  . 

*'  I  do  not  think  it  is  at  all  my  duty  to  oppose 
myself  to  the  popular  movement,  but  to  try  rather 
to  guide  and  to  give  it  definite  shape.  So  long  as 
the  financial  position  of  the  country,  or  the  influ- 
ence of  the  Control,  is  not  likely  to  be  affected 
by  concessions  made  to  the  Notables,  I  believe  I 
should  be  very  foolish  to  express  any  hostility  to 
their  wishes.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  I  propose  to 
act,  and  to  advise  Cherif  Pasha  when  the  matter 
is  ripe  for  discussion.  It  is,  to  sum  up,  by  advis- 
ing promptness  in  carrying  out  the  necessary 
measures  with  the  army,  and,  in  the  second  place, 


208  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

by  reasonable  discussion  of  any  petitions  presented 
by  the  Notables,  that  we  can  alone  hope  to  assist  in 
converting  the  armistice  into  a  peace." 

Sir  Auckland  Colvin  rightly  judged  the 
situation.  Cherif  Pasha  was  the  nominal  Prime 
JNIinister  but  Arabi,  as  Sir  Edward  Malet  said,  was 
the  "arbiter  of  the  destinies  of  the  country."  A 
local  newspaper,  Kl  Hedjaz,  which  was  the  organ 
of  the  Arabist  party,  spoke  of  "  the  illustrious  and 
magnanimous  Emir,  His  Excellency  Ahmed  Bey 
Arabi."  When  Arabi  received  orders  to  leave  Cairo 
with  his  regiment,  he  did  not  take  his  departure 
as  a  simple  Colonel  in  command  of  a  battalion. 
He  made  a  sort  of  royal  progress  through  the 
streets  of  Cairo,  which  were  crowded  with 
spectators  on  the  occasion.  He  was  received  with 
enthusiasm,  and,  on  arrival  at  the  railway  station, 
he  harangued  the  troops.  "  Une  ere  nouvelle,"  he 
said,  "  vient  de  s'ouvrir  pour  I'Egypte,  et  grace  aux 
hommes  places  a  la  tete  des  aftaires,  en  qui  nous 
devons  avoir  toute  confiance,  I'heure  du  developpe- 
ment  et  de  la  prosperite  vient  de  sonner  pour  nous. 
Kendons  hommage  aux  qualites  et  merites  qui 
distinguent  les  membres  du  nouveau  Cabinet ;  et 
en  })articulier  a  Mahmoud  Pacha  Sami,  notre 
JNIinistre  de  la  Guerre  .  .  .  Je  voudrais  que  vous 
puissiez  comprendre  tons,  quelle  giorieuse  mission 
est  reservee  a  une  armee  bien  unie,  bien  com- 
mandee,  bien  disciplinee,  et  ne  marchant  que  vers 
un  but  unique,  le  bien  de  la  patrie.  Vous  avez 
une  force  entre  les  mains,  et  tons  reunis  vous  en 
representez  une  invincible."^  A  little  later,  a  fete 
was  given  iit  Zagazig  in  honour  of  Arabi.  About 
1000  pe()})le  were  ])resent,  "all  patriots"  having 
been  invited  to  attend.     Arabi  was  received  with 

'  This  speech  was,  of  course,  delivered  in  Arabic.  Hie  French 
translation,  quoted  above,  was  subsequently  published  in  the  local 
newspapers. 


CH.XII        THE  CHERIF  MINISTRY  209 

enthusiasm.  He  made  a  speech  in  which  he  insisted 
on  the  necessity  of  reforms,  inveighed  against  the 
employment  of  Europeans  in  Egypt,  and  said  that 
he  had  three  regiments  in  Cairo  on  whom  he 
could  rely  to  carry  out  his  behests. 

Whilst,  however,  in  public  Arabi  incited  hatred 
to  Europeans,  in  private  he  used  a  different 
language.  On  November  1,  Arabi,  Ali  Bey  Fehmi, 
and  Toulba  Bey  Ismet  had  an  intervicAv  with  Sir 
Auckland  Colvin.  Arabi  "described  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Mamelukes  and  that  of  the  present 
dynasty  as  being  equally  oppressive  to  the  Arab 
population.  His  point  was  to  show  that  up  to  the 
present  the  Egyptians  have  had  no  security  for  life  or 
property.  They  were  imprisoned,  exiled,  strangled, 
thrown  into  the  Nile,  starved,  and  robbed  accord- 
ing to  the  will  of  their  masters.  A  liberated  slave 
was  a  freer  man  than  a  freeborn  Arab.  The  most 
ignorant  Turk  was  preferred  and  honoured  before 
the  best  of  the  Egyptians.  He  illustrated  his 
statement  by  the  case  of  the  Mufettish.^  He  then 
went  on  at  great  lengtli  to  explain  that  men  came 
of  one  common  stock  and  had  equal  rights  of 
personal  liberty  and  security.  The  development 
of  this  theme  took  some  considerable  time,  and 
was  curious  in  its  naive  treatment,  but  it  evidently 
was  the  general  outcome  of  the  speaker's  laboured 
thoughts,  and  was  the  expression,  not  of  rhetorical 
periods,  but  of  conviction.  Passing  on  to  the 
bearing  of  his  reasoning  on  facts,  he  said  that  on 
the  1st  February  the  Circassian  rule  (by  which  he 
meant  the  arbitrary  Turkish  regime)  had  fallen  in 
Egypt ;  on  the  9th  September,  the  necessity  of 
substituting  for  it  the  era  of  law  and  justice  had 
been  recognised  and  established.  It  was  for  law 
and  justice  that  he  and  the  army  contended.  He 
disclaimed  in  the  plainest  words  the  desire  to  get 

'  Ismail  Pasha's  Fiuauce  Minister,  who  was  assassinated  in  187G. 
VOL.   I  P 


210  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  ii 

rid  of  Europeans,  whether  as  employes  or  residents  ; 
he  spoke  of  them  as  the  necessary  instructors  of 
the  people.  He  himself  and  the  two  officers 
(pointing  to  them)  had  never  been  to  school. 
Intercourse  with  Europeans  had  been  their  school. 
He  and  all  felt  the  need  of  it ;  they  had  no  wish  to 
question  the  need  of  Europeans  in  the  adminis- 
tration ;  on  the  contrary,  if  more  were  required  let 
them  come.  .  .  .  The  impression  left  on  my  mind 
was  that  Arabi,  who  spoke  with  great  moderation, 
calmness,  and  conciliation,  is  sincere  and  resolute, 
but  is  not  a  practical  man.  The  exposition,  not 
the  execution  of  ideas,  is  his  strength.  The  other 
two  Colonels  are  clearly  more  practical  men,  and 
act,  I  should  say,  as  a  sedative  on  Arabi,  when  his 
views  excite  and  stimulate  him  too  dangerously." 

Whilst  the  leading  officers  of  the  army  were 
thus  assuming  the  role  of  demagogues,  the  dis- 
cipline of  the  men  became  daily  more  and  more 
shaken.  Early  in  November,  a  couple  of  soldiers, 
who  had  been  arrested  by  the  police  for  brawling, 
were  forcibly  released  by  their  comrades  from  the 
guard-house  to  which  they  had  been  conveyed.  A 
little  later,  the  Government  decided  to  change  the 
Colonel  of  the  artillery  quartered  in  Cairo,  but  the 
soldiers  of  the  regiment  opposed  the  change,  and 
declared  that  they  would  not  obey  any  new  Colonel 
who  might  be  appointed.  Their  opposition  was 
overcome,  but  not  without  considerable  con- 
cessions having  been  made  to  them.  About  the 
same  time,  the  band  of  a  regiment  quartered  at 
Cairo  refused  to  obey  an  order  to  play  at  the 
theatre.  The  troops  at  Suez  also  showed  signs 
of  insubordination,  due  to  a  soldier  having  been 
murdered  by  an  Italian.  These  symptoms  were 
sufficient  to  indicate  that  there  was  no  public 
force  in  Egypt  on  whom  reliance  could  be  placed 
to  maintain  order. 


OH.  XII        THE  CHElilF  MINISTRY  211 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  minds  of  the  civil  popula- 
tion were  excited  by  the  vernacular  press,  whicli 
attacked  Europeans  and  their  systems  of  govern- 
ment with  virulence  and  appealed  to  JNloham- 
medan  fanaticism.  "  We  are  the  prey,"  wrote  one 
of  these  newspapers,  "of  two  lions,  England  and 
France,  who  are  watching  for  the  favourable 
moment  to  realise  their  designs,  hidden  under  a 
deceptive  policy.  .  .  .  One  day  we  hope  to  see  our 
administrations  cleared  of  all  Europeans,  and  on 
that  day  we  can  say  tliat  England  and  France 
have  rendered  us  a  great  service,  for  which  we  shall 
really  thank  them."  "  Some  people,"  another  news- 
paper wrote,  *'  pretend  tliat  fanaticism  is  ruinous  to 
progress,  yet  our  best  days  were  tliose  in  which  we 
conquered  the  Universe  by  devotion  to  our  faith. 
To-day  we  have  neglected  it,  and  we  and  our 
country  are  in  the  hands  of  strangers,  but  our  mis- 
fortunes are  a  just  punishment  for  our  sins. 
O  ye  Ulema  of  El-Azhar!  wliose  sacred  duty 
it  should  be  to  combat  this  religious  decadence, 
what  will  be  your  answer  at  the  Day  of  Judg- 
ment to  Flim  who  can  read  the  secrets  of  your 
hearts  ? " 

Writings  of  this  sort  naturally  led  to  retorts 
from  the  local  European  press.  A  French  paper, 
U  f^'gijpte,  described  Osman,  the  third  of  the 
Khalifs,  as  "  le  fanatique  heritier  d'un  faux  pro- 
phete."  The  editor's  life  was  threatened,  and  he 
left  the  country.  His  newspaper  was  suppressed, 
as  also  was  El  Hedjaz,  a  newspaper  which  had 
specially  distinguished  itself  by  the  violence  of  its 
language  in  support  of  Pan-Islamic  views.  "The 
suppression  of  this  newspaper,"  Sir  Edward  JNlalet 
wrote,  "especially  while  Arabi  Bey  was  still  at 
Cairo,  was  regarded  as  a  sign  of  returning  authority 
to  the  Government ;  and  consequently  had  the 
effect  of,  to  some  degree,  restoring  confidence." 


212  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  ii 

In  spite  of  all  this  inflammatory  literature,  the 
mass  of  the  people  remained  for  some  time  in- 
different to  all  that  was  passing.  Eventually, 
however,  the  insubordination,  whicli  had  shown 
itself  in  the  army,  began  to  spread  to  the  civil 
population.  This  it  was  sure  to  do,  for  the  reason 
given  by  Sir  Auckland  Colvin  in  a  JNIemorandum 
dated  September  24.  "  What,"  he  said,  "  gives  a 
show  of  justification  to  the  recent  conduct  of  the 
army  and  gives  them  support  among  great  numbers 
of  the  respectable  Egyptians,  is  that  there  is  a 
great  deal  of  truth  in  their  complaints.  They  are 
sure  of  sympathy  when  they  ask  for  justice,  and 
protest  against  acts  of  arbitrary  violence.  The 
only  way  in  which  the  Government  can  deprive 
them  of  the  influence  which  they  acquire  by  their 
appeal  is  by  taking  the  game  out  of  their  hands." 

When  the  year  1881  closed,  therefore,  the  con- 
dition of  affairs  was  as  follows.  The  Khedive  was 
brooding  over  the  humiliation  inflicted  on  him  by 
his  mutinous  army,  and  was  desirous  of  an  oppor- 
tunity to  reassert  his  authority.  Cherif  Pasha 
was  inspired  by  some  statesmanlike  principles,  and 
was  endeavouring  to  regain  the  legitimate  authority 
of  the  Government,  but  he  was  wanting  in  the 
energy  and  strength  of  character  necessary  to 
control  the  turbulent  elements  which  had  been 
let  loose.  He  was  ably  seconded  by  Sir  Edward 
Malet  and  by  Sir  Auckland  Colvin.  Arabi  was 
the  real  ruler  of  the  country.  He  had  the  army 
at  his  back.  Early  in  January  1882,  he  was 
appointed  Under  -  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  as 
"  it  was  thought  better  that  he  should  belong  to 
the  Government  than  be  outside  it."  The  popula- 
tion of  Egypt  was  discontented,  but  the  junction 
between  the  national  party  and  the  mutinous  army 
was  not  complete.  The  civil  element  still  looked 
askance   at  the   soldiers.      The    native    press    was 


CH.  XII        THE  CHERIF  MINISTRY  213 

appealing  to  Mohammedan  fanaticism,  and  inciting 
hatred  against  Europeans. 

Under  circumstances  such  as  these,  the  utmost 
care  was  necessary.  In  the  general  ferment  which 
then  existed,  a  false  step  would  be  fatal.  The 
British  and  French  Governments  were  about  to 
take  a  step  which  was  to  be  well-nigh  destructive 
of  all  hope  of  guiding  the  movement,  and  was  to 
render  foreign  interference  of  some  sort,  whether 
Turkish  or  European,  an  almost  unavoidable 
necessity. 


CHAPTER   XIII 

THE    JOINT    NOTE 
January  1882 

Proposal  to  establish  an  Anglo-French  Military  Control — Change  of 
Ministry  in  France — M.  Gambetta  proposes  joint  action — Lord 
Granville  agrees — Sir  Edward  Malet  consulted — Sir  Auckland 
Colvin's  recommendations — M.  Gambetta  prepares  a  draft  note 
— Lord  Granville  agrees — Instructions  sent  to  Cairo — Proposed 
increase  in  the  army — Reorganisation  of  the  Chamber  of  Notables 
— Eifect  produced  by  the  Note — Remarks  on  the  Note. 

Immediately  after  the  mutiny  of  September  9, 
M.  Barthelemy  St.  Hilaire  proposed  to  Lord 
Granville  that  a  joint  Military  Control  should  be 
established  in  Egypt.  A  British  and  a  French 
General  were  to  be  sent  to  Cairo.  These  officers, 
the  French  Minister  thought,  "would  be  able  to 
introduce  order  and  discipline  into  the  Egyptian 
army."  The  British  Government  asked  "  what 
consequences  would  ensue  supposing  these  Generals 
were  set  at  nought  by  the  Egyptian  army."  To 
this  question,  "  INI.  Barthelemy  St.  Hilaire  answered 
that  in  such  a  case  it  might  be  necessary  to  make 
it  unmistakably  manifest  that  the  Generals  had  the 
support  of  England  and  France.  He  spoke  in  very 
general  terms  of  a  naval  demonstration,  of  the 
despatch  of  English  and  French  ships  of  war  to 
Alexandria,  but  he  did  not  make  any  definite  pro- 
posal or  suggestion  on  the  subject."  The  proposal 
was  referred  to   Cairo,  where  it  was  scouted  by 

214 


CH.  XIII  THE   JOINT   NOTE  215 

Cherif  Pasha  and  by  Sir  Auckland  Colvin.  The 
fact  that  it  should  have  been  made  showed  how 
little  the  French  Government  realised  the  true 
nature  of  the  local  situation.  At  a  moment  when 
every  endeavour  was  being  made  to  incite  the 
population  against  European  interference  of  any 
kind,  it  was  absurd  to  suppose  that  two  European 
Generals  could,  by  mere  force  of  character,  have 
obtained  any  control  over  the  mutinous  army. 
The  only  result  of  sending  them  would  have  been 
to  cause  another  and  probably  more  serious  mutiny. 
This  proposal  was,  therefore,  allowed  to  drop. 

No  further  proposal  for  joint  action  on  the  part 
of  England  and  France  was  put  forward  until  the 
middle  of  December,  by  which  time  a  change 
of  Ministry  had  taken  place  in  France.  M. 
Gambetta  assumed  the  direction  of  affairs.  His 
masterful  spirit  soon  imparted  a  fresh  impulse  to 
Egyptian  policy,  in  which  he  took  a  lively  personal 
interest. 

On  December  15,  M.  Gambetta  told  Lord 
Lyons  that  "he  considered  it  to  be  extremely 
important  to  strengthen  the  authority  of  Tewfik 
Pasha.  On  the  one  hand,  every  endeavour  should 
be  made  to  inspire  Tewfik  himself  with  confidence 
in  the  support  of  France  and  England,  and  to 
infuse  into  him  firmness  and  energy.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  enemies  of  the  present  system, 
the  adherents  of  Ismail  Pasha  and  Halim  Pasha, 
and  the  Egyptians  generally  should  be  made  to 
understand  that  France  and  England,  by  whose 
influence  Tewfik  has  been  placed  on  the  throne, 
would  not  acquiesce  in  his  being  deposed  from 
it.  .  .  ,  Any  interposition  on  the  part  of  the 
Porte,  M.  Gambetta  declared  emphatically  to  be, 
in  his  opinion,  wholly  inadmissible.  .  .  .  He 
thought  the  time  was  come  when  the  two  Govern- 
ments should  consider  the  matter  in  common  m 


216  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

order  to  be  prepared  for  united  and  immediate 
action  in  case  of  need." 

To  this  communication,  Lord  Granville  replied 
on  December  19 :  *'  Her  JNIajesty's  Government 
quite  agree  in  thinking  that  the  time  has  come 
when  the  two  Governments  should  consider  what 
course  had  better  be  adopted  by  both  Governments. 
Her  Majesty's  Government  also  think  that  it  is 
desirable  that  some  evidence  should  be  given  of 
their  cordial  understanding ;  but  that  it  requires 
careful  consideration  what  steps  should  be  taken  in 
case  of  disorder  again  reappearing." 

To  any  one  who  can  read  between  the  lines, 
this  correspondence  is  instructive.  It  gives  a 
correct  indication  of  what  was  to  follow.  Both 
Governments  were  in  a  frame  of  mind  which  is 
dangerous  in  politics.  They  both  thought  that, 
in  ordinary  conversational  language,  "something 
must  be  done."  The  action  of  the  French 
Government  was  directed  by  a  fiery  and  energetic 
Minister  who  could  not  brook  inaction.  M.  Gam- 
betta  thoroughly  understood  what  he  wanted.  He 
wished  to  bring  Egypt  under  Anglo-French  control 
without  an  armed  occupation,  if  that  were  possible  ; 
but  if  it  were  impossible,  then  he  would  accept  the 
occupation  as  the  best  solution  of  the  question. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  Channel,  affairs  were 
directed  by  a  Minister  with  a  far  calmer  judgment 
than  M.  Gambetta,  but  who  was  wanting  in 
initiative.  It  is  a  dangerous  thing  in  politics  for 
a  responsible  INlinister  to  accept  vaguely  the  prin- 
ci])le  that  "something  must  be  done,"  when  he  has 
not  a  clear  idea  of  what  should  be  done.  The 
acceptation  of  the  principle  will  not  improbably 
lead  liim  into  doing  things  which  he  will  sub- 
sequently wish  had  been  left  undone.  At  a  later 
period,  Lord  Granville  was  to  see  that,  though 
there  "  were  objections  to  every  possible  course," 


cH.xin  THE  JOINT  NOTE  217 

at  the  same  time,  the  main  question  was,  "which 
of  them  offered  the  least  inconvenience."  But  he 
discovered  this  too  late.  For  the  moment,  he 
allowed  his  headstrong  French  associate  to  drag 
him  in  a  direction  opposed  to  that  which,  as  a 
choice  of  evils,  he  most  approved,  namely,  a 
Turkish  occupation.  He  was  eventually  to  drift 
into  a  solution  to  which  he  was  much  opposed, 
namely,  a  British  occupation,  and  it  was  only  by 
the  accident  of  a  change  of  INIinistry  in  France 
that  he  was  prevented  from  drifting  into  what 
was  probably  the  worst  solution  possible,  namely, 
an  Anglo-French  occupation. 

On  December  24,  M.  Gambetta  developed  some- 
what more  fully  the  nature  of  the  steps  which  he 
thought  might  advantageously  be  taken  by  the 
British  and  French  Governments.  The  Chamber 
of  Notables  was  about  to  assemble  at  Cairo.  Their 
meeting  would,  M.  Gambetta  thought,  "produce 
a  considerable  change  in  the  political  situation  of 
Egypt."  He  proposed,  therefore,  that  "  the  two 
Governments  should  instruct  their  representatives 
at  Cairo  to  convey  collectively  to  Tewfik  Pasha 
assurances  of  the  sympathy  and  support  of  France 
and  England,  and  to  encourage  His  Highness  to 
maintain  and  assert  his  proper  authority.  .  .  .  This 
seemed  to  him  a  simple  and  practical  measure,  to 
be  adopted  without  delay,  and  the  two  Govern- 
ments might  make  it  a  starting-point  for  consider- 
ing in  concert  what  further  steps  they  should  be 
ready  to  take  in  case  of  need." 

Lord  Granville  communicated  M.  Gambetta's 
proposal  to  Sir  Edward  Malet,  and,  on  December  26, 
asked  him  whether  he  saw  any  objection  to  it.  On 
the  following  day.  Sir  Edward  Malet  replied  :  "  I 
see  no  objection  to  M.  Gambetta's  ])roposal.  The 
support  that  the  Khedive  is  most  likely  to  require 
is  towards  the  maintenance  of  the  independence  of 


218  JMODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

the  Chamber  against  the  jealousies  and  suspicions 
of  the  Porte."  Thereupon,  Lord  Granville  in- 
structed Lord  Lyons  to  inform  JNI.  Gambetta  that 
the  British  Government  agreed  to  his  proposal. 
AA'hen  this  message  was  communicated  to  M. 
Gambetta,  he  said  that  he  would  prepare  a  draft 
of  an  instruction  to  the  British  and  French  repre- 
sentatives at  Cairo  for  submission  to  the  British 
Government. 

On  December  30,  Sir  Edward  Malet  tele- 
graphed to  Lord  Granville  stating  that  it  would 
be  desirable  to  await  the  arrival  of  a  despatch  then 
on  its  way  from  Cairo  before  deciding  on  the  terms 
of  the  communication  which  was  to  be  addressed 
to  the  Egyptian  Government.  "It  would  be 
unadvisable,"  Sir  Edward  Malet  added,  "that  the 
Khedive  should  be  encouraged  to  hope  that  we 
would  support  him  in  maintaining  an  attitude  of 
reserve  towards  the  Chamber.  It  has  been  con- 
voked with  the  full  approval  of  Cherif  Pasha,  who 
looks  to  it  for  success  and  support.  To  discoun- 
tenance it  would  be  to  play  into  the  hands  of  the 
Porte,  increase  the  influence  of  the  military,  and 
diminish  that  which  we  are  now  obtaining  as 
befriending  moderate  reform.  The  reply  of  the 
Chamber  to  the  Khedive's  speech  is  stated  to  be 
extremely  moderate  and  satisfactory." 

The  despatch  to  which  Sir  Edward  INIalet 
alluded  in  this  telegram  was  dated  December  26. 
It  enclosed  a  remarkable  INIemorandum  prepared 
by  Sir  Auckland  Colvin,  who  wrote  as  follows : — 

"The  events  of  the  last  three  months,  and  the 
movement  still  going  on  in  Egypt,  must  necessarily 
make  itself  felt  in  the  relations  of  Egypt  with  the 
two  Powers.  It  will  be  well  to  describe  briefly 
what  the  present  movement  seems  to  be,  and  in 
what  direction  it  threatens  to  encroach  on  the 
ground  held  by  England  and  France. 


CH.  XIII  THE  JOINT  NOTE  219 

"In  its  origin,  the  movement  is,  I  tliink, 
miquestioiiably  an  Egyptian  movement  against 
Turkish  arbitrary  rule.  The  rebound  I'rom 
Ismail  Pasha's  tyranny,  the  growing  emancipa- 
tion of  the  Egyptian  mind  owing  to  its  close 
contact  with  Europeans,  and  the  opportunity 
given  by  the  anomalous  position  in  which  Egypt 
finds  herself  in  relation  severally  to  Turkey  and 
the  two  Powers,  have  immediately  led  to  the 
events  we  are  now  witnessing.  Cherif  Pasha, 
having  been  placed  at  the  head  of  the  movement, 
partly  from  conviction  but  more  by  weakness,  is 
allowing  himself  to  be  carried  forward  on  it,  and 
will,  I  think,  be  eventually  swept  away  by  it.  He 
is  quite  incompetent  to  control,  and  little  able  to 
guide  it. 

"  The  movement,  though  in  its  origin  anti-Turk, 
is  in  itself  an  Egyptian  national  movement.  For 
the  moment,  it  is  careful  in  its  attitude  towards 
Europeans  because  it  has  need  of  them  in  its  duel 
with  its  immediate  opponents,  but  it  cannot  look 
on  them  with  favour,  or  be  animated,  aufond^  by 
any  other  desire  than  that  of  eventually  getting 
rid  of  them." 

"  So  much  for  the  nature  of  the  movement;  next, 
as  to  the  direction  in  which  it  threatens  to  encroach 
upon  the  ground  now  occupied  by  England  and 
France, 

*'  There  will  be,  I  think,  a  twofold  danger  :  first, 
a  disposition  to  ignore  or  modify  the  engagements 
by  which  Egypt  is  bound  ;  secondly,  to  get  rid  of 
foreign  interference  in  branches  of  the  administra- 
tion in  regard  to  which  there  exists  no  direct 
engagement. 

"  With  regard  to  the  first  point,  ...  if  the  right 
of  voting  the  Budget,  in  otlier  words,  control  over 
the  finances,  is  given  to  the  Chamber,  the  ])osition 
of  the  Anglo-French   Control  will  be  profoundly 


220  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

modified.  At  present,  it  is  effective  because  the 
Council  gcverns  the  country,  and  in  the  Council 
the  Control  has  a  seat  and  an  effective  voice,  whilst 
it  is  in  constant  and  intimate  relations  with  the 
different  individuals  composing  the  Cabinet.  But 
it  can  have  no  relations,  except  of  the  most  indirect 
character,  with  the  Chamber,  nor  any  confidence  in 
the  decisions  of  that  irresponsible  and  ill-histructed 
body.  How,  if  the  Chamber  is  to  vote  the  Budget, 
can  the  Control  exercise  any  useful  check  on  the 
finances  ?  The  Chamber,  doubtless,  in  voting  the 
Budget,  can  only  do  so  within  the  conditions 
allowed  by  the  Law  of  Liquidation  ;  but  those 
conditions  are  sufiiciently  elastic  to  allow  of  the 
finances  being  misapplied  in  a  degree  which  would 
endanger  financial  equilibrium. 

"  We  have  caused  this  to  be  pointed  out  to  Cherif 
Pasha,  who  is  said  to  be  prepared  to  modify  his 
projects  in  accordance  with  our  views.  But 
whether  the  Chamber  will  accept  his  modification 
is  another  matter." 

As  regards  the  second  point,  that  is  to  say,  the 
desire  to  get  rid  of  foreign  interference  in  those 
branches  ojf  the  administration  in  respect  to  which 
the  Egyptian  Government  were  under  no  distinct 
international  engagement,  Sir  Auckland  Colvin 
said  that  "successful  attacks  on  one  or  more  of 
those  administrations  would  sap  the  moral  influence 
of  the  Control,  as  well  as  destroy,  proportionately 
as  such  attacks  are  successful,  the  material  hold 
acquired  by  the  Powers  in  the  country." 

Under  these  circumstances.  Sir  Auckland  Colvin 
thouglit  that  for  the  guidance  of  himself  and  tlie 
other  high  British  and  French  officials  in  Egypt, 
the  "  wishes  of  the  two  Cabinets  should  be 
expressed  as  to  the  attitude  that  they  were  to 
assume." 

He  then  proceeded  to  lay  the  following  recom- 


CH.XIII  THE  JOINT  NOTE  221 

mendations  before  the  British  Government.  "The 
liberal  movement,"  he  said,  "  now  going  on  should, 
I  think,  in  no  wise  be  discouraged.  It  lias  many 
enemies,  no  less  among  Europeans  than  amongst 
Turks.  But  I  believe  it  is  essentially  the  growth 
of  tlie  popular  spirit,  and  is  directed  to  the  good  of 
the  country,  and  that  it  would  be  most  impolitic 
to  thwart  it.  But  precisely  because  I  wish  it  to 
succeed,  it  seems  to  me  essential  that  it  should 
learn  from  the  first  within  what  limits  it  must 
confine  itself.  Otherwise,  expectations  may  be 
formed  and  hopes  raised,  the  failure  of  which 
may  lead  to  its  entire  discomfiture.  In  all  that 
is  doing  or  to  be  done,  neither  the  Government 
nor  the  Chamber  should  be  allowed  to  forget  that 
the  Powers  have  assumed  a  direct  financial  control 
over  the  country  and  intend  to  maintain  it.  The 
Powers  should  not,  in  my  opinion,  accept  any 
proposed  measures  which  jeopardise  this  control, 
which  is  essential  at  present  to  the  well-being  of 
the  country,  and  is,  therefore,  the  main  safeguard 
against  the  recurrence  of  an  *  Egyptian  Question.' 
All  that  is  guaranteed  by  the  Law  of  Liquidation 
and  preceding  Decrees  should  also  be  authoritatively 
placed  beyond  the  pale  of  discussion.  All  that  is 
designed  to  transfer  the  centre  of  financial  authority 
from  the  Control  to  the  Chamber  should  be  especi- 
ally discountenanced  and,  if  need  be,  negatived, 
as  neutralising  and  nullifying  the  agency  through 
which  the  Powers  assure  themselves  of  the  efficient 
conduct  of  financial  affairs,  for  which  they  have  made 
themselves  responsible  in  Egypt. 

'*  At  the  same  time,  I  should  give  Cherif  Pasha, 
oi  whoever  may  represent  the  Government,  to 
understand  that  he  is  expected  to  discourage  and 
oppose  popular  attacks  on  European  administra- 
tions, and  that  the  Powers  will  by  no  means  look 
with   indifference   on    the    success    of    any    such 


222  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

attacks.  Each  of  these  administrations  is  in 
itself,  though  doubtless  with  many  iin})eifections, 
a  centre  of  reform.  They  are  the  spokes  of  the 
wheel  representing  the  Control.  .  .  .  The  line,  it 
will  be  thus  seen,  that  I  advocate,  is  the  open 
and  firm  recognition  by  the  Powers,  through  their 
diplomatic  agents,  at  this  critical  juncture  when 
Egypt  is  remoulding  her  internal  reorganisation, 
of  the  material  interest  they  possess  and  intend 
to  maintain  in  the  administration,  leaving  full 
liberty  to  the  Egyptians  to  frame  what  measures 
they  please  for  their  internal  government,  so  far 
as  they  are  not  inconsistent  with  the  status 
acquired  by  the  Powers.  In  fact,  the  Egyptian 
administration  is  a  partnership  of  three.  Unless 
the  Powers  are  prepared  to  modify  their  share, 
they  must  secure  and  strengthen  it,  now  that 
the  Egyptians  are  in  a  state  of  movement  and 
change.  They  cannot  look  on  with  indifference, 
and  allow  matters  to  be  discussed  and  settled 
here  without  some  intimation  of  their  views.  If 
a  clear  understanding  is  not  imposed  from  the  first, 
much  misunderstanding  will  arise,  embittering 
more,  as  I  think,  the  relations  between  us  and  the 
Egyptians  than  would  the  authoritative  declara- 
tion, now  when  the  Chamber  is  about  to  meet,  of 
the  intentions  of  the  Powers." 

Sir  Auckland  Colvin's  INIemorandum  has  been 
quoted  at  length  because  it  is  important  to  ascer- 
tain what  information  as  regards  the  situation  in 
Egypt  was  before  the  Britisli  Government  when 
it  was  decided  to  agree  to  M.  Gambetta's  proposal. 
The  JNIemorandum  was  received  at  the  Foreimi 
Office  on  January  2.  On  the  same  day,  the  draft 
note  prepared  by  M.  Gambetta,  which  was  to  be 
sent  to  the  British  and  French  Consuls-General 
at  Cairo,  readied  London.  It  was  couched  in 
the  following  terms  : — 


CH.  XIII  THE  JOINT  NOTE  223 

"You  have  already  been  instructed  on  several 
occasions  to  inform  the  Khedive  and  his  Govern- 
ment of  the  determination  of  England  and  France 
to  afford  them  support  against  the  difficulties  of 
various  kinds  which  might  interfere  with  the 
course  of  public  affairs  in  Egypt.  The  two 
Powers  are  entirely  agreed  on  this  subject,  and 
recent  circumstances,  especially  the  meeting  of  the 
Chamber  of  Notables  convoked  by  the  Khedive, 
have  given  them  the  opportunity  for  a  further 
exchange  of  views.  I  have  accordingly  to  instruct 
you  to  declare  to  the  Khedive  that  the  English 
and  French  Governments  consider  the  maintenance 
of  His  Highness  on  the  tlirone,  on  the  terms  laid 
down  by  the  Sultan's  Firmans,  and  officially 
recognised  by  the  two  Governments,  as  alone  able 
to  guarantee,  for  the  present  and  future,  the  good 
order  and  development  of  general  prosperity  in 
Egypt,  in  which  France  and  Great  Britain  are 
equally  interested.  The  two  Governments  being 
closely  associated  in  the  resolve  to  guard  by  their 
united  efforts  against  all  cause  of  complication, 
internal  or  external,  which  might  menace  the  order 
of  things  established  in  Egypt,  do  not  doubt 
that  tlie  assurance  publicly  given  of  their  formal 
intentions  in  this  respect  will  tend  to  avert  the 
dangers  to  which  the  Government  of  the  Khedive 
might  be  exposed,  and  which  would  certainly  find 
England  and  France  united  to  oppose  them.  They 
are  convinced  that  His  Highness  will  draw  from 
this  assurance  the  confidence  and  strength  which 
he  requires  to  direct  the  destinies  of  Egypt  and 
his  people." 

On  January  6,  the  Britisli  Government  agreed 
to  M.  Gambetta's  draft,  with  the  reservation 
"that  they  must  not  be  considered  as  committing 
themselves  thereby  to  any  particular  mode  of 
action,  if  action  should  be  found  necessary."     On 


224  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  ii 

January  7,  M.  Gambetta  wrote  to  Lord  Lyons : 
"We  observe  with  pleasure  that  the  only  reservation 
of  the  Government  of  the  Queen  is  as  to  the  mode 
of  action  to  be  employed  by  the  two  countries 
when  action  is  considered  necessary ;  and  this  is 
a  reservation  in  which  we  participate." 

It  was,  therefore,  four  days  after  the  arrival  in 
London  of  Sir  Auckland  Colvin's  Memorandum, 
which  is  quoted  above,  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment intimated  their  acceptance  of  M.  Gambetta's 
proposals.  On  January  6,  the  instructions  were 
telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward  Malet.  Identic  in- 
structions were  at  the  same  time  sent  by  the 
French  Government  to  M.  Sienkiewicz. 

When  these  instructions  reached  Cairo,  the  local 
situation  was  as  follows.  The  Chamber  of  Notables 
had  been  opened  by  the  Khedive  on  December  26. 
Sultan  Pasha,  the  President  of  the  Chamber,  and 
Suleiman  Pasha  Abaza,  one  of  the  leading 
members,  replied  to  the  Khedive's  opening  address 
in  terms  expressive  of  their  loyalty  and  devotion 
to  the  public  interests.  On  January  2,  Sir  Edward 
Malet  reported :  "  At  an  interview  which  I  had 
with  the  Khedive  on  the  31st  ultimo  I  found  His 
Highness,  for  the  first  time  since  my  return  in 
September,  cheerful  in  mood  and  taking  a  hopeful 
view  of  the  situation.  He  spoke  with  much 
satisfaction  of  the  apparently  moderate  tendencies 
of  the  Delegates,  and  he  expressed  his  belief 
that  the  country  would  now  progress.  The 
change  was  very  noticeable,  because  His  High- 
ness had,  up  to  the  time  of  the  opening  of  the 
Chamber,  been  full  of  misgiving,  and  I  feared 
that  this  feeling  was  prompted  not  only  by  a 
mistrust  of  what  the  Delegates  might  do,  but 
also  by  a  dislike  of  the  Chamber  as  an  institution." 

Two  difficulties,  however,  lay  aliead.  In  the 
first    place,   the    military    party  wished   tlie    army 


cH.  XIII  THE  JOINT  NOTE  225 

to  be  increased  to  18,000  men,  the  maximum 
figure  allowed  by  the  Firman  of  1879.  The 
Controllers  were  prepared  to  grant  a  certain 
increase,  but  they  declined,  on  financial  grounds, 
to  give  all  that  the  military  party  desired,  and  in 
this  matter  they  were  supported  by  the  British 
Government.  Cherif  Pasha  was  at  first  inclined 
to  go  farther  than  the  Controllers  approved  in 
the  direction  of  increasing  the  army.  At  last, 
however,  "  he  sided  entirely  with  the  Control, 
and  was  equally  resolved  not  to  give  way."  On 
the  eve  of  the  meeting  of  the  Chamber,  it  was 
decided  to  fix  the  Military  Budget  for  1882 
at  £E.522,000,  an  increase  of  £E.  154,000  over 
the  Budget  for  the  previous  year.  The  Minister 
of  War,  however,  was  not  satisfied.  He  wished 
for  a  further  increase  of  about  £E.  126,000,  which 
would  have  enabled  the  army  to  be  brought  up 
to  18,000  men. 

The  other  difficulty  was  of  a  different  character. 
The  Chamber  was  convoked  under  Ismail  Pasha's 
law  of  1866.  It  was  known  that,  when  the 
Chamber  met,  it  would  demand  larger  powers 
than  those  conferred  by  this  law.  In  anticij)ation 
of  such  demands,  the  Egyptian  Ministry  had 
prepared  new  regulations,  which  were  submitted 
to  the  Chamber  on  January  2.  In  sending  these 
proposals  to  Lord  Granville,  Sir  Edward  JNIalet 
remarked  :  "  Your  Lordship  will  observe  that 
guarantees  are  given  in  these  regulations  for  the 
observance  of  the  duties  of  Egypt  towards  foreign 
Powers.  With  the  exception  of  these  restrictions, 
the  constitution  of  the  Chamber  is  extremely 
liberal,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that,  as  time 
goes  on,  further  changes  in  a  liberal  direction 
will  be  made."  It  remained  to  be  seen  whether 
the  Chamber  \vould  be  satisfied  with  the  proposals 
of  the  Government. 

VOL.  I  Q 


226  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

The  situation  was  evidently  critical.  Still,  there 
was  hope  that,  with  very  careful  guidance,  the 
difficulties  of  the  moment  might  be  overcome, 
and  a  complete  upset  of  the  State  machinery 
obviated. 

One  main  point  should  surely  have  been  borne 
in  mind  before  the  Joint  Note  was  delivered. 
It  was  that  a  National  Party  existed  in  Egypt. 
On  this  subject,  the  British  Government  appear 
to  have  been  under  a  delusion  from  the  first.  They 
thought  that  the  movement  was  wholly  military, 
and,  therefore,  undeserving  of  sympathy.  At  a 
later  period  (July  22,  1882),  when  British  military 
intervention  had  become  necessary,  ]Mr.  Gladstone, 
speaking  in  the  House  of  Commons,  said  :  "There 
have  been  periods  in  this  history  at  which  it  has 
been  charitably  believed,  even  in  this  country, 
that  the  military  party  was  the  popular  party, 
and  was  struggling  for  the  liberties  of  Egypt. 
There  is  not  the  smallest  rag  or  shred  of  evi- 
dence to  support  that  contention.  .  .  .  Military 
violence  and  the  regimen  established  by  mili- 
tary violence  are  absolutely  incompatible  with  the 
growth  and  the  existence  of  freedom.  .  .  .  The 
reign  of  Cromwell  was  a  great  reign,  but  it  did 
nothinoj  for  Eng-lish  freedom.  .  .  .  The  reitjn  of 
Napoleon  was  a  splendid  reign,  but,  founded  on 
military  power,  it  did  nothing  for  freedom  in 
France." 

However  true  these  general  principles  may  be, 
nothing  can  be  more  certain  than  that  at  that 
time  there  existed  in  Egypt  a  national  party 
who  were  working  more  or  less  in  co-operation 
with  the  military  party.  Cherif  Pasha,  who  was, 
as  Sir  Auckland  Colvin  said,  an  Egyptian  gi^and 
seigneur^  and  who  was  one  of  the  dominant 
race,  recognised  its  existence,  and  wisely  recom- 
mended   a    policy    which    would    encourage    the 


CH.  XIII  THE  JOINT  NOTE  227 

development  of  the  national,  at  the  expense  of 
the  military  elements  in  the  movement.  Sir 
Edward  JNIalet  also  ^  had  distinctly  warned  the 
Government  of  the  unwisdom  of  taking  any  step 
which  would  be  construed  as  one  of  hostility  to 
the  national  movement.  One  of  the  most  able 
Europeans  in  Egypt  at  that  time  was  Sir 
Auckland  Colvin.  He  was  a  trained  Anglo- 
Indian  official,  and  was  certainly  not  carried  away 
by  any  Utopian  ideas  as  to  the  possibility  or 
desirability  of  rapidly  developing  free  institutions 
amongst  a  backward  Oriental  people.  His  official 
position  obliged  him  to  look  after  the  interests 
of  the  Egyptian  Treasury,  but  his  political  insight 
was  too  keen  to  allow  of  his  being  deceived  as 
to  the  true  nature  of  the  movement  which  was  in 
course  of  progress.  He  had  warned  the  British 
Government  that  "the  liberal  movement  then 
going  on  should  in  no  wise  be  discouraged. 
Though  in  its  origin  anti-Turk,  it  was  in  itself 
an  Egyptian  national  movement." 

Such,  therefore,  was  the  situation  in  Egypt 
when  the  British  and  French  Governments  com- 
municated the  Joint  Note  to  their  diplomatic 
representatives  in  Cairo. 

The  instructions  were  received  at  Cairo  on  the 
night  of  January  6.  At  5.30  p.m.  on  the  8th  Sir 
Edward  Malet  telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville : 
"My  French  colleague  and  I  communicated  the 
dual  note  to  the  Khedive  to-day."  "  His  High- 
ness," he  added,  "requested  us  to  express  to  our 
respective  Governments  his  sincere  gratitude  for 
the  solicitude  which  it  showed  for  his  own  welfare 
and  that  of  his  people." 

In  an  article  written  by  Mr.  John  Morley  in 
the  Fortnightly  Review  (July  1882),  the  effect  of 
the  Note  is  described  in  the  following  words  :  "  At 

'   Vide  aiifc,  |>,  -Ul. 


228  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

Cairo,  the  Note  fell  like  a  bombshell.  Nobody  had 
expected  such  a  declaration,  and  nobody  there  was 
aware  of  any  reason  why  it  should  have  been 
launched.  What  was  felt  was  that  so  serious  a 
step  on  such  delicate  ground  could  not  have  been 
taken  without  deliberate  calculation  nor  without 
some  grave  intention.  The  Note  was,  therefore, 
taken  to  mean  that  the  Sultan  was  to  be  thrust 
still  farther  in  the  background  ;  that  the  Khedive 
was  to  become  more  plainly  the  puppet  of  England 
and  France ;  and  that  Egypt  would,  sooner  or 
later,  in  some  shape  or  other,  be  made  to  share  the 
disastrous  fate  of  Tunis.  The  general  effect  was, 
therefore,  mischievous  in  the  highest  degree.  The 
Khedive  was  encouraged  in  his  opposition  to  the 
sentiments  of  the  Chamber.  The  military,  national, 
or  popular  party  was  alarmed.  The  Sultan  was 
irritated.  The  other  European  Powers  were  made 
uneasy.  Every  element  of  disturbance  was  roused 
into  activity." 

Cherif  Pasha  called  on  Sir  Edward  Malet  and 
M.  Sienkiewicz  on  .Tanuary  10,  and  said  that  the 
"message  was  regarded,  first,  as  encouraging  the 
Khedive  to  place  himself  in  antagonism  to  reform  ; 
secondly,  that  the  wording  which  connected,  as  it 
were,  the  events  of  September  with  tlie  opening  of 
the  Chamber,  showed  a  spirit  unfavourable  to  the 
latter  ;  thirdly,  that  it  indicated  a  desire  to  loosen 
the  tie  to  the  Porte ;  fourthly,  that  it  contained  a 
menace  of  intervention,  which  nothing  in  the  state 
of  the  country  at  ])resent  justified." 

Sir  Edward  Malet's  personal  testimony  was  no 
less  conclusive.  On  January  9,  he  telegraphed  to 
Lord  Granville:  "The  communication  has,  at  all 
events  temporarily,  alienated  from  us  all  confidence. 
Everything  was  progressing  ca])itally,  and  England 
was  looked  on  as  the  sincere  wellwisher  and  pro- 
tector of  the  country.     Now,  it  is  considered  that 


cH.  XIII  THE  JOINT  NOTE  229 

England  has  definitely  thrown  in  her  lot  with 
France,  and  that  France,  from  motives  in  connec- 
tion with  her  Tunisian  campaign,  is  determined 
ultimately  to  intervene  here.'  "It  is  too  soon," 
Sir  Edward  jNIalet  wrote  on  January  10,  "to  judge 
at  present  of  the  ultimate  result  of  what  has  taken 
place ;  but  for  the  moment  it  has  had  the  effect  to 
cause  a  more  complete  union  of  the  national  party, 
the  military,  and  the  Chamber,  to  unite  these  three 
in  a  common  bond  of  opposition  to  England  and 
France,  and  to  make  them  feel  more  forcibly  than 
they  did  before  that  the  tie  which  unites  Egypt  to 
the  Ottoman  Empire  is  a  guarantee  to  which  they 
must  strongly  adhere  to  save  themselves  from 
aggression.  The  military,  who  had  fallen  into  the 
background  on  the  convocation  of  the  Chamber, 
are  again  in  everybody's  mouth,  and  Arabi  Bey  is 
said  to  be  foremost  in  protesting  against  what  he  is 
represented  to  consider  as  unjust  interference." 

The  greatest  General,  it  has  been  said,  is  he 
who  makes  the  fewest  mistakes.  The  same  may 
be  said  of  politicians  and  diplomatists.  A  remark 
made  to  me  in  this  connection  many  years  ago  by 
Sir  F'rancis  Baring,  the  first  Lord  Northbrook,  has 
sunk  into  my  memory.  I  was  staying  at  his 
country-house  in  1864,  having  just  returned  from 
America,  where  I  had  been  present  as  a  spectator 
with  the  Northern  army.  I  discussed  the  prospects 
of  the  war  which  was  then  going  on,  and  expressed 
my  opinions  with  all  the  confidence  of  youth. 
After  listening  for  a  while.  Sir  Francis  said  to 
me  :  "  Now  that  you  are  a  young  man,  you  should 
write  down  not  what  has  hajjpened  but  what  you 
think  is  going  to  happen.  You  will  be  surprised 
to  find  how  wrong  you  are."  Nearly  half  a  cen- 
tury of  official  life,  during  which  time  I  have 
been    behind   the   scenes    wliilst    events    of   some 


230  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  u 

interest  and  importance  were  passing,  has  con- 
vinced me  of  the  justice  of  the  remark  made  by 
my  shrewd  old  relative.  I  have  myself  made  too 
many  erroneous  political  forecasts  to  be  inclined 
to  criticise  severely  the  mistakes  of  others.  It 
must,  however,  be  admitted  tluit,  in  agreeing  to 
the  Joint  Note,  Lord  Granville  made  a  serious 
mistake.  It  is  clear  that  the  British  and  French 
Governments  were  aiming  at  different  objects. 
The  French  Government,  whilst  admitting  the 
partnership  with  England  as  an  unavoidable,  though 
perhaps  unpleasant,  necessity,  wished  to  tighten  the 
hold  of  France  over  Egypt.  The  British  Govern- 
ment, on  the  other  hand,  wished  above  all  things 
to  avoid  the  necessity  of  serious  interference  in 
Egypt.  When,  on  January  6,  Lord  Granville 
made  a  reservation  in  agreeing  to  the  Joint  Note 
to  the  effect  that  he  was  not  committed  "  to  any 
particular  mode  of  action,"  and  when,  on  January  7, 
M.  Gambetta  replied  "c'est  une  reserve  qui  nous 
est  commune,"  they  were  in  reality  far  from  being 
agreed.  Each  interpreted  his  reservation  in  a  differ- 
ent manner.  Lord  Granville  meant  that,  as  a  last 
resource,  he  would  fall  back  on  Turkish  armed 
intervention.  JNI.  Gambetta,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  "emphatically  of  opinion  that  any  interven- 
tion of  the  Porte  was  wholly  inadmissible."  On 
January  14,  the  llepithlique  Franx/aise,  which  was 
the  recognised  organ  of  JM.  Gambetta,  declared 
that  "  it  would  be  a  grave  error  to  imagine  that  the 
two  Powers  were  not  firmly  resolved  to  follow  up 
their  })latonic  demonstration  in  a  suitable  manner  if 
order  should  be  disturbed,  or  if  the  authority  of  the 
Khedive  should  again  be  placed  in  jeopardy."  In 
other  words,  M.  Gambetta  contemplated  an  Anglo- 
French  occupation. 

Another  consideration  should  have  made  Lord 
Granville  pause.      Before  he  agreed  to  the  Joint 


OH.  XIII  THE  JOINT  NOTE  231 

Note,  he  was  in  possession  of  Sir  Auckland  Colvin's 
Memorandum  of  December  26.  Sir  Edward  JNIalet 
drew  his  special  attention  to  this  memorandum, 
and  urged  that  it  should  be  considered  before  any 
decision  was  taken.  It  is  an  extremely  able  paper. 
It  gave  a  very  clear  description  of  the  local  situa- 
tion. Sir  Auckland  Colvin  pointed  out  that  it 
would  be  most  "impolitic  to  thwart"  the  move- 
ment then  going  on  in  Egypt,  the  national  char- 
acter of  which  he  fully  recognised.  His  principal 
business,  however,  was  to  look  after  the  finances 
of  Egypt.  He  was  aware  that  without  European 
assistance  it  was  hopeless  to  expect  that  the  finances 
could  be  brought  into  good  order.  He  deprecated 
anything  which  would  jeopardise  the  financial 
control  exerted  by  France  and  England.  He 
advocated  "the  open  and  firm  recognition  by  the 
Powers  ...  of  the  material  interest  they  possess 
and  intend  to  maintain  in  the  administration."  In 
point  of  fact,  the  Egyptian  administration  was  "  a 
partnership  of  three,"  and  he  advocated  the  prin- 
ciple that  no  change  could  be  made  in  the  terms  of 
association  without  the  consent  of  all  the  partners. 
All  this  was  perfectly  true.  Moreover,  it  was 
natural  that,  holding  the  position  which  he  held. 
Sir  Auckland  Colvin  should  have  advocated  views  of 
this  nature.  They  were  views  to  which  the  French 
Government  would  readily  have  assented,  for  French 
p6licy  in  Egypt  had,  for  a  long  time  past,  been 
guided  to  a  great  extent  by  the  interests  of  indi- 
vidual Frenchmen  in  the  solvency  of  the  Egyptian 
Treasury.  But  the  case  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment was  somewhat  different.  They  had,  indeed, 
agreed  to  the  appointment  of  Controllers.  They 
had  been  parties  to  the  Law  of  Liquidation.  But 
it  was  going  a  distinct  step  farther  to  giv^e  a  solemn 
pledge  that  they  would  interfere  seriously  if  any 
complication  arose,  whether  "internal  or  external, 


232  MODERN  EGYPT  it.  ii 

which  miixht  menace  the  order  of  things  established 
in  Egypt."  If  this  pledge  meant  anything,  it  meant 
that  the  British  Government  would  give  materia! 
support  to  the  Controllers  ;  and,  indeed,  when  the 
matter  came  to  be  discussed  at  a  later  period  in 
Parliament,  the  case  of  the  Government  rested 
upon  the  alleged  obligation  to  sup})ort  the  Control. 
An  obligation,  indeed,  existed,  but  it  did  not  extend 
nearly  so  far  as  the  French  Government,  with  the 
liritish  Government  following  in  their  train,  implied. 
The  British  Government  might  perfectly  well  have 
accepted  as  correct  Sir  Auckland  Colvin's  descrip- 
tion of  the  facts  of  the  situation,  without  adopting 
to  the  full  his  recommendations.  They  were  in  a 
position  to  take  a  more  unbiassed  view  than  Sir 
Auckland  Colvin  of  the  extent  to  which  it  was 
wise  to  go  in  the  direction  of  interference  in  Egypt 
on  purely  financial  grounds.  There  was  no  reason 
why,  at  this  moment,  the  Controllers  should  not 
have  been  informed  that  they  could  rely  on  nothing 
but  moral  support,  and  that  they  must  do  the  best 
they  could,  in  the  difficult  circumstances  in  which 
they  were  ])laced,  by  persuasion  and  force  of  char- 
acter. At  the  same  time,  the  Egyptian  Government 
and  the  Arabists  might  have  been  told  that  the 
British  and  French  Governments  had  no  wish  to 
check  any  reasonable  development  of  the  national 
movement.  The  Kliedive  might  have  been  en- 
couraged to  come  to  terms  with  his  people  rather 
than  to  resist  their  wislies.  Attention  might  have 
been  drawn  to  the  views  of  the  Controllers,  on  the 
ground  that  their  financial  knowledge  and  experi- 
ence would  be  of  great  use  to  tlie  Egyptian  people, 
and  that,  in  tlie  event  of  their  advice  being  system- 
atically neglected,  financial  disorder  would  almost 
inevitably  ensue.  At  the  same  time,  it  might  have 
been  hinted  that  no  armed  intervention  was  to  be 
feared    in    respect    to    a   mere    financial    question, 


CH.  XIII  THE  JOINT  NOTE  233 

however  much  the  two  Governments  might  regret 
to  see  financial  disorder  prevail.  Armed  interven- 
tion would  be  reserved  for  the  time  when  life  and 
property  were  no  longer  secure.  It  cannot,  indeed, 
be  stated  with  any  degree  of  confidence  that,  if 
hmguage  of  this  sort  had  been  held,  the  occupa- 
tion of  Egypt  by  foreign  troops  would  have  been 
avoided.  The  financial  interests  concerned  were 
so  great,  and  the  risk  that  financial  disorder  would 
eventually  have  led  to  anarchy  was  so  considerable, 
that  it  may  well  be  that  armed  intervention  of 
some  sort  would  ultimately  have  become  an  un- 
avoidable necessity.  This,  however,  is  mere  con- 
jecture. What  is  more  certain  is  that,  by  following 
M.  Gambetta's  lead,  the  British  Government 
pledged  themselves  to  a  greater  degree  of  inter- 
ference in  Egyptian  internal  affairs,  and  especially 
financial  affairs,  than  the  actual  circumstances  of 
the  case  appear  to  have  necessitated. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  Lord  Granville 
associated  himself  with  M.  Gambetta's  Note  because 
he  failed  to  appreciate  the  effect  which  the  Note 
would  produce.  In  the  debate  which  subsequently 
took  place  in  the  House  of  Lords,  Lord  Granville 
alluded  to  his  despatch  of  November  4,  1881,  which 
set  forth  the  policy  of  the  British  Government.^ 
That  despatch,  he  said,  "  had  the  singular  good 
fortune  of  being  generally  approved  both  at  home 
and  abroad."  This  statement  was  quite  correct. 
When  the  despatch  in  question  was  communicated 
to  Cherif  Pasha  by  Sir  Edward  Malet,  he  "  expressed 
great  satisfaction  at  it,  and  stated  that  he  should 
have  it  translated  for  hisertion  in  the  local  press, 
as  it  ought  to  have  an  excellent  effect."  Lord 
Granville  then  went  on  to  say  :  "  .^Vt  the  end  of 
December,  M.  Gambetta  proposed  that  we  should 
join  with  France  in  a  Dual  Note  on  the  same  lines 

*  Vide  ante,  p.  203. 


234  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  n 

as  my  despatch  of  November,  but  possibly  accentu- 
ated as  to  its  terms  by  the  fact  of  its  being  drafted 
by  a  more  eloquent  pen."  There  was,  however,  a 
wide  difference  between  both  the  tone  and  the  sub- 
stance of  Lord  Granville's  despatch  of  November  4, 
and  the  Joint  Note  of  January  8.  The  former  was 
friendly  and  sympathetic.  The  latter  was  menacing. 
The  former  indicated  that  nothing  but  "the  occur- 
rence in  Egypt  of  a  state  of  anarchy"  would  be 
likely  to  lead  to  foreign  intervention  of  a  serious 
description  in  Egypt.  The  latter  stated  in  some- 
what harsh  terms  that  the  British  and  French 
Governments  were  determined  to  maintain  "the 
order  of  things  established  in  Egypt,"  an  expression 
which  might  be  held  to  cover  a  very  wide  field. 
Moreover,  it  was  to  be  inferred  from  the  despatch 
of  November  4  that,  if  any  foreign  intervention 
were  found  necessary,  the  military  forces  of  the 
Sultan  would  be  employed.  The  British  and 
French  Governments  deprecated  the  idea  that 
they  entertained  "any  self-aggrandising  designs." 
On  the  other  hand,  the  studied  silence  of  the 
Joint  Note  in  respect  to  the  contingency  of 
Turkish  intervention  naturally  led  to  the  suppo- 
sition that,  in  an  extreme  case,  Anglo-French 
and  not  Turkish  intervention  was  contemplated. 
Neither,  in  so  far  as  M.  Gambetta  was  concerned, 
was  the  inference  incorrect. 

When  carburetted  hydrogen  and  air  in  certain 
proportions  exist  in  a  mine,  no  great  harm  is  done 
so  long  as  they  are  left  alone.  But  if  a  miner 
enters  with  a  lighted  candle,  an  explosion  at  once 
takes  place.  This  is  what  the  French  and  British 
Governments  did  in  Egypt  when  they  issued  the 
Joint  Note.  Previous  to  the  issue  of  the  Note,  the 
National  Party  and  the  Military  Party  existed  side 
by  side.  Cherif  Pasha,  aided  by  Sir  Edward  Malet 
and  Sir  Auckland  Colvin,was  laboriously  and  wisely 


caxiii  THE  JOINT  NOTE  235 

endeavouring  to  keep  the  two  parties  separate. 
There  was  some  hope  that  their  united  efforts 
would  be  successful,  and  that  the  National  Party, 
which  constituted  the  more  healthy  of  the  two 
elements,  would  eventually  predominate  over  the 
Military  Party,  which  constituted  an  element  of 
obvious  danger.  At  this  moment,  the  British  and 
French  Governments  appeared,  without  any  suffi- 
cient reason,  on  the  scene.  They  applied  a  lighted 
candle  to  the  inflammable  material.  In  an  instant, 
the  two  elements  combined  with  an  explosion.  The 
French  Government  possibly  wished  for  an  explo- 
sion. They  were,  at  all  events,  callous  as  to  whether 
an  explosion  occurred  or  not.  But  Lord  Granville's 
action  can  only  be  explained  on  the  assumption, 
either  that,  in  his  desire  to  act  with  the  French 
Government,  he  momentarily  forgot  the  safety- 
lamp  of  diplomatic  prudence  and  reserve,  or  else 
that  he  did  not  sufficiently  appreciate  the  fact  that 
the  mine  was  full  of  fire-damp.^ 

From  the  moment  the  Johit  Note  was  issued, 
foreign  intervention  became  an  almost  unavoidable 
necessity. 

'  It  has  been  occasionally  stated, — apparently  on  the  authority  of 
Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt  {Secret  History,  etc.,  pp.  159  and  182),— that,  in 
following  the  French  lead  during  these  neg-otiations,  the  British 
Government  were  influenced  by  their  desire  to  conclude  a  Commercial 
Treaty  with  France.  I  believe  this  statement  to  be  wholly  devoid  of 
foundation.  Sir  Charles  Dilke,  who  was  at  the  time  Under-Secretary 
of  State  at  the  Foreign  Office,  and  whose  evidence  on  this  point  seems 
to  me  conclusive,  wrote,  on  June  27,  1907,  to  the  Manchester  Guardian  : 
**  At  no  time  was  the  Egyptian  policy  of  either  Cabinet  allowed  to  have 
a  bearing  upon  the  commercial  relations  of  the  Powers." 

Whilst  the  proofs  of  this  work  were  passing  through  the  press,  a 
second  edition  of  Mr.  Blunt's  book  was  published.  In  the  Appendix, 
a  correspondence  is  given  between  Sir  Charles  Dilke  and  Mr.  Wilfrid 
Blunt,  which  is  confirmatory  of  the  opinion  that  there  was  no  connec- 
tion whatever  between  the  policy  set  forth  in  the  Joint  Note  and  the 
commercial  relations  between  France  and  England. 


CHAPTER   XIV 

THE    EFFECTS    OF    THE    JOINT    NOTE 
January-February  1882 

The  British  Government  wish  to  explain  the  Joint  Note — The  French 
Government  oiiject — The  Chamber  of  Notables  claims  the  right  to 
vote  the  Budget — Proposals  of  the  British  Government — Objections 
of  the  French  Government — The  Consuls-General  instructed  to 
oppose  the  Chamber — The  Chamber  demands  a  change  of  Ministry 
— Appointment  <  '  a  National  Ministry — The  French  Government 
press  for  an  Anglo-French  occupation — The  British  Government 
favour  a  Turkish  occupation  —  Resignation  of  M.  Gambetta — 
Remarks  on  his  policy. 

When  Lord  Granville  agreed  to  the  Joint  Note 
he  possibly  thought  that  the  best  method  to  obviate 
the  necessity  of  armed  intervention  in  Egypt, 
whether  Turkish  or  Anglo-French,  was  to  threaten 
to  intervene.  The  Note  itself,  indeed,  almost 
expressed  this  view  in  plain  words.  It  appeared, 
however,  that  tlie  Note  had  produced  an  effect 
opposite  to  that  which  was  intended.  It  had 
increased  the  chances  that  armed  intervention 
would  be  necessary.  Lord  Granville  recognised 
that  he  had  made  a  mistake.  He  accordingly 
applied  himself  to  the  task  of  rectifying  his  error, 
liis  French  partner,  on  the  other  hand,  was  far 
from  being  convinced  that  any  mistake  had  been 
made.  On  the  contrary,  he  adhered  strongly  to 
the  ])olicy  indicated  in  the  .loint  Note. 

On  January  10,  Cherif  Pasha  expressed  a  hope 
that  the  two   Powers   would   make  some   further 

236 


CH.  XIV     EFFECTS  OF  JOINT  NOTE  237 

communication  which  would  tend  to  remove  the 
bad  impression  caused  by  the  Joint  Note.  On  the 
same  day,  Lord  Granville  instructed  Lord  Lyons 
to  consult  the  French  Government  on  the  desira- 
bility of  sending  "  an  explanatory  telegram  to  Sir 
Edward  INIalet  to  the  effect  that  the  character  of 
the  dual  communication  had  been  misunderstood." 

On  January  11,  Lord  Lyons  reported  the  result 
of  his  consultation  with  M.  Gambetta.  M.  Gam- 
betta  "  was,  of  course,  ready  to  study  attentively 
any  proposal  of  Her  Majesty's  Government,  but  he 
was  himself  decidedly  of  opinion  that  it  might  be 
extremely  unadvisable  to  send  any  explanation  at 
all  of  the  dual  communication." 

Cherif  Pasha  further  suggested  that  the  Khedive 
might  reply  to  the  Note  in  a  sense  which  would 
perhaps  mitigate  its  bad  effects.  Sir  Edward 
Malet  (January  11)  "did  not  see  any  particular 
objection  "  to  this  proposal,  but  his  French  colleague 
would  not  hear  of  it.  He  thought  that  the  Egyptian 
Government  "  had  only  to  listen  to  the  advice  of 
the  two  Powers  and  be  silent." 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  immediate  effect  of  the 
Joint  Note  was  to  bring  to  a  head  the  quarrel 
between  the  Ministry,  backed  up  by  the  Controllers, 
and  the  Chamber  of  Notables.  The  Egyptian 
Budget  was  at  that  time  divided  into  two  parts. 
The  first  part  dealt  with  the  revenues  which  were 
assigned  to  the  payment  of  the  interest  on  the 
Debt.  The  second  part  dealt  with  tlie  remainder 
of  the  revenues,  which  was  left  at  the  disposal 
of  the  Government.  The  Chamber  of  Notables 
claimed  the  right  of  voting  the  second  part  of  the 
Budget.  The  Controllers  and  Cherif  Pasha  ob- 
jected to  this  })roposal,  on  the  ground  that,  if  the 
right  claimed  by  the  Chamber  were  accordetl  to 
them,  the  Council  of  Ministers  and,  therefore,  the 
Controllers,  would  lose  their  hold  over  the  finances 


238  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  ii 

of  tlie  country.  "  There  was  a  chance,"  Sir  Edward 
Malet  telegraphed  on  January  10,  "of  arriving  at 
an  understanding,  but  this  is  apparently  now  passed. 
The  Chamber  may  exercise  its  right  with  modera- 
tion and  good  sense,  but  it  is  a  sanguine  presumption. 
On  tlie  other  hand,  it  is  impossible  now  to  suppress 
the  Chamber  except  by  intervention,  which  1 
earnestly  deprecate.  In  fact,  intervention  could 
only  be  justified  on  the  violation  of  the  Law  of 
Liquidation,  not  on  the  apprehension  of  its  viola- 
tion, and  it  is  right  to  say  that  as  yet  1  have  heard 
of  no  nitention  on  the  part  of  any  one  to  infringe  it." 
When  this  message  reached  Lord  Granville,  he 
made  an  effort  to  release  himself  from  French 
guidance.  As  an  English  Liberal,  he  could  not  do 
otherwise  than  sympathise  to  some  extent  with  the 
development  of  free  institutions  in  Egypt.  He 
appears  also  to  have  seen  that  he  was  being  hurried 
rapidly  along  the  road  which  led  to  increased  inter- 
vention in  the  internal  affjiirs  of  Egypt.  Moreover, 
the  somewhat  overbearing  conduct  of  the  French 
was  distasteful  to  the  more  fair-minded  English 
statesman,  whose  character  and  training  alike  led 
him  to  favour  compromise  and  to  reject  extreme 
measures.  Lord  Granville,  therefore,  telegraphed 
to  Sir  Edward  Malet :  "  Her  Majesty's  Government 
do  not  wish  to  commit  themselves  to  a  total  or  per- 
manent exclusion  of  the  Chamber  of  Notables  from 
handling  the  Budget.  Caution,  however,  will  be 
required  in  dealing  with  it,  regard  being  had  to 
the  pecuniary  interests  on  behalf  of  which  Her 
JNIajesty's  Government  have  been  acting."  The 
French  Goverimient,  however,  speedily  placed  a 
check  on  any  idea  of  making  concessions  to  the 
Chamber.  Lord  Lyons  reported  that  M.  Gam- 
betta  "  expressed  a  very  strong  objection  to  any 
interference  at  all  by  the  Egyptian  Chamber  with 
the  Bud<xet.     He  said  that  it  behoved  France  and 


CH.  XIV     EFFECTS  OF  JOINT  NOTE         239 

England  to  be  very  firm,  lest  any  appearance  of 
vacillation  on  their  part  should  encourage  the  pre- 
tensions of  the  Notables  to  lay  their  hands  on  the 
Budget ;  and  he  argued  that  their  touching  the 
Budget  must  inevitably  lead  to  the  overthrow  of 
the  arrangement  made  by  the  Liquidation  Com- 
mission, to  the  subversion  of  the  French  and 
English  Control,  and  to  the  ruin  of  the  Egyptian 
finances.  Finally,  M.  Gambetta  expressed  his  con- 
viction that  any  explanation  of  the  joint  com- 
munication of  the  two  Governments  would  serve 
to  swell  the  arrogance  of  the  opponents  of  France 
and  England,  and  encourage  them  in  their  designs 
upon  the  Budget." 

Lord  Granville  yielded  to  French  pressure. 
"The  proposal  of  the  Notables,"  he  'vvrote  to  Lord 
Lyons,  "  at  all  events  in  its  present  shape,  cannot  be  , 
agreed  to,  although  there  may  be  points  worthy 
of  consideration  hereafter.  Sir  Edward  JMalet  has, 
therefore,  been  instructed  to  join  his  French 
colleague  in  supporting  Cherif  Pasha  in  his  op- 
position to  the  demand  of  the  Chamber  in  this 
respect."  \\'hen  this  message  was  communicated 
to  M.  Gambetta,  it  became  at  once  apparent  that 
he  had  no  intention  of  leaving  the  door  open  to 
future  concessions.  He  seized  at  once  on  that 
portion  of  Lord  Granville's  message  which  was 
ftivourable  to  his  own  views,  and  rejected  the  rest. 
"  A  very  strong  instruction "  had,  he  said,  been 
already  sent  to  the  French  representative  at  Cairo, 
"  directing  him  to  concert  with  Sir  Edward  ^lalet, 
and  to  insist  upon  Cherif  Pasha  absolutelv  reject- 
ing the  demands  of  the  Notables,  on  the  ground 
that  they  were  incom})atible  with  the  state  of  things 
established  in  Egypt  by  international  engagements 
with  France  and  England."  A  compromise  had 
been  suggested  at  Cairo  to  the  effect  that  the 
rejection  of  the  demands  should  be  accompanied 


240  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

by  an  assurance  that  they  would  be  favourably 
considered  at  some  later  period.  M.  Gambetta, 
however,  told  Lord  Lyons  that  he  had  "  especially 
mstructed  INI.  Sienkiewicz  not  to  listen  for  a 
moment  to  anything  of  the  kind." 

In  spite  of  the  support  given  by  the  two  Powers 
to  Cherif  Pasha  and  the  Controllers,  it  became 
clearer  every  day  that  the  Chamber  of  Notables 
would  not  yield.  On  January  20,  Sir  Edward 
Malet  telegra})hed :  '*  The  Chamber  will  almost 
certainly  vote  the  counter-project  of  Law,  which 
places  the  administrative  and  financial  power  in  its 
hands,  and  amounts  to  Government  by  Conven- 
tion. .  .  .  Armed  intervention  Avill  become  a 
necessity  if  we  adhere  to  the  refusal  to  allow  the 
Budget  to  be  voted  by  the  Chamber." 

Two  days  later  {January  22),  Sir  Edward  JMalet 
asked  Lord  Granville  whether  "  he  might  consider 
proposals  which  had  been  made  to  him  unofficially 
by  the  President  of  the  Chamber,  with  a  view  to 
coming  to  an  arrangement  which  would  accord  to 
delegates  from  the  Chamber  the  right  to  co-operate 
with  tlie  Ministers  in  the  vote  and  examination  of 
the  Budget."  Sir  Auckland  Colvin  thought  "that 
the  negotiation  might  possibly  result  in  a  reason 
able  arrangement,"  but  his  French  colleague,  M.  de 
Blignieres,  "was  strongly  opposed  to  receding  in 
any  way  from  an  absolute  refusal  to  allow  the 
Chamber  to  participate  in  framing  the  Budget." 

No  answer  appears  to  have  been  sent  to  this 
proposal,  but  a  plan  was  elaborated  in  London 
under  which  some  control  over  the  public  revenues 
would  have  been  given  to  the  Chamber  of  Not- 
ables. In  sending  this  scheme  to  Lord  Lyons,  on 
January  25,  Lord  Granville  said  :  "  It  seems  clear 
that  the  claim  of  the  Notables,  in  the  form  in 
which  it  is  presented,  is  unacceptable,  if  not  im- 
practicable.  .  .  .   At  the  same  time,  it  would  be 


CH.  XIV     EFFECTS  OF  JOINT  NOTE         241 

consistent  with  the  desire  which  Her  INIajesty's 
Government  and  that  of  France  entertain  to 
encourage  the  judicious  development  of  the  in- 
stitutions of  Egypt,  and  for  this  purpose,  as  well 
as  for  the  practical  advantage  that  would  be  derived 
from  it,  it  would  seem  advisable  and  probably 
would  not  be  difficult  to  find  matters  confined  to 
the  expetiditure  side  of  the  Budget  in  which  the 
local  knowledge  of  the  Notables  could  be  profitably 
employed." 

When  M.  Gambetta  received  this  communica- 
tion, he  replied  (January  29)  that  the  lYench 
Government  agreed  in  principle  to  Lord  Gran- 
vilfe's  proposals.  Agreement  in  principle  to  the 
proposals  made  by  a  foreign  Government  is 
not  unfrequently  a  diplomatic  euphemism  for 
total  rejection.  Such  it  was  in  the  present  case. 
M.  Gambetta  made  so  many  objections  in  detail 
to  Lord  Granville's  proposals  as  to  render  the 
concessions  to  the  popular  party  in  Egypt  of  little 
value.  More  especially,  he  was  of  opinion  that  the 
Budget  of  the  Police  and  of  the  Administration  of 
the  Wakfs  (religious  endowments)  should  not  be 
under  the  control  of  the  Chamber  of  Notables. 

Lord  Granville's  reply,  which  is  dated  February  2, 
brings  out  clearly  the  different  spirits  which  ani- 
mated the  French  and  the  British  Governments. 
"  Her  Majesty's  Government,"  Lord  Granville 
wrote,  "are  unable,  without  further  information, 
to  offer  an  opinion  upon  the  classification  of  the 
Egyptian  Police,  nor  does  it  appear  to  them  tliat 
the  Governments  of  England  and  France  are  called 
upon  to  interfere  in  the  question  of  JNIusulman 
religious  foundations,  in  which  they  do  not  see 
that  their  interests  are  afllected,  and  which  would 
appear  at  first  sight  to  be  a  matter  with  which 
the  Chamber  of  Notables  would  be  peculiarly  com- 
petent to  deal.   .  ,  .   Her  Majesty's  Government 

VOL.  I  R 


242  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  n 

apprehend  that  neither  of  these  are  questions  upon 
which  it  rests  with  the  Governments  of  England 
and  Franee  to  give  or  withhold  privileges,  but  if 
the  Egyptian  authorities  are  disposed  to  concede 
them,  they  do  not  think  that  it  is  for  them  to 
object." 

It  is  clear  from  this  correspondence  that 
M.  Gambetta  wished  to  interfere  in  every  detail 
of  the  Egyptian  administration,  even  although  no 
semblance  of  international  right  could  be  invoked 
to  justify  such  interference.  Lord  Granville,  on 
the  other  hand,  wished  to  keep  within  the  strict 
limits  of  international  right,  and  to  deal  in  a  fair 
spirit  of  compromise  with  the  national  movement 
in  Egypt. 

Whilst  these  negotiations  were  going  on  in 
London  and  Paris,  Sir  Edward  INIalet  and 
M.  Sienkiewicz  made  a  written  communication 
to  Ch^rif  Paslia  setting  forth  the  attitude  which 
the  British  and  French  Governments  intended  to 
adopt  towards  the  Chamber  of  Notables.  They 
explained  "that  the  Chamber  could  not  vote  the 
Budi>:et  without  infrino'iu'jj  tlie  Decrees  establishinoj 
the  Control,  and  that  an  innovation  of  the  nature 
proposed  by  the  Chamber  could  not  be  introduced 
without  the  assent  of  the  English  and  French 
Governments."  In  order,  however,  not  to  close 
the  door  to  a  possible  understanding,  the  two 
Consuls- General  added  that  "if  the  Government 
of  the  Khedive  deemed  fit  to  open  negotiations 
on  the  subject,  they  were  prepared  to  transmit 
its  proposals  to  their  respective  Governments,  but 
they  considered  that  such  a  negotiation  should  be 
on  the  understanding  that  the  Government  and 
the  Chamber  were  agreed  with  regard  to  the  rest 
of  the  proposed  Organic  Law,"  When  Cherif 
Pasha  received  this  connnunication,  he  wrote 
(February  1)  to  tlie  Chamber  explaining  the  situa- 


CH.  XIV     EFFECTS  OF  JOINT  NOTE         243 

tion,  and  requesting  them  "to  formulate  a  basis 
of  negotiation  with  the  Powers." 

This  conununication  brouglit  matters  to  a  head. 
On  February  2,  a  deputation  from  the  Cliamber 
waited  on  the  Khedive  and  requested  him  to 
change  his  Ministers.  "  His  Highness  asked  on 
what  law  of  the  Chamber  they  founded  their 
right  to  make  the  request.  This  they  could  not 
answer,  but  insisted  on  a  change.  They  also  pre- 
sented a  copy  of  the  draft  Organic  Law  of  the 
Chamber,  and  requested  His  Highness  to  sign, 
saying  that  the  right  to  \ote  the  Budget  was  not 
one  for  discussion  with  foreign  Powers.  His 
Highness  dismissed  them,  saying  that  he  would 
consider  their  request." 

It  was  clear  that  a  change  of  Ministry  was 
inevitable.  The  Kliedive  was  obliged  to  yield 
because,  as  he  told  Sir  Edward  Malet,  "  he  had 
no  force  to  resist."  Later  on  the  same  day,  the 
Khedive  received  the  deputation  again  and  asked 
them  to  "name  the  persons  whom  they  desired  as 
Ministers.  This  they  at  first  declined  to  do  on 
the  ground  that  the  selection  was  the  prerogative 
of  His  Highness."  On  the  following  day,  how- 
ever, a  further  deputation  from  the  Chamber 
waited  on  the  Khedive,  and  stated  that  they 
wanted  Mahmoud  Pasha  Sami,  who  was  then 
Minister  of  War,  to  be  appointed  President  of 
the  Council.  He  was  accordingly  appointed  on 
February  5.  Arabi  Bey  was,  at  the  same  time, 
named  Minister  of  War.  The  other  members  of 
tlie  Cabinet,  except  Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi,  wlio 
assumed  the  direction  of  Foreign  Affairs,  were 
members  of  the  National  or  Military  parties,  terms 
which  had  now  become  wholly  synonymous. 

The  effect  produced  by  tlie  change  of  Ministry 
on  the  views  of  the  Khedivial  party  in  Egypt  Avas 
marked.     Until  then,  Chdrif  Pasha  had  entertained 


2U  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  u 

hopes  of  guiding  the  movement,  and  had  stood  out 
against  any  idea  of  armed  Turkish  intervention. 
He  now  informed  Sir  Edward  Malet  that  "the 
only  issue  froin  the  situation  was  the  immediate 
despatch  to  Egypt  of  a  Commissioner  from  tlie 
Porte,  to  be  followed  as  soon  as  possible  by  a 
Turkish  force.  .  .  .  He  thought  that  by  acting 
with  tact,  and  accepting  any  Ministry  the  Chamber 
asked  for,  the  moment  could  be  tided  over  without 
public  disturbance;  but  he  was  of  opinion  that,  as 
the  army  had  again  exercised  dictatorship,  there 
was  no  hope  for  the  future  unless  it  were  rendered 
powerless  by  force."  The  Khedive  shared  Cherif 
Pasha's  views. 

As  events  developed,  it  became  more  and  more 
clear  that  M.  Gambetta  wished  to  force  on  an 
Anglo-French  occupation  of  Egypt.  On  January 
25,  Lord  Granville  wrote  to  Lord  Lyons  in  the 
following  terms  : — 

"The  French  Ambassador  told  me  yesterday 
eveninfj  that  M.  Gambetta  had  written  to*  him 
expressing  his  opinion  that  it  was  desirable,  in 
view  of  the  probable  crisis  in  Egypt,  that  the 
English  and  French  Governments  should  come  to 
an  understanding  as  to  the  course  which  they 
should  pursue.  M.  Gambetta,  it  appeared,  had 
not  in  his  letter  given  his  opinion  as  to  what  steps 
should  be  taken,  but  he  was  desirous  to  know  the 
views  of  Her  Majesty's  Government.  Any  Turkish 
intervention  was,  in  ]\L  Gambetta's  opinion,  the 
worst  possible  solution.  M.  Gambetta's  attention 
had  been  called  to  a  plan,  which  had  appeared  in 
the  press,  of  calling  in  the  co-operation  of  Europe. 
M.  Gambetta  remarked  tliat  the  position  of 
England  in  Egypt,  in  consequence  of  her  Indian 
Dossessions,  was  unique.  That  of  France,  owing 
to  her  being  a  great  African  Power,  and  to  other 
circumstances,    was    of    tlie    greatest   importance. 


CH  XIV     EFFECTS  OF  JOINT  NOTE         245 

Besides  this  normal  position  of  the  two  Powers, 
arrangements  had  been  entered  into  by  Egypt, 
which  had  been  acquiesced  in  by  the  European 
Powers  generally.  It  would,  in  JNI.  Gambetta's 
opinion,  be  most  disadvantageous  to  Egypt  and  to 
the  two  Powers  that  these  arrangements  should 
be  in  any  way  weakened." 

When  I^ord  Granville  received  this  communica- 
tion, it  was  impossible  to  ignore  any  longer  the 
radical  difference  of  opinion  which  existed  between 
the  British  and  French  Governments.  In  a  despatcli 
to  Lord  Lyons,  dated  January  30,  he  laid  down 
the  policy  of  tlie  British  Government :  "  Her 
Majesty's  Government,"  he  said,  "desire  to  main- 
tain the  rights  of  the  sovereign  and  vassal  as  now 
established  between  the  Sultan  and  the  Khedive, 
to  secure  the  fulfilment  of  international  engage- 
ments, and  to  protect  the  development  of  institu- 
tions within  this  limit.  They  believe  that  the 
French  Government  share  these  views.  The 
question  remains — If  in  Egypt  a  state  of  disorder 
should  occur  which  would  be  incompatible  with 
this  policy,  what  measures  should  be  taken  to 
meet  the  difficulty  ?  .  .  .  It  is  to  be  regretted, 
but  it  appears  to  Her  Majesty's  Government 
apparent,  that  if  such  a  contingency  unfortunatelv 
occurred,  there  are  objections  to  every  possible 
course.  The  question  remains  —  which  of  them 
offers  the  least  inconvenience  ?  .  .  .  Her  Majesty's 
Government  have  a  strong  objection  to  the  occupa- 
tion by  themselves  of  Egypt.  It  would  create 
opposition  in  Egypt  and  in  Turkey ;  it  would 
excite  the  suspicion  and  jealousy  of  other  European 
Powers,  who  would.  Her  Majesty's  Government 
have  reason  to  believe,  make  counter-demonstra- 
tions on  their  own  part,  which  might  possibly  lead 
to  very  serious  complications,  and  it  would  throw 
upon    them    the    responsibility    of    governing    a 


246  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

country  inhabited  by  Orientals  under  very  adverse 
circumstances. 

"They  beUeve  that  such  an  occupation  would 
be  as  distasteful  to  the  French  nation  as  the  sole 
occupation  of  Egypt  by  the  French  would  be  to 
this  country. 

"They  have  carefully  considered  the  question 
of  a  joint  occupation  by  England  and  France,  and 
they  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that,  although 
some  of  the  objections  above  stated  might  be 
lessened,  others  would  be  very  seriously  aggravated 
by  such  a  course. 

"  With  regard  to  Turkish  occupation.  Her 
Majesty's  Government  agree  that  it  would  be  a 
great  evil,  but  thev  are  not  convinced  that  it  would 
entail  political  dangers  so  great  as  those  attending 
the  other  alternatives  which  have  been  mentioned 
above.  .  .  .  The  most  important  point  is  that  the 
union  of  the  two  countries  should  be  both  real  and 
apparent. 

"M.  Gambetta  entertains  objections  to  any 
further  admission  of  the  other  European  Powers 
to  interference  in  Egyptian  aflairs.  Her  JNIajesty's 
Government  agree  that  England  and  France  have 
an  exceptional  position  in  that  country  owing  to 
actual  circumstances  and  to  international  agree- 
ments, and  they  also  believe  that  inconvenience 
might  arise  from  many  Powers  being  called  u})on 
to  join  in  any  administrative  functions  ;  but  they 
would  submit  for  the  consideration  of  the  French 
Government  whether  it  would  not  be  desirable 
to  enter  into  some  communication  with  the  other 
Powers  as  to  the  most  desirable  mode  of  dealing 
with  a  state  of  things  which  ap})ears  likely  to 
interfere  with  the  Firmans  of  the  Sultan  and  the 
international  engagements  of  Egypt." 

Tiie  day  after  this  despatch  was  written  (January 
31),   M.   Ciambetta  resigned  office.     He  was  sue- 


CH.  XIV     EFFECTS  OF  JOINT  NOTE  247 

ceeded  by  ^I.  de  Freycinet,  under  whose  auspices 
a  complete  change  took  place  in  the  Egyptian 
policy  of  the  French  Government. 

During;  the  short  time  M.  Gambetta  was  in 
office,  he  exercised  a  decisive  and  permanent  in- 
fluence on  the  future  course  of  Egyptian  history. 
Lord  Granville,  M.  de  Freycinet,  and  others  might 
do  their  best  to  put  back  the  hands  of  the  clock, 
but  it  was  impossible  that  they  should  ever 
restore  the  status  quo  ante  Gambetta.  When  he 
assumed  office,  the  Egyptians  entertained  con- 
fidence in  the  intentions  of  England  and  France, 
especially  in  those  of  England.  The  amalgamation 
of  the  military  and  national  parties  in  Egypt  was 
not  complete.  The  Egyptian  movement  was  not 
altogether  beyond  control.  When  he  left  office, 
England  and  France  were  alike  mistrusted  by  the 
Egyptians.  The  ascendency  of  the  military  over 
the  national  party  was  complete.  Any  hope  of 
controlling  the  Egyptian  movement,  save  by  the 
exercise  of  material  force,  had  well-nigh  disappeared. 
Possibly,  the  movement  was  incapable  of  being 
controlled,  but  an  ex  post  facto  conjecture  of  this 
sort  hardly  appears  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  plea 
that,  before  reverting  to  extreme  measures,  every 
possible  endeavour  should  have  been  made  to 
control  it. 

In  the  opinion  of  many  competent  autiiorities, 
M.  Gambetta  adopted  a  mistaken  policy.  But 
there  are  always  at  least  two  sides  to  every  ques- 
tion. It  will  be  as  well,  therefore,  to  examine 
the  case  from  JNI.  Gambettas  point  of  view.  It 
was  stated  by  his  friend  and  political  su]:>porter, 
M.  Joseph  Keinach,  in  an  article,  published  in 
the  Nineteenth  Century  of  December  1882. 

One  portion  of  M.  Reinach's  argument  may  be 
very  briefly  treated.     He  complained  that  there  was 


248  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  ii 

a  want  of  "sincerity  and  cordiality"  in  the  dealings 
of  the  British  Foreign  Office  with  France.  Also 
he  thought  that  public  opinion  in  England  "ex- 
perienced the  influence  of  certain  Tories,  who 
believed  that  it  would  be  best  to  slacken  pro- 
ceedings as  much  as  possible,  in  the  hope  of  find- 
ing some  opportunity  for  entering  the  Nile  valley 
without  France."  As  to  this  argument,  all  I  have 
to  say  is  that  I  believe  I  have  seen  every  official 
document, whether  published  or  unpublished,  which 
is  in  the  possession  of  the  British  Foreign  Office, 
bearing  upon  the  questions  now  under  discussion. 
I  have  also  had  ample  opportunities  of  ascertaining, 
by  personal  and  verbal  communications,  the  views 
of  the  principal  actors  on  the  scene.  These  events 
are  now  matters  of  past  history.  Many  of  the 
principal  persons  concerned  are  dead.  Had  there 
been  any  design  of  outwitting  France,  such  as 
M.  Reinach  insinuated,  I  certainly  should  not  be  de- 
terred by  any  false  spirit  of  patriotism  from  stating 
the  true  facts  of  the  case.  I  am,  however,  able  to 
state  with  the  utmost  confidence  that  the  insinua- 
tions of  M.  Reinach  •  are  without  a  shadow  of 
foundation.  The  policy  of  the  British  Government 
at  the  time  may  or  may  not  have  been  mistaken, 
but  it  was  certainly  sincere.  When  Lord  Gran- 
ville deprecated  a  British  or  Anglo-French  armed 
intervention  in  Egypt,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
he  meant  what  he  said,  and,  moreover,  that  he  had 
behind  him  the  preponderating  weight  of  British 
public  opinion. 

Leaving  aside  this  collateral  issue,  I  proceed  to 
state  M.  Reinach's  main  argument.  He  thought 
that  "grave  mistakes"  were  committed  by  the 
British  Government.  The  British  Foreign  Office 
failed  to  understand  how  dangerous  the  situation 
in  Egypt  had  become  when  the  Chamber  of 
Notables  met.     Neither  Mr.  Gladstone  nor  Lord 


CH.  XIV     EFFECTS  OF  JOINT  NOTE         249 

Granville  saw  that  "the  Chamber  of  Notables  vs^as 
a  sham  assembly,  Ariibi  an  ambitious  intriguer, 
encouraged  and  suborned  by  the  fanatic  Council 
of  Constantinople,  and  the  national  party  a  ludi- 
crous invention  of  some  badly  informed  or  too  well 
paid  journalist."  M.  Gambetta,  on  the  other  hand, 
"siuiply  made  use  of  his  eyes  and  ears."  He  saw 
all  these  things  plainly  enough.  "The  hesitation 
of  the  English  Government,"  M.  Reinach  con- 
tinued, "to  suppress  the  first  acts  of  the  insurrec- 
tion plotted  by  the  military  camarilla  at  Cairo  was 
much  more  than  a  lack  of  cordiality  towards  us 
(the  French)  and  our  alliance ;  it  was,  as  far  as 
Egyptian  matters  are  concerned,  pernicious  and 
deplorable  to  the  highest  degree.  It  encouraged 
the  spirit  of  rebellion  among  Arabi's  partisans.  It 
helped  to  kindle  and  rouse  a  fire,  which  a  bucket 
of  water  shed  at  the  proper  time  would  have 
extinguished,  into  a  conflagration  where  lives  and 
treasures  have  been  uselessly  destroyed." 

In  other  words,  to  put  the  matter  plainly. 
M.  Gambetta  was  convinced,  as  early  as  December 
1881,  that  armed  intervention  of  some  sort  in 
Egypt  would,  sooner  or  later,  becon  e  necessary. 
Therefore,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  take  steps  which 
he  knew  might  and  probably  would  precipitate  the 
final  and,  as  he  thought,  inevitable  conclusion. 

It  is  impossible  to  prove  that  JNI.  Gambetta  was 
wrong.  It  is  equally  impossible  to  prove  that  he 
was  right.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Artibi 
movement  was  in  some  respects  a  boiiajide  national 
movement.  There  can  be  equally  little  doubt  that, 
if  Arabi  and  his  followers  had  been  left  at  the  head 
of  affairs  without  any  control,  a  state  of  the  utmost 
confusion  would  have  been  produced  in  Egypt,  and 
that  eventually  armed  foreign  intervention  of  some 
sort  might  have  become  necessary.  In  December 
1881,   however,   the    only  practical    question   was, 


250  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

would  it  be  possible  to  control  and  guide  the 
movement  ?  It  is  not  certain  that  it  would  have 
been  impossible  to  do  so.  A  few  able  Europeans, 
like  Sir  Auckland  Colvin,  by  the  exercise  of  tact 
and  judgment,  by  encouraging  the  civil  elements 
of  Egyptian  society,  and  by  the  exhibition  of  some 
sympathy  with  reasonable  native  aspirations,  might' 
possibly  in  time  have  acquired  a  sufficient  degree 
of  moral  control  over  the  movement  to  have 
obviated  the  necessity  for  armed  intervention.  In 
any  case,  on  the  assumption  that  armed  interven- 
tion was  a  solution  to  be  avoided,  save  as  a  last 
resource,  the  experiment  was  worth  trying.  It  is 
impossible,  however,  to  read  the  correspondence  on 
this  subject  without  seeing  that  M.  Gambetta  did 
not  regard  armed  intervention,  provided  it  was 
Anglo-French  and  not  Turkish  intervention,  in 
this  light.  On  the  contrary,  he  wished  to  brhig 
about  a  state  of  things  which  would  render  it 
necessary.  Obviously,  therefore,  from  his  point  of 
view,  the  experiment  was  not  worth  trying.  But 
his  conclusion  cannot  command  assent  unless  his 
premises  be  accepted,  and  there  are  strong  grounds 
for  holding  that  his  premises  were  wrong.  Tlie 
essential  point,  at  all  events  from  the  British  point 
of  view,  was  to  avoid  any  armed  intervention. 

Mr.  John  Morley  summed  up  the  case  in  the 
following  words,  which  appear  to  be  correct.  "  It 
is  impossible,"  he  said,  "to  conceive  a  situation 
that  more  imperatively  called  for  caution,  circum- 
spection, and  deference  to  the  knowledge  of 
observers  on  the  scene,  or  one  that  was  actually 
handled  with  greater  rashness  and  hurry.  INI. 
Gambetta  had  made  u])  his  mind  that  the  military 
movement  was  leading  to  the  abyss,  and  that  it 
must  be  peremptorily  arrested.  It  may  be  that  he 
was  right  in  supposing  that  the  army,  which  had 
first  found  its  power  in  the  time  of  Ismail,  would 


OH.  XIV     EFFECTS  OF  JOINT  NOTE         251 

go  from  bad  to  worse.  But  everything  turned  upon 
the  possibihty  of  pulling  up  the  army,  without 
arousinff  other  elements  more  dangerous  still.  M. 
Gainbetta's  impatient  policy  was  worked  out  in  his 
own  head  without  reference  to  the  conditions  on  the 
scene,  and  the  result  was  what  might  have  been 
expected."  ^ 

It  may  be  conceded  to  M.  Reinach  that  at  this 
time  "  grave  mistakes "  were  committed  by  the 
British  Government  in  respect  to  Egypt.  An 
Englishman  who  holds,  as  Lord  Granville  held,  that 
a  British  or  Anglo-French  occupation  of  Egypt  was 
above  all  things  to  be  avoided,  may  with  perfect  con- 
sistency indicate  those  mistakes.  But  a  Frenchman, 
more  especially  a  partisan  of  M.  Gambetta,  has  no 
right  to  criticise  them.  His  mouth  should  be  closed, 
for  "the  hesitations,  indecisions,  perplexities,  half- 
measures,  and  delays  which  characterised  English 
tactics,"  and  of  which  M.  Reinaeli  complained,  were 
due  to  the  strong  desire  of  the  British  Government 
to  co-operate  witli  the  French.  Lord  Granville 
honestly  wished  to  avoid  any  armed  intervention  in 
Egypt,  and  as  honestly  wished,  if  any  intervention 
eventually  became  necessary,  that  the  arms  em- 
ployed should  be  those  of  the  legitimate  Suzerain  of 
Egypt,  and  not  those  of  France  or  England.  Had 
he  been  left  from  the  first  to  act  according  to  the 
dictates  of  his  own  judgment,  it  is  possible  that  no 
foreign  occupation  would  have  been  necessary,  and 
it  is  more  than  probable  that  no  British  occupation 
would  have  taken  place.  But  he  allowed  himself 
to  be  hifluenced  by  his  French  colleague,  whose 
strong  will  and  rash  policy  dragged  him  to  such  an 
extent  along  a  road  which  he  had  no  wish  to 
follow,  that  eventually  retreat  became  impossible. 
Englishmen  may  criticise  Lord  Granville  for  yield- 
ing too  much  to  France.     French  criticism  can  only 

1   Fortnightly  Review,  July  1882. 


252  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

be  based  either  on  the  assumption  that  JNI.  Gam- 
betta's  action  was  best  calculated  to  prevent  a  foreign 
occupation,  or  on  the  allegation  that  an  Anglo- 
French  occupation  of  Egypt  was  in  itself  to  be 
desired  as  a  preventive  against  evils  which  might 
arise,  rather  than  as  a  cure  for  evils  which  liad 
already  arisen.  The  verdict  of  subsequent  events 
has  disproved  the  assumption.  The  allegation  is  a 
matter  of  opinion.  M.  Gambetta  and  M.  lleinach 
held  one  opinion  on  this  point.  Lord  Granville 
held  another,  and,  as  I  venture  to  think,  a  wiser 
opinion. 

During  the  parliamentary  discussions  which 
took  place  in  England,  a  great  deal  of  ingenious 
special  pleading  was  devoted  to  showing  that  the 
occupation  of  Egypt  was  due,  not  to  any  action 
taken  in  1881  and  1882,  but  to  the  appointment 
of  European  Controllers  in  1879.^  The  facts  con- 
nected with  this  subject  may  be  explained  by  a 
metaphor.  Suppose  a  man  to  be  suffering  from  a 
severe  but  not  necessarily  fatal  disease.  He  calls 
in  a  doctor  who  prescribes  some  mild  remedies,  and 
warns  him  that,  unless  he  be  careful,  the  disease 
will  increase  in  virulence.  He  fails  to  profit  by 
the  advice  which  he  has  received,  and  in  conse- 
quence gets  worse.  He  then  calls  in  another 
doctor,  who  abandons  the  mild  treatment  of  his 
predecessor,  and  ajjplies  some  more  drastic  remedy. 
The  remedy,  far  from  producing  any  good  effect, 
aggravates  the  disease,  and  the  patient  dies.  Under 
these  circumstances,  the  friends  of  the  patient,  pro- 
vided they  be  impartially  minded,  will  not  inquire 
carefully  into  the  suitability  or  otherwise  of  the 
remedies  applied  by  the  first  doctor.  They  will 
hold  with  reason  that  the  patient's  death  was 
hastened,  if  indeed  it  was  not  caused,  by  the  heroic 
but    mistaken   treatment   of  the   second    medical 

»   Vide  ante,  p.  160. 


CH.XIV     EFFECTS  OF  JOINT  NOTE         253 

adviser.  In  the  case  of  Egypt,  Lord  Salisbury 
stood  in  the  place  of  the  first  doctor.  Lord 
Granville,  acting  under  the  advice  of  his  impetuous 
French  colleague,  stood  in  the  place  of  the  second. 

Similarly,  in  France  the  mistakes  made  by 
M.  Gambetta  were  forgotten,  and  the  British  occu- 
pation of  Egypt  was  subsequently  attributed  by 
M.  Joseph  Reinach  and  other  Gambettists  to  the 
fact  that  "the  demeanour  of  the  Freycinet  ]\!inis':ry 
was  unworthy  of  France  and  of  the  Republic." 
Whether  this  accusation  is  true  or  the  reverse  is 
a  matter  for  Frenchmen  to  decide.  To  an  English- 
man it  would  appear  that  the  fact  of  JVI.  de 
Freycinet's  having  been  opposed  to  an  Anglo- 
French  occupation  of  Egypt  does  not  relieve 
M.  Gambetta  from  the  responsibility  of  having 
largely  contributed  to  create  a  situation  from  which 
it  was  well-nigh  impossible  to  escape  except  by 
means  of  armed  intervention  of  one  sort  or  another. 

The  atmosphere  of  party  politics,  whether  in 
France  or  England,  is  not  congenial  to  the 
formation  of  an  impartial  judgment.  A  Minister, 
who  is  in  the  thick  of  a  tough  parliamentary 
struggle,  must  use  whatever  arguments  he  can  to 
defend  his  cause  without  inquiring  too  closely 
whether  they  are  good,  bad,  or  indifferent.  How- 
ever good  they  may  be,  they  will  probably  not 
convince  his  political  opponents,  and  they  can 
scarcely  be  so  bad  as  not  to  carry  some  sort  of 
conviction  to  the  minds  of  those  who  are  pre- 
disposed to  support  him.  Politicians  who  are  not 
bound  by  any  strong  party  ties  can  weigh  the 
arguments  in  a  somewhat  more  judicial  spirit. 
The  conclusions  stated  in  this  chapter  will,  it 
is  hoped,  commend  themselves  to  those  who 
stand  outside  the  immediate  sphere  of  political 
partisanship. 


CHAPTER    XV 

THE   ARXbI    ministry 

February-May  1882 

Proposal   to   revise   the   Org;tnic    Law — Mr.    ^^'^ilfrid    Blunt — M.   de 

Blignieres  resigns — Concessions  made  to  the  army — Disorganisa- 
tion in  the  provinces  —  The  Porte  protests  against  the  Joint 
Note — The  Powers  are  invited  to  an  exchange  of  views — M.  de 
Freycinet  wishes  to  depose  the  Khedive — Lord  Granville  proposes 
to  send  Financial  Commissioners  to  Egypt — Alleged  conspiracy  to 
murder  Arabi — The  Ministers  resign,  but  resume  office — M.  de 
Freycinet  assents  to  Turkish  intervention  —  Arabi  requested  to 
leave  Egypt — He  refuses  to  do  so — The  Ministers  again  resign— 
The  Khedive  reinstates  Arab! — And  asks  for  a  Turkish  Com- 
missioner. 

The  official  transactions  of  the  next  four  months 
are  recorded  in  several  ponderous  volumes,  but 
the  main  facts  admit  of  being  very  briefly  stated. 

The  Chamber  of  Notables,  whose  powers  were 
at  once  increased  by  the  new  Ministry,  was,  Sir 
Auckland  Colvin  wrote  on  February  13,  "wholly 
under  the  influence  of  a  mutinous  and  successful 
army."  Some  well-meaning  proposals  were  put 
forward  by  tlie  British  Government  with  a  view 
to  revising  the  Organic  Law  in  a  sense  which 
would  be  liberal  but,  at  the  same  time,  would  not 
give  excessive  powers  to  the  Chamber.  A  few 
months  earlier,  a  suii:i>:estion  of  this  sort  miijlit 
perliaps  have  led  to  some  useful  resiflt.  But  the 
propitious  moment  had  been  allowed  to  pass, 
and  it  was  now  too  late  to  stem  the  Egyptian 
Revolution,  for   such   it  really  was,  by  redrafting 

254 


ctt  XV         THE  ARABI  ministry  255 

an  article  in  a  Khedivial  Decree.  "It  would  be 
childish,"  M.  de  Freycinet  thought  (April  20),  "to 
be  discussing  the  pattern  of  a  carpet  when  the 
house  in  which  it  was  laid  down  was  in  flames."  Sir 
Auckland  Colvin's  opinion  was  no  less  decisive  and 
his  metaphor  no  less  apt.  "The  house,"  he  said, 
"is  tumbling  about  our  ears,  and  the  moment  is 
not  propitious  for  debating  whether  we  would  like 
another  storey  added  to  it.  Until  civil  authority  is 
reassured  and  the  military  despotism  destroyed, 
discussion  of  the  Organic  Law  seems  premature 
and  useless." 

The  civil  elements  of  the  national  party  still 
made  some  slight  show  of  independence,  but  the 
tendencies  which  were  at  work  to  ensure  the  pre- 
dominance of  the  mutinous  army  were  too  strong 
to  be  resisted.  Not  only  did  Arabi  receive  en- 
couragement from  the  Sultan,  but  the  advice  of 
English  sympathisers  with  the  nationalist  cause 
tended  to  consolidate  the  union  between  the 
military  and  civil  elements  of  the  movement. 

Of  these  sympathisers,  the  most  prominent  was 
Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt.  Mr.  Blunt  had  hved  a  good 
deal  with  Mohammedans,  and  took  a  warm  interest 
in  all  that  related  to  themselves  and  their  relio-ion. 
He  appears  to  have  believed  in  the  possibility  of 
a  regeneration  of  Islam  on  Islamic  principles.  It 
chanced  that  he  was  in  Egypt  during  the  winter 
of  1881-82.  He  threw  himself,  with  all  the  en- 
thusiasm of  a  poetic  nature,  into  the  Arabist  cause, 
and  became  the  guide,  philosopher,  and  friend  of 
Arabi  and  his  coadjutors.  Mr.  Blunt  saw  that 
he  had  to  do  with  a  movement  which  was  in 
some  degree  unquestionably  national.  He  failed 
to  appreciate  sufficiently  the  fact  that  the  pre- 
dominance of  the  military  party  would  be  fatal 
to  the  national  character  of  the  movement. 
At   one   period   of   the   proceedings,    his   services 


256  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

were  utilised  as  an  intermediary  between  Sir 
Edward  JNIalet  and  the  nationalists.  The  selec- 
tion was  unfortunate,  for  it  is  abundantly  clear 
from  the  account  which  Mr.  Blunt  has  given 
of  his  own  proceedings^  that,  with  tiie  exception 
of  some  knowledge  of  the  Arabic  language,  he 
possessed  none  of  the  qualifications  necessary  to 
ensure  success  in  the  execution  of  so  difficult  and 
delicate  a  mission.  He  advised  the  nationalists  to 
hold  to  the  army  or  they  would  be  "annexed  to 
Europe."^  The  advice  was,  without  doubt,  well- 
meant,  but  it  was  certainly  inopportune  and  mis- 
chievous. Whatever  danger  of  "annexation  to 
Europe  "  existed  lay  rather  in  the  direction  of  the 
consolidation  of  the  national  and -military  parties 
than  in  that  of  their  separation.  A  trained 
politician  would  have  seen  this.  INIr.  Blunt  had 
had  no  political  training  of  any  value.  He  was 
an  enthusiast  who  dreamt  dreams  of  an  Arab 
Utopia.  He,  therefore,  failed  to  see  what  Cherif 
Pasha  and  others  on  the  spot  saw.  He  worked 
earnestly  and  to  the  best  of  his  abilities  to  prevent 
a  foreign  occupation  of  Egypt.  But  the  impartial 
historian  must  perforce  record  his  name  amongst 
those  who,  by  ill-advised  action  at  a  critical  moment, 
unwittingly  contributed  to  bring  about  the  solution 
which  they  most  of  all  deplored. 

Terrorised  by  a  mutinous  army  on  the  one  side, 
urged,  on  the  other  side,  by  their  English  advisers, 
whose  weight  with  the  British  public  they  greatly 

'  Blunt's  Secret  Hisfoiy  of  the  British  Occupiition  of  Egypt. 

^  A  letter  from  Dr.  Schweinfurth,  tlie  well-known  botanist,  was 
published  in  the  Times  of  June  21,  18<52.  He  related  an  interview 
he  had  had  with  some  members  of  the  Chamber.  lie  commended  their 
moderation  and  good  sense,  and  then  went  on  to  say :  "  From  England 
they  expect  more  for  their  cause  than  from  France.  They  imagine 
that  in  England  you  are  all  of  the  same  complexion  as  Mr.  Blunt, 
or  at  least,  as  Sir  William  (Jregory.  At  Ghirgeh,  they  showed  me 
with  much  satisfaction  Mr.  lilunt's  telegram  addressed  to  all  the 
members  of  the  Egyptian  Chamber:  *Si  vous  allez  vous  de'sunir  de 
I'arme'e,  I'Europe  vous  amiexera.'  "    See  also  Secret  Jliatory,  etc.,  p.  271. 


CH.XV         THE  ARABI  ministry  257 

overrated,^  to  seek  salvation  in  submitting  to 
military  dictation,  it  can  be  no  matter  for  sur- 
prise that  the  ignorant  and  inexperienced  men 
who  feebly  represented  genuine  constitutionalism 
sank  into  insignificance  and  ranged  themselves  on 
the  side  of  the  mutineers. 

The  power  of  the  Controllers  disappeared.  Sir 
Edward  JNlalet  wrote  to  Lord  Granville  (February 
20)  that  he  thought  it  had  "become  a  question 
whether  the  Control  should  be  maintained,  now 
that  it  existed  only  in  name."  M.  de  Blignieres 
resigned  his  appointment. 

Mahmoud  Pasha  Sami,  the  new  President  of 
the  Egyptian  Council,  shared  the  usual  fate  of 
revolutionary  leaders.  He  was  violently  attacked 
because  he  failed  to  carry  out  his  engagement  that 
all  Europeans  should  be  turned  out  of  Egyptian 
employment.  Arabi,  Sir  Auckland  Colvin  wrote 
(February  27),  warned  him  that  "he  was  like  a 
man  trying  to  balance  himself  on  a  plank."  Every 
effort  was  made  to  keep  the  army  in  a  good  humour. 
Fresh  battalions  were  raised.  The  pay  of  the 
officers  and  men  was  increased  without  reference 
to  the  sufficiency  of  the  revenue  to  meet  the  fresh 
expenditure  thus  incurred.  Hundreds  of  officers 
were  promoted.  The  Khedive  pointed  out  that 
"the  law  required  the  previous  examination  of 
officers  under  the  rank  of  full  Colonel,"  but  Arabi 
was  ready  with  an  explanation.  The  officers,  he 
said,  "were  of  such  well-known  capacity  that 
examination  was  unnecessary.  Moreover" — and 
this  was  perhaps  more  to  the  point — "  they  refused 
to  be  examined,  and  were  supported  in  their  refusal 
by  the  rest  of  the  army."  The  Khedive  was  obliged 
to  yield.  Clearly,  as  Sir  Ciiarles  Cookson  wrote, 
"all  the  pretended  aspirations  for  legality  and 
constitutional    liberty    had    ended   in   substituting 

^  See  Appendix  to  this  chapter. 
VOL.  I  S 


258  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

tlie  indisputable  will  of  the  army  for  all  lawful 
authority." 

In  the  provinces,  complete  disorganisation  pre- 
vailed. The  INIoudirs  had  lost  all  authority.  At 
JNIansourah  and  elsewliere,  JNIr.  Ilowsell,  the  English 
administrator  of  the  State  Domains,  found  that 
"  all  power  was  paralysed."  In  the  neighbourhood 
of  Zagazig,  the  British  Vice  -  Consul  reported, 
**  armed  bands  continue  to  attack  and  pillage 
villages."  An  active  trade  was  carried  on  in  fire- 
arms. At  Damietta,  the  black  soldiers  of  Abdul- 
Al's  regiment  robbed  and  ill-treated  the  inhabitants 
with  impunity.  An  unwise  attempt  was  made  by 
the  Government  to  deprive  the-  Bedouins  of  the 
privileges  which  they  had  enjoyed  since  the  days  of 
Mehemet  Ali,  but  the  heads  of  the  various  tribes 
met  on  April  8,  and  declared  that  they  would  allow 
no  interference  in  their  affairs.  Tlie  banks  would 
no  longer  lend  large  sums  of  money  ;  petty  usurers 
asked  as  much  as  6  per  cent  monthly  interest  on 
small  loans.  Land  was  everywhere  losing  in  value. 
Sir  Edward  INIalet  quoted  one  example  of  land, 
bought  a  few  months  ])reviously  for  £G(),  being 
sold  at  £28  an  acre.  An  officer  of  the  army  told 
the  peasants  at  Zagazig  that  the  acres  belong- 
ing to  their  landlords  "  were  theirs  by  right."  In 
a  word,  all  the  usual  symptoms  of  revolution  were 
prevalent  in  Egypt.  The  moderate  men  became 
alarmed.  "  The  disorganised  and  uneasy  state  of 
the  provinces,"  Sir  Charles  Cookson  wrote,  "has 
caused  many  of  the  Notables  and  others  who  have 
a  stake  in  the  country  to  draw  back  from  the 
hastily  formed  alliance  with  the  military  party, 
and  seek  for  other  means  of  escaping  from  its 
domination." 

It  is  now  time  to  return  to  the  history  of  diplo- 
matic action.  The  Porte  protested  against  the 
Joint    Note.       The    answer   of    the    four    Powers 


CH.XV         THE  ARABI  MINISTRY  259 

(Russia,  Austria,  Germany,  and  Italy)  was  to  the 
effect  that  they  "desired  the  maintenance  of  the 
status  quo  in  Egypt  on  the  basis  of  the  European 
arrangements  and  of  the  Sultan's  Firmans,  and 
tliat  they  were  of  opinion  that  this  status  quo  could 
not  be  modified  except  by  an  understanding  between 
the  Great  Powers  and  the  Suzerain  Power."  This 
reply  did  not  answer  the  expectations  of  the  Sultan. 
He  was  irritated  by  the  use  of  the  word  "Suzerain" 
instead  of  "  Sovereign."^  Moreover,  his  design  of 
acquiring  a  more  absolute  control  over  Egyptian 
affairs  was  in  no  way  advanced  by  the  opinion 
expressed  by  the  Powers  that  any  change  in  the 
Egyptian  status  quo  was  a  matter  of  general  Euro- 
pean interest. 

The  protest  of  the  Porte,  however,  stimulated 
the  British  and  French  Governments  to  place 
themselves  in  communication  with  the  other 
Powers.  The  British  Government  took  the  initi- 
ative. The  French  Government  were  invited  to 
join  Her  Majesty's  Government  in  addressing  the 
Powers.  M.  de  Freycinet  agreed  "  with  the  reser- 
vation that  it  be  well  understood  that  the  French 
Government  reserve  their  adhesion  to  any  miHtary 
intervention  in  Egypt,  and  that  they  will  examine 
that  question  when  the  necessity  for  any  interven- 
tion shall  have  arisen."  Accordingly,  on  February 
11,  a  Circular  was  addressed  by  the  British  and 
French  Governments  to  the  Cabinets  of  Berlin, 
Vienna,  Rome,  and  St.  Petersburg,  asking  them 
whether  they  would  be  prepared  to  enter  into  an 
exchange  of  views  on  the  affairs  of  Egypt.     "  The 

^  The  Sultan  is  Suzerain  of  Bulgaria.  Article  1  of  the  Berlin  Treaty 
says  :  "  Bulgaria  is  constituted  an  autonomous  and  tributary  Princi- 
pality under  the  Suzerainty  of  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan."  In 
so  far  as  Egypt  is  concerned^  the  word  "Sovereign"  is  technically 
more  correct.  The  Firman  of  1841  granted  to  Mehemet  All  uses  the 
expression  "  Ma  connaissance  Souveraine."  llie  Sukan  cannot  depose 
the  Prince  of  Bulgaria.  Technically  speaking,  he  can  depose  the 
Khedive,  and,  in  fact,  in  1879  he  .ieposed  Ismail  Pasha. 


2G0  INIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

Governments  of  England  and  France,"  it  was  said, 
*'  do  not  consider  that  a  case  for  discussing  tlie 
expediency  of  an  intervention  has  at  present 
arisen.  .  .  .  But,  should  the  case  arise,  they  would 
wijih  that  any  such  eventual  intervention  should 
represent  the  united  action  and  authority  of  Europe. 
In  that  event,  it  would  also,  in  their  opinion,  be 
riglit  that  the  Sultan  should  be  a  party  to  any 
proceeding  or  discussion  that  might  ensue." 

The  proposal  to  treat  Egyptian  affairs  as  an 
international,  rather  than  as  an  exclusively  Anglo- 
French  question,  was  well  received.  All  the  Powers 
expressed  their  willingness  to  enter  into  an  exchange 
of  views.  No  progress  had,  however,  so  far  been 
made  as  to  the  nature  of  the  views  which  were  to 
be  exchanged.  Until  the  British  and  French 
Governments  could  agree  as  to  the  proposals  they 
were  to  submit  to  the  other  Powers,  it  was  hopeless 
to  expect  any  general  agreement. 

Both  Governments  were,  however,  daily  becom- 
ing more  convinced  that  some  action  was  necessary. 
"  The  Egyptian  question,"  M.  de  Freycinet  said  to 
Lord  Lyons  (April  8),  "was  like  a  bill  of  exchange. 
The  exact  day  at  which  the  bill  would  be  presented 
for  payment  was  not  known,  but  it  was  quite 
certain  that  the  presentation  would  not  be  long 
delayed,  and  it  would  be  only  prudent  to  provide 
means  of  meeting  the  liability  before  the  constable 
was  upon  us."  The  remedy  he  proposed  was  to 
depose  the  Khedive,  and  to  substitute  Hahm  Pasha 
in  his  place.  The  authority  of  the  Sultan  would, 
without  doubt,  have  to  be  brought  into  play,  but 
M.  de  Freycinet  thought  that  '*the  great  object 
was  to  ward  off  a  military  intervention  of  what- 
ever kind  it  might  be,  and  he  would  rather  the 
Sultan  should  depose  twenty  Khedives  than  send 
one  soldier  to  Egypt."  T^ord  Granville  rejected 
this  proposal.     He  did  not  see  that  it  would  dc 


CH.XV         THE  ARABI  ministry  261 

any  good,  and,  moreover,  he  pointed  out  *'  that 
after  the  declarations  of  support  so  recently  given 
to  the  Khedive,  in  the  name  of  the  British  and 
French  Governments,  it  would  be  an  act  question- 
able in  point  of  good  faith  if  we  were  now  not 
only  to  abandon  him,  but  to  combine  for  his 
removal  without  any  new  or  more  apparent  cause 
than  can  at  present  be  shown  to  exist." 

The  Khedive  also  found  a  warm  defender  in 
Sir  Edward  Malet,  who  expressed  himself  in 
the  following  terms :  "  When  I  hear  him  (the 
Khedive)  abused  for  lack  of  energy  and  capacity, 
I  doubt  whether  there  be  many  men  who  would 
have  been  able  to  extricate  themselves  from  the 
difficulties  in  which  he  has  been  involved."  In 
the  place  of  so  drastic  a  remedy  as  the  deposition 
of  the  Khedive,  Lord  Granville  put  forward  a 
characteristic  proposal  of  his  own.  The  idea  of 
sending  special  Commissioners  to  report  on  the 
situation  in  Egypt  appears,  during  a  considerable 
period,  to  have  presented  some  strong  attractions 
to  the  British  Government.  Lord  Granville  now 
fell  back  on  a  proposal  of  this  sort.  He  suggested 
to  the  French  Govtiiunent  that  "the  British  and 
French  Representatives  at  Cairo  might  each  for 
the  moment  be  advantageously  supported  by  having 
at  their  side  an  adviser  possessed  of  the  necessary 
technical  experience,  who  had  been  in  the  habit  of 
considering  economical  reforms,  and  to  whom  they 
might  have  recourse  for  an  independent  and  im- 
partial opinion  upon  any  points  which  seemed  to 
them  doubtful  or  complicated."  Lord  Granville 
wished  this  proposal  to  be  considered  by  the  French 
Government,  but  he  "  had  no  wish  to  press  the 
suggestion  if  M.  de  P'reycinet  saw  decided  objec- 
tions to  it."  M.  de  Freycinet  saw  some  obvious 
objections  to  the  proposal  ;  amongst  others,  it 
would,   he  thought,   "  be   difficult  to   prevent  the 


262  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

Controllers  from  supposing  that  it  was  with  a  view 
to  controlling  them  that  the  agents  were  to  be 
furnished  with  special  Financial  Advisers.  They 
would,  in  fact,  suppose  that  they  would  sink  from 
the  position  of  '  Controleurs '  into  that  of  '  Con- 
troles.'"  This  proposal  was,  therefore,  allowed  to 
drop.  A  more  strange  idea  than  that  of  sending 
two  gentlemen,  "  who  had  been  in  the  habit  of 
considering  economical  reforms,"  in  order  to  control 
a  mutinous  army  certainly  never  entered  into  the 
head  of  a  responsible  statesman.^ 

Whilst  these  barren  diplomatic  negotiations 
were  going  on  in  Europe,  another  incident  occurred 
in  Cairo  of  a  nature  to  precipitate  the  crisis,  which 
had  now  become  inevitable.  A  large  number  of 
Egyptian  officers  had,  as  has  been  already  men- 
tioned, been  promoted.  This  caused  great  dis- 
content amongst  the  Turkish  and  Circassian  officers 
who  had  been  passed  over.  Arabi  and  his 
colleagues  feared  their  resentment.  A  story  was, 
therefore,  got  up  that  the  leaders  of  the  military 
and  nationalist  party  were  to  be  murdered.  On 
April  12,  nineteen  officers  and  soldiers  were  arrested 
on  a  charge  of  conspiracy  to  murder  Arabi.  By 
April  22,  as  many  as  forty-eight  persons  had  been 
arrested.  Amongst  these,  was  Osman  Pasha  Rifki, 
the  late  Minister  of  War.  They  were  tried  by  a 
Court-martial,  whose  proceedings  were  secret. 
They  were  undefended  by  counsel.  Forty  officers, 
including  Osman  Pasha  Rifki,  were  condemned  to 
exile  for  life  to  the  farthest  limits  of  the  Soudan. 

Arabi's  account  of  this  affair  is  given  in  a  docu- 
ment entitled  "  Instructions  to  my  Counsel,"  which 
was  subsequently  published.     "  A  Mameluke  slave 

^  This  proposal,  tlioiig'h  in  a  somewhat  different  form,  appears  to 
liave  emanated  from  Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt.  On  March  20,  1882,  he 
wrote  to  Lord  Granville  sufr^estin'j'  that  ''sometliing  in  the  nature  of 
a  commission  of  inquiry"  should  he  sent  to  Egypt. — Secret  Uintory, 
etc.,  p.  232. 


CII.XV  THE  ARABI  ministry  263 

of  the  Khedive's,"  he  said,  "  and  a  Circassian,  made 
a  plot  to  administer  arsenic  to  Abdul-Al  Pasha  at 
the  Koubbeh  school.  The  Circassian  succeeded 
in  putting  some  of  the  poison  into  the  Pasha's 
milk,  which  he  took  nightly,  but  fortunately  the 
servant  found  it  out  in  time  to  save  his  life.  .  .  . 
This  plan  having  failed,  another  was  set  on  foot 
to  get  rid  of  me.  A  party  of  Circassians  agreed 
together  to  kill  me  as  well  as  every  native  Egyptian 
holding  high  appointments."  There  does  not, 
however,  appear  to  have  been  a  shadow  of  trust- 
worthy evidence  to  show  that  the  charge  of  con- 
spiracy was  true.  The  verdict  of  the  Court-martial 
is  a  wild  rambling  document,  bearing  the  character 
of  a  political  manifesto  rather  than  that  of  a  judicial 
decision.  Like  most  ignorant  men,  Arabi  was  very 
suspicious.  The  conspiracy  to  murder  him  merely 
existed  in  his  own  imagination. 

The  Khedive  was  now  placed  in  a  position  of 
^reat  difficulty.  The  sentence  of  the  Court- 
anartial  was  manifestly  unjust,  but  it  was  question- 
able whether  he  would  be  able  to  resist  the  pressure 
brought  to  bear  on  him  by  his  Ministers,  who  were, 
of  course,  in  favour  of  its  being  confirmed.  Tlie 
Porte  interfered.  Osman  Pasha  Rifki  bore  the 
title  of  Ferik,  or  General,  which  was  conferred  by 
the  Sultan  and  could  only  be  taken  away  by  His 
Imperial  Majesty.  The  Sultan,  therefore,  desired 
that  the  matter  should  be  referred  to  him.  The 
Khedive  answered  that  he  would  comply  with  this 
request.  By  doing  so,  he  threw  himself  into  the 
arms  of  the  Porte,  and  assumed  an  attitude  of 
direct  hostility  to  his  Ministers,  but  he  explained 
to  Sir  Edward  Malet  (May  6)  that  he  thought 
it  better  that  Egypt  should  lose  some  of  its 
privileges  at  the  hands  of  the  Porte,  and  that 
proper  authority  should  be  re-established,  ratiier 
than    that    the    existing    misgovernment    should 


264  INIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

continue.  The  INIinisters  were  much  incensed. 
The  President  of  the  Council  told  Sir  Edward 
JMalet  "  that  if  the  Porte  should  send  an  order  to 
cancel  the  sentence  of  the  Court-martial  on  the 
Circassian  prisoners,  the  order  would  not  be  obeyed, 
and  that  if  the  Porte  sent  Commissioners,  they 
would  not  be  allowed  to  land,  but  would  be  re- 
pulsed by  force,  if  necessary." 

The  defiant  attitude  adopted  by  the  Egyptian 
Ministers  towards  the  Porte  was,  without  doubt, 
in  a  measure  due  to  the  belief  that,  in  resisting 
Turkish  interference,  they  could  count  on  French 
support.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  directly  it  was 
suggested  that,  by  reason  of  Osman  Pasha  Rifki's 
rank,  Turkish  interference  was  necessary,  M.  de 
Freycinet  stated  that  "  he  was  strongly  of  opinion 
that  the  Khedive  should  himself  grant  the  pardon 
immediately  by  virtue  of  his  own  prerogative 
without  waiting  for  action  on  the  part  of  the 
Porte."  Lord  Granville  agreed.  Identic  instruc- 
tions to  advise  the  Khedive  in  this  sense  were, 
therefore,  sent  to  the  British  and  French  repre- 
sentatives at  Cairo.  The  Khedive  acted  on  this 
advice.  On  May  9,  he  signed  a  Decree  commuting 
the  sentence  of  the  Court-martial  on  the  forty 
officers  into  exile  from  Egypt,  but  not  to  the 
Soudan.  The  commutation  of  this  sentence 
widened  the  breach  between  the  Khedive  and 
his  JNIinisters.  On  May  18,  Sir  Edward  Malet 
reported  that  "relations  had  been  broken  off 
between  the  Khedive  and  his  Ministers,"  and  that 
"the  situation  had  become  most  serious."  The 
representatives  of  the  great  Powers,  with  uncon- 
scious humour,  requested  the  President  of  the 
Council  "to  describe  the  situation."  The  latter 
replied  that,  as  the  Khedive  and  his  Ministers 
could  not  agree,  the  Chamber  had  been  convoked 
without  the  authority  of  the  Khedive  having  been 


CH.  XV  THE   ARABI   MINISTRY  ^65 

requested.  "The  complaint  against  His  Highness 
was  that  he  had  acted  in  a  way  to  diminish  the 
autonomy  of  Egypt,  and  on  many  occasions 
without  consulting  his  Ministers."  There  appears 
to  be  little  doubt  that  the  intention  of  the  military 
party  at  this  time  was  to  depose  the  Khedive,  to 
exile  the  family  of  Mehemet  Ali,  and  to  appoint 
Mahmoud  Pasha  Sami  Governor-General  by  the 
national  will. 

By  this  time,  the  civil  elements  in  the  national 
movement  had  again  become  alive  to  the  folly  of  their 
conduct  in  allying  themselves  with  the  mutineers. 
Sultan  Pasha,  the  President  of  the  Chamber,  told 
Sir  Edward  Malet  that  "in  overthrowing  Cherif 
Pasha  the  Chamber  had  acted  under  pressure  from 
Arabi,  and  that  the  very  deputies  who  had  then 
insisted  on  the  course  taken,  finding  that  they 
had  been  deceived,  were  now  anxious  to  overthrow 
the  Ministry."  On  May  13,  Sir  Edward  Malet 
wrote:  "The  President  of  the  Chamber  and  the 
deputies  ostensibly  take  the  part  of  the  Khedive, 
but  they  have  requested  His  Highness  to  pardon 
and  to  be  reconciled  with  his  Ministers.  The 
Khedive  has  refused.  His  Highness  remains  firm, 
and  will  not  be  reconciled  to  a  Ministry  which 
has  defied  him  openly,  threatened  himself  and 
his  family,  and,  by  the  convocation  of  the 
Chamber  without  his  sanction,  has  violated  the 
law.  At  Cairo,  there  is  considerable  uneasiness, 
and  many  persons  are  leaving." 

The  President  of  the  Council  then  tendered  his 
resignation  to  the  Khedive.  The  British  and 
French  Consuls-General  proposed  that  Mustapha 
Pasha  Fehmi  should  be  appointed  President. 
"We  agree,"  Sir  Edward  Malet  said,  "to  the 
nomination  of  any  one,  except  Arabi  Pasha." 
The  leaders  of  the  military  party  had  stated  that, 
if  the  Ministry  were  changed,  they  would  not  be 


266  MODERN  EGYPT  ft  ii 

responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  order.  The 
British  and  French  Governments,  however,  would 
not  accept  this  denial  of  responsibility.  Their 
representatives  in  Cairo  were  authorised  "to  send 
for  Arabi  and  inform  him  that  if  there  is  a  disturb- 
ance of  order,  he  will  find  Europe  and  Turkey, 
as  well  as  England  and  France,  against  him,  and 
will  be  held  responsible." 

When  Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi  was  offered  the 
Presidency  of  the  Council,  he  declined  to  accept 
the  ])ost.  The  Ministers  also  said  that  "they 
would  only  resign  if  the  Chamber  of  Notables 
desired  it."  The  President  of  the  Chamber 
"declared  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  change 
the  Ministry  so  long  as  the  military  power 
continued  to  be  vested  in  Arabi  Pasha."  Under 
these  circumstances,  the  British  and  French 
Consuls  -  General  informed  the  Khedive  that 
"personal  questions  must  be  set  aside."  As  His 
Highness  was  unable  to  form  a  new  Ministry,  he 
was  "requested  to  enter  into  relations  with  the 
present  one." 

It  was  by  this  time  evident  that  some  decisive 
intervention  in  Egypt  was  inevitable,  but  the 
question  of  whether  that  intervention  should  be 
Turkish  or  Anglo-French  still  remained  undecided. 
On  May  21,  however,  INI.  de  Freycinet  took  a  great 
step  in  advance.  He  recognised  the  possibility 
of  Turkish  armed  intervention.  The  following 
proposals  were  submitted  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment : — 

1.  An  Anglo-French  squadron  was  to  be  sent 
to  Alexandria. 

2.  The  British  and  French  Governments  were 
to  "request  the  Porte  to  abstain  for  the  present 
from  all  intervention  or  interference  in  Egy))t." 

3.  The  Cabinets  of  Germany,  Austria,  Russia, 
and  Italy  were  to  be  informed  of  the  despatch  of 


CH.  XV         THE  ARABI  MINISTRY  267 

an  Anglo-French  squadron  to  Alexandria,  and  they 
were  to  be  asked  to  send  to  their  representatives  at 
Constantinople  similar  instructions  to  those  sent  to 
the  British  and  French  Ambassadors. 

4.  The  French  Government  agreed  to  abandon 
the  idea  of  deposing  the  Khedive,  "a  plan  which, 
if  adopted  in  time,  might,  in  their  opinion,  have 
prevented  serious  complications." 

5.  As  regards  the  important  question  of  Turkish 
intervention,  M.  de  Freycinet  expressed  himself  in 
the  following  terms  :  "  The  French  Government 
continue  to  be  opposed  to  Turkish  intervention, 
but  they  would  not  regard  as  intervention  a  case 
in  which  Turkish  forces  were  summoned  to  Egypt 
by  England  and  France,  and  operated  there  under 
English  and  French  control,  for  an  object,  and  on 
conditions  which  France  and  England  should  have 
themselves  defined.  If,  after  the  arrival  of  their 
ships  at  Alexandria,  the  French  and  English 
Governments  should  consider  it  advisable  that 
troops  should  be  landed,  they  should  have  recourse 
neither  to  English  nor  to  French  troops,  but  should 
call  for  Turkish  troops,  on  the  conditions  above 
specified." 

6.  The  Consuls -General  were  to  be  instructed 
'*to  recognise  as  legal  no  other  authority  than 
that  of  Tewfik  Pasha,  and  not  to  enter  into 
relations  with  any  other  de  facto  Government, 
except  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  safety  of 
their  countrymen." 

Lord  Granville  at  once  acceded  to  these  pro- 
posals. He  thought,  however,  that  in  requesting 
the  Sultan  to  abstain  for  the  present  from  all 
interference  in  Egypt,  it  would  be  "desirable  to 
intimate  in  guarded  language  that  it  was  not 
improbable  that  further  propositions  might  be 
made  hereafter  to  the  Porte."  Moreover,  Lord 
Granville   suggested   "in  view  of  the  very   large 


268  MODERN  EGYPT  n.  ii 

force  which  it  is  ]>roposed  should  be  despatched 
to  Alexandria  by  England  and  France,  that  it 
might  be  as  well,  if  not  inconsistent  with  the 
other  objects  which  M.  de  Freycinet  has  in  view, 
that  the  other  Powers,  including  Turkey,  should 
be  invited  to  have  their  flags  represented."  In 
other  words,  the  British  Government  wished  for 
Turkish  executive  action  under  international 
sanction.  Both  the  Turkish  action  and  the 
international  sanction  were,  on  the  other  hand, 
distasteful  to  the  French.  M.  de  Freycinet, 
however,  agreed  to  Lord  Granville's  first  proposal 
so  far  as  to  instruct  the  French  Ambassador  at 
Constantinople  that  he  might  "hint  to  the  Sultan, 
in  very  moderate  terms,  that  it  was  not  improbable 
that  further  proposals  might  be  made  to  the  Porte 
hereafter."  As  regards  the  international  sanction, 
M.  de  Freycinet  would  make  no  concession.  "  I 
am  not  of  opinion,"  he  said,  "that  we  should  at 
present  invite  the  other  Powers  to  send  ships  by 
the  side  of  ours.  It  is  not,  in  my  judgment,  for 
our  own  interest  that  we  should  in  this  way  take 
an  initiative  which  would  deprive  the  Anglo- 
French  action  of  the  directive  character,  which 
Europe  herself  assigns  to  it,  and  appears  desirous  to 
leave  to  it  in  Egypt."  When  M.  de  Freycinet's 
reply  was  communicated  to  Lord  Granville,  he 
**told  the  French  Ambassador  that  Mr.  Gladstone 
agreed  with  him  in  regretting  that  the  other 
Powers  had  not  been  invited  to  co-operate.  Her 
Majesty's  Government  tho'ight  this  a  mistake,  but 
as  the  French  Government  had  gone  so  far  to 
meet  the  views  of  Her  Majesty's  Government, 
they  have  concurred  in  the  course  taken." 

The  weak  part  of  this  scheme  was  that  the 
intention  to  invite  Turkish  co-operation  was  not 
})ublicly  announced.  Sir  Edward  Malet  at  once 
saw  the  danger.     On  May   14,  he  telegraphed  to 


OH.  XV  THE  ARABI  MINISTRY  269 

Lord  Granville :  "  Knowing  the  feeling  here  (i.e. 
at  Cairo)  I  fear  that  if  the  Sultan's  implied  co- 
operation is  not  secured  and  made  known,  and  if 
he  does  not  give  his  countenance  at  the  beginning 
to  the  action  of  the  Powers,  there  is  a  risk  that 
the  Chamber  and  the  army  may  again  coalesce 
and  offer  resistance,  which  would  otherwise,  I 
think,  be  impossible."  The  Khedive  was  no  less 
anxious  to  obtain  the  moral  support  of  the  Sultan. 
On  May  20,  he  asked  Sir  Edward  Malet  "to  beg 
the  English  Government  to  induce  the  Porte  to 
send  him  a  telegram  approving  of  his  entering 
into  negotiations  with  us  for  the  restoration  of  his 
authority,  and  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo. 
He  wished  for  it  as  a  lever  to  act  on  the  deputies, 
and  dissipate  the  idea,  which  was  then  taking  root 
with  them  and  the  military,  that  the  Sultan  opposed 
the  action  of  the  Powers."  A  frank  explanation  of 
the  intentions  of  the  Powers  might  perhaps,  even  at 
this  late  hour,  have  ensured  the  cordial  co-opera- 
tion of  the  Sultan.  As  it  was,  lie  was  irritated 
by  the  action  taken  by  the  British  and  French 
Governments,  more  especially  by  the  despatch 
of  an  Anglo-Frjnch  squadron  to  Alexandria. 
The  Turkish  Ambassadors  at  Paris  and  London 
were  instructed  to  protest.  The  despatch  of  the 
squadron  also  gave  offence  to  the  other  Powers, 
who  thought  that  they  should  have  been  previously 
consulted  on  the  subject,  and,  therefore,  declined 
to  join  in  the  Anglo-French  recommendation  to 
the  Sultan  that  he  should  abstain  from  all  inter- 
ference in  Egypt. 

The  dislike  of  the  French  Government  to  Turkish 
intervention  was,  however,  such  as  to  render  it 
injpossible  to  obtain  the  full  advantage  which 
might  otherwise  possibly  have  been  derived  from 
the  co-operation  of  the  Sultan.  On  May  19,  M.  de 
Freycinet  told  Lord  Lyons  that  "there  were  very 


270  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

strong  objections  to  speaking  openly  at  that  moment 
either  at  Constantinople  or  elsewhere  of  the  agree- 
ment to  call  in  Turkish  troops,  in  case  military  in- 
tervention in  Egypt  should  be  unavoidable."  On 
JNIay  22,  therefore,  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to 
Sir  Edward  JMalet :  "  The  French  Government  are 
nervous  lest  the  conditional  consent  they  have 
given  to  Turkish  intervention  may  be  publicly 
announced  at  Cairo  or  Constantinople,  and  produce 
an  explosion  of  public  feeling  at  Paris."  Under 
these  circumstances,  all  that  could  be  done  was  to 
send  a  somewhat  vague  explanatory  telegram  to 
the  British  and  French  representatives  at  Berlin, 
Rome,  St.  Petersburg,  Vienna,  and  Constantinople. 
"  It  was  never  proposed,"  Lord  Granville  said,  "  to 
land  troops  or  to  resort  to  a  military  occupation  of 
the  country.  Her  Majesty's  Government  intend, 
when  once  calm  has  been  restored,  and  the  future 
secured,  to  leave  Egypt  to  herself,  and  to  recall 
their  squadron.  If,  contrary  to  their  expectations, 
a  pacific  solution  cannot  be  obtained,  they  will 
concert  with  the  Powers  and  with  Turkey  on  the 
measures,  which  shall  have  appeared  to  them  and 
to  the  French  Government  to  be  the  best."  At 
the  same  time  (JNIay  23),  Lord  Dujfferin  told  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Constantinople  that 
if  "  instead  of  helping  to  terminate  the  crisis  in  the 
desired  manner,  the  I*orte  complicates  the  situation 
by  falsifying  facts  and  rumiing  counter  to  our 
advice,  we  shall  double  the  number  of  our  ships 
at  Alexandria,  and  their  stay  will  be  indefiinitely 
prolonged."  Lord  Dufferin  "  had  already  hinted 
to  Said  Pasha  confidentially  that  if  the  Ottoman 
Government  acted  in  a  loyal  and  reasonable 
manner,  the  first-fruits  of  their  moderation  might  be 
the  countermanding  of  the  additional  ships  of  war 
which  were  under  orders  to  join  the  squadron." 
In  the   meanwhile   (May   19),   the    British   and 


CH.  XV         THE  ARABI  ministry  271 

French  Consuls -General  had  been  instructed  "to 
advise  the  Khedive  to  take  advantage  of  a 
favourable  moment,  such,  for  instance,  as  the 
arrival  of  the  fleets,  to  dismiss  the  present  JNIinistry 
and  to  form  a  new  Cabinet  under  Cherif  Pasha,  or 
any  other  person  inspiring  the  same  confidence." 
Sir  Edward  Malet  replied  (May  20)  that  he  and 
M.  Sienkiewicz  had  considered  these  instructions. 
"  Until  the  supremacy  of  the  military  party  is 
broken,"  he  added,  "the  Khedive  is  powerless  to 
form  a  new  Ministry.  No  one  will  accept  the  task 
until  this  is  effected,"  He,  therefore,  proposed  to 
enter  into  negotiations  with  Arabi  and  his  three 
principal  coadjutors  with  a  view  to  inducing  them 
to  leave  the  country.  Sultan  Pasha,  the  President 
of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  consented  to  act  as 
intermediary.  He  questioned  the  Consuls-General 
as  to  "  whether  there  was  any  infringement  of  the 
Porte's  sovereign  rights  in  the  action  of  England 
and  France."  Sir  Edward  Malet  replied  that  "the 
intention  of  the  two  Governments  was  to  respect 
those  rights  and  in  no  way  to  infringe  them."  The 
negotiation  failed.  Arabi  positively  refused  "  either 
to  retire  from  his  position  or  from  the  country." 
An  Egyptian  Colonel  said,  in  the  presence  of  a 
member  of  the  French  Consular  service,  that  "  the 
officers  would  hew  Arabi  in  pieces  if  he  deserted 
them."  A  Cabinet  Council  was  held  at  which  it  was 
decided  that  the  Government  should  re})ly  "to  any 
official  demands  made  upon  them  that  they  did  not 
admit  the  right  of  the  English  and  French  Govern- 
ments to  interfere,  and  that  they  recognised  no 
ultimate  authority  but  that  of  the  Sultan."  At 
the  same  time,  the  President  of  the  Chamber 
informed  the  French  Consul  -  General  that  "  he 
could  no  longer  rely  upon  the  deputies,  on  account 
of  the  feeling  against  the  intervention  of  the  two 
Powers  which   was   gaining  ground."     It  was,   in 


272  MODERN  EGYPT  pi.  n 

fact,  clear  that  tlie  fears  vvliich  Sir  Edward  JNIalet 
had  expressed  on  JMay  14  had  been  realised.  The 
rehic Lance  of  the  French  Government  to  appeal  to 
the  authority  of  the  Sultan  had  cast  suspicion  on 
tlie  intentions  of  tlie  AVestern  Powers,  and  had 
again  united  the  civil  and  military  elements  of  the 
Egyptian  movement.  JNIore  than  this,  the  jealousy 
shown  by  the  French  of  Turkish  intervention  had 
resulted  in  strengthening  the  unnatural  alUance 
between  Arabi  and  the  Sultan.  Essad  Effendi,  a 
confidential  agent  of  the  Sultan,  arrived  at  Cairo. 
It  was  certain  that  the  defiant  attitude  adopted  by 
the  Egyptian  Ministers  was  in  a  great  measure  due 
to  the  messages  brought  by  this  individual  from 
Constantinople. 

Meanwhile,  in  anticipation  of  the  failure  of  the 
negotiations  with  Arabi,  Sir  Edward  Malet  and 
^I.  Sienkiewicz  had,  on  Mny  21,  suggested  to  their 
respective  Governments  that  they  should  be 
authorised  to  make  an  official  demand  that  Arabi 
and  his  principal  coadjutors  should  leave  the 
country.  When,  however,  they  saw  the  decided 
attitude  taken  up  by  the  leaders  of  the  military 
party,  they  hesitated  to  adopt  so  strong  a  measure 
on  their  own  authority.  On  May  23,  Sir  Edward 
Malet  telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville  in  the 
following  terms :  "  M.  Sienkiewicz  and  I  hesitate 
to  make  an  official  demand  to  the  INIinisters,  which 
we  know  beforehand  will  be  met  with  refusal,  until 
we  are  in  a  position  to  declare  what  would  be  the 
consequences  of  such  a  refusal,  and  I  accordingly 
venture  to  beg  Your  Lordship  to  favour  me  with 
further  instructions.  The  present  situation  has 
been  brought  about  by  the  JNIinisters  and  the 
people  persisting  in  a  belief  that  the  two  Powers 
will  not  despatch  troops,  and  tliat  the  opposition  of 
France  renders  a  Turkish  intervention  impossible. 
In  the  meanwhile,  military  preparations  are  being 


OH.  XV         THE  ARABI  ministry  273 

carried  on,  and  a  fanatical  feeling  against  foreigners 
is  sedulously  fostered.  I  am  still  of  opinion  that  if 
the  Sultan  declares  himself  at  once,  and  if  it  be 
known  that  troops  are  ready  to  be  despatched,  we 
may  succeed  without  the  necessity  for  landing 
them."  On  receipt  of  this  message,  Lord  Granville 
telegraphed  (May  24)  to  Lord  Lyons  in  the  follow- 
ing terms :  "  Tell  M.  de  Freycinet  that  the  news 
from  Cairo  is  disquieting.  Time  is  all  important. 
Propose  to  him  that  the  two  Governments  should 
telegraph  a  Circular  to  the  Powers,  requesting  them 
to  join  in  asking  the  Sultan  to  have  troops  ready  to 
send  to  Egypt  under  strict  conditions." 

No  immediate  answer  was  sent  to  Sir  Edward 
Malet's  telegram,  but  the  two  Governments 
authorised  their  Consuls-General  to  take  whatever 
steps  they  considered  possible  to  ensure  the  de- 
parture from  Egypt  of  Arabi  and  his  principal 
partisans,  and  the  nomination  of  Cherif  Pasha  to 
be  President  of  the  Council. 

When  this  telegram  reached  Cairo,  a  document 
was  being  circulated  amongst  the  officers  and 
soldiers  of  the  army  in  which  it  was  stated  that  the 
British  and  French  Governments  insisted  on  the 
following  points :  All  the  Ministers  were  to  be 
exiled ;  all  the  officers  on  the  Army  List  were 
to  leave  Egypt ;  the  entire  army  was  to  be  dis- 
banded ;  Egypt  was  to  be  occupied  by  foreign 
troops  ;  the  Chamber  was  to  be  dissolved.  "  The 
French  representative  and  I,"  Sir  Edward  JNIalet 
telegraphed  on  May  2.5,  "  persuaded  that  the  situa- 
tion would  become  still  further  complicated,  and 
even  dangerous  to  the  lives  of  foreigners,  if  these 
conditions  were  believed  to  be  true  ones,  determined 
upon  the  official  step  from  whicli  we  had  hitherto 
shrunk."  They  handed  an  official  Note  to  the 
President  of  the  Council,  in  which  the  following 
demands  were  set  forth  : — 

vol..  I 


274  ISrODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

"1.  The  temporary  retirement  from  Egypt  of 
Arabi  Pasha,  witli  tlie  mamtenance  of  his  rank  and 
pay.  2.  The  retirement  into  the  interior  of  Egypt 
of  Ali  Pasha  Fehmi  and  Abdul- Al  Pasha,  who  will 
also  retain  their  rank  and  pay.  3.  The  resignation 
of  the  present  INIinistry." 

The  Note  added  that  "the  intervention  of  the 
two  Powers,  being  divested  of  all  character  of 
vengeance  and  reprisal,  they  will  use  their  good 
offices  to  obtain  from  the  Khedive  a  general 
amnesty,  and  will  watch  over  its  strict  observance." 

In  consequence  of  the  delivery  of  this  Note,  the 
Ministers  resigned  on  INIay  26.  At  the  same  time, 
they  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Khedive  stating  that 
as  His  Highness  had  accepted  the  conditions 
proposed  by  the  two  Powers,  he  had  acquiesced  in 
foreio-n  intervention  in  contradiction  to  the  terms 
of  the  Firmans.  The  Khedive  replied  that  he 
accepted  the  resignation  of  the  Ministry  because 
it  was  the  will  of  the  nation,  and  that,  as  regards 
the  rest,  it  ^\as  a  matter  between  him  and  the 
Sultan,  whose  rights  he  would  always  respect. 

For  a  moment,  there  appeared  some  hope  that 
the  crisis  was  over.  Sir  Edward  Malet  reported 
(May  27)  that  the  Ministers  "  perceived  that,  were 
they  to  reject  the  conditions  which  the  Khedive 
had  accepted,  they  would  be  in  overt,  instead  of 
covert  rebellion,  a  position  from  which  they  shrank. 
The  retirement  of  the  Ministry  was,  therefore,  due 
to  the  decisive  and  firm  attitude  assumed  by  His 
Highness."  The  French  Government  were  elated. 
They  now  answered  the  proposal  made  by  Lord 
Granville  on  May  24,  to  the  effect  that  the  Powers 
should  be  addressed  with  a  view  to  Turkish  troops 
being  held  in  readiness  to  proceed  to  Egypt.  M. 
Tissot,  the  French  representative  in  London,  wrote 
to  Lord  Granville  in  the  following  terms  :  *'  M.  de 
Freycinet  telegraphs  to   me  that  the  Council  of 


CH.XV         THE  ARABl  MINISTRY  275 

Ministers,  to  whom  he  has  submitted  your  proposal, 
have  been  unanimous  in  thinking  that  notliing  in 
the  present  situation  of  affairs  would  justify  an 
appeal  to  Turkish  troops.  A  Note  was  delivered 
by  our  Consuls-General  on  the  25th  instant ;  the 
Ministry  has  just  tendered  its  resignation,  the 
elements  of  resistance  are  manifestly  in  process 
of  disorganisation  ;  there  is,  tlierefore,  every  motive 
for  awaiting  the  course  of  events.  It  appears 
impossible  to  M.  de  Freycinet  that  you  should  not 
be  struck  with  the  justice  of  these  considerations, 
and  that,  taking  into  account  the  recent  events 
which  have  taken  place  at  Cairo,  you  should  not, 
yourself,  my  dear  Lord,  recognise  the  uselessness 
of  the  step  which  you  at  first  proposed  to  him." 

This  elation  was  short-lived.  On  INIay  27,  Sir 
Edward  JNIalet  telegraphed  that  Cherif  Pasha  had 
been  asked  to  form  a  JNlinistry,  but  had  refused  to 
do  so,  "on  the  ground  that  no  Government  was 
possible  so  long  as  the  military  chiefs  remained 
in  the  country."  The  Khedive,  Sir  Edward  Malet 
added,  "will  now  endeavour  to  form  another 
Ministry,  altiiough  he  has  faint  hope  of  being  able 
to  get  an  efficient  one,  if  he  can  form  one  at  all." 
Sir  Edward  Malet  urged  that  the  Sultan  should  be 
called  upon  to  exercise  his  authority,  and  especially 
that  he  should  despatch  an  officer  to  Egypt  with 
as  little  delay  as  possible.  The  Khedive  also 
thought  that  "  a  Turkish  Commissioner  could 
make  himself  heard  and  restore  tranquillity." 
Toulba  Pasha,  one  of  Arabi's  principal  associates, 
had  an  interview  with  the  Khedive,  at  which 
"  he  stated  that  the  army  absolutely  rejected  the 
Joint  Note  and  awaited  the  decision  of  the  Porte, 
which  was  the  only  authority  they  recognised." 
There  was,  in  fact,  little  doubt  that  the  JNlinisters 
were  acting  in  collusion  with  the  Porte. 

On  May  28,  the   Grand  Vizier  telegraphed  to 


276  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

the  Khedive  statmg  that  a  Turkish  Commissioner 
would  be  sent  if  an  official  request  to  that  effect 
were  made.  The  Khedive  asked  the  British  and 
French  Consuls-General  what  he  was  to  do.  His 
position  was,  indeed,  one  of  the  utmost  difficulty. 
The  officers  of  the  regiments  and  of  the  Police 
force  stationed  at  Alexandria  had  telegraphed  to 
him  on  the  previous  day  (INIay  27)  that  "they 
would  not  accept  the  resignation  of  Arabi  Paslia, 
and  tliat  they  allowed  twelve  hours  to  His 
Highness  to  consider,  after  which  delay  they  would 
no  longer  be  responsible  for  public  tranquillity." 
Moreover,  Sultan  Pasha  and  other  deputies  told 
the  Khedive  in  the  presence  of  the  British  and 
French  Consuls -General,  that  "unless  he  agreed 
to  reinstate  Arabi  as  Minister  of  War,  his  life 
was  not  safe."  Nevertheless,  Sir  Edward  Malet 
reported,  "  His  Highness  refused."  As  regards  the 
request  for  a  Turkish  Commissioner,  Sir  Edward 
Malet  telegraphed:  "I  stated  that,  if  His 
Highness's  life  were  in  danger,  I  could  not  give  any 
advdce  against  the  step  he  proposed,  if  it  appeared 
to  be  the  only  chance  of  safety.  JNI.  Sienkiewicz 
limited  himself  to  saying  *that  he  would  request 
instructions  from  the  French  Government,'  and  we 
left  without  giving  any  further  answer,  although 
the  Khedive  urged  the  necessity  of  immediately 
making  some  reply  to  the  Grand  Vizier."  Well 
might  Sir  Edward  INIalet  say:  "The  position  of 
the  Khedive  is  a  most  painful  one.  Threatened 
with  death,  prevented  by  us  from  going  to 
Alexandria  while  there  was  yet  time,^  and  not 
allowed  to  appeal  to  the  only  quarter  from  which 
effectual  assistance  can  come,  he  must  feel  bitterly 
the   ap})arent   result   at   present  of  following   our 

*  The  Khedive  had,  a  short  while  previously,  wished  to  go  to 
Alexandria,  l)ut  he  was  urged  by  the  British  aud  Freuch  Goverumentfl 
to  remain  at  Cairo. 


CH.  XV         THE  ARABI  ministry  277 

advice  and  relying  upon  our  support."  The 
necessity  for  action  was,  indeed,  so  a]) parent  that 
Lord  Granville,  without  waiting  to  consult  the 
French  Government,  telegraphed  both  to  I^ord 
DufFerin  at  Constantinople  and  to  the  Ambassadors 
at  the  other  courts  of  Europe  that  "  Her  INIajesty's 
Government  considered  it  most  desirable  that  no 
time  should  be  lost  by  the  Sultan,  who  should  send 
an  order  to  support  the  Khedive,  to  reject  the 
accusation  of  the  fallen  Ministry  with  regard  to 
His  Highness,  and  to  order  the  three  military 
chiefs,  and  perhaps  also  the  ex-President  of  the 
Council,  to  come  and  explain  their  conduct  at 
Constantinople."  M.  de  Freycinet,  when  he  was 
informed  of  what  had  been  done,  sent  similar 
instructions  to  the  French  representatives  abroad, 
but  he  evidently  did  so  with  reluctance. 

In  the  meanwhile,  Cairo  and  Egypt  generally 
remained  in  the  hands  of  the  military  party.  On 
May  29,  Admiral  Sir  Beauchamp  Seymour  (after- 
wards liOrd  Alcester),  who  commanded  the  British 
fleet,  which  had  by  this  time  arrived  at  Alex- 
andria, telegraphed  :  "  Alexandria  is  apparently  con- 
trolled this  morning  by  the  military  ])arty."  It 
was  clear  that,  in  the  absence  of  any  effective  help 
from  without,  the  Khedive  would  be  obliged  to 
yield  to  the  wishes  of  the  mutinous  army.  On 
May  28,  Sir  Edward  Malet  telegraphed  to  Lord 
Granville  in  the  following  terms  :  "  This  afternoon, 
the  Chiefs  of  religion,  including  the  Patriarch,  and 
the  Chief  Rabbi,  all  the  deputies,  Ulema  and  others, 
waited  on  the  Khedive,  and  asked  him  to  reinstate 
Arabi  as  Minister  of  War.  He  refused ;  but  they 
besought  him,  saying  that,  though  he  might  be 
ready  to  sacrifice  his  own  life,  he  ought  not  to 
sacrifice  theirs,  and  that  Arabi  had  threatened  them 
all  with  death  if  they  did  not  obtain  his  consent. 
The  Colonel  of  the   Khedive's   Guard  stated  that 


278  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  ii 

the  guard  of  the  Palace  had  been  doubled,  that 
orders  had  been  given  to  them  to  prevent  his 
leaving  the  Palace  for  his  usual  drive,  and  to  fire 
if  he  attempted  to  force  his  way.  Under  these 
circumstances,  the  Khedive  yielded,  not  to  save 
himself,  but  to  preserve  the  town  from  bloodshed." 
At  the  same  time,  the  Khedive  made  a  formal 
demand  to  the  Sultan  that  a  Commissioner  should 
be  sent  to  Egypt. 

The  situation  at  the  end  of  May  was,  therefore, 
as  follows :  An  attempt  had  been  made  to  free  the 
Khedive  from  the  dictatorship  of  the  military  party. 
In  spite  of  the  support  accorded  by  the  British  and 
French  Governments,  the  attempt  had  completely 
failed.  Arabi  and  his  associates  had  again 
triumphed.  British  diplomacy,  although  somewhat 
more  free  in  action  than  previous  to  the  accession 
to  power  of  M.  de  Freycinet,  was  still  hampered 
by  its  association  with  France.  No  frank  appeal 
could  be  made  to  the  Sultan  that  he  should  exercise 
his  authority,  although  both  Lord  Granville  and  Sir 
Edward  Malet  saw  that  in  such  an  appeal  lay  the 
only  chance  of  avoiding  military  intervention  of 
some  sort.  M.  de  Freycinet  was  almost  as  much 
opposed  as  his  predecessor  to  Turkish  intervention. 
The  result  of  all  this  vacillation  was  that  the  policy 
of  England  and  France  was  suspected  on  all  sides, 
—  by  the  Sultan,  who  was  greatly  irritated ;  by  the 
other  Powers  ;  and  by  the  Egyptians.  The  Khedive, 
in  the  meanwhile,  had  so  far  found  that  Anglo- 
French  support  was  a  weak  reed  on  which  to  lean 
in  time  of  necessity. 

The  end,  however,  was  not  far  off.  It  was 
daily  becoming  more  clear  that  Arabi  could  be 
suppressed  by  nothing  but  force.  If  no  one  else 
would  use  the  requisite  force,  the  task  would 
necessarily  devolve  on  England. 


CH.XV         THE  ARABI  JNlINISTllY  279 


APPENDIX 

Note  on  the  relations  between  Mr.  Gladstone  and 
Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt. 

The  overestimate  of  Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt's  influence  was  in 
no  small  degree  due  to  the  fact  that  he  was  known  to  be  in 
communication  with  Mr.  Gladstone.  As  Mr.  Blunt  in  his 
Secret  History  has  narrated  at  length  his  dealings  with 
Mr.  Gladstone,  who,  he  says  (p.  369),  was,  in  his  opinion, 
"  capable  of  any  treachery  and  any  crime,"  I  think  that,  in 
justice  to  the  memory  of  that  distinguished  statesman,  I 
should  furnish  whatever  evidence  is  in  my  possession  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  he  regarded  the  question  of  his  rela- 
tions with  Mr.  Blunt.  At  a  later  period  of  Egyptian 
history  (October  23,  1883),  Lord  Granville  wrote  to  me 
privately,  forwarding  a  letter  addressed  by  Mr.  Blunt  to 
Sir  Edward  Hamilton,  Mr.  Gladstone's  Private  Secretary, 
with  the  following  remarks : 

Gladstone  sent  me  this  letter,  condemning  Blunt,  but  suggest- 
ing that  I  miglit  send  it  on  to  you. 

I  declined,  and  expressed  a  hope  that  Hamilton  would  not 
answer  him  at  all ;  that  there  was  no  knowing  what  use  he 
might  make  of  the  fact  of  his  being  in  correspondence  with  any 
one  in  Downing  Street. 

But  as  Gladstone  returns  to  the  charge,  I  forward  it  to  you 
privately. 

He  writes : 

"  There  are  certain  parts  of  Blunt's  letter  which,  indifferently 
as  I  think  of  him,  I  certainly  should  have  wished  Baring  to  see. 
My  rule  has  always  been  to  look  in  the  declarations  of  even  the 
extremest  opponents  for  anything  which  either  may  have  some 
small  percentage  of  truth  in  it,  or  ought  not  to  be  let  pass 
without  contradiction  (private  in  this  case).  I  know  not  how 
it  is  that  he  writes  to  Hamilton,  but  you  see  it  is  personal  and 
tuluyant,  not  official." 

Gladstone's  principle  is  plausible,  but  I  fancy  it  often  gets 
h  m  into  unnecessary  difficulties. 

\  ou  have  seen  Blunt,  and  heard  all  he  had  to  say. 

1  replied  on  November  5,  in  the  following  terms : 

I  would  just  as  soon  that  Mr.  Blunt  was  not  in  corre- 
spondence with  any  one  connected  with  the  Government;  if 
it  were  known,  it  might  be  misinterpreted. 


280  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

The  principle  of  not  neglecting  criticisms  which  come  from 
an  opponent  is  a  very  sound  one,  and  I  always  endeavour  to 
follow  it.  But,  in  this  case,  we  may  have  the  advantage  of 
knowing  what  Blunt  has  to  say  without  corresponding  with  him. 
He  will  not  hide  his  light  under  a  bushel.  You  may  feel  sure 
tliat  before  long  it  will  burn  brightly  in  the  pages  of  some 
magazine. 

I  also,  for  Mr.  Gladstone's  information,  replied  at  some 
length  to  Mr.  Blunfs  criticisms,  but  neither  his  letter,  nor 
my  reply,  are  of  sufficient  importance  or  interest  to  warrant 
their  reproduction. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  BOMBARDMENT  OF  ALEXANDRIA 

May-July  1882 

State  of  the  country — Vacillation  of  the  Porte — A  Conference  pro- 
posed— Dervish  Pasha  and  Essad  Effendi  sent  to  Egypt — The 
Alexandria  massacres — Failure  of  Dervish  Pasha's  Mission — Panic 
in  Egypt — The  Conference  meets — Tlie  Ragheb  Ministry — The 
British  Admiral  demands  that  the  construction  of  batteries  at 
Alexandria  shall  cease — The  French  decline  to  co-operate — The 
bombardment  of  Alexandria — The  town  abandoned  and  burnt. 

Arabi's  reinstatement  was  *'  looked  upon  by  the 
natives  as  a  sign  that  the  Christians  were  going  to 
be  expelled  from  Egypt,  that  they  were  to  recover 
the  land  bought  by  Europeans  or  mortgaged  to 
them,  and  that  the  National  Debt  would  be  can- 
celled." Great  numbers  of  Christians  left  the 
interior.  The  British  residents  at  Alexandria  called 
upon  their  Government  to  provide  means  for  the 
protection  of  their  lives.  "  Every  day's  delay,"  Sir 
Charles  Cookson  telegraphed  on  May  30,  *'  increases 
the  dangerous  temper  of  the  soldiery,  and  their 
growing  defiance  of  discipline."  The  officers  of 
the  army  were  "obtaining  by  threats  signatures 
to  a  petition  praying  for  the  deposition  of  the 
Khedive."  The  President  of  the  Chamber  re- 
quested the  deputies  to  go  to  their  homes  "  in  order 
to  save  them  from  being  compelled  to  sign  the 
petition."  Official  business,  except  at  the  Ministry 
of  War,  was  at  a  standstill.  Tiie  whole  country  was 
in  a  state  of  panic.     Sir  Edward  Malet  warned  the 

281 


282  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

British  Government  (May  31)  that  "a  collision 
might  at  any  moment  occur  between  the  INIoslems 
and  the  Christians." 

It  was  abundantly  clear  by  this  time  that  the 
question  of  protecting  European  financial  interests 
in  Egypt  had  fallen  completely  into  the  back- 
ground. It  was  also  clear  that  the  national  move- 
ment was  entirely  under  the  control  of  the  military 
party.  Foreign  intervention  of  some  sort  had 
become  necessary. 

For  years  past,  the  Ottoman  Government  had 
been  longing  to  regain  their  hold  over  Egypt.  The 
chanceries  of  Europe  were  filled  with  notes  and 
protests  embodying  the  querulous  complaints  made 
by  the  Porte  against  the  intervention  of  the 
European  Powers  in  Egyptian  affiiirs,  and  against 
the  insufficient  recognition  accorded  to  the  sovereign 
rights  of  the  Sultan.  The  Turkish  opportunity 
had  at  last  come.  The  force  of  circumstances  had 
fought  in  favour  of  Turkish  pretensions.  The 
Khedive  and  the  two  Western  Powers  had  en- 
deavoured to  settle  the  affairs  of  Egypt  indepen- 
dently of  the  Sultan.  They  had  signally  failed  in 
the  attempt.  All  the  Powers  of  Europe,  with  the 
exception  of  France,  were  in  favour  of  employing 
the  authority  of  the  Sultan  as  the  executive  arm 
by  which  order  should  be  restored  in  Egypt.  Even 
French  opposition  was  much  modified.  The  Re- 
publique  Fra7ifaise,  indeed,  which  was  inspired  by 
M.  Gambetta,  strongly  opposed  any  idea  of  Turkish 
intervention.  "  II  faut  niaintenir,"  it  said  on  May 
31,  "  Tiudependance  de  I'Egypte,  en  interdire  I'ap- 
proche  aux  Commissaires  aussi  bien  qu'aux  troupes 
du  Sultan."  But  M.  Gambetta  was  no  longer  in 
office.  "Je  ne  m'expliquerai  point  a  la  tribune," 
M.  de  Freycinet  said  in  the  French  Chamber  on 
June  1,  "sur  les  divers  moyens  auxquels  on  pour- 
rait  etre  conduit,  mais  il  y  a  un  moyen  que  j'exclus; 


CH.  XVI  THE  BOMBARDMENT  283 

ce  moyen  c'est  une  intervention  militaire  Fran^'aise 
en  Egypte."  This  declaration,  which  produced  an 
explosion  of  indignation  from  M.  Gambetta,  was 
almost  tantamount  to  publicly  admitting  the 
possibility  of  Turkish  intervention. 

It  is  one  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  vacillating 
and  tortuous  policy  invariably  pursued  by  the  Porte 
that  Turkish  statesmen  are  rarely  able  to  seize  the 
favourable  moment  for  action  in  support  of  their 
most  cherished  views.  The  Khedive  had  asked  for 
the  despatch  of  a  Turkish  Commissioner  to  Egypt. 
The  British  and  French  Governments  viewed  the 
proposal  more  or  less  favourably.  It  might  reason- 
ably have  been  supposed  that  the  Sultan  would 
seize  with  avidity  the  opportunity  for  asserting  his 
sovereign  rights  which  was  thus  afforded  him.  He 
did  nothing  of  the  kind.  He  was  inclined  to  show 
his  resentment  at  the  way  in  which  he  had  been 
enjoined  not  to  intervene  at  the  commencement  of 
the  Egyptian  troubles,  by  refusing  to  act  at  the 
instance  of  England  and  France  when  they  were 
favourably  disposed  towards  his  intervention.  A 
suggestion  was  ostentatiously  promulgated  that 
the  withdrawal  of  the  allied  fleet  from  Alexandria 
must  be  a  preliminary  condition  to  the  despatch  of 
a  Turkish  Commissioner.  The  Sultan  had  yet  to 
learn  that  his  assistance,  though  desirable,  was  not 
indispensable. 

In  the  meanwhile,  M.  de  Freycinet,  under  the 
p]:essure  of  circumstances,  had  in  some  degree  over- 
come his  objections  to  international  action.  On 
May  30,  he  telegraphed  to  M.  Tissot  that  "  there 
could  no  longer  be  any  reasonable  hope  of  a  pacific 
solution  through  the  moral  influence  of  the  French 
and  English  squadrons,  and  the  good  offices  of  the 
two  agents  at  Cairo."  He  therefore  proposed  to 
Lord  Granville  that  a  Conference  should  be  sum- 
moned.     Lord    Granville   at   once   intimated    his 


284  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

concurrence  in  this  proposal,  which  was  well  received 
by  the  other  Powers.  Prince  Bismarck  thought 
the  idea  of  a  Conference  "a  very  good  expedient 
for  covering  the  change  of  policy  on  the  part  of 
the  French  Government  in  regard  to  the  admissi- 
bility of  Turkish  intervention."  The  Sultan  was 
pressed  to  join  the  Conference.  "  I  expressed  my 
hope,"  Lord  Granville  wrote  on  June  2,  "  that 
Musurus  Pasha  would  represent  to  his  Government 
the  expediency  of  acting  in  cordial  co-operation 
with  England.  I  remarked  that  if  the  Sultan  were 
to  make  difficulties  and  raise  obstacles,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  find  arguments  to  meet  the  pressure 
that  would  be  put  upon  us  to  take  immediate  and 
independent  action  in  consideration  of  the  pressing 
nature  of  the  circumstances  and  engagements  under 
which  we  lay." 

The  idea  of  assembling  a  Conference  was  distaste- 
ful to  the  Sultan,  and  the  proposal  was  sufficient 
to  overcome  his  hesitation  about  the  despatch 
of  a  Turkish  Commissioner  to  Egypt.  Dervish 
Pasha  left  Constantinople  for  Alexandria  on  June  4. 
The  Porte  "  confidently  hoped  that  the  mission  of 
Dervish  Pasha  would  suffice  to  restore  the  normal 
situation  in  Egypt  to  the  general  satisfaction," 
and  Musurus  Pasha  was  instructed  to  express  to 
Lord  Granville  a  hope  that  the  project  of  the  Con- 
ference would  be  abandoned.  He  was  told  in  reply 
that  if  it  were  found  that  there  were  good  hopes 
of  a  settlement  being  speedily  attained  by  the  un- 
assisted efforts  of  Dervish  Pasha,  there  would  be 
no  objection  to  the  Conference  adjourning  for  a 
short  time  in  order  that  the  result  of  his  mission 
might  be  watched. 

Any  beneficial  results,  which  might  possibly 
have  accrued  from  the  despatch  of  the  Turkish 
mission  to  Egypt,  were  frustrated  by  the  conditions 
under  which   it    was    sent.     It    would    have    been 


CH.  XVI  THE  BOMBARDMENT  285 

contrary  to  the  traditions  and  to  the  existing  practice 
of  Turkish  diplomacy  to  have  selected  one  capable 
Commissioner,  in  whom  confidence  might  be  re- 
posed, and  to  have  traced  clear  and  straightforward 
instructions  for  his  guidance.  Whilst  Dervish 
Pasha  was  to  act  on  lines  friendly  to  the  Khedive 
and  hostile  to  Arabi,  his  colleague,  Essad  EfFendi, 
was  to  be  guided  by  diametrically  opposite  prin- 
ciples. He  was  to  hold  out  the  hand  of  fellowship 
to  the  mutineers.  Moreover,  in  order  to  guard 
against  the  possibility  of  common  action  on  the  part 
of  the  two  Commissioners,  each  of  them  was  to 
communicate  independently  with  the  Sultan.  The 
end  to  be  obtained  by  each  of  the  Commissioners 
was,  indeed,  identical,  though  the  method  of  attain- 
ing it  was  more  explicitly  set  forth  in  Dervish  Pasha's 
instructions  than  in  those  of  Essad  EfFendi.  The 
latter  was  merely  told  that  the  principal  object  he 
should  bear  in  mind  was  to  "  faire  echouer  les  entre- 
prises  et  intrigues  pernicieuses  des  etrangers." 
Dervish  Pasha,  on  the  other  hand,  was  told  that 
*'  in  order  to  create  a  rivalry  amongst  the  Consuls, 
he  was  to  attach  himself  to  the  Consuls  of  Ger- 
many, Austria,  and  Italy,  by  pretending  to  invite 
them  to  decisive  deliberations,  and  to  promise  to 
take  their  advice." 

Save  in  respect  to  this  point  of  principle,  the 
instructions  given  to  each  of  the  two  Commissioners 
differed  widely.^  Dervish  Pasha  was  ordered,  if 
necessary,  to  arrest  Arabi  and  his  principal  fol- 
lowers and  to  send  them  to  Constantinople^  to 
abolish  the  Chamber  of  Notables,  to  curtail  the 
powers  of  the  Khedive,  to  extend  those  of  the 
Sultan,  and,  lastly,  to  call  for  troops  if  necessary. 

'  The  instructions  to  each  Commissioner  were,  of  course,  secret. 
But  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  accuracy  of  the  facts  here  stated  in 
connection  with  them.  See  also  the  testimony  of  Mr.  AVilfrid  Blunt, 
who  was  probably  well-informed  on  the  point  under  discussion. — Secret 
History,  etc.,  p.  305. 


286  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  u 

Essad  Eifendi,  on  the  other  hand,  was  instructed 
to^  thank  the  "  Notables  et  hommes  de  marque  de 
I'Egypte  pour  le  devouement  dont  ils  ont  fait 
preuve,"  and  to  assure  every  one  that  the  Sultan 
had  no  intention  of  curtaihng  the  powers  granted 
to  the  Khedive  by  the  Firmans.  "  Quant  a  I'envoi 
d'une  force  arm^e,"  it  was  added,  "  ce  n'est  qu'une 
invention  pernicieuse  et  malveillante."  It  was,  in 
fact,  certain  that  the  Sultan  was  reluctant  to  bring 
his  troops  into  collision  with  the  population  of 
Egypt.  He  preferred  to  pose  as  their  defender 
against  European  aggression.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, it  is  not  surprising  that  the  bewildered 
Essad  Effendi  should,  shortly  after  his  arrival  at 
Cairo,  have  reported  that  the  policy  of  Dervish 
Pasha  was  in  entire  contradiction  to  the  instruc- 
tions he  had  himself  received.  He  asked,  but 
asked  in  vain,  for  some  clear  indication  of  what  he 
was  to  do. 

Dervish  Pasha,  however,  lost  no  time  in  acting 
on  his  instructions.  He  resolved  to  assert  his 
authority.  On  June  10,  he  received  a  deputation 
from  the  Ulema  of  Cairo.  "  One  of  them,"  Sir 
Edward  Malet  reported,  "well  known  as  a  follower 
of  Artibi,  proceeded  to  deliver  a  speech,  extolling 
the  course  pursued  by  the  army  in  having  pre- 
served the  country  from  falling  into  the  hands  of 
infidels.  Upon  this,  the  Commissioner  rose  from 
his  seat,  and,  in  forcible  language,  reminded  those 
present  that  he  had  come  to  issue  orders  and  not 
to  listen  to  preaching.  The  ofiending  Alim  was 
thereupon  seized  and  forced  to  retire  by  an 
attendant  of  colossal  stature  who  appears  always 
at  hand." 

It  was,  to  say  the  least,  a  curious  coincidence 
that  at  the  moment  when  it  appeared  possible 
that  the  rulership  of  Egypt  would  slip  from  the 
hands  of  the  military  clique,  wliich  then  exercised 


cH.  XVI  THE  BOMBARDMENT  287 

supreme  power,  an  incident  should  have  occurred 
which  showed  that  without  the  aid  of  Arabi  and 
his  colleagues  public  tranquillity  could  not  be  pre- 
served. For  some  while  past,  the  population  of 
Alexandria  had  shown  unusual  signs  of  efferves- 
cence. Europeans  had  been  hustled  and  spat  upon 
in  the  streets.  A  Sheikh  liad  been  crying  aloud  in 
the  public  thoroughfares,  "O  INIoslems,  come  and 
help  me  to  kill  the  Christians!"  On  June  9,  a 
Greek  was  warned  by  an  Egyptian  to  "  take  care, 
as  the  Arabs  were  going  to  kill  the  Christians  either 
that  day  or  the  day  following."  On  the  10th,  some 
low-class  Moslems  went  about  the  streets  calling  out 
that  "the  last  day  for  the  Christians  was  drawing 
nigh."^  On  June  11,  the  storm  burst.  It  is 
needless  to  give  the  details  of  the  riot  which  took 
place  on  that  day.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say 
that  disturbances  broke  out  simultaneously  in  three 
places.  Some  fifty  Europeans  were  slaughtered 
in  cold  blood  under  circumstances  of  the  utmost 
brutality.  INI  any  others,  amongst  whom  was  Sir 
Charles  Cook  son,  the  British  Consul,  were  severely 
wounded  and  narrowly  escaped  with  their  lives. 
"Whenever  a  European  appeared  in  sight,  the 
mob  cried  out  *  O  Moslems  I  Kill  him  I  Kill  the 
Christian  I ' " 

Both  the  Khedive  and  Arabi  have  at  times 
been  accused  of  having  instigated  the  Alexandria 
massacres.^     So   calm   and    impartial   an    observer 

*  Royle's  Egyptian  Campaigns  o/"1882  to  1885^  vol.  i.  p.  88. 

2  Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt  (Secret  Hintory,  pp.  497-534)  gives  at  great 
length  the  evidence  on  which  he  relies  to  incriminate  the  Khedive. 
After  a  careful  examination  of  all  the  facts,  I  have  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  this  evidence  is  altogether  valueless.  It  is  unnecessary 
that  I  should  give  my  reasons  at  length. 

Lord  Randolph  Churchill  made  himself  the  principal  mouthpiece  in 
Parliament  of  the  cliarges  against  the  Khedive.  Papers  on  the  subject 
were  laid  before  I'  rliament  (see  Egypt,  No.  4,  1884).  They  were 
forwarded  to  Sir  Edward  Malet  on  August  6,  1883,  by  Lord  Granville 
with  the  following  remarks  :  "  A  full  examination  of  the  papers  and 
arguments  adduced  by  Lord  Randolph  Churchill  leads  to  the  couclusiou 


288  ISIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

as  Sir  Edward  INIalet,  however,  held  that  both 
accusations  were  devoid  of  foundation,  and  that 
the  massacres  were  the  natural  outcome  of  the 
political  effervescence  of  the  time.  There  can 
be  little  doubt  that  this  view  of  the  question  is 
correct.  A  considerable  moral  responsibility,  how- 
ever, rested  on  Arabi  and  his  colleagues  for  tne 
blood  which  was  shed.  For  a  long  time  past,  they 
had  done  their  best  to  arouse  the  race  hatred  and 
fanaticism  of  the  cowardly  mob  at  Alexandria.^ 
The  natural  result  ensued. 

The  effect  of  the  riot  was  instantaneous.  Sir 
Edward  JNIalet  reported  to  I^ord  Granville,  on 
June  13,  that  Dervish  Pasha's  mission  had  alto- 
gether failed  in  its  object.  The  Sultan's  Com- 
missioner was  obliged  to  bow  to  the  authority  of 
Arabi.  He  informed  the  representatives  of  the 
Powers  that  "  under  the  urgent  circumstances  of 
the  case,  he  would  assume  joint  responsibility  with 
Arabi  Pasha  for  the  execution  of  the  orders  of  the 
Khedive."  Dervish  Pasha  distributed  decorations 
alike  to  the  Arabists  and  to  the  Khedivial  party, 
but  his  influence  was  gone.  None  of  the  officers 
of  the  army  went  to  see  him.  It  was  only  by  "  a 
remnant  of  politeness"  that  Arabi  answered  the 
letters  which  Dervish  Pasha  addressed  to  him. 

It  was  r.bout  this  moment  that  the  Sultan 
informed  Lord  Dufferin  that  "Arabi  Pasha  had 
made  a  complete  submission,  and  tliat  the  status 
quo  was  about  to  be  established."  Musurus  Pasha 
also  told  Lord  Granville  that  the  Sultan  had 
conferred    on   Arabi    the    Grand    Cordon    of  the 

that  no  prima  facie  evidence  (either  legal  or  moral)  exists  in  support  of 
the  charges  which  liave  been  preferred  against  His  Highness  Tewfik 
Pasha." 

As  regards  Arabi,  Sir  Charles  Wilson,  who  watched  his  trial, 
expressed  tlie  opinion  that '' there  was  no  evidence  to  connect  Arabi 
with  the  mass;icre  at  Alexandria  on  June  11." 

'  Al)unilant  evidence  in  supjjort  of  tliis  statement  was  adduced  at 
Arabi's  trial. 


CH.  XVI  THE  BOMBARDMENT  289 

Medjidieh,  and  that  Arabi  "  had  expressed  his 
gratitude  and  had  reiterated  his  assurances  of 
fideUty  and  devotion  to  the  Sultan."  His  JNIajesty 
thought  that  there  was  "  no  longer  occasion  for 
anxiety."  The  alarm  which  had  prevailed  had 
been  due  to  insubordination  on  the  part  of  the 
military,  but  these  acts  of  submission  and  the 
restoration  of  tranquillity  "  removed  all  difficulties 
and  rendered  any  measures  of  rigour  useless." 
The  extent  of  Arabi's  submission  may  be  gathered 
from  the  fact  that,  on  July  5,  Arabi  "  intimated 
to  Dervish  Pasha  that  he  had  better  quit  Egypt," 
and  tliat  when,  on  July  8,  he  was  summoned, 
through  Essad  EfFendi,  to  proceed  to  Constan- 
tinople "he  refused  to  comply  with  the  invitation 
of  His  Majesty."  Then,  at  last.  Lord  DufFerin 
extorted  from  the  unwilling  Minister  for  Foreign 
Afiairs  at  the  Porte  the  admission  that  "  Arabi 
had  taken  the  bit  in  his  teeth  and  that  it  was 
evident  something  must  be  done." 

Manifestly  something  had  to  be  done,  for  the 
whole  framework  of  society  in  Egypt  was  on  the 
point  of  collapsing.  By  June  17,  14,000  Christians 
had  left  the  country,  and  some  6000  more  were 
anxiously  awaiting  the  arrival  of  ships  to  take 
them  away.  On  June  26,  ten  Greeks  and  three 
Jews  were  murdered  by  a  fanatical  mob  at  Ben  ha. 
Anibi,  following  perhaps  unconsciously  the  ex- 
ample of  the  French  Jacobins,  proposed  to  the 
Council  that  the  property  of  all  Egyptians  leaving 
the  country  should  be  confiscated.^  On  June  29, 
Mr.  Cartwright,  Sir  Edward  JNIalet's  locum  teiiens,^ 

^  It  is  possible  that  Arabi  designedly  copied  the  proceedings  of  the 
Jacobins.  1  have  been  informed  on  good  autliority  that  at  this  period 
he  devoted  a  good  deal  of  attention  to  the  literature  of  the  French 
Revolution. 

2  Ill-health  obliged  Sir  Edward  Malet  to  leave  Egypt  at  this  time. 
He  subse(iuently  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  sudden  illness  by 
wbicli  he  was  prostrated  was  the  result  of  a  plot  to  poison  him. — See 
his  letter  in  the  Times  of  October  12,  1907. 

vox..  1  u 


290  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  n 

reported  to  Lord  Granville  :  '*  The  exodus  of 
Europeans  and  the  preparations  for  flight  continue 
with  vigour.  ...  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  the 
collapse  and  ruin  which  have  so  suddenly  overtaken 
the  country.  .  .  .  The  natives,  even  the  religious 
Sheikhs,  are  now  raising  their  voices  against  the 
military  party,  and  a  large  number  of  respectable 
Arabs  are  leaving  the  country.  The  departure  of 
Turkish  families  is  taking  large  proportions." 

The  effect  of  the  massacre  at  Alexandria  was 
to  quicken  the  slow  pace  of  European  diplomacy. 
M.  de  Freycinet  thought  it  "more  than  ever 
imperative  that  the  Conference  should  be  con- 
stituted without  the  least  delay."  On  June  13, 
the  British  and  French  Governments  instructed 
their  representatives  at  the  various  courts  of 
Europe  to  propose  that  "  the  Sultan,  as  Sovereign, 
shall,  in  case  of  necessity,  be  jointly  invited  by  the 
Powers  united  in  Conference  to  be  prepared  to 
lend  to  the  Khedive  a  sufficient  force  to  enable 
His  Highness  to  maintain  his  authority ;  the  Sultan 
to  be  requested  to  give  a  positive  assurance  that 
these  troops  should  only  be  used  for  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  status  quo,  and  that  there  should  be 
no  interference  with  the  liberties  of  Egypt  secured 
by  the  previous  Firmans  of  the  Sultan,  or  with 
existing  European  agreements ;  the  troops  not  to 
remain  in  Egypt  for  a  longer  period  than  a  month, 
except  at  the  request  of  the  Khedive,  and  with  the 
consent  of  the  Great  Powers,  or  of  the  Western 
Powers  as  representing  Europe ;  the  reasonable 
expenses  of  the  expedition  to  be  borne  by  the 
Egyptian  Government."  This  was  quickly  followed 
by  a  proposal  that  the  Conference  should  meet 
immediately  "  with  or  without  Turkey."  The 
Sultan  declined  to  join  the  Conference.  He 
thought  it  unnecessary,  as  "Dervish  Pasha  was 
succeeding  in  his  efforts  to  fulfil   his  mission  in 


CH.  XVI  THE  BOMBARDMENT  291 

Egypt."  The  result  was  that,  after  some  diplomatic 
skirmishing,  the  Conference  met  at  Constantinople 
on  June  23  without  the  Porte  being  represented. 

It   is  unnecessary   to  dwell    at    length    on   the 
tedious   proceedings    of  the  Conference.      It  was 
clear,    as    Lord    Salisbury    said    in   the    House    of 
Lords    on  July   24,   that  the   "  European   concert 
was  rather  a  phantasm."     On  the  one  side,  was  the 
British  Government,  represented  at  the  Conference 
by  one  of  the  most  able  diplomatists  of  the  day. 
Lord    Granville    and    Lord    DufFerin    thoroughly 
understood  what  they  wanted.     They  wished  for 
order  to  be  maintained  in  Egypt,  and  they  were 
alive  to  the  fact  that,  without  the  employment  of 
material    force,    order   could    not   be    maintained. 
European  public  opinion  had  been  irritated  by  the 
"  tortuous  and  occult  devices  "  of  the  Sultan.     If 
the   Sultan  refused   to   send   troops,   it  would  be 
necessary  to   "resort  to  an   armed   occupation  of 
Egypt  other  than  through  the  instrumentality  of 
Turkey."     On  the  other   side,   were   the   various 
Powers  of  Europe,  watchful  of  their  own  interests, 
but   unwilling    to    incur   any    responsibility.       On 
June  30,  Lord  Dufferin  reported  that  so  far  the 
Conference   had    "done   absolutely  nothing,"  and 
that,   unless  something  could  speedily  be  settled, 
"the   prolongation    of  its    existence    would    seem 
useless."     By  July  2,  the  Conference  had  only  got 
so  far  as  to  consider  "the  object  to  be  attained  by 
the   armed  Turkish   intervention    in   Egypt,"  and 
the  united  Ambassadors  had  come  to  the  sage  but 
somewhat  impotent  conclusion  that,  if  the  Porte 
refused  an  invitation  to   send  troops,    "the  Con- 
ference reserved  the  right  to  express  an  opinion  as 
to  what  should  be  done  at  the  opportune  moment." 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  bewildered  ruler,  whose 
battalions  it  was  proposed  to  use  in  order  to  keep 
the  peace,  held  aloof  from  the  Council  Chamber, 


292  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.ii 

being  at  times  willing  and  at  times  unwilling  to 
act.  He  wished  to  know  what  Lord  Granville 
meant  when  he  referred  to  "the  safe  improve  - 
ment  of  the  internal  administration  of  Egypt." 
He  was  anxious  to  have  some  explanations  on  this 
point,  for  his  suspicions  had  been  excited  by  the 
fact  that  the  Conference  had  been  invited  to  con- 
sider how  "the  prudent  development  of  Egyptian 
institutions "  might  best  be  effected.  "  What," 
Lord  Dufferin  reported,  "  has  excited  His  Majesty's 
mistrust,  is  evidently  the  allusion  to  Parliamentary 
Government,  which  he  imagines  to  be  shadowed 
forth  in  the  word  '  institutions.'  " 

Eventually,  on  July  6,  the  Conference  got  so 
far  as  to  invite  the  Sultan  to  send  troops  under 
certain  conditions,  which  were  specified  in  general 
terms,  and  which,  in  the  event  of  the  invitation 
being  accepted,  were  to  be  embodied  in  a  subse- 
quent agreement  between  the  six  Powers  and 
Turkey. 

Whilst  these  discussions  were  taking  place, 
matters  had  been  going  from  bad  to  worse  in 
Egypt.  On  June  26,  Mr.  Cartwright  wrote : 
"The  exclusive  hifluence  of  Arabi  Pasha  is  best 
shown  by  the  unbroken  ascendancy,  the  intolerable 
pretensions,  and  the  threatening  attitude  of  the 
army."  A  mock  inquiry  was  instituted  into  the 
massacres  of  June  11,  but  the  English  member  of 
the  Commission  soon  withdrew  from  the  proceed- 
ings, and  the  Minister  of  War  told  the  Khedive's 
private  secretary  that  "  he  would  not  allow  any 
Arab  to  be  executed,  unless  for  every  Arab,  a 
European  was  hung."  No  one  dared  to  give  evi- 
dence which  might  be  distasteful  to  the  military 
party. 

The  Austrian  and  German  representatives  in 
Egypt  urged  the  formation  of  a  INIinistry  approved 
by  the  military  party.     l*rince  Bismarck  thought 


CH.  XVI  THE  BOMBARDMENT  293 

that  Arabi  had  become  a  power  "avec  lequel  il 
fallait  compter." 

The  German  and  Austrian  proposals  were  not 
viewed  with  disfavour  in  Paris.  M.  de  Freycinet 
spoke  about  "the  possibihty  of  patching  up  the 
Egyptian  question  by  making  terms  with  Arabi," 
but  was  at  once  met  with  the  decisive  statement 
that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  British  Government,  no 
'*  satisfactory  or  durable  arrangement  was  possible 
without  the  overthrow  of  Arabi  Pasha  and  the 
military  party  in  Egypt." 

Under  the  pressure  exerted  by  the  Austrian 
and  German  Consuls -General,  the  Khedive,  on 
June  7,  nominated  Ragheb  Pasha,  an  effete  old 
man,  to  be  President  of  the  Council,  with  Arabi  as 
his  JNlinister  of  War.  The  result  was  what  might 
have  been  expected.  On  June  28,  Mr.  Cartwright 
reported  to  Lord  Granville  :  **  Ragheb  Pasha  meets 
with  great  difficulties  in  his  endeavour  to  control 
the  military  element  in  his  Ministry.  I  hear  that 
His  Excellency  is  greatly  disheartened  at  his 
want  of  success,  and  finds  the  officers  too  much 
occupied  with  warlike  designs  and  preparations  to 
pay  any  serious  attention  to  reassuring  measures, 
or  to  the  need  of  serious  steps  with  a  view  to  the 
establishment  of  order  and  a  more  normal  state  of 
affairs." 

For  some  while  past,  both  British  public  opinion 
and  the  British  Government  had  shown  a  dis- 
position to  break  through  the  diplomatic  cobwebs 
which  were  hindering  all  effective  action  and  allow- 
ing Arabi  to  defy  Europe.  The  opportunity  for 
doing  so  now  presented  itself.  So  early  as  June  3, 
the  Admiralty  was  informed  that  batteries  were 
being  raised  at  Alexandria  with  the  intention  of 
using  them  against  the  British  fleet.  The  Sultan 
gave  orders  that  the  construction  of  these  batteries 
should    cease,   and    for   the   time  being  his  order 


294  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  n 

was  obeyed.  A  month  later,  the  works  were 
recommenced.  The  garrison  of  Alexandria  was 
reinforced.  Arabi  urged  upon  his  colleagues  the 
desirability  of  a  Icvce  en  masse.  On  July  5,  Mr. 
Cartwright  reported  :  "  At  a  Council  of  INIinisters 
held  yesterday,  Arabi  Pasha  made  a  very  violent 
speech  against  the  S  ultan.  He  has,  moreover,  ordered 
the  officers  of  the  Egyptian  army  to  discontinue 
all  communication  with  Dervish  Pasha,  who  is  to 
be  told  that  his  mission  in  Egypt  is  terminated." 
On  July  3,  Lord  Alcester  was  instructed  to 
prevent  the  continuance  of  work  on  the  fortifica- 
tions. If  not  immediately  disconthiued,  he  was  to 
"  destrov  the  earthworks  and  silence  the  batteries  if 
they  opened  fire."  The  French  Government  were 
informed  of  the  issue  of  these  instructions  and 
invited  to  co-operate.  The  other  Powers  of 
Europe  were  also  informed.  On  July  5,  JNI.  de 
Freycinet  told  Lord  Lyons  that  **  the  French 
Government  could  not  instruct  Admiral  Ccnrad  to 
associate  himself  with  the  English  Admiral  in 
stopping  by  force  the  erection  of  batteries  or  the 
placing  of  guns  at  Alexandria.  The  French 
Government  considered  that  this  would  be  an  act 
of  offensive  hostility  against  Egypt,  in  which  they 
could  not  take  part  without  violating  the  con- 
stitution, which  prohibits  their  making  war  without 
the  consent  of  the  Chamber."  On  July  6,  INI.  de 
Freycinet,  in  answer  to  a  question  addressed  to 
him  by  INI.  Lockroy  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
"  repeated  emphatically  the  assurance  that  the 
arms  of  France  would  not  be  used  without  the 
express  consent  of  the  Chamber."  On  July  6, 
Lord  Alcester  sent  a  note  to  the  commandant  of 
the  garrison  demanding  that  the  work  of  fortifi- 
cation and  the  erection  of  earthworks  should  be 
discontinued.  He  was  informed  in  reply  that  no 
guns   had    recently   been    added   to    the   forts,   or 


CH.XVI  THE  BOMBARDMENT  295 

military  preparations  made.  The  truth  of  this 
statement  was  confirmed  by  Dervish  Pasha.  On 
the  9th,  however,  work  on  the  fortifications  recom- 
menced. Guns  were  mounted  on  Fort  Silsileh. 
At  daybreak  on  July  10,  Lord  Alcester  gave  notice 
to  the  Consuls  resident  at  Alexandria  that  he  would 
*'  commence  action  twenty-four  hours  after,  unless 
the  forts  on  the  isthmus  and  those  commanding 
the  entrance  to  the  harbour  were  surrendered." 
The  different  Cabinets  of  Europe  were  informed 
of  this  step. 

The  views  of  the  Austrian  Government  on  a 
matter  of  this  sort  are  of  special  importance,  on 
account  of  the  interest  possessed  by  Austria  in 
any  step  which  menaces  the  integrity  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire.  When  Sir  Henry  Elliot,  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Vienna,  informed  Count  Kalnoky 
of  the  measures  about  to  be  taken  by  the  British 
Admiral,  "  His  Excellency  replied  without  hesita- 
tion that  he  thought  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment perfectly  right  in  the  step  that  was  being 
taken,  and  nothing  could  be  more  complete  and 
cordial  than  the  manner  in  which  he  declared  the 
action  to  be  perfectly  legitimate,  as  it  was 
impossible  for  us  to  permit  the  threatening  pre- 
parations to  be  carried  on  without  interference." 

The  bewilderment  of  the  Sultan  was  at  this 
moment  extreme.  Baron  de  Ring,  who  had  been 
formerly  French  Consul -General  in  Egypt  and 
whose  Arabist  sympathies  were  well  known,  was 
at  Constantinople,  and  had  given  the  Sultan  to 
understand  that  France  would  be  glad  to  see  some 
compromise  effected  with  Arabics  party.  Under 
these  circumstances,  the  Sultan  was  inclined  to  join 
the  Conference.  Indeed,  on  July  10,  he  informed 
the  German  Charge  d'AfFaires  at  Constantinople 
that  "a  Turkish  Commissioner  would  join  the  Con- 
ference the  next  day  but  one."     It  was,  however, 


296  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  n 

clear  that  the  work  of  restoring  order  in  Egypt 
was  about  to  be  taken  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  Conference.  When,  on  July  10,  the  Sultan 
was  informed  of  the  intended  bombardment  of 
Alexandria,  he  told  Lord  Dufferin  that  he  "  would 
send  a  categorical  answer  to  his  communication  by 
five  o'clock  to-morrow  (July  11)."  In  the  mean- 
while, he  asked  that  the  bombardment  should  be 
delayed,  and  he  appointed  a  new  Prime  Minister, 
who  at  once  called  on  Lord  Dufferin  and  said 
that  "to-morrow  (the  12th)  he  would  be  able  to 
propose  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  Egyptian 
question."  Lord  Dufferin  forwarded  the  Sultan's 
request  to  London  and  to  Alexandria,  but  he  "held 
out  no  hope  that  the  line  of  action  determined 
upon  would  be  modified."  He  also  pointed  out 
"the  folly,  when  such  great  interests  were  at  stake, 
of  postponing  diplomatic  action  till  it  became 
materially  impossible  to  interfere  with  the  course 
of  events." 

The  Sultan  was,  as  usual,  too  late.  The 
patience  both  of  the  British  Government  and  of 
the  British  public  was  exhausted.  For  the  last 
year  and  a  half,  every  one  had  been  agreed  that 
something  should  be  done,  but  no  one  could  agree 
as  to  what  should  be  done.  At  last,  something 
effectual  was  done.  "At  7  a.m.,  on  the  11th,"  Lord 
Alcester  stated  in  his  report  on  the  bombardment, 
"I  signalled  from  the  Invincible  to  the  Alexandra 
to  fire  a  shell  into  the  recently  armed  earthworks 
termed  the  Hospital  Battery,  and  followed  this  by 
a  general  signal  to  the  fleet  'Attack  the  enemy's 
batteries,'  when  immediate  action  ensued  between 
all  the  ships  in  the  positions  assigned  to  them,  and 
the  whole  of  the  forts  commanding  the  entrance  to 
the  harbour  of  Alexandria."  By  5.30  p.m.,  the 
batteries  were  silenced.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
following   day,    the    Egyptian    garrison    retreated, 


OH.  XVI  THE  BOMBARDMENT  297 

having  first  set  fire  to  the  town,  which  was  pillaged 
by  the  mob.  Several  Europeans  were  murdered. 
On  the  evening  of  the  13th,  150  marines,  with  a 
Gatlino-  ouii,  were  landed  from  the  fleet,  but  re- 
embarked  after  remaining  on  shore  for  about  half 
an  hour.  On  the  morning  of  the  14th,  a  further 
force  was  landed.  In  the  course  of  the  next  day 
or  two,  reinforcements  having  arrived,  effective 
possession  was  taken  of  the  town  and  something- 
like  order  restored.  On  July  18,  Europeans  and 
Egyptians  began  to  return  to  Alexandria. 

It  has  been  frequently  stated  by  critics  hostile 
to  England  that  Alexandria  was  set  on  fire  by  the 
shells  from  the  British  fleet.  For  this  statement 
there  is  not  a  shadow  of  foundation.^     There  is  no 

*  Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt's  testimony  on  Egyptian  affairs  generally  ia 
of  very  little  value,  but  it  may  perhaps  be  quoted  on  this  special 
point.  His  first  impressions  are  recorded  in  the  following  words 
(Secret  History,  etc.,  p.  872):  "^'July  14th.  Went  to  see  Gregory. 
He  is  frightened  at  Alexandria's  being  burnt,  and  will  have  it  that 
Arabi  did  not  order  it.  I  say  he  ordered  it,  and  was  right  to  do  so. 
This  is  the  policy  of  the  Russians  at  Moscow,  and  squai-es  with  all 
I  know  of  their  intentions."  Somewhat  later,  Mr.  Blunt  wrote 
(pp.  390-91)  :  "  With  regard  to  the  burning  of  Alexandria,  I  have  never 
been  able  to  make  up  my  mind  exactly  what  part,  if  any,  the  Egyptian 
army  took  in  it.  Arabi  has  always  persistently  denied  having  or(lered 
it,  and  an  act  of  such  great  energy  stands  so  completely  at  variance 
with  the  rest  of  his  ail-too  supine  conduct  of  the  war  that  I  think  it 
may  be  fairly  dismissed  as  improbable.  .  .  .  Ninet,  who  was  present 
at  the  whole  affair,  attributes  the  conflagration  primarily  to  Seymour's 
shells,  and  this  is  probably  a  correct  account.  ...  I  do  not  consider 
the  question  of  any  great  importance  as  affecting  the  moral  aspect  of 
the  case,  it  being  clearly  a  military  measure.  .  .  .  Historically,  how- 
ever, it  is  of  importance,  and  I  therefore  say  that  on  a  balance  of 
evidence  I  am  of  opinion  that  the  retreating  army  had  its  share  in  it, 
not  in  consequence  of  any  order,  but  as  an  act  of  disorder." 

Mr.  Broadley,  who  defended  Ar/ibi  at  his  trial,  evidently  had  strong 
suspicions  that  the  burning  of  Alexandria  was  his  handiwork.  On 
November  27,  1882,  he  wrote  to  Mr.  Blunt:  "Nothing  presents 
difficulties  but  the  burning  of  Alexandria.  As  regards  this,  1  believe 
the  proof  will  fail  as  to  Arabi's  orders,  but  many  ugly  facts  remain,  viz.  : 
(1)  No  efforts  to  stop  conflagration  and  loot.  (2)  Continued  intimacy 
with  Suliman  Sami  afterwards.  (8)  No  punishment  of  offenders. 
(4)  Large  purchases  of  petroleum.  (5)  Systematic  manner  of  incendi- 
arism by  soldiers.  This  is  the  rub.  Could  Arabi  have  not  stopped  the 
whole  thing  .^  Besides,  some  of  his  speeches  have  a  very  burning 
appearance." — Secret  History,  etc.,  p.  468. 


298  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

doubt  that  the  conflagration  was  the  deliberate 
work  of  incendiaries. 

At  the  time,  the  British  Government  were 
severely  blamed  for  not  taking  prompt  measures 
immediately  after  the  bombardment  to  stop  the 
conflagration  and  to  restore  order  in  the  to^\^l. 
So  early  as  July  7,  the  Khedive  pointed  out  that 
the  bombardment  should  be  immediately  followed 
by  the  landing  of  a  military  force.  The  War 
Office  and  the  Admiralty  were  desirous  to  land 
troops,  but  their  advice  was  overruled  by  the 
Cabinet  on  political  grounds.  Mr.  Gladstone  stated 
in  the  House  of  Commons  that  the  landing  of  a 
force  was  objectionable,  because  it  would  have  in- 
volved *'the  assumption  of  authority  upon  the 
Egyptian  question,"  and  would  have  been  *'  grossly 
disloyal  in  the  face  of  Europe  and  the  Conference." 
It  is  difficult  to  conceive  the  frame  of  mind  of  any 
one  who  considers  that  firing  several  thousand  shot 
and  shell  into  Egyptian  forts  did  not  involve  an 
'*  assumption  of  authority,"  whereas  landing  some 
men  to  prevent  a  populous  city  from  being  burnt 
to  the  ground  did  involve  such  an  assumption. 
These  technicalities,  which  are  only  worthy  of  a 
special  pleader,  were  the  bane  of  the  British 
Government  in  dealing  with  the  Egyptian  ques- 
tion during  Mr.  Gladstone's  JNIinistry.  No  foreign 
Power  would  have  had  any  reasonable  ground  for 
complaint  if,  immediately  after  the  bombardment, 
a  force  sufficient  to  preserve  order  had  been  landed 
at  Alexandria. 

The  question  remains  whether,  apart  from  the 
details  in  the  execution,  the  bombardment  was 
justifiable.  There  can  be  no  doubt  tliat  it  was 
perfectly  justifiable,  not  merely  on  the  narrow 
ground  taken  up  by  the  British  INIinistry,  namely, 
that  it  was  necessary  as  a  means  of  self-defence, 
but  because  it  was  clear  that,  in   tlie  absence   of 


CH.XVI  THE  BOMBARDMENT  299 

effectual  Turkish  or  international  action,  the  duty 
of  crushing  Arabi  devolved  on  England.^ 

*  The  bombardment  of  Alexandria  led  to  the  retirement  from  Mr. 
Gladstone's  Cabinet  of  Mr.  Brig^lit,  "  the  colleague  who  in  fundamentals 
stood  closest  to  him  of  them  all"  (Morley's  Life  of  Gladstone,  iii.  p.  83). 
The  arguments  by  which  Mr.  Gladstone  defended  the  action  taken  at 
Alexandria  are  given  in  a  letter  addressed  at  the  time  to  Mr.  Bright 
(p.  84).  Save  to  those  who  hold  that,  under  no  circumstances  is  the 
use  of  force  justifiable,  they  would  appear  to  be  conclusive. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

TEL-EL-KEBIR 
July-September  1882 

State  of  the  country — British  policy — Vote  of  credit — Negotiations 
with  France — Fall  of  the  Freycinet  Ministry — France  declines  to 
co-operate — Negotiations  with  Italy — Italy  declines  to  co-operate 
— Negotiations  with  Turkey— Tel-el-Kebir — General  remarks. 

After  the  bombardment  of  the  forts,  Arabi  retired 
to  Kafr-Dawar,  a  few  miles  distant  from  Alex- 
andria, whence  he  issued  a  Proclamation  stating 
that  "irreconcilable  war  existed  between  the 
Egyptians  and  the  English,  and  all  those  who 
proved  traitors  to  their  country  would  not  only  be 
subjected  to  the  severest  punishment  in  accordance 
with  martial  law,  but  would  be  for  ever  accursed 
in  the  future  world."  On  July  22,  the  Khedive 
formally  dismissed  Arabi  from  the  post  of  Minister 
of  War,  but  it  was  not  till  August  27,  that  a  new 
Ministry  under  the  presidency  of  Cherif  Pasha, 
with  Riaz  Pasha  as  INIinister  of  the  Interior,  was 
formed  at  Alexandria.  In  the  meanwhile,  the 
condition  of  the  provinces  was  one  of  complete 
anarchy.  The  towns  of  Tanta,  Damanhour,  and 
INIehalla  were  plundered,  and  the  European  in- 
habitants massacred. 

The  history  of  the  next  two  months  may  be 
summarised  in  a  single  sentence.  England  stepped 
in,  and  with  one  rapid  and  well -delivered  blow 
crushed   the  rebellion.     But  it  will  be  interesting 

300 


CH.  XVII  TEL-EL-KEBIR  301 

to  the  student  of  diplomatic  history  to  know  in 
somewhat  greater  detail  how  it  was  that  the  British 
Government  were  left  to  act  alone  in  the  matter. 

After  the  bombardment  of  Alexandria,  British 
public  opinion  was  thoroughly  roused.  On  July 
22,  Mr.  Gladstone  stated  the  policy  of  the  British 
Government  in  the  House  of  Commons.  "  We 
feel,"  he  said,  "  that  we  should  not  fully  discharge 
our  duty  if  we  did  not  endeavour  to  convert  the 
present  interior  state  of  Egypt  from  anarchy  and 
conflict  to  peace  and  order.  We  shall  look  during 
the  time  that  remains  to  us  to  the  co-operation  of 
the  Powers  of  civilised  Europe,  if  it  be  in  any  case 
open  to  us."  But,  INIr.  Gladstone  added,  amidst 
the  cheers  of  the  House,  "  if  every  chance  of 
obtaining  co-operation  is  exhausted,  the  work  will 
be  undertaken  by  the  single  power  of  England." 
Parliament  granted,  by  a  majority  of  275  to  19, 
the  money  (£2,300,000)  for  which  the  Government 
asked.  15,000  men  were  ordered  to  Malta  and 
Cyprus.  A  force  of  5000  men  was  ordered  to  be 
sent  to  Egypt  from  India.  Sir  Garnet  (afterwards 
Lord)  Wolseley  was  placed  in  chief  command. 
He  was  to  go  to  Egypt  "  in  support  of  the  authority 
of  His  Highness  the  Khedive,  as  established  by  the 
Firmans  of  the  Sultan  and  existing  international 
engagements,  to  suppress  a  military  revolt  in  that 
country." 

Simultaneously  with  the  military  preparations, 
diplomatic  negotiations  were  actively  carried  on. 
The  French  Government  were  "  firmly  resolved  to 
separate  the  question  of  protecting  the  Suez  Canal 
from  that  of  intervention  properly  so  -  called." 
They  would  "abstain  from  any  operation  in  the 
interior  of  Egypt  except  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
pelling direct  acts  of  aggression.  If,  therefore, 
the  English  troops  thought  fit  to  undertake 
such  operations,  they  must  not  count  on  French 


302  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

co-operation."  Amongst  other  reasons  for  adopting 
this  course,  it  was  stated  that  the  Ministers  of  War 
and  Marine  considered  that  the  season  was  most 
unfavourable,  and  that  at  least  half  the  troops 
would  perish  from  sickness,  if  operations  were 
undertaken  before  November.  At  the  same  time, 
the  French  Chargd  d' Affaires  in  London  told 
Lord  Granville  "that  it  was  certain  that  M.  de 
Freycinet  wished  it  to  be  understood  that  the 
French  Government  had  no  objection  to  our  {i.e. 
the  British)  advance  if  we  decided  to  make  it." 
M.  de  Freycinet,  however,  was  not  unwilling  to 
take  action  in  common  with  England  for  the 
defence  of  the  Canal.  On  July  19,  the  French 
Chamber  granted  to  the  Government,  by  a  majority 
of  421  to  61,  the  navy  credits  for  which  they 
asked,  amounting  to  about  £313,000.  In  the 
course  of  the  debates  on  this  vote,  it  became  clear 
that  much  difference  of  opinion  existed  in  the 
Chamber.  M.  Gambetta  denounced  in  the  stronejest 
terms  the  despatch  of  Turkish  troops  to  Egypt, 
and  spoke  eloquently  in  support  of  the  Anglo- 
French  alliance.  "  Au  prix  des  plus  grands  sacri- 
fices," he  said,  "ne  rompez  jamais  Talliance 
Anglaise.  Et  precisement  —  je  livre  toute  ma 
pensee,  car  je  n'ai  rien  a  cacher — precisement  ce 
qui  me  soUicite  a  I'alliance  Anglaise,  a  la  co-opera- 
tion Anglaise,  dans  le  bassin  de  la  Mediterranee, 
et  en  Egypte,  et  ce  que  je  redoute  le  plus,  entendez- 
le  bien,  outre  cette  rupture  ndfaste,  c'est  que  vous 
ne  livriez  a  I'Angleterre  et  pour  toujours,  des 
territoires,  des  fleuves,  et  des  passages  ou  votre 
droit  de  vivre  et  de  trafiquer  est  dgal  au  sien."' 

1  To  a  limited  extent,  M.  Gambetta  was  a  true  prophet,  although 
time  alone  can  show  how  far  he  was  rij^ht  in  usiiij^^  the  words  pour 
toujours:  lu  the  meanwhile,  it  may  he  remarked  that  the  "  right  to 
live  and  to  trade"  in  Egypt  has  been  as  fully,  indeed,  j)erhaps  some- 
what more  fully  assured  to  the  French  since  the  British  oecujjation  than 
was  the  case  before  the  occurrence  of  that  event.     According  to  a 


CH.  XVII  TEL-EL-KEEIR  303 

M.  Clemenceau,  on  the  other  hand,  was  animated 
with  a  very  different  spirit.  He  congratuhited 
the  Government  on  not  having  taken  part  in 
the  bombardment  of  the  forts  at  Alexandria,  he 
approved  of  the  Conference,  and  he  deprecated  any 
active  French  interference  in  Egypt.  Speaking 
with  a  manifest  suspicion  of  the  poUcy  and  inten- 
tions of  Germany,  he  said  that  it  appeared  to  him 
that  endeavours  were  being  made  to  get  the  French 
forces  scattered  over  Africa,  and  that,  as  Austria 
had  been  pushed  into  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  so 
France  had  been  pushed  into  Tunis,  and  was  now 
being  pushed  into  Egypt. 

Active  preparations  were  now  made  in  the 
French  dockyards.  The  French  Admiral  at  Port 
Said  was  instructed  to  concert  measures  with  Rear- 
Ad  miral  Hoskins  for  the  protection  of  the  Suez 
Canal.  But  both  the  French  Government  and  the 
French  Chamber  were  haunted  by  the  idea  that 
France  would  be  isolated  in  Europe.  M.  de 
Freycinet  wished  to  have  a  distinct  mandate  from 
the  Conference  deputing  England  and  France  to 
watch  over  the  Canal.  The  British  and  French 
Ambassadors  at  Constantinople  were,  therefore, 
instructed  to  propose  to  their  colleagues  that  the 
Conference  should  designate  the  Powers  who, 
failing  any  effective  action  on  the  part  of  Turkey, 
should  be  charged  in  case  of  need  to  take  whatever 
measures  were  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the 
Canal.  It  soon  became  apparent  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  obtain  a  mandate  from  the  Powers. 
Prince  Bismarck  "  was  afraid  of  giving  the  question 
greater  proportions  by  such  a  step,  and  of  convert- 
ing it  into  a  war  between  the  Christian  Powers  of 
Europe  and  the  Mohammedan  countries."     Count 

statement  published  in  the  Journal  Offidel  in  1903,  French  capitiil  to 
the  extent  of  over  67  millions  sterliuir  was  at  that  time  invested  io 
Effypt.     I  do  not  doubt  that  this  amount  has  now  been  exceeded. 


304  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  u 

Minister,  however,  assured  Lord  Granville  that, 
in  the  event  of  the  British  Government  taking 
action  on  their  own  initiative,  they  would  receive 
the  moral  support  of  Germany,  although  Prince 
Bismarck  \vas  not  prepared  to  go  to  the  length 
of  a  formal  mandate.  The  Austrian  Government 
shared  the  views  set  forth  by  Germany. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  feeling  in  France  against 
any  intervention  in  Egypt  grew  apace.  The  parti- 
sans of  non-intervention  and  those  of  intervention 
united  against  the  Suez  Canal  Credit  Bill.  The 
opposition  was  increased  by  a  communication  made 
by  the  German  Ambassador  in  Paris  to  M.  de 
Freycinet,  which  favoured  Turkish  intervention  as 
the  best  means  for  safeguarding  the  Canal.  This 
communication  was  regarded  as  one  of  many  steps 
said  to  have  been  recently  taken  by  Prince 
Bismarck  with  a  view  to  keeping  M.  de  Freycinet 
in  office.  Resentment  at  the  interference  in  their 
internal  affiiirs  implied,  as  the  French  conceived, 
in  the  undisguised  su])port  Prince  Bismarck  was 
sup})osed  to  give  to  INI.  de  Freycinet,  had  been 
ranklino;  for  some  while  in  French  minds.  The 
suspicions  entertained  of  Germany  found  expres- 
sion in  a  report  made  by  the  Committee  of  the 
Chamber.  Some  members  of  the  Committee 
thought  "  que  Tinteret  de  la  France  ^tait  de  ne 
pas  intervenir  en  Egypte  et  de  ne  point  immo- 
biliser  dans  une  expedition  lointaine  une  partie  de 
nos  forces  militaires.  Sans  meconnaitre  que  la 
politique  de  non-intervention  avait  ses  perils,  ils 
ont  expose  que  la  politique  d'intervention  leur 
paraissait  plus  dangereuse  encore  dans  la  situation 
actuelle  de  I'Europe."  M.  Clemenceau,  in  the 
final  debate  on  the  Bill,  expressed  himself  as 
follows  :  "  JNIessieurs,  la  conclusion  de  ce  qui  se 
passe  en  ce  moment  est  celle-ci  :  L'Europe  est 
couverte  de  soldats,  tout  le  monde  attend,  toutes 


CH.  XVII  TEL-EL-KEBIR  305 

les  Puissances  se  reservent  leur  liberte  pour 
I'avenir  ;  reservez  la  liberte  d'actioii  de  la  France." 
A  division  took  place  on  July  29,  with  the  result 
that  the  Government  were  defeated  by  a  large 
majorily,  the  numbers  being  416  to  75.  This  vote 
brought  about  the  ftiU  of  the  Freycinet  Ministry, 
and  finally  settled  the  question  of  French  inter- 
vention in  Egypt.  A  new  Government  was 
formed  under  the  presidency  of  M.  Duclerc,  who, 
on  August  8,  informed  the  Chamber  that  "le 
Gouvernement  s'inspirera  de  la  pensee  qui  est 
dictee  par  ce  vote  et  y  conformera  sa  politique." 

For  the  time  being,  the  attitude  of  the  French 
Government  and  people  was  dignified  and  friendly 
to  England.  There  was,  indeed,  no  reason  for  the 
display  of  any  unfriendly  feeling.  Whether  it  was 
or  was  not  wise  that  France  should  intervene 
actively  in  the  affairs  of  Egypt,  might  be  an  open 
question.  But  one  point  was  clear.  The  British 
Government  had  done  all  in  their  power  to  ensure 
French  co-operation;  their  want  of  success  in 
obtaining  it  was  due  to  the  action  of  the  French 
Government  and  of  the  French  people,  speaking 
through  their  constitutional  representatives.  When, 
a  little  later,  British  military  preparations  were  in  a 
more  advanced  stage,  M.  Grevy,  the  President  of 
the  French  Republic,  told  the  British  Chargd 
d' Affaires  at  Paris  "that  it  was  not  only  out  of 
goodwill  to  England  that  he  hoped  for  the  prompt 
success  of  our  arms,  it  was  also  in  the  interest  of 
France.  Pan-Islamism  was  a  factor  of  great  weight 
in  the  future ;  and  he  considered  it  of  the  highest 
importance  that  there  should  be  no  doubt,  even  for 
a  moment,  that  Musulman  or  Arab  troops  could 
not  resist  Europeans  in  the  field.  The  action  of 
the  Chamber  had  prevented  the  French  Govern- 
ment from  giving  practical  proof  of  their  desire  for 
our  success,  but   he  could  assure  me  (in  spite  of 

VOL.  I  X 


306  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

what  some  few  might  say  to  the  contrary)  that 
France  wished  well  to  England  in  this  matter,  and 
would  sincerely  rejoice  at  the  success  of  her  arms." 
The  Temps,  which  was  supposed  to  be  the  organ 
of  the  French  Government,  pointed  out  that,  even 
if  England  established  herself  in  Egypt,  as  France 
had  done  in  Tunis,  "  la  France  y  gagnerait  autant 
qu'elle."  The  main  point  was  to  keep  out  the 
Turk.  "Nous  avons,"  the  same  newspaper  said, 
"  des  interets  de  diverses  sortes  en  Egypte :  la 
liberte  du  Canal,  le  paiement  de  nos  creanciers,  la 
securite  de  ceux  de  nos  nationaux  qui  habitent  le 
pays — autant  d'interets  que  ne  menace  aucunement 
I'Angleterre,  mais  nous  avons,  sur  le  Nil,  un  interet 
infiniment  superieur  a  ceux-la ;  c'est  que  le  Turc 
ne  change  pas  sa  domination  nominale  contre  un 
pouvoir  reel,  c'est  que  la  puissance  Ottomane,  au 
lieu  d'y  remporter  un  avantage,  y  re^oive  un 
echec." 

Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir, 
the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  congratu- 
lated the  British  Government  on  the  victory,  and 
"expressed  his  sincere  hope  for  the  prompt  and 
complete  success  of  the  British  forces  in  Egypt." 
"There  was,"  M.  Duclerc  said  a  day  or  two  later 
(September  15),  "no  doubt  in  France  a  certain 
general  spirit  of  Chauvinism  (which  personally  he 
did  not  share)  which  must  have  an  outburst  when 
fighting  is  going  on  anywhere  without  France 
being  in  it,  and  which  was  inclined  to  flare  up  at 
any  moment.  He  trusted,  however,  that  Her 
JNIajesty's  Government  knew  the  right  value  to 
attach  to  the  outpourings  of  some  portion  of  the 
Paris  press.  The  sober  good  sense  of  France  felt 
that  the  success  of  England  against  Arabi  was  also 
a  solid  gain  to  the  rulers  of  Algeria." 

In  spite,  however,  of  all  this  apparent  cordiality, 
it  was  evident  that  there  were  rocks  ahead      The 


CH.  XVII  TEL-EL-KEBIR  307 

force  of  circumstances  had  unfortunately  severed 
the  entente  cordiale  between  Enghxnd  and  France. 
Internal  dissension  and  mistrust  of  Germany  had 
paralysed  French  action  at  a  critical  moment. 
But,  whatever  may  have  been  the  causes,  the  fact 
that  the  French  had  lost  their  former  footing  of 
equality  in  Egypt  was  not  calculated  to  make  them 
easier  to  deal  with  when  the  final  arrangements 
to  be  adopted  in  the  valley  of  the  Nile  came  to 
be  discussed.  Signs  of  the  coming  estrangement 
were,  indeed,  already  visible  to  observers  behind 
the  scenes. 

Foiled  in  their  endeavours  to  obtain  the  co- 
operation of  the  French,  the  British  Government 
turned  to  Italy.  Italian  jealousy  had  been  set 
ablaze  at  the  prospect  of  British,  and  still  more 
of  Anglo-French,  intervention  in  Egypt.  The 
policy  of  England  was  attacked  with  virulence 
by  the  Itahan  press.  The  Anglo-French  Control 
had,  it  was  said,  brought  about  the  ruin  of 
Egypt.  A  sedative  was  evidently  required. 
On  July  24,  Sir  Augustus  Paget,  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Rome,  was  authorised  "  to  join 
with  his  French  colleague  in  the  application  to  be 
made  to  the  Italian  Government  to  co-operate 
with  England  and  France  in  the  steps  to  be  taken 
for  the  protection  of  the  Suez  Canal ;  and  he 
was  at  the  same  time  to  express  the  great 
satisfaction  of  Her  INIajesty's  Government  should 
Italy  agree  to  be  associated  with  Enghuid  in 
this  important  work."  This  was  immediately 
(July  25)  followed  by  a  further  instruction  to  Sir 
Augustus  Paget  to  invite  the  co-operation  of  Italy 
without  waiting  for  action  on  the  part  of  tlie 
French  Ambassador.  On  July  26,  the  British 
Government  went  still  farther.  They  no  longer 
limited  their  invitation  to  co-operation  in  order  to 
secure   the  safety  of  the  Canal.     Lord  Granville 


308  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  u 

informed  the  Italian  Ambassador  in  London  that 
"  Her  JNIajesty's  Government  would  also  welcome 
the  co-operation  of  Italy  in  a  movement  in  the 
interior,  which  they  were  of  opinion  could  no 
longer  be  delayed,  and  for  which  they  were  making 
active  preparations."  Lord  DufFerin  was  also 
instructed  to  state  to  the  Conference  that  "while 
reserving  to  themselves  the  liberty  of  action  which 
the  pressure  of  events  might  render  expedient  and 
necessary.  Her  JNIajesty's  Government  would  be 
glad  to  receive  the  co-operation  of  any  Powers 
who  were  ready  to  afford  it." 

At  this  moment,  the  Sultan,  after  much  vacilla- 
tion, had  signified  his  readiness  to  send  Turkish 
troops  to  Egypt.  On  July  29,  General  Menabrea 
informed  Lord  Granville  that  "  under  these  circum- 
stances, the  Italian  Government  would  be  open  to 
a  charge  of  contradiction  if  they  were  to  negotiate 
with  a  view  to  the  intervention  of  any  other 
Power,  and  that  it  only  remained  for  them,  there- 
fore, to  express  their  thanks  to  the  British  Cabinet 
for  having  entertained  the  idea  that  the  friendship 
of  Italy  for  England  might  take  the  form  of  an 
active  co-operation."  Although,  therefore,  these 
negotiations  produced  no  practical  result,  they  had 
the  effect  of  calminij  Italian  irritation.  Hence- 
forward,  Italian  policy  in  Egypt  was  conducted  on 
lines  which  were  consistently  friendly  to  England. 

In  view  of  the  restless  ambition  displayed  at 
times  by  the  Italian  Government  and  their  desire, 
which  has  frequently  been  manifested,  to  extend 
their  influence  in  the  Mediterranean,  the  refusal  of 
Italy  to  co-operate  with  the  British  Government 
in  Egypt  appears  at  first  sight  strange.  It  is  not 
pro)  able  that  M.  Mancini,  who  was  then  in  power, 
could  have  attached  much  importance  to  Turkish 
promises,  or  that  he  could  have  believed  to  any 
great  extent  in  the  efficacy  of  Turkish  assistance. 


CH.  xvn  TEL-EL-KEBIR  309 

The  real  reasons  for  Italian  inaction  must  be 
sought  elsewhere  than  in  a  desire  to  spare  the 
susceptibilities  of  the  Porte.  Something  may, 
without  doubt,  be  attributed  to  a  reluctance  on 
the  part  of  Italy  to  separate  herself  from  the 
European  concert.  Something  was  also  due  to 
the  fact  that,  from  a  naval  and  military  point  of 
view,  the  Italian  Government  was  not  ready  to 
take  prompt  action.  But  the  main  reason  was 
to  be  sought  in  the  mistrust  of  France,  which  then 
existed  in  Italy,  and  in  fear  of  ultimate  collision 
with  the  French,  which  engendered  a  reluctance 
to  co-operate  with  them.  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  reasons,  the  decision  of  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment was  unquestionably  a  wise  one.  It  relieved 
Italy  from  a  heavy  responsibility.  It  removed 
the  risk  of  complications  whether  with  France 
or  England.  It  left  the  care  of  Italian  interests 
in  Egypt  in  the  hands  of  a  Power  traditionally 
and  necessarily  friendly  to  Italy,  and  it  enabled 
the  Italian  Government  to  devote  themselves  to 
the  study  of  internal  questions. 

Turning  from  Paris  and  Rome  to  Constanti- 
nople, it  will  not  be  wholly  unprofitable  to  trace 
in  some  detail  the  tortuous  windings  of  Turkish 
diplomacy. 

Immediately  after  the  bombardment  of  Alex- 
andria, the  Sultan  again  brought  forward  his 
favourite  solution  of  the  Egyptian  question. 
Tewfik  Pasha  should  be  deposed,  and  Halim 
Pasha  should  be  installed  in  his  place.  The  latter 
would  be  "an  excellent  ruler,"  His  nomination 
would  "prevent  the  effusion  of  blood  and  satisfy 
everybody."  This  proposal  was  summarily  rejected 
by  the  British  Government,  and  the  Sultan  was 
told  that  "he  was  only  wasting  time  by  putting 
forward  such  suggestions." 

Pressure  was  brought  to  bear  on  the  Porte  to 


310  JMODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

join  tlie  Conference,  with  tlie  result  that  on  July 
20,  Said  Pasha  and  Assim  Pasha  were  named  to 
be  the  Turkish  representativ^es. 

After  much  hesitation,  the  Sultan  consented  to 
send  troops  to  Egypt  under  conditions  which  were 
generally  of  a  nature  to  keep  Turkish  intervention 
under  the  control  of  the  Powers  of  Euroj)e.  On 
July  26,  Said  Pasha  informed  the  Conference  that 
troops  were  on  the  point  of  starting.  At  the 
same  time,  he  "  expressed  a  hope  that  the  military 
intervention  of  the  foreign  Powers  in  Egypt  would 
no  longer  be  necessary."  In  reply,  Lord  Granville 
stated  that  "  Her  JNIajesty's  Government  would 
accept  the  arrival  and  co-operation  of  Turkish 
forces  in  Egypt,  provided  the  character  in  which 
they  came  was  satisfactorily  defined  and  cleared 
from  all  ambiguity  by  previous  declarations  of 
the  Sultan." 

It  was  evident  that  the  conditions  under  which 
Turkish  co-operation  was  promised  were  far  from 
being  free  from  ambiguity.  Moreover,  the  Sultan 
would  not  issue  any  Proclamation  against  Arabi. 
The  Grand  Vizier  told  Lord  Dufferin  that  he 
"  did  not  think  it  would  be  advisable  to  issue  a 
Proclamation  until  after  the  troops  were  landed." 
Lord  Dufferin  replied  that  "if  the  Sultan  desired 
to  co-operate  with  Her  INIajesty's  Government  it 
was  necessary  he  should  first  clearly  define  the 
attitude  he  intended  to  assume  towards  Arabi  and 
the  rebellious  faction." 

Whilst  the  Sultan,  acting  apparently  under  the 
erroneous  impression  that  his  assistance  was  in- 
dispensable, was  thus  endeavouring  to  intervene 
without  the  restraints  imposed  upon  him  by  the 
Powers,  the  reluctance  to  call  in  Turkish  aid  in 
any  shape  was  increasing,  notably  in  Egypt.  On 
July  31,  the  Khedive  told  Sir  Auckland  Colvin 
that    he    "  was    very    apprehensive    of    Turkish 


CH.  XVII  TEL-EL-KEIUR  311 

intrigue,  and   trusted   that   the    Turks  would   be 
closely  controlled." 

Preparations  were  now  made  for  the  despatch  of 
5000  Turkish  troops  to  Egypt,  and  on  August  2, 
Said  Pasha  undertook  to  submit  to  the  Confer- 
ence a  draft  Proclamation,  denouncing  Arabi  as 
a  rebel.  Besides  the  Proclamation,  which  was 
necessary  as  a  guarantee  of  the  Sultan's  intentions, 
it  was  essential  that,  before  Turkish  troops  landed 
in  Egypt,  a  JNIilitary  Convention  should  be  framed 
indicating  the  manner  in  which  they  were  to  be 
employed.  On  August  5,  therefore.  Lord  DufFerin 
informed  Said  and  Assim  Pashas,  "  that  unless  the 
Sultan  would  issue  a  Proclamation  of  a  satisfactory 
character,  and  unless  the  Turkish  Government 
would  consent  to  enter  into  a  Military  Convention 
with  Her  Majesty's  Government,  the  Ottoman 
troops  would  not  be  allowed  to  land."  At  the 
same  time,  the  British  Admiral  was  instructed,  in 
the  event  of  any  vessel  with  Turkish  troops  appear- 
ing at  an  Egyptian  port,  to  inform  the  officer  in 
command,  "with  the  utmost  courtesy,  that  the 
despatch  of  Turkish  troops  must  be  premature  and 
due  to  some  misunderstanding,  and  that  his  orders 
were  to  request  the  officer  commanding  to  proceed 
to  Crete  or  elsewhere,  and  to  apply  to  the  Turkish 
Government  for  further  instructions,  as  he  was 
precluded  from  inviting  them  to  land  in  Egypt." 
The  Admiral  was,  at  the  same  time,  instructed  "  to 
prevent  their  landing  if  they  declined  to  comply 
with  his  advice."  The  result  of  adopting  this 
firm  attitude  was  that,  at  a  meeting  of  the 
Conference  held  on  August  7,  the  Ottoman 
Delegates  made  the  following  declaration  :  "  The 
Sublime  Porte  accepts  the  invitation  for  military 
intervention  in  Egypt  made  to  it  by  the  Identic 
Note  of  July  15,  as  well  as  the  clauses  and 
conditions  contained  therein."     At  the  same  time, 


312  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.ii 

a  promise  was  made  to  Lord  Dufferin  that  a 
Proclamation  declaring  Arabi  to  be  a  rebel  should 
be  at  once  drawn  up  and  communicated  to 
him.  On  August  9,  the  Proclamation  was  sent 
to  Lord  Duft'erin.  On  the  10th,  the  text  of 
the  Proclamation  was  accepted  by  the  British 
Government  with  some  slight  modifications. 

In  the  never-ceasing  jar  of  Palace  intrigue,  which 
always  goes  on  at  Constantinople,  the  party  which 
was  in  favour  of  an  understanding  with  England 
appeared  for  the  moment  to  have  got  the  upper 
hand.  The  question  of  the  Proclamation  having 
been  apparently  settled,  negotiations  were  set  on 
foot  with  a  view  to  the  arrangement  of  a  Military 
Convention  between  England  and  Turkey.  A 
draft  Convention  was  communicated  by  Musurus 
Pasha  to  Lord  Granville  on  August  10.  It  pro- 
vided that  the  British  troops  should  not  pass 
beyond  the  zone  which  they  then  occupied  in 
Alexandria  and  its  neighbourhood,  that  they  should 
not  remain  more  than  three  months,  that  all 
persons  arrested  should  be  handed  over  to  the 
Khedive's  authorities,  and  that  all  further  details 
should  be  settled  between  the  Ottoman  Commis- 
sioners and  the  British  Commander-in-Chief  on 
the  spot.  It  was  obvious  that  these  terms  were 
unacceptable.  The  Sultan  now  made  an  effort  to 
get  the  Military  Convention  before  the  Conference, 
instead  of  treating  separately  with  the  British 
Government.  This  attempt,  however,  failed.  It 
had,  indeed,  now  become  clear  to  everybody, 
except  the  Sultan,  that  it  was  useless  to  prolong 
the  sittings  of  the  Conference.  At  a  meeting 
held  on  August  14  "the  Representatives  of  the 
Powers  unanimously  expressed  their  opinion  that 
the  moment  had  come  to  suspend  the  labours  of 
the  Conference."  The  Sultan,  however,  who  but 
a  short  time  previously  had  resisted  the  meeting  of 


OH.  XVII  TEL-EL-KEBIR  313 

the  Conference,  and  who  had  only  been  persuaded 
with  difficulty  to  allow  an  Ottoman  representative 
to  attend  its  meetings,  now  gave  a  further  instance 
of  the  perversity  which  appears  always  to  attend 
Turkish  diplomacy.  He  was  anxious  that  the 
Conference  should  continue  to  sit,  thinking,  with- 
out doubt,  that  there  would  be  a  greater  chance  of 
dissension  amongst  the  l^owers  if  the  Conference 
were  sitting,  than  would  be  the  case  if  it  suspended 
its  labours.  The  Ottoinan  delegates  were,  there- 
fore, instructed  to  say  that  "they  did  not  share  the 
opinions  of  the  Representatives  of  the  Powers." 
They  reserved  the  right  of  fixing  a  date  for  the 
next  meeting  of  the  Conference.  The  date  was, 
however,  not  fixed.  The  Conference  was  never 
formally  closed.     It  died  a  natural  death. 

Foiled  in  his  attempt  to  bring  the  Military 
Convention  before  the  Conference,  the  Sultan  fell 
back  on  negotiations  with  the  British  Government. 
On  August  18,  Lord  Dufferin  spent  five  hours  in 
discussing  the  matter  with  Said  and  Assim  Pashas, 
with  the  result  that  the  Turkish  delegates  agreed 
to  a  Convention  subject  to  the  approval  of  the 
Sultan.  On  the  following  day,  the  Sultan  rejected 
the  draft  Convention,  and  made  counter  proposals 
which  Lord  Dufferin  declined  to  discuss.  At  the 
same  time,  the  Ottoman  Government  refused  per- 
mission for  the  embarkation  at  Smyrna  of  some 
mules  purchased  for  the  use  of  the  British  troops 
in  Egypt.  The  action  was  characterised  by  Lord 
Granville  as  "  most  unfriendly."  In  view  of  all 
these  circumstances.  Lord  Dufferin  wrote  to  Said 
Pasha  and  begged  him  "to  consider  as  void  and 
non  avenues  whatever  friendly  assurances  and  ex- 
pressions of  confidence  in  relation  to  the  Egyptian 
question  he  might  have  addressed  to  him  outside 
the  Conference." 

After  tlie  lapse  of  a  few  days,  the  negotiations 


314  INIODERN  EGYPT  pt.ii 

were  renewed.  IMunir  Bey,  an  officer  of  the 
Sultan's  household,  was  sent  to  I^ord  Duffiirin  to 
assure  him  "that  it  was  from  no  unfriendly  feeling 
towards  England  that  the  ])rohibition  against  the 
export  of  mules  had  been  insisted  upon,  and  that, 
in  order  to  show  his  friendly  feelings.  His  JNIajesty 
had  ordered  it  to  be  removed."  Lord  DufFerin 
"  took  the  opportunity  of  again  repeating  to  Munir 
Bey  some  very  earnest  words  of  warning  as  to  the 
gravity  of  the  situation." 

On  the  same  day  (August  23),  Lord  Dufferin, 
at  the  request  of  Said  Pasha,  paid  him  a  visit 
and  discussed  the  question  of  the  Convention 
again  with  him  and  Assim  Pasha.  The  result 
of  this  discussion  was  that  the  Turkish  delegates 
agreed  to  all  the  clauses  of  the  Military  Conven- 
tion proposed  by  the  British  Government,  except 
that  the  latter  wished  the  Turkish  troops  to 
disembark  at  Aboukir,  Rosetta,  and  Damietta, 
whilst  the  Sultan  attached  great  importance  to 
the  disembarkation  taking  place  at  Alexandria. 
Lord  Dufferin  then  alluded  to  the  Proclamation 
against  Arabi,  which,  although  the  text  had  been 
arranged  between  the  two  Governments,  had  not 
yet  been  issued.  What  followed  had  best  be 
related  in  Lord  Duffer in's  words.  *'  Said  Pasha," 
Lord  Dufferin  telegraphed,  "then  began  with 
much  hesitation,  and  evidently  against  his  will,  to 
suggest  to  me,  in  a  roundabout  manner,  that  the 
Proclamation  agreed  upon  should  not  be  issued 
at  all  in  the  first  instance,  but  that  another 
Proclamation  of  a  different  character,  containing 
a  final  appeal  to  Arabi's  sense  of  loyalty,  should 
precede  it.  This  im]nident  repudiation  of  his 
former  engagements  made  me  so  angry  that  I 
got  up  and  left  the  room,  simply  saying  that  it 
was  impossible  to  negotiate  either  a  Convention 
or  anything  else   under  such  circumstances.     On 


OH.  XVII  TEL-EL-KEBIR  315 

this,  the  two  Pashas  followed  me  downstairs  and 
into  the  street,  accompanied  by  their  secretaries 
and  dependants,  calling  to  me  that  they  withdrew 
every  word  of  what  they  had  said,  that  I  must 
consider  it  altogether  as  non  avenu,  and  that 
they  would  never  again  allude  to  the  proposal. 
On  concluding'  our  interview  in  a  more  amicable 
mood,  I  told  them  that  I  could  not  sign  any 
Convention  until  the  Proclamation  had  been 
officially  communicated  to  me  in  French  and 
Arabic,  and  that  not  a  single  Turkish  soldier 
would  be  allowed  to  land  until  it  had  been  pro- 
claimed in  Egypt.  The  two  Pashas  seemed 
heartily  ashamed  of  themselves,  and  admitted 
that  they  had  been  compelled  to  make  the 
proposal  very  much  against  their  will."  On  this 
interview  being  reported  to  London,  Lord 
Granville  telegraphed  to  Lord  Dufferin  that 
"Her  INIajesty's  Government  were  unable  to 
make  any  further  changes  in  the  provisions 
of  the  proposed  Military  Convention."  Lord 
Dufferin  was,  at  the  same  time,  instructed  to 
intimate  to  the  Porte  that,  "  under  the  present 
pressure  of  circumstances,  it  would  not  be  well 
for  the  dignity  of  either  England  or  Turkey  that 
the  negotiations  should  be  indefinitely  prolonged." 
On  August  24,  Said  and  Assim  Pashas  paid  a 
further  visit  to  Lord  Dufferin,  and  endeavoured 
to  obtain  some  modifications  in  the  draft  Con- 
vention. On  the  25th,  an  incident  occurred  which 
showed  how  little  in  earnest  the  Sultan  was  in 
the  friendly  assurances  given  to  the  British 
Government.  Lord  Dufferin  telegraphed  to  Lord 
Granville :  "  I  regret  to  have  to  inform  your 
Lordship  that  although  the  Prime  Minister  and 
the  Foreign  Minister  had  actually  written  a  letter 
ordering  the  release  of  the  shepherds  and  muleteers 
engaged  by  the  contractors  to  proceed  to  Egypt 


316  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  i: 

ill  charge  of  the  live  stock  which  had  been  shipped 
at  Odessa  and  Smyrna  for  the  use  of  our  army, 
a  subsequent  order  from  the  Palace  annulled  their 
decision.  A  further  order  from  the  Palace  has 
threatened  with  imprisonment  the  artificers  who 
have  undertaken  to  supply  the  contractors  with 
the  six  hundred  pack-saddles  we  require." 

The  time  during  which  Turkish  co-operation 
would  have  been  useful,  was  now  rapidly  passing 
away.  On  August  25,  Sir  Edward  JNIalet  tele- 
graphed to  Lord  Granville :  "  The  action  of  the 
Sultan  has  been  such  as  to  prevent  the  possibility 
of  the  rebels  believing  that  the  Sultan  is  really 
anxious  to  assist  us ;  and  thus  the  moral  support, 
which  an  alliance  with  Turkey  might  have  given 
us,  cannot  any  longer  be  attained.  Both  Ch^rif 
Pasha  and  Riaz  Pasha  have  expressed  confidentially 
their  extreme  anxiety  to  obviate  the  difficulties 
which  the  arrival  of  Turkish  troops  would  entail, 
and  they  are  especially  apprehensive  of  the  com- 
plications which  may  ensue  hereafter  from  their 
presence  in  the  country." 

On  August  27,  tlie  Turkish  delegates  again 
waited  on  Lord  Dufferin  and  informed  him  that 
they  would  unconditionally  acce])t  the  Convention 
in  the  terms  to  which  the  British  Government 
had  agreed.  Directly  the  Convention  was  signed, 
the  Proclamation  denouncing  Arabi  as  a  rebel 
would  be  published  in  Egypt  and  communicated 
officially  to  the  British  Ambassador.  It  was 
known  that  the  Austrian  Government  was  anxious 
that  England  and  Turkey  should  come  to  terms. 
It  was  more  in  deference  to  the  views  of  that 
Government  than  for  any  other  reason,  that,  on 
August  28,  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  Lord 
Dufferin  authorising  him  to  agree  to  the  Conven- 
tion on  the  following  conditions :  That  the 
animals,    supplies,    and    persons    for   the    British 


CH.  XVII  TEL-EL-KEBIR  317 

expedition  should  be  immediately  released,  and 
that  a  promise  should  be  given  by  the  Porte  to 
assist  in  forwarding  the  same  to  Egypt ;  that  an 
assurance  should  be  given  that  no  furtlier  impedi- 
ments would  be  offered  hereafter ;  that  the 
Proclamation  declaring  Arabi  a  rebel  should  be 
issued  immediately ;  and  that  British  officers,  who 
should  be  sent  either  to  Crete  (where  the  Turkish 
force  was  then  collected)  or  to  Constantinople, 
as  the  Porte  might  prefer,  should  concert  with 
Turkish  officers  as  to  the  military  operations  to 
be  undertaken.  The  matter  appeared  now  at  last 
to  be  settled.  On  August  31,  Lord  Granville 
telegraphed  to  this  effect  to  Sir  Edward  Malet. 

On  the  same  day,  Said  Pasha  made  an  earnest 
appeal  to  Lord  Dufferin  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment should  "  allow  the  disembarkation  of  Turkish 
troops  to  take  place  at  Alexandria,  on  condition 
that  the  troops  should  merely  file  through  the 
town,  and  march  at  once  to  Aboukir."  The 
Sultan,  Lord  Dufferin  said,  was  "on  his  knees." 
"  I  would  venture,"  Lord  Dufferin  added,  '*  most 
earnestly  to  urge  Her  Majesty's  Government  to 
acquiesce  in  His  Majesty's  prayers."  In  spite  of 
the  little  faith  Lord  Dufferin  had  in  Turkish 
sincerity,  he  thought  that  a  real  chance  of 
establishing  good  relations  with  the  Porte  had 
now  presented  itself.  "  The  Sultan  promised  to 
do  everything  Her  Majesty's  Govermnent  desired 
in  regard  to  the  Proclamation,  and  to  ensure  an 
altered  tone  in  the  press."  On  September  1,  Lord 
Granville  telegraphed  to  Lord  Dufferin  that  his 
recent  message  "altered  the  situation,"  but  that 
the  British  Government  could  not  agree  to  dis- 
embarkation at  Alexandria.  They  "  would  prefer 
that  the  landing  should  take  place  in  the  Suez 
Canal."  On  September  2,  I^ord  Dufferin  was 
able  to  telegraph  the  final  text  of  the  Convention 


318  MODERN  EGYPT  vi.  ii 

to  Lord  Granville,  and  to  state  that  it  was  ready 
for  signature.  On  September  3,  Lord  Dufferin 
saw  the  Sultan.  "His  Majesty  confirmed,  in 
a  perfectly  explicit  manner,  all  the  propositions 
made  by  Said  Pasha."  The  Proclamation,  the 
Sultan  said,  was  being  translated  into  Arabic 
and  would  be  communicated  to  Lord  Dufferin 
immediately.  On  September  4,  Lord  Dufferin 
was  authorised  to  sign  the  JNLilitary  Convention 
as  soon  as  the  Proclamation  against  Arabi  was 
published. 

Strong  representations  were  again  made  by  the 
Khedive  and  Cherif  Pasha  against  the  landing  of 
Turkish  troops  in  Egypt.  Nevertheless,  Lord 
Granville  decided  to  adhere  to  his  arrangement 
with  the  Sultan.  This  was  all  the  more  loyal  on 
the  part  of  the  British  Government,  inasmuch  as 
evidence  was  forthcoming  to  show  that  even  at 
this  late  hour  the  Sultan  contemplated  treating 
with  Arabi  behind  the  backs  both  of  the  British 
Government  and  the  Khedive. 

By  September  6,  the  Proclamation  was  ready 
and  was  published  in  the  newspapers  before  being 
communicated  to  Lord  Dufferin.  It  was  found 
that  the  text  did  not  tally  with  the  draft  to 
which  the  British  Government  had  agreed.  Lord 
Dufferin  thereupon  telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville  : 
*'  I  at  once  stated  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  that,  in  presence  of  such  an  inconceivable 
act  of  bad  faith  as  the  publication  without  warning 
of  a  different  document  from  that  which  had  been 
formally  agreed  upon  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments, I  must  decline  signing  the  Convention ; 
that  I  should  report  what  had  happened  to  my 
Government ;  and  that  I  should  not  be  surprised 
if  it  declined  to  continue  negotiations.  Said 
Pasha  fully  admitted  that  he  had  been  guilty  of 
an  act  of  what   he    called   'heedlessness,'  but  he 


en.  XVII  TEL-El    KEBIR  319 

said  that  the  fault  had  been  cominitted  through 
an  excess  of  zeal,  as  the  denunciation  of  Anibi 
in  the  new  Proclamation  was  still  stronger  than 
in  the  old.  He  undertook  .  .  .  that  an  official 
correction  of  what  had  been  published  in  the 
Vakit  should  be  inserted  in  that  paper.  He 
begged  me  to  do  my  best  to  mitigate  the  indigna- 
tion, which  I  led  him  to  understand  this  intolerable 
mode  of  procedure  would  arouse  in  the  mind 
of  the  British  Government."  On  September  10, 
Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  Lord  Dufferin 
accepting  some  of  the  changes  made  in  the  Pro- 
clamation, but  objecting  to  others.  Sir  Edward 
Malet  was,  at  the  same  time,  informed  that,  in 
consequence  of  the  difficulties  which  had  been 
raised  about  the  Proclamation,  the  signature  of 
the  Military  Convention  had  been  deferred.  On 
the  same  day  (September  10),  the  Turkish  Pleni- 
potentiaries met  Lord  Dufferin,  bringing  with 
them  copies  of  a  draft  Convention  and  of  a 
new  Proclamation.  Even  at  this  late  hour, 
however,  further  difficulties  were  raised.  Said 
Pasha  explained  to  Lord  Dufferin  "  with  much 
earnestness "  that  it  was  most  desirable  that  the 
words  "  se  rendront  a  Port  Said,"  which  had  been 
struck  out  of  the  Convention,  should  be  maintained. 
After  much  discussion,  it  was  settled  that  the  words 
should  only  be  interpreted  in  the  following  sense, 
viz.  that  the  Turkish  ships  should  "direct  their 
course  to  Port  Said,  in  order  to  enter  the  Canal." 
Lord  Granville  was  asked  by  telegraph  to  agree 
to  this  modification. 

At  the  moment  when  the  Porte  was  pressing 
for  the  signature  of  the  Convention,  another  act 
was  committed  which  showed  how  little  confidence 
could  be  placed  in  the  assurances  of  the  Sultan. 
A  number  of  porters,  who  had  been  engaged  at 
Lord    Wolseley's    request    for    service    with    the 


820  IMODERN  EGYPT  pt.  u 

army  in  Eoypt,  were  imprisoned  by  order  of  the 
Porte.  They  were  only  released  after  I^ord 
Dufferin  had  made  a  strong  representation  on 
the  subject.  Indeed,  Lord  Dufferin  was  at  one 
time  authorised  to  break  off  all  diplomatic  relations 
with  the  Porte. 

On  the  afternoon  of  September  13,  Lord 
Granville  telegraphed  to  Lord  Dufferin  that  he 
might  sign  the  })roposed  Military  Convention.  On 
the  morning  of  the  same  day,  however,  the  battle 
of  Tel-el- Kebir  was  fought.  The  French  Govern- 
ment, who  had  always  looked  upon  the  presence 
of  the  Turks  in  Egypt  with  great  disfiivour,  were 
the  first  to  suggest  that  a  Military  Convention 
with  the  Porte  was  now  no  longer  necessary. 
The  Khedive  also  told  Sir  Edward  Malet  that 
"if  anything  could  enhance  the  value  of  the 
victory,  it  was  that  it  removed  all  pretext  for 
the  signature  of  a  Convention  with  Turkey.  He 
said  that  he  looked  back  with  dismay  at  the 
danger  which  Egypt  would  have  incurred,  if  the 
Sultan,  through  the  presence  of  his  troops,  had 
obtained  a  footing  in  the  couiitry."  Under  these 
circumstances,  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  Lord 
Dufferin  that  he  "presumed  that  the  emergency 
having  passed,  His  INIajesty  the  Sultan  would 
not  now  consider  it  necessary  to  send  troops  to 
Egypt." 

Before  this  message  could  arrive,  the  Sultan  sent 
for  Lord  Dufferin  and  kept  him  eleven  hours  at 
the  Palace  discussing  a  variety  of  further  changes, 
which  he  wished  to  have  made  both  in  the  Con- 
vention and  the  Proclamation.  Finally,  matters 
were  brought  to  a  close  on  September  18  by  the 
despatch  of  the  following  telegram  from  Lord 
Granville  to  Lord  Dufferin:  "Her  Majesty's 
Government  greatly  appreciate  the  fact  that  a  sub- 
stantial accord  exists  between  the  Government  of 


CH.  xvn  TEL-EL-KEBIR  321 

the  Sultan  and  that  of  Her  Majesty  on  the 
Egyptian  Question,  and  especially  as  to  tlie  rebellion 
of  Arabi  Pasha  and  the  position  of  His  Highness 
the  Khedive.  The  occasion  of  the  proposed  Mili- 
tary Convention  between  this  country  and  Turkey 
having  now  passed  away,  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment rejoice  that  it  is  no  longer  necessary  to  dis- 
cuss the  difficulties  which  have  been  raised  by  His 
Majesty.  Your  Excellency  is,  therefore,  authorised 
to  convey  to  the  Sultan,  in  the  most  courteous 
terms,  the  permission  given  you  to  drop  the  negotia- 
tions on  this  question." 

In  summing  up  the  history  of  these  events. 
Lord  DufFerin  said  :  "I  can  only  reiterate  that, 
from  first  to  last,  I  have  used  every  means  at  my 
disposal  to  induce  the  Turkish  Government  to 
move  quickly,  and  to  settle  the  matter  out  of 
hand.  .  .  .  Their  conduct  was  so  obviously  contrary 
to  their  interests,  that  Europe  had  begun  to  mis- 
judge the  situation.  While  ruining  my  reputation 
as  an  honest  man,  they  were  enhancing  it  as  a 
diplomatist,  for  it  had  begun  to  be  believed  that 
the  delay  in  signing  the  Convention  could  not 
possibly  result  from  their  own  incomprehensible 
shortsightedness,  but  must  have  been  artificially 
created  by  the  Machiavellian  astuteness  of  the 
English  Ambassador." 

Lord  Granville  also  summed  up  the  Egyptian 
negotiations  in  a  despatch  to  Lord  Duffer  in,  dated 
October  5,  1882,  which  concluded  with  the  follow- 
ing words  :  "  This  summary  of  events  will  show 
that  the  isolated  action  which  has  been  forced  upon 
Her  Majesty's  Government  was  not  of  their  seek- 
ing. From  the  first  moment  when  it  became 
apparent  that  order  could  not  be  re-established  in 
Egypt  without  the  exercise  of  external  force,  they 
maintained  that  that  force  should  be  supplied  by 
the  Sultan  as  Sovereign  of  Egypt.     They  proposed 

VOL.   I  Y 


322  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  n 

this  solution  to  the  Conference,  and  Your  Excel- 
lency lost  no  opportunity  of  urging  it  upon  His 
Majesty  and  his  advisers.  Our  efforts  to  induce 
them  to  intervene  in  Egypt,  under  conditions  which 
would  satisfy  Europe,  proved  unavailing,  and  when 
it  became  necessary  to  make  immediate  provision 
for  the  safety  of  the  Suez  Canal,  we  prepared  to 
undertake  this  duty  jointly  with  France,  with  the 
co-operation  of  any  other  Powers  who  might  be 
prepared  to  join  us.  We  addressed  a  special  invita- 
tion to  Italy  to  take  part  in  the  arrangements. 
The  progress  of  the  rebellion  having  destroyed  the 
authority  of  the  Khedive,  and  reduced  Egypt  to  a 
state  of  anarchy,  we  invited  France  and  Italy  to 
act  with  us  in  suppressing  it ;  and  when  those 
Powers  declined  to  do  so,  we  still  urged  the  Porte 
to  send  troops,  insisting  only  on  such  conditions  as 
were  indispensable  to  secure  unity  of  action.  But, 
before  the  Turkish  Government  carried  out  its 
agreement  to  sign  the  Military  Convention,  the 
success  of  our  arms  had  put  an  end  to  the  insur- 
rection." 

The  details  of  these  negotiations  have  been 
stated  at  some  length  because  they  afford  an 
admirable  instance  of  the  diplomatic  procedure 
ordinarily  adopted  by  the  Ottoman  Government. 
The  Turks,  as  a  nation,  possess  many  fine,  though 
perhaps  somewhat  barbaric  qualities.  But  a  species 
of  paralysis  appears  to  affect  most  Turks  in  high 
positions.  The  duplicity  and  shortsightedness  of 
the  Ottoman  Government  come  out  strongly  in 
every  incident  of  these  negotiations. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  give  a  detailed  account  of 
the  military  operations  by  wliicli  the  insurrection 
in  Egypt  was  crushed.  They  have  been  described 
in  a  book  published  by  the  British  War  Office, 
and  in  other  works.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say 
that    Lord    Wolseley    arrived    at    Alexandria    on 


CH.  XVII  TEL-EL-KEBIR  323 

August  13.  Previous  to  this,  some  desultory 
operations  had  taken  place  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Alexandria.  Lord  Wolseley  decided  to  move  on 
Cairo  by  way  of  Ismailia.^  The  Canal  was  seized 
in  spite  of  the  querulous  cries  of  M.  de  Lesseps. 
On  September  13,  the  Egyptian  army  was  totally 
routed  at  Tel-el-Kebir.^  A  small  force  of  cavahy 
was  at  once  pushed  on  to  Cairo,  which  was  captured 
without  a  blow  being  struck.  Kinglake's  prophecy 
had  been  fulfilled.  "The  Englishman" — in  the 
person  of  Major  Watson,  R.E.,  with  two  squadrons 
of  the  4th  Dragoon  Guards  and  a  detachment  of 
Mounted  Infantry,  who  occupied  the  Citadel  on 
the  evening  of  September  14 — "planted  a  firm 
foot  on  the  banks  of  the  Nile,  and  sat  in  the  seats 
of  the  faithful."  Arabi  and  his  associates,  who 
throughout  the  whole  affair  do  not  appear  to  have 
displayed  a  single  quality  worthy  of  respect  or 
admiration,  surrendered.^ 

It  is  always  a  somew^hat  unprofitable  proceeding 
to  speculate  on  what  might  have  been  in  politics, 
but  I  cannot  close  this  portion  of  the  narrative 
without  hazarding  a  conjecture  as  to  whether  any 
foreign  occupation  of  Egypt  could  have  been 
avoided.  Mistakes  were,  without  doubt,  com- 
mitted.    The  true  nature  of  the  Arabi  revolt  was 

'  Arabi  was  warned  by  Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt  that  he  would  probably  be 
attacked  from  the  side  of  Ismailia.  "  I  believe,"  Mr.  Bluut  writes 
{Secret  History,  p.  228),  "  that  it  was  in  consequence  of  this  hint  that  the 
lines  of  Tel-el-Kebir  were  be^un  to  be  traced  by  Arabi." 

'^  At  this  time,  I  was  in  India.  On  Aujjust  22,  Lord  Wolseley  wrote 
to  me  from  Ismailia:  "I  hope  to  hit  Arabi  very  hard  about  tlie  10th 
or  12th  of  September  at  latest."  Lord  W^olseley  was  only  twenty-four 
hours  out  in  his  prediction. 

3  Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt,  in  spite  of  his  sympathy  with  Arabi,  says,  in 
.speaking  of  the  fact  that  he  did  not  attempt  to  handle  the  Ko-yp+ian 
troops  in  the  field  :  "  His  abstention  on  this  head  has  been  attributed 
by  liis  detractors  to  physical  cowardice,  and  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  the 
conclusion  that  there  was  some  truth  in  this." — Secret  History,  etc., 
p.  385. 


324  I\[0DI:RN  EGYPT  pt.ii 

misunderstood.^  It  was  more  than  a  mere  military 
mutiny.  It  partook  in  some  degree  of  the  nature 
of  a  bona  fide  national  movement.  It  was  not 
solely,  or,  indeed,  mainly  directed  against  Euro- 
peans and  European  interference  in  Egyptian 
affairs,  although  anti-European  prejudice  exercised 
a  considerable  influence  on  the  minds  of  the  leaders 
of  the  movement.  It  was,  in  a  great  degree,  a 
movement  of  the  Egyptians  against  Turkish  rule. 
Although  previous  to  the  issue  of  the  Joint  Note 
some  hope  might  have  been  entertained  of  guiding 
the  movement,  and  although  I  am  distinctly  of 
opinion  that  an  effort  to  guide  it  should  have  been 
made,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  chances  of  failure 
predominated  over  those  of  success.  Leaving  out 
of  account  questions  of  detail,  and  speaking  with 
some  knowledge  of  the  various  classes  of  Egyptian 
society,  I  ask  myself,  where  were  the  elements  for 
the  formation  of  any  stable  government  to  have 
been  found  when,  in  pursuance  of  the  policy  of 
"  Egypt  for  the  Egyptians,"  there  had  been  elimi- 
nated, as  would  probably  have  been  the  case,  first, 
the  Europeans,  with  all  their  intelligence,  wealth, 
and  governing  power ;  secondly,  the  Khedive  in 
whose  place  some  illiterate  Egyptian,  of  the  type 
of  Arabi  or  ISIahmoud  Sami,  would  have  been 
appointed ;  thirdly,  the  Syrians  and  Armenians, 
with  all  their  industry  and  capacity  for  sedentary 
employment ;  fourthly,  the  nativ^e  aristocracy, 
largely  composed  of  Turks,  who  were  at  that  time 
the  ])rincipal  large  landowners  in  the  country,  and 
amongst  whom,  in  spite  of  many  defects,  the 
habits    and    traditions    of    a   governing   class   still 

*  Sir  Donald  Mackenzie  Wallace,  who  accompanied  Lord  Dufferiu 
to  rVypt  and  who  had  exceptionally  ffood  opportunities  for  forming  an 
opinion  on  this  subject,  says  :  "  'I'liere  can  be  no  longer  any  reasonable 
doubt  that  the  English  Government  totally  misconceived  the  real 
nature  of  the  Egyptian  revolutionary  movement." — Eyypt  and  thi 
Eijiiptian  Question,  p.  3Go. 


CM.  XVII  TEL-EL-KEBIR  325 

lingered ;  when,  in  fact,  the  nationalists  and  muti- 
neers had  got  rid  of  all  the  classes,  who  then 
governed,  and  who  for  several  centuries  had  governed 
the  country  ?  The  residue  would  have  consisted, 
first,  of  the  mass  of  the  fellaheen  population,  who 
were  sunk  in  the  deepest  ignorance,  who  cared  little 
by  whom  they  were  governed  provided  they  were 
not  overtaxed,  and  whose  main  idea  throughout  the 
Arabi  movement  was  to  tear  up  the  bonds  of  the 
Greek  or  Syrian  usurer ;  secondly,  of  a  certain 
number  of  small  proprietors,  village  Sheikhs, 
Omdehs,  etc.,  who  constituted  the  squirearchy  of 
the  country,  and  who,  in  point  of  knowledge  and 
governing  capacity,  were  but  little  removed  from 
the  fellaheen ;  thirdly,  of  the  Copts,  whose  religion 
would  certainly,  sooner  or  later,  have  prevented 
them  from  acting  in  complete  harmony  with  the 
Arabists,  and  who,  even  if  tolerated  by  the 
Mohammedan  population,  could  neither  have  ob- 
tained any  influence  over  the  Mohammedans,  nor, 
even  if  that  influence  had  been  obtained,  could 
have  used  it  to  the  general  advantage  of  the 
country  ;  fourthly,  of  the  hierarchy,  consisting  prin- 
cipally of  the  Ulema  of  the  El-Azhar  Mosque. 
The  latter,  though  numerically  the  smallest,  was  by 
far  the  most  important  and  influential  of  the  four 
classes  to  which  allusion  is  made  above.  The  spirit 
which  animated  them  would,  in  the  first  instance 
at  all  events,  have  been  infused  into  the  masses 
below.  They  would  have  been  the  Jacobins  of  the 
movement,  which,  whether  nationalist  or  military, 
would  certainly  have  been  reactionary  in  so  far 
as  it  would  have  tended  to  destroy  whatever  germs 
of  civilisation  had  been  implanted  into  Egypt. 
Like  their  prototypes  in  France,  they  would,  had 
no  strong  hand  intervened,  have  maintained  their 
supremacy  until,  possibly  after  an  acute  and  disas- 
trous   period    of    tidnsition,    their    incapacity    for 


326  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

government  had  been  clearly  demonstrated.  The 
corruption,  misgovernment,  and  oppression,  which 
would  have  prevailed,  if  the  influence  of  this  class 
had  become  predominant,  would  probably  have 
been  greater  than  any  to  which  Egypt  had  been 
exposed  at  previous  periods.  An  attempt  would 
have  been  made  to  regulate,  not  only  the  govern- 
ment, but  also  the  social  life  of  the  country  upon 
those  principles  of  the  Mohammedan  faith  which 
are  most  antiquated,  obsolete,  and  opposed  to  the 
commonplace  ideas  of  modern  civilisation. 

Egypt  may  now  almost  be  said  to  form  part  of 
Europe.  It  is  on  the  high  road  to  the  far  East. 
It  can  never  cease  to  be  an  object  of  interest  to  all 
the  Powers  of  Europe,  and  especially  to  England. 
A  numerous  and  intelligent  body  of  Europeans  and 
of  non-Egyptian  Orientals  have  made  Egypt  their 
home.  European  capital  to  a  large  extent  has 
been  sunk  in  the  country.  The  rights  and  privileges 
of  Europeans  are  jealously  guarded,  and,  moreover, 
give  rise  to  complicated  questions,  which  it  requires 
no  small  amount  of  ingenuity  and  technical  know- 
ledge to  solve.  Exotic  institutions  have  sprung 
up  and  have  taken  root  in  the  country.  The 
Capitulations  impair  those  rights  of  internal 
sovereignty  which  are  enjoyed  by  the  rulers  or 
legislatures  of  most  States.  The  population  is 
heterogeneous  and  cosmopolitan  to  a  degree  almost 
unknown  elsewhere.  Although  the  prevailing  faith 
is  that  of  Islam,  in  no  country  in  the  world  is  a 
greater  variety  of  religious  creeds  to  be  found 
amongst  important  sections  of  the  community. 

In  addition  to  these  peculiarities,  which  are  of  a 
normal  character,  it  has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that 
in  1882  the  army  was  in  a  state  of  mutiny;  the 
Treasury  was  bankrupt ;  every  branch  of  the 
administration  had  been  dislocated  ;  the  ancient 
and   arbitrary   method,   under  which    the   country 


CH.  XVII  TEL-EL-KEBIR  327 

had  for  centuries  been  governed,  had  received  a 
severe  blow,  whilst,  at  the  same  time,  no  more 
orderly  and  law-abiding  form  of  government  had 
been  inaugurated  to  take  its  place. 

Is  it  probable  that  a  Government  composed  of 
the  rude  elements  described  above,  and  led  by 
men  of  such  poor  ability  as  Arabi  and  his  co- 
adjutors, would  have  been  able  to  control  a  com- 
plicated machine  of  this  nature  ?  Were  the 
Sheikhs  of  the  El-Azhar  Mosque  likely  to 
succeed  where  Tewfik  Pasha  and  his  Ministers, 
who  were  men  of  comparative  education  and 
enlightenment,  acting  under  the  guidance  and 
inspiration  of  a  first-class  European  Power,  only 
met  with  a  modified  success  after  years  of  patient 
labour  ?  There  can  be  but  one  answer  to  these 
questions.  Sentimental  politicians  may  consider 
that  the  quasi-national  character  of  Arabi's  move- 
ment gives  it  a  claim  to  their  sympathies,  but 
others  who  are  not  carried  away  by  sentiment 
may  reasonably  maintain  that  the  fact  of  its  having 
been  a  quasi-national  movement  w^as  one  of  the 
reasons  which  foredoomed  it  to  failure ;  for,  in 
order  to  justify  its  national  character,  it  had  to 
run  counter,  not  only  to  the  European,  but  also 
to  the  foreign  Eastern  elements  of  Egyptian  govern- 
ment and  society.  Neither  is  it  in  the  nature  of 
things  that  any  similar  movement  should,  under 
the  present  conditions  of  Egyptian  society,  meet 
with  any  better  success.  The  full  and  immediate 
execution  of  a  policy  of  "  Egypt  for  the  Egyptians," 
as  it  was  conceived  by  the  Arabists  in  1882,  was, 
and  still  is  impossible. 

History,  indeed,  records  some  very  radical 
changes  in  the  forms  of  government  to  which  a 
State  has  been  subjected  w  ithout  its  interests  being 
absolutely  and  permanently  shipwrecked.  But  it 
may   be   doubted   whether   any    instance    can    be 


328  INIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

quoted  of  a  sudden  tmnsfer  of  power  in  any 
civilised  or  semi-civilised  community  to  a  class  so 
ignorant  as  the  pure  Egyptians,  such  as  they  were 
in  the  year  1882.  These  latter  have,  for  centuries 
past,  been  a  subject  race.  Persians,  Greeks, 
Romans,  Arabs  from  Arabia  and  Baghdad,  Cir- 
cassians, and  finally,  Ottoman  Turks,  have  suc- 
cessively ruled  over  Egypt,  but  we  have  to  go 
back  to  the  doubtful  and  obscure  precedents  of 
Pharaonic  times  to  find  an  epoch  when,  possibly, 
Egypt  was  ruled  by  Egyptians.  Neither,  for  the 
present,  do  they  appear  to  possess  the  qualities 
which  would  render  it  desirable,  either  in  their 
own  interests,  or  in  those  of  the  civilised  world 
in  general,  to  raise  them  at  a  bound  to  the  category 
of  autonomous  rulers  with  full  rights  of  internal 
sovereignty. 

If,  however,  a  foreign  occupation  was  inevitable, 
or  nearly  inevitable,  it  remains  to  be  considered 
whether  a  British  occupation  was  preferable  to 
any  other.  From  the  purely  Egyptian  point  of 
view,  the  answer  to  this  question  cannot  be 
doubtful.  The  intervention  of  any  European 
Power  was  preferable  to  that  of  Turkey.  The 
intervention  of  one  European  Power  was  pre- 
ferable to  international  intervention.  The  special 
aptitude  shown  by  Englishmen  in  the  government 
of  Oriental  races  pointed  to  England  as  the  most 
effective  and  beneficent  instrument  for  the  gradual 
introduction  of  European  civilisation  into  Egypt. 
An  Anglo-French  or  an  Anglo-Italian  occupation, 
from  both  of  which  we  narrowly  and  also  acci- 
dentally escaped,  would  have  been  detrimental  to 
Egyptian  interests  and  would  ultimately  have 
caused  friction,  if  not  serious  dissension,  between 
England  on  the  one  side  and  France  or  Italy  on 
the  other. 

The  only  thing  to  be  said  in  favour  of  Turkish 


C11.XVII  TEL-EL-KEBIR  329 

■nlerveiition  is  that  it  would  have  reheved  England 
from  the  responsibiUty  of  intervening.  It  has  been 
shown  in  tlie  course  of  this  narrative  that,  hi  the 
early  stages  of  the  proceedings,  the  policy  of  the 
two  Western  Powers,  which  was  guided  by  the 
anti-Turkish  sentiments  prevalent  in  France,  was 
not  of  a  nature  to  invite  or  encourage  Turkish 
co-operation.  At  a  later  period,  the  shortsighted- 
ness of  the  Sultan  was  such  as  to  cause  the  Porte 
to  commit  political  suicide  in  so  far  as  decisive 
Turkish  action  was  concerned.  Perhaps  it  was 
well  that  it  did  so,  for  it  is  highly  probable  that 
armed  Turkish  intervention  in  Egypt,  accompanied, 
as  it  might  well  have  been,  by  misgovernment, 
paltry  intrigue,  corruption,  and  administrative  and 
financial  confusion,  would  only  have  been  the 
prelude  to  further,  and  possibly  more  serious  inter- 
national complications. 

By  a  process  of  exhausting  all  other  expedients, 
we  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  armed  British 
intervention  was,  under  the  special  circumstances  of 
the  case,  the  only  possible  solution  of  the  diffi- 
culties which  existed  in  1882.  Probably  also  it 
was  the  best  solution.  The  arguments  against 
British  intervention,  indeed,  were  sufficiently 
obvious.  It  was  easy  to  foresee  that,  with  a 
British  garrison  in  Egypt,  it  would  be  difficult  that 
the  relations  of  England  either  with  France  or 
Turkey  should  be  cordial.  With  France  especially, 
there  would  be  a  danger  that  our  relations  might 
become  seriously  strained.  Moreover,  we  lost  the 
advantages  of  our  insular  position.  The  occupation 
of  Egypt  necessarily  dragged  England  to  a  certain 
extent  within  the  arena  of  Continental  politics. 
In  the  event  of  war,  the  presence  of  a  British 
garrison  in  Egypt  would  possibly  be  a  source  of 
weakness  rather  than  of  strength.  Our  position  in 
Egypt  placed  us  in  a  disadvantageous  diplomatic 


330  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  u 

position,  for  any  Power,  witli  whom  we  had  a 
difference  of  opinion  about  some  non- Egyptian 
question,  was  at  one  time  able  to  retaliate  by 
opposing  our  Egyptian  policy.  The  complicated 
rights  and  privileges  possessed  by  the  various 
Powers  of  Europe  in  Egypt  facilitated  action  of 
this  nature. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  force  of  these 
arguments.  The  answer  to  them  is  that  it  was 
impossible  for  Great  Britain  to  allow  the  troops 
of  any  other  European  Power  to  occupy  Egypt. 
When  it  became  apparent  that  some  foreign  occu- 
pation was  necessary,  that  the  Sultan  would  not 
act  save  under  conditions  which  were  impossible 
of  acceptance,  and  that  neither  French  nor  Italian 
co-operation  could  be  secured,  the  British  Govern- 
ment acted  with  promptitude  and  vigour.  A  great 
nation  cannot  throw  off  the  responsibilities  which 
its  past  history  and  its  position  in  the  world  have 
imposed  upon  it.  English  history  affords  other 
examples  of  the  Government  and  people  of  England 
drifting  by  accident  into  doing  what  was  not  only 
right  but  was  also  most  in  accordance  with  British 

mterests.  Ael  8e  o-KOTrelv  fiev  Kol  irpdrreLv  ael  ra  hiKaia, 
av/xTrapaTijpelv  8'  oVti)?  a/xa  zeal  (TUficpepovTa  earai  ravra} 

Such  was  the  advice  Demosthenes  gave  to  his 
fellow-countrymen.  In  spite  of  some  mistakes  of 
detail,  it  was  on  this  sound  principle  that,  broadly 
speaking,  the  British  Government  acted  in  dealing 
with  E^j-yptian  affairs  in  1882. 

*  Oration  For  the  Megalopolitan$. 


CHAPTER  XVIll 

THE   DUFFERIN    MISSION 

September  1882-August  1883 

British  policy — Trial  of  Arabi — Resig'nation  of  Riaz  Pasha — Exile  of 
political  prisouers — Courts-martial — The  Alexandria  Indemnities 
— The  abolition  of  the  Dual  Control — Rupture  of  the  Anglo- 
French  understanding — Lord  Dutferin's  Report — My  arrival  in 
Egypt 

Kinglake's  prophecy  was  that  the  Enghshman 
would  phmt  his  foot  firmly  in  the  valley  of  the 
Nile.  It  had  so  far  been  fulfilled  that  the  English- 
man had  planted  his  foot,  but  he  had  not  planted  it 
firmly.  Hardly,  indeed,  had  his  foot  been  planted 
when,  fearful  of  what  he  had  done,  he  struggled 
to  withdraw  it.  A  few  hours  after  the  battle  of 
Tel-el-Kebir  had  been  fought.  Sir  Edward  INIalet 
was  instructed  to  send  to  London  "as  soon  as 
possible,  suggestions  as  to  army,  finance,  and 
administration  for  the  future."  Lord  Dufferin 
was,  at  the  same  time,  informed  that  "  Her 
Majesty's  Government  contemplated  shortly  com- 
mencing the  withdrawal  of  the  British  troops  from 
Egypt." 

The  British  Government  were,  at  a  subsequent 
period,  blamed  for  not  having  at  once  proclaimed 
a  Protectorate.  A  petition  signed  by  2(i00  Euro- 
peans residing  at  Alexandria  was  presented  to 
Lord  Dufferin  in  favour  of  a  permanent  British 
occupation  of   Egypt.     The   Egyptians  generally 

331 


832  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ii 

also  viewed  British  intervention  with  unmixed 
satisfaction. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  if  the  position  of 
the  British  Government  had  been  more  strongly 
asserted  directly  after  the  occupation,  many  of  the 
obstacles  which  have  stood  in  the  path  of  the 
reformer  would  have  been  swept  away.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  adoption  of  a  policy  of  this  sort 
would  have  constituted  a  breach  of  faith  with 
Europe.  It  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  it  would 
have  met  with  adequate  support  in  England.  It 
may  be  said,  therefore,  that  the  execution  of  this 
policy  was,  for  all  practical  purposes,  both  un- 
desirable and  impossible. 

Moreover,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  mere 
proclamation  of  a  Protectorate  would  not  in  any 
degree  have  impaired  the  rights  and  privileges  of 
Europeans  resident  in  Egypt,^  and  it  was  these 
which  so  much  hampered  the  progress  of  reform  in 
the  early  days  of  the  occupation.  In  order  to 
ensure  this  result,  annexation,  either  permanent  or 
temporary,  would  have  been  necessary. 

At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
situation  in  Egypt  was  misunderstood  both  by  the 
British  Government  and  by  British  public  opinion  of 

^  The  French  Government  established  a  Protectorate  over  Tunis  in 
1884,  but  subsequent  ne^otintions  with  the  Powers  were  necessary 
before  the  re'^ime  of  the  Capitulations  could  be  modified.  The  diffi- 
culties whicli  the  existence  of  the  Capitulations  threw  in  the  way  of 
the  French  administration  of  Tunis  have  been  described  by  a  very 
competent  authority,  who  wrote  under  the  pseudonym  of  P. H.X.,  in 
the  following  terms: — "Les  difficulte's  que  devait  faire  cesser  I'organi- 
sation  de  la  reforme  financiere  et  de  notre  controle  sont  relativement 
peu  de  chose  aupres  des  complications  inextricables  et  des  abus  que  la 
multiplicite  comme  la  toute-puissance  des  juridictions  Europeennes  en 
Tunisie  avaient  fait  naitre.  Sous  pre'texte  de  proteger  les  Europe'ens 
contre  I'arbitraire  et  le  desordre  du  Gouvernement  Beylical,  les  Capitu- 
lations leur  assuraient  des  privileges  qui  s'etaient  etendus  demesure- 
ment  a  mesure  que  I'autorite  locale  s'atfaiblissait  ;  ce  qui  n'etait  a 
I'origine  qu'uiie  exception  etait  devenue  plus  fort  que  la  regie,  en  sorta 
que  I'administration  indigene,  eut-elle  ete  animee  des  meilleures  inten- 
tions du  monde,  s'etait  trouvee  peu  a  peu  completement  paralyse'e" 
{La  Politique  Franfuiae  en  Tunisie,  p.  360). 


OH.  XVIII    THE  DUFFERIN  MISSION  333 

the  time.  Moreover,  party  politics  cast  their  baneful 
spell  over  the  Ell^■lish  proceedings,  and  obscured 
the  real  issues  at  stake.  Two  alternative  policies 
were  open  to  the  British  GovernmenL  These  were, 
first,  the  policy  of  speedy  evacuation ;  and,  secondly, 
the  policy  of  reform.  It  was  not  sufficiently 
understood  that  the  adoption  of  one  of  these 
policies  was  wholly  destructive  of  the  other.  The 
withdrawal  of  the  British  troops  connoted  severity 
in  the  treatment  of  the  rebels,  the  establishment  of 
some  rough  prsetorian  guard  composed  of  foreigners, 
who  would  have  quelled  all  disturbance  with  a  high 
hand,  the  re-establishment  of  an  arbitrary  rule,  and 
the  abandonment  of  all  attempts  to  introduce  the 
various  reforms  which  follow  in  the  train  of 
European  civilisation.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
adoption  of  a  policy  of  reform  connoted  an 
indefinite  prolongation  of  the  British  occupation, 
and  an  increase  of  European  interference,  without 
which  no  progress  was  possible. 

It  was  natural  and  praiseworthy  that  public 
opinion  in  England  should  have  been  opposed  to 
handing  the  Egyptians  over  to  the  uncontrolled 
rule  of  the  Turkish  Pashas,  but  it  was  character- 
istic of  the  want  of  consistency,  which  so  often 
distinguishes  English  politics,  that  the  same  people 
who  cried  out  most  loudly  for  control  over  the 
Pashas,  were  also  those  who  most  strenuously 
opposed  the  adoption  of  the  only  method  by  which 
Pashas  could  be  effectively  controlled.  They 
wished  to  withdraw  the  British  troops,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  to  secure  all  those  advantages  which 
could  only  be  obtained  by  their  continued  presence 
in  the  country.  Party  politicians  had  not  failed 
to  dwell  constantly  and  in  condemnatory  terms 
on  the  number  of  Europeans  employed  in  Egypt. 
It  was  a  good  ad  captandum  cry,  for  at  the  time 
the  British  public  did  not  appreciate  the  extent 


334  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  n 

to  which  European  agency  was  necessary  if  a 
policy  of  reform  was  to  be  adopted.  The 
attempt  to  attain  two  objects,  which  were  irrecon- 
cihible  one  with  the  other,  naturally  rendered  the 
policy  of  the  British  Government  vacillating  and 
uncertain. 

This  vacillation  showed  itself  immediately  after 
the  occupation  in  the  treatment  accorded  to  Arabi 
and  the  other  leaders  of  the  rebellion.  There  could 
be  no  doubt  that,  as  a  subject  of  the  Khedive, 
Arabi  had  been  guilty  of  treason  and  rebellion, 
and  that,  as  an  officer  of  the  army,  he  had  been 
guilty  of  mutiny.  Had  he  been  tried  by  Court- 
martial  and  shot  directly  after  he  was  taken  prisoner, 
no  injustice  would  have  been  done.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  was  regarded  by  some  few  Englishmen  as 
a  hero,  and,  from  a  purely  political  point  of  view,  it 
was  more  than  questionable  whether  it  was  wise  to 
elevate  him  to  the  rank  of  a  martyr.  INIoreover,  it 
is  not  easy,  as  a  matter  of  public  morality,  to  state 
precisely  at  what  point  the  sacred  right  of  revolu- 
tion begins  or  ends,  or  to  say  at  what  stage  a 
disturber  of  the  peace  passes  from  a  common 
rioter,  who  is  an  enemy  to  society,  to  the  rank  of 
a  leader  in  a  political  movement  set  on  foot  for 
the  attainment  of  ends  wliich  command  at  least  a 
certain  degree  of  sympathy.  The  commonplace 
standard  of  success  is  not  a  bad  test  by  which  to 
decide  this  question.  It  is  difficult  to  justify 
unsuccessful  rebellion,  or  to  maintain  that  those 
who  have  been  instrumental  in  brinffing  it  about 
should  not  suffer  the  extreme  consequences  of 
their  own  conduct.  Even  from  this  point  of  view, 
however,  it  was  not  easy  to  decide  on  Arabi's  fate. 
Had  he  been  left  alone,  there  cannot  be  a  doubt 
that  he  would  have  been  successful.  His  want  of 
success  was  due  to  British  interference.  The 
British  Goverinnent  had,  tliercfore,  a  perfect  right 


CH.  XVIII   THE  DUFFERIN  MISSION         3'So 

to  decide  on  his  fate.  Their  decision  could  not  be 
doubtful.  British  public  opinion  condemned  the 
execution  of  prisoners  for  political  offences,  and 
the  British  Government  would  naturally  follow 
public  opinion  on  a  point  of  this  sort.  "  Her 
Majesty's  Government,"  Lord  Granville  wrote, 
"  were  disposed  to  recommend  to  the  Khedive 
to  adopt  the  more  humane  practice  of  modern 
times,  and  to  exercise  his  prerogative  of  mercy," 
if  it  were  found  that  Arabi  could  not  be  charged 
with  any  other  crimes  than  those  of  treason  and 
rebellion.^  It  was,  from  the  first,  doubtful  whether 
any  *'  crime  which,  according  to  the  practice  of 
civilised  nations,  called  for  the  extreme  penalty 
of  the  law"  could  be  brought  home  to  Arabi,  and 
it  was  certainly  not  worth  while  to  prolong  the 
proceedings,  and  thus  keep  the  country  in  a 
ferment,  whilst  a  lengthy  inquiry  into  this  point 
was  going  on.  The  best  plan  would  have  been 
for  the  British  Government  to  have  decided  at 
once  that  Arabi  and  his  principal  associates  should 
be  exiled. 

Unfortunately,  this  was  not  done.  The  fiction 
was  maintained  that  the  fate  of  the  prisoners 
depended,  not  on  the  strong  Government  which 
had  suppressed  the  revolt,  but  on  the  weak 
Government  which  had  proved  itself  powerless 
to  suppress  it.  Arabi  and  his  fellow -prisoners 
were  made  over  to  the  Khedive.  There  miaht 
have  been  some  slight  justification  for  the  adoption 
of  this  course  if  the  cession  had  been  real,  and  if, 
in  view  of  the  early  withdrawal  of  the  British 
troops  which  was  then  contemplated,  the  British 

^  The  following  statement,  for  which,  of  course,  there  is  not  the 
smallest  foundation,  is  one  amongst  very  numerous  illustrations  which 
might  be  given  of  the  little  value  to  be  attached  to  Mr.  AVilfrid  Blunt's 
testimony  on  Egyptian  affairs.  He  writes  {Secret  History,  p.  44;^)  tbat 
"Gladstone  had  made  up  his  mind  that  Arabi  should  be  executed  no 
less  than  had  the  Foreign  Office." 


336  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  n 

Government  had  stood  aside  whilst,  under  the 
protection  of  British  bayonets,  the  Turkish  party 
wreaked  its  vengeance  on  the  Arabists,  and  struck 
te.  ror  hito  the  hearts  of  future  revolutionists. 
But  this  was  obviously  both  undesirable  and  im- 
possible. The  cession  was,  therefore,  made  unreal. 
The  Khedive  was  to  have  the  appearance  of 
dealinir  with  Ariibi,  but  he  was  not  to  move  a 
step  without  the  consent  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment. JNIore  than  this,  when  the  Egyptian 
Government  established  a  court  to  try  Arabi, 
it  was  thought,  and,  without  doubt,  rightly 
thought,  that  the  trial  would  be  a  mockery. 
Hence  arose  an  unseemly  wrangle,  in  which  the 
Egyptian  Government  endeavoured  to  create  a 
condition  of  things  which  would  increase  the 
cliances  of  Arabi  being  condemned  to  death, 
whilst  the  British  Government  insisted  on  a  fair 
trial  conducted  in  public,  and  with  European 
counsel  to  defend  the  prisoners.  The  Egyptian 
Government  were,  of  course,  obliged  to  yield. 
After  long  discussions,  the  conditions  under  which 
the  trial  was  to  be  conducted  were  settled.  On 
November  7,  Lord  Dufferin,  who  had  been  deputed 
on  a  special  mission  to  Egypt,  arrived  in  Cairo. 
He  saw  at  a  glance  that  it  was  essential  to  bring 
tlie  Arabi  proceedings  to  a  close.  A  preliminary 
in(juiry  had  rendered  it  clear  that  no  charge, 
except  that  of  rebellion,  could  be  established 
against  Arabi.  Lord  DufFerin,  therefore,  arranged 
that  Arabi  should  plead  guilty  to  the  charge  of 
rebellion,  that  he  should  be  sentenced  to  death, 
and  that,  inunediately  after  the  sentence  was 
pronounced,  it  should  be  connnuted  into  perpetual 
exile.  This  arrangement  was  carried  out.  Several 
places  were  suggested  to  which  Arabi  might  be 
sent.  It  was  finally  settled  that  he  should  go  to 
Ceylon.      A    special    ship   was    chartered,  and    he 


CH.  XVIII    THE  DUFFERIN  MISSION  337 

and  his  six  principal  associates  left  Suez  on 
December  26.^ 

In  the  meanwhile,  Riaz  Pasha  resigned  his 
position  in  the  Ministry,  ostensibly  on  the  ground 
of  ill- health.  It  was,  however,  well  known  that 
the  real  reason  for  his  resignation  was  that  he  could 
not  reconcile  himself  to  the  idea  of  Arabi  having 
escaped  capital  punishment.  Neither  would  it  be 
fair  to  ascribe  this  attitude  to  vindictive  feelings. 
Without  doubt,  Riaz  Pasha  thought  that  the 
execution  of  Arabi  was  not  merely  an  act  of 
justice  but  a  State  necessity. 

In  a  report  addressed  to  Lord  Granville  on 
December  12,  Lord  Dufferin  described  the  effect 
produced  in  Egypt  by  the  commutation  of  the 
capital  sentence  on  Arabi  and  his  principal  followers. 
The  Europeans  and  the  Pashas  condemned  the 
leniency  with  which  they  had  been  treated.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  mass  of  the  people  approved  of 
the  commutation  of  the  sentences. 

In  addition  to  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion,  about 
150  persons  were  condemned,  some  to  exile  from 
Egypt,  and  some  to  residence  in  the  provinces 
under  police  supervision  for  various  terms.  On 
January  1,  1883,  a  Decree  was  issued  granting  an 
amnesty  to  all  other  prisoners  charged  with  political 
offences. 

"The  debris  of  the  late  rebellion  having  thus 
been  cleared  away,"  Lord  Dufferin  expressed  a 
hope  that  "the  stage  was  cleared  for  reconstruc- 
tion." Unfortunately,  however,  some  months  were 
yet  to  elapse  before  the  whole  of  these  debris  were 
fully  cleared  away.  The  prisons  were  crowded  with 
persons  who  were  charged  with  murder,  pillage, 
and  arson.  At  Tanta,  from  seventy  to  eighty 
Christians,  mostly  Greeks  and  Syrians,  had  been 
massacred,    on    July    13,    by   a    mob    of    Moslem 

'  lu  1901,  Arabi  was  allowed  to  return  to  Egypt. 
VOL.  I  Z 


338  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

fanatics  under  circumstances  of  great  brutality. 
On  the  same  day,  eight  Italians  had  been  killed  at 
Mehallet-Kebir,  and,  on  July  14,  fourteen  Christians 
and  one  Jew  had  been  killed  at  Damanhour  and 
its  neighbourhood.  In  all  these  places,  the  houses 
and  shops  of  the  Christians  had  been  pillaged.  It 
was  impossible  to  allow  crimes  of  this  nature  to 
remain  unpunished.  Commissions  were,  therefore, 
appointed  to  make  preliminary  inquiries  and  to  send 
accused  persons,  against  whom  a  prima  facie  case 
had  been  established,  for  trial  before  a  Court-martial. 
There  was  little  risk  of  injustice  being  committed. 
"  The  persons  dealt  with  by  the  Commissioners," 
Lord  Dufferin  pertinently  remarked,  "and  by  the 
Court-martial  were  Musulman  Egyptians  accused 
of  murdering  and  pillaging  Christians,  principally 
European  Christians.  My  experience  of  the  East 
has  long  since  convinced  me  that  an  Oriental  court 
of  justice  may  be  safely  trusted  not  to  strain  either 
law  or  evidence  when  the  cause  lies  between  a 
Musulman  culprit  and  his  Christian  victim.  During 
all  the  time  I  was  in  Egypt,  Major  MacDonald  ^ 
was  principally  preoccupied  in  noting  the  tendency 
of  the  Court  to  unduly  favour  the  prisoners  ;  and 
Your  Lordship  may  rest  assured  that  whatever 
miscarriages  of  justice  may  have  occurred  have 
been  occasioned  by  the  escape  of  the  guilty,  and 
not  by  the  condemnation  of  any  innocent  persons." 
These  were  wise  words,  but  the  advice  of  the  im- 
partial and  experienced  diplomatist  was  unheeded 
by  party  politicians  in  England,  who  saw  in  the 
Egyptian  trials  an  opportunity  for  attacking  the 
Government  of  the  day.  The  fate  of  Suleiman 
Sami,  a  miscreant  who  was  largely  responsible  for 
the  burning  of  Alexandria  and  who  was  deservedly 

1  Major  (subsequently  Sir  Claude)  MacDonald  was  Lord  Dufferiu's 
Military  Attache'.  He  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  watching  the 
proceedings  of  the  Court-martial. 


CH.  XVIII    THE  DUFFERIN  MISSION  339 

hanged,  attracted  a  special  degree  of  fictitious 
sympathy,  and  was  characterised  by  Lord  Randolph 
Churchill  in  the  House  of  Commons  as  "  the 
grossest  and  vilest  judicial  murder  that  has  ever 
stained  the  ainials  of  Oriental  justice."  Both 
the  British  Government  and  the  authorities  in 
Egypt,  however,  stood  firm  in  the  face  of  these 
attacks.  In  a  few  cases,  capital  punishment  was 
inflicted.  Others  were  condemned  to  various  terms 
of  penal  servitude  and  imprisonment.  A  large 
number  of  accused  persons  were  released  after  a 
preliminary  inquiry.  Eventually,  on  October  9, 
1883,  a  Decree  was  issued  abolishing  the  Special 
Commissions  and  the  Court-martial. 

The  punishment  of  the  principal  offenders  was 
not  the  only  burning  question  which  the  rebellion 
left  in  its  wake.  A  large  amount  of  valuable 
property  had  been  destroyed  at  Alexandria.  After 
some  lengthy  negotiations,  a  Decree  appointing  an 
International  Commission  to  assess  the  claims  was 
issued  on  January  13,  1883.  The  delay  hi  the 
settlement  of  this  question  caused  great  irritation 
and  discontent. 

The  final  rupture  of  the  Anglo-French  entente, 
which  followed  immediately  after  the  occupa- 
tion, increased  the  difficulties  of  the  situation. 
On  September  20,  M.  Duclerc  told  the  British 
Charge  d'Affaires  in  Paris,  "that  he  thought 
it  would  be  in  the  interest  of  England  to  give  at 
an  early  date  some  notion  of  what  her  future 
intentions  were  with  regard  to  Egypt."  It  was 
impossible  at  that  moment  to  state,  save  in  the 
most  general  terms,  what  were  the  intentions 
of  England  as  regards  Egypt,  and  it  soon  became 
apparent  that  the  only  ])()int  to  which  for  the 
moment  the  French  Govenunent  attached  any  real 
imp(irtance,  was  the  contiiuiance  of  the  Anglo- 
French    Control,  as    it   existed    previous    to   the 


340  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.ii 

occupation.  The  Egyptian  Government,  m  the 
other  hand,  wished  tlie  institution  to  be  abolished 
on  the  ground  that  its  dual  nature  and  semi- 
political  character  had  caused  great  inconvenience. 
Public  opinion  in  England  pronounced  strongly 
in  favour  of  its  abolition.  In  spite  of  considerable 
pressure  exerted  by  France,  the  British  Govern- 
ment wisely  stood  firm  and  declined  to  accede  to 
the  French  wishes  on  this  point.  The  presidency 
of  the  Commission  of  the  Debt  was  offered  to 
France,  but  was  declined  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
not  "  consistent  with  the  dignity  of  France  to 
accept  as  an  equivalent  for  the  abolition  of  the 
Control,  a  position  which  was  simply  that  of 
cashier."  Eventually,  after  some  sharp  diplomatic 
skirmishing,  the  negotiations  were  dropped,  and 
the  French  Government  "resumed  its  liberty  of 
action  in  Egypt."  From  that  moment,  until  the 
signature  of  the  Anglo-French  Agreement  in  1904, 
French  action  in  Egypt  was  more  or  less  per- 
sistently hostile  to  England. 

On  January  3,  1883,  Lord  Granville  addressed 
a  circular  to  the  Powers  in  which  he  expressed 
himself  in  the  following  terms  :  "Although  for  the 
present  a  British  force  remains  in  Egypt  for  the 
preservation  of  public  tranquillity,  Her  JNIajesty's 
Government  are  desirous  of  witlidrawino;  it  as  soon 
as  the  state  of  the  country  and  the  organisation  of 
proper  means  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Kliedive's 
authority  will  admit  of  it.  In  the  meanwhile,  the 
position  in  which  Her  Majesty's  Government  are 
placed  towards  His  Highness  imposes  upon  them 
the  duty  of  giving  advice  with  the  object  of 
securing  that  the  order  of  thhigs  to  be  established 
shall  be  of  a  satisfactory  character,  and  ))ossess  the 
elements  of  stability  and  progress."  Lord  Dufferin 
was  sent  to  Egypt  to  report  u})on  the  measures 
which  were  necessary  in  order  that  "the  adniinis- 


CH.  XVIII    THE  DUFFERIN  MISSION  341 

tration  of  affairs  should  be  reconstructed  on  a 
basis  which  would  afford  satisfactory  guarantees 
for  the  maintenance  of  peace,  order,  and  prosperity 
in  Egypt,  for  the  stability  of  the  Khedive's 
authority,  for  the  judicious  development  of  self- 
government,  and  for  the  fulfilment  of  obligations 
towards  the  Powers." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  on  Lord  Duflferin's 
detailed  proposals.  A  few  remarks  on  the  main 
framework  of  his  plan  will  suffice. 

It  was  not  the  first  time  that  an  endeavour  had 
been  made  on  the  banks  of  the  Nile  to  make 
bricks  without  straw.  The  task,  which  Lord 
Dufferin  was  called  upon  to  perform,  was,  in  fact, 
impossible  of  execution.  He  was  asked  to  devise 
a  plan  for  the  complete  rehabilitation  of  the 
country,  and,  at  the  same  time,  one  which  would 
not  be  inconsistent  with  the  policy  of  speedily 
withdrawing  the  British  garrison.  It  can  be  no 
matter  for  surprise  that,  in  spite  of  the  qualities  of 
statesmanship,  political  foresight,  and  literary  skill, 
all  of  which  Lord  Dufferin  possessed  in  an  eminent 
degree,  he  should  have  failed  to  accomplish  the 
impossible.  It  is,  moreover,  difficult  to  read  Lord 
Dufferin's  report  without  entertaining  a  suspicion 
that  he  was  aware  that  the  policy  of  the  British 
Government  was  incapable  of  execution.  There 
was  only  one  practicable  method  by  which  the 
Egyptian  administration  could  be  reformed.  That 
was  to  place  the  government  more  or  less  under 
British  guidance.  Lord  Dufferin's  statesmanlike 
eye  saw  this  clearly  enough.  His  remarks  on  this 
point  form,  indeed,  the  most  valuable  portion  of 
his  report.  "I  cannot,"  he  said,  "conceive  any- 
thing which  would  be  more  fatal  to  the  prosperity 
and  good  administration  of  the  country  than  the 
hasty  and  inconsiderate  extrusion  of  any  large 
proportion  of  the  Europeans  in  the  service  of  the 


342  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.ii 

Government,  in  deference  to  the  somewhat  un- 
reasonable clamour  which  has  been  raised  against 
them.  For  some  time  to  come,  European  assist- 
ance in  the  various  Departments  of  Egyptian 
administration  will  be  absolutely  necessary.  .  .  . 
It  is  frightful  to  contemplate  the  misery  and 
misfortune  which  would  be  entailed  on  the  popula- 
tion, were  the  Financial,  the  Public  Works,  and 
analogous  Departments  to  be  left  unorganised 
by  a  few  high-minded  European  officials.  The 
Egyptian  Government  would  quickly  become  a 
prey  to  dishonest  speculators,  ruinous  contracts, 
and  delusive  engineering  operations,  from  which 
they  are  now^  protected  by  the  intelligent  and 
capable  men  who  are  at  hand  to  advise  them  in 
reference  to  these  subjects.  This  is  especially 
true  in  regard  to  financial  matters.  The  main- 
tenance of  Egypt's  financial  equilibrium  is  the 
guarantee  of  her  independence." 

Without  doubt.  Lord  Dufferin  was  right.  But 
in  what  manner  was  the  ascendency  of  European 
influence  to  be  secured  ?  It  could  only  be  secured 
by  the  prolongation  of  the  British  occupation. 
Lord  Dufferin's  instructions,  however,  forbade  him 
to  state  in  clear  and  positive  terms  the  inevitable 
inference  to  be  drawn  from  his  own  proposals. 

In  the  meanwhile,  in  deference,  to  a  great 
extent,  to  British  public  opinion,  a  certain  develop- 
ment of  free  institutions  was  proposed.  But 
Lord  Dufferin  appears  to  have  liad  little  con- 
fidence that  he  would  succeed  in  "creating  a 
vitalised  and  self -existent  organism,  instinct  with 
evolutionary  force."  "A  paper  constitution,"  he 
said,  "is  proverbially  an  unsatisfactory  device. 
Few  institutions  have  succeeded  that  have  not 
been  the  outcome  of  slow  growth,  and  gradual 
development;  but  in  the  East,  even  the  germs  of 
constitutional  freedom  are  non-existent.   Despotism 


CH.  xvm    THE  DUFFERIN  MISSION  343 

not  only  destroys  the  seeds  of  liberty,  but  renders 
the  soil,  on  which  it  has  trampled,  incapable  of 
growing  the  plant.  A  long- enslaved  nation  in- 
stinctively craves  for  the  strong  hand  of  a  master, 
rather  than  for  a  lax  constitutional  regime.  A 
mild  ruler  is  more  likely  to  provoke  contempt  and 
insubordination  than  to  inspire  gratitude." 

It  was,  without  doubt,  desirable  to  make  some 
beginning  in  the  way  of  founding  liberal  institu- 
tions, but  no  one  with  any  knowledge  of  tlie  East 
could  for  one  moment  suppose  that  the  Legis- 
lative Council  and  Assembly,  founded  under  Lord 
DufFerin's  auspices,  could  at  once  become  either 
important  factors  in  the  government  of  the 
country,  or  efficient  instruments  to  help  in  adminis- 
trative and  fiscal  reform. 

Where  Order  deigns  to  come. 
Her  sister.  Liberty,  cannot  be  far.* 

What  Egypt  most  of  all  required  was  order 
and  good  government.  Perhaps,  longo  intervallo, 
liberty  would  follow  afterwards.  No  one  but  a 
dreamy  theorist  could  imagine  that  the  natural 
order  of  things  could  be  reversed,  and  that  liberty 
could  first  be  accorded  to  the  poor  ignorant  re- 
presentatives of  the  Egy]itian  people,  and  that  the 
latter  would  then  be  able  to  evolve  order  out  of 
chaos.  In  the  early  days  of  the  struggles  which 
eventually  led  to  Italian  unity,  Manzoni  said  that 
"his  country  must  be  morally  healed  before  she 
could  be  politically  regenerated.*'  ^  The  remark 
applied  in  a  far  greater  degree  to  Egypt  in  1882 
than  it  did  to  Italy  in  1827.  Lord  DufFerin  was 
certainly  under  no  delusion  as  to  the  realities  of 
the  situation.  In  the  concluding  portion  of  his 
report,  he  said  that   one   of  the    main    points    to 

*  Akenside,  Pleasures  of  the  Imagination. 
•  Bolton  King,  History  of  Italian  Unity,  vol.  i.  p.  112. 


344  MODERN  EGYPT  rx.  ii 

consider  was  "how  far  we  can  depend  upon  the 
continued,  steady,  and  frictionless  operation  of  the 
machinery  we  shall  have  set  up.  A  great  part 
of  what  we  are  about  to  inaugurate  will  be  of 
necessity  tentative  and  experimental.  .  .  .  Before 
a  guarantee  of  Egypt's  independence  can  be  said 
to  exist,  the  administrative  system  of  which  it 
is  the  leading  characteristic  must  have  time  to 
consolidate,  in  order  to  resist  disintegrating  in- 
fluences from  within  and  without,  and  to  acquire 
the  use  and  knowledge  of  its  own  capacities.  .  ,  . 
With  such  an  accunmlation  of  difficulties,  native 
statesmanship,  even  though  supplemented  by  the 
new-born  institutions,  will  hardly  be  able  to 
co))e,  unless  assisted  for  a  time  by  our  sympathy 
and  guidance.  Under  these  circumstances,  I 
would  venture  to  submit  that  we  can  hardly  con- 
sider the  work  of  reorganisation  complete,  or  the 
responsibilities  imposed  upon  us  by  circumstances 
adequately  discharged,  until  we  have  seen  Egypt 
shake  herself  free  from  the  initial  embarrassments 
which  I  have  enumerated  above."  In  other  words, 
Lord  Dufferin,  without  absolutely  stating  that  the 
British  occupation  must  be  indefinitely  prolonged, 
clearly  indicated  the  maintenance  of  the  para- 
mount influence  of  the  British  Government  for  an 
indefinite  period  as  an  essential  condition  to  the 
execution  of  the  policy  of  reform. 

Lord  Dufferin  threw  out  another  important 
hint.  "  If,"  he  said,  "  I  had  been  commissioned  to 
place  affairs  in  Egypt  on  the  footing  of  an  Indian 
subject  State,  the  outlook  would  have  been  different. 
The  masterful  hand  of  a  Kesident  would  have 
quickly  bent  everything  to  his  will."  After  de- 
tailing the  advantao;es  to  be  derived  from  this 
system  of  government,  Lord  Dufferin  added : 
"The  Egyptians  would  have  justly  considered 
these    advantages     as    dearly    purchased     at     the 


CH.  XVIII   THE  DUFFERIN  MISSION  345 

expense  of  their  domestic  independence.  INIoreover, 
Her  Majesty's  Government  and  the  public  opinion 
of  England  have  pronounced  against  any  such 
alternative."  Public  opinion  in  England,  however, 
had  not  pronounced  strongly  against  this  alter- 
native. On  the  contrary,  many  people  were  of 
opinion  that  the  course  indicated  by  Lord  Dufferin 
was  the  best  to  adopt.  It  is,  moreover,  possible, 
in  spite  of  the  forced  condemnation  which  he 
pronounced,  that  Lord  Dufferin  was  of  a  some- 
what similar  opinion.  It  was,  indeed,  clear  that 
for  some  long  while  to  come,  the  representative 
of  the  British  Government  in  Egypt  would  of 
necessity  be  more  than  an  ordinary  diplomatic 
agent.  "The  title-deeds  of  all  political  authority," 
it  has  been  truly  said,  "are  elastic."^  Their  elas- 
ticity was  about  to  be  put  to  the  test  in  Egypt. 

The  question  of  who  should  be  the  man  then 
arose.  I  was  at  that  time  in  India.  Sir  Edward 
Malet  was  promoted  to  be  Minister  at  Brussels. 
The  British  Government  did  me  the  honour  of 
inviting  me  to  become  his  successor.  I  accepted 
the  invitation  and  arrived  in  Cairo  on  September 
11,  1883. 

*  Oliver's  Alexander  Hamilton,  p.  169. 


PART   III 
THE  SOUDAN 

1882-1907 


The  difficulties  of  the  case  have  passed  entirely  beyond  the 
limits  oj"  stich  political  and  military  difficulties  as  I  have  knmvn 
m  the  course  of  an  experience  of  half  a  century. 

Mr.  Gladstone,  Speech  iyi  tJie  House  of  Commons 
on  Soudan  affairs,  Febricary  23,  1885. 


847 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE    HICKS   EXPEDITION 
January-November  1883 

Extent  of  Egyptian  territory — Misgovernment  in  the  Soudan — Slave^ 

hunting  —  Said  Pasha's  views  —  Colonel  Stewart's  Report  —  The 
Mahdi — Military  and  financial  situation — Interference  from  Cairo 
— Attitude  of  the  British  Government  —  Destruction  of  General 
Hicks's  army. 

The  affairs  of  the  Soudan  exercised  a  very  im- 
portant influence  on  the  course  of  events  in  Egypt, 
more  especially  during  the  years  which  immediately 
followed  the  British  occupation  of  the  country. 
They  will,  therefore,  be  treated  separately. 

At  the  time  when  this  narrative  commences,  the 
nominal  authority  of  the  Khedive  extended  over 
an  area  stretching  from  Wadi  Haifa  on  the  nortli 
to  the  Equator  on  the  south,  a  distance  of  about 
1300  miles,  and  from  JNlassowah  on  the  east  to  the 
western  limit  of  the  Darfour  province  on  the  west, 
a  distance  of  about  1300  miles — that  is  to  say,  he 
ruled,  or  attempted  to  rule,  over  a  territory  twice 
as  big  as  France  and  Germany  together. 

The  worst  forms  of  misgovernment  existed  over 
this  vast  tract  of  country.  Sir  Samuel  Baker,  on 
the  occasion  of  his  second  visit  to  the  Soudan  in 
1870,  wrote :  "  I  observed  with  dismay  a  frightful 
change  in  the  features  of  the  country  between 
Berber  and  the  capital  since  my  former  visit.  The 
rich  soil  on  the  banks  of  the  river,  which  had  a  few 
years  since  been  highly  cultivated,  was  abandoned. 

349 


350  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

.  .  .  There  was  not  a  dog  to  howl  for  a  lost  master. 
Industry  had  vanished  ;  oppression  had  driven  tlie 
inhabitants  from  the  soil."^  The  taxes,  which 
were  excessive  in  amount,  were  collected  by  Basil i- 
Bozouks.  These  agents  were  described  by  Colonel 
Stewart,  who  was  sent  to  the  Soudan  in  the  winter 
of  1882-83  to  report  on  the  state  of  the  country,  as 
"swaggering  bullies,  robbing,  plundering,  and  ill- 
treating  the  people  with  impunity."  In  addition, 
moreover,  to  the  evils  attendant  on  a  thoroughly 
bad  and  oppressive  system  of  government,  tlie 
Soudan  suffered  from  a  scourge  peculiar  to  itself. 
It  was  the  happy  hunting-ground  of  the  Arab 
slave-dealer.  "The  entire  country,"  Sir  Samuel 
Baker  wrote,  "was  leased  out  to  piratical  slave- 
hunters,  under  the  name  of  traders,  by  the 
Khartoum  Government." 

Even  assuming  that  Ismail  Pasha  was  sincere 
in  his  desire  to  suppress  slavery  and  to  govern 
the  Soudan  well,  nothing  is  more  certain  than 
that  he  was  powerless  to  do  so.  Qui  t?^op 
embi'asse^  mat  etreint.  In  extending  his  dominions 
to  the  centre  of  Africa,  the  Khedive  had  under- 
taken a  task  which  was  far  beyond  the  military 
and  financial  resources,  as  well  as  the  adminis- 
trative capacity  of  the  Egyptian  Government. 
His  predecessor,  Said  Pasha,  saw  this,  although 
during  his  time  the  area,  over  which  the  Khedive 
of  Egypt  was  supposed  to  exercise  authority, 
was  far  smaller  than  in  1883.  In  1850,  Said 
Pasha  visited  Khartoum.  "After  due  considera- 
tion he  had  almost  decided  to  abandon  the  country, 
and  was  only  restrained  from  doing  so  by  the 
Sheikhs  and  Notables  pointing  out  the  inevitable 
anarchy  that  would  result  from  such  a  measure." 
Twenty- seven  years  later.  Colonel  Stewart  saw 
that  the  only  hope  of  improvement  lay  in  abandon- 

^  Ismailia,  p.  11. 


cH.  XIX       THE  HICKS  EXPEDITION        351 

ing  some  of  the  outlying  provinces  of  the  Soudan, 
and  thus  bringing  the  ambitious  task,  which  the 
Egyptian  Government  had  set  itself  to  perform, 
within  comparatively  manageable  limits.  "  It  is 
generally  acknowledged,"  he  wrote,  "  that  the 
Soudan  is,  and  has  for  many  years  been,  a  source 
of  loss  to  the  Egyptian  Government.  .  .  .  Putting, 
however,  the  financial  view  of  the  question  aside,  I 
am  firmly  convinced  that  the  Egyptians  are  quite 
unfit  in  every  way  to  undertake  such  a  trust  as  the 
government  of  so  vast  a  country  with  a  view  to  its 
welfare,  and  that  both  for  their  own  sake  and  that 
of  the  people  they  try  to  rule,  it  would  be  advisable 
to  abandon  large  portions  of  it.  The  fact  of  their 
incompetence  to  rule  is  so  generally  acknowledged 
that  it  is  unnecessary  to  discuss  the  question." 

There  is  a  tradition  in  the  Mohammedan  world 
that,  at  some  future  time,  a  Mahdi  ^  will  appear  on 
earth,  upon  whose  coming  the  world  will  be  con- 
verted to  the  Mohammedan  religion.  A  variety 
of  unauthorised  rumours  are  current  amono-st  the 

o 

lower  orders  of  Mohammedans  as  to  the  appearance 
and  qualities  of  the  true  Mahdi,  such  as,  for  instance, 
that  he  will  have  very  long  hands  ;  but  these  are 
discarded  by  the  more  learned  classes.  A  work 
written  at  Mecca  in  1883  by  a  Sherif  of  that  place, 
and  entitled  21ie  Conquests  of  Islam,  contains 
what  may  be  considered  as  an  authorised  version  of 
the  conditions  which  the  true  Mahdi  must  fulfil. 
"  The  greatest  of  the  signs,"  it  is  said,  "  shall  be 
that  he  shall  be  of  the  line  of  Fatma  {i.e.  a  Sherif, 
or  descendant  of  the  Prophet)  ;  that  he  shall  be 
proclaimed  Mahdi  against  his  will,  not  seeking 
such  proclamation  for  himself,  and  not  causing 
strife  amongst  tiie  Faithful  to  obtain  it,  nor  even 
yielding  to  it  till  threatened  with  death  by  them. 

'  The  literal  meaning  of  the  word  "  Mahdi "  is  one  who  is  "  con- 
ducted in  the  right  path." 


352  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

He  shall  be  proclaimed  in  the  Mosque  of  Mecca, 
not  elsewhere  ;  he  shall  not  appear  save  when  there 
is  strife  after  the  death  of  a  Khalifa ;  he  shall 
neither  come  nor  be  proclaimed  until  such  time  as 
there  is  no  Khalifa  over  the  Moslems.  His  advent 
shall  coincide  with  that  of  Anti-Christ,  after  whom 
Jesus  will  descend  and  join  himself  to  the  Mahdi. 
These  are  the  great  signs  of  his  coming.  The 
others  are  imaginary  or  disput?d,  and  whosoever 
shall,  of  his  own  will,  declare  himself  to  be  Mahdi 
and  try  to  assert  himself  by  force,  is  a  pretender, 
such  as  have  already  appeared  many  times." 

In  August  1881,  a  man  named  Mohammed 
Ahmed  proclaimed  himself  to  be  the  Mahdi  in 
the  Soudan.^  He  was  born  in  1843  in  the 
province  of  Dongola.  As  a  young  man  he  was 
apprenticed  to  his  uncle,  a  boatbuilder  in  Sennar, 
but  the  tendency  which,  from  liis  earliest  child- 
hood, he  had  shown  towards  religious  studies,  led 
him  to  abandon  trade,  and  to  enter  a  religious 
school  at  Khartoum.  His  mission,  as  ex])lained 
in  his  various  Proclamations,  was  to  gain  over 
the  Soudan  to  his  cause,  then  to  march  on  Egypt, 
overthrow  the  heretical  Turks,  and  convert  the 
whole  world.  All  who  opposed  his  mission  were  to 
be  destroyed,  whether  Christians,  Mohammedans, 
or  Pagans. 

Mohammed  Ahmed  was   at  once  branded   by 

*  Many  persons  had  appeared  in  Earypt  prior  to  1881  claiming  to  be 
the  Mahdi.  See,  for  instance,  Colonel  Burj^oyne's  History,  etc.,  1798  to 
1801,  f.  13.  In  Ismail  I'asha's  time,  a  .Mahdi  appeared  in  I^pper  Kg-ypt. 
He  and  his  followers  were  put  to  death  (see  l>ady  Duff  Gordon's 
Letters  from  Egypt,  p.  342).  In  the  l\oran,  no  allusion  is  made  to  the 
cominj^  of  tlie  Alahdi.  'ilie  belief  in  a  future  Ma'r.ti  is  l)ased  on  a 
Haditli,  tliat  is  to  say,  one  of  tlie  traditiunary  sayiiijjs  of  tlie  I'lopliet, 
which  were  recorded  hy  Al)u  Hekr  and  others.  It  is  confined  to  the 
Sunnis.  According?  to  the  Sliiaiis,  the  Mahdi  lias  already  apj)eared 
in  the  person  of  Mohammed  Al)u  el  Kasim,  the  twelftli  Imam,  wlio  is 
believed  to  he  concealed  in  some  secret  place  until  the  day  of  his 
manifestation  before  the  end  of  the  world. — Hughes  s  Dictionary  of 
Islam,  p.  305. 


cH.  XIX       THE  HICKS  EXPEDITION         353 

orthodox  INIohainmedans  in  Egypt  and  elsewhere 
as  a  False  INIahdi  (Mutemahdi).  Neither,  in  spite 
of  the  credulity  and  ignorance  of  the  population 
of  the  Soudan,  is  it  probable  that  he  would  have 
met  with  any  success  even  in  that  province,  had 
not  the  prevailing  discontent  predisposed  the 
inhabitants  against  the  Egy])tian  Government. 
It  was,  however,  Colonel  Stewart  wrote,  *'  a 
melancholy  fact  that  the  Government  was  almost 
universally  hated  and  abhorred."  The  people, 
therefore,  flocked  to  the  standard  of  the  Mahdi, 
whose  prestige  was  increased  by  some  successes 
gained  over  the  Egyptian  troops  in  the  early 
days  of  the  insurrectionary  movement.  It  soon 
became  apparent  that  the  Egyptian  Government 
had  to  deal,  not  with  any  petty  disturbance  which 
must  sooner  or  later  succumb  to  superior  force, 
but  with  a  formidable  rebellion,  the  suppression 
of  which  would  tax  to  the  utmost  their  military 
and  financial  resources.  What,  therefore,  was  the 
nature  of  those  resources  ? 

The  army  was  in  a  deplorable  condition.  "  The 
troops  in  garrison  here  (at  Khartoum),"  Colonel 
Stewart  wrote  on  January  5,  1883,  "are  working 
at  elementary  drill  and  tactics,  and  are  making 
some  progress.  It  is,  however,  very  uphill  work ; 
the  officers  are  so  ignorant  and  so  incapable  of 
grasping  the  meaning  of  the  simplest  movement. 
Quite  one -third  of  the  troops  are  also  ignorant 
of  the  use  of  the  rifle,  and  they  would  be  more 
formidable  as  adversaries  were  they  simply  armed 
with  sticks.  Many  have  also  superstitious  ideas 
of  the  power  of  the  Mahdi."  A  little  later 
(February  27),  Colonel  Stewart  wrote :  "  It  is 
impossible  for  me  to  criticise  too  severely  the 
conduct  of  the  Egyptian  troops,  both  officers  and 
men,  towards  the  natives.  Their  general  conduct 
and  overbearing  manner  is  almost  sufficient  to  cause 

VOL.  I  2  A 


354  MODERN  EGYPT  pi.  iii 

a  rebellion.  When  to  this  conduct  cowardice  is 
added,  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  avoid  expressing 
my  contempt  and  disgust.'  Moreover,  the  soldiers 
were  imbued  with  Arabist  sympathies ;  their 
loyalty  to  the  Khedive  was  doubtful.  "The 
question,"  Colonel  Stewart  wrote  on  February 
16,  "is  whether  they  will  remain  faithful,  or 
whether  their  cowardice  may  not  induce  them  to 
desert,  knowing,  as  they  will,  that  the  JNIahdi 
will  not  harm  them.  .  .  .  At  one  or  two  of  the 
late  skirmishes,  they  were  heard  exclaiming,  '  Oh, 
Effendina  Arabi !  If  you  only  knew  the  position 
Tewfik  has  placed  us  in  ! ' " 

The  financial  position  was  as  bad  as  the  military. 
The  Soudan  revenue  for  1882  was  estimated  at 
£E.507,000,  and  the  expenditure  at  £E. 610,000, 
thus  leaving  a  deficit  of  £E.  103,000.  There  is 
little  use  in  endeavouring  to  ascertain  what  the 
real  revenue  of  the  Soudan  was  at  this  time. 
No  trustworthy  accounts  were  kept.  It  is 
certain,  however,  that  it  had  for  years  been  the 
practice  to  overestimate  the  revenue,  and  it  was 
obvious  in  the  then  condition  of  affairs  that  little 
or  no  revenue  of  any  kind  was  to  be  expected. 
*'  There  can  be  no  doubt,"  Colonel  Stewart  wrote, 
"  that  the  deficits  of  many  provinces  are  very  far 
in  excess  of  those  stated.  Probably,  no  revenue 
whatever  has  been  collected  in  the  province  of 
Kordofan.  INIuch  the  same  can  also  be  said 
of  Dara  and  Fashoda.  Sennar,  with  perhaps 
Darfour,  must  also  be  in  pretty  much  the  same 
plight." 

Several  British  officers,  chief  amongst  whom 
was  General  Hicks,  were  appointed  to  the  staff  of 
the  Soudan  army  in  the  spring  of  1883.  Shortly 
after  his  arrival  at  Khartoum  in  ^larch  1883, 
General  Hicks  made  an  appeal  to  Cairo  for  help. 

Those  who  have  followed   the   account  which 


CH.XIX       THE  HICKS  EXPEDITION         355 

has  already  been  given  of  the  financial  situation  in 
Egypt  at  that  time,  will  be  able  to  judge  of  the 
degree  of  pecuniary  assistance  which  it  was  possible 
for  the  exhausted  Treasury  at  Cairo  to  afford  to 
General  Hicks.  Nevertheless,  an  effort  was  made 
to  provide  funds  for  the  Soudan.  General  Hicks 
was  told  that  up  to  the  end  of  the  year  1883  the 
Egyptian  Government  would  provide  him  with 
£E.  147,000.  The  pecuniary  aid  thus  afforded, 
though  sufficient  to  cause  embarrassment  to  the 
Egyptian  Treasury,  was  wholly  inadequate  to 
meet  General  Hicks's  wants.  It  only  amounted 
to  enough  to  provide  for  the  pay  of  the  men  to 
the  end  of  the  current  year.  "  Tlie  native  Bashi- 
Bozouks,"  (icneral  Hicks  pointed  out,  "  are  still 
months  in  arrears  of  pay.  The  men  on  the  Blue 
Nile  are  in  some  cases  two  years  in  arrear." 

The  position,  therefore,  in  the  spring  of  1883 
was  as  follows : — The  Treasury  was  exhausted  ; 
the  army  was  unpaid,  undisciplined,  untrained, 
partially  disloyal,  and,  therefore,  worthless  as  a 
fighting  machine. 

Under  such  conditions,  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment had  to  face  a  formidable  rebellion,  which 
drew  its  strength  from  two  potent  forces,  namely : 
first,  the  religious  fervour  of  a  credulous,  fanatical, 
but  courageous  population ;  secondly,  the  well- 
merited  hatred  engendered  by  a  long  course  of 
misgovernment.  The  difficulty  of  the  task  was 
enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the  scene  of  the  rebellion 
was  remote  from  the  headquarters  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  that  the  physical  difficulties  of  communi- 
cation with  the  base  of  operations  were  very  great. 
It  was  a  task  which  would  have  taxed  the  resources 
of  a  civilised  Government  whose  affairs  were  con- 
ducted by  men  of  the  utmost  energy  and  intelli- 
gence. It  was  altogether  beyond  the  strength  of 
the  inexperienced  Cairene  administrators,  who  had 


356  IMODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

themselves  only  just  emerged  from  an  internal 
revolution  which,  but  for  foreign  aid,  would  have 
been  successful. 

The  Horatian  maxim  Versate  diu,  quid  fen  e 
recusent,  quid  vahant  humeri,  holds  good  of  politics 
as  well  as  of  poetry.  The  first  thing  which  the 
Egyptian  Government  ought  to  have  done  was  to 
have  considered  whether  their  strength  was  pro- 
portionate to  the  task  which  they  had  undertaken. 
The  main  question  to  be  decided  was  whether  the 
Egyptian  Government  should,  for  the  time  being 
at  all  events,  abandon  the  more  remote  parts  of  the 
Soudan  and  stand  on  the  defensive  at  Khartoum,  or 
whether  an  expedition  should  be  sent  into  Kordofan, 
which  had  become  the  chief  centre  of  rebellion,  in 
the  hope  of  dealing  a  crushing  blow  to  the  rising 
power  of  the  Mahdi.  The  importance  of  the 
decision  in  this  matter  was  realised  by  the  British 
authorities  on  the  spot,  more  especially  by  Colonel 
Stewart,  who  could  speak  with  high  authority 
on  Soudan  affairs.  On  December  27,  1882,  that 
is  to  say,  whilst  El  Obeid,  the  capital  of  the  Kor- 
dofan province,  was  still  besieged  and  Abdul-Kader 
Pasha,  who  was  Governor-General  of  the  Soudan, 
was  preparing  an  ex])edition  for  its  relief.  Colonel 
Stewart  wrote :  '*  I  would  beg  to  point  out  how 
very  important  it  is  that  the  present  expedition 
should  prove  a  success.  A  failure  would  probably 
entail  the  total  loss,  if  not  of  the  Soudan,  of  at  any 
rate  many  provinces.  This  truth  can  hardly  be 
brought  home  with  too  much  force  to  the  Egyptian 
Government."  At  that  time.  Colonel  Stewart 
thought  that  "Abdul-Kader  had  every  right  to 
expect  a  success."  A  little  later  (January  9),  when 
Colonel  Stewart  had  seen  more  of  the  Egyptian 
troops  and  had  become  strongly  convinced  of  their 
hiefficiency,  he  s])()ke  less  hoj)cfully.  Alluding  to 
various  small  engagements  in  wliich  the  Egyptian 


CH.  XIX      THE  HICKS  EXPEDITION         357 

troops  had  behaved  badly,  he  wrote  :  '*  It  is  very 
evident  that  the  matter  will  become  exceedingly 
serious  should  the  troops  continue  to  exhibit  such 
pusillanimity.  It  will  be  quite  hopeless  to  expect 
to  cope  successfully  with  the  rebellion,  and  it  will 
only  remain  with  the  Egyptian  Government  to 
make  the  best  terms  they  can  with  the  Mahdi." 
On  January  16,  he  recurred  to  the  same  subject. 
"This  move  of  Abdul-Kader,"  he  wrote  to  Sir 
Edward  Malet,  "  is  a  critical  one,  for,  should  he 
meet  with  any  reverse,  it  will  probably  be  a  decisive 
one,  as  far  as  Egyptian  authority  in  this  country  is 
concerned." 

On  February  16,  when  the  fall  of  El  Obeid  was 
imminent,  Colonel  Stewart  wrote  :  "  The  question 
now  arises,  '  What  should  be  done  in  this  crisis  ? ' 
I  think  the  first  thing  the  Government  will  have  to 
decide  on  will  be  whether  the  Kordofan  expedition 
should  leave  or  not.  My  own  opinion,  from  what 
I  am  told  and  know  of  the  Egyptian  soldiers,  is 
that  to  send  it  would  be  to  run  a  very  great  risk, 
and  if  the  expedition  were  defeated,  the  probability 
is  that  the  Soudan  would  be  lost.  Should  it  be 
decided  to  give  up  the  expedition,  I  wo  ild  then 
suggest  that  orders  should  be  at  once  sent  to 
Slatin  Bey,  the  Governor  of  Darfour,  to  destroy 
all  his  stores  and  retreat  as  best  he  can  on  the 
Bahr-el-Ghazal  Province.  There  is,  of  course,  a 
chance  that  Khartoum  may  be  beleaguered,  but  I 
can  hardly  fancy  that  even  10,000  Egyptian  soldiers, 
if  they  remain  faithful,  and  are  commanded  by  some 
energetic  officers,  will  allow  themselves  to  be  shut 
up."  Two  days  later  (February  18),  the  news  of 
the  fall  of  El  Obeid  reached  Khartoum.  On 
February  20,  Colonel  Stewart  wrote :  "  I  am 
strongly  of  opinion  that  to  advance  now  on  Kor- 
dofan would  be  exceedingly  injudicious,  and  that 
the  alternative  policy  of  remaining  on  the  defensive. 


358  IMODERN  EGYPT  pt.  in 

vigorously  putting  down  any  attempted  rising  on 
this  bank  of  the  Nile,  and  waiting  to  see  what 
will  happen,  is  the  true  one.  To  advance  now  with 
our  miserable  troops  against  an  enemy  flushed  with 
recent  success,  well  supplied  with  arms,  and  worked 
up  to  a  pitch  of  fanaticism,  would  be  but  to  risk  a 
disaster  with  no  corresponding  advantage  now  that 
Obeid  has  fallen.  A  serious  disaster  or,  indeed,  a 
check,  would  also  very  probably  involve  the  loss  of 
the  whole  of  the  Soudan."  Speaking  of  the  '*  utter 
worthlessness  of  the  Egyptian  infantry,"  Colonel 
Stewart  added  :  "  It  is  almost  impossible  for  me 
to  convey  an  idea  of  the  contempt  with  which  all 
classes  of  people  here  regard  them.  The  negro 
troops  will  not  associate  with  them,  nor  will, 
curiously  enough,  the  Egyptian  officers  in  com- 
mand of  those  troops."  ^ 

It  was  unfortunate  that  Colonel  Stewart's  advice 
was  not  followed.  Both  Lord  DufFerin  and  Sir 
Edward  Malet  shared  his  views.  On  April  2, 
1888,  Lord  Dufferin  had  an  interview  with  Ibrahim 
Bey,  the  head  of  the  Soudan  Department  at  Cairo, 
in  which  he  said  that  "  if  the  Egyptian  Government 
were  wise,  it  would  confine  its  present  efforts  to 
the  re-establishment  of  its  authority  in  Sermar,  and 
would  not  seek  to  extend  its  dominion  beyond  that 
province  and  the  bordering  river  banks."  In  his 
general  report  on  Egypt,  Lord  Dufferin,  whilst 
deprecating  the  abandonment  of  the  whole  of  the 
Soudan,  no  necessity  having  as  yet  arisen  for  so 
heroic  a  remedy,  added :  "  I  apprehend,  however, 

1  In  a  letter  dated  September  1,  1883,  Mr.  Power,  the  British  Con- 
sular A^ent  at  Khartoum,  wrote  :  "  In  three  days,  we  march  on  a 
canipaij^n  tli;it  even  the  most  sanfruine  look  forward  to  with  the  f;reatest 
jrloom.  We  have  liere  i)000  intaiitry  that  titty  fjood  men  would  rout 
in  ten  minutes,  and  1000  cavalry  (Hasiii-liozouks)  tliat  have  never  leaiiit 
even  to  ride,  and  these,  with  a  few  Nordent'elt  fiuns,  are  to  heat  tiie 
60,000  men  whom  the  Mahdi  has  ^rot  tof^ether.  .  .  .  Tiiat  Kj^-yptian 
officers  and  men  are  not  worth  the  ammunition  they  throw  away,  is 
well  known." — Power's  Letters  from  Khartoum,  p.  20. 


CH.XIX      THE  HICKS  EXPEDITION         359 

that  it  would  be  wise  on  the  part  of  Egypt  to 
abandon  Darfour  and  perhaps  part  of  Kordofan, 
and  to  be  content  with  maintaining  her  jurisdiction 
in  the  provinces  of  Khartoum  and  Sennar."  On 
June  5,  when  General  Hicks  was  urging  the 
Egyptian  Government,  through  Sir  Edward  Malet, 
to  give  him  more  men  and  more  money,  the  latter 
telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville  :  "  Your  Lordship 
is  aware  that  it  is  already  impossible  for  the 
Egyptian  Government  to  supply  the  funds  de- 
manded for  the  Soudan,  and  the  proposed 
operations  will  run  a  considerable  risk  of  failure 
unless  they  are  conducted  on  a  large  scale,  and 
unless  the  army  is  well  supplied  in  every  respect. 
Under  these  circumstances,  a  question  arises  as  to 
whether  General  Hicks  should  be  instructed  to 
confine  himself  to  maintaining  the  present  supre- 
macy of  the  Khedive  in  the  region  between  the 
Blue  and  White  Niles."  Sir  Edward  Malet  added 
that  he  "had  furnished  Cherif  Pasha  with  a  copy 
of  General  Hicks's  telegram,  as  requested,  but 
without  comment  or  expression  of  opinion  upon 
its  contents." 

What,  however,  was  the  opinion  of  General 
Hicks,  the  officer  who  was  to  command  the  expedi- 
tion about  to  be  sent  against  the  INIahdi  ?  General 
Hicks's  position  was  one  of  great  difficulty.  The 
Government  at  Cairo  had  not  learnt  the  elementary 
lesson  that,  in  dealing  with  a  state  of  affiiirs  such 
as  that  which  then  existed  in  the  Soudan,  the  first 
essential  and  preliminary  condition  to  success  was 
to  entrust  the  supreme  command  to  one  individual 
and  to  support  him  cordially.  Ala-el -Din  Pasha 
was  sent  to  Khartoum  to  supersede  Abdul-Kader 
Pasha,  of  whom  Colonel  Stewart  thought  highly  ; 
but  when  he  arrived  (February  1883)  he  did 
not,  in  the  first  instance,  declare  his  mission. 
"Although,"  Colonel    Stewart    wrote,   "nominally 


360  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

he  has  no  official  position,  his  presence  is  sufficient 
to  neutralise  the  influence  of  Abdul-Kader,  with 
the  result  that  practically  no  one  is  in  command." 
It  is  easy  to  believe  that  the  position  of  the 
Governor-General  at  Khartoum  was  tlius  rendered 
extremely  difficult.  Suleiman  Pasha  Niazi,  who  is 
described  by  Colonel  Stewart  as  "a  miserable-look- 
ing old  man  of  seventy-four  or  seventy-five,"  was 
sent  up  in  nominal  command  of  the  troops,  with 
the  understanding  "that  he  was  to  defer  in  all 
things  to  his  subordinate  (General  Hicks),  who  was 
held  responsible  for  the  direction  of  all  prepara- 
tions and  operations."  In  addition  to  the  confusion 
caused  by  these  arrangements,  much  harm  resulted 
from  the  inveterate  habit,  which  was  at  that  time 
common  to  many  high  Egyptian  authorities,  of 
giving  orders  direct  to  subordinate  officials  over 
the  lieads  of  their  superiors.  After  mentioning 
a  flagrant  instance  of  this  sort,  Colonel  Stewart 
added  (January  26)  :  "  I  need  hardly  point  out 
how  deplorable  is  this  independent  action  of  the 
Khedive's.  Should  it  continue,  we  shall  not  alone 
have  all  the  authorities  here  quarrelling  with  each 
other,  but  it  will  be  also  quite  impossible  to  carry 
out  any  concerted  plan.  The  Khedive  must  entrust 
some  one  here  with  supreme  authority  (Dictator) 
and  then  leave  him  alone.  To  telegraph  what  he 
should  do  or  not  do,  or  to  correspond  with  his 
subordinates  over  his  head,  is  only  to  make  his 
position  quite  untenable,  and  to  insure  a  disastrous 
termination  to  the  campaign."  Colonel  StcAvart's 
letters  written  at  this  time,  are  full  of  complaints 
of  the  "backstairs  influence"  exerted  at  Cairo,  and 
of  the  "  unbusinesslike  interference  of  the  Cairo 
Government  in  Soudan  affairs."  "Until  matters," 
he  wrote  on  February  27,  "are  conducted  in  a 
businesslike,  straightforward,  and  honest  w^ay,  it  is 
hopeless  to  expect  any  amelioration  in  the  Soudan." 


CH.XIX      THE  HICKS  EXPEDITION         361 

The  difficulties  of  a  British  officer  suddenly 
thrust  into  the  middle  of  these  paltry  intrigues  can 
easily  be  imagined.  General  Hicks  soon  found  his 
position  intolerable.  Suleiman  Pasha  in  no  way 
considered  his  own  office  as  a  sinecure.  On  the 
contrary,  he  paid  no  attention  to  the  opinions 
expressed  by  General  Hicks.  At  last,  after  making 
a  series  of  complaints  to  which  little  attention  was 
paid.  General  Hicks  telegraphed,  on  July  16,  to 
Sir  Edward  Malet :  "  My  orders  and  arrangements 
here  are  quite  disregarded  ;  promises  are  made  that 
they  shall  be  carried  out,  but  nothing  whatever  is 
done.  Suleiman  Pasha  disregards  them  altogether. 
It  is  useless  to  keep  me  here  under  these  condi- 
tions, and  it  is  a  position  which  I  cannot  hold.  I 
beg  you  will  have  me  recalled."  This  telegram 
brought  matters  to  a  crisis.  General  Hicks  was 
appointed  Commander-in-Chief  in  the  Soudan  with 
the  rank  of  General  of  Division.  Suleiman  Pasha 
was  recalled  from  Khartoum,  but  any  good  effect, 
which  might  otherwise  have  been  produced  by  this 
measure,  was  marred  owing  to  his  being  at  once 
named  Governor  of  the  Eastern  Soudan.  His 
new  appointment.  General  Hicks  telegraphed,  was 
"  looked  upon  as  promotion." 

In  view  of  the  intrigues  which  surrounded 
General  Hicks,  of  the  wretched  material  of  which 
his  army  was  composed,  and  of  the  fact  that  the 
Egyptian  Government  could  not  comply  with  his 
requests  for  men  and  money,  it  is  scarcely  conceiv- 
able that  he  should  have  been  confident  of  success. 
But  he  seems  to  have  underrated  the  difficulties  of 
the  task  which  lay  before  him.  He  was  perhaps 
unduly  elated  at  some,  trifiing  successes  gained 
during  the  early  stages  of  the  rebellion  over  the 
forces  of  the  Mahdi.  He  thought  (June  23) 
that  as  he  advanced,  the  tribes,  though  "afraid 
of    commencing    hostilities    against    the    Mahdi, 


362  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

would  join  him  as  camp-followers.*'  It  does 
not  appear  that  at  any  time  General  Hicks 
was  definitely  asked  by  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment to  state  his  views  as  to  the  wisdom  of 
undertaking  the  expedition,  though  it  might  have 
been  supposed  that  ordinary  prudence  would  have 
dictated  the  necessity  of  obtaining,  in  official  form, 
a  very  distinct  expression  of  his  opinion  on  this 
momentous  question.  But  on  June  18,  that  is  to 
say  about  three  months  before  he  started  into 
the  Kordofan  desert,  he  telegraphed  to  General 
Valentine  Baker,  who  was  at  the  time  at  the  head 
of  the  Egyptian  Police :  "  In  my  telegram  of  the 
3rd  of  June  to  Malet,  I  pointed  out  what  I  thought 
was  necessary  to  ensure  success  in  Kordofan  and 
guard  against  all  possible  eventualities.^  At  the 
same  time  I  am  prepared  to  undertake  the  campaign 
with  the  force  available ;  the  risks  are,  as  I  have 
said,  in  case  of  a  mishap,  but  I  think  this  is  not 
at  all  probable.  Khartoum  ought  to  be  safe  from 
outside  under  any  circumstances." 

Looking  to  the  terms  of  this  telegram,  it  is 
not  difficult  to  judge  of  General  Hicks's  frame  of 
mind.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  expeditionary 
force,  as  it  eventually  started,  was  below  the 
strength  which  he  recommended,  and  that  the 
material  of  which  the  army  was  composed  was  of 
the  worst  possible  description,  it  can  scarcely  be 
conceived    that   he   felt   sanguine    of  success.     It 

*  The  telegram  to  which  allusion  is  here  made  runs  as  follows  : 
*'Tlie  force  we  have  is  not  nearly  sufficient  to  undertake  the  Kordofan 
campaign.  ...  It  should  be  10^000  men.  What  number  of  men  will 
it  be  possible  for  the  (iovernment  to  send  me  in  augmentation .''  When 
we  consider  that  a  defeat  miglit  mean  not  only  the  loss  of  Darfour  and 
Kordofan,  but  also  of  Sennar,  and  possibly  Kliartoum,  I  think  no  risk 
should  be  run."  It  was  this  telegram  which  elicited  the  opinion 
expressed  by  Sir  Edward  Malet  {ade  ante,  p.  359)  that  General  Hicka 
should  confine  his  operations  to  the  country  lying  between  the  Blue 
and  ^Vhite  Niles.  But  the  telegram  was  sent  on  to  Chcrif  Pasha  "  with- 
out comment  or  expression  of  opinion."  The  natural  result  ensued. 
General  Hicks's  weighty  opinions  were  never  properly  considered. 


CH.XIX      THE  HICKS  EXPEDITION         363 

may  be  surmised  that  his  qualified  expression  of 
willingness  to  undertake  the  campaign  was  in- 
spired, not  so  much  by  any  heartfelt  confidence  of 
success  based  on  a  full  consideration  of  the  whole 
of  the  facts,  as  by  the  reluctance  naturally  felt 
by  a  gallant  soldier  to  appear  to  shrink  from  a 
dangerous  undertaking. 

The  truth  is  that  the  decision  in  this  matter 
should  not  have  been  left  to  General  Hicks.  It 
was  from  no  fault  of  their  own  that  the  Govern- 
ment which  then  existed  at  Cairo  were  power- 
less to  provide  the  resources,  whether  in  men  or 
money,  which  were  necessary  in  order  to  suppress 
the  rebellion.  The  helplessness  of  the  Khedive's 
Government  was  the  result  of  the  misgovernment 
of  the  Khedive's  predecessor.  But  it  behoved  the 
Egyptian  Ministers  to  look  the  facts  with  which 
they  had  to  deal  fairly  in  the  face,  and  to  bring  the 
objects,  which  they  sought  to  attain,  into  harmony 
with  the  means  which  they  possessed  for  attaining 
them.  They  did  nothing  of  the  sort.  They  drifted 
on,  until  at  last  they  brought  on  their  heads  a 
catastrophe,  which  involved  the  collapse  of  Egyp- 
tian authority  over  the  whole  of  the  Soudan. 

There  was  only  one  method  by  which  the 
realities  of  the  situation  might  have  been  brought 
home  to  the  minds  of  the  Khedive  and  his 
Ministers.  The  British  Government  should  have 
insisted  on  the  adoption  of  a  rational  and  practicable 
policy.  Unfortunately,  they  abstained  from  all 
interference.  They  appear,  indeed,  to  have  seen 
that  the  wisest  plan  for  the  Egyptian  Government 
would  have  been  to  stand  on  the  defensive  at 
Khartoum.  But  they  did  nothing  to  enforce  this 
view. 

The  British  Government  had,  in  fact,  been  led 
much  against  their  will  into  the  occupation  of 
Egypt.     They  were  now  fearful  that  they  might 


364  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  m 

unconsciously  drift  into  military  intervention  in 
the  Soudan.  Lord  Granville  was  determined  to 
guard  against  this  danger.  He  refused  to  have 
anything  to  say  to  Soudan  matters.  The  fact  that 
General  Hicks's  telegrams  were  sent  to  the  various 
Egyptian  authorities  through  Sir  Edward  Malet 
roused  him  to  a  sense  of  danger.  He  thought  that 
the  British  representative,  by  allowing  himself  to 
become  the  medium  of  communication  between 
Cairo  and  Khartoum,  might  involve  his  Govern- 
ment in  some  degree  of  responsibility.  On  May  7, 
Lord  Granville,  therefore,  telegraphed  to  Mr. 
Cartwright,  who  temporarily  occupied  Sir  Edward 
Malet's  place:  "Her  Majesty's  Government  are 
in  no  w^ay  responsible  for  the  operations  in  the 
Soudan,  which  have  been  undertaken  under  the 
authority  of  the  Egyptian  Government,  or  for  the 
appointment  or  actions  of  General  Hicks."  This 
disclaimer  of  responsibility  was  repeated  in  a  letter 
addressed  by  Sir  Edward  Malet  to  Cherif  Pasha 
on  May  22,  when  forwarding  another  telegram 
addressed  by  General  Hicks  to  Lord  Dufferin. 
"In  this  particular  instance,"  Sir  Edward  said,  "I 
desire  to  guard  against  any  supposition  on  the  part 
of  Your  Excellency  that  my  sending  a  copy  of 
the  telegram  to  Your  Excellency  indicates  any 
expression  of  opinion  with  regard  to  the  recom- 
mendations contained  in  it." 

A  little  later,  Lord  Granville  was  again  alarmed 
at  the  continuance  of  communication  between  Sir 
Edward  Malet  and  General  Hicks.  On  August  8, 
he  wrote  to  Sir  Edward  Malet:  "It  appears  that 
General  Hicks  continues  to  communicate  with  you 
respecting  the  financial  difficulties  which  he  meets 
with  in  the  Soudan,  under  the  impression  that 
you  will  exert  your  influence  with  the  Egyptian 
Government  to  induce  them  to  give  favourable 
consideration  to  his  wishes.     I  need  not  remind 


CH.XIX       THE  HICKS  EXPEDITION         365 

you  that  Her  JNIajesty's  Government  assume  no 
responsibility  whatever  in  regard  to  the  conduct 
of  affairs  in  the  Soudan,  and  it  is  desirable  that 
General  Hicks  should  understand  that,  although 
they  are  glad  to  receive  information  as  to  the 
progress  of  the  campaign,  it  is  their  policy  to 
abstain  as  much  as  possible  from  interference  with 
the  action  of  the  Egyptian  Government  in  that 
quarter."  Sir  Edward  Malet  informed  Lord 
Granville  that  his  action  had  been  in  strict  con- 
formity with  the  instructions  he  had  received  on 
this  subject.  He  took  steps,  also,  to  render  the 
position  clear  to  General  Hicks.  On  August  18, 
he  telegraphed  to  General  Hicks  :  "  I  congratulate 
you  on  your  appointment  as  Commander-in-Chief 
and  General  of  Division.  The  act  is  spontaneous 
on  the  part  of  the  Egyptian  Government,  for 
although  I  am  ready  to  transmit  to  them  tele- 
grams that  come  from  you,  I  am  debarred  by 
my  instructions  from  giving  advice  with  regard 
to  action  on  them,  the  policy  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government  being  to  abstain  as  much  as  possible 
from  interference  with  the  action  of  the  Egyptian 
Government  in  the  Soudan." 

The  objections  to  British  military  intervention 
were  obvious,  neither  was  the  danger  against  which 
Lord  Granville  sought  to  guard  imaginary.  It 
might  well  have  happened  that,  almost  before  the 
Government  were  aware  of  it,  they  might  have 
found  themselves  in  a  situation  which  would  have 
obliged  them  to  assert  their  authority  by  force  of 
arms  in  the  Soudan.  The  history  of  the  rise  of 
Uiitish  power  in  the  East  served  as  a  warning  that 
one  forward  step  in  the  direction  of  territorial 
extension  often  leads  to  another,  until  at  last  a 
goal  is  reached  far  more  distant  than  any  which 
was  originally  contemplated.  IVIoreover,  when 
once  a  question,  such  as  the  state  of  the  Soudan, 


366  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  iii 

becomes  a  matter  for  public  discussion  in  England, 
there  are  not  wanting  many  who,  partly  from  the 
love  of  adventure  natural  to  most  Englishmen, 
partly  from  a  keen  sense  of  the  benefits  which 
would  be  conferred  locally  by  British  interference, 
and  partly  from  a  great,  perhaps  an  exaggerated 
idea  of  England's  mission  as  a  civilising  agent  in 
the  world,  are  prone  to  push  on  the  Government 
to  action  without  sufficient  consideration  of  the 
ultimate  consequences  of  their  proposals.  Under 
these  circumstances,  it  behoved  a  wise  statesman  to 
move  cautiously.  Nevertheless,  looking  back  over 
the  course  of  events  as  we  now  know  them,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  the  line  of  action  which  Lord 
Granville  adopted  was  very  unfortunate.  It  is  to 
be  regretted  that  he  did  not  by  timely  interference 
save  the  Egyptian  Government  from  the  conse- 
quences of  their  own  want  of  foresight.  Had  he, 
acting  on  the  views  expressed  by  the  various 
British  authorities  in  Egypt,  stepped  in  and  for- 
bidden the  desi)atch  of  the  Hicks  expedition  to 
Kordofan,  not  only  would  thousands  of  lives  and 
the  large  sums  of  money,  which  were  subsequently 
squandered,  have  been  saved,  but  he  would  have 
deserved  the  gratitude  of  the  Egyptian  people,  and 
would  have  saved  his  own  country  from  that  inter- 
ference which  he  so  much  dreaded,  and  which  was 
eventually  precipitated  by  the  negative  policy 
adopted  in  the  early  stage  of  the  ])roceedings. 
Lord  Granville  appears  to  have  thought  that  he 
effectually  threw  off  all  responsibility  by  declaring 
that  he  was  not  responsible.  There  could  not  have 
been  a  greater  error.  The  responsibility  of  the 
British  Government  for  the  general  conduct  of 
aflairs  in  Egypt  did  not  depend  on  a  few  phrases 
thrown  into  a  des])atch  and  subsequently  published 
in  a  parliamentary  paper.  It  was  based  on  the 
facts  that  the  British  Government  were  in  military 


CH.X1X       THE  HICKS  EXPEDITION         367 

occupation  of  the  country,  that  the  weakness  and 
inefficiency  of  the  native  rulers  were  notorious,  and 
tluit  the  civiHsed  world  fixed  on  England  a  respon- 
sibility which  it  was  impossible  to  shake  off  so 
long  as  the  occupation  lasted.  "Those,"  Lord 
Salisbury  said  in  the  House  of  Lords  (February  12, 
1884),  "  who  have  the  absolute  power  of  preventing 
lamentable  events,  and  knowing  what  is  taking 
place,  refuse  to  exercise  that  power,  are  responsible 
for  what  happens."  Lord  Granville  failed  to  see 
this.  Instead  of  recognising  the  facts  of  the 
situation,  he  took  shelter  behind  an  illusory 
abnegation  of  responsibility,  which  was  a  mere 
phantasm  of  the  diplomatic  and  parliamentary 
mind.  The  result  was  that  the  facts  asserted 
themselves  in  defiance  of  diplomacy  and  parlia- 
mentary convenience. 

It  may,  however,  be  urged  in  defence  of  the 
policy  adopted  by  Lord  Granville  that  he  does 
not  appear  to  have  received  sufficient  warning  of 
the  possible,  and,  indeed,  probable  consequences 
of  inaction.  What  was  most  of  all  required  was 
that  an  alarm-bell  should  be  rung  to  rouse  the 
British  Government  from  its  lethargy,  and  show 
that  the  consequences  of  inaction  might  be  more 
serious  than  those  of  action.^  But  no  sufficient 
warning  appears  to  have  been  given.  The  result 
was  that  the  Egyptian  Governm,ent  blundered  on 
headlong  to  their  own  destruction,  and  that  the 
British  Government,  like  the  frail  beauty  of 
Byron's  poem,  whilst  vowing  that  they  would  ne'er 
consent  to  a  policy  of  intervention  in  the  Soudan, 
consented  but  a  short  time  afterwards  to  a  degree 

•  "  I  am  not  of  the  opiiiiou  of  those  gentlemen  who  are  against 
disturbing  the  public  repose  ;  I  like  a  clamour  when  there  is  an 
aliuse.  The  fire-bell  at  midnight  disturbs  your  sleep,  but  it  keeps  you 
from  being  burned  in  your  bed.  The  liue-and-cry  ahirnis  the  country, 
but  it  preserves  all  the  property  of  the  province." — Burke's  Speech  on 
the  Prosecution  for  Libels. 


368  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iii 

of  intervention  far  greater  than  would  have  been 
necessary  had  the  true  facts  of  the  situation  been 
hi  the  first  instance  recognised. 

On  Septen.ber  8,  1883,  that  is  to  say,  three  days 
before  my  arrival  in  Egypt,  General  Hicks  started 
on  the  expedition,  which  was  to  terminate  in  so 
disastrous  a  manner.  At  Cairo,  news  from  the 
Soudan  was  anxiously  awaited,  but  no  one  con- 
templated the  possibility  of  the  disaster  which 
shortly  ensued.  I  remember  speaking  to  Cherif 
Pasha  as  to  the  desirability  of  giving  up  the 
outlying  provinces  of  the  Soudan.  He  was  not 
disinclined  to  give  up  Darfour ;  on  the  other  hand, 
he  held  strongly  to  Kordofan.  But,  he  added, 
with  the  light-heartedness  characteristic  of  a  Galli- 
cised  Egyptian,  "  Nous  en  causerons  plus  tard ; 
d'abord  nous  allons  donner  une  bonne  raclee  a  ce 
monsieur  "  {i.e.  the  INlahdi).^ 

Cherif  Pasha  was  soon  undeceived.  On  No- 
vember 22,  news  reached  Cairo  that  on  the  5th 
General  Hicks's  army  had  been  totally  destroyed. 
'*  Hardly  anythmg  was  known  of  the  country 
into  which  the  army  was  venturing,  beyond  the 
fact  that  it  was  the  driest  in  the  Soudan."  The 
last  communication  received  from  General  Hicks 
spoke  of  the  want  of  water  and  of  the  intense 
heat.  The  final  catastrophe  is  described  by  Colonel 
Colville  in  the  following  words  :  "  On  advancing  to 
Kasghil,  the  army  was  led  astray  by  the  guides, 
who  were  Mahdi's  men,  and  who,  when  they  were 
sure  that  it  was  thoroughly  lost  in  the  bush, 
deserted    it.       After   wandering    three    days    and 

1  On  January  4,  1884,  Sir  Charles  W.  Wilson  wrote:  "When 
Hicks  Pasha  left  Cairo,  it  was  not  intended  that  he  should  do  more 
than  clear  Senuar  of  rebel  bauds,  a  work  he  accomplished  with  ease, 
and  protect  Khartoum.  It  is  useless  to  inquire  what  madness  made 
the  Egyptian  Government  order  Hicks  Pasha  to  attempt  the  reconquest 
of  K()i(iof;in  ;  it  was  a  hazardous  operation,  and  with  the  troops 
employed,  of  whom  Colonel  Stewart  has  given  a  faithful  picture, 
disaster  was  an  almost  foregone  conclusion." 


CH.  XIX      THE  HICKS  EXPEDITION         369 

nights  without  water,  they  came  upon  a  force 
of  the  enemy  near  Kasghil.  But  many  hundreds 
had  already  died  from  thirst,  and  the  remainder 
were  too  feeble  to  olier  any  determined  resistance, 
and  were  soon  despatched  by  the  enemy.  A 
brilliant  charge  was  made  by  Hicks  Pasha  and 
his  staff,  who  all  died  fighting  like  men."  ^ 

It  was  not  until  twenty- two  years  later  that 
the  site  of  the  Hicks  disaster  was  visited  by  any 
European.  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  went  over  the 
ground  in  the  course  of  a  tour  through  Kordofan 
during  the  winter  of  1905-6.  He  recorded  his 
impressions  in  the  following  words  : — 

I  visited  the  battlefield  where  the  late  General  Hicks 
Pasha  and  his  force  were  almost  entirely  annihilated  by  the 
Dervish  hordes  in  1883,  despite  the  fact  that  within  a  mile 
of  the  spot  where  the  thirst-stricken  troops  were  overwhelmed 
was  a  large  pool  of  water,  of  which  they  were  apparently 
in  complete  ignorance.  The  locality  is  in  the  depths  of  a 
huge  forest  some  thirty  miles  south  of  El  Obeid,  and  I  have 
no  hesitation  in  hazarding  the  opinion  that,  had  the  efforts 
to  relieve  El  Obeid  been  conducted  by  a  far  more  numerous 
and  efficient  force,  the  result  would  have  been  the  same.  It 
is  abundantly  evident  that  the  Government  of  that  period 
neither  realised  the  situation  nor  appreciated  the  enormous 
difficulties  attendant  on  the  movement  of  a  large  force 
through  such  country ;  the  dispatch  of  the  expedition, 
under  the  circumstances,  can  only  be  characterised  as  an 
act  of  extreme  folly. 

Thus,  the  whole  edifice  of  territorial  aggrandise- 
ment in  Africa,  which  Ismail  Pasha  and  ids  pre- 
decessors, in  an  evil  moment  for  their  country,  had 
planned,  toppled  to  the  ground.  It  was  built  on 
no  sure  foundation.  The  power  gained  by  semi- 
civilised  skill  over  the  wild  tribes  of  the  Soudan 
had  been  grossly  misused.  Slave-hunting  Pashas, 
and   corrupt   and  extortionate  tax-collectors,   had 

*  History  of  the  Soudan  Campaign ,  p.  16. 
VOL.  I  2  B 


370  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

rendered  the  name  of  Egypt  hateful  to  tlie  people. 
A  despotism,  which  is  neither  strong  nor  beneficent, 
must  perforce  fall  directly  it  is  exposed  to  serious 
attack.  The  bubble  Government  established  by 
Ismail  Pasha  and  his  predecessors  in  the  Soudan 
collapsed  directly  it  was  pricked  by  the  religious 
im])ostor  who  was  now  to  rule  the  country,  neither 
amongst  the  population  whose  fate  was  at  stake  in 
the  combat  was  a  voice  raised  or  a  sword  drawn 
to  avert  its  downfall. 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE  ABANDONMENT  OF  THE  SOUDAN 

November  1883-January  1884 

My  position — I  press  the  British  Goveiument  to  depart  from  a  passive 
attitude  —  Lord  Granville's  reply  —  The  Egyptian  Government 
decide  to  hold  Khartoum  —  Colonel  Coetlogon  recommends  a 
retreat  on  Berber — Opinions  of  the  military  authorities  at  Cairo 
— The  Egyptian  Government  wish  to  invoke  the  aid  of  the 
Sultan  —  The  British  Government  recommend  withdrawal  from 
tlie  Soudan — The  Egyptian  Ministers  resign — Nubar  Pasha  takes 
office — Observations  on  the  policy  of  withdrawal  from  the  Soudan. 

I  HAVE  SO  far  been  dealing  with  a  period  of 
Egyptian  history  during  which  I  either  played 
a  subordinate  part,  or  was  in  no  way  connected 
with  Egypt.  I  have  occasionally  criticised  tlie 
acts  of  those  who  were  responsible  for  the  conduct 
of  Egyptian  affairs  at  this  time.  I  now  reach 
another  period.  It  would  be  false  modesty  not 
to  recognise  that  from  this  time  forward  I  was 
myself  one  of  the  principal  actors  on  the  Egyptian 
stage,  not,  of  course,  to  the  extent  of  being  re- 
sponsible for  the  general  policy  of  the  Britisli 
Government,  but  rather  to  the  extent  of  being 
mainly  responsible  for  the  management  of  local 
affairs  in  Egypt.  This  latter  responsibility  1 
accept,  only  begging  that  it  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  my  action  had  of  necessity  to  conform 
itself  to  the  lines  of  general  policy  adopted  in 
London. 

Durhig    the    period    when    I    represented    the 

371 


372  JNIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

British  Government  in  Egypt,  Egyptian  affiiirs 
frequently  formed  the  subject  of  pubUc  discussion. 
jNIy  own  conduct  was  at  times  sharply  criticised. 
Any  3ne  engaged  in  English  public  life  must 
expect  at  times  to  receive  some  hard  knocks.  I 
believe  I  know,  perhaps  better  than  any  one  else, 
the  mistakes  which  I  committed,  and  I  shaU  use 
my  best  endeavours  to  deal  with  them  at  least  as 
unsparingly  as  I  have  dealt  with  what  appear  to 
me  to  be  the  mistakes  of  others.  Se  judice^  nemo 
nocens  absolvitur. 

The  first  step  of  any  importance  taken  in 
connection  with  Soudan  affairs  after  my  arrival 
in  Egypt  was  on  November  19,  1883,  on  which 
day  I  sent  the  following  telegram  to  Lord 
Granville:  "The  position  of  affairs  in  the  Soudan 
is  becoming  very  serious.  .  .  .  Nothing  definite 
has  been  heard  of  Hicks  since  September  27. 
He  only  had  provisions  for  two  months.  The 
Egyptian  Government  are  very  anxious,  and  evi- 
dently anticipate  bad  news.  Giegler  Pasha,  who 
was  with  Gordon  in  the  Soudan,  and  whom  I 
saw  to-day,  says  that  if  Hicks  is  beaten,  Khartoum 
will  probably  fall.  In  fact,  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment have  no  money,  and  excepting  Wood's  and 
Baker's  forces,^  they  have  sent  almost  their  last 
available  man  to  the  Soudan.  If  Hicks's  army  is 
destroyed,  I  have  little  doubt  that,  unless  they  get 
assistance  from  outside,  they  will  lose  the  whole  of 
the  Soudan.  Neither,  if  once  they  begin  to  fall 
back,  is  it  easy  to  say  where  along  the  valley  of 
the  Nile  they  could  arrest  the  rebel  movement. 
From  some  observations  which  Cherif  Pasha  let 
dro])  to  me  this  morning,  I  think  it  not  at  all 
im])r<)l)able  that  before  long  he  will  ask  for  the 
assistance  of  English  or  Indian  troops.     He  said 

•  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  commanded  the  Egyptian  ai*my  then  in  course 
of  tonnation.     General  Valentine  Baker  commanded  the  Gendarmerie. 


CH.  XX  THE  SOUDAN  373 

to  me,  *I  suppose  Her  Majesty's  Government 
would  not  like  to  see  Turks  intervene  in  the 
Soudan?'  Shall  I  be  right  in  telling  him,  if  the 
occasion  arises,  that  under  no  circumstances  must 
he  look  for  the  assistance  of  British  or  Indian 
troops  in  the  Soudan  ?  As  regards  Turkish 
assistance,  I  should  be  glad  to  receive  instructions 
as  to  the  attitude  I  am  to  adopt.  It  is  a  question 
which  course  the  Egyptian  Government  would 
dislike  most — to  call  in  the  Turks,  or  to  abandon 
the  Soudan.  My  own  opinion  is  that,  if  Hicks  be 
beaten,  the  wisest  course  for  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment to  adopt  is  to  accept  defeat  and  fall  back 
on  whatever  point  on  the  Nile  they  can  hold  with 
confidence,  although  the  adoption  of  this  course 
would  certainly  give  a  great  impulse  to  the  Slave 
Trade.  But  it  will  not  be  easy  to  persuade  them 
of  this.  Turkish  intervention  would,  I  think,  be 
most  undesirable.  ...  I  may  now,  at  any  moment, 
be  forced  to  discuss  these  Soudan  affairs  with 
Cherif  Pasha,  and  it  is,  therefore,  desirable  that  I 
should  receive  some  indications  of  Your  Lordship's 
views.  It  will  be  very  difficult,  under  the  circum- 
stances, to  maintain  a  purely  passive  attitude,  and 
to  give  no  advice  whatsoever." 

To  this  telegram  Lord  Granville  replied,  on 
November  20,  in  the  following  words :  "  We 
cannot  lend  English  or  Indian  troops.  ...  It 
would  not  be  for  the  advantage  of  Egypt  to  invite 
Turkish  troops  into  the  Soudan.  If  consulted, 
recommend  the  abandonment  of  the  Soudan  within 
certain  limits." 

The  principal  object  which  I  had  in  view  in 
sending  my  telegram  of  November  19  was  to 
draw  the  British  Government  out  of  the  passive 
attitude  which  they  had  hitherto  adopted.  A 
short  residence  in  the  country  had  been  sufficient 
to  convince  me  that  it  was  neither  possible  nor 


374  JMODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

desirable  to  leave  the  Egyptian  Government  to 
manage  Soudan  affairs  without  any  advice  or 
assistance.^  My  object  had  been  attained.  It 
is  true  that  I  was  instructed  only  to  give 
advice  "  if  consulted,"  but  as  I  was  sure  to  be 
consulted,  the  reserve  placed  on  my  action  did 
not  practically  hamper  me.  I  had  obtained  a 
definite  expression  of  opinion  as  to  the  Soudan 
])olicy  which  commended  itself  to  the  British 
Government  in  the  event  of  a  disaster  happening 
to  General  Hicks's  army.  They  would  not  afford 
military  aid  to  reconquer  the  Soudan ;  they  were 
also  averse  to  the  employment  of  Turkish  troops. 
Under  these  circumstances,  the  only  possible 
course  to  pursue  would  be  to  abandon  the  Soudan 
within  certain  limits.  This  is  the  policy  which, 
as  has  been  already  mentioned,  commended  itself 
to  Lord  Dufferin,  Sir  Edward  ]\'alet,  and  Colonel 
Stewart ;  but  the  telegram  which  I  sent  on 
November  19,  was,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  the  first 
occasion  upon  which  the  British  Government  were 
strongly  pressed  to  express  a  decided  opinion  on  the 
subject.  I  consider  myself,  therefore,  largely  respon- 
sible for  initiating  the  policy  of  withdrawal  from 
the  Soudan.  On  5lr.  Gladstone's  Government  rests 
the  responsibility  of  approving  that  policy. 

So  early  as  November  18,  a  report  reached 
Cairo  that  General  Hicks's  army  was  surrounded 
and  in  want   of  provisions.     But  it  was  not  till 

*  On  November  22,  I  wrote  privately  to  Lord  Granville  :  "  I  fully 
understand  the  policy  of  the  Government,  which  is  not  to  be  drawn 
into  affairs  in  the  Soudan.  I  see  no  reason  why  this  policy  should  not 
be  carried  out.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  quite  impossible  to  separate 
the  Egyptian  question  from  the  Soudan  question  altogether."  In 
anotlier  letter,  dated  December  23,  I  said  :  "  The  separation  of  tlie 
Soudan  question  from  the  question  of  Egypt  proper  was  always  well- 
nigh  impossible  on  financial  grounds.  Now,  it  has  become  quite 
impossible.  1  think  tlie  policy  of  complete  abandonment  is,  on  the 
whole,  the  be*t  of  wliich  the  circumstances  admit ;  but  I  am  not  sure  if 
the  extreme  difficulty  of  carrying  it  out,  or  the  consequences  to  which 
it  must  almost  inevitably  lead,  are  fully  appreciated  at  home." 


cH.xx  THE   SOUDAN  375 

the  22nd  that  intelligence  was  received  of  the 
destruction  of  the  army. 

I  did  not  at  once  press  any  advice  on  the 
Egyptian  Government.  In  the  first  place,  contra- 
dictory reports  continued  to  be  received  regarding 
the  fate  of  General  Hicks's  army,  and,  indeed,  some 
weeks  elapsed  before  all  doubts  as  to  the  occur- 
rence of  the  disaster  were  removed.  In  the 
second  place,  it  was  necessary  to  consult  the 
military  authorities,  who  naturally  required  time 
to  study  the  facts  of  the  case  before  expressing  any 
opinion  as  to  the  course  to  be  adopted.  In  the 
third  place,  I  wished  to  give  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment time  in  order  to  see  whether  they  would  be 
able  to  devise  any  practicable  policy  of  their  own. 

The  first  decision  at  which  the  Egyptian 
Government  arrived  was  "to  try  and  hold  Khar- 
toum, and  to  reopen  the  route  between  Suakin 
and  Berber."  In  reporting  this  decision  to  Lord 
Granville,  on  November  23,  I  said  that  "accord- 
ing to  several  telegrams  received  from  Khartoum, 
there  appeared  to  be  a  general  opinion  on  the  spot 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  hold  the  town,  and 
that  it  would  be  necessary  to  fall  back  on  Berber." 

On  November  26,  Colonel  Coetlogon,  an  officer 
of  General  Hicks's  army  who  had  remained  at 
Khartoum,  telegraphed  to  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  in 
the  following  terms:  "I  think  it  right  to  let  you 
know  the  situation.  Khartoum  and  Sennar  cannot 
be  held.  In  two  months'  time,  there  will  be  no 
food.  All  supplies  are  cut  off.  To  save  what 
remains  of  the  army  in  the  Soudan,  a  retreat  on 
Berber  should  be  made  at  once,  and,  by  a  combined 
movement  from  Berber  and  Suakin,  that  route 
should  be  opened.  Reinforcements  arriving  could 
not  reach  Khartoum  except  by  land,  and  for  that  a 
very  large  force  is  necessary.  .  .  .  The  troops  that 
are  left  are  the  refuse  of  the  army,  mostly  old  and 


376  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

blind.  Again  I  say,  the  only  way  of  saving  what 
remains  is  to  attempt  a  general  retreat  on  Berber, 
This  is  the  real  state  of  affairs  here,  and  1  beg  of 
you  to  impress  it  on  His  Highness  the  Kliedive." 

By  December  3,  I  had  obtained  the  views  of 
the  principal  British  military  authorities  in  Cairo, 
and  I  was  able  to  report  to  Lord  Granville  on  the 
situation.  *'  The  most  important  question  for 
the  moment,"  I  said,  "is  to  know  whether  the 
Egyptian  Government  will  be  able  to  maintain 
themselves  at  Khartoum.  I  have  had  the  advan- 
tage of  fully  discussing  this  question  with  General 
Stephenson,  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  and  General  Baker.^ 
All  these  high  military  authorities  are  of  one 
opinion.  They  consider  that,  if  the  INIahdi 
advances,  it  will  be  impossible  for  the  Egyptian 
Government  to  hold  Khartoum,  I  mean,  of  course, 
with  any  forces  of  which  they  now  dispose,  or  are 
likely  to  dispose.  I  leave  out  of  account  the  con- 
tingency of  despatching  forces  to  Khartoum 
belonging  either  to  Her  JNlajesty  the  Queen  or 
His  Imperial  JNlajesty  the  Sultan.  Your  Lordship 
has  informed  me  that  Her  Majesty's  Government 
are  not  prepared  to  send  English  or  Indian  troops 
to  the  Soudan.     I  will  not  now  attempt  to  discuss 

*  Sir  Frederick  Stephenson  then  commanded  the  British  army  of 
occupation.  General  Baker  left  for  Suakin  durine^  the  course  of  these 
discussions.  He  did  not  see  my  despatch  before  he  left  Cairo.  I, 
therefore,  wrote  to  him  with  a  view  to  ascertaininj?  whetlier  I  had 
riijhtly  interpreted  the  opinions  whicli  he  liad  expressed  to  me  verbally. 
He  replied  on  January  7,  1884,  in  tlie  following  terms:  "  1.  I  did  not 
believe  tliat,  witliout  the  aid  of  e.xterior  power,  Egypt  could  reconquer 
or  hold  tlie  Soudan.  2.  1  believed  tliat  tlie  loss  of  tlie  Soudan  would 
be  a  disastrous  blow  to  Egypt,  and  that  the  e.xpenditure  necessary  for 
the  defence  of  Egypt  proper  would  be  ruinous  to  her  financially  in  the 
future,  and  far  in  excess  of  the  sum  which  tlie  Soudan  liad  cost  in  the 
past.  3.  I  tliouglit  it  necessary  that  both  England  and  Egypt  should 
immediately  adopt  a  definite  policy,  and  that  the  latter  should  prepare 
to  witlidraw  from  tlie  Soudan,  unless  England  could  afl'ord  such  aid  ag 
would  enable  her  to  recover  it  and  hold  it."  This,  of  course,  really 
meant  that  General  Baker  wished  the  British  Government  to  undertake 
the  recouquest  of  the  Soudan, 


CH.XX  THE  SOUDAN  377 

the  possible  contingency  of  troops  belonging  to 
His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan  being  sent  to  the 
Soudan.  The  adoption  of  this  last-named  measure 
involves  serious  political  considerations,  which  I 
must  leave  to  the  appreciation  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government. 

"The  reasons  which  have  led  General  Stephen- 
son, Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  and  General  Baker  to  tlie 
conclusions  that,  if  the  Mahdi  advances,  it  will  be 
impossible  for  the  Egyptian  Government  to  hold 
Khartoum  are  that  the  garrison  is  demoralised, 
that  they  have  little  or  no  confidence  in  the  fight- 
ing qualities  of  the  soldiers,  tliat  the  Egyptian 
Government  have  no  adequate  reinforcements  to 
send,  and  that  the  difficulty  of  provisioning  the 
place,  whether  from  the  north  or  the  south,  is  very 
great,  as  are  also  the  difficulties  of  maintaining  a 
line  of  communications.  It  is  also  very  doubtful 
whether  General  Baker  will  be  able  by  force  to 
open  up  the  Suakin-Berber  route.^  .  .  .  General 
Stephenson  and  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  are  of  opinion 
that  if  the  Egyptian  Government  be  left  to  rely 
exclusively  on  their  own  resources,  and  the  Mahdi 
advances,  Khartoum  must  fall.  They  think  that 
an  endeavour  should  be  made  to  open  out  tiie 
Berber-Suakin  route,  not  because  the  mere  estab- 
lishment of  communication  between  those  two 
points  will  enable  the  Egyptian  Government,  with 
the  forces  at  their  disposal,  to  hold  Khartoum,  but 
because  the  success  of  General  Baker's  undertaking; 
will  afford  the  best  hope  of  retreat  to  the  garrisons 
of  Khartoum  and  the  immediate  neighbourhood. 

*'  If  Khartoum  is  abandoned,  they  think  that 
the  whole  valley  of  the  Nile  down  to  Wadi  Haifa 
or  thereabouts  will  probably  be  lost  to  the 
Egyptian  Government. 

^  General    Baker's   expedition   to   Suakin   will   be   described    in  a 
subsequent  chapter. 


378  JMODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

"I  have  dwelt  especially  on  the  opinions  of 
General  Stephenson  and  Sir  Evelyn  Wood, 
because,  as  they  have  seen  this  despatch,  I  am 
confident  that  I  am  riglitly  interpreting  their 
views.  I  may,  however,  add  that  I  have  gathered, 
in  communication  with  Baker  Pasha,  that  his 
views  on  the  military  situation  do  not  differ 
materially  from  those  of  General  Stephenson  and 
Sir  Evelyn  Wood. 

"My  own  views  on  the  points  which  I  have 
so  far  discussed  are,  relatively  speaking,  of  little 
value.  But  I  should  wish  to  say  that,  in  view  of 
the  facts  with  which  we  have  to  deal,  it  appears 
to  me  scarcely  possible  to  arrive  at  any  other 
conclusions  than  those  of  General  Stephenson  and 
Sir  Evelyn  W^ood.  Their  views  are  also  shared 
by  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd,^  who  has  been  present  at 
many  of  our  discussions. 

"  I  need  hardly  say  that  these  views  are,  not 
unnaturally,  very  unpalatable  to  the  Egyptian 
Government.  I  hardly  think  that  Ch^rif  Pasha 
believes  that  he  will  be  able  to  hold  Khartoum 
if  the  Mahdi  advances,  but  neither  he  nor  his 
colleagues  can  make  up  their  minds  to  aban- 
doning it." 

Whilst  this  despatch  was  on  its  way  to  London, 
daily  discussions  took  place  in  Cairo  about  the  policy 
which  was  to  be  pursued.  It  became  clearer  every 
day  that,  if  the  Egyptian  Government  were  left 
to  themselves,  they  would  never  decide  upon  any 
definite  and  practicable  policy.  On  December  10, 
I  sent  the  followiug  private  telegram  to  Lord  Gran- 
ville :  *'  I  have  not  telegraphed  for  fresh  instructions 
as  I  thought  it  useless  to  do  so  until  events  had  de- 
veloped somewhat,  and  I  had  something  definite  to 
recommend.     But  it  is  quite  clear  to  me  that  more 

*  Mr.   Clifford   Lloyd  had  been  sent  to   Egypt  to  reorganise   the 
Department  of  the  Interior. 


OH.  XX  THE  SOUDAN  379 

definite  instructions  must  shortly  be  sent  as  to  the 
attitude  of  Her  Majesty's  Government  and  as  to 
the  advice  to  be  given  to  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment. At  present,  they  are  drifting  on  without 
any  very  definite  or  practical  plan  of  action,  and 
will  continue  to  do  so  unless  they  are  told  what 
course  to  pursue."  This  was  followed,  on 
December  12,  by  an  official  telegram  in  which  I 
informed  Lord  Granville  that  Cherif  Pasha  had 
called  upon  me  and  informed  me  that  "  the  Khedive 
had  held  a  Council  of  Ministers  and  that  they  had 
resolved  to  place  themselves  absolutely  in  the  hands 
of  Her  Majesty's  Government."  The  Egyptian 
Government  thought  that  the  best  solution  of  the 
question  was  to  invite  the  aid  of  the  Sultan.  They 
wished  the  British  Govenmient  to  arrange  the  con- 
ditions under  which  Turkish  aid  would  be  afforded, 
the  principal  of  these  conditions  being  that  the 
Sultan's  troops  should  leave  the  country  when 
their  presence  was  no  longer  required.  Clierif 
Pasha  pointed  out  that  as  the  rebellion  in  the 
Soudan  was  a  religious  movement,  it  would  prob- 
ably gather  strength  if  British  or  Indian  troops 
were  employed. 

On  December  13,  I^ord  Granville  replied  in  the 
following  terms :  "  Her  Majesty's  Government 
have  no  intention  of  employing  British  or  Indian 
troops  in  the  Soudan.  Her  Majesty's  Government 
have  no  objection  to  offer  to  the  employment  of 
Turkish  troops,  provided  they  are  paid  by  the 
Turkish  Government,  and  that  such  employment 
be  restricted  exclusively  to  the  Soudan,  with  their 
base  at  Suakin.  Excepting  for  securing  the  safe 
retreat  of  the  garrisons  still  holding  positions  in 
the  Soudan,  Her  Majesty's  Government  cannot 
agree  to  increasing  the  burden  on  the  Egyptian 
revenues  by  expenditure  for  operations  which,  even 
if  successful,  and  this  is  not  probable,  would  be 


380  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

of  doubtful  advantage  to  Egypt.  Her  INIajesty's 
Goveriiiiieiit  recommend  the  Ministers  of  the 
Khedive  to  come  to  an  early  decision  to  abandon 
all  territory  south  of  xissouan,  or,  at  least,  of  Wadi 
Haifa.  They  will  be  prepared  to  assist  in  main- 
taining order  in  Egypt  proper,  and  in  defending  it, 
as  well  as  the  ports  of  the  Red  Sea." 

On  December  16,  I  informed  Lord  Granville 
that  I  had  communicated  to  Cherif  Pasha  the 
leading  features  of  the  policy  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment in  respect  to  Soudan  affairs.  Cherif  Pasha 
told  me  that  he  saw  considerable  objections  to  the 
abandonment  of  the  territory  south  of  Wadi  Haifa. 
He  promised  that  he  would  communicate  to  me 
a  written  Memorandum  on  the  subject.  On 
December  22,  Cherif  Pasha  gave  me  this  Memo- 
randum. The  Egyptian  Government,  it  was  said, 
"  cannot  agree  to  the  abandonment  of  territories 
which  they  consider  absolutely  necessary  for  tlie 
security,  and  even  for  the  existence,  of  Egypt 
itself."  Cherif  Pasha  reiterated  his  proposal  that 
Turkish  troops  should  be  sent  under  conditions  to 
be  negotiated  in  concert  with  the  British  Govern- 
ment. 

The  impression  left  on  my  mind  during  the 
course  of  these  discussions  was  that  the  Egyptian 
Government  were  only  half  in  earnest  in  tlieir  desire 
to  invoke  Turkish  aid.  My  belief  at  the  time  was 
that  they  wished  to  use  the  suggestion  about  the 
employment  of  Turkish  troops  as  an  instrument 
by  which  to  force  the  hand  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, and  oblige  the  latter  to  employ  British 
troops.  Moreover,  the  condition  laid  down  by 
the  British  Government  to  the  effect  that  the 
Ottoman  Treasury  should  bear  the  cost  of  the 
expedition,  was  practically  prohibitive.  In  tele- 
graphing the  substance  of  Cherif  Pasha's  note  to 
Lord  Granville,  I,  therefore,  added  the  following 


cH.  XX  THE  SOUDAN  381 

remarks :  "  If  negotiations  are  commenced  with 
tlie  Porte  on  the  basis  of  tlie  latter  paying,  they 
are,  I  conceive,  ahiiost  certain  to  fail.  I  believe 
that  the  policy  recommended  by  Her  Majesty's 
Government  is,  on  the  whole,  the  best  of  which 
the  very  difficult  circumstances  admit.  .  .  .  No 
amount  of  argument  or  persuasion  will  make  the 
present  Ministry  adopt  the  policy  of  abandonment. 
The  only  way  in  which  it  can  be  carried  out  is  for 
me  to  inform  the  Khedive  that  Her  Majesty's 
Government  insist  on  its  adoption,  and  that  if  the 
present  Ministers  will  not  carry  it  out,  he  must 
name  others  who  will  do  so.  Further,  I  am  not 
sure  that  any  Egyptian  Ministers  can  be  found  who 
will  be  willing  to  carry  out  the  policy,  and  capable 
of  doing  so.  If,  therefore,  it  is  forced  on  the 
Egyptian  Government,  Her  Majesty's  Government 
must  be  prepared  to  face  the  possible  contingency 
of  appointing  English  Ministers  temporarily." 

Some  delay  ensued  before  any  answer  was  sent 
to  this  telegram.  In  the  interval,  Cherif  Pasha 
presented  me,  on  January  2,  1884,  with  a  further 
Note.  In  this  Note,  it  was  stated  that  the  Egyptian 
Government  proposed  to  apply  to  the  Porte  for 
10,000  men.  In  the  event  of  their  request  being 
refused,  they  wished  to  restore  the  Eastern  Soudan 
and  the  ports  of  the  Red  Sea  to  the  Sultan,  and  to 
endeavour  with  their  own  resources  to  hold  the 
valley  of  the  Nile  up  to  Khartoum.  In  forwarding 
this  proposal  to  Lord  Granville,  I  said  :  "  I  can 
only  say  that  I  entirely  disbelieve  that  any  Egyptian 
force,  which  can  be  got  together,  will  be  capable 
of  defending  the  whole  length  of  the  valley  of 
the  Nile  from  Khartoum  downwards." 

On  January  4,  I  received  Lord  Granville's 
reply.  It  was  to  the  effect  that  the  British 
Government  had  no  objection  to  the  Sultan  being 
asked  to  send  troops  to  Suakin  provided  that  there 


382  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ni 

was  no  increase  of  Egyptian  expenditure,  and  pro- 
vided also  that  the  decision  to  be  taken  by  the 
Egyptian  Government  as  regards  its  ovm  move- 
ments was  not  retarded.  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment concurred  in  the  proposal  tliat,  in  the  event 
of  the  Sultan  declining  to  send  troops,  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  shores  of  the  Red  Sea  and  of 
the  Eastern  Soudan  should  be  given  back  to  the 
Porte.  As  regards  the  suggestion  that,  with  the 
frontiers  thus  reduced,  the  Egyptian  Government 
should  endeavour  to  hold  the  Nile  up  to  Khartoum, 
Her  Majesty's  Government,  it  was  said,  "do  not 
believe  it  to  be  possible  for  Egypt  to  defend 
Khartoum,  and  whilst  recommending  the  concen- 
tration of  the  Egyptian  troops,  they  desire  that 
those  forces  should  be  withdrawn  from  Khartoum 
itself,  as  well  as  from  the  interior  of  the  Soudan, 
and  you  will  so  inform  Cherif  Pasha." 

Simultaneously  with  this  telegram,  a  further 
confidential  message  was  sent  to  me  for  use  should 
occasion  require.  It  was  to  the  following  effect : 
**  It  is  essential  that  in  important  questions  affect- 
ing the  administration  and  safety  of  Egypt,  the 
advice  of  Her  JNIajesty's  Government  should  be 
followed,  as  long  as  the  priwisional  occupation 
continues.  Ministers  and  Governors  must  carry 
out  this  advice  or  forfeit  their  offices.  The  appoint- 
ment of  English  INIiuisters  would  be  most  objec- 
tionable, but  it  will  no  doubt  be  possible  to  find 
Egyptians  who  will  execute  the  Khedive's  orders 
under  English  advice.  The  Cabinet  will  give  you 
full  support." 

On  communicatino;  the  views  of  the  British 
Government  to  Cherif  Pasha,  I  found,  as  I  had 
anticipated,  a  strong  determination  to  reject  the 
policy  of  withdrawal  from  Khartoum.  I  was, 
therefore,  obliged  to  make  use  of  the  instructions 
contained   in    Lord    Granville's    confidential    tele- 


CH.  XX  THE  SOUDAN  383 

gram.^     The  result  was  that,  on  January  7,  Cherif 
Pasha  tendered  his  resignation  to  the  Khedive. 

My  position  at  this  moment  was  one  of  consider- 
able difficulty.  The  policy  of  withdrawal  from  the 
Soudan  was  very  unpopular  in  Egypt.  Riaz  Pasha 
was  asked  to  form  a  Ministry,  but  declined  to  accept 
the  task.  A  rumour  reached  me  that  I  should  be 
told  that  no  JNlinistry  could  be  formed  to  carry  out 
the  policy  of  withdrawal  from  the  Soudan  ;  thus, 
it  was  hoped,  the  hand  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment would  be  forced,  and  Cherif  Pasha  would  of 
necessity  have  returned  to  office  to  carry  out  his 
own  policy.  I  had  warned  the  British  Govern- 
ment that  they  might  have  to  face  the  possibility 
of  nominating  English  Ministers.  This,  however, 
they  were  unwilling  to  do.  JNIy  instructions  were 
to  get  an  Egyptian  Ministry  appointed.  If,  how- 
ever, no  Egyptian  Ministry  could  be  formed  to 
carry  out  the  policy  recommended  by  the  British 
Government,  I  intended  to  take  the  government 
temporarily  into  my  own  hands,  and  then  telegraph 
to  London  for  instructions.  The  Egyptians  had, 
I  know,  some  inkling  of  what  was  likely  to 
happen,  as,  without  making  any  official  or  private 
communication  to  the  Ministers,  I  purposely 
allowed  my  intention  to  be  known.  The  Khedive 
became  alarmed  at  the  prospect  of  my  pro- 
gramme being  carried  into  execution.  He,  there- 
fore, decided  to  yield.  On  the  night  of  January  7, 
he  sent  for  me  and  informed  me  that  he  had 
accepted  the  resignation  of  his  Ministers,  and 
had  sent  for  Nubar  Pasha.  He  added  that  he 
*'  accepted  cordially  the  policy  of  abandoning  tlie 
whole  of  the  Soudan,  which,  on  mature  reflection, 
he  believed  to  be  the  best  in  the  interests  of  the 

^  Although  I  was  unable  to  agree  with  Cherif  Pasha  about  Soudan 
affairs,  my  personal  relations  with  him  during  all  this  period  were 
excellent.  On  the  day  following  his  resignation,  he  dined  at  my 
house,  to  the  great  astonishment  of  all  the  gossips  of  Cairo. 


384  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

country."  On  January  8,  I  was  able  to  telegraph 
to  Lord  Granville  that  Nubar  Pasha  had  consented 
to  form  a  Ministry,  and  that  "he  entirely  con- 
curred in  the  wisdom  of  abandoning  the  Soudan, 
retaining  possession  of  Suakin." 

Thus  the  general  policy,  which  was  to  be 
pursued,  was  definitely  settled.  It  was,  indeed, 
high  time  to  come  to  some  decision.  Mr.  Power 
telegraphed  from  Khartoum  on  December  30 : 
"The  state  of  affairs  here  is  very  desperate."  On 
January  7,  Colonel  Coetlogon  telegraphed  to  the 
Khedive :  "  I  would  strongly  urge  on  Your  High- 
ness the  great  necessity  for  an  immediate  order  for 
retreat  being  given.  Were  we  twice  as  strong  as 
we  are,  we  could  not  hold  Khartoum  against  the 
whole  country,  which,  without  a  doubt,  are  one 
and  all  a":ainst  us." 


"O" 


Few  measures  have  formed  the  subject  of  more 
severe  criticism  than  the  policy  adopted  by  Mr. 
Gladstone's  Government  in  1883-84  in  connection 
with  the  Soudan.  On  February  12,  1884,  a  vote 
of  censure  on  the  Government  was  moved  by 
Lord  Salisbury  in  the  House  of  Lords  and  by  Sir 
Stafford  Northcote  in  the  House  of  Commons. 
It  was  couched  in  the  following  terms :  "  That 
this  House  ...  is  of  opinion  that  the  recent 
lamentable  events  in  the  Soudan  are  due  in  a  great 
measure  to  the  vacillating  and  inconsistent  policy 
pursued  by  Her  Majesty's  Government."  Care 
was  evidently  taken  not  to  base  the  attack  on  the 
Government  upon  any  specific  objections  to  the 
policy  of  withdrawal  from  the  Soudan.  Lord 
SaUsbury,  indeed,  said  ;  "  We  may  think  it  was  a 
right  policy  to  maintain  the  Soudan,  or  we  may 
think  it  was  a  riglit  policy  to  abandon  it;  but  we 
must,  whatever  opinion  we  hold,  condemn  the 
policy   of  the    Government."     Looking   back   on 


CH.XX  THE  SOUDAN  885 

what  occurred,  and  making  allowance  for  the  fact 
that  the  necessities  of  party  warfare  often  involve 
an  expression  of  condemnation  or  of  approval  in 
somewhat  exaggerated  terms,  it  must  be  admitted 
that  the  censure,  which  the  leading  Conservative 
statesmen  wished  to  pass  on  the  Government, 
though  severe,  was  not  altogether  undeserved. 
Unquestionably,  the  state  of  affairs,  which  then 
existed  in  the  Soudan,  was  in  some  measure  due 
to  the  policy  of  the  British  Government.  But  if 
we  inquire  in  what  measure  it  was  due  to  that 
pohcy,  the  answer  is  clear.  The  British  Govern- 
ment could  have  used  their  paramount  influence  in 
Egypt  to  stop  the  departure  of  General  Hicks's 
expedition,  and  they  did  not  do  so.  Had  they  done 
so,  it  is  not  only  possible  but  also  probable  that  the 
advance  of  the  Mahdi  would  have  been  arrested  at 
Khartoum.  Putting  aside  points  of  detail,  that  is 
the  sum  total  of  the  charge  which  can  be  brought 
against  Mr.  Gladstone's  Government.  I  do  not 
know  of  any  answer  to  this  charge  save  that  which  is 
contained  in  the  commonplace,  but  extremely  true 
remark  that  it  is  easy  to  be  wise  after  the  event. ^ 

Turning  to  the  criticisms  made,  not  so  much  by 
responsible  party  leaders  as  by  the  general  public, 
it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  view  which  was  at  the 
time  freely  expressed,  and  which  has  to  some  extent 
floated  down  the  tide  of  history,  was  that  the  British 
Government  were  responsible  for  the  relapse  of  the 
Soudan  into  barbarism,  and  that  not  only  might 
that  country  have  been  preserved  to  Egypt,  but  that 
it  would  have  been  so  preserved  had  the  Egyptian 
Government  been  allowed  to  follow  their  own  de- 
vices.    General  Gordon  did  a  good  deal  to  propagate 

1  Mr.  Morley  {Life  of  Gladstone,  vol.  iii.  p.  72)  very  appropriately 
prefaces  his  chapter  on  Ei^-ypt  by  the  following  characteristic  i-emark 
made  by  the  Duke  of  >Vellington  ;  "  1  find  many  very  ready  to  say 
what  I  ought  to  have  done  wlien  a  battle  is  over  ;  but  I  wish  some  of 
these  persons  would  come  and  tell  me  what  to  do  before  the  battle." 
VOL.  I  2  c 


386  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  in 

this  idea.  His  Journal  abounds  with  statements 
fixing  the  responsibility  for  the  abandonment  of  the 
Soudan  on  the  British  Government.  I  maintain 
that  this  view  is  entirely  erroneous.  Save  in  respect 
to  one  sin  of  omission,  that  is  to  say,  that  no  veto 
was  imposed  on  the  Hicks  expedition,  the  British 
Government  were  in  no  way  responsible  for  the  loss 
of  the  Soudan.  They  were  responsible  for  obliging 
the  Egyptian  Government  to  look  the  facts  fairly  in 
the  face.  Now  the  main  fact  was  this, — that  after 
the  defeat  of  General  Hicks's  army,  the  Soudan 
was  lost  to  Egypt  beyond  any  hope  of  recovery, 
unless  some  external  aid  could  be  obtained  to  effect 
its  reconquest.  That  external  aid  could  only  come 
from  two  countries,  England  or  Turkey.  The 
British  Government  decided  that  the  troops  of 
Great  Britain  should  not  be  used  to  reconquer 
the  Soudan.  This  decision  was  ratified  by  British 
public  opinion,  neither  am  I  aware  that  any  one, 
who  could  speak  with  real  authority  on  the  subject, 
was  at  the  time  found  to  challenge  its  wisdom.  It 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that,  if  British  troops  had 
been  sent  to  the  Soudan  in  1883,  they  would  have 
been  obliged  to  stay  there  in  considerable  lumibers. 
The  Egyptian  Government  could  not,  with  their 
own  resources,  have  held  the  country  even  after 
the  forces  of  the  iNIahdi  had  been  defeated.  The 
conditions  of  the  problem  which  awaited  solution 
were,  therefore,  essentially  different  from  those 
which  obtained  some  thirteen  years  later  when 
the  reconquest  of  the  Soudan  was  taken  in  hand. 
Turning  to  the  other  alternative,  it  may  be  said 
that,  although  the  proposal  to  utilise  the  Sultan's 
services  gave  occasion  to  some  diplomatic  trifling, 
no  one  seriously  wished  Turkish  troops  to  be 
em])loyed.  Every  one  felt  that  the  remedy  would 
be  worse  than  the  disease.  'I'he  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment, as  in  the  days  of  Anibi,  were  afraid  that  if 


OH  XX  THE  SOUDAN  387 

Turkish  troops  once  came  into  the  country,  they 
would  not  leave  it  again.  The  British  Government 
gave  a  half-hearted  assent  to  the  employment  of  a 
Turkish  force,  but  coupled  their  assent  with  con- 
ditions which  were  impossible  of  execution.  Even 
supposing  that  the  Sultan  would  have  been  able  to 
reconquer  the  country,  which  is  a  bold  assumption, 
it  was  notorious  that  the  misgovernment  of  Turkish 
Pashas  had  caused  the  rebellion,  and  it  might  be 
safely  predicted  that,  whatever  temporary  success 
might  be  gained,  no  permanent  settlement  could  be 
hoped  for  if  Turkish  authority  were  re-established. 
It  must  also  be  remembered  that  to  take  so 
important  a  step  as  that  of  immediately  sending 
troops  to  the  Soudan  would  have  been  quite 
inconsistent  with  the  character  of  the  Sultan.  It 
is  highly  improbable  that  he  would  have  consented 
to  render  any  prompt  and  effective  assistance.  For 
all  these  reasons,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 
decision  not  to  call  in  Turkish  aid  was  wise.^ 

^  About  four  years  later,  the  question  of  handing  over  Suakiu  to 
the  Turks  was  again  raised.  I  did  not  like  the  proposal,  but  the 
difficulties  of  the  whole  Egyptian  situation  were  at  that  time  so  great, 
that  I  was  rather  disposed  to  support  it,  as  a  choice  of  evils.  Lord 
Salisbury,  however — very  wisely,  I  think — rejected  the  idea,  and,  as 
subsequent  events  proved,  it  was  fortunnte  that  he  did  so.  His 
opinion  was  conveyed  to  me  in  the  following  very  characteristic  letter, 
dated  December  22,  1888  :  "  At  first,  your  proposal  to  hand  over 
Suakin  to  the  Turk  seemed  to  me  very  alluring.  It  would  be  such 
a  blessing  to  be  rid  of  it,  both  for  Egypt  and  for  us  ;  and  in  the  light 
of  that  hope,  the  conditions  which  it  would  be  necessary  to  obtain  from 
the  Turks  did  not  seem  insuperable  obstacles,  but  only  difficulties  to 
be  overcome.  But  as  time  went  on — and  especially  after  we  had  been 
able  to  watch  the  impression  caused  by  Grenfell's  easy  success — we 
felt  the  task  was  not  so  easy.  It  is  as  material  that  we  should  look 
at  the  matter  from  an  English,  as  that  you  should  look  at  it  from  an 
Egyptian  point  of  view.  Unluckily,  the  English  point  of  view  is  not 
only  in  practice  the  most  important,  but  it  is  also  the  most  difficult 
to  understand.  The  misfortune — the  root- difficulty — we  have  iu 
dealing  with  questions  like  those  which  beset  Egypt  is  that  public 
opinion  in  its  largest  sense  takes  no  note  of  them.  Unless  some 
startling  question  appealing  to  their  humanity  arises,  the  constituencies 
are  quite  indifferent.  The  result  is  that  the  Members  of  the  House 
of  Commons  are  each  like  a  ship  without  an  anchor.  They  drift  as 
any  chance  current  may  drive  them.     Yet  the  combined  resultant  oi 


388  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

If,  therefore,  neither  British  nor  Turkish  troops 
were  to  be  employed,  withdrawal  from  the  Soudan 
was  imposed  on  the  Egyptian  Government  as  an 
unavoidable  although  unpleasant  necessity.  This, 
in  fact,  was  the  conclusion  to  which  all  the 
responsible  authorities  on  the  spot  arrived  at 
different  stages  of  the  proceedings.  I  have  already 
given  the  opinions  expressed    by  Lord  Dufferin, 

their  many  drifting  wills  is  omnipotent  and  without  appeal.  If  they 
vote  wrong  on  an  Irish  question,  a  hint  from  their  electoral  supporters 
will  bring  them  right.  If  they  vote  wrong  on  an  Egyptian  question, 
there  is  no  such  appeal.  The  result  is  that  we  are  at  the  mercy  of 
any  fortuitous  concurrence  of  fanaticisms  or  fads  that  chance  may 
direct  against  us.  This  preamble  is  necessary  to  enable  you  to 
understand  the  importance  1  attach  to  the  next  remark :  if  we 
withdrew  our  own  and  tlie  Egyptian  troops  from  Suakin  in  favour 
of  Turkey,  we  should  be  assailed  by  three  separate  feelings — the 
Turcophobists,  still  very  strong  ;  the  military  or  jingo  feeling,  which 
simply  desires  to  annex,  and  objects  to  evacuating  in  all  cases  ;  and 
the  curious  collection  of  fanatics  who  believe  that  by  some  magic  wave 
of  the  diplomatic  wand  the  Soudan  can  be  turned  into  a  second  India. 
The  superficial  philanthropy  of  the  day  runs  in  this  channel,  and  by 
its  side,  as  is  often  the  case,  a  current  of  decided  roguery.  There  are 
promoters,  and  financiers,  and  contractors  of  various  kinds,  who  know 
perfectly  well  that  there  is  as  much  chance  of  colonising  the  Sahara 
as  the  Soudan,  but  who  see  a  prospect  of  sweeping  a  shoal  of  guile- 
less shareholders  into  their  net,  and  are  longing  to  take  advantage 
of  the  prevailing  delusion.  All  these  people  would  grumble  fiercely 
if  we  gave  Suakin  to  the  Turks  ;  but  if  we  could  have  done  with  it, 
the  riddance  would  be  well  worth  a  few  grumbles.  But  the  Turks 
would  commit  every  po-^sible  blunder.  Tliey  would  oppress  the 
Arabs,  destroy  all  possibility  of  any  trade,  except  the  Slave  Trade,  to 
which  they  would  give  every  facility  ;  and,  having  caused  the  hostility 
of  the  natives  to  the  utmost  by  taxation  and  misgovernment,  would 
allow  the  garrison  of  Suakin  to  fall  into  so  weak  a  state  in  regard  to 
command,  numbers,  and  equipment,  that  some  fine  day  a  lieutenant 
of  the  Khalifa  would  rush  the  fortresses.  If  such  a  thing  happened, 
the  combined  forces  to  which  I  have  referred  would  have  their 
opportunity.  They  would  dominate  the  House  of  Commons.  The 
political  air  would  be  rent  with  tales  of  the  inefficiency  and  the 
brutality  of  the  Turks,  and  with  praises  of  the  virtues  of  the 
Soudanese,  only  requiring  Home  Rule  under  the  aegis  of  Great  IJritain 
to  develop  them  into  an  equatorial  Arcadia.  The  whole  evil  would  je 
attributed  to  the  evacuation,  which  must  be  immediately  reversed.  1 
need  not  go  any  farther.  There  would  be  endless  complications  with 
foreign  Powers,  and  a  great  deal  of  waste  of  blood  and  money  with  no 
result.  It  might  go  much  I'arther  still,  for  there  is  a  good  deal  of 
loose  powder  about  on  the  shores  of  the  Red  Sea.  On  these  grounds 
alone,  we  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  a  Turkish  occupation 
presents  more  dangers  than  advantages." 


CH.XX  THE  SOUDAN  389 

Sir  Edward  Malet,  and  Colonel  Stewart  prior  to  the 
occurrence  of  the  Hicks  disaster,  and  those  of  Sir 
Frederick  Stephenson,  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  General 
Baker,  and  myself  expressed  subsequent  to  that 
event.  Sir  Auckland  Colvin,  who  knew  Egypt 
well,  wrote  to  me  from  India,  in  December  1883, 
advocating  the  policy  of  abandoning  the  Soudan. 
Mr.  Power,  also,  put  the  matter  in  homely  and 
forcible  language.  Writing  to  his  mother  on 
February  9,  1884,  he  said  :  "  Holdhig  Khartoum  is 
bosh.  .  .  .  This  is,  indeed,  a  *  land  of  desolation,'  as 
Baker  called  it.  We  must  give  it  up."  I  would 
now  speak  of  the  opinions  of  General  Gordon. 
Colonel  Stewart  was,  I  think,  a  better  authority 
on  Soudan  affairs,  as  they  then  existed,  than 
General  Gordon ;  but  the  public  attached  great 
weight  to  General  Gordon's  opinions.  What, 
therefore,  were  those  opinions  ? 

General  Gordon  so  frequently  expressed  at  short 
intervals  opinions  which  were  opposed  to  each  other, 
that  it  is  not  easy  to  answer  this  question  with 
confidence.  In  a  pamphlet  issued  by  the  Pall  Mall 
Gazette  in  1885  and  entitled  Too  Late,  it  was  stated 
that  General  Gordon's  "  personal  views  as  to  the 
impolicy  of  abandoning  Khartoum  were  notorious  "  ; 
and  in  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette  of  January  11,  1884, 
an  account  is  given  of  an  interview  between 
General  Gordon  and  a  representative  of  that  news- 
paper. General  Gordon  is  alleged  to  have  con- 
demned the  policy  of  evacuation.  "You  must 
either,"  he  said,  "surrender  absolutely  to  the 
Mahdi  or  defend  Khartoum  at  all  hazards."  I  do 
not  call  in  question  the  fact  that  General  Gordon 
used  language  of  this  sort,  but  it  was  certainly 
op])osed  both  to  what  he  wrote  about  the  same 
time  officially,  and  to  what  he  said  when  he  was 
on  the  point  of  starting  for  Khartoum. 

On  January  22, 1884,  whilst  on  his  way  to  Egypt, 


390  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

General  Gordon  wrote  a  INIemorandum  which  he 
sent  to  Lord  Granville,  and  in  which  the  following 
passage  occurs :  "  The  Soudan  is  a  useless  posses- 
sion, ever  was  so,  and  ever  will  be  so.  ...  1  think 
Her  Majesty's  Government  are  fully  justified  in 
recommending  the  evacuation,  inasmuch  as  the 
sacrifices  necessary  towards  securing  a  good  govern- 
ment would  be  far  too  onerous  to  admit  of  such 
an  attempt  being  made."  Colonel  Stewart,  after 
reading  General  Gordon's  INIemorandum,  wrote  as 
follows :  "  I  have  carefully  read  over  General 
Gordon's  observations  and  cordially  agree  wit 
what  he  states.  ...  I  quite  agree  with  Genera 
Gordon  that  the  Soudan  is  an  expensive  and  use- 
less possession.  No  one  who  has  visited  it  can 
escape  the  reflection  :  '  What  a  useless  possession 
and  what  a  huge  encumbrance  on  Egypt.' " 

Further  evidence  can  be  produced,  which  is  even 
more  conclusive  as  regards  General  Gordon's  views. 
When  he  arrived  in  Cairo  in  January  1884,  I  had 
to  prepare  certain  instructions  for  him.  One 
passage  of  those  instructions  ran  as  follows  :  "You 
will  bear  in  mind  that  the  main  end  to  be  pursued 
is  the  evacuation  of  the  Soudan.  This  policy  was 
adopted  after  very  full  discussion  by  the  Egyptian 
Government  on  the  advice  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government.  I  understand,  also,  that  you  entirely 
concur  in  the  desirability  of  adopting  this  policy." 
When  I  went  through  the  draft  instructions  with 
General  Gordon,  I  well  remember  stopping  at  this 
passage  and  asking  him  whether  I  was  right  in 
saying  that  he  agreed  in  the  policy  adopted  by 
the  Egyptian  Government  on  the  advice  of  the 
British  Government.  Without  the  smallest  hesi- 
tation. General  Gordon  expressed  in  the  strongest 
terms  his  entire  concurrence  in  that  policy.  In- 
deed, he  insisted  that  a  phrase  should  be  added 
stating  that  in  his  opinion  the  policy,  which  had 


cfl.  XX  THE  SOUDAN  391 

been  adopted,  "should  on  no  account  be  changed." 
This  was  accordingly  done. 

It  seems  to  me  that  this  evidence  is  conclusive. 
I  think  that  I  have  every  right  to  assume  that 
when  General  Gordon,  at  a  momentous  period  of 
his  life,  gave  his  opinion  deliberately  in  official 
form,  and  with  a  due  sense  of  the  responsibility 
he  was  taking,  what  he  then  said  must  be  regarded 
as  his  true  opinion,  and  that  it  cannot  be  gainsaid 
by  any  obiter  dicta  let  fall  in  conversation  at  other 
times. 

Mere  appeal  to  authority  is,  however,  a  weak 
argument.  Reason,  it  has  been  truly  said,  and 
not  authority,  should  determine  the  judgment.  I 
maintain  that,  judged  by  the  standard  of  reason, 
the  arguments  in  favour  of  the  policy  adopted  at 
the  time  are  irrefragable.  I  am,  of  course,  merely 
speaking  of  the  general  policy,  not  of  the  details 
of  its  execution,  in  respect  to  which,  as  I  shall 
subsequently  show,  many  errors  were  committed. 
The  only  practical  question  was,  not  whether  it 
was  or  was  not  desirable  to  hold  Khartoum,  but 
whether  it  was  possible  to  hold  Khartoum.  To 
this  question  there  could  only  be  one  answer. 
The  Egyptian  Government,  with  the  resources  of 
which  they  disposed,  were  unable  to  hold  Khar- 
toum. No  one,  therefore,  has  a  right  to  criticise 
the  policy  which  was  actually  adopted,  unless  he  is 
prepared  to  advocate  that  the  reconquest  of  the 
Soudan  should  have  been  effected  by  British, 
British -Indian,  or  Turkish  troops.  For  my  own 
part,  I  may  say  that,  although  during  the  period 
1  represented  the  British  Government  in  Egypt 
I  may  have  made  many  mistakes,  there  is  one 
episode  to  which  I  look  back  without  the  least 
sense  of  personal  regret.  Time  and  reflection 
have  only  served  to  convince  me  more  strongly 
than    ever    that    I    acted    rightly   in   advocating 


392  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  in 

withdrawal  from  the  Soudan  in  1883-84.  It  was 
the  adoption  of  that  policy  which  allowed  the 
Egyptian  and  British  Governments,  after  a  painful 
period  of  transition,  to  devote  themselves  to  the 
work  of  reorganisation  and  reform  in  Egypt  proper, 
a  work  which  could  not  have  been  undertaken 
at  tliat  time  with  any  prospect  of  success  so  long 
as  the  Soudan  hung  like  a  dead -weight  round 
the  necks  of  Egyptian  reformers.  Whatever 
else  may  be  said  against  the  Egyptian  policy  of 
Mr.  Gladstone's  Government,  my  conviction  is  that 
they  deserve  the  eternal  gratitude  of  the  Egyptian 
people  for  coming  down  with  a  heavy  hand  on  all 
the  vacillations  of  the  Cairene  administrators,  and 
obliging  the  Egyptian  Government  to  look  the 
facts  of  the  case  fairly  in  the  face.^ 

There  is,  however,  another  criticism  which  was 
directed  against  the  conduct  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment at  this  time  and  to  which  some  allusion 
should  be  made.     It  was  stated  that,  even  suppos- 

^  In  a  private  letter  to  me,  dated  December  28, 1883,  Lord  Granville 
stated  the  case  in  characteristic  lang'uage.  "  It  tal<es  away,"  he  said, 
"somewhat  of  the  position  of  a  man  to  sell  his  racers  and  hunters,  but 
if  he  cannot  afford  to  keep  them,  tlie  sooner  they  ^o  to  Tattersall's  the 
better."  1  have  a  large  number  of  private  letters  from  Lord  Granville. 
Some  of  them  are  very  interestinsf.  His  light  touches  on  serious 
questions  were  inimitable,  and  his  good  humour  and  kindness  of  heart 
come  out  in  every  line  lie  wrote.  It  was  possible  to  disagree  with  him, 
but  it  was  impossible  to  be  angry  with  him.  It  was  also  impossible  to 
get  him  to  give  a  definite  answer  to  a  difficult  question  when  he  wished 
not  to  commit  himself.  His  power  of  eluding  the  main  point  at  issue 
was  quite  extraordinary.  Often  did  I  think  that  lie  was  on  the  horns 
of  a  dilemma,  and  that  he  was  in  a  position  from  which  no  escape  was 
possible  without  the  expression  of  a  definite  opinion.  I  was  generally 
mistaken.  With  a  smile  and  a  quick  little  epigrammatic  plirase.  Lord 
Granville  would  elude  one's  grasp  and  be  off  without  giving  any  opinion 
at  all.  I  remember  on  one  occasion  pressing  him  to  say  what  he  wished 
me  to  do  aiiout  one  of  the  numerous  offshoots  of  tlie  general  tangle, 
wliich  formed  tlie  Egyptian  Question.  The  matter  was  one  of  consider- 
able importance.  All  I  could  extract  from  him  was  the  Delphic  saying 
that  my  "  presence  in  London  would  be  a  good  excuse  for  a  dawdle." 

I  remember  once  comparing  notes  with  Lord  Goscben  on  this 
subject.  He  told  me  that  on  one  occasion,  when  he  was  at  Con- 
stantinople,  after   many    unsuccessful    endeavours   to   obtain    definite 


OH.  XX  THE  SOUDAN  393 

ing  that  withdrawal  from  the  Soudan  was  necessary, 
the  policy  of  the  Government  should  not  have  been 
publicly  announced.  This  view  was  advocated  by 
Lord  Salisbury.  Speaking  in  the  House  of  Lords 
on  February  27,  1885,  he  said  :  "  As  soon  as  they 
(the  British  Government)  made  up  their  minds 
that  the  Soudan  was  to  be  evacuated,  their  first 
course  was  to  retire  the  garrisons  as  rapidly  as 
they  could,  and  when  this  was  done  they  might 
announce  their  policy  as  loudly  as  they  please. 
But  it  was  an  unfortunate  announcement  when 
the  men  were  in  deadly  danger,  —  a  policy  of 
crass  folly,  which  almost  amounts  to  a  crime." 
This  criticism,  though  strongly  expressed,  sounds 
reasonable  in  substance ;  and,  in  fact,  if  the  policy 
advocated  by  Lord  Salisbury  had  been  possible, 
it  would  unquestionably  have  been  the  best  to 
pursue.  Can  any  one,  however,  suppose  that, 
when  the  British  press  and  the  British  Parliament 
were    actively    engaged    in    discussing    Egyptian 

answers  to  certain  important  questions  which  he  had  addressed  to  Lord 
Granville,  he  wrote  a  very  lengthy  and  very  strong-  private  letter, 
intimating  that  unless  clear  answers  were  sent,  he  would  resign.  'I'he 
only  reply  he  received  from  Lord  Granville  was  as  follows:  "My 
dear  Goschen — Thank  you  a  thousand  times  for  expressing  your  views 
so  frankly  to  your  old  colleagues."  The  dawdling  policy,  or,  to  put  the 
case  in  another  way,  the  policy  of  not  having  a  policy  at  all,  is  often 
very  good  diplomacy,  particularly  when  it  is  carried  out  by  a  man  of 
Lord  Granville's  singular  tact,  quickness,  and  diplomatic  experience. 
This  line  of  action,  which  involves  delaying  any  important  decision 
until  the  last  moment  and  not  looking  far  ahead,  is  rather  in  con- 
formity with  English  customs  and  habits  of  thought.  It  was  generally 
practised  by  many  of  the  Englisli  statesmen  and  diplomatists  of  Lord 
Granville's  generation.  Unfortunately,  Lord  Granville,  during  tiie 
latter  portion  of  his  career,  fell  on  times  when,  under  the  auspices 
of  Prince  Bismarck,  a  directness,  I  might  almost  say  a  brutality,  had 
been  introduced  into  European  diplomacy,  which  did  not  exist  before. 
Lord  Granville  always  seemed  to  me  to  make  the  mistake  of  con- 
founding the  cases  in  which  the  dawdling  launez-faire  policy  was  wise, 
with  those  in  which  it  was  necessary  to  take  time  by  the  forelock  and 
have  a  clearly  defined  policy  at  an  early  date.  This,  in  a  F\)reign 
Minister,  is  a  great  fault.  He  becomes  to  too  great  a  degree  the  sport 
of  circumstances,  and  inspires  foreign  Governments  with  a  belief  that 
the  policy  of  hia  country  is  vacillating  and  uncertain. 


394  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  hi 

affairs,  when  keen  party  opponents  were  constantly 
pressing  the  Government  for  a  dechu-ation  of  their 
intentions,  when  Cairo  was  full  of  newspaper 
correspondents,  when  the  policy  of  withdrawal 
could  only  be  enforced  by  the  heroic  remedy 
of  a  change  of  Ministry  in  Egypt,  when  it  is 
remembered  that  such  a  thing  as  official  secrecy 
is  almost  unknown  in  Egypt,  and  when  it  is 
further  remembered  that  numerous  agents,  some 
of  whom,  especially  General  Gordon  himself,^  were 
not  remarkable  for  reticence  of  speech,  necessarily 
had  to  be  taken  into  the  confidence  of  the  Govern- 
ment,— can  any  one  suppose  for  one  moment  that, 
under  all  these  circumstances,  the  adoption  of  a 
policy  of  withdrawal  could  have  been  kept  secret  ? 
Secrecy  was,  in  fact,  impossible,  and  it  mattered 
little  whether  any  public  announcement  was  or 
was  not  made,  at  all  events  in  Europe  or  in  Egypt 
proper. 

This,  therefore,  is  all  I  have  to  say  about  the 
policy  of  withdrawal  from  the  Soudan.  In  spite 
of  the  vehemence  with  which  every  one  connected 
with  the  adoption  of  this  policy  was  at  one  time 
assailed,  I  believe  it  to  have  been  the  only  wise  policy 
possible  under  the  circumstances.  Further,  in  spite 
of  some  obvious  drawbacks,  and  of  many  mistakes 
in  the  execution,  I  believe  the  adoption  of  this 
policy  to  have  been  beneficial  to  Egypt  itself  and 
to  the  accomplishment  of  the  general  aims  of  Eng- 
land in  that  country.  If  I  am  asked  whether  the 
policy  of  withdrawal  from  the  Soudan  \vas  desir- 
able or  the  reverse,  and,  if  undesirable,  why  it  was 
adopted,  I  have  no  hesitation  in  answering  these 
questions.  As  a  mere  academic  question,  I  think 
that  the  policy  of  withdrawing  from  Khartoum  was 

*  It  will  presently  be  explained  (pp.  467-471)  that  General  Gordon 
was  himself  responsible  for  spreading-  in  the  Soudan  the  news  that  the 
Egyptian  Government  intended  to  withdraw  from  tlie  country. 


OH.  XX  THE  SOUDAN  395 

undesirable,  but  I  decline  to  consider  that,  in  view 
of  the  circumstances  which  then  existed,  the 
question  of  the  desirability  or  undesirability  of 
withdrawal  was  at  the  time  one  of  any  practical 
importance.  A  long  course  of  misgovernment  had 
culminated  in  a  rebellion  in  the  Soudan,  which  the 
Egyptian  Government  were  powerless  to  repress. 
They,  therefore,  had  to  submit  to  the  time- 
honoured  law  expressed  in  the  words  Vae  victis. 
The  abandonment  of  the  Soudan,  however 
undesirable,  was  imposed  upon  the  Egyptian 
Government  as  an  unpleasant  but  imperious 
necessity  for  the  simple  reason  that,  after  the 
destruction  of  General  Hicks's  army,  they  were 
unable  to  keep  it.  This,  as  it  appears  to  me,  is 
the  residuum  of  truth  which  may  be  extracted 
from  all  the  very  lengthy  and  somewhat  stormy 
discussions  which  have  taken  place  on  this  subject. 


CHAPTER    XXI 

THE    REBELLION   IN   THE   EASTERN   SOUDAN 
August  1883-March  1884 

Prevailing  discontent — Annihilation  of  a  force  sent  to  Sinkat — And  of 
one  sent  to  Tokar — Defeat  of  the  Egyptians  at  Tamanieb — It  is 
decided  to  send  the  Gendarmerie  and  some  black  troops  under 
Zobeir  Pasha  to  Suakin  —  Instructions  to  General  Baker  —  He 
arrives  at  Suakin — His  instructions  are  modified — Zobeir  Pasha 
retained  at  Cairo — General  Baker  advances  to  Tokar — His  defeat — 
Fall  of  Sinkat — It  is  decided  to  send  a  British  force  to  Tokar — 
Fall  of  Tokar — General  Graiiam  advances — Action  at  El  Teb — The 
British  troops  return  to  Suakin — Battle  of  Tamai — Results  of  the 
operations. 

The  events  already  narrated  could  not  fail  to 
have  a  great  effect  in  the  Eastern  Soudan. 
There  also  a  long  course  of  misgovernment  had 
produced  its  natural  result.  The  people  were  ripe 
for  rebellion  against  the  Egyptian  Government. 
When,  therefore,  towards  the  middle  of  1883,  the 
Mahdi  issued  a  Proclamation  to  the  inhabitants  of 
the  Eastern  Soudan,  inviting  them  "to  advance 
against  the  Turks  and  drive  them  out  of  the 
country,"  they  were  well  disposed  to  respond  to  his 
appeal.  A  former  slave-dealer  at  Suakin,  named 
Osman  Digna,  was  appointed  to  be  the  Mahdi's 
Emir.  He  was  a  man  of  considerable  ability,  and 
was  destined  in  the  near  future  to  play  a  leading 
part  in  the  affairs  of  the  Eastern  Soudan. 

At  this  time,  an  Egyptian  garrison  was  posted 
at  Sinkat,  a  spot  situated  about  fifty  miles  from 

396 


CH.  XXI       THE  EASTERN  SOUDAN  397 

Suakin.  The  road  from  Suakin  to  Sinkat  passes 
through  some  rocky  defiles,  which  present  great 
facilities  for  defence  against  any  force  advancing 
from  the  coast.  The  geographical  position  of 
Sinkat  renders  it  devoid  of  military  importance. 
A  wise  foresight  would  have  dictated  its  abandon- 
ment and  the  retreat  of  the  garrison  to  Suakin 
at  an  early  stage  of  the  rebellion.  Unfortunately, 
this  was  not  done  ;  the  result  was  disastrous.  The 
garrison  of  Sinkat  was  commanded  by  Tewfik  Bey, 
an  officer  of  courage  and  ability,  who  is  described 
by  Mrs.  Sartorius  as  "the  one  grand  and  noble 
man  who  stands  forth  so  prominently  amongst  the 
horde  of  Egyptian  officials."  ^ 

The  first  overt  act  of  rebellion  took  place  on 
August  5.  On  that  day,  Osman  Digna  appeared 
with  1500  men  before  Sinkat  and  demanded,  in  the 
name  of  the  Mahdi,  that  both  Sinkat  and  Suakin 
should  be  delivered  up  to  him.  These  demands 
being  refused,  Osman  Digna  attacked  the  outskirts 
of  Sinkat.  He  was  repulsed  with  considerable 
loss.  Two  of  his  nephews  were  killed,  and  he  was 
himself  wounded. 

On  September  9,  Tewfik  Bey  again  defeated  the 
rebels  at  Handoub,  a  spot  on  the  road  leading  from 
Suakin  to  Berber. 

These  successes  were,  however,  but  the  prelude  to 
a  series  of  disasters  which  were  about  to  befall  the 
Egyptian  arms.  Towards  the  middle  of  October, 
a  force  of  about  160  men  sent  by  Suleiman  Pasha, 
the  Governor  of  Suakin,  to  the  relief  of  Sinkat, 
was  attacked  and  totally  defeated  by  the  Dervishes. 
The  women  and  children,  who  accompanied  the 
soldiers,  alone  escaped  to  become  the  slaves  of 
their  captors. 

•  The  Soudan,  p.  61.  Mrs.  Sartorius  was  the  wife  of  Colonel 
Sartorius,  who  was  General  Baker's  principal  staff  officer.  She 
accompanied  her  husband  to  Suakin. 


398  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

The  result  of  this  engagement  was  to  increase 
the  prestige  of  the  JNIahdi  and  of  Osman  Digna, 
and  to  encourage  amongst  their  followers  the  belief 
that  they  were  fighting  in  a  cause  w^hich  would 
render  them  invincible.  Another  event  soon  fol- 
lowed tending  in  the  same  direction. 

On  November  3,  an  Egyptian  force  of  about  550 
men  was  despatched  from  Suakin  to  Trinkitat,  a 
seaport  lying  about  forty -five  miles  to  the  south. 
The  object  of  this  expedition  was  to  relieve  Tokar, 
situated  some  twenty  miles  from  the  coast,  which 
place  was  at  that  time  invested  by  the  JNIahdist 
forces.  Captain  JMoncrieff",  R.N.,  the  British  Consul 
at  Jeddah,  accompanied  the  expedition.  The  force 
left  Trinkitat  on  the  morning  of  November  4. 
After  marching  for  about  an  hour  and  a  half,  they 
were  attacked  by  the  Dervishes.  "  The  Egyptian 
troops  formed  square,  the  front  and  right  of  the 
square  commenced  firing,  but  by  some  means  the 
left  of  the  square  was  broken  into  by  eight  or  ten 
Arabs,  which  immediately  created  a  panic  amongst 
the  troops  and  caused  a  general  stampede."  In 
this  action,  Captain  Moncrieff  and  160  Egyptian 
officers  and  men  were  killed.  The  attacking  force 
only  amounted  to  about  200  men. 

A  worse  disaster  was  to  follow.  Suleiman 
Pasha  and  JNIahmoud  Tahir  Pasha,  who  com- 
manded the  troops  at  Suakin,  were  fearful  of  the 
effect  which  would  be  produced  at  Cairo  when 
the  news  arrived  of  the  recent  defeat  near  Tokar. 
They  were  aware  that  an  expedition  was  to  be 
sent  from  Cairo  to  Suakin  under  the  command  of 
General  Baker.  They  determined,  therefore,  "to 
try  another  throw  of  the  dice  with  a  fine  regiment  of 
600  Soudanese,  under  JNIajor  Kassiin,  that  had  been 
hurriedly  sent  from  INIassowah."  This  regiment 
was  attacked  and  cut  to  pieces.  Of  the  whole 
force,  only  2  officers  and  33  men  returned  to  Suakin. 


caxxi       THE  EASTERN  SOUDAN  399 

These  successive  victories  established  the  power 
of  Osman  Di<i:na  in  the  Eastern  Soudan.  On 
November  19,  1883,  I  telegraphed  to  Lord 
Granville :  *'  It  is  clear  that  Egyptian  authority 
in  the  Eastern  Soudan  does  not  extend  beyond 
the  coast,  and  is  even  threatened  there." 

After  the  defeat  of  General  Hicks's  army,  the 
military  authorities  at  Cairo  were  of  opinion  that 
an  endeavour  should  be  made  to  open  out  the 
Berber- Suakin  route  with  a  view  to  facilitating 
the  retreat  of  the  garrison  of  Khartoum.  The 
question  then  arose  as  to  what  troops  should  be 
employed  to  attain  this  object. 

The  British  Government  objected  to  the  em- 
ployment of  the  Egyptian  army,  then  being 
organised  by  Sir  Evelyn  Wood.  There  were 
valid  grounds  for  their  objection.  The  army 
was  intended  for  service  in  Egypt  proper.  Its 
organisation  was  at  that  time  defective.  None 
of  the  men  had  served  for  more  than  one  year. 
Sir  Evelyn  Wood  and  the  officers  serving  under 
him  had  not  as  yet  had  time  to  fashion  into  shape 
the  raw  material  at  their  disposal.  The  employ- 
ment of  the  Egyptian  army  might  not  improbably 
have  led  to  a  further  disaster.  The  British  War 
Office  authorities  felt  this  so  strongly  that,  at  a 
subsequent  period  when  British  troops  were  em- 
ployed, they  declined  to  allow  any  portion  of  the 
Egyptian  army  to  take  part  in  the  expedition. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  only  force  avail- 
able was  the  Egyptian  Gendarmerie  commanded 
by  General  Baker.  A  few  British  officers  were 
attached  to  this  force,  but  with,  I  think,  one 
exception  (Colonel  Sartorius),  they  were  not  on 
the  active  list  of  the  British  army,  and  it  was 
held,  perhaps  somewhat  illogically,  that  the 
Egyptian  Government  possessed  a  greater  degree 
of  liberty  of  action  in  respect  to  the  employment 


400  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

of  this  force  than  was  the  case  in  respect  to  the 
army.  The  Gendarmerie  were  fairly  well  equipped, 
but,  with  the  exception  of  some  "200  Turks,  who 
were  good  soldiers,  the  force  was  composed  of  bad 
fighting  material. 

It  was  with  the  utmost  hesitation  that  I  con- 
sented to  the  despatch  of  General  Baker's  force  to 
Suakin.  I  was  under  no  delusion  as  to  the  quality 
of  the  troops  which  he  would  command.  JNlore- 
over,  I  feared  that  Baker  Pasha  would  be  led  into 
the  committal  of  some  rash  act.  He  was  a 
gallant  officer,  and  it  was  certain  that  his  military 
instincts  would  revolt  at  inaction,  more  especially 
when  Sinkat  and  Tokar  were  being  beleaguered  in 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  Suakin.  There  were 
also  special  reasons  which  made  me  doubtful  as  to 
the  wisdom  of  sending  General  Baker.  He  had 
been  obliged  to  leave  the  British  army  under 
circumstances  on  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  dwell. 
He  was  ardently  attached  to  his  profession,  and  it 
was  well  known  that  the  main  object  of  his  life 
was  to  regain  his  position  in  the  British  army, 
which  he  hoped  to  do  by  distinguished  service  in 
the  field.  Before  he  left  Cairo,  I  impressed  upon 
him  strongly  that  the  necessity  of  avoiding  any 
disaster  must  come  before  all  other  considerations, 
and  that  if  he  did  not  feel  suflficient  confidence  in 
his  troops  to  advance,  he  must  remain  and  defend 
Suakin,  however  painful  the  consequences  might 
be  as  regards  the  garrisons  of  Sinkat  and  Tokar. 
General  Baker  expressed  to  me  his  entire  con- 
currence in  these  views,  and  promised  that  he 
would  act  up  to  them.  I  was  not,  however, 
content  with  mere  verbal  instructions.  On  the 
advice  of  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  and  myself,  a  letter, 
which  contained  the  following  passage,  was  written 
to  General  Baker  by  the  Khedive  on  December  17: 
"The  mission  entrusted  to  you,  having  as  its  object 


OH.  XXI       THE  EASTERN  SOUDAN  401 

the  pacification  of  the  regions  designated  in  my 
above-mentioned  order,  and  the  maintenance,  as 
far  as  possible,  of  communication  between  Berber 
and  Siiakin,  I  wish  you  to  act  with  the  greatest 
prudence  on  account  of  the  insufficiency  of  the 
forces  placed  under  your  command. 

"I  think  it  would  be  hazardous  to  commence 
any  military  operations  before  receiving  the  rein- 
forcements which  shall  be  sent  to  you  with  Zobeir 
Pasha.  ...  If,  in  the  event  of  the  situation  im- 
proving, you  should  consider  an  action  necessary,  I 
rely  on  your  prudence  and  ability  not  to  engage 
the  enemy  except  under  the  most  favourable 
conditions.  .  .  .  ]\Iy  confidence  in  your  prudence 
enables  me  to  count  upon  your  conforming  to 
these  instructions." 

On  December  27,  General  Baker  arrived  at 
Suakin.  Almost  simultaneously  with  his  arrival, 
the  change  of  Ministry  narrated  in  the  last 
chapter  took  place  at  Cairo.  The  result  of  this 
change  was  the  issue,  on  January  11,  1884,  of 
the  following  further  instructions  to  General  Baker 
by  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  acting  on  behalf  of  the 
Khedive : — 

1.  All  that  portion  of  your  instructions  which  gives  you 
discretion  to  open  the  Suakin -Berber  route  westward  of 
Sinkat  by  force,  if  necessary,  is  cancelled. 

2.  If  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  use  force  in  order  to 
extricate  the  garrisons  of  Sinkat  and  Tokar  you  can  do  so, 
provided  you  consider  your  forces  sufficient  and  you  may 
reasonably  count  on  success. 

The  enforced  submission  of  the  men  who  have  been 
holding  out  at  these  two  places  would  be  very  painful  to 
His  Highness  the  Khedive;  but  even  such  a  sacrifice  is 
better,  in  his  opinion,  than  that  you  and  your  troops  should 
attempt  a  task  which  you  cannot  fairly  reckon  to  be  within 
your  power. 

3.  You  are  directed  to  continue  to  use  every  effort 
possible  to  open  the  route  up  to  Berber  by  diplomatic 
means. 

VOL.  I  2d 


402  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  in 

About  this  time,  another  change  of  importance 
was  made.  On  December  9,  1  wrote  to  Lord 
Granville :  "  The  Egyptian  Government  propose 
to  send  Zobeir  Pasha  to  Suakin.  Your  Lordship, 
without  doubt,  is  aware  of  Zobeir  Pasha's  ante- 
cedents. He  lias  been  intimately  connected  with 
the  Slave  Trade.  Under  ordinary  circumstances, 
his  employment  by  the  Egyptian  Government 
would  have  been  open  to  considerable  objection, 
and  I  should  have  thought  it  my  duty  to  remon- 
strate against  it.  Under  present  circumstances, 
however,  I  have  not  thought  it  either  necessary  or 
desirable  to  interfere  with  the  discretion  of  the 
Egyptian  Government  in  this  matter.  Whatever 
may  be  Zobeir  Pasha's  faults,  he  is  said  to  be  a 
man  of  great  energy  and  resolution.  The  Egyptian 
Government  consider  that  his  services  may  be 
very  useful  in  commanding  the  friendly  Bedouins 
who  are  to  be  sent  to  Suakin,  and  in  conducting 
negotiations  with  the  tribes  on  the  Berber- Suakin 
route  and  elsewhere.  I  may  mention  that  Baker 
Pasha  is  anxious  to  avail  himself  of  Zobeir  Pasha's 
services.  Your  Lordship  will,  without  doubt,  bear 
in  mind  that,  up  to  the  present  time,  the  whole 
responsibility  for  the  conduct  of  affairs  in  the 
Soudan  has  been  left  to  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment. It  appears  to  me  that,  under  present 
circumstances,  it  would  not  have  been  just,  while 
leaving  all  the  responsibility  to  the  Egyptian 
Government,  to  have  objected  to  that  Govern- 
ment using  their  own  discretion  on  such  a  point 
as  the  employment  of  Zobeir  Pasha.  I  make  these 
remarks  as  the  employment  of  Zobeir  Pasha  may 
not  improbably  attract  attention  in  England." 

Every  Englishman  is  justly  proud  of  the  part 
which  his  country  has  borne  in  the  suppression  of 
Slavery  and  the  Slave  Trade ;  few  will  be  disposed 
to  challenge  the  distinguished  part  played  by  the 


o-H  XXI       THE  EASTERN  SOUDAN  403 

Anti-Slavery  Society  in  this  humane  work.  The 
Society,  however,  is  not  without  its  defects.  Con- 
centration of  thought  and  action  on  one  subject, 
together  with  a  certain  want  of  imagination  which 
occasionally  characterises  the  conduct  of  English- 
men in  dealing  with  foreign  affairs  and  wliich  is 
perhaps  in  some  degree  due  to  tlieir  insular  habits 
of  thought,  produce  their  natural  effect.  The 
members  of  the  Anti-Slavery  Society  appear  some- 
times to  be  unable  to  look  at  any  question  save 
from  a  purely  anti-slavery  point  of  view,  and,  even 
from  that  point  of  view,  they  are  often  liable  to 
error  through  failure  to  judge  accurately  of  the 
relative  importance  of  events.  It  is  certain  that 
the  action  of  the  Society  in  connection  witli  Soudan 
affairs  in  1883-84,  though  well  hitentioned,  was 
mischievous.  The  main  question,  whether  from 
the  general  or  the  anti-slavery  point  of  view,  was 
how  to  quiet  the  Soudan.  The  establishment  of 
the  Mahdi's  domination  in  that  country  coukl  not 
fail  to  give  an  impulse  to  the  Slave  Trade.  Every 
measure  which  tended  to  counteract  the  JNlahdi's 
authority  should,  therefore,  have  been  welcomed 
by  the  Anti- Slavery  Society,  even  although  it 
might  have  been  open  to  some  objections  in 
detail.  The  Society  failed  to  see  this.  They 
were  so  taken  up  with  the  objections  to  the  detail, 
that  they  forgot  tlie  main  principle.  In  deference 
to  the  opinions  which  the  Society  was  known  to 
entertain,  it  was  decided  not  to  send  Zobeir  Pasha  to 
Suakin.  The  consequences  of  this  decision  are  thus 
described  by  Mrs.  Sartorius  :  "  As  a  matter  of  fact 
Zobeir  never  came  down.  .  .  .  This  was  another 
grand  blunder  that  rendered  the  Suakin  expedition 
ahnost  hopeless  from  the  first.  'J'he  black  troo])s 
required  to  be  led  in  their  own  fashion  ;  they  had 
no  idea  of  diill  or  discipline.  There  was  no  time 
to   lick   them   into    shape.      With    Zobeir    I^asha 


404  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

at  their  head,  they  would  have  been  formidable 
antagonists  to  tiie  Soudanese,  and  have  fought  in 
precisely  the  same  fashion.  AVithout  him,  they 
were  wasted." 

On  January  31,  telegraphic  communication  with 
Suakin  was  established.  General  Baker  reported 
that  he  was  at  Trinkitat,  and  hoped  to  move  on 
the  following  day  to  Tokar.  Some  little  delay, 
however,  occurred.  On  February  2,  General  Baker 
telegraphed  that  he  would  advance  on  the  morning 
of  the  3rd  with  3200  men.  "  There  is,"  he  added, 
"every  chance  of  success."  I  awaited  the  result 
with  anxiety.  On  the  6th,  General  Baker  tele- 
graphed :  "  I  marched  yesterday  morning  with 
3500  men  towards  Tokar  ;  we  met  the  enemy, 
after  two  miles'  march,  in  small  numbci  s,  and  drove 
them  back  about  two  miles  nearer  the  wells  of  Teb. 
On  the  square  being  only  threatened  by  a  small 
force  of  the  enemy,  certainly  less  than  1000  strong, 
the  Egyptian  troops  threw  down  their  arms  and 
ran,  carrying  away  the  black  troops  with  them, 
and  allowing  themselves  to  be  killed  without  the 
slightest  resistance.  INIore  than  2000  were  killed. 
They  fled  to  Trinkitat.  Unfortunately,  the 
Europeans  who  stood  suffered  terribly.  .  .  .  The 
troops  are  utterly  untrustworthy  except  for  the 
defence  of  earthworks." 

I  remember  the  bitter  disappointment  with 
which  I  received  this  telegram.  JNIy  worst  fears 
had  been  realised.  General  Baker  had  evidently 
been  led  into  undertaking  a  task  which  was  beyond 
the  powers  of  the  inefficient  force  at  his  dis})osal. 
I  remember  also  that  my  first  impression  was  that, 
after  the  strong  manner  in  which  I  had  spoken  to 
him  and  after  the  assurances  he  had  given  to  me  at 
Cairo,  General  Baker  would  re})roach  himself  fur 
having  advanced  on  Tokar.  It  was  with  this  feel- 
ing uppermost  in   my  mind  that  I  at  once  tele- 


PH.  XXI       THE  EASTERN  SOUDAN  405 

graphed  to  the  Consul  at  Suakin  :  "Tell  General 
Baker  that  I  feel  sure  that  he  did  all  that  could  be 
done,  that  he  has  my  entire  confidence,  and  that  I 
shall  continue  to  do  all  I  can  to  help  and  support 
him." 

When  this  matter  was  subsequently  (February 
12)  discussed  in  England,  Lord  Derby,  speaking 
on  behalf  of  the  British  Government,  said  :  "  We 
may  have  known — we  did  knoAv — that  the  com- 
position of  General  Baker's  force  was  not  very 
good,  but  I  venture  to  affirm  that  nobody  supposed 
that  a  body  of  men  calling  itself  a  regular  army 
would  run  away,  almost  without  a  shot  fired,  from 
half  its  own  number,  or  less  than  half,  of  savages 
under  no  discipline  whatever.  It  is  a  thing,  I 
should  imagine,  new  in  war.  It  is  a  misfortune, 
but  it  is  a  misfortune  for  which  we,  sitting  in 
London,  can  hardly  hold  ourselves  responsible." 

I  agree  in  this  view.  I  do  not  think  that 
the  British  Ministers  were  responsible  for  the 
despatch  of  General  Baker's  force  to  Suakin 
except  in  so  far  that,  by  not  offering  any  other 
form  of  assistance,  they  practically  obliged  the 
Egyptian  Government  either  to  utilise  the  Gen- 
darmerie or  to  remain  altogether  inactive.  INIani- 
festly,  they  could  form  no  independent  opinion 
of  the  military  value  of  General  Baker's  force. 
The  main  responsibility,  therefore,  rests  on  the 
authorities  at  Cairo,  and  notably  on  myself. 

Mr.  Gladstone  stated  in  the  House  of  Commons: 
"Baker  Pasha  was  under  no  military  necessity  to 
undertake  this  expedition.  He  was  not  enlisted 
for  that  purpose,  and  was  under  no  honourable 
or  military  obligation  to  undertake  it  unless  he 
thought  it  hopeful.  ...  I  say  he  went  with  a  be- 
lief that  the  means  at  his  command  were  adequate 
means  for  the  purpose  which  he  had  in  view.  .  .  . 
Baker  Pasha  stated  that  he  was  very  confident  that 


406  MODEUN  EGYPT  pt.  in 

the  means  at  his  disposal,  though  not  sufficient  to 
reheve  all  the  garrisons,  were  sufficient  for  Tokar, 
which  would  liave  been  most  important.  On  the 
2nd  of  February,  three  days  before  the  calamity 
which  overtook  him.  Baker  Pasha  telegraphs  that 
he  will  advance  to  the  relief  of  Tokar  to-morrow 
with  every  chance  of  success."  All  this  is  per- 
fectly true.  I  have  heard  it  stated  that  General 
Baker  was  induced  to  advance  by  one  of  his  staff 
officers  against  his  own  judgment.  How  far  this 
statement  is  correct,  I  cannot  say.  There  can, 
however,  be  no  doubt  that  he  made  an  error  in 
advancing.  He  saw  the  hopelessness  of  endeavour- 
ing to  relieve  Sinkat,^  but  he  was  too  confident  of 
success  in  the  direction  of  Tokar. 

Whilst,  however,  the  accuracy  of  INIr.  Gladstone's 
statement  may  be  admitted,  he  did  not,  as  it 
appears  to  me,  state  the  whole  case ;  neither, 
indeed,  was  he  in  possession  of  sufficient  informa- 
tion to  have  enabled  him  to  do  so.  Mrs.  Sartorius 
had  the  best  possible  opportunities  of  learning  the 
opinions  current  amongst  the  officers  at  Suakin. 
This  is  what  she  says :  "  I  still  say  that  the 
military  and  other  authorities  at  Cairo  should  not 
have  allowed  General  Baker  to  advance ;  they 
ought  not  to  have  left  it  to  him,  for  they  could  not 
but  know  that  he  had  no  choice."  Regarded  by 
the  light  of  subsequent  events,  there  is  much  force 
in  this  criticism.  Either  General  Baker  should  not 
have  been  sent  to  Suakin,  or,  if  sent,  he  should 
have  received  no  discretionary  power  to  advance  ; 
in  fact,  it  would  have  been  better  that  he  should 
have  received  positive  orders  not  to  advance.  I 
was  principally  responsible  for  this  mistake,  that  is 

*  "A  most  painful  decision  has  lately  been  arrived  at,  namely,  that 
we  ourselves  cannot  relieve  Sinkat,  for  it  would  be  madness  to  trust 
our  troops  in  a  broken  an<l  mountainous  country  like  that  through 
which  the  Sinkat  road  runs.  We  intend  to  do  what  we  can  in  the 
Tokar  direction." — The  Soudan,  p.  210. 


CH.  XXI       THE  EASTERN  SOUDAN  407 

to  say,  I  could  liave  prevented  General  Baker  from 
going  to  Suakin,  and,  although  1  knew  the  risk  I 
was  running  and  although  1  thought  seriously  of 
imposmg  a  veto  on  the  expedition,  I  eventually 
decided  not  to  do  so.  I  remember  the  nature  of 
the  arguments  which  led  me  to  take  this  decision. 
I  was  not  influenced  by  the  consideration  that 
General  Baker's  force  would  be  able  to  open  up 
the  Berber-Suakin  route.  I  never  believed  that 
he  would  be  able  to  do  so,  and,  as  has  been 
already  stated,  this  portion  of  his  instructions 
underwent  considerable  modifications  immediately 
after  the  change  of  INIinistry  took  place  in  Cairo. 
The  way  I  reasoned  the  matter  was  this :  here  are  two 
garrisons,  one  at  Sinkat  and  one  at  Tokar,  shut  up 
within  a  short  distance  of  the  coast  ;  moreover,  the 
administration  at  Suakin  is  so  bad,  and  the  troops 
there  are  so  demoralised,  that  the  Egyptian 
position  at  Suakin  itself  may  at  any  moment  be 
endangered ;  the  British  Government  will  not 
afford  any  military  aid,  neither  will  they  allow  the 
Egyptian  Government  to  use  their  own  army  ;  I 
daresay  they  are  right  in  these  decisions,  but  the 
position  thus  created  for  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment and  its  British  advisers  is,  to  say  the  least,  a 
painful  one ;  are  we  not  only  to  refuse  assistance, 
but  are  we  also  to  impose  a  veto  on  the  Egyptian 
Government  employing  the  only  remaining  force  at 
their  disposal,  with  the  certainty  that  in  doing  so 
Suakin  itself  will  be  endangered  and  that  any  hope 
of  relieving  the  beleaguered  garrisons  of  Sinkat  and 
Tckar  will  have  to  be  abandoned  ?  I  answered 
this  question  at  the  time  in  the  negative.  Sub- 
sequent events  showed  that  I  should  have  answered 
it  in  the  affirmative.  I  should  have  stated  the 
case  to  the  British  Government,  and  have  informed 
them  that  the  Egyptian  Government  had  no 
trustworthy  force  at  their  disposal  with  which  to 


408  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  in 

act,  and  that  they  must  decide  whether  or  not  to 
defend  Suakin,  and  to  send  a  British  force  to 
relieve  the  two  garrisons.  It  was,  however, 
difficult  at  the  time  to  take  up  this  line.  I  felt 
sure  that  the  British  Government  would  do  nothing 
to  help  the  beleaguered  garrisons,  although  they 
would  have  afforded  naval  protection  to  Suakin. 
Indeed,  so  early  as  November  23,  Admiral  Hewett 
was  ordered  to  maintain  Egyptian  authority  at 
the  Red  Sea  ports.  Moreover,  however  acute 
the  pressure  and  however  painful  the  consequences 
of  inaction  might  be,  I  sympathised  with  the 
reluctance  of  the  British  Government  to  be  drawn 
into  military  operations  in  the  Soudan.  Once 
begun,  it  was  difficult  to  say  where  they  would  end. 
Then,  again,  in  view  of  the  instructions,  written 
and  verbal,  which  General  Baker  had  received 
before  leaving  Cairo,  and  in  view  of  the  whole 
tenor  of  his  conversation,  I  beheved  that  I  might 
rely  on  him  not  to  advance  unless  success  was 
well-nigh  absolutely  certain,  and,  indeed,  I  thought 
it  probable  that,  when  he  arrived  at  Suakin  and 
had  studied  the  situation,  he  would  tell  me  that 
the  risk  of  advancing  either  to  Sinkat  or  Tokar 
with  the  troops  under  his  command  was  too  great 
to  be  undertaken.  In  reasoning  thus,  I  was 
mistaken.  General  Baker's  military  instincts,  the 
natural  reluctance  of  a  gallant  officer  to  leave  the 
beleaguered  garrisons  to  their  fate  without  making 
an  effi)rt  to  help  them,  the  pressure  which  was 
probably  brought  to  bear  on  him  by  the  younger 
and  less  responsible  British  officers  at  Suakin  to 
advance,  and  the  special  personal  inducement 
which  existed  in  his  case  to  distinguish  himself  by 
lieading  a  daring  and  successful  military  exploit, 
all  acted  in  a  sense  contrary  to  the  conclusions 
formed  when  discussing  the  matter  calmly  in  my 
room  at  Cairo. 


:h.  XXI       THE  EASTERN  SOUDAN  409 

For  these  reasons,  I  think  I  was  wrong  in 
allowing  General  Baker's  expedition  to  go  to 
Sua  kin. 

Sinkat  had  for  long  been  in  great  straits.  With 
the  defeat  of  General  Baker's  force,  the  last  hope 
of  relief  disappeared.  On  February  12,  news 
reached  Suakin  that  Tewfik  Bey,  despairing  of  all 
succour  and  finding  his  provisions  exhausted,  had 
made  the  desperate  resolution  to  evacuate  Sinkat 
and  fight  his  way  to  Suakin.  He  made  a  brave 
fight  for  life  and  killed  large  numbers  of  the  enemy, 
but  eventually  his  whole  force,  with  the  exception 
of  about  thirty  women  and  six  men,  was  annihi- 
lated. Thus,  another  was  added  to  the  list  of 
disasters  in  the  Soudan. 

The  defeat  of  General  Bak-er's  force  caused  a 
panic  at  Suakin.  Manifestly,  the  first  thing  to  do 
was  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  the  town.  Admiral 
Hewett  landed  a  small  force.  He  was  placed  in 
civil  and  military  command.  I  was,  at  the  same 
time,  authorised  to  inform  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment that  "  in  the  event  of  an  attack  on  Suakin  on 
the  part  of  the  rebels,  the  town  would  be  defended 
by  a  British  force." 

In  the  meanwhile,  British  public  opinion  was 
greatly  excited  about  Soudan  affairs.  Party 
politicians  were  sure  not  to  allow  so  good  an 
opportunity  for  attacking  the  Government  to 
escape.  Chauvinists  and  humanitarians  alike 
swelled  the  ranks  of  the  opposition.  A  meeting 
was  called  at  the  Mansion  House  to  condemn  the 
policy  of  the  Government.  No  inconsiderable 
section  of  British  public  opinion  was  dis})osed  to 
push  the  Government  on  to  a  policy  of  reconquer- 
ing the  Soudan  without  much  regard  either  to  the 
difficulties  of  the  task,  or  to  the  ulterior  conse- 
quences which  would  have  ensued  had  such  a 
course   been   adopted.      Mr.    Forster,  who    was   a 


410  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

leading  member  of  the  Anti- Slavery  Society  and 
the  chief  of  the  party  of  bellicose  philanthropy, 
attacked  the  Government.  V^'^hen,  eventually,  it 
was  decided  to  send  an  expedition  to  Suakin, 
Mr.  Forster  said  (February  14) :  "  I  rejoice  that  the 
Government  have  taken  their  present  policy.  By 
that,  they  are  more  likely  to  strike  a  blow  against 
slavery  than  anything  we  have  yet  done."  There 
was  no  mistaking  this  language.  The  Government 
were  invited  to  undertake  a  military  campaign 
against  slavery. 

Thus,  there  was  a  risk  that  the  Government, 
which  had  been  too  fearful  of  assuming  responsibility 
during  the  early  stages  of  the  Soudan  troubles, 
would  now,  under  the  pressure  of  excited  and 
ill-informed  public  opinion  in  England,  be  forced 
into  the  assumption  of  more  serious  responsibilities 
than  they  were  aware  of,  or  than  it  was  desirable 
that  they  should  assume.  On  February  12,  I 
repeated  to  Lord  Granville  the  following  telegram 
which  I  had  received  from  General  Gordon,  who 
was  then  on  his  way  to  Khartoum :  "  I  sincerely 
hope  that  you  will  be  reassured  as  to  the  situation, 
in  spite  of  all  that  has  happened."  I  added,  '*  I 
entirely  agree  on  all  points  witli  General  Gordon, 
and  trust  that,  in  S})ite  of  the  panic  which  appears  to 
prevail  in  London,  Her  IMajesty's  Govermnent  will 
not  change  any  of  the  main  points  of  their  policy." 
I  followed  this  up  by  a  further  telegram  on  the  same 
day  in  which  I  said  :  "I  am  altogether  opposed  to 
sending  troops  to  Suakin  exce])t  to  hold  the  town." 
I  held  this  opinion  because  I  did  not  believe  that 
British  troops  would  arrive  in  time  to  save  Tokar. 

The  pressure  on  the  Government  was,  however, 
too  strong  to  be  resisted.  It  was  decided  to  send  a 
force  to  the  relief  of  Tokar. 

By  February  28,  about  4000  British  soldiers, 
under  the  command  of  Major-General  Sir  Gerald 


CH.XXI       THE  EASTERN  SOUDAN  411 

Graham,  were  collected  at  Trinkitat.  A  week 
before  that  date,  however,  a  report  arrived  to 
the  effect  that  the  garrison  of  Tokar  was  about 
to  capitulate. 

The  British  Government  were  singularly  un- 
fortunate. From  this  time  forth,  the  stock  argu- 
ment of  their  opponents  was  that  their  action  was 
mvariably  "too  late."  This  was  the  title  given 
to  a  pamphlet  published  a  year  later  on  the  Gordon 
mission ;  amongst  party  politicians,  Lord  Randolph 
Churchill,  more  especially,  used  his  remarkable 
oratorical  powers  to  place  before  the  public  the 
aspect  of  Soudan  aflairs  represented  by  these 
words.  The  facts  of  the  case  had,  however,  to  be 
faced.  It  was  clear  that  the  expedition  would 
not  be  able  to  accomplish  the  only  object  with 
which  it  had  been  sent.  What,  therefore,  was  to 
be  done  ?  On  February  24,  Sir  W.  Hewett 
telegraphed  to  the  Admiralty  that  the  news  of 
the  fall  of  Tokar  had  been  confirmed ;  but,  he 
added,  with  all  the  conviction  and  impetuosity  of 
a  fighting  sailor  who  was  longing  for  action,  "we 
must  move  on  there  with  our  men.  Rebels  are 
sure  to  stand  ;  they  are  in  considerable  numbers 
mustering.  Our  forces  landed.  Decisive  victory 
will  re-establish  order  amongst  the  tribes  round 
here."  I  remember  Sir  Frederick  Stephenson, 
coming  into  my  room  on  the  morning  of  February 
23  and  saying  to  me,  "  Well !  Tokar  has  fallen, 
but  of  course  we  must  go  on."  He  subsequently 
telegraphed  to  Lord  Hartington,  who  was  at  that 
time  Secretary  of  State  for  War :  "  News  just 
received  that  rebels  are  in  force  on  Baker  Pasha's 
late  battlefield,  eager  to  fight  and  confident  of 
victory.  I  strongly  recommend  that  Graham 
should  be  ordered  to  advance  towards  Tokar, 
should  this  prove  true." 

It  was  clear  that  the  soldiers  and  sailors  were 


412  MODERN  EGYPT  pi.  m 

like  greyhounds  straining  at  the  leash.  They  were 
almost  within  sight  of  their  enemy,  and  at  the 
last  moment  it  appeared  that  they  might  not 
be  allowed  to  attack.  They  were  naturally  dis- 
appointed, and  I  trust  that  the  same  spirit  will 
always  animate  the  British  army  and  navy.  My 
view,  however,  at  the  time  was  that  the  soldiers 
and  sailors  should  not  be  allowed  to  decide  the 
question.  As  Tokar  had  already  fallen,  I  could 
not  see  what  was  tlie  object  of  expending  a 
number  of  valuable  lives  under  the  pretence  of 
relieving  the  garrison.  I,  therefore,  telegraphed 
to  Lord  Granville  on  the  evening  of  February 
23  in  the  following  terms,  "  If  the  troops  are 
not  to  advance  on  Tokar,  the  War  Office  should 
send  out  orders  without  a  moment's  delay.  The 
soldiers  are,  of  course,  longing  for  a  fight, 
and  will  advance  if  there  is  the  smallest  excuse 
for  doing  so.  I  can  scarcely  entertain  a  doubt 
that  Tokar  has  fallen.  In  that  case,  I  think 
a  useless  effusion  of  blood  should  be  stopped ; 
that  enough  troops  should  be  left  to  garrison 
Suakin  ;  and  that  the  remainder  should  come  back 
here.  I  would  on  no  account  send  a  British  force 
to  Kassala."  At  the  same  time,  I  repeated  to 
Lord  Granville  a  telegram  which  I  had  received 
from  General  Gordon,  in  answer  to  a  messaoe 
despatched  by  me  telling  him  of  the  report  that 
Tokar  had  fallen.  "I  think,"  he  said,  "if  Tokar 
lias  fallen.  Her  Majesty's  Government  had  better 
be  quiet,  as  I  see  no  advantage  to  be  now  gained 
by  any  action  on  tlieir  part.  I^et  events  work 
themselves  out.  Tiie  fall  of  Tokar  will  not  affect  in 
the  least  the  state  of  affairs  here  {i.e.  at  Khartoum)." 
It  vv'as,  without  doubt,  difficult  for  the  Govern- 
ment to  act  on  the  advice  of  General  Gordon  and  my- 
self To  have  landed  a  force  at  Trinkitat,  and  then 
to  have  brought  it  away  without  achieving  anything 


CH.  XXI       THE  EAS TERX  SOUDAN  413 

whatever,  would  have  rendered  the  Government 
ridiculous,  and  would  have  exposed  them  to  further 
attacks  in  Parliament.  Tiie  lives  of  the  officers 
and  men  who  subsequently  fell  at  the  battle  of 
El  Teb,  were,  in  reality,  sacrificed  to  public 
clamour  and  the  necessities  of  the  Parliamentary 
situation.  On  February  15,  Lord  Granville  wrote 
privately  to  me  telling  me  that  the  papers  on  the 
subject  were  about  to  be  presented  to  Parliament. 
"I  have,"  he  said,  "cut  out  your  opinion  un- 
favourable to  the  expedition.  You  might  as  well 
try  to  stop  a  mule  with  a  snaffle  bridle  as  check 
the  feeling  here  on  tlie  subject.  Our  great  object 
must  now  be  to  get  them  {i.e.  the  troops)  back 
as  soon  as  possible."  When,  eventually,  the 
Soudanese  were  beaten,  the  Government,  which 
had  been  violently  attacked  from  one  quarter  for 
inaction,  were  attacked  from  another  quarter  for 
their  activity.  On  March  14,  Lord  Granville  wrote 
to  me :  "  We  are  very  nearly  stalemated  in  the 
Soudan  by  the  bloody  victories." 

Sir  Gerald  Graham  was  consulted.  On  February 
24,  the  following  telegram  was  sent  to  him  from 
the  War  Office  :  "  Assuming  Tokar  to  have  fallen, 
what  course  would  you  recommend,  remembering 
that  no  distant  expedition  will  be  sanctioned  ? 
Could  the  force  march  to  Teb,  protect  fugitives, 
bury  the  English  dead,  and  return  by  land  to 
Suakin  ?  If  a  movement  on  Suakin  is  threatened, 
you  may  take  the  offensive  from  Trinkitat  oi 
Suakin,  as  you  think  best.  Report  fully  on  the 
position."  There  could  be  no  mistaking  the  spirit 
of  this  message.  It  meant  that  the  Government 
wanted  Sir  Gerald  Graham  to  suffo-est  action  of 
some  sort,  so  that  the  policy  of  sending  the  ex- 
pedition to  Suakin  might  in  some  degree  be 
justified.  This,  of  course,  tallied  with  the  views 
of    the    soldiers.       After    receiving     Sir     Gerald 


414  IMODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

Graliam's  report,  Lord  Hartington  sent  him  the 
foUowmg  mstriictions  :  "  You  should,  if  practicable, 
before  attacking,  summon  the  chiefs  to  disband 
their  forces  and  attend  Gordon  at  Khartoum  for 
the  settlement  of  the  Soudan.  Say  that  we  are 
not  at  war  with  the  Arabs,  but  must  disperse  force 
threatening  Suakin."  This  telegram  was  first 
communicated  to  me  by  Sir  Frederick  Stephenson. 
I  felt  convinced  that  the  proposed  summons  to 
the  tribal  leaders  to  go  to  Khartoum  would  not 
be  productive  of  any  result.  I,  therefore,  tele- 
graphed privately  to  Lord  Granville  (February  27) : 
"  Stephenson  has  shown  me  the  AYar  Secretary's 
telegram  to  Graham.  I  do  not  think  that  you 
can  stop  Graham  advancing  now.     It  is  too  late." 

On  the  morning  of  February  29,  Sir  Gerald 
Graham  advanced  with  his  entire  available  force. 
He  found  the  Dervishes  entrenched  at  El  Teb ; 
they  were  attacked  and  driven  from  their  position 
with  heavy  loss.  The  British  loss  amounted  to 
189  of  all  ranks,  killed  and  wounded. 

On  IMarch  3,  Sir  Gerald  Graham  advanced  to 
Tokar,  which  was  reached  without  any  further 
fitxhtino;.  On  the  4th,  the  whole  force  returned 
to  Trinkitat,  and  on  the  5th  embarked  for 
Suakin.  Admiral  Hewett  telegraphed  to  the 
Admiralty  :  "  Tokar  expedition  most  successful." 
The  success  or  failure  of  the  expedition  must 
be  a  matter  of  opinion.  Its  original  object 
was  to  relieve  the  garrison  of  Tokar.  This  ob- 
ject had  not  been  accomplished.  It  had  been 
shown,  not  for  the  first  time  in  history,  that  a 
small  body  of  well-disciplined  British  troops  could 
defeat  a  horde  of  courageous  savages.  But  no 
other  important  object  had  been  attained.  Osman 
Digna  had  received  a  severe  blow,  but  his  power  in 
the  Soudan  was  by  no  means  broken.  Osman 
Digna's  own  view  on  the  subject  may  be  gathered 


cH.  XXI       THE  EASTERN  SOUDAN  415 

from  a  letter  written  by  him  at  the  time  and  found 
some  years  afterwards  at  Tokar.  "  The  English," 
he  said,  "  did  not  stay  long.  God  struck  fear  into 
their  hearts,  and  they  went  back  the  next  morning, 
staying  only  one  night  at  the  Mamurieh,  and  then 
they  started  back  in  their  steamers." 

The  question  now  arose  of  whether  any  further 
operations  should  be  undertaken  by  Sir  Gerald 
Graham's  force.  On  March  2,  Admiral  Hewett 
telegraphed  to  the  Admiralty  recommending  that 
the  troops  should  be  assembled  at  Suakin,  and  that 
Osman  Digna,  who  was  still  in  the  neighbourhood, 
should  be  attacked.  "That,"  he  said,  "will  quiet 
the  whole  of  this  country."  On  JNIarch  7,  Lord 
Granville  telegraphed  to  me:  "Her  Majesty's 
Government  have  approved  the  recommendation 
of  Admiral  Hewett  and  General  Graham  to  land  a 
force  at  Suakin  to  give  effect  to  their  Proclamation 
calling  upon  the  rebel  chiefs  to  come  in  and  de- 
nouncing Osman  Digna  as  an  impostor.  They  will 
march  on  Osman's  camp  to  disperse  force  if  the 
Proclamation  is  ineffectual." 

The  Proclamation  produced  no  effect,  and,  on 
March  13,  General  Graham's  force  advanced  on 
Tamai,  a  few  miles  from  Suakin,  which  was 
occupied  by  a  Mahdist  force  estimated  at  12,000 
men.  On  the  following  morning,  an  engagement 
ensued.  After  an  obstinate  fight,  2000  Dervishes 
were  killed ;  the  remainder  fled  to  the  hills.  In 
this  action,  the  British  loss  was  13  officers  and  208 
men,  killed  and  wounded. 

On  the  following  day  (March  15),  Osman  Digna's 
camp  was  burned,  and  the  British  force  returned  to 
Suakin.  On  the  17th,  Sir  Gerald  Graham  tele- 
graphed to  the  War  Office :  "  The  present  position 
of  affairs  is  that  two  heavy  blows  have  been  dealt 
at  the  rebels  and  followers  of  the  Mahdi,  who  are 
profoundly  discouraged.     They  say,  however,  that 


416  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

the    English   troops    can    do    no   more,  and   must 
re-embark  and  leave  the  country  to  them." 

It  will  be  as  well  to  break  off  the  narrative  of 
events  in  the  Eastern  Soudan  at  this  point.  The 
subsequent  operations  depended  upon  the  course  of 
events  in  the  valley  of  the  Nile,  to  which  it  is  now 
time  to  revert.  It  will  be  sufficient  for  the  present 
to  say  that  the  whole  of  the  episode  narrated  in 
this  chapter  is  not  one  to  which  any  En<jjlishman 
can  look  back  with  either  pride  or  pleasure.  INIany 
valuable  lives  were  lost.  A  great  slaughter  of 
fanatical  savages  took  place.  But  no  political  or 
military  result  was  obtained  at  all  commensurate 
with  the  amount  of  life  and  treasure  which  was 
expended. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE    GORDON    MISSION 

December  1883-January  1884 

The  situation  in  Earypt — Sir  Frederick  Stephenson — General  Earle — 
Sir  Edgar  Vincent — Sir  Evelyn  Wood — Foreign  Office  support — 
First  and  second  proposals  to  send  General  Gordon — They  are 
rejected — Third  proposal  to  send  General  Gordon — It  is  accepted 
— No  British  officer  should  have  been  sent  to  Khartoum — General 
Gordon  should  not  in  any  case  liave  been  chosen — The  responsi- 
bility of  the  British  press — And  of  the  British  Government — 
General  Gordon's  optimism — My  regret  at  having  assented  to  the 
Gordon  Mission. 

During  the  course  of  an  official  career  which 
extended  over  a  period  of  nearly  fifty  years,  I  at 
times  had  some  hard  work.  But  I  never  had  such 
hard  work,  neither  was  I  ever  in  a  position  of  such 
difficulty,  or  in  one  involving  such  a  continuous 
strain  on  the  mind,  the  nerves,  and,  I  may  add,  the 
temper,  as  during  the  first  three  months  of  the  year 
1884.  I  was  rarely  able  to  leave  my  house.  I 
had  a  very  small  staff  to  help  me.  I  was  generally 
hard  at  work  from  daybreak  till  late  at  night. 
Witliout  doubt,  mistakes  were  made  during  this 
period,  but  looking  back  to  the  difficulties  of  the 
situation  and  remembering  the  confusion  which 
then  reigned  in  Egyptian  affairs,  I  caimot  help 
reflecting  that  it  was  quite  as  much  by  luck  as  by 
good  management  that  the  mistakes  were  not  more 
numerous  and  more  serious.  I  had,  fortunately, 
one  qualification  for  dealing  with  the  situation,  and 

V()I>.   I  417  2  E 


418  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

that  was  a  strong  constitution.  Without  that,  I 
should  certainly  have  broken  down  altogether. 

Without  entering  into  any  detail,  I  will  describe 
the  broad  features  of  the  Egyptian  situation,  as  it 
then  existed. 

The  Egyptian  question  alone,  by  which  I  mean 
the  work  of  reorganisation  in  Egypt  proper,  pre- 
sented difficulties  of  no  common  order.  On  to 
this  was  now  grafted  the  Soudan  question,  which 
by  itself  was  one  of  the  utmost  importance,  and 
which  for  the  time  being  exercised  a  paramount, 
though  indirect  influence  on  the  solution  of  all 
other  Egyptian  questions.  The  Gov^ernment 
Treasury  was  well-nigh  bimkrupt.  It  seemed  at 
the  time  as  though  a  whole  or  partial  re})udiation 
of  the  Egyptian  debt  was  imminent,  and,  if  this 
had  happened,  very  troublesome  international  com- 
plications would  have  ensued.  The  Europeans 
were  discontented  because  trade  was  depressed, 
and  because  the  indemnities  due  to  them  for  their 
losses  during  and  after  the  Alexandria  bombard- 
ment had  not  yet  been  paid.  The  Pashas  were 
in  a  morose  and  sullen  condition  because  their 
privileges  were  threatened.  The  people  were  dis- 
contented because  they  had  not  as  yet  reaped  the 
benefits  which  they  had  expected  from  the  British 
occupation.  The  old  arbitrary  system  of  govern- 
ment by  the  courbash  had  been  abolished,  but 
nothing  had  as  yet  been  instituted  to  take  its 
place.  The  Anibist  , rebellion  had  profoundly 
shaken  the  authority  of  the  ruling  classes.  The 
reorganisation  of  the  army  and  of  the  police  had 
only  just  been  commenced.  A  large  force  of 
Gendarmerie  had  been  withdrawn  for  service  at 
Suakin,  whence  such  of  them  as  did  not  leave 
their  bones  to  whiten  on  the  sands  of  Trinkitat 
were  to  return  discomfited  and  demoralised.  The 
Anglo -Egyptian    officials   were  for  the  most  part 


CH.  XXII       THE  GORDON  MISSION  419 

new  to  their  work.  With  some  rare  exceptions, 
the  Egyptian  officials  were  not  only  nseless  but 
often  obstructive.  A  severe  epidemic  of  cholera 
had  but  recently  sw^ept  over  the  country,  leaving 
behind  it  a  variety  of  troublesome  quarantine 
questions,  the  settlement  of  which  involved  con- 
siderable diplomatic  difficulties.  Every  man's 
hand  was  against  the  British  Government.  French 
hostility  was  never  more  active.  The  other  Powers 
of  Europe,  with  the  exception  of  Italy,  were 
animated  with  no  very  friendly  sentiments  tow^ards 
England.  Prince  Bismarck  disliked  the  Liberal 
Government  in  England ;  moreover,  he  was  at 
this  time  making  an  effort,  which  ended  in  failure, 
to  conciliate  France,  a  policy  which  naturally  led 
Germany  to  adopt  a  hostile  attitude  towards 
England  in  Egypt.  The  Sultan  again  came  for- 
ward with  his  favourite  idea  of  deposing  Tewfik 
Paslia  and  substituting  Halim  in  his  place,  an  idea 
which  was,  as  on  former  occasions,  at  once  nipped 
in  the  bud  by  the  British  Government.  Nubar 
Pasha  was  unpopular  in  the  country.  The  attitude 
which  he  assumed  on  matters  connected  with  in- 
ternal reform,  increased  the  difficulties  of  the  situa- 
tion. His  main  object  at  this  time  was  to  get 
rid  of  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd,  who  was  endeavouring 
to  reorganise  the  Department  of  the  Interior. 
An  international  question  of  considerable  import- 
ance had  also  to  be  dealt  with  during  this  period. 
The  powers  of  the  Mixed  Courts  had  expired, 
and  the  conditions  under  which  they  were  to  be 
renewed  had  to  be  discussed.  This  subject  afforded 
a  wide  field  for  petty  international  intrigue.  In 
England,  the  Government  were  exposed  to  con- 
stant attacks  from  party  politicians.  The  incidents 
of  this  party  warfare  necessitated  frequent  re- 
ference to  Cairo  for  information,  the  collection  of 
which    often    caused   great   trouble   and   waste  of 


420  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  in 

valuable  time,^  which  I  grudged  all  the  more  be- 
cause I  was  aware  that,  when  the  information  had 
been  collected,  it  wotdd  be  of  little  real  utility 
and  that,  in  fact,  it  was  only  demanded  with  a 
view  to  affording  a  handle  to  Parliamentary  attack 
or  defence.  The  Government  themselves  did  not 
know  their  own  mind.  Every  British  official  in 
Egypt  turned  to  me  for  advice  and  guidance  about 
the  affairs  of  his  Department,  and  in  each  Depart- 
ment numerous  troublesome  questions  of  detail 
were  constantly  cropping  up  for  settlement.  I 
was  myself  new  to  the  work  and  had  not  had 
sufficient  time  to  take  stock  of  the  situation, 
which  was  greatly  changed  since  T  left  the  country 
in  1880,  or  to  fully  understand  the  characters  of  the 
principal  people  with  whom  I  had  to  deal.  Look- 
ing at  the  situation  as  a  whole,  it  seemed  as  if 
Isaiah's  prophecy  had  been  fulfilled.  "  The  Lord 
hath  mingled  a  perverse  spirit  in  the  midst  thereof, 
and  they  have  caused  Egypt  to  err  in  every  work 
thereof,  as  a  drunken  man  staggereth  in  his  vomit." 
There  were,  however,  some  redeeming  features  in 
the  situation. 

In  the  fu'st  place,  the  presence  of  a  British  army 
in  the  country  afforded  a  solid  guarantee  that,  in 
spite  of  administrative  disorder  and  foreign  intrigue, 
nothing  could  occur  of  a  nature  calculated  to  en- 
danger seriously  the  stability  of  the  Khedive's 
rule.  The  behaviour  and  discipline  of  the  British 
troops  were  alike  excellent.  Moreover,  they  were 
commanded  by  an  officer  (Sir  Frederick  Stephen- 
son) who  combined  in  a  high  degree  all  the  qualities 
necessary  to  fill  with  advantage  to  his  country  a 
post  of  such  exceptional  difficulty  as  the  conmiand 

^  On  this  subject,  and,  indeed,  on  all  others,  1  received  the  utmost 
personal  consideration  from  Lord  Granville.  On  February  8,  1884, 
he  wrote  to  me:  "I  keep  over  tlie  references  to  you  as  much  as 
possible,  and  I  hope  you  fully  understand  that  questions  do  not 
mean  complaints." 


CH.  XXII       THE  GORDON  MISSION  421 

of  an  army  of  occupation  in  a  foreign  country. 
The  French  residents  in  Egypt  resented  the 
presence  of  a  British  army  in  their  midst.  They 
were  in  a  state  of  nervous  irritabihty,  which 
rendered  them  prompt  to  take  offence  at  the 
smallest  real  or  imaginary  provocation.  At  any 
moment,  some  paltry  squabble  might  have  occurred 
between  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  army  of 
occupation  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  population  on 
the  other  hand,  which,  if  any  Frenchman  had  been 
concerned,  might  have  caused  much  trouble.  The 
General  Officer  in  command  of  the  troops  was  thus 
called  upon  to  exercise  great  tact,  firmness,  patience 
and  judgment.  These  qualities  Sir  Frederick 
Stephenson  possessed  in  a  high  degree ;  it  was 
largely  due  to  him  that  such  difficulties  as  arose 
never  assumed  proportions  which  it  was  beyond 
the  resources  of  local  diplomacy  to  settle  satis- 
factorily. Sir  Frederick  Stephenson  won  for  him- 
self the  admiration  even  of  those  who  were  most 
hostile  to  the  British  occupation. 

General  Earle  occupied  at  Alexandria  much 
the  same  position  as  that  held  by  Sir  Frederick 
Stephenson  at  Cairo.  A  first-rate  soldier,  a  clear- 
headed and  vigorous  man  of  business,  endowed 
with  exceptional  tact,  good  manners,  and  judgment, 
he  was  respected  and  liked  by  the  whole  population 
of  Alexandria.  A  statue,  now  standing  in  the 
principal  square  of  the  town,  was  erected  by  public 
subscription  to  his  memory,  and  bears  witness  to 
the  honour  in  which  he  was  universally  held.  The 
Dervish  bullet,  which  subsequently  cut  short  this 
promising  career,  deprived  the  Queen  and  the 
country  of  a  servant  of  the  higliest  merit. 

Another  bright  spot  on  the  otherwise  dark 
horizon  was  that,  in  s])ite  of  occasional  jars,  reli- 
ance could  always  be  placed  on  the  loyalty  and 
devotion  of  the  British  officials  in  the  service  of 


422  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

the  Egyptian  Government.  Of  the  services  ot 
those  officials,  I  shall  have  to  speak  more  fully  at  a 
later  period.  For  the  present,  I  need  only  allude  to 
the  work  performed  by  Sir  Edgar  A^incent  and  by 
Sir  Evelyn  ^Vood.  The  former  was  using  all  the 
resources  of  a  mind  endowed  with  singular  fertility 
of  resource  to  strui^o-le  with  a  financial  situation 
which  appeared  well-nigh  desperate.  Sir  Evelyn 
Wood  was  reconstructing  the  Egy]:)tian  army  out 
of  materials  which  appeared  at  the  time  to  be  very 
unpromising.  Moreover,  his  advice  on  the  military 
aspects  of  the  Soudan  question,  on  which  the  policy 
of  the  Government  mainly  depended,  was  of  great 
value.  He  loyally  sup])orted  me  in  enforcing  a 
course  of  action,  which,  although  obviously  dictated 
by  reason,  was  at  the  time  extremely  unpo})ular 
with  almost  all  classes  whether  in  England  or  in 

There  was  yet  a  third  consideration  from  which 
I  derived  a  certain  amount  of  consolation  during 
this  stormy  and  difficult  period.  It  has  often  been 
my  fate  to  disagree  with  the  Government  which  I 
was  serving,  but  I  have  seen  somethino;  of  the 
relations  between  foreign  Governments  and  their 
representatives  abroad.  So  far  as  is  possible  foi 
any  one  \\ho  has  never  sat  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, I  think  I  can  appreciate  the  difficulties  of 
Parliamentary  life,— dilHculties  which,  owing  to  a 
variety  of  circumstances,  have  increased  in  magni- 
tude during  the  last  few  years.  Looking  to  the 
whole  of  the  facts,  my  experience  leads  me  to  the 
conclusion  that  British  Ministers,  whether  Liberal 
or  Conservative,  are  good  masters  to  serve. 

Of  course,  the  exigencies  of  Parliamentary  war- 
fare are  sometimes  too  much  even  for  the  most 
loyal  of  Ministers.  They  are  occasionally  obliged 
to  trim  their  sails  to  a  Parliamentary  breeze ; 
during  the  Soudan  discussions,  indeed,  the  breeze 


CH.  XXII       THE  GORDON  MISSION  423 

rose  almost  to  the  force  of  a  hurricane  ;  and,  when 
this  happens,  the  character  and  reputation  of  their 
representative  abroad  may  suffer.  But  even  then, 
it  will  probably  only  suffer  for  a  time  if  he  has 
a  fairly  good  case  to  show.  Not  only  British 
Ministers,  but  British  public  opinion  are  fair  and 
just  in  the  long  run,  although  both  the  fairness 
and  the  justice  are  at  times  obscured  in  the  midst 
of  a  sharp  party  conflict.  I  often  disagreed  with 
Lord  Granville  during  his  tenure  of  office  ;  but  I 
always  felt  that,  if  I  got  into  any  real  difficulty,  he 
would  support  me  to  the  best  of  his  ability. 

On  December  1,  1883,  I  received  the  following 
telegram  from  Lord  Granville  :  "  If  General  Charles 
Gordon  were  willing  to  go  to  Egypt,  could  he  be  of 
any  use  to  you  or  to  the  Egyptian  Government,  and, 
if  so,  in  what  capacity  ? "  ^  I  did  not  at  that  time 
know  General  Gordon  well,  but  I  had  seen  a  little  of 
him,  and  I  had,  of  course,  heard  much  of  him.  INIy 
first  impression  was  decidedly  adverse  to  his  employ- 
ment in  the  Soudan.  Moreover,  when  I  spoke  to 
Cherif  Pasha  on  the  subject,  I  found  that  he  enter- 
tained strong  objections  to  the  proposal.  I  was 
unwilling  to  put  forward  my  own  objections,  which 
were  in  some  degree  based  on  General  Gordon's 
personal  unfitness  to  undertake  the  work  in  hand. 
In  replying  to  Lord  Granville,  therefore,  I  only 
dwelt  on  the  objections  entertained  by  the  Egyptian 
Government,  which  were  reasonable,  and,  I  thought, 
calculated  to  produce  an  impression  in  London, 
without  bringing  in  the  awkward  question  of  per- 
sonal fitness.  It  was  with  these  feelings  uppermost 
in  my  mind  that,  on  December  2,  I  telegraphed  to 

*  Sir  Henry  Gordon  {Events,  etc.,  p.  322)  says  that  if  General  Gordon 
had  gone  to  Khartoum  six  weeks  earlier  the  result  of  his  mission  "would 
most  likely  have  been  a  complete  success.'  This  conclusion  is,  of 
course,  a  Tnere  conjecture  and  is  incapable  of  proof.  I  see  no  reason  to 
believe  that  the  despatch  of  General  Gordon  to  Khartoum  early  in 
December  would  have  materially  altered  the  course  of  events. 


424  MODERX   EGYPT  pt.  m 

Lord  Granville :  "  The  Egyptian  Government  are 
very  much  averse  to  employing  General  Gordon, 
mainly  on  the  ground  that,  the  moveuient  in  the 
Soudan  being  religious,  the  appointment  of  a 
Christian  in  high  command  would  probably  alienate 
the  tribes  who  remain  faithful.  I  think  it  wise  not 
to  press  them  on  the  subject."  ^ 

The  idea  of  sending  General  Gordon  to  the 
Soudan  was  then  allowed  to  drop  for  a  while,  but 
his  employment  continued  to  be  warmly  advocated 
by  the  press  in  England,  more  especially  by  the 
Pall  Mdll  Gazette,  a  newspaper  which  took  a  lead- 
ing part  in  the  discussion  of  Egyptian  affairs  at 
that  time. 

On  December  22,  I  sent  to  Lord  Granville  a 
telegram  advising  that  the  British  Government 
should  insist  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian 
troops  from  the  Soudan."  I  indicated  that  Cherif 
Pasha  would  probably  resign,  and  I  added  :  "Also, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  send  an  officer  of  high 
authority  to  Khartoum  with  full  powers  to  with- 
draw the  garrisons  and  to  make  the  best 
ments  he  can  for  the  future  of  the  country." 

On  January  7,  the  Ministry  of  Cherif  Pasha 
resi<>'ned,  and  a  new  JNIinistrv  was  formed  under 
the  presidency  of  Nubar  Pasha.  On  January  10, 
Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  me  :  "Could  General 
Charles  Gordon  or  Sir  Charles  AVilson  be  of  assist- 
ance under  altered  circumstances  in  Egypt  ? "  I 
had  had  further  time  to  think  over  this  proposal 
since  sending  my  telegram  of  December  22.  The 
more  I  thought  of  it,  the  less  was  I  inclined  to 
send  General  Gordon,  or,  indeed,  any  Englishman 
to  Khartoum.     I  discussed  the  matter  with  Nubar 

*  Tliere  was  reason  in  the  objection  taken  by  the  Ejryptian  Govern- 
ment. On  March  4,  18B4,  General  Gordon  telej^raphed  from  Kiiar- 
toum  :  "  My  weakness  is  that  of  being  foreign  and  Chi'istian,  and 
peaceful." 

*  Vide  ante,  p.  881. 


CH.XXII       THE  GOllDON  MISSION  425 

Pasha,  and  we  both  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
best  plan  would  be  to  send  Abdul- Kader  Pasha.  He 
had  been  a  former  Governor-General  of  the  Soudan. 
He  had  been  highly  sj)oken  of  by  Colonel  Stewart. 
He  had  the  reputation  of  being  a  courageous  and 
ca])able  soldier.  It  was  under  these  circumstances 
that,  on  January  11,  I  telegraphed  to  Lord  Gran- 
ville :  "  I  have  consulted  with  Nubar  Pasha,  and  I 
do  not  think  that  the  services  of  General  Gordon 
or  Sir  Charles  Wilson  can  be  utilised  at  present." 
I  had  thus  twice  rejected  the  proposal  to  send 
General  Gordon  to  Khartoum.  Would  that  I  had 
done  so  a  third  time  ! 

On  January  14,  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to 
me :  "  Can  you  give  further  information  as  to 
prospects  of  retreat  for  army  and  residents  at 
Khartoum,  and  measures  taken  ? "  On  the  follow- 
ing day  (January  15),  Lord  Granville  telegraphed 
to  me  privately  :  "  I  hear  indirectly  that  Gordon 
is  ready  to  go  straight  to  Suakin  without  passing 
through  Cairo  on  the  following  rather  vague  terms. 
His  mission  to  be  to  report  to  Her  JNIajesty's 
Government  on  the  military  situation  of  the 
Soudan,  and  to  return  without  any  further  engage- 
ment towards  him.  He  would  be  under  you  for 
instructions  and  will  send  letters  through  you 
under  flying  seal.  You  and  Nubar  Pasha  to  give 
him  all  assistance  and  facilities  as  to  telegraph- 
ing, etc.  Egyptian  Government  to  send  Ibraliim 
Bey  Fauzi  to  meet  him  at  Suez,  with  a  writer  to 
attend  on  him.  He  might  be  of  use  in  informhig 
you  and  us  of  the  situation.  It  would  be  popular 
at  home,  but  there  may  be  countervailing  objec- 
tions. Tell  me  your  real  opinion  with  or  without 
Nubar  Pasha."  ^ 

*  Mr.  Morley  {Life  of  Gladstone,  vol.  iii.  p.  140)  says  that,  on  January 
14,  Lord  Granville  wrote  to  Mr.  Gladstone  as  follows  :  "  It  Gordon  says 
he  believes  he  could,  by  his  personal  inliuence,  excite  the  tribes  to 


426  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  in 

On  January  16,  I  sent  two  telegrams  to  Lord 
Granville,  one  ofTicial,  and  the  other  private.  The 
official  telegram  was  as  follows :  "  I  hope  soon  to 
be  able  to  telegraph  fully,  as  the  subject  of  the 
withdrawal  from  Khartoum  is  now  being  discussed. 
There  can  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  very  great 
difficulties  will  be  encountered.  It  was  intended 
to  despatch  Abdul- Kader,  the  new  Minister  of 
War,  to  Khartoum  ;  he  at  first  accepted,  but  now 
declines  to  go.  The  Egyptian  Government  would 
feel  greatly  obliged  if  Her  INIajesty's  Government 
would  select  a  well-qualified  British  officer  to  go 
to  Khartoum  instead  of  the  War  Minister.  He 
would  be  given  full  powers,  both  civil  and  military, 
to  conduct  the  retreat."  At  the  same  time,  I 
sent  the  following  private  telegram  :  "My  official 
telegram  of  to-day,  and  your  private  telegram  of 
yesterday.  Gordon  would  be  the  best  man  if  he 
will  pledge  himself  to  carry  out  the  policy  of  with- 
drawing from  the  Soudan  as  quickly  as  is  possible 
consistently  with  saving  life.  He  must  also  fully 
understand  that  he  must  take  his  instructions  from 
the  British  representative  in  Egypt  and  report  to 
him.^  He  was  at  Brussels  early  this  month  and 
is  now  believed  to  be  in  England.  If  so,  please  see 
him.  I  would  rather  have  him  than  any  one  else, 
provided  there  is  a  perfectly  clear  understanding 
with  him  as  to  what  his  position  is  to  be  and  what 
line  of  policy  he  is  to  carry  out.  Otherwise,  not. 
Failing    him,    consider    Stewart.     Whoever    goes 

escort  the  Khartoum  garrisou  and  inhabitants  to  Suakin,  a  little  pressure 
on  Baring  might  he  advisable."  Mr.  Gladstone  replied  by  telegraph 
that  he  agreed.  Hence,  the  telegram  from  Lord  Granville  to  me  given 
above. 

1  have  been  told  on  good  authority  that  Mr.  Gladstone  was,  in  the 
first  instance,  much  opposed  to  the  despatcli  of  General  Gordon  to  Khar- 
toum, and  tliat  he  only  yielded  witli  great  reluctance  to  the  pressure 
wliiili  was  brought  to  bear  on  him  by  some  of  his  colleagues. 

^  Tlie  reason  why  1  said  this  was  that  I  knew  something  of  General 
Gordon's  erratic  character,  and  I  tliought  that  the  only  chanos  of 
keeping  him  to  his  task  was  to  appeal  to  his  sense  of  discipline. 


CH.  XXII       THE  GORDON  MISSION  427 

should  be  distinctly  warned  that  he  will  undertake 
a  service  of  great  difficulty  and  danger." 

On  January  18,  Lord  Granville  informed  me 
by  telegraph  that  General  Gordon  and  Colonel 
Stewart  would  leave  London  that  evening  for 
Egypt.  On  the  same  day,  Lord  Granville  wrote 
privately  to  me  :  "  1  was  glad  to  get  your  approval 
of  Gordon.  He  may  possibly  be  of  great  use,  and 
the  appointment  will  be  popular  with  many  classes 
in  this  country.  He  praises  you  very  highly  and 
expressed  a  wish  to  be  placed  entirely  under  you." 

General  Gordon's  own  account  of  how  he  came 
to  go  to  the  Soudan  is  as  follows:  "  At  noon  he, 
Wolseley,  came  to  me  and  took  me  to  the  Ministers. 
He  went  in  and  talked  to  the  Ministers,  and  came 
back  and  said :  '  Her  INIajesty's  Government  want 
you  to  undertake  this.  Government  are  deter- 
mined to  evacuate  the  Soudan,  for  they  will  not 
guarantee  future  government.  Will  you  go  and 
do  it  ? '  I  said  :  *Yes.'  He  said  :  'Go  in.'  I  went 
in  and  saw  them.  They  said  :  'Did  Wolseley  tell 
you  your  orders  ?'  I  said  :  '  Yes.'  I  said  :  '  You 
will  not  guarantee  future  government  of  the 
Soudan,  and  you  wish  me  to  go  up  and  evacuate 
now.'  They  said  :  '  Yes,'  and  it  was  over,  and  I 
left  at  8  P.M.  for  Calais."  ^ 

General  Gordon's  appointment,  the  Pall  3Iall 
Gazette  said,  with  perfect  truth,  "  w  as  applauded 
enthusiastically  by  the  press  all  over  the  country 
without  distinction  of  party."  I  was  reproached 
for  having  too  "  tardily  discovered  that  Gordon  was 
the  best  man,"  and  the  Government  were  sharply 
criticised  for  not  having  utilised  his  services  at  an 
earlier  date. 


Mr.   Gladstone's  Government   made  two  jrreat 
dealing  with   Soudan   affj 

*  Letters  to  the  Rev.  J.  Barnes,  1885. 


mistakes  in  dealing  with   Soudan   affairs  in   their 


428  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

early  stages.  Of  these  one  was  a  sin  of  omission, 
and  the  otiier  a  sin  of  commission.  The  sin  of 
omission  was  that  the  Government  did  nothing  to 
stop  the  departure  of  the  Hicks  expedition.  The 
sin  of  commission  was  the  despatch  of  General 
Gordon  to  Khartoum.  Looking  back  at  what 
occurred  after  a  space  of  many  years,  two  points  are 
to  my  mind  clear.  The  first  is  tliat  no  Englishman 
should  have  been  sent  to  Khartoum.  The  second 
is  that,  if  any  one  had  to  be  sent,  General  Gordon 
was  not  the  right  man  to  send. 

The  reasons  why  no  Englishman  should  have 
been  sent  are  now  sufficiently  obvious.  If  he  were 
beleaguered  at  Khartoum,  which  was  possible  and 
even  probable,  the  British  Government  might  be 
obliged  to  send  an  expedition  to  relieve  him.  The 
main  object  of  British  policy  was  to  avoid  behig 
drawn  into  military  operations  in  the  Soudan. 
The  employment  of  a  British  official  at  Khartoum 
involved  a  serious  risk  that  it  would  be  no  longer 
possible  to  adhere  to  this  ])olicy,  and  the  risk  was 
materially  increased  when  the  individual  chosen  to 
go  to  the  Soudan  was  one  who  had  attracted  to 
himself  a  greater  degree  of  popular  sympathy  than 
almost  any  Englishman  of  modern  times.  General 
Gordon,  Lord  Cairns  said  (February  14)  amidst 
the  cheers  of  the  House  of  Lords,  "  is  one  of  our 
national  treasures,"  and,  although  possibly  party 
politicians  used  the  popular  sympathy  with  General 
Gordon  as  a  card  in  the  political  game.  Lord  Cairns's 
expression  faithfully  represented  the  general  tone  of 
British  public  opinion  at  that  time. 

The  Government  scarcely  realised  the  gravity 
of  the  decision  at  which  they  had  arrived.  I 
believe  I  am  correct  in  stating  that  the  question 
was  not  discussed  at  a  Cabinet  Council.  Some 
years  afterwards.  Sir  Charles  Dilke,  who  was  then 
a  member  of  the  Government,  gave  me  the  follow- 


CH.XXII       THE  GORDON  MISSION  429 

ing  extract  from  his  Journal:  "January  18,  1884. 
— Meeting  at  War  Office.  Ld.  G.,  Hartington, 
Northbrook,  and  self.  Decided  to  send  Colonel 
(Jordon  to  Suakin  to  report  on  the  Soudan."^ 

I  think  I  may  say  that  I  saw  the  danger  more 
clearly  than  the  Ministers  in  England,  and  it  was 
on  that  account  that  I  wished  to  send  an  Egyptian 
official  to  Khartoum,  but  I  did  not  realise  it  so 
fully  as  I  should  have  done. 

If,  however,  it  was  a  mistake  to  send  any 
Englishman  to  Khartoum,  it  was  a  still  greater 
mistake  to  choose  General  Gordon  as  the  man  to 
send. 

It  happens  to  most  men  engaged  in  public  life 
that  their  conduct  gives  rise  to  some  differences  of 
opinion.  General  Gordon's  actions  were  rarely 
subjected  to  this  healthy  form  of  criticism.  A 
wave  of  Gordon  cidtus  passed  over  England  in 
1884.  His  personal  character,  which  was  in  many 
respects  noble,  the  circumstances  connected  with 
his  mission  to  the  Soudan,  the  perilous  position 
in  which  he  was  placed  at  Khartoum,  his  heroic 
defence  of  the  town,  and  his  tragic  death,  all 
appealed  powerfully  to  the  imagination  of  a  people, 
who  are  often  supposed  to  be  pre-eminently  cold 

*  On  January  18,  Lord  Northbrook  wrote  privately  to  me  as  follows  : 
"  I  ^ot  a  summons  to-day  to  the  W.  O.  to  meet  C'hiiiese  Gordon  with 
Granville,  Hartington,  and  Dilke.  The  upsliotof  the  meeting  was  that 
he  leaves  by  to-niglit's  mail  for  Suakin  to  report  on  the  best  way  of 
withdrawing  the  garrisons,  settling  the  country,  and  to  perform  such 
other  duties  as  may  be  entrusted  to  him  by  the  Kliedive's  Government 
through  you.  He  will  be  under  you,  and  wishes  it.  He  has  no  doubt 
of  being  able  to  get  on  with  you.  He  was  very  ]io])eful  as  to  the  state 
of  affairs,  does  not  believe  in  the  great  powers  of  the  Mahdi,  does  not 
think  the  tribes  will  go  much  beyond  their  own  confines,  and  does  not 
see  why  the  garrisons  should  not  get  off.  He  did  not  soem  at  all 
anxious  to  retain  the  Soudan,  and  agreed  lieartily  to  accept  tlie  policy 
of  withdrawal." 

The  following  entry  occurs  in  Sir  Mountstuart  Grant  Duff's  Notes 
from  a  Diary  1896-1901,  vol.  ii.  p.  75  :  *' Nortiibrook  said  that,  if  he 
had  previously  read  Gordon's  book,  nothing  would  have  induced  him 
to  couseut  to  his  going  anj'where.     It  was  the  book  of  a  maduiau  !" 


430  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  in 

and  practical,  but  who  in  reality  are  perhaps  more 
led  by  their  emotions  than  any  other  nation  in 
Europe.^  During  this  stage  of  national  excite- 
ment, any  one  who  had  attempted  to  judge  General 
Gordon's  conduct  by  the  canons  of  criticism  which 
are  ordinarily  applied  to  human  action,  would  have 
failed  to  obtain  a  hearing.  His  melancholy  death 
also  silenced  the  voice  of  criticism.  Five  years 
after  its  occurrence,  a  critic,  who  was  disposed  to 
be  hostile  to  General  Gordon  (Colonel  Chaill^ 
Long),  wrote  to  Mr.  Gladstone,  with  a  view  to 
eliciting  an  expression  of  his  opinion  on  General 
Gordon's  conduct.  INIr.  Gladstone,  with  the  mag- 
nanimity of  a  true  statesman  and  the  delicate 
feelings  of  a  gentleman,  declined  to  enter  into  any 
discussion  on  the  subject.^ 

The  public  enthusiasm  which  General  Gordon's 
name  evoked  led  to  some  disastrous  consequences, 
yet  I  cannot  bring  myself  to  condemn  it.  It  was, 
in  fact,  eminently  creditable  to  the  British  public. 
There  was  nothii)<>:  mean  or  self-seekino'  about  it. 
It  was  a  genuine  and  generous  tribute  to  moral 
worth,  and  it  showed  that,  even  in  this  material 
age,  moral  worth  has  a  hold  on  the  public  opinion 
of  at  least  one  great  civilised  country.  It  may  be 
that  the  Gordon  of  real  life  did  not  always  act  quite 
up  to  the  standard  of  the  idealised  hero  who  was 
present  to  the  public  mind,  but,  after  all,  this  is 
merely  to  say  that  he  was  human  and  fallible. 
More  than  this,  whatever  may  have  been  General 
Gordon's  defects,  the  main  lines  of  his  character 
were  really  worthy  of  admiration.  I  do  not  speak 
so  much  of  his  high  courage  and  fertility  in  mili- 

^  It  was,  I  think,  Lord  Beacoiisfield  who  said  that  the  Eiij,''lish  were 
the  most  emotional  i)eople  in  Europe,  and  Lortl  IJeaconsfield  was  a  keen 
observer  of  human  nature.  Lord  Salisbury  once  wrote  to  me:  "  It 
is  easier  to  combat  with  the  rinderpest  or  the  cholera  than  with  a 
popular  sentiment." 

2  BelJ'ord'n  Ahiijazlne,  SepLeniber  1890,  p.  549. 


CH.XXII       THE  GORDON  MISSION  431 

tary  resource,  though  in  these  respects  he  was 
remarkable,  but  of  his  moral  qualities.  His  reli- 
gious convictions,  though  eccentric,  were  sincere. 
No  one  could  doubt  the  remarkable  purity  of  his 
private  life,  or  his  lofty  disinterestedness  as  regards 
objects,  such  as  money  and  rank,  which  usually 
excite  the  ambition  of  mankind.  His  aims  in  life 
were  unquestionably  high  and  noble. 

Besides  his  moral  qualities,  there  was  another 
point  in  General  Gordon's  character,  which  was 
eminently  calculated  to  attract  tlie  sympathy  of 
the  British  public.  He  was  thoroughly  uncon- 
ventional. He  chafed  under  disci})line,  and  was 
never  tired  of  pouring  forth  the  vials  of  his  wrath 
on  the  official  classes.^  Mistrust  of  Government 
officials  is  engrained  in  tlie  Eno-lish  character,  and 
I  may  add  that  I  hope  the  dislike  of  being 
over  -  governed  will  ever  continue  to  exist  in 
England. 

It  is  dangerous  when  either  an  individual  or  a 
nation  allow  their  imagination  to  predominate  ovei" 
their  reason,  and  this  is  what  the  British  nation 
did  under  the  spell  of  General  Gordon's  name. 
But  it  is  perhaps  better  that  the  national  imagina- 
tion should  even  run  riot  at  times  in  a  o-ood  cause 
rather  than  that  a  dull  level  of  practical  utility 
should  invariably  be  maintained,  and  that  the 
imaginative  qualities  should  be  discarded  alto- 
gether. Enthusiasts  are  troublesome  to  politicians 
and  diplomatists,  but  the  world  would  be  dull 
without  them.  The  enthusiastic  and  emotional 
classes   found,   or   thought   they   had   found  their 

*  General  Gordon,  who  had  a  keen  sense  of  humour,  was  fully  aware 
of  his  own  unfitness  for  official  employment.  "  I  own,"  he  wrote  in  his 
Journal  (p.  59),  "to  luivino;  l)een  very  insubordinate  to  Her  Majesty's 
Ciovernment  and  its  officials,  but  it  is  my  nature,  and  I  cannot  help  it. 
I  tear  I  have  not  even  tried  to  play  battledore  and  shuttlecock  with 
them.  I  know  if  1  was  chief  I  would  never  employ  m;/,\e/J',  for  I  am 
incorris^ible.  To  meu  like  Dilke,  who  weigh  every  word,  I  must  be 
perfect  poison." 


432  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  in 

ideal  type  in  General  Gordon,  and  accordingly 
they  bestowed  on  him  extreme,  sometimes  ex- 
travagant eulogy.^ 

General  Gordon  was  no  friend  to  the  particular 
official  class  to  which  I  belonged.  "  I  must  say," 
he  wrote,  "  I  hate  our  diplomatists.  I  think,  with 
few  exceptions,  they  are  arrant  humbugs ;  and  I 
expect  they  know  it."  Acting  on  this  general 
principle,  General  Gordon  in  his  Journal  which, 
when  it  was  first  published,  was  probably  read 
by  almost  every  educated  man  in  England,  held 
up  Mr.  (subsequently.  Sir  Edwin)  Egerton,^  myself 
and  others  to  odium  and  ridicule.  To  all  this, 
acting  on  Mr.  Gladstone's  principle,  I  shall  not 
attempt  to  reply,  more  especially  as  I  feel  sure 
that,  had  he  lived,  no  one  would  have  regretted 
what  he  wrote  more  than  General  Gordon  himself 
But  I  must,  for  the  elucidation  of  this  narrative, 

1  Unquestionably,  officialism  and  enthusiasm — notably  undisciplined 
enthusiasm— we  se  murient  pas,  as  the  French  would  say.  At  the  same 
time,  strang-e  as  it  may  appear  to  some  sections  of  the  public,  it  is 
quite  possible  to  have  a  genuine  sympathy  for  suffering  humanity 
without  constantly  mouthing-  the  catchpenny  phrases  which  form  to 
so  large  an  extent  the  stock-in-trade  of  the  professional  "friends  of 
humanity."  These  latter  are  usually  not  over-cliaritable  to  those  who 
cannot  accept,  and  at  once  carry  into  execution,  the  whole  of  their 
idealist  programmes.  There  appears  to  be  much  truth  in  Mr.  John 
Morley's  remark  {Robespierre,  p.  59),  that  "  the  most  ostentatious  faith 
in  humanity  in  general  seems  always  to  beget  the  sharpest  mistrust  of 
all  human  beings  in  particular."  1  should  term  most  of  the  leading 
British  officials  in  Egypt  humanitarians  under  any  reasonable  inter- 
pretation of  that  term,  but  the  responsible  nature  of  their  position 
naturally  obliges  them  to  look  at  the  questions  with  which  they 
have  to  deal  from  many,  and  not  merely  from  one  point  of  view. 

2  Mr.  Egerton  acted  as  my  locum  tenens  when  I  was  temporarily 
absent  from  Cairo  in  1884. 

I  saw  (Jeneral  Gordon's  Journal  in  manuscript  before  it  was  printed. 
I  know  that  I  am  correct  in  saying  that  the  Government  would  have  pre- 
ferred that  the  Journal  should  liave  been  published  without  any  omissions. 
At  the  instance,  lutwever,  of  (Jeneral  Gordon's  friends  and  family,  a 
good  deal  of  violent  and  very  foolish  abuse  of  I>ord  Granville — and,  if  I 
remember  rightly,  of  others — was  omitted.  It  is,  in  my  opinion,  to  be 
regretted  that  this  was  done.  The  publication  of  the  Journal,  as  it  was 
originally  written,  would  have  enabled  the  public  to  judge  more  accu- 
rately of  the  value  of  General  Gordon's  criticisms,  than  was  possible 
when  only  an  expurgated  edition  was  issued. 


OH.  XXII       THE  GORDON  MISSION  433 

state  why  I  think  it  was  a  mistake  to  send  General 
Gordon  to  Khartoum. 

"  It  is  impossible,"  I  wrote  privately  to  Lord 
Granville  on  January  28,  1884,  "not  to  be  charmed 
by  the  simplicity  and  honesty  of  Gordon's  character." 
"  My  only  fear,"  I  added,  "  is  that  he  is  terribly 
flighty  and  changes  his  opinions  very  rapidly.  I 
am  glad  that  Stewart,  who  impressed  me  favour- 
ably, is  going  with  him,  but  I  do  not  think  Gordon 
much  likes  it  himself.  He  said  to  me  :  '  They  sent 
him  (Stewart)  with  me  to  be  my  wet-nurse.'"^ 
Impulsive  flightiness  was,  in  fact,  the  main  defect 
of  General  Gordon's  character,  and  it  was  one 
which,  in  my  opinion,  rendered  him  unfit  to  carry 
out  a  work  which  pre-eminently  required  a  cool 
and  steady  head.  I  used  to  receive  some  twenty 
or  thirty  telegrams  from  General  Gordon  in  the 
course  of  the  day  when  he  was  at  Khartoum,  those 
in  the  evening  often  giving  opinions  which  it  was 
impossible  to  reconcile  with  others  despatched 
the  same  morning.  Scarcely,  indeed,  had  General 
Gordon  started  on  his  mission,  when  Lord  Gran- 
ville, who  does  not  appear  at  first  to  have  under- 
stood General  Gordon's  character,  began  to  be 
alarmed  at  his  impulsiveness.  On  February  8, 
Lord  Granville  wrote  to  me  :  "  I  own  your  letters 
about  Gordon  rather  alarm.  His  changes  about 
Zobeir  are  difficult  to  understand.^  Northbrook 
consoles  me  by  saying  that  he  says  all  the  foolish 
things  that  pass  through  his  head,  but  that  his 
judgment  is  excellent."     I  am  not  prepared  to  go 

^  Whilst  on  his  way  to  Khartoum,  Colonel  Stewart  wrote  me  a  letter, 
from  which  it  was  clear  that,  at  one  time,  the  relations  between  him 
and  General  Gordon  were  much  strained.  He  asked  me  to  tear  it  up 
directly  I  had  read  it,  without  showing  it  to  any  one.  This  I  accordingly 
did.  Subsequently,  they  appear  to  have  been  fully  reconciled,  but  it  was 
only  natural  that  there  should  have  been  occasional  jars  between  two 
men  of  such  very  different  characters  and  habits  of  thought 

^  This  is  an  allusion  to  circumstances  which  took  place  at  Cairo,  and 
which  will  be  presently  narrated. 

VOL.  I  2  F 


434  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

so  far  as  to  say  that  General  Gordon's  judgment 
was  excellent.  Nevertlieless,  there  was  some  truth 
in  Lord  Xorthbrook's  remark.  I  often  found  that, 
amidst  a  mass  of  irrelevant  verbiage  and  amidst 
many  contradictory  ophiions,  a  vein  of  sound 
common  sense  and  political  instinct  ran  through 
General  Gordon's  proposals.  So  much  was  I 
impressed  with  this,  and  so  fearful  was  I  that  the 
sound  portions  of  his  proposals  would  be  rejected 
in  London  on  account  of  the  eccentric  language 
in  which  they  were  often  couched,  that,  on 
February  12,  I  telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville: 
"  In  considering  Gordon's  suggestions,  please  re- 
member that  his  general  views  are  excellent,  but 
that  undue  importance  must  not  be  attached  to 
his  words.  We  must  look  to  the  spirit  rather 
than  the  letter  of  what  he  says." 

In  spite  of  General  Gordon's  high  qualities, 
however,  I  do  not  think  that  a  man  of  his  peculiar 
character  was  a  proper  person  to  send  on  such  an 
extremely  difficult  mission  as  that  of  arranging 
for  the  evacuation  of  the  Soudan.  The  task  was, 
indeed,  so  difficult  that  it  is  probable  that  no  one 
could  have  carried  it  out  successfully,  but  I  believe 
that  a  better  chance  of  success  would  have  pre- 
sented itself  if  Colonel  Stewart  had  been  sent 
without  General  Gordon.  It  is  singular  how 
entirely  General  Gordon's  reputation  has  over- 
shadowed that  of  Colonel  Stewart.  I  have  rarely 
come  across  anybody  wlio  impressed  me  more 
favourably  than  this  cool,  sagacious,  and  courageous 
soldier.  His  premature  death  was  a  great  loss 
both  to  England  and  to  Egypt. 

One  further  point  remains  to  be  considered. 
Who  was  responsible  for  sending  General  Gordon  ? 

In  a  sense,  the  main  responsibility  rests  with  the 
press  of  England,  and,  notably,  with  the  Pall  Mall 
Gazette.     The  people  of  England,  as  represented 


CH.  XXII       THE  GORDON  MISSION  435 

by  the  press,  insisted  on  sending  General  Gordon  to 
the  Soudan,  and  accordingly  to  the  Soudan  he  was 
sent.  "Anonymous  authorship,"  one  of  the  wisest 
political  thinkers  of  modern  times  has  stated, 
'*  places  the  public  under  the  direction  of  guides 
who  have  no  sense  of  personal  responsibility."  ^  The 
arguments  in  favour  of  newspaper  influence  are  too 
commonplace  to  require  mention.  But  newspaper 
government  has  certain  disadvantages,  and  these 
disadvantages  were  never  more  clearly  shown  than 
in  the  incident  now  under  discussion. 

The  attitude  of  the  British  press,  however, 
though  it  may  be  pleaded  in  palliation  of  the 
mistake  which  was  made,  does  not,  of  course, 
exonerate  the  Government  from  responsibility. 
The  truth  is,  that  Mr.  Gladstone's  Government 
did  not  fully  realise  the  importance  of  the  step  they 
were  taking.  Whilst  entirely  agreeing  in  the  policy 
of  evacuating  the  Soudan,  I  had  pressed  upon  the 
Government  the  extreme  difficulty  of  carrying  the 
policy  into  execution.  I  had  told  Lord  Granville 
that  any  one  who  went  to  the  Soudan  would 
"  undertake  a  service  of  great  difficulty  and  danger." 
But  these  warnings  fell  unheeded,  neither  can  it  be 
any  matter  for  surprise  that  they  should  have  done 
so,  for  the  one  person  who  the  Government  were  told 
on  all  sides  was  the  highest  authority  on  Soudan 
affairs,  namely.  General  Gordon  himself,  did  not 
share  my  apprehensions  in  any  degree ;  neither 
was  any  danger-signal  hoisted  by  Colonel  Stewart. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  when  General  Gordon 
was  in  London,  his  views  were  far  too  optimistic. 
He  did  not  rightly  appreciate  either  the  state  of 
affairs  which  then  existed  in  the  Soudan,  or  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  task  which  he  had  undertaken.  Being 
deceived   himself,  it   was   natural  that   lie  should, 

^  Sir  G.  Coniewall  Lewis,  On  the  Injluence  of  Authority  in  Matters  oj 
Opinion,  p.  355. 


436  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

quite  unintentionally,  have  deceived  the  Govern- 
ment, and  should  have  encouraged  them  in  the 
optimism  to  which  all  Governments  are  somewhat 
prone.^  On  January  28,  after  having  seen  General 
Gordon,  I  wrote  to  Lord  Granville :  "  Gordon 
speaks  very  hopefully  of  being  able  to  do  the  whole 
thing  in  tiiree  or  four  months."  So  late  as  Feb- 
ruary 20,  that  is  to  say,  two  days  after  his  arrival 
at  Khartoum,  General  Gordon  wrote  to  Colonel 
Coetlogon  :  "  I  have  proposed  to  you  to  go  back  to 
Cairo  because,  in  my  belief,  there  is  not  the  least 
chance  of  any  danger  being  now  incurred  in 
Khartoum,  which  I  consider  as  safe  as  Cairo.  .  .  . 
You  may  rest  assured  that  you  leave  a  place  which 
is  as  safe  as  Kensington  Park." 

To  sum  up, — the  main  defence  of  the  Govern- 
ment, for  what  it  is  worth,  is  contained  in  the 
saying  of  the  French  revolutionary  leader  when  he 
was  reproached  for  obeying,  the  dictates  of  the 
Jacobin  mob  :  *' Je  suis  leur  chef;  il  faut  que  je  les 
suive."  The  Government  did  not  attempt  to  guide 
public  opinion.  They  followed  it.  Nevertheless, 
the  opinions  which  General  Gordon  entertained, 
may  be  pleaded  as  some  justification  for  the  line  of 
policy  adopted  by  the  Government.  If  the  British 
Ministers  erred  on  the  side  of  optimism,  it  is 
certain  that  their  optimistic  views  were  shared  by 
General  Gordon,  and,  indeed,  were  largely  based  on 
what  he  said  both  before  leaving  London  and  whilst 
on  his  way  to  Khartoum. 

So  far  as  my  personal  responsibility  is  concerned, 
I  can  plead  no  such  justification,  or,  at  all  events, 
I  can  only  plead  it  to  a  less  degree.     I  was  never 

*  On  September  28,  1884,  General  Gordon  wrote  in  his  Journal 
(p.  110):  "The  Government  may  say  that  tiiey  liad  reasonable  hopea 
that  I  would  succeed  ;  1  will  neither  say  1  gave  them  such  assurance 
or  that  1  did  not  give  it.  I  think  1  was  neutral  in  giving  or  in  not 
giving  such  an  assurance."  When  General  Gordon  wrote  this,  he 
must  have  forgotten  many  of  his  previous  utterances. 


OH.  XXII       THE  GORDON  MISSION  437 

under  any  delusion  as  to  the  difficulties  of  the  task 
which  General  Gordon  had  undertaken,  or  as  to  the 
personal  danger  which  he  and  Colonel  Stewart 
would  run.  More  than  this,  I  mistrusted  General 
Gordon's  judgment,  and  I  was  in  reality  adverse  to 
his  employment.  I  am  not  now  making  use  of  ea^ 
post  facto  arguments.  I  have  such  a  vivid  recol- 
lection of  my  own  frame  of  mind  at  that  time,  that 
I  can  state  very  positively  why  it  was  that,  after 
having  twice  refused  to  utilise  General  Gordon's 
services,  I  yielded  on  being  pressed  a  third  time 
by  Lord  Granville.  I  believed  that  at  that  time 
I  stood  alone  in  hesitating  to  employ  General 
Gordon.  Public  opinion  in  England  was  calling 
loudly  for  his  employment.  Lord  Granville's 
telegrams,  though  couched  in  language  from  which 
it  might  be  inferred  that  the  Government  would 
defer  to  my  opinion,  showed,  nevertheless,  clearly 
enough  a  strong  wish  on  the  part  of  the  Govern- 
ment that  General  Gordon  should  be  employed. 
Nubar  Pasha  concurred  in  this  view.  I  did  not, 
however,  attach  much  importance  to  his  opinion 
on  the  special  point  at  issue.  Sir  Evelyn  AA^ood's 
opinion  carried  more  weight  with  me.  He  was 
favourable  to  the  employment  of  General  Gordon. 
So  also  was  Colonel  Watson,  who  was  at  that 
time  on  the  staff  of  the  Egyptian  army,  and  who 
spoke  with  the  authority  of  one  who  knew  General 
Gordon  well,  having  served  under  him  in  the 
Soudan. 

With  this  array  of  opinion  against  me,  I  mis- 
trusted my  own  judgment.  I  did  not  yield  because 
I  hesitated  to  stand  up  against  the  storm  of  public 
opinion.  I  gave  a  reluctant  assent,  in  reality 
against  my  own  judgment  and  inclination,  because 
I  thought  that,  as  everybody  differed  from  me,  I 
must  be  wrong.  I  also  thought  that  I  might  be 
unconsciously  prejudiced  against  General  Gordon 


438  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iii 

from  the  fact  that  his  habits  of  thought  and 
modes  of  action  in  dealing  with  pubhc  affairs 
differed  widely  from  mine. 

In  yielding,  I  made  a  mistake  which  I  shall 
never  cease  to  regret.  It  may  well  be  that,  had  I 
not  yielded,  the  result  would  have  been  the  same. 
The  public  feeling  in  favour  of  sending  General 
Gordon  was  so  strong  as  to  be  almost  irresistible. 
But  this  consideration  does  not  constitute  any 
consolation  to  me.  By  yielding,  I  rendered  myself 
in  some  degree  responsible  for  all  the  valuable 
lives  which  were  lost,  and  the  treasure  which  was 
subsequently  expended  in  the  Soudan. 

The  whole  incident  left  a  strong  impression  on 
my  mind.  Unquestionably,  much  harm  has  been 
done  at  times  by  Governments  failing  to  yield,  or 
yielding  too  late,  to  a  clear  and  unmistakable  ex- 
pression of  public  opinion.  Nothing,  in  fact,  can 
be  more  foolish  or  hurtful  than  that  officials  should 
unreasonably  oppose  a  stiff  barrier  of  bureaucratic 
obstruction  to  the  views  of  the  outside  public.  If 
they  do  so,  they  are  liable  to  be  swept  away.  But 
occasions  do  occur,  which  in  these  democratic  days 
are  becoming  more  rather  than  less  frequent,  when 
the  best  service  a  Government  official  can  render 
to  his  country  is  to  place  himself  in  opposition  to 
the  public  view.  Indeed,  if  he  feels  certain  that  he 
is  right,  it  is  his  bounden  duty  to  do  so,  especially 
in  respect  to  questions  as  to  which  public  opinion 
in  England  is  ill-informed.  Such  an  occasion  ])re- 
sented  itself  when  there  was  a  question  of  sending 
General  Gordon  to  the  Soudan.  It  was  worth  while 
to  incur  a  good  deal  of  unpopularity  and  misie])re- 
sentation  in  order  to  save  the  Government  and  the 
nation  from  making  so  great  a  mistake.  "  A  man," 
it  has  been  truly  said,  "  who  never  disagrees  with 
his  countrymen,  and  who  shrinks  from  unpopularity 
as  the  worst  of  all  evils,  can  never  have  a  share  in 


CH.XXII       THE  GORDON  MISSION  439 

moulding  the  traditions  of  a  virile  race,  though  for 
a  time  he  may  make  its  fashions."  ^  I  repeat, 
therefore,  that  I  shall  never  cease  to  regret  that 
I  did  not  stand  to  my  guns  and  maintain,  to  the 
best  of  my  ability,  my  original  objections  to  the 
Gordon  mission.  Had  I  known  General  Gordon 
better,  I  should  certainly  never  have  agreed  to  his 
employment. 

*  Oliver's  Alexander  Hamilton,  p.  436. 


CHAPTER    XXIII 

GORDON    AT    CAIRO 

January  24-26,  1884 

General  Gordon  wishes  to  go  to  Suakin — He  goes  to  Cairo — (!!on- 
sequences  which  resulted  from  the  change  of  route — General 
Gordon's  views  as  to  the  Soudan — His  London  instructions — 
Instructions  issued  at  Cairo — General  Gordon  appointed  Governor- 
General  of  the  Soudan — And  furnished  with  certain  Proclamations 
— Reasons  why  General  Gordon's  instructions  were  changed — 
The  Darfour  Sultan — General  Gordon  proposes  tliat  Zobeir  Pasha 
should  accompany  him — Interview  between  General  Gordon  and 
Zobeir  Pasha — It  is  decided  not  to  employ  Zobeir  Pasha — General 
Gordon  leaves  Cairo. 

When,  on  January  18,  Lord  Granville  informed 
me  that  General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  were 
about  to  proceed  to  Egypt,  be  added  tbat  General 
Gordon  was  anxious  not  to  go  to  Cairo,  and  tbat 
he  would  go  through  the  Suez  Canal  straight  to 
Suakin.  I  was  requested  to  meet  him  at  Ismailia. 
The  reason  why  General  Gordon  did  not  wish  to 
visit  Cairo  was  obvious.  He  had  publicly  criticised 
the  conduct  of  the  Khedive  in  no  measured  terms, 
and  did  not  wish  to  meet  him. 

The  road  from  Suakin  to  Berber  was  at  this 
time  blocked.  The  tribes  were  in  a  state  of  open 
rebellion,  and  had  gained  a  series  of  successes  over 
the  Egyptian  troops.  It  was  certain  that  General 
Gordon  would  never  be  able  to  reach  Khartoum 
by  the  Suakin  route.  I,  therefore,  telegraphed 
to  Eord  Granville,  on  January  19,  urging  the 
desirability  of  General  Gordon's  coming  to  Cairo. 
Lord    Granville  supported   my  view.     The   result 

440 


CH.  XXIII         GORDON  AT  CAIRO  411 

was  that  General  Gordon  came  to  Cairo.  He 
arrived  on  the  evening  of  January  24. 

If  I  had  not  interfered  as  regards  General 
Gordon's  route,  a  point  which  seemed  at  the 
time  to  be  one  of  detail,  the  course  of  history 
in  the  Soudan  would  have  been  changed  and 
many  valuable  lives,  including  probably  that  of 
General  Gordon  himself,  would  have  been  saved. 
General  Gordon  would  possibly  never  have  got 
to  Khartoum,  and  it  would  not,  therefore,  have 
been  necessary  to  send  any  British  expedition  to 
the  Soudan.  It  is  probable,  indeed  almost  certain, 
that  in  a  few  weeks  he  would  have  returned 
to  England  without  having  effected  anything  of 
importance  towards  the  accomplishment  of  his 
mission.  I  remember  that  it  crossed  my  mind 
that  I  had  better  not  interfere,  but  leave  General 
Gordon  to  work  out  his  plans  in  his  own  way. 
It  was,  however,  clear  that,  in  going  to  Suakin, 
General  Gordon  would  foredoom  his  mission  to 
failure,  and  that  he  would  never  have  made  any 
such  proposal  had  he  been  well  acquainted  with 
the  state  of  affairs  then  existing  in  the  Eastern 
Soudan.  I  had,  therefore,  excellent  reasons  for 
interfering,  but,  looking  back  upon  events  as  they 
subsequently  occurred,  I  regret  that  I  did  so. 

On  the  morning  of  January  25,  General  Gordon 
accompanied  me  to  the  Ismailia  Palace  to  see  the 
Khedive.  Colonel  Stewart  wrote  in  his  journal  : 
''Gordon  apologised  to  Tewfik  for  his  former 
brusque  behaviour,  and  the  interview  went  off 
very  well 

The  question  of  General  Gordon's  instructions 
then  had  to  be  discussed.  I  shall  have  to  deal 
with  this  matter  at  some  length,  as  it  has  formed 
the  subject  of  much  misapprehension.^ 

^  For  iustance.  Sir  William  Butler  {Charles  George  Gordon,  p.  200) 
says:   ''Few  persons  are  aware  that  the  English  Government  knew 


442  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

On  January  23,  whilst  on  his  way  to  Egypt, 
General  Gordon  wrote  a  Memorandum  settinir 
forth  the  line  of  policy  which  he  proposed  to 
pursue  in  the  Soudan.  It  contained  the  following 
passage : 

"My  idea  is  that  the  restoration  of  the  country 
should  be  made  to  the  different  petty  Sultans,  who 
existed  at  the  time  of  Mehemet  All's  conquests, 
and  whose  families  still  exist ;  that  the  Mahdi 
should  be  left  altogether  out  of  the  calculations  as 
regards  the  handing  over  of  the  country,  and  that 
it  should  be  optional  with  the  Sultans  to  accept 
his  supremacy  or  not.  As  these  Sultans  would 
probably  not  be  likely  to  gain  by  accepting  the 
Mahdi  as  their  sovereign,  it  is  probable  that  they 
will  hold  to  their  independent  positions.  .  .  .  The 
most  difficult  question  is  how,  and  to  whom,  to 
hand  over  the  arsenals  of  Khartoum,  Dongola,  and 
Kassala,  which  towns  have,  so  to  say,  no  old- 
standing  families,  Khartoum  and  Kassala  having 
sprung  up  since  Mehemet  All's  conquest.  Prob- 
ably it  would  be  advisable  to  postpone  any  decision 
as  to  these  towns  till  such  time  as  the  inhabitants 
have  made  known  their  opinion." 

Colonel  Stewart  in  recording  his  "cordial 
agreement "  with  General  Gordon's  views,  added  : 
"  Handing  back  the  territories  to  the  families  of 
the  dispossessed  Sultans  is  an  act  of  justice  both 
towards  them  and  their  people.  The  latter,  at  any 
rate,  will  no  longer  be  at  the  mercy  of  foreign  mer- 
cenaries, and  if  they  are  tyrannised  over,  it  will  be 
more  or  less  their  own  fault.  Handing  back  the 
districts  to  the  old  families  is  also  a  politic  act,  as 
raising  up  a  rival  power  to  that  of  the  INIahdi.  As 
it  is  impossible  for  Her  Majesty's  Government  to 

nothing  of  the  appointment  of  their  officer  as  Governor-General  of  the 
Soudan^  or  of  the  clianj^e  of  his  destination  from  iSuakin  to  tlie  Nile 
route,  until  some  days  after  hoth  had  been  ejected  by  our  Minister  in 
Cairo."     Both  of  these  statement  are  devoid  of  foundation. 


CH.  xxm         GORDON  AT  CAIRO  443 

foresee  all  the  eventualities  that  may  arise  during 
the  evacuation,  it  seems  to  me  as  the  more  judicious 
course  to  rely  on  the  discretion  of  General  Gordon 
and  his  knowledge  of  the  country." 

The  policy  of  setting  up  the  local  Sultans  to 
govern  the  country  appeared  at  the  time  wise  and 
politic;  but,  looking  at  events  with  an  after-know- 
ledge of  what  subsequently  happened,  it  is  evident 
that  General  Gordon  both  underrated  the  power  of 
the  JNIahdi,  and  overrated  the  influence  of  the  local 
Sultans.  The  most  powerful  and  warlike  tribes 
in  the  Soudan  were  partisans  of  the  Mahdi.  The 
families  of  the  local  Sultans,  who  had  governed  the 
Soudan  in  former  times,  had  lost  all  hold  on  the 
public  opinion  of  the  country. 

JNIoreover,  General  Gordon  himself  indicated  one 
great  difficulty  in  the  way  of  giving  effect  to  this 
policy.  It  was  that,  in  respect  to  Khartoum, 
Dongola,  and  Kassala,  there  were  "  no  old-standing 
families."  Now,  whoever  holds  Khartoum,  domi- 
nates a  large  part  of  the  Soudan  ;  unless,  therefore, 
the  policy  in  question  could  be  carried  into  execu- 
tion as  regards  Khartoum,  it  was  almost  sure  to 
fall  to  the  ground  altogether. 

When  General  Gordon  arrived  in  Egypt,  I 
received  a  copy  of  the  instructions,  dated  January 
18,  which  were  given  to  him  in  London  by  Lord 
Granville.  The  principal  portion  of  these  instruc- 
tions was  as  follows  : — 

*'  Her  Majesty's  Government  are  desirous  that 
you  should  proceed  at  once  to  Egypt  to  report  to 
them  on  the  military  situation  in  the  Soudan,  and 
on  the  measures  which  it  may  be  advisable  to  take 
for  the  security  of  the  Egyptian  garrisons  still 
holding  positions  in  that  country,  and  for  the 
safety  of  the  European  population  in  Khartoum. 

"  Vou  are  also  desired  to  consider  and  report 
upon  the  best  mode  of  effecting  the  evacuation  of 


444  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

the  interior  of  the  Soudan,  and  upon  the  manner 
in  which  the  safety  and  the  good  administration 
by  the  Egyptian  Government  of  the  parts  on  the 
sea-coast  can  best  be  secured.  .  .  . 

"  You  will  consider  yourself  authorised  and 
instructed  to  perform  such  other  duties  as  the 
Egyptian  Government  may  desire  to  intrust  to 
you  and  as  may  be  communicated  to  you  by  Sir 
E.  Baring." 

On  the  morning  of  January  25,  a  meeting  took 
place  to  consider  whether,  acting  on  the  authority 
I  had  received  from  Lord  Granville,  I  should  issue 
further  instructions  to  General  Gordon.  At  this 
meeting  were  present  Nubar  Pasha,  General  Gordon, 
Colonel  Stewart,  Sir  Evelyn  AVood,  and  myself 
After  a  long  discussion,  the  meeting  was  adjourned 
till  the  following  afternoon.  It  was  arranged 
that,  in  the  interval,  I  was  to  embody  in  a  letter 
addressed  to  General  Gordon  the  conclusions  at 
which  we  had  arrived. 

On  the  occasion  of  the  second  meeting,  I  went 
through  the  draft  instructions  which  I  had  pre- 
pared, and  discussed  them  with  General  Gordon 
and  the  others  who  were  present.  A  few 
changes  were  made.  The  following  extracts  will 
be  sufficient  to  show  the  leading  features  of  these 
instructions : — 

"It  is  believed  that  the  number  of  the  Euro- 
peans at  Khartoum  is  very  small,  but  it  has  been 
estimated  by  the  local  authorities  that  some 
10,000  to  15,000  people  will  wish  to  move  north- 
wards from  Khartoum  only  when  the  Egyptian 
garrison  is  withdrawn.  These  people  are  native 
Christians,  Egyptian  employees,  their  wives  and 
children,  etc.  The  Government  of  His  Highness 
the  Kliedive  are  earnestly  solicitous  tiiat  no  effort 
should  be  spared  to  ensure  the  retreat  both  of  these 
people  and  of  the  Egyptian  garrison  without  loss 


OH.  XXIII         GORDON  AT  CAIRO  445 

of  life.  As  regards  the  most  opportune  time  and 
the  best  method  for  effecting  tlie  retreat,  whether 
of  the  garrisons  or  of  tlie  civil  populations,  it  is 
neither  necessary  nor  desirable  that  you  should 
receive  detailed  instructions.  .  .  . 

"  You  will  bear  in  mind  that  the  main  end  to  be 
pursued  is  the  evacuation  of  the  Soudan.  This 
policy  was  adopted,  after  very  full  discussion,  by 
the  Egyptian  Government,  on  the  advice  of  Her 
Majesty's  Government.  It  meets  with  the  full 
approval  of  His  Highness  the  Khedive,  and  of  the 
present  Egyptian  Ministry.  I  understand,  also, 
that  you  entirely  concur  in  the  desirability  of 
adopting  this  policy,  and  that  you  think  it  should 
on  no  account  be  chanoed.^  You  consider  that  it 
may  take  a  few  months  to  carry  it  out  with  safety. 
You  are  further  of  opinion  that  '  the  restoration  of 
the  country  should  be  made  to  the  different  petty 
Sultans  who  existed  at  the  time  of  Mehemet  Ali's 
conquest,  and  whose  families  still  exist ;  and  that 
an  endeavour  should  be  made  to  form  a  confedera- 
tion of  those  Sultans.'  In  this  view,  the  Egyptian 
Government  entirely  concur.  It  will,  of  course,  be 
fully  understood  that  the  Egyptian  troops  are  not 
to  be  kept  in  the  Soudan  merely  with  a  view  to 
consolidating  the  power  of  the  new  rulers  of  the 
country.  But  the  Egyptian  Government  have  the 
fullest  confidence  in  your  judgment,  your  know- 
ledge of  the  country,  and  your  comprehension  of 
the  general  line  of  policy  to  be  pursued.  You  are, 
therefore,  given  full  discretionary  power  to  retain 
the  troops  for  such  reasonable  period  as  you  may 
think  necessary,  in  order  that  the  abandonment 
of  the  country  may  be  accomplished  with  the  least 
possible  risk  to  life  and  property. 

"  A  credit  of  £100,000  has  been  opened  for  you 

*  The  last  part  of  this  sentence  was  added  at  Gordon's  own  request 
(vide  ante,  p.  390). 


446  MODERN   EGYPT  pi\  in 

at  the  Finance  Department,  and  further  funds  will 
be  supplied  to  you  on  your  requisition  when  this 
sum  is  exhausted." 

Simultaneously  with  the  issue  of  these  instruc- 
tions, a  letter  was  addressed  by  the  Khedive  to 
General  Gordon  appointing  him  Governor-General 
of  the  Soudan.  General  Gordon  was,  at  the  same 
time,  furnished  with  two  Proclamations  from  the 
Khedive  addressed  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Soudan. 
In  one  of  these,  the  appointment  of  General  Gordon 
to  be  Governor-General  was  notified,  and  the  people 
were  invited  to  obey  his  orders.  In  the  other 
Proclamation,  more  distinct  allusion  was  made  to 
the  intention  of  the  Government  to  evacuate  the 
Soudan.  "We  have  decided,"  it  was  said,  "to 
restore  to  the  families  of  the  kings  of  the  Soudan 
their  former  independence." 

"  General  Gordon,"  I  wrote  to  Lord  Granville 
on  February  1,  "has  authority  and  discretion  to 
issue  one  or  other  of  these  Proclamations  whenever 
he  may  think  it  desirable  to  do  so.  He  fully 
understands  that  he  is  going  to  Khartoum  for  the 
purpose  of  carrying  out  the  policy  of  evacuation, 
and  has  expressed  to  me  his  fullest  concurrence  in 
the  wisdom  of  this  policy.  Your  Lordship  will 
have  seen,  by  my  instructions  to  him,  that  no 
doubt  is  left  on  this  point,  and  these  instructions 
were  drafted  at  the  request  and  with  the  entire 
approval  of  General  Gordon  himself  It  was, 
however,  thought  desirable,  after  full  discussion 
here,  that  the  widest  discretionary  powers  should 
be  given  to  General  Gordon  as  regards  the  manner 
of  carrying  out  the  policy,  and  as  to  the  best  time 
and  mode  of  announcing  it  at  Khartoum." 

It  has  been  frequently  stated,  first,  that  the 
instructions  which  General  Gordon  received  at  Cairo 
differed  so  widely  from  those  which  were  given 
to  him  in  London  as  to  alter  entirely  the  character 


cH.  XXIII         GORDON  AT  CAIRO  447 

of  his  mission  ;  and,  secondly,  that  the  change  in 
his  instructions  was  effected  by  myself  without 
any  reference  to  London.  These  statements  were 
freely  made  by  the  press.  They  were  echoed  by 
Mr.  Egmont  Hake,  Sir  William  Butler,  and  others 
who  have  written  on  the  Gordon  Mission.  The 
British  Government,  also,  wrote  to  me  a  despatch 
in  which,  though  they  approved  of  the  instruc- 
tions given  to  General  Gordon,  tliey  confirmed  the 
erroneous  popular  impression  that  the  London 
instructions  had  been  materially  altered  by  me, 
acting  on  my  own  authority,  without  reference  to 
the  Foreign  Office.  "  Her  Majesty's  Government," 
it  was  said,  "bearing  in  mind  the  exigencies  of  the 
occasion,  concurred  in  these  instructions,  which 
virtually  altered  General  Gordon's  mission  from 
one  of  advice  to  that  of  executing,  or  at  least 
directing,  the  evacuation  not  only  of  Khartoum, 
but  of  the  whole  Soudan,  and  they  were  will- 
ing that  General  Gordon  should  receive  the  very 
extended  powers  conferred  upon  him  by  the 
Khedive  to  enable  him  to  effect  this  very  difficult 
task," 

The  statement  that  the  instructions,  which 
General  Gordon  received  in  Cairo,  altered  the 
character  of  his  mission  is  substantially  correct. 
The  statement  that  I  altered  General  Gordon's 
instructions  without  authority  from  the  British 
Government  is  wholly  devoid  of  foundation. 

I  never  cared  to  go  into  this  subject  at  the 
time,  because  my  hands  were  full  of  other  work, 
and,  moreover,  by  the  time  the  discussions  to 
which  I  allude  took  place,  the  question  merely  had 
an  historic  interest.  But  I  may  now  state  what 
occurred. 

In  the  first  place,  I  have  to  observe  that  the 
importance  of  this  question  has  been  exaggerated. 
In    reality,    it   mattered   little    what    instructions 


448  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

General  Gordon  received,  because  he  was  not  the 
sort  of  man  to  be  bound  by  any  instructions.^ 

In  the  second  place,  the  instructions,  which 
General  Gordon  received  in  London,  were  manifestly 
written  without  a  due  appreciation  of  the  neces- 
sities of  the  situation.  The  Egyptian  Government 
had  asked  for  "a  well -qualified  British  officer  to 
go  to  Kliartoum  with  full  powers,  both  civil  and 
military,  to  conduct  the  retreat."  It  would  have 
been  a  mere  mockery  if,  instead  of  an  executive 
officer,  they  had  been  given  some  one  whose  sole 
duty  it  would  have  been  to  write  a  report.  There 
had  already  been  a  sufficient  number  of  reports 
about  the  Soudan.  The  moment  had  arrived 
when  it  was  necessary  to  cease  writing  and  to 
act.  It  would  have  been  particularly  ridiculous 
to  send  General  Gordon,  of  all  men  in  the  world, 
as  a  "mere  reporter  upon  a  difficult  situation."^ 
General  Gordon  was  essentially  a  man  of  action. 
No  one,  who  knew  anything  of  his  character, 
could  have  supposed  for  one  moment  that  he 
would  confine  himself  to  mere  reporting. 

The  idea,  however,  appears  to  have  originated 
with  General  Gordon  himself  On  January  15, 
Loid  Granville  telegraphed  to  me  that  General 
Gordon  was  prepared  to  go  to  the  Soudan  on  certain 
"rather  vague  terms,"  the  principal  of  which  was  that 
he  was  to  "report  to  Her  Majesty's  Government  on 
the  military  situation  of  the  Soudan."  JNIoreover, 
on  February  14,  Sir  Charles  Dilke  stated  in  tlie 
House  of  Commons :  "  General  Gordon  drafted 
his  own  instructions.  .  .  .  Believing  him  to  be 
the  highest  authority,  that  he  knew  more  of  the 
conditions,  and  that  he  was  better  able  to  form  a 

*  On  January  21,  1884,  I  wrote  to  Lord  Granville :  "  It  is  as  well 
that  Gordon  sliould  be  under  my  orders,  but  a  man  who  habitually 
consults  the  Prophet  Isaiah  when  he  is  in  a  difficulty  is  not  apt  tc 
obey  the  orders  of  any  one." 

'^  Too  Late,  p.  4. 


CH.  XXIII         GORDON  AT  CAIRO  449 

judgment  on  the  subject  than  anybody  else,  we 
asked  him  to  draft  his  own  instructions."  In  spite 
of  this  fact,  however,  nothing  can  be  more  certain 
than  that  General  Gordon  never  considered  his 
mission  to  be  that  of  a  simple  reporter.  Indeed, 
on  the  day  (January  18)  on  which  General  Gordon 
received  his  London  instructions.  Lord  Granville 
telegraphed  to  me  :  "Gordon  suggests  that  it  may 
be  announced  in  Egypt  that  he  is  on  his  way  to 
Khartoum  to  arrange  for  the  future  settlement  of 
the  Soudan  for  the  best  advantage  of  the  people." 
Nothing  was  said  of  reporting.  If  General  Gordon 
was  to  arrange  for  *'the  future  settlement  of  the 
Soudan,"  I  fail  to  see  how  he  could  do  so  without 
exercising;  some  executive  authoritv. 

In  the  third  place,  it  is  to  be  observed  that 
the  proposal  that  General  Gordon  should  be  made 
Governor-General  of  the  Soudan  did  not  emanate 
from  any  one  in  Cairo.  It  was  made  by  General 
Gordon  himself,  whilst  he  was  on  the  journey  from 
London  to  Egypt,  and  was  communicated  to  me  by 
Lord  Granville  who,  on  January  22,  telegraphed  to 
me  certain  "  suggestions  made  by  Gordon  as  to  the 
steps  which  should  be  taken  with  regard  to  the 
present  state  of  affairs  in  the  Soudan."  ^  The  first 
of  these  suggestions  was  that  the  Khedive  should 
issue  a  Proclamation  to  the  people  of  the  Soudan, 
in  the  following  terms  :  "  To  the  people  of  the 
Soudan !  The  immense  distances  which  have 
separated  me  from  you  have  given  rise  to  disorders 
which  have  resulted  in  revolt  against  my  authority. 
This  revolt  has  cost  much  blood  and  treasure,  far 
beyond  any  adequate  compensation,  and  has  thrown 

»  See  Egypt,  No.  2  of  188i,  p.  4.  A  short  despatch  from  Lord 
Granville  to  nie  is  published  in  this  Parliamentary  paper.  From  tliis 
despatch  it  appears  that  certain  suggestions  of  General  (Gordon's 
were  telegraphed  to  me,  and  tliat  1  was  authorised  to  cai  ry  them  out. 
But  the  suggestions  themselves  were  not  published.  If  tliey  had  been 
publislied,  no  misapprehension  on  the  point  now  under  discussion  would 
have  been  possible. 

VOI,.   I  2  G 


450  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

burdens  on  Lower  Egypt  which  are  mtolerable. 
I  have,  tlierefore,  determined  to  restore  to  the 
various  Sultans  of  the  Soudan  their  independence, 
and  for  this  purpose  I  have  commissioned  General 
Gordon,  hite  Governor-General  of  the  Soudan,  to 
proceed  there  as  my  representative,  and  to  arrange 
with  you  for  the  evacuation  of  the  country  and 
the  withdrawal  of  my  troops.  Her  Majesty's 
Government,  being  most  desirous  of  your  welfare, 
have  also  appointed  General  Gordon  as  their  Com- 
missioner for  the  same  purpose.  General  Gordon 
is  hereby  appointed  Governor-General  for  the  time 
necessary  to  accomplish  the  evacnatio7i."  ^ 

The  second  su<><>:estion  was  that  a  Proclama- 
tion  should  be  issued  in  General  Gordon's  name, 
announcing  that  he  had  "accepted  the  post  of 
Governor-General  of  the  Soudan.''^  "I  recommend," 
General  Gordon  said  in  his  telegram  to  Lord 
Granville,  which  was  repeated  to  me,  "that  these 
Decrees  and  Proclamations  should  be  published  as 
soon  as  possible  in  the  Soudan."  In  forwarding 
General  Gordon's  recommendations  to  me,  Lord 
Granville  added  :  *'  Her  JNIajesty's  Government  have 
not  sufficient  local  knowledge  to  enable  them  to 
form  an  opinion  as  to  the  practicability  of  these 
suggestions,  and  I  therefore  authorise  you,  as  time 
is  valuable,  either  immediately  to  make  the  arrange- 
ments suggested,  or  to  await  General  Gordon's 
arrival,  and  consult  with  him  as  to  the  action  to 
be  taken."  As,  when  I  received  this  telegram. 
General  Gordon  had  already  left  Brindisi,  I  did 
not  think  it  desirable  to  act  upon  the  authority 
given  to  me  to  cause  these  Proclamations  to  be 
issued  at  once.  I  decided  to  await  General 
Gordon's  arrival.  Wlien  he  arrived,  I  moved  the 
Khedive  to  name  him  Governor-General  of  the 
Soudan.      This   was  in    accordance  with    General 

*  The  italics  are  not  iu  the  oriii-iual. 


CH.  XXIII         GORDON  AT  CAIRO  451 

Gordon's  own  suggestion,  upon  wliich  I  had  been 
authorised  by  Lord  Granville  to  act.  Further, 
as  I  have  already  mentioned,^  certain  Proclama- 
tions were  prepared  and  given  to  General  Gordon 
with  discretionary  power  to  use  them  should  he 
think  fit  to  do  so.  These  Proclamations  did  not 
differ  materially  from  those  wliich  had  been  com- 
municated to  me  in  Lord  Granville's  telegram  of 
January  22. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  was  with  some 
surprise  that,  on  February  4,  I  received  a  telegram 
from  Lord  Granville  asking  me  whether  "  General 
Gordon  had  accepted  any  appointment  from  the 
Khedive."  And  it  was  with  still  greater  surprise 
that  I  found  myself  accused,  not  only  by  the 
public,  but  also  to  a  certain  extent  by  the  Govern- 
ment, of  having  altered  the  character  of  General 
Gordon's  mission  without  any  authority  to  do  so. 
The  documents  quoted  above  are  sufficient  to  show 
that  this  accusation  was  altofjether  groundless. 
Indeed,  so  little  importance  did  I  attach  to  the 
changes  in  the  instructions,  which  had  been  made 
at  Cairo,  that  on  January  28,  I  wrote  privately  to 
Lord  Granville:  "  You  will  see  that  I  gave  Gordon, 
at  his  own  request,  additional  instructions,  of 
which  I  hope  you  will  approve.  They  really 
amount  to  nothing  more  than  what  he  had 
already  received,  but  they  give  him  a  little 
latitude  as  to  the  time  at  which  the  troops  shall 
be  withdrawn."  Looking  to  the  fact  that,  on  the 
face  of  the  thing,  it  was  absurd  to  send  General 
Gordon  as  a  mere  reporter,  to  the  further  fact  tliat 
General  Gordon,  who  had  just  arrived  from  London, 
never  said  one  word  to  me  to  induce  the  belief 
that  such  was  the  intention  of  the  Government, 
and  also  to  the  fact  that  Lord  Granville  had  him- 
self authorised    me    to    secure  General    Gordon's 

*  Vide  untey  p.  446. 


452  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

nomination  as  Governor-General  of  the  Soudan, 
it  never  occurred  to  me  that  I  was  departing 
from  the  wishes  and  instructions  of  the  British 
Government  by  one  hair's-breadth.  The  explana- 
tion of  all  this  confusion  is,  however,  very  simple. 
I  believe  that  the  original  intention  of  the  British 
Government  was  that  General  Gordon  should 
limit  himself  to  reporting,  and  that  Lord  Granville 
did  not  see  that,  in  authorising  General  Gordon  to 
accept  the  appointment  of  Governor-General  of  the 
Soudan,  he  changed  the  spirit  of  the  instructions 
which  he  had  issued  on  January  18.  He  was, 
therefore,  surprised  to  find  out  what  he  had  done. 

Leaving  aside,  however,  the  personal  and,  there- 
fore, unimportant  question  of  who  is  responsible  for 
naming  General  Gordon  Governor-General  of  the 
Soudan,  I  wish  to  say  that,  in  my  opinion,  the 
decision  was  a  wise  one.  General  Gordon  was  about 
to  depart  on  a  very  difficult  and  dangerous  mission. 
He  had  resided  for  some  while  in  the  Soudan, 
and  was  supposed  to  be  well  acquainted  with  the 
affairs  of  that  country.  The  only  chance  of 
success  lay  in  following  his  advice,  and  adopthig 
such  measures  as  he  thought  most  likely  to  conduce 
to  the  accomplishment  of  his  task.  He  wished  to 
be  named  Governor-General,  and  he  was  obviously 
right.  Otherwise,  he  would  have  exercised  no 
authority. 

To  resume  the  narrative.  It  has  been  already 
mentioned  that  one  of  the  mahi  difficulties,  which 
stood  in  the  way  of  re-establishing  the  rule  of  the 
local  Sultans  in  the  Soudan,  was  that  in  some  of 
the  most  important  portions  of  the  country  tliere 
were  no  old-standing  families.  This  difficulty  did 
not,  however,  exist  in  respect  to  Darfour.  Only 
ten  years  had  elapsed  since  that  province  had 
been  annexed  by  Egypt.  Before  that  period,  the 
country  had  been  governed  by   a  line   of  Sultans 


on.  XXIII         GORDON  AT  CAIRO  453 

which  had  existed  for  more  than  four  hundred  years. 
When  the  annexation  took  place,  the  surviving 
members  of  the  reigning  family  were  deported 
to  Cairo.  The  Egyptian  Government  doled  out 
allowances  to  them.  In  respect  toDarfour,  therefore, 
there  seemed  to  be  some  prospect  of  carrying  into 
execution  the  policy  advocated  by  General  Gordon. 
There  were  several  members  of  the  Darfour 
family  at  Cairo.  It  was  no  easy  matter  to  decide 
which  to  choose.  The  position  of  a  Roi  en  exil  is 
not  under  any  circumstances  calculated  to  ennoble 
the  character.  When  the  ex-monarch  happens  to 
be  an  ignorant  barbarian  leading  a  slothful  life  in 
a  semi -civilised  Oriental  capital,  such  as  Cairo,  and 
dependent  on  the  charity  of  the  Government  for  his 
subsistence,  no  element  is  wanting  to  hasten  the 
process  of  moral  decadence.  The  uses  of  adversity 
had  not  been  turned  to  account  by  the  Darfour 
family.  The  materials  from  which  a  choice  had 
to  be  made  were,  therefore,  unpromising.  How- 
ever, a  choice  was  made.  The  individual  chosen 
was  Emir  Abdul-Shakour,  son  of  the  late  Sultan 
Abdul -Rahman.  He  is  described  in  Colonel 
Stewart's  Journal  as  a  "common-looking,  unintelli- 
gent, and  badly-dressed  native."  He  was  given 
"£E.2000,  a  well-embroidered  coat,  and  the  biggest 
decoration  that  could  be  found."  He  at  first  wished 
to  remain  in  Cairo  for  several  days  in  order  to  make 
preparations  for  his  departure,  but  General  Gordon 
was  in  a  hurry  to  be  off,  and  the  Darfour  Sultan 
was  with  some  difficulty  induced  to  start  with 
him.  Colonel  Stewart,  speaking  of  General 
Gordon's  departure  from  Cairo  on  the  night  of 
January  26,  wrote  in  his  Journal :  "  Some  delay 
was  caused  at  starting  by  the  numerous  retinue 
of  the  Darfour  Sultan.  Extra  carriages  had  to  be 
put  on  for  the  accommodation  of  his  twenty-three 
wives   and   a    quantity  of  baggage.      At  the    last 


454  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

moment,  his  gala  uniform  was  almost  forgotten, 
and  there  was  some  commotion  until  it  was  found." 

Altogether,  it  did  not  look  much  as  if  an  "  un- 
intelligent native  "  with  twenty -three  wives  and  a 
quantity  of  baggage,  who  was,  as  it  subsequently 
appeared,  inordinately  proud  of  his  decoration  and 
of  his  "gala  uniform,"  would  be  very  helpful  in 
inaugurating  the  new  policy. 

One  further  incident  of  importance  occurred 
whilst  General  Gordon  was  in  Cairo. 

In  the  course  of  this  narrative  allusion  has 
already  been  made  to  Zobeir  Pasha.^  It  is  need- 
less to  dwell  at  length  on  the  history  of  his  pre- 
vious relations  with  General  Gordon.  It  will  be 
sufficient  to  say  that  Zobeir  Pasha's  social  position, '^ 
the  wealth  which  he  had  amassed  in  slave-hunting, 
his  courage,  ability,  and  force  of  character,  had  at 
one  time  won  for  him  a  position  of  commanding 
influence  in  the  Soudan.  In  June  1878,  Zobeir 
Pasha's  son,  Suleiman,  raised  a  revolt  in  the  Bahr- 
el-Ghazal  province,  and  killed  200  of  the  Egyptian 
regular  troops.  General  Gordon's  lieutenant,  Gessi, 
was  sent  against  him,  and,  in  the  beginning  of  1879, 
the  rebellion  was  crushed.  Suleiman  was  taken 
prisoner  and  shot.  A  letter  from  Zobeir  Pasha  was 
found  in  Suleiman's  possession,  in  which  the  father 
incited  the  son  to  revolt.  Zobeir  Pasha's  property 
was  confiscated.  In  1884,  he  was  residing  at 
Cairo.  He  was  detained  there,  but  was  allowed 
his  personal  liberty  and  received  an  allowance  from 
the  Egyptian  Government.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, it  was  natural  that  there  should  be  enmity 
between  General  Gordon  and  Zobeir  Pasha. 

On  January  22,  whilst  General  Gordon  was  on 
his  way  to  Egypt,  I  received  the  following  telegram 

*   Vide  ante,  pp.  402-404. 

^  Zobeir    Pasha    is    a    descendant    of   the    Abbaside    dynasty   of 
Khalifs. 


CH.  XXIII         GOllDON  AT  CAIRO  455 

from  Lord  Granville :  "  Gordon  considers  it  most 
important  that  Zobeir  should  be  well  watched  by  a 
European  to  prevent  his  sending  emissaries  or  letters 
to  the  Soudan.  He  has  suggested  that  Zobeir 
should  be  sent  to  Cyprus,  but  there  is  no  legal 
power  to  detain  him  if  sent."  On  receiving  this 
telegram,  I  took  steps  to  have  Zobeir  Pasha  watched. 

On  January  25,  whilst  paying  a  visit  to  Cherif 
Pasha,  General  Gordon  accidentally  met  Zobeir 
Pasha.  A  short  conversation  ensued  between  the 
two,  with  the  result  that  General  Gordon  ex- 
pressed a  wish  that  he  and  Zobeir  Pasha  should 
meet  in  my  presence  with  a  view  to  the  latter 
stating  his  complaints. 

On  the  morning  of  the  26th,  I  received  a  written 
Memorandum  from  General  Gordon,  in  which, 
after  sketching  the  history  of  the  events  which  led 
to  Zobeir  Pasha's  expulsion  from  the  Soudan,  he 
went  on  to  express  himself  as  follows  : — 

"  Zobeir,  without  doubt,  was  the  greatest  slave- 
hunter  who  ever  existed.  Zobeir  is  the  most  able 
man  in  the  Soudan,  he  is  a  capital  general,  and  has 
been  wounded  several  times.  Zobeir  has  a  capacity 
of  government  far  beyond  any  other  man  in  the 
Soudan.  All  the  followers  of  the  INIahdi  would,  I 
believe,  leave  the  Mahdi  on  Zobeir's  approach,  for 
the  Mahdi's  chiefs  are  ex-chiefs  of  Zobeir.  Person- 
ally, I  have  a  great  admiration  for  Zobeir,  for  he 
is  a  man,  and  is  infinitely  superior  to  those  })oor 
fellows  who  have  been  Governors  of  the  Soudan. 
But  I  question  in  my  mind,  'Will  Zobeir  ever 
forgive  me  the  death  of  his  son  ? '  and  that  question 
has  regulated  my  action  respecting  him,  for  I  have 
been  told  he  bears  me  the  greatest  malice,  and  one 
cannot  wonder  at  it,  if  one  is  a  father.  I  would 
even  now  risk  taking  Zobeir,  and  would  wilHngly 
bear  the  responsibility  of  doing  so,  convinced  as  I 
am  that  Zobeir's  approach  ends  the  JNIahdi,  which 


456  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

is  a  question  which  has  its  pulse  in  Syria,  the 
Hedjaz,  and  Palestine, 

"  It  cannot  be  the  wish  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government,  or  of  the  Egyptian  Government,  to 
have  an  intestine  war  in  the  Soudan  on  its  evacua- 
tion, yet  such  is  sure  to  ensue,  and  the  only  way 
which  would  prevent  it  is  the  restoration  of  Zobeir, 
who  would  be  accepted  on  all  sides,  and  who  would 
end  the  Mahdi  in  a  couple  of  months.  My  duty 
is  to  obey  the  orders  of  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, i.e.  to  evacuate  the  Soudan  as  soon  as 
possible  vis-a-vis  the  safety  of  the  Egyptian  em- 
ployes. To  do  this,  I  want  no  Zobeir.  But  if 
the  addenda  is  made  that  I  leave  a  satisfactory 
settlement  of  affairs,  then  Zobeir  becomes  a  si^ie 
qua  non.  Therefore,  the  question  resolves  itself 
into  this,  does  Her  Majesty's  Government,  or 
Egyptian  Government,  desire  a  settled  state  of 
affairs  in  the  Soudan  after  the  evacuation  ?  Do 
those  Governments  want  to  be  free  of  this  trouble- 
some fanatic  ?  If  they  do,  then  Zobeir  should  be 
sent ;  if  the  two  Governments  are  indifferent,  then 
do  not  send  him,  and  I  have  confidence  we  will 
get  out  the  Egyptian  employes  in  three  or  four 
montlis,  and  will  leave  a  cockpit  behind  us.  It  is 
not  my  duty  to  dictate  what  should  be  done.  I 
will  only  say — 

"  1.   1  was  justified  in  my  action  against  Zobeir. 

"2.  That  if  Zobeir  bears  no  malice  personally 
against  me,  I  would  take  him  at  once,  as  a  humanly 
certain  settler  of  the  Mahdi  and  of  those  in  revolt. 

**  I  have  written  this  Memorandum,  and  Zobeir's 
story  may  be  lieard.  1  only  ask  that  after  he  has 
been  interrogated,  I  may  be  questioned  on  such 
subjects  as  his  statements  are  at  variance  with 
mine.  I  would  wish  the  inquiry  to  be  official,  and 
in  such  a  way  tliat  whatever  may  be  the  decision 
come  to,  it  may  be  come  to  in  my  absence. 


CXI.XX1I1  GORDON  AT  CAIRO  457 

•*  With  respect  to  the  Skive  Trade,^  I  think 
nothing  of  it,  for  there  will  be  Slave  Trade  always 
as  long  as  Turkey  and  Egypt  buy  the  slaves,  and 
it  may  be  Zobeir  will  or  might  see  his  interests  to 
stop  it  in  some  manner. 

"  I  will,  therefore,  sum  up  my  o])inion,  viz.  that 
I  would  willhigly  take  the  responsibility  of  taking 
Zobeir  up  with  me,  if  after  an  interview  with  Sir 
E.  Baring  and  Nubar  Pasha,  they  felt  the  mystic 
feeling  I  could  trust  him,  and  which  mystic  feeling 
I  felt  I  had  for  him  to-night  when  I  met  him  at 
Ch^rif  Pasha's  house.  Zobeir  could  have  nothing 
to  gain  in  hurting  me,  and  I  would  have  no  idea 
of  fear.  In  this  affair  my  desire,  I  own,  would  be 
to  take  Zobeir.  I  cannot  exactly  say  why  I  feel 
towards  him  thus,  and  I  feel  sure  that  his  going- 
would  settle  the  Soudan  affair  to  the  benefit  of 
Her  Majesty's  and  Egyptian  Governments,  and  I 
would  bear  the  responsibility  of  recommending  it." 

The  interview  between  General  Gordon  and 
Zobeir  Pasha  took  place  on  the  afternoon  of 
January  26  in  the  presence  of  Nubar  Pasha,  Sir 
Evelyn  Wood,  Colonel  Stewart,  Colonel  Watson, 
Giegler  Pasha,  and  myself.^  A  shorthand  writer 
and  an  interpreter  were  present.  The  scene  was 
dramatic  and  interesting.  Both  General  Gordon 
and  Zobeir  Pasha  were  labouring  under  great 
excitement  and  spoke  with  vehemence.  Zobeir 
Pasha  did  not  deny  that  his  son  had  rebelled  against 
the  Egyptian  Government,  but  he  denied  his  own 
complicity  in  the  rebellion.  General  Gordon's  case 
rested  mainly  upon  the  letter  addressed  by  Zobeir 

'  General  Gordon's  instructions  given  to  him  in  London,  contained 
the  following  passage  :  "  You  should  pay  especial  consideration  to  the 
question  of  the  steps  that  may  usefully  be  taken  to  counteract  the 
stimulus  which  it  is  feared  may  possibly  be  given  to  the  Slave  Trade 
by  the  present  insurrectionary  movement,  and  by  the  withdrawal  of 
the  Egyptian  authority  from  the  Interior." 

2  A  full  account  of  this  interview  is  given  in  Egypt,  No.  12  of  1884, 
pp.  38-41. 


458  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

Pasha  to  his  son,  which  was  found  by  Gessi.  This 
letter  could  not  be  produced  at  the  time,  but 
I  saw  a  copy  of  it  subsequently.  If  genuine, 
it  afforded  sufficient  proof  of  Zobeir  Pasha's  com- 
plicity in  his  son's  rebellion. 

After  this  interview  was  over  and  Zobeir  Pasha 
had  retired,  General  Gordon's  Memorandum,  in 
which  he  had  proposed  that  Zobeir  Pasha  should 
accompany  him  to  Khartoum,  was  discussed.  All 
present,  more  especially  Colonel  Stewart,  were 
opposed  to  sending  him.  I  had  always  been  rather 
in  favour  of  employing  Zobeir  Pasha  in  the  Soudan. 
Moreover,  I  saw  tliat  the  main  difficulty  in  the  way 
of  carrying  out  General  Gordon's  policy  was  the 
absence  of  any  strong  local  men  to  whom  to  entrust 
the  future  government  of  the  Soudan,  and  especially 
of  Khartoum.  I  believed  that,  by  giving  Zobeir 
Pasha  money  and  an  influential  position,  it  might 
be  possible  to  secure  his  friendshij)  towards  General 
Gordon  ;  and  there  could  be  no  doubt  that,  if  this 
friendship  could  be  secured,  he  would  prove  a 
valuable  instrument  in  the  execution  of  General 
Gordon's  policy.  The  arguments  on  the  other 
side  were,  however,  strong. 

In  the  first  place,  the  employment  of  Zobeir 
Pasha  would  be  sure  to  raise  an  outcry  in  England. 
I  should  not  have  minded  this,  if  1  could  have  felt 
certain  that  his  employment  was  desirable.  But 
was  it  desirable  ?  I  was  not  at  that  moment 
prepared  to  take  the  responsibility  of  answering 
this  question  in  the  affirmative.  The  weight  of 
authoritative  opinion  was  decidedly  against  sending 
him  to  the  Soudan.  My  wish  was  to  follow 
General  Gordon's  lead,  but  he  himself  hesitated  as 
to  what  course  to  pursue.  It  was  impossible  to  say 
how  far  this  impulsive  man  was  animated,  not  so 
much  by  a  consideration  of  the  political  necessities 
of  the  case,  as  by  a  chivalrous  feeling  that  possibly 


CH.  XXIII  GORDON  AT  CAIRO  459 

in  former  times  he  might  have  done  some  injustice 
to  Zobeir  Pasha,  and  that  he  wished  to  atone  for 
such  injustice  by  giving  his  old  adversary  an  oppor- 
tunity of  retrieving  his  position.  The  argument, 
however,  which  convinced  me  that,  for  the  time 
being  at  all  events,  it  was  undesirable  to  employ 
Zobeir  Pasha,  was  that  forty-eight  hours  before  I 
received  General  Gordon's  Memorandum  proposing 
that  Zobeir  Pasha  should  accompany  him  to  the 
Soudan,  I  had  received,  through  Lord  Granville,  a 
proposal,  also  emanating  from  General  Gordon,  that 
Zobeir  Pasha  should  be  deported  to  Cyprus.^  A 
few  minutes'  conversation  with  Zobeir  Pasha,  and 
a  "mystic  feeUng "  which  that  conversation  had 
engendered,  had  led  General  Gordon  to  jump  from 
one  extreme  to  the  other.  Instead  of  being  con- 
sidered as  an  enemy,  Zobeir  Pasha  was  to  be  treated 
as  a  trusted  ally,  on  whose  conduct  the  success  of 
the  mission  was  to  depend.  1  have  no  confidence 
in  opinions  based  on  mystic  feelings.  Colonel 
Stewart  subsequently  (M.irch  11)  wrote  to  me  from 
Khartoum:  "I  never  saw  or  met  any  one  whose 
mind  and  imagination  are  so  constantly  active  as 
Gordon's.  For  him  to  giasp  an  idea  is  to  act  on  it 
at  once."  Short  as  my  personal  acquaintance  had 
been  with  General  Gordon,  it  was  clear  to  me  that 
his  various  obiter  dicta  were  not  to  be  regarded 
as  expressions  of  his  matured  opinions.  It  might 
eventually  be  desirable  to  employ  Zobeir  Pasha, 
but  it  was  necessary  to  give  General  Gordon  more 
time  to  think  over  the  matter  before  taking  action. 
Under  these  circumstances,  I  had  no  hesitation 
in  deciding  against  the  immediate  employment  of 
Zobeir  Pasha.  "  At  General  Gordon's  suggestion," 
I  wrote  to  Lord  Granville, "  I  informed  Zobeir  Pasha 
that  he  would  be  allowed  to  remain  in  Cairo,  and 
that  the  future  treatment  he  would  receive  at  the 

*  Vide  ante,  p.  455. 


460  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

hands  of  the  Egyptian  Government  depended  in 
a  great  measure  upon  whether  General  Gordon 
returned  alive  and  well  from  the  Soudan,  and  upon 
whether,  whilst  residing  at  Cairo,  Zobeir  Pasha  used 
his  influence  to  facilitate  the  execution  of  the  policy 
upon  which  the  Government  had  determined." 
Thus  the  matter  was  settled  for  the  moment. 

On  the  night  of  January  26,  General  Gordon  and 
Colonel  Stewart  left  Cairo  on  the  ill-fated  expedi- 
tion from  which  they  were  destined  never  to  return. 
General  Gordon  was  in  excellent  spirits  and  hopeful 
of  success.  My  own  heart  was  heavy  within  me. 
I  knew  the  diflficulties  of  the  task  which  had  to  be 
accomplished.  I  had  seen  General  Gordon.  Nothing 
could  have  been  more  friendly  than  his  behaviour. 
The  main  lines  of  his  policy  appeared  wise  and  prac- 
tical. Nevertheless,  I  was  not  relieved  of  the  doubts 
which  I  originally  entertained  as  to  the  wisdom 
of  employing  him.  Manifestly,  in  spite  of  many 
fine  and  attractive  qualities,  he  was  even  more 
eccentric  than  I  had  originally  supposed.  How- 
ever, the  die  was  cast.  A  comet  of  no  common 
magnitude  had  been  launched  on  the  political 
firmament  of  the  Soudan.  It  was  difficult  to 
predict  its  course.  It  now  only  remained  for  me 
to  do  my  best  to  help  General  Gordon,  and  to  trust 
to  the  shrewd  common  sense  of  his  companion, 
Colonel  Stewart,  to  act  in  some  degree  as  a  correc- 
tive to  the  impulsiveness  of  his  wayward  chief.^ 

*  I  may  mention  that  during-  the  short  period  whilst  General  Gordon 
and  Colonel  Stewart  were  at  Cairo  I  was  most  unfortunately  afflicted  with 
a  severe  sore  throat,  which  well-nigh  deprived  me  of  any  powers  of 
speech.  The  health  of  individuals  in  responsible  positions,  more  especi- 
ally at  critical  moments,  has  a  more  serious  bearing  on  public  affairs 
than  is  often  supposed.  During  the  Egyptian  Conference,  which  sat  in 
London  in  the  summer  of  188.5,  the  course  of  events  was,  I  am  in- 
clined to  think,  a  good  deal  influenced  by  the  fact  that  Lord  Granville 
had  a  rather  unusually  severe  attack  of  gout.  Further,  I  may  mention 
that  whilst  the  question  of  Zobeir  Pasha's  despatch  to  the  Soudan  waa 
under  discussion,  Mr.  Gladstone  was  ill  in  bed.  (See  further  remarks 
on  this  subject,  p.  631.) 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

Gordon's  journey  to  khartoum 

January  26-February  18,  1884 

Contradictory  nature  of  General  Gordon's  proposals — The  Darfour 
Sultan — General  Gordon  proposes  to  visit  the  Mahdi — Or  to  retire 
to  the  Equator — He  issues  a  Proclamation  announcing  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Soudan  —  The  Slavery  Proclamation  —  General 
Gordon  arrives  at  Khartoum — He  is  sanguine  of  success — Colonel 
Stewart's  warning. 

On  February  1,  Colonel  Stewart  wrote  to  me 
from  Korosko  :  "  I  shall  be  very  glad  when  we  are 
actually  at  Khartoum  and  face  to  face  with  the 
situation.  Gordon  is  so  full  of  energy  and  action 
that  he  cannot  get  along  without  doing  something, 
and  at  present  he  revenges  himself  for  his  enforced 
inactivity  by  writing  letters,  despatches,  etc.,  and 
sending  telegrams." 

Now,  in  fact,  began  a  period  during  which  I 
received  a  large  number  of  very  bewildering  and 
contradictory  messages  from  General  Gordon.  They 
began  immediately  after  he  left  Cairo.  Sir  Henry 
Gordon  subsequently  wrote :  *'  It  was  no  part  of 
General  Gordon's  character  to  form  a  definite 
opinion  from  imperfectly  known  facts,  and  to 
adhere  obstinately  to  that  opinion,  notwithstanding 
the  evidence  of  altered  circumstances  and  new 
elements."  Much  may  be  forgiven  to  fraternal  afiec- 
tion.     The  truth,  however,  is  that  General  Gordon's 

461 


462  MODERN  EGYPT  '       pt.  m 

main  defect  was  that  he  was  constantly  forming 
strong  opinions  on  imperfectly  known  facts. 
Extreme  consistency  in  political  matters  is  certainly 
not  a  cardinal  virtue.  It  lias,  indeed,  been  char- 
acterised by  Emerson  as  "the  hobgoblin  of  little 
minds."  But  the  peculiarity  of  General  Gordon  was 
that,  in  great  things  as  in  small,  his  revulsions  of 
opinion  were  so  ra})id  and  so  complete  that  it  was 
almost  impossible  to  follow  him.  On  INIarch  11, 
Colonel  Stewart  wrote  to  me  from  Khartoum:  "I 
most  sincerely  congratulate  you  on  the  interruption 
in  the  telegraphic  communication.^  The  shower  of 
telegrams  which  we  have  been  sending  you  of  late 
must  have  acted  somewhat  like  a  cold  douche. 
Yesterday,  I  told  Gordon  that  his  numerous  com- 
munications might  tend  to  confuse  you,  but  he  replied 
that  he  was  merely  giving  you  different  aspects  of 
the  same  question."  General  Gordon's  communica- 
tions did,  indeed,  tend  to  confuse  me.  In  addition 
to  the  other  difficulties  of  the  situation,  this  further 
difficulty  was  now  superadded,  that  I  had,  if  I  may 
be  allowed  to  coin  such  an  expression,  to  learn 
Gordonese.  I  had  to  distinguish  between  such  pro- 
posals of  General  Gordon  as  represented  his  matured 
opinions,  and  others  which  were  mere  bubbles 
thrown  up  by  his  imaginative  brain,  probably 
forgotten  as  soon  as  made,  and,  therefore,  un- 
worthy of  serious  attention.  I  do  not  say  that  I 
al,ways  succeeded  in  eliminating  the  dross  in  order 
to  arrive  at  the  valuable  residuum.  I  can  only 
say  that  the  task  was  one  of  great  difficulty,  and 
that  I  did  my  best  to  accomplish  it. 

1  Before  telep^raphic  communication  between  Khartoum  and  Cairo 
was  permanently  interrupted,  several  temporary  breaks  took  place 
owin^  to  the  line  being  in  a  very  bad  condition.  Lord  Granville 
expressed  much  the  same  idea  as  Colonel  Stewart,  On  March  21,  he 
wrote  to  me:  "I  am  not  sure  that  the  stoppage  of  communication 
with  Gordon  for  a  time  is  the  greatest  of  niihlortunes  either  for  himself 
or  us." 


CH.XXIV  JOURNEY  TO  KHARTOUM         463 

The  policy  of  setting  up  the  local  Sultans  did 
not  begin  well.  The  Darfour  Prince,  who  accom- 
panied General  Gordon,  was  a  wretched  creature. 
On  January  29,  General  Gordon  telegraphed  to  me  : 
"The  Emir  Abdul-Shakour  has  taken  to  drinking." 
On  the  30th,  Colonel  Stewart  wrote  in  his  diary : 
"The  Darfour  Sultan  decided  to  get  out  here 
(Assouan)  and  not  to  come  with  us  any  farther." 
Two  days  previously  (28th),  Gordon  wrote  to  me : 
"  Please  listen  to  no  telegrams  from  the  Sultan  of 
Darfour's  family.  I  have  explained  to  him  that, 
having  placed  him  at  Dongola,  whence  clear  roads 
exist  to  Darfour,  we  wash  our  hands  of  him,  for  it 
is  his  work  to  raise  the  tribes  in  his  favour.  We 
have  nought  to  do  with  him  and  will  not  support 
him,  for  we  cannot  do  so."  The  Darfour  Prince 
was  manifestly  deficient  in  the  qualities  necessary 
to  carry  out  a  policy  such  as  that  projected  by 
General  Gordon.  He  got  as  far  as  Dongola, 
where  he  remained  for  some  months,  and  then 
returned  to  Cairo. 

Whilst  General  Gordon  was  on  his  way  from 
Brindisi  to  Port  Said,  he  gave  tlie  following  mes- 
sage for  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  to  an  English  officer, 
who  was  a  fellow -passenger  on  the  same  ship : 
"Tell  Lloyd,  no  panics.  It  is  possible  that  I 
may  go  to  the  Mahdi  and  not  be  heard  of  for 
two  months,  for  he  might  keep  me  as  a  hostage 
for  Zobeir.  You  can  tell  Lloyd  this  when  you 
get  to  Cairo,  so  that  he  can  publish  it  at  the 
right  time,  if  necessary."  Owing  to  Mr.  Clifford 
Lloyd  being  confined  to  his  house  through  illness, 
I  did  not  hear  of  this  message  until  General  Gordon 
was  half-way  to  Khartoum.  Looking  to  General 
Gordon's  very  singular  character,  I  thought  it  not 
impossible  that  he  would  carry  out  the  idea  of  going 
to  the  Mahdi.  Had  he  done  so,  he  would  certainly 
have  been  detained    a  prisoner  for  life,    unless  a 


454  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

British  force  had  been  sent  to  release  liiin.  I, 
therefore,  telegraphed  to  him  :  "  I  hope  you  will 
give  me  a  positive  assurance  that  you  will  on  no 
account  put  yourself  voluntarily  in  the  power  of 
the  JNIahdi.  Tlie  question  is  not  a  personal  one. 
There  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  the  strongest 
political  objections  to  your  risking  a  visit  to  the 
iNIahdi."  In  reply,  General  Gordon  telegraphed  tc 
me  that  he  had  no  intention  of  visiting  the  Malidi. 
I  do  not  believe  that  he  ever  seriously  contemplated 
this  step.  It  was  merely  an  idea  which  flashed 
through  his  brain  for  a  moment.  But,  had  he 
gone,  the  consequences  both  to  himself  and,  pos- 
sibly, to  his  country,  would  have  been  so  serious 
that  it  was  as  well  to  obtain  from  him  an  assur- 
ance that  he  would  not  give  effect  to  this  hare- 
brained project. 

I  turn  to  another  incident  which  occurred  about 
this  time.  On  February  1,  General  Gordon  wrote 
to  me  from  Korosko  enclosing  a  letter  for  the  King 
of  the  Belgians.  In  this  letter,  he  spoke  of  going  up 
the  AVhite  Nile,  taking  possession  of  the  Bahr-el- 
Ghazal  and  Equatorial  Provinces,  and  then  handing 
them  over  to  the  King  of  the  Belgians.  I  received 
this  letter  on  February  9.  This  project  did  not 
appear  to  me  to  be  feasible.  INIoreover,  I  was  always 
afraid  of  General  Gordon  acting  on  the  impulse 
of  the  moment  without  sufficient  reflection.  I, 
therefore,  telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville :  "  I  do 
not  think  tliat  General  Gordon  should  be  allowed, 
at  all  events  for  the  present,  to  go  anywhere  south 
of  Khartoum."  At  the  same  time,  I  sent  the 
following  private  telegram  to  Lord  Granville : 
"Do  I  understand  riglitly  that  I  have  full  powers 
to  give  Gordon  positive  orders  not  to  ])roceed 
beyond  a  certain  point,  if  I  think  it  necessary  to 
do  so?  I  believe  he  would  obey  oiders,  but  I 
doubt  his  caring  much  about  suggestions.     If  he 


CH.  XXIV   JOURNEY  TO  KHARTOUM         4G5 

comes  to  any  harm,  it  will  be  the  worst  thing  that 
has  happened  yet.  I  am  more  anxious  lest  his  total 
disregard  for  his  own  safety  should  lead  to  further 
serious  difficulties  than  almost  anything  else."  On 
February  10,  Lord  Granville,  in  reply  to  my 
inquiry,  sent  me  the  following  private  telegram  : 
"  You  have  full  powers.  Instruct  Gordon  not  to 
proceed  at  present  south  of  Khartoum."  This  was 
followed,  on  February  11,  by  an  official  telegram, 
which  was  to  the  following  effect :  "  Her  Majesty's 
Government  are  of  opinion  that  General  Gordon 
should  not,  at  present,  go  beyond  Khartoum."  I 
communicated  the  views  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment on  this  point  to  General  Gordon  on 
February  12,  and  in  reply  received  a  telegram, 
stating  that  he  would  not  go  south  of  Khartoum 
without  my  permission. 

It  may  be  as  well,  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  that 
I  should  anticipate  this  narrative  so  far  as  to  state, 
in  the  present  place,  what  subsequently  occurred 
in  connection  with  this  particular  })oint.  On 
March  9,  General  Gordon  sent  me  several  tele- 
grams. In  one  of  them  he  proposed  to  resign  his 
commission  in  the  British  army,  to  "  take  all 
steamers  and  stores  up  to  the  Equatorial  and  Bahr- 
el-Ghazal  provinces,  and  consider  those  provinces  as 
under  the  King  of  the  Belgians."  Later  on,  I  shall 
have  to  deal  with  the  reply  which  Lord  Granville 
gave  to  the  various  proposals  then  under  discussion. 
I  need  here  only  state  that,  in  communicating  to 
General  Gordon  the  views  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, I  instructed  him  to  hold  on  at  Khartoum 
until  I  could  communicate  with  Her  Majesty's 
Government,  and  I  told  him  that  he  should  on  no 
account  proceed  to  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  and  Equa- 
torial provinces.  In  his  Journal,  General  Gordon 
complained  bitterly  of  not  having  been  allowed  to 
proceed  up  the  White  Nile.  Writing  on  October  5, 
VOL.  I  2  H 


466  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

1884,  he  said:  "Her  INIajesty's  Government 
ought  to  have  taken  the  bold  step  of  speaking 
out  and  saying,  SHIFT  FOR  YOURSELF 
in  3Iarch,'^  when  I  could  have  done  so,  and  not 
now  when  I  am  in  honour  bound  to  the  people 
after  six  months'  bothering  warfare.  Not  only 
did  Baring  not  say  '  Shift  for  yourself,'  but  he 
put  a  veto  upon  my  going  to  the  Equator,  vide 
his  telegrams  in  Stewart's  Journal." 

As  regards  General  Gordon's  complaint  on  this 
subject,  I  have  tlie  following  observations  to  make. 

In  the  first  place,  I  doubt  whether  General 
Gordon  would  in  any  case  have  attempted  to  go  up 
the  White  Nile.  If  he  had  done  so,  he  would  have 
been  obliged  to  abandon  the  garrisons  of  Khartoum 
and  other  places,  and  this,  as  Colonel  Stewart  wrote 
to  me  so  early  as  INIarch  4,  he  was  "  the  last  man 
in  the  world  to  do." 

In  the  second  place,  if  General  Gordon  had  made 
the  attempt,  I  believe  he  would  have  failed.  Both 
he  and  his  followers  would  almost  certainly  have 
been  taken  prisoners  by  the  Mahdi. 

In  the  third  place,  in  spite  of  the  entry  in  General 
Gordon's  Journal,  to  which  I  have  alluded  above, 
it  is  clear  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  instructions 
received  from  me  on  this  particular  point  did  not 
hamper  his  action.  I  received  an  undated  telegram 
from  him,  on  April  16,  1884,  which  was  to  the 
following  effect :  "  I  consider  myself  free  to  act 
accordincr  to  circumstances.  I  shall  hold  on  here 
as  long  as  I  can,  and  if  I  can  suppress  the  rebellion, 
I  shall  do  so.  If  I  cannot,  I  shall  retire  to  the 
Equator."  Colonel  Stewart,  at  the  same  time, 
telegraphed  that  he  did  not  think  it  would  be 
possible  to  get  to   Berber.     "  I   am  inclined,"  he 

*  In  this  and  other  quotations  from  General  Gordon's  Journal,  the 
capitals  and  italics,  save  in  a  few  cases  to  which  attention  is  specially 
drawn,  are  in  the  original. 


CM.  XXIV   JOURNEY  TO  KHARTOUM         407 

added,  "to  think  my  retreat  will  perhaps  be  safer 
by  the  Equator.  1  siiall,  therefore,  follow  tlie 
fortunes  of  General  Gordon."  Mr.  Power,  the 
British  Consuhir  Agent  at  Khartoum,  telegraphed 
to  the  same  effect.  These  messages  constitute  a 
sufficient  proof  that,  in  spite  of  my  telegram  of 
P^ebruary  12,  General  Gordon  did  not  think  himself 
precluded  from  retiring  up  the  White  Nile,  should 
he  have  thought  fit  to  do  so. 

It  will  be  borne  in  mind  that  General  Gordon 
took  with  him  two  Proclamations,  one  of  which 
stated  that  the  Egyptian  Government  had  decided 
to  withdraw  their  troops  from  the  Soudan,  whilst 
in  the  other  it  was  stated  that  General  Gordon 
was  appointed  Governor-General  of  the  Soudan.^ 

On  February  1,  Colonel  Stewart  wrote  to  me 
from  Korosko :  *'  It  seems  to  me  that  at  present 
the  most  suitable  plan  is  not  to  publish  abroad 
throughout  the  Soudan  that  we  mean  to  leave. 
Before  doing  so,  we  ought  at  any  rate  to  place 
the  kinglets  in  their  several  districts.  Whether 
it  will  be  possible  to  induce  Gordon  to  remain 
silent  in  the  matter  is,  however,  more  than 
doubtful." 

On  February  11,  General  Gordon  and  Colonel 
Stewart  arrived  at  Berber.  The  following  entry 
occurs  in  Colonel  Stewart's  Journal,  dated  February 
12  :  "I  was  called  up  at  5  a.m.  by  General  Gordon, 
who,  having  pondered  deeply  all  night,  had  come  to 
the  decision  of  opening  the  Pandora  box,  and  openly 
proclaiming  the  divorce  of  the  Soudan  from  Egypt, 
and  the  forming  of  local  militias,  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  Soudan  officials  in  every  important  post. 
At  8  A.M.,  Hussein  Pasha  Khalifa,  and  JNlohammed 
Tahir,  the  judge  of  the  civil  court,  a  man  w^e 
have  every  reason  to  believe  is  a  bosom-friend  of 
the  Mahdi,   made  their   a})pearance.     With   their 

*  Vide  ante,  p.  44G. 


468  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

assistance,  and  after  showing  them  the  secret 
Firmans,  which  the  General  thought  necessary 
to  show  them  to  allay  their  alarm  at  the  over- 
turning of  the  Khedive's  authority,  a  Proclamation 
was  drawn  up.  This  Proclamation  appointed  a 
Committee,  or  provisional  Government  consisting 
of  six  of  the  most  influential  Notables  of  the 
Mudirieh,  and  proclaimed  that  the  JNIudirieh  was 
from  henceforth  independent  of  Cairo,  but  subject 
to  General  Gordon  as  Governor -General  and 
Commissioner  of  the  British  Government.  The 
Proclamation  was  affixed  to  the  gate,  and  caused 
a  good  deal  of  excitement ;  so  far  as  I  am  able 
to  judge,  the  people  appeared  to  approve  of  it." 

On  February  13,  the  following  further  entry 
occurs  in  Colonel  Stewart's  Journal :  "  At  2  p.m., 
Hussein  Pasha  Khalifa  and  the  leadino;  men  of  the 
province  assembled  in  secret  conclave,  and  General 
Gordon,  after  a  speech,  showed  them  the  secret 
Firman.  This  document  caused  the  most  profound 
astonishment,  but  in  so  far  as  one  could  judge  from 
what  they  said,  nothing  could  exceed  their  delight. 
We  have  tried  to  fathom  what  those  present  really 
thought,  and  we  are  told  that  it  was  a  mistake 
to  have  shown  it.  We  are  told  that  the  probable 
effect  will  be  to  lead  those  who  read  the  Firman  to 
conclude  that  all  the  concessions  made  by  General 
Gordon,  viz.  : — half -tax  {sic),  were  made  merely 
with  a  view  to  getting  the  troops  out  of  the 
country  without  danger,  and  to  leave  the  people 
to  stew  in  their  own  juice.  On  consideration,  it 
may  perhaps  have  been  a  mistake  to  show  this 
Firman,  but  General  Gordon  says  that,  as  the 
object  of  his  mission  is  to  get  out  of  the  country 
and  to  leave  tliein  independent,  that  he  could  not 
have  put  a  sharper  spur  into  them  to  organise 
their  government  tlian  by  this  action.  It  is 
certain   that   they    fondly    believe   that    by    some 


CH.XX1V   JOURNEY  TO  KHARTOUM         469 

means  or  other  they  would  be  rid  of  the 
Cairo  Government,  and  remain  inde])endent  under 
General  Gordon,  who  would  give  them  greater 
local  liberties  and  not  interfere  with  their  darling 
slave-trade.  As  regards  my  own  opinion  on  the 
matter,  I  fully  admit  that  the  question  of  showing 
or  not  showing  the  Firman  is  a  difficult  one  to 
answer.  Perhaps  1  should  have  preferred  follow- 
ing Nubar  Paslia's  advice  and  delaying  any  action 
in  the  matter  till  a  later  period,  wlien  I  could  have 
better  judged  what  would  have  been  the  result,  or 
at  any  rate,  till  the  political  situation  had  become 
clearer." 

In  a  letter  to  me  of  the  same  date,  February  13, 
Colonel  Stewart  wrote :  '*  You  will  see  by  my 
Journal  that  Gordon  has  taken  his  leap  in  the  dark 
and  shown  his  secret  Firman.  How  it  will  act,  and 
what  will  be  the  result,  goodness  only  knows.  At 
any  rate,  the  deed  is  done  and  we  must  now  abide 
by  the  result  and  hope  for  the  best." 

General  Gordon  says  in  his  Journal  (p.  28.5)  that 
the  Khedive's  Firman  —  by  which  he  meant  the 
Proclamation  which  was  g-iven  to  him  in  Cairo — was 
not  "  promulgated  "  in  the  Soudan,  and  the  same 
statement  is  repeated  by  the  editor  of  the  Journal 
(Mr.  Egmont  Hake)  in  a  note  on  p.  309.  It  is 
clear,  however,  from  the  facts  narrated  above,  that, 
after  the  events  which  took  place  at  Berber,  the 
existence  of  the  Firman  must  have  been  known 
throughout  the  Soudan. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  General  Gordon 
committed  an  error  of  judgment  in  showing  the 
Firman  at  Berber.  News  of  the  intended  abandon- 
ment of  the  Soudan  had,  indeed,  reached  Khartoum 
prior  to  that  date.  But  it  was  only  half  believed. 
It  was  not  till  after  the  events  which  took  place 
at  Berber  on  February  12  and  13,  that  the  inten- 
tions of  the  Egyptian  Government  became  widely 


470  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  lu 

known.  Sir  Reginald  Wingate^  alludes  to  the 
"  fatal  Proclamation  wliich  gave  the  Soudan 
away,"  and  he  has  informed  me  verbally  that  his 
researches  have  led  him  to  the  conclusion  that 
General  Gordon's  difficulties  were  greatly  increased 
by  the  action  taken  at  Berber. 

If  General  Gordon  had  not  stated  the  fact  himself, 
and  if  we  did  not  know  something  of  his  peculiar 
character,  it  would  be  almost  incredible  that  he 
should  have  shown  such  an  important  document 
as  the  Khedive's  Firman  to  the  Sheikhs  at  Berber 
without  having  fully  mastered  its  contents.  Such, 
however,  is  the  case.  He  appears  subsequently  to 
have  seen  that  he  made  a  mistake  in  showinjj  the 
Firman,  for,  on  November  9,  1884,  the  following 
entry  occurs  in  his  Journal  (p.  309) :  "  If  the 
Mahdi  got  this  {i.e.  the  Firman),  he  would  have 
crowed,  though  he  may  know  of  it,^  for  I  sliowed 

^  Mahdiism,  etc.,  p.  121.  Father  Ohi-walder  also  says:  ''Gordon 
himself  committed  a  mistake  by  which  he  gave  a  death-blow  to  himself 
and  his  mission.  On  his  way  to  Khartoum,  he  stopped  at  Berber  and 
interviewed  the  Mudir  Hussein  Pasha  Khalifa  ;  he  imprudently  told 
him  that  he  had  come  up  to  remove  the  Egyptian  garrisons,  as  Egypt 
had  abandoned  the  Soudan.  At  Metemmeh  also  ...  he  committed  a 
similar  imprudence,  by  giving  the  same  information  to  Haj  AH  Wad 
Saad,  the  Emir  of  Metemmeh." — Ten  Years'  Captivity  in  the  Muhdi's 
Camp,  p.  123. 

2  On  October  22,  i.e.  eighteen  days  before  General  Gordon  made  this 
entry  in  his  Journal,  he  had  received  a  letter  from  the  Mahdi  (Appendix 
to  Journal,  p.  522),  in  which  the  latter  gave  a  list  of  the  documents  which 
had  fallen  into  his  possession  at  the  time  of  Colonel  Stewart's  death. 
Inter  alia,  the  Mahdi  wrote:  "Also  we  have  seen  your  telegram  dated 
August  28,  1884^,  stating  that,  as  for  the  Firman  emanating  from  the 
Khedive  to  all  the  Nobles  and  Notables  and  people  of  the  Soudan, 
announcing  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  of  the  Government  from  it, 
and  their  evacuation  of  tiie  country,  and  leaving  it  to  the  Soudanese  to 
appoint  rulers  of  the  country  from  among  the  natives, — you  had  not  been 
aide  to  communicate  it,  or  to  show  it  to  any  one  on  account  of  what 
had  taken  place."  The  receipt  of  this  letter  is  recorded  in  General 
(lordon's  Journal  (p.  220)  in  the  followinar  cliaracteristic  words  written 
on  October  22,  1884 :  ''Tlie  Mahdi's  letter  is  to  relate  how  he  captured 
the  post,  etc. ,  Abbas  (the  steamer  in  which  Stewart  went  down  the 
Nile),  etc.  .My  answer  was  tliat  I  did  not  care  who  had  surrendered 
and  who  had  l)een  captured.  As  for  these  letters,  I  cannot  make  head 
or  tail  of  them,  so  I  leave  them  to  the  Arabic  sciiolars  of  tlie  Univer- 
sities."   General  Gordon  knew  very  little  Arabic,  neither  does  he  appeal 


cflxxiv   JOURNEY  TO  KHARTOUM         471 

it,  not  knuwhig  well  its  contents,^  to  Hussein  Pasha 
Khalifa  {vide  Stewart's  Journal,  which  went  down 
and  in  which  I  criticised  my  having  done  so)." 

I  now  turn  to  another  episode.  In  1877,  a 
Convention  was  signed  between  the  British  and 
Egyptian  Governments  having  for  its  object  the 
abolition  of  slavery  and  of  the  Slave  Trade  in  Egypt. 
The  Convention  was  not  to  come  into  operation 
in  the  Soudan  till  the  year  1888.  It  would,  under 
any  circumstances,  have  been  very  difficult  to  apply 
the  Convention  to  the  Soudan.  General  Gordon 
knew  this.  So  early  as  October  11,  1883,  Lord 
Granville  wrote  privately  to  me  :  "  About  slavery, 
I  was  very  keen  at  first,  and  the  first  cold  water 
I  got  was,  of  all  people  in  the  world,  from  Colonel 
Gordon,  who  seemed  to  me  sensible  on  the  matter." 
In  other  words,  in  spite  of  his  anti-slavery  sympa- 
thies, and  although  he  had  himself  been  a  witness 
of  the  horrors  of  the  Slave  Trade,  General  Gordon 
recognised  the  facts  of  the  situation  more  fully  than 
his  friends,  who,  in  so  far  as  the  incident  about  to 
be  narrated  is  concerned,  became  his  critics. 

On  February  12,  Colonel  Stewart,  who  was 
then  at  Berber,  made  the  following  entry  in  his 
Journal :  "  A  deputation  of  the  Notables  came  to 
inquire  whether  the  Treaty,  which  had  been  printed 
and  published  by  General  Gordon,  in  November 
1877,  by  which  all  slaves  would  be  freed  in  1889, 
was  in  his  present  programme.  General  Gordon, 
knowing  the  utter  futility  of  saying  '  Yes,'  replied 
'  No,'  and  published  a  Proclamation  to  this  effect. 
It  is  probable  that  this  Proclamation  interested  and 
pleased  the  people  more  than  anything  else." 

A  few  days  later,  the  Proclamation  was  publisheci 

to  have  taken  pains  to  ^et  Arabic  documents  properly  translated  to  him. 
This,  added  to  his  habitual  carelessness  in  the  transaction  of  business, 
led  him  into  the  committal  of  many  mistakes  which  might  have  been 
avoided. 

1  The  italics  are  not  in  the  oiijjiual. 


472  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

in  Kliartoum.  It  was  to  the  following  effect:  "  My 
sincerest  desire  is  to  adopt  a  course  of  action  which 
shall  lead  to  public  tranquillity,  and  knowing  your 
regret  at  the  severe  measures  taken  by  the  Govern- 
ment for  the  suppression  of  the  slave  traffic,  and 
the  seizure  and  punishment  of  all  concerned, 
according  to  the  Convention  and  Decrees,  I  confer 
upon  you  these  rights,  that  henceforth  none  shall 
interfere  with  your  property ;  whoever  has  slaves, 
shall  have  full  right  to  their  services  and  full  control 
over  them.  This  Proclamation  is  a  proof  of  my 
clemency  towards  you." 

This  Proclamation  naturally  caused  some  ex- 
citement in  England.  That  a  man  who  had 
heretofore  been  considered  a  champion  of  the 
anti- slavery  cause,  should,  immediately  on  his 
arrival  at  Khartoum,  sanction  slavery  and  thus 
run  counter  to  the  traditions  of  his  previous 
career,  seemed,  indeed,  astonishing.  The  special 
supporters  of  the  anti  -  slavery  movement  were 
up  in  arms.  Party  managers,  moreover,  were  not 
likely  to  let  slip  such  a  good  opportunity  for 
attacking  the  Government.  On  February  18, 
Sir  Stafford  Northcote,  speaking  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  asked,  amidst  the  '*  loud  cheers  "  of  his 
supporters,  whether  "  General  Gordon's  powers 
extended  to  the  issue  of  such  a  Proclamation  ? " 

The  Government  were,  in  fact,  in  an  em- 
barrassing position.  It  was  obvious  from  the  first 
that,  if  the  Soudan  were  abandoned,  a  stimulus 
would  be  given  to  slavery  and  the  Slave  Trade. 
Nothing  General  Gordon  could  have  said  or  done 
could  have  acted  as  an  antidote.  He  rightly 
judged  that  he  had  to  look  to  the  main  object  of 
his  mission,  which  was  to  evacuate  the  Soudan. 
He  sought,  therefore,  to  make  some  capital  out  of 
permitting  the  continuance  of  an  abuse  which  he 
was  powerless  to   arrest.     Without  doubt,   under 


OH.  XXIV   JOURNEY  TO  KHARTOUM         473 

ordinary  circumstances,  it  would  have  been  better, 
if  he  could  not  remedy  the  evil,  at  all  events  not 
to  have  given  the  sanction  of  his  name  to  its  con- 
tinuance. But  the  circumstances  in  which  General 
Gordon  was  placed  were  far  from  being  ordinary. 
The  difficulties  of  carrying  out  his  task  were  such 
that  he  could  not  afford  to  miss  a  point  in  the  game. 
He  was  free  from  the  peculiar  feature  which, 
according  to  many  foreign  critics,  is  such  a  promi- 
nent defect  in  the  English  character,  and  which, 
if  it  be  not  cant,  is  nearly  allied  to  cant.  I  mean 
that  particular  phase  of  thought  which,  although  it 
cannot  deny  that  certain  unpleasant  facts  exist, 
hesitates  to  draw  the  logical  conclusion  from  their 
existence,  and  hesitates  still  more  to  make  any 
open  acknowledgment  of  their  existence.  General 
Gordon  probably  reasoned  thus  :  "  As  I  cannot  stop 
slavery,  there  can  be  no  harm  in  my  saying  so, 
and  in  acting  accordingly."  A  section  of  British 
public  opinion,  on  the  other  hand,  reasoned  some- 
what as  follows  :  "  We  know  that  you  cannot  stop 
slavery,  but  you  had  better  hide  the  unpleasant 
fact  from  the  eyes  of  the  world." 

General  Gordon's  action  in  this  matter  appeared 
to  me  to  be  justifiable.  I,  therefore,  determined  to 
support  him  to  the  best  of  my  ability.  On  February 
21,  General  Gordon  telegraphed  to  me  as  follows : 
"  Several  telegrams  have  been  sent  from  the  press 
asking  about  what  I  said  respecting  slaves.  The 
question  asked  me  was  this :  Did  I  insist  on  the 
liberation  of  slaves  in  1889,  as  per  Treaty  of  1877  ? 
I  answered  that  the  Treaty  would  not  be  enforced 
in  1889  by  me,  which,  considering  the  determina- 
tion of  Her  JNIajesty's  Government  respecting  the 
Soudan,  was  a  self-evident  fact.  The  question  is 
one  of  slave-holding,  not  of  slave-hunting,  and,  in 
my  opinion,  that  Treaty  of  1877  will  never  be 
carried  out  in  Cairo  as  to  slave-holding." 


474  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

I  sent  the  following  reply :  "  About  your 
Slavery  Proclamation,  1  am  sure  I  quite  under- 
stand your  reasons.  I  have  telegraphed  home  to 
say  that  I  think  you  are  quite  right.  You 
are  doing  admirably,  and  may  rely  on  my  full 
support  in  everything." 

At  the  same  time  (February  21),  I  sent  the 
following  telegram  to  Lord  Granville  :  *'  It  is  only 
natural  that  the  Proclamation  issued  by  General 
Gordon  at  Khartoum  should  have  caused  a  good 
deal  of  surprise  in  England.  But  in  reality  his 
declaration  with  regard  to  the  buying  and  selling 
of  slaves  is  of  very  little  practical  importance,  and 
it  is  easy  enough  to  understand  his  reasons  for 
making  it. 

"  It  was  obvious  from  the  first  that  a  revival  of 
slavery  in  the  Soudan  would  result  from  the  policy 
of  abandonment.  Nothing  tliat  General  Gordon 
can  do  at  Khartoum  will  prevent  this  revival ; 
knowing  that  he  is  powerless  to  stop  slavery 
in  the  future,  General  Gordon  evidently  intends 
using  it  as  a  concession  to  the  people  which  will 
strengthen  his  position  in  other  matters.  I  con- 
sider that  he  has  succeeded  admirably  so  far,  and 
I  sincerely  trust  that  he  will  be  allowed  full  liberty 
of  action  to  complete  the  execution  of  his  general 
plans.  I  have  informed  him  that  my  personal 
opinion  is  entirely  in  his  favour,  and  that  I  will 
give  him  all  tiie  support  in  my  power. 

"  As  to  the  best  means  of  preventing  slavery, 
the  subject  will  have  to  be  considered  carefully  and 
discussed  afresh,  in  view  of  the  altered  circum- 
stances of  the  situation." 

After  this,  the  subject  was  allowed  to  drop. 
The  Pall  iMall  Gazette  wrote  :  "  The  Government 
stood  by  their  agent  with  commendable  courage, 
and,  as  is  usual  when  responsible  authorities 
well-informed    as   to    facts    resist  the   clamour  of 


OH.  XXIV  JOURNEY  TO  KHARTOUM         475 

ill-informed  public  opinion,  the  cry  promptly 
subsided." 

On  February  18,  General  Gordon  readied 
Khartoum.  His  arrival  was  announced  to  me  by 
Mr.  Power,  in  the  following  telegram  :  "  Gordon 
arrived  here  this  morning,  and  met  with  a  wonder- 
ful demonstration  of  welcome  on  the  part  of  the 
population.  The  state  of  affairs  here,  since  it 
was  heard  that  Gordon  was  coming,  gives  every 
promise  of  the  speedy  pacification  of  this  portion 
of  the  Soudan.  His  speech  to  the  people  was 
received  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm." 

On  the  following  day  (February  19)  Mr.  Power 
sent  me  another  telegram.  "  Gordon,"  he  said, 
"  met  with  a  great  reception  yesterday.  Has  ordered 
all  white  troops  to  leave  for  Cairo.  Soudani 
soldiers  kept  in  Khartoum.  Has  formed  Council 
of  twelve  Notables,  Arabs,  to  sit  with  him.  Burned 
all  old  records  of  debts  against  people,  and  instru- 
ments of  torture  in  Government  House.  Colonel 
Stewart  at  prison  striking  irons  off  all  prisoners  of 
war,  debtors,  and  men  who  have  long  ago  served 
their  sentences.  Gordon  sends  Ibrahim  Pasha 
down  with  detachment  of  white  troops.  Every- 
thing is  now  safe  here  for  troops  and  Europeans. 
He  is  giving  the  people  more  than  they  expected 
from  the  Mahdi." 

General  Gordon  was  at  tliis  time  hopeful  as 
regards  the  future.  Without  doubt,  he  was  over- 
sanguine,  but  at  the  time  a  reasonable  prospect 
seemed  to  exist  that  he  would  be  able  to  carry 
out  his  mission  successfully.  He  had  begun  well. 
On  February  12,  he  telegraphed  to  me:  "Do  not 
fear  for  the  Khartoum  garrison.  It  can  come  by 
Berber,  if  necessary,  but  neither  the  men  who 
attacked  Baker,  nor  those  who  attacked  Hicks,  will 
ever  leave  tribal  limits.  What  had  to  be  feared 
was  the  rising  of  other  peoples,  which  I  trust  I 


4>7G  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  hi 

have  prevented  by  libenil  concessions."  Again,  on 
February  14,  he  telegraphed  to  me :  "  I  believe 
you  need  not  give  yourself  any  further  anxiety 
about  this  part  of  the  Soudan.  The  people,  great 
and  small,  are  heartily  glad  to  be  free  of  a  union 
which  only  caused  them  sorrow." 

To  a  certain  extent,  General  Gordon  was  right 
in  his  view  of  the  situation.  The  tribes  round 
Khartoum  were  wavering.  If  they  openly  joined 
the  Malidi,  the  difficulties  of  the  situation  would  be 
greatly  increased.  The  only  chance  of  ensuring 
their  friendship  was  by  making  liberal  concessions. 
General  Gordon  had  made  such  concessions.  He 
had  issued  a  Proclamation  sanctioning  slavery, 
which,  although  it  caused  consternation  in  London, 
was  hailed  with  delight  at  Khartoum.  He  had 
remitted  taxes.  He  had  destroyed  the  bonds  of 
the  usurers — always  a  most  popular  proceeding  in 
an  Oriental  country.  He  had  released  prisoners 
who  were  unjustly  confined.  His  mere  presence 
at  Khartoum  was  interpreted  as  a  guarantee  that 
the  future  government  of  the  Soudan  would  be 
less  oppressive  than  that  of  the  past.  Lord 
Gianville's  buoyant  spirits  at  once  rose.  On 
February  15,  he  wrote  privately  to  me  :  '*  It  was  an 
anxious  moment  while  Gordon  was  in  the  desert. 
\Mien  he  gets  at  the  head  of  6000  men,  it  becomes 
more  of  a  normal  situation.  It  looks  as  if  he 
would  succeed."  ^ 

1  On  another  occasion  (December  28,  1883),  speaking'  of  Eg-yptian 
affairs  jj^eiierally,  Lord  (Jninville  wrote  to  nie  :  "  1  was  delighted  to 
see  that  you  do  not  feel  the  alarm,  which  is  felt  here,  and  apparently 
in  Egypt.  I  am  perpetually  reproaching  myself  with  heing  too 
optimistic.  The  difficulties  are  great,  especially  the  enormous  one  of 
finance,  but  they  ouglit  not  to  be  insurmountable."  I  do  not  think 
tliat  I  was  ever  very  optimistic  about  Egyptian  affairs.  Indeed,  as 
regards  finance,  1  at  one  time  erred  somewhat  on  the  side  of  undue 
pessimism.  What  1  felt  during  this  period  was  that,  amidst  all  the 
excitement  that  then  prevailed,  and  which  resulted  in  some  very 
wild  and  ill-considered  suggestions  being  occasionally  made,  it  w.aa 
necessary   for    me   to    keep    my    head,    to    ascertain    so    far    as    was 


CH.  XXIV  JOURNEY  TO  KHARTOUM         477 

The  shrewd  Scotchman,  who  accompanied 
General  Gordon,  was  not,  however,  carried  away 
by  the  jubilation  of  the  moment.  On  February  17, 
Colonel  Stewart  wrote  to  me  :  *'  The  problem  of 
evacuating  the  Soudan  is  continually  in  our  minds. 
I  must  confess  the  more  one  looks  at  it,  the  more 
difficult  it  becomes.  However,  perhaps,  when 
actually  tackled,  it  will  resolve  itself  somehow  or 
other." 

I  have  already  stated  that  it  was,  in  my  opinion, 
a  mistake  ever  to  have  sent  General  Gordon  to 
the  Soudan.  Once  sent,  however,  the  best  chance 
of  success  lay  in  adopting  the  course  advocated  by 
the  Pall  Mall  Gazette.  General  Gordon  should 
have  had  *'  carte  blanche  to  do  the  best  that  could 
be  done,"  so  long  as  he  conformed  to  the  broad  lines 
of  the  policy  which  he  was  sent  to  carry  out.  I 
saw  this  from  the  first,  and  regulated  my  conduct 
accordingly.  My  difficulty  lay  in  discovering, 
amidst  the  numerous  contradictory  opinions  that 
emanated  from  General  Gordon,  what  it  was  he 
really  wished  should  be  done.  Unfortunately,  a 
section  of  the  British  public  did  not  realise  suffi- 
ciently the  importance  of  giving  General  Gordon 
a  free  hand.  In  spite  of  his  popularity,  directly  he 
made  proposals  which  ran  counter  to  the  current 
of  preconceived  public  opinion,  a  chorus  of  dis- 
approbation was  raised,  in  which  some  of  General 
Gordon's  warmest  friends  and   supporters  joined. 

possible  the  real  facts  of  tlie  case,  to  consider  carefully  the  merits  of 
any  proposal  before  acting  upon  it,  and  especially  to  avoid  the  use 
of  sensational  or  exaggerated  language.  On  April  13,  1884,  (ienoral 
Gordon  sent  me  a  telegram  wliicli  I  did  not  receive  till  six  years  later 
(March  20,  18i)0),  and  in  which  he  exhorted  me  to  depart  "from  that 
delicious  diplomatic  calm  wliich  is  Paradise."  He  fre(|uently  used 
language  of  a  somewhat  similar  description  in  his  Journal.  The 
"diplomatic  calm "  existed  in  a  somewhat  less  degree  than  General 
Gordon  supposed.  Its  appearance  was  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that,  in 
my  opinion,  the  greater  the  difficulties,  the  more  does  it  behove  any 
one  in  a  responsible  position  to  maintain  a  clear  judgment,  and  not 
be  carried  away  by  sentiment  or  rash  advice. 


478  IMODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

The  Government  accepted  the  principle  thcat  they 
must  follow  General  Gordon's  advice.  Mr.  Glad- 
stone, speaking  in  the  House  of  Commons,  on 
February  12,  said  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
Government  "  to  beware  of  interfering  with 
General  Gordon's  plans  generally."  They  adhered 
to  this  principle,  at  all  events  in  respect  to  the 
Slavery  Proclamation,  with  the  result  that  the 
agitation  against  it  speedily  died  a  natural  death. 

The  Soudan  question  was,  indeed,  as  Colonel 
Stewart  said,  to  be  solved  *'  somehow  or  other,"  but 
its  solution  was  to  bring  to  the  British  Government 
the  political  discredit  which  always  attaches  itself 
to  failure.  It  was  to  cause  a  great  waste  of  public 
treasure  and  to  involve  the  sacrifice  of  many  valu- 
able lives,  including  those  of  the  two  brave  men  on 
whose  actions  the  attention,  not  only  of  England 
and  Egypt,  but  it  may  also  be  said  of  all  Europe 
was  then  fixed. 


CHAPTER   XXV 

ZOBEIR    PASHA 
February  18-March  l6,  1884 

The  turning-point  of  General  Gordon's  Mission — General  Gordon's 
Memorandum  of  February  8— Change  in  General  Gordon's  views 
— He  asks  for  Zobeir  Pasha — I  advise  that  Zobeir  Pasha  should  be 
General  Gordon's  successor — llie  Government  reject  this  proposal 
— General  Gordon  proposes  to  "  smash  up"  the  Mahdi — Conflicting 
policies  advocated  by  General  Gordon — His  Proclamation  stating 
that  British  troops  were  coming  to  Khartoum — General  Gordon's 
neglect  of  his  instructions — I  again  urge  the  employment  of  Zobeir 
Pasha — Difficulty  of  understanding  General  Gordon's  telegrams — 
Colonel  Stewart  recommends  that  Zobeir  Pasha  should  l)e  sent — I 
support  this  view — General  Gordon  recommends  that  the  Berber- 
Suakin  route  should  be  opened — ITie  Government  object  to  the 
employment  of  Zobeir  Pasha — I  again  urge  the  employment  of 
Zobeir  Pasha — General  Gordon's  communications  to  tlie  Times' 
correspondent — The  tribes  round  Khartoum  waver — The  Govern- 
ment reject  the  Zobeir  proposal  —  I  instruct  General  Gordon 
to  hold  on  to  Khartoum — I  again  urge  on  the  Government  the 
necessity  of  employing  Zobeir  Pasha — The  proposal  is  rejected — 
I  remonstrate —  Final  rejection  of  the  Zobeir  proposal — Were  the 
Government  right  in  their  decision  ? 

Everything  of  political  importance  connected 
with  General  Gordon's  Mission  took  place  within  a 
few  weeks  of  his  arrival  at  Khartoum.  The  essential 
facts  connected  with  the  history  of  those  eventful 
weeks  can  be  summed  up  in  a  few  words.  General 
Gordon  proposed  that  Zobeir  Pasha  should  govern 
the  Soudan  as  a  feudatory  of  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment. Colonel  Stewart  and  myself  at  first  liesitated 
as  to  the  desirability  of  sending  Zobeir  Pasha  to 
the  Soudan,  but  after  a  brief  interval   we   came 

479 


480  INIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

round  to  General  Gordon's  opinion.  The  British 
Government  would  not  agree  to  tlie  employment 
of  Zobeir  Pasha.  Subsequently,  the  tribes  round 
Khartoum  rose.  General  Gordon  and  Colonel 
Stewart  were  besieged.  It  was  clear  that  General 
Gordon's  political  mission  had  failed,  and  from 
that  moment  there  only  remained  an  im])ortant 
military  question  to  decide,  viz.,  whether  a  British 
military  force  should  or  should  not  be  sent  to  the 
relief  of  Khartoum. 

The  broad  facts  of  the  case  are  already  well 
known.  They  were  set  forth  in  the  Parliamentary 
papers,  which  were  published  at  the  time.  I  am 
not,  however,  aware  that  any  attempt  has  as  yet 
been  made  to  give  so  clear  a  p?Tcfs  of  the  whole 
of  the  correspondence  as  to  enable  a  thorough 
appreciation  to  be  formed  of  the  parts  played 
respectively  by  those  who  were  the  principal 
actors  in  this  political  drama — I  might  almost  say 
political  tragedy.  I  propose,  at  the  risk  of  being 
tedious,  to  make  such  Si  precis. 

On  February  8,  General  Gordon,  who  was  then 
at  Abu  Hamed,  addressed  to  me  an  important 
Memorandum.  He  wrote :  "  In  spite  of  all  that 
has  occurred,  I  feel  satisfied  that  the  prestige  of 
the  Cairo  Government,  except  in  so  far  as  the 
conduct  of  their  troops  in  the  field  is  concerned,  is 
not  seriously  shaken,  and  lliat  the  people  still 
continue  to  look  up  to  the  Cairo  Government  as 
the  direct  representatives  of  the  Sultan  as  Khalif, 
and  would  look  with  horror  on  a  complete  separa- 
tion." He  proposed  that  the  Egyptian  Government 
"  should  continue  to  maintain  their  position  as 
a  Suzerain  Power,  nominate  the  Governor-General 
and  Moudirs" — v;ho  were  to  be  Soudanese — "and 
act  as  a  supreme  Court  of  A])peal.  Their  control- 
ling influence  should,  however,  be  a  strictly  moral 
one,  and  limited  to  giving  advice."    "  I  would,  there- 


cH.  XXV  ZOBEIll  PASHA  481 

fore,"  he  added,  ''earnestly  beg  that  evacuation, 
but  not  abandonment,  be  the  programme  to  be 
followed,  and  that  the  Firman,  with  which  I  am 
provided,  be  changed  into  one  recognising  moral 
control  and  suzerainty." 

Accompanying  this  Memorandum,  were  some 
remarks  by  Colonel  Stewart  upon  General  Gordon's 
proposals,  to  which  he  gave  a  qualified  support. 
He  said  that  he  "  did  not  quite  agree  with  General 
Gordon  that  the  prestige  of  Cairo  had  not  been 
greatly  diminished."  General  Gordon's  Memor- 
andum and  Colonel  Stewart's  observations  did  not 
reach  me  till  February  23. 

In  the  meanwhile,  I  had  received  a  private  letter 
from  Colonel  Stewart,  dated  Korosko,  February  1, 
in  which  the  following  passage  occurred  :  "  Gordon 
is  apparently  still  hankering  after  Zobeir,  says  he 
feels  a  sympathy  for  him,  etc.  It  is  impossible  to 
say  that  he  may  not  of  a  sudden  request  him  to  be 
sent  up.  Should  such  be  the  case,  I  trust  you  will 
not  let  him  leave  Cairo  unless  under  very  cogent 
reasons.  I  am  convinced  his  coming  up  would  be 
a  dangerous  experiment.  It  is  also  quite  possible 
that  he  may  not  have  the  influence  attributed  to 
him,  now  that  it  is  said  his  Bazingers  (slave 
soldiers)  have  ceased  to  exist."  On  the  other 
hand,  General  Gordon  wrote  to  me  from  Abu 
Hamed  on  February  8  :  "  W^ith  respect  to  Zobeir, 
he  is  the  only  man  who  is  fit  for  Governor-General 
of  the  Soudan  if  we  wish  it  to  be  quiet,  and  as  for 
his  touching  me,  he  would  have  no  object  to  do  so. 
I  wish  you  would  see  more  of  this  remarkable 
man.  ...  I  wish  Lady  Baring  would  see  him." 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that,  as  General  Gordon 
approached  Khartoum  and  as  he  became  better 
informed  of  the  situation  in  the  Soudan,  not  only 
did  the  optimism  of  the  views,  which  he  had 
previously  held,  fade  away,  but  also  his  sympathy 

VOL.  I  2  I 


482  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

for  the  people  of  the  country  led  him  to  forget  the 
main  object  for  the  accomplishment  of  which  he 
had  been  sent  to  the  Soudan.  But  a  few  months 
were  to  elapse  before  the  same  man  who  had 
insisted  that,  in  his  mstructions,  it  should  be 
stated  that  the  policy  of  evacuating  the  Soudan 
"  should  on  no  account  be  changed,"  was  to  write 
in  his  Journal  :  "  I  hate  her  Majesty's  Government 
for  their  leaving  the  Soudan  after  having  caused 
all  its  troubles." 

The  first  indication  I  got  of  the  rapid  change 
which  was  to  take  place  in  General  Gordon's  views 
was  contained  in  a  letter  from  Colonel  Stewart, 
dated  Berber,  February  13,  in  which  he  wrote : 
"  Gordon  is  so  full  of  sympathy  for  these  people 
that  he  is  inclined  to  use  every  effort  to  mitigate 
the  efi'ect  of  our  withdrawal,  but  I  am  convinced 
no  effort  of  his  will  prevent  the  reign  of  anarchy. 
Personally,  although  I  regret  the  unavoidable,  still 
I  am  persuaded  that  the  evacuation  policy  is  the 
right  one,  and  that  it  will  probably  be  in  the  end 
the  best  for  all  parties." 

Immediately  upon  his  arrival  at  Khartoum,  on 
February  18,  General  Gordon  sent  me  the  following 
telegram  :  "In  a  previous  INIemorandum,^  I  alluded 
to  the  arrival  of  an  epoch  when  whites,  fellaheen 
troops,  civilian  employes,  women  and  children  of 
deceased  soldiers — in  short,  the  Egyptian  element 
in  the  Soudan — will  be  removed  ;  when  we  shall 
be  face  to  face  with  the  Soudan  administration, 
and  when  I  must  witlidraw  from  the  Soudan.  I 
have  stated  that  to  withdraw  without  being  able 
to  })lace  a  successor  in  my  seat  would  be  the  signal 
for  general  anarchy  throughout  the  country,  which, 
though  all  Egyptian  element  was  withdrawn,  would 
be  a  misfortune,  and  inhuman. 

*  This  is  the  Memorandum  of  February  8,  which  did  uot  reach  me 
till  the  23rd.      Vide  ante,  pp.  480-481. 


CH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  483 

"  Also,  I  have  stated  that,  even  if  I  placed  a 
man  in  my  seat  unsupported  by  any  Government, 
the  same  anarchy  would  ensue. 

"  Her  Majesty's  Government  could,  I  think, 
without  responsibility  in  money  or  men,  give  the 
commission  to  my  successor  on  certain  terms  which 
1  will  detail  hereafter.  If  this  solution  is  examined, 
we  shall  find  that  a  somewhat  analogous  case  exists 
in  Afghanistan,  where  Her  Majesty's  Government 
give  moral  support  to  the  Ameer,  and  go  even 
beyond  that  in  giving  the  Ameer  a  subsidy,  which 
would  not  be  needed  in  the  present  case. 

"  I  distinctly  state  that  if  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment gave  a  Commission  to  my  successor,  I  recom- 
mend neither  a  subsidy  nor  men  being  given.  I 
would  select  and  give  a  commission  to  some  man, 
and  promise  him  the  moral  support  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government  and  nothing  more. 

"  It  may  be  argued  that  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment would  thus  be  giving  nominal  and  moral 
support  to  a  man  who  will  rule  over  a  Slave  State, 
but  so  is  Afghanistan,  as  also  Socotra. 

**  This  nomination  of  my  successor  must,  I  think, 
be  direct  from  Her  Majesty's  Government. 

"As  for  the  man.  Her  Majesty's  Government 
should  select  one  above  all  others,  namely,  Zobeir. 
He  alone  has  the  ability  to  rule  the  Soudan,  and 
would  be  universally  accepted  by  the  Soudan.  He 
should  be  made  K.C.M.G.,  and  given  presents." 
After  stating  the  terms  under  which  Zobeir  Pasha 
should  be  nominated.  General  Gordon  continued  : 
"  Zobeir's  exile  at  Cairo  for  ten  years,  amidst  all  the 
late  events  and  his  mixing  with  Europeans,  must 
have  had  a  great  effect  on  his  character.  Zobeir's 
nomination,  under  the  moral  countenance  of  Her 
Majesty's  Government,  would  bring  all  the  mer- 
chants, European  and  others,  back  to  the  Soudan 
in  a  short  time.     I  have  asked  Stewart  to  gfive  his 


484  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

opinions  independently  of  mine,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent a  one-sided  view.  He  is  a  first-rate  man." 
At  the  same  time,  Colonel  Stewart  sent  me  the 
following  telegram  :  "  With  reference  to  Gordon's 
telegram  of  to-day,  I  think  that  the  policy  he 
urges  would  greatly  facilitate  our  retirement  from 
the  country.  As  to  Avhether  Zobeir  Pasha  is  the 
man  who  should  be  nominated,  I  think  we  have 
hardly  yet  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  country  to 
be  able  to  form  an  opinion.  It  is,  however,  prob- 
able that  whoever  is  nominated  will  be  accepted 
for  a  time." 

I  thought  that  General  Gordon,  when  at  Cairo, 
had  made  his  proposal  to  utilise  Zobeir  Pasha's 
services  without  sufficient  deliberation.  When, 
however,  I  found  that,  after  an  interval  of  three 
weeks  and  after  having  had  an  opportunity  of 
judging  of  the  situation  at  Khartoum,  General 
Gordon  still  thought  that  Zobeir  Pasha's  services 
might  be  utilised,  it  appeared  to  me  safe  to  assume 
that  he  was  expressing  something  in  the  nature 
of  a  matured  opinion,  and  that  he  was  not,  as  so 
frequently  happened,  dashing  off  an  ill-considered 
proposal  on  the  spur  of  the  moment.  I,  therefore, 
resolved  to  support  him  in  so  far  as  the  ultimate 
utilisation  of  Zobeir  Pasha's  services  was  concerned. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  was  manifestly  a  risk  in 
allowing  Zobeir  Pasha  and  General  Gordon  to  be 
at  Khartoum  together.  Moreover,  General  Gordon's 
cautious  companion.  Colonel  Stewart,  entertained 
considerable  doubts  as  to  the  advisability  of  em- 
ploying Zobeir  Pasha.  I  had  great  confidence  in 
Colonel  Stewart's  judgment.  I  wished  to  give  him 
the  time,  for  whicli  he  asked,  to  form  an  opinion. 

On  February  19,  therefore,  I  re])eated  to  Lord 
Granville  General  Gordon's  and  Colonel  Stewart's 
telegrams  of  the  I8th,  with  the  following  remarks 
of  my  own  : — 


ciL  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  485 

"  As  regards  the  choice  of  his  (General  Gordon's) 
successor,  there  is,  as  Colonel  Stewart  says  in  his 
telegram,  no  necessity  to  decide  at  once,  but  I 
believe  Zobeir  Pasha  to  be  the  only  possible  man. 
He  undoubtedly  possesses  energy  and  ability,  and 
has  great  local  influence. 

"As  regards  the  Slave  Trade,  I  discussed  the 
matter  with  General  Gordon  when  he  was  in  Cairo, 
and  he  fully  agreed  with  me  in  thinking  that  Zobeir 
Pasha's  presence  or  absence  would  not  affect  the 
question  in  one  way  or  the  other.  I  am  also  con- 
vinced, from  many  things  that  have  come  to  my 
notice,  that  General  Gordon  is  quite  right  in 
thinking  that  Zobeir  Pasha's  residence  in  Egypt 
has  considerably  modified  his  character.  He  now 
understands  what  European  power  is,  and  it  is 
much  better  to  have  to  deal  with  a  man  of  this 
sort  than  with  a  man  like  the  Mahdi. 

"  I  should  be  altogether  opposed  to  having 
General  Gordon  and  Zobeir  Pasha  at  Khartoum 
together.  As  soon  as  General  Gordon  has  arranged 
for  the  withdrawal  of  the  garrison  and  the  rest  of 
the  Egyptian  element,  he  could  leave  Khartoum, 
and  Zobeir  Pasha  might  shortly  afterwards  start 
from  Cairo.  One  of  my  chief  reasons  for  allowing 
the  interview  betw  een  the  two  men  to  take  place 
was  that  I  wished  to  satisfy  myself  to  some  extent  of 
the  sentiments  entertained  by  Zobeir  Pasha  towards 
General  Gordon.  I  would  not  on  any  account  run 
the  risk  of  ])utting  General  Gordon  in  his  power. 

"  If  Zobeir  Pasha  is  nominated,  it  will  be  very 
necessary  to  lay  down  in  writing  and  in  the  plainest 
language  what  degree  of  support  he  may  expect 
from  Her  Majesty's  Government.  I  cannot  recom- 
mend that  he  should  be  promised  the  moral  support 
of  Her  Majesty's  Government.  In  the  first  place, 
he  would  scarcely  understand  the  sense  of  the 
phrase,  and,  moreover,  I  do  not  think  he  would 


486  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  hi 

attach  mucli  importance  to  any  support  which  was 
not  material.  It  is  for  Her  JNlajesty's  Government 
to  judge  what  the  effect  of  his  appointment  would 
be  upon  public  opinion  in  England,  but  except  for 
that,  I  can  see  no  reason  why  Zobeir  Pasha  should 
not  be  proclaimed  Ruler  of  the  Soudan  with  the 
approbation  of  Her  IMajesty's  Government.  It 
should  be  distinctly  explained  to  him  in  writing 
that  he  must  rely  solely  upon  his  own  resources  to 
maintain  his  position.  He  might  receive  a  moder- 
ate sum  of  money  from  the  Egyptian  Government 
to  begin  with.  His  communications  with  that 
Government  might  be  conducted  through  Her 
Majesty's  Representative  in  Cairo,  as  General 
Gordon  suggests. 

"  With  regard  to  the  detailed  conditions  men- 
tioned by  General  Gordon,  1  think  they  might 
form  the  subject  of  further  consideration  and  dis- 
cussion, both  with  General  Gordon  and  with  others 
in  authority  here.  I  am  inclined  to  doubt  whether 
such  conditions  would  be  of  any  use ;  they  would 
probably  not  long  be  observed. 

"  In  conclusion,  I  may  add  that  I  have  no  idea 
whether  Zobeir  Pasha  would  accept  the  position 
which  it  is  proposed  to  offer  him." 

On  February  22,  Lord  Granville  replied  :  "  Her 
Majesty's  Government  are  of  opinion  that  the 
gravest  objections  exist  to  the  appointment  by 
their  authority  of  a  successor  to  General  Gordon. 
The  necessity  does  not,  indeed,  appear  to  have  yet 
arisen  of  ffoino;  bevond  the  sujjcrestions  contained 
in  General  Gordon's  Memorandum  of  the  23rd 
ultimo,^  by  making  a  special  provision  for  the 
government  of  the  country. 

"  In  any  case,  the  public  opinion  of  this  country 
would  not  tolerate  the  appointment  of  Zobeir 
Pasha." 

•  Vide  ante,  p.  442. 


CH.XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  487 

Simultaneously  with  the  receipt  of  this  tele* 
gram,  I  received  General  Gordon's  Memorandum 
written  at  Abu  Hamed  on  February  8.  This 
Memorandum,  though  in  some  respects  at  variance 
with  the  proposals  contained  in  his  telegram  of 
the  18th,  enabled  me  more  fully  to  understand 
the  general  line  of  policy  which  he  wished  to 
advocate.  I  repeated  to  General  Gordon  Lord 
Granville's  telegram  of  the  22nd,  and  at  the  same 
time  I  added  the  following  remarks  of  my  own  : 
"The  views  expressed  in  your  telegram  of  the 
18th  do  not  appear  to  me  to  harmonise  with  those 
contained  in  your  letter  of  the  8th  instant,  which  I 
received  this  morning,  but  that  is  of  no  conse- 
quence. The  real  difficulty  is  to  find  a  man,  or 
several  men,  who  will  take  over  the  government  of 
the  country  to  the  south  of  Wadi  Haifa,  especially 
the  government  of  Khartoum  itself.  In  view  of 
the  objections  entertained  in  England  against 
Zobeir,  can  you  suggest  any  other  names  ? " 

I  resolved  to  postpone  any  further  connnunica- 
tion  to  Lord  Granville  until  I  had  received  General 
Gordon's  reply  to  my  question.  It  came  on  Feb- 
ruary 26,  and  was  as  follows  :  "  Telegram  of  the  23rd 
February  received  respecting  Zobeir.  That  settles 
question  for  me.  1  cannot  suggest  any  other. 
Mahdi's  agents  active  in  all  directions.  No  chance 
of  Mahdi's  advance  personally  from  Obeid.  You 
must  remember  that  when  evacuation  is  carried 
out,  Mahdi  will  come  down  here,  and,  by  agents, 
will  not  let  Egypt  be  quiet.  Of  course,  my  duty 
is  evacuation,  and  tlie  best  I  can  for  establishing  a 
quiet  government.  The  first  I  hope  to  accomplish. 
The  second  is  a  more  difficult  task,  and  concerns 
Egypt  more  than  me.  If  Egypt  is  to  be  quiet, 
Mahdi  must  be  smashed  up.  Mahdi  is  most 
unpopular,  and  with  care  and  time  could  be 
smashed.    Remember  that  once  Khartoum  belong-s 


488  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

to  Mahdi,  the  task  will  be  far  more  difficult ;  yet 
you  will,  for  safety  of  Egypt,  execute  it.  If  you 
decide  on  smashing  JNIaluli,  then  send  up  another 
£100,000,  and  send  up  200  Indian  troops  to  Wadi 
Haifa,  and  send  officer  up  to  Dongola  under  pretence 
to  look  out  quarters  for  troops.  Leave  Suakin  and 
JNIassowah  alone.  I  re})eat  that  evacuation  is  pos- 
sible, but  you  will  feel  effisct  in  Egypt,  and  will  be 
forced  to  enter  into  a  far  more  serious  affiiir  in 
order  to  guard  Egypt.  At  present,  it  would  be 
comparatively  easy  to  destroy  Mahdi." 

I  have  now  arrived  at  the  moment  which  was 
the  turning-point  of  General  Gordon's  mission.  It 
will  be  well  to  pause  in  order  that  I  may  give  a 
summary  of  the  situation  as  it  then  stood. 

On  February  26,  the  date  on  which  I  received 
the  above  telegram  from  General  Gordon,  thirty- 
nine  days  had  elapsed  since  he  had  left  London, 
thirty-one  days  since  he  had  left  Cairo,  and  eight 
days  since  he  had  arrived  at  Khartoum.  During 
that  period,  leaving  aside  points  of  detail,  as  to 
which  his  contradictions  had  been  numerous, 
General  Gordon  had  marked  out  for  himself  no 
less  than  five  different  lines  of  policy,  some  of 
which  were  wholly  conflicting  one  with  another, 
whilst  others,  without  being  absolutely  irrecon- 
cilable, differed  in  respect  to  some  of  their  most 
important  features. 

On  January  18,  he  started  from  London  with 
instructions  which  had  been  dictated  by  himself. 
His  wish  then  was  that  he  should  be  merely  sent 
to  "  report  upon  the  best  means  of  effecting  the 
evacuation  of  the  interior  of  the  Soudan."  He 
expressed  his  entire  concurrence  in  the  policy  of 
evacuation.  This  was  the  first  and  original  stage 
of  General  Gordon's  opinions. 

Before  he  arrived  in  Egypt  on  January  24,  he 
had   changed   his  views  as   to  the  nature   of  the 


vjH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  489 

functions  he  should  fulfil.  He  no  longer  wished 
to  be  a  mere  reporter.  He  wished  to  be  named 
Governor-General  of  the  Soudan  with  full  execu- 
tive powers.  He  supplemented  his  original  ideas 
by  suggesting  that  the  country  should  be  handed 
over  to  "the  different  petty  Sultans  who  existed 
at  the  time  of  Mehemet  All's  conquest.'  This  was 
the  second  stage  of  General  Gordon's  opinions. 

Fifteen  days  later  (February  8),  he  wrote  from 
Abu  Hamed  a  Memorandum  in  which  he  advo- 
cated "evacuation  but  not  abandonment."  The 
Government  of  Egypt  were  "to  maintain  their  posi- 
tion as  a  Suzerain  Power,  nominate  the  Governor- 
General  and  Moudirs,  and  act  as  a  supreme  Court 
of  Appeal."  This  was  the  third  stage  of  General 
Gordon's  opinions. 

Ten  days  later  (February  18),  General  Gordon 
reverted  to  the  principles  of  his  JNIemorandum  of 
the  8th,  but  with  a  notable  difference.  It  was  no 
longer  the  Egyptian,  but  the  British  Government 
which  were  to  control  the  Soudan  administration. 
The  British  Government  were  also  to  appoint  a 
Governor -General  who  was  to  be  furnished  with 
a  British  commission,  and  who  was  to  receive  a 
British  decoration.  Zobeir  Pasha  was  the  man 
whom  General  Gordon  wished  the  British  Govern- 
ment to  select.  'This  was  the  fourth  staff e  of 
General  Gordon  s  opinions. 

Eight  days  later  (February  26),  when  General 
Gordon  had  learnt  that  the  British  Government 
were  not  prepared  to  approve  of  Zobeir  Paslia  being 
sent  to  the  Soudan,  he  proposed  that  the  JNlahdi 
should  be  "  smashed  up,"  and  that,  to  assist  in  this 
object,  200  British  Indian  troops  should  be  sent 
to  Wadi  Haifa.  This  was  the  fifth  staae  of 
General  Gordon  s  opinions. 

In  thirty-nine  days,  therefore.  General  Gordon 
had  drifted  by  successive  stages  from  a  proposal 


490  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iii 

that  he  should  report  on  the  affairs  of  the  Soudan, 
to  advocating  the  policy  of  "smashing  up"  the 
Mahdi.  It  would,  he  said,  be  '*  comparatively  easy 
to  destroy  the  JNIahdi." 

It  is  inconceivable  that  General  Gordon  should 
have  thought  that  the  JNIahdi  could  be  destroyed 
with  any  force  which  the  Egyptian  Government 
could  place  at  his  disposal.  British  or  British-Indian 
troops  would  have  to  be  employed.  He  must  have 
known  this.  Accordingly,  three  days  later  he  took 
another  step  in  advance.  He  proposed  (February  29) 
that  British-Indian  troops  should  be  used  to  open 
up  the  Suakin-Berber  road.  This,  he  said,  "will 
cause  an  immediate  collapse  of  the  revolt."  About 
the  same  time  (February  27),  he  issued  a  Proclama- 
tion in  which  he  stated  that  he  had  advised  the 
people  to  desist  from  rebellion,  but,  he  added, 
"finding  that  my  advice  had  no  effect  on  some 
people,  I  have  been  compelled  to  use  severe 
measures,  so  much  so  that  British  troops  are  now 
on  their  way  to  reach  Khartoum." 

Mr.  Egmont  Hake  says,^  "the  statement  that 
British  troops  were  on  their  way  to  Khartoum  is, 
of  course,  inexplicable.  It  was  probably  due  to 
the  fact  that  Gordon  had  heard  that  British  troops 
were  advancing  along  the  Suakin-Berber  route." 
This  explanation  is  wholly  insufficient.  At  this 
time,  telegraphic  communication  between  Khartoum 
and  Cairo  was  open.  Nothing  could  have  been 
easier  than  for  General  Gordon  to  have  asked  me 
whether  such  rumours,  supposing  there  to  have 
been  any,  were  true,  and  I  should,  of  course,  at 
once  have  replied  in  the  negative.  It  is  clear  that 
General  Gordon  made  the  statement  about  British 
troops  being  on  their  way  to  Khartoum  knowing  it 
to  be  unfounded.  He  wished  to  exercise  a  moral 
effect  upon  the  population.     I  will  not  attempt  to 

*  The  Story  of  Chbicm  (lordon,  pp.  82  and  163. 


OH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  491 

discuss  wlietlier,  under  the  circumstances  in  which 
General  Gordon  was  placed,  his  statement  was 
justifiable  from  a  moral  point  of  view.'  Many  a 
military  commander  before  General  Gordon  has 
found  it  necessary  to  employ  ruses  of  various 
descriptions.  From  the  point  of  view  of  ex- 
pediency, it  would  appear  that  General  Gordon 
made  a  mistake.  It  was  certain  that,  in  a  short 
time,  the  people  would  find  out  that  no  British 
troops  were  on  their  way  to  Khartoum.  Thus, 
General  Gordon  would  be  discredited.  Indeed, 
when  eventually  Lord  Wolseley's  expedition  ad- 
vanced, the  news  of  the  approach  of  a  British 
force  failed  to  obtain  credence. 

It  can  be  no  matter  for  surprise  that  the  British 
Government  should  have  been  bewildered  by  the 
rapid  changes  in  General  Gordon's  opinions.  And 
this  bewilderment  was  mixed  with  some  alarm,  for 
their  impulsive  agent  appeared  to  be  hurrying  them 
along  a  path  which  would  almost  certainly  lead  to 
British  armed  intervention  in  the  Soudan.  Now, 
the  Government  lield  that  one  of  the  main  objects 
of  their  policy  should  be  to  avoid  any  such  inter- 
vention. Mr.  Gladstone,  speaking  in  the  House 
of  Commons  on  February  23,  1885,  said:  "When 
General  Gordon  left  this  country  and  when  he 
arrived  in  Egypt,  he  declared  it  to  be — and  I  have 
not  the  smallest  doubt  it  was — a  fixed  })ortion  of 
his  policy,  that  no  British  force  should  be  employed 
in  aid  of  his  mission."  This  statement  is  unques- 
tionably correct. 

The  following  letter  from  Lord  Northbrook,  dated 
February  29,  contains  such  a  clear  description  of  the 
difficulties  of  the  moment,  that  I  give  it  in  full : — 

What  a  queer  fellow  Gordon  is  and  how  rapidly  he 
changes  his  opinions ! 

I.  Zobeir  is  to  be  sent  to  Cyprus  before  Gordon  ari'ives 
in  Egypt. 


492  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  hi 

II.  Zobeir  is  to  rule  at  Khartoum. 

I.  The  Mahdi  is  a  good  kind  man,  whom  Gordon  is  to 
visit  quietly  and  settle  affairs  with. 

II.  The  Mahdi  is  to  be  Emir  of  Kordofan. 

III.  The  Mahdi  is  to  be  smashed  up. 

I.  The  Suakin-Berber  route  is  to  be  opened  up,  and  the 
Hadendowa  tribe  is  to  be  set  upon  by  the  other  tribes.^ 

II.  Suakin  is  to  be  left  alone.^ 

Why  should  Zobeir  be  trusted  ?  His  antecedents  are  all 
against  it.  Why  should  he  oppose  the  Mahdi  .'*  He  is 
supposed  to  have  had  a  main  hand  in  the  insurrection. 
Why  should  he  protect  Egypt  ?  He  knows  her  weakness, 
and  is  just  as  likely  to  be  her  worst  enemy.^  Why  should 
he  like  us  ?  Gordon  and  you  must  have  very  good  reasons, 
but  I  hope  you  will  let  us  know  them.  There  is  no  disposi- 
tion here  to  negative  Zobeir,  simply  because  his  nomination 
woukl  undoubtedly  be  extremely  distasteful  to  every  one  who 
has  paid  any  attention  to  the  history  of  the  Soudan,  or  cares 
about  checking  the  Slave  Trade.  But,  looked  at  with  refer- 
ence to  the  real  interests  of  Egypt,  the  arguments  and 
probabilities  against  seem  to  me  greatly  to  preponderate. 

The  Mahdi  must  be  "  smashed  up.'"*  This  seems  to  be 
Gordon's  view  now.  But  he  gives  no  reasons,  and  it  is 
utterly  contrary  to  our  policy  hitherto.  Indeed,  his  telegram 
does  not  differ  very  much  from  Cherif  Pasha's  programme  of 
keeping  Khartoum,  upon  which  you  turned  him  out. 

Things  may  be  in  such  a  condition  that  a  change  may  be 
necessary,  but  I  cannot  say  I  feel  that  confidence  in  Gordon's 
opinions,  which  are  often  most  hastily  expressed  and  con- 
stantly changed,  to  induce  me  to  think  without  further 
reasons  being  given,  that  we  were  all  wrong  in  January  last. 

*  This  proposal  was  contained  in  an  undated  Memorandum  sent  to 
me  by  General  Gordon  which  I  received  on  February  4,  1884.  See 
Egypt,  No.  12  of  1884,  p.  61. 

^  When  General  (iordou  was  in  Cairo,  he  wished  the  whole  of  the 
garrison  of  Suakin  to  be  witlidrawn,  except  1.50  men.  I  think  that  this 
question  must  have  formed  the  subject  of  further  discussion  between 
General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  after  their  arrival  at  Khartoum, 
for  on  March  4,  Colonel  Stewart  wrote  to  nie  :  "I  trust  the  Govern- 
ment will  not  be  so  ill-advised  as  to  send  away  the  troops  from  Suakin  ; 
it  would  be  in  every  way  a  very  had  move,  and  very  prejudicial  to  us." 

^  Lord  Northbrook  might  have  quoted  General  Gordon's  own  testi- 
mony in  support  of  tliis  view.  When,  early  in  December  1883,  I 
favoured  the  idea  that  Zobeir  Pasha  should  be  sent  to  Suakin,  General 
Gordon  wrote  :  "  Zobeir  will  mana2:e  to  get  taken  prisoner  and  wili 
head  the  revolt." — JJirtit.s,  etc.,  p.  314. 


CH.  XXV  ZOBElll  PASHA  493 

If  the  religious  movement  is  really  so  serious  that  the 
Mahdi  must  be  "  smashed  up "  for  the  safety  of  Egypt, 
how  is  it  to  be  done  ?  For  my  part,  I  can  only  see  one  way, 
and  that  is  to  set  Musulman  against  Musulman,  and  to  try 
and  induce  the  Turk  to  take  the  business  up.  Turk  against 
Arab  it  will  be,  and  a  serious  business  too. 

Pray  do  not  suppose  that,  because  we  hesitate  to  take 
very  grave  decisions  involving  a  considerable  change  of  policy 
without  time  to  consider  and  without  further  motives  upon 
which  to  form  our  judgment,  that  we  have  the  least  want  of 
confidence  in  you.  As  to  Gordon,  I  have  great  confidence 
in  his  wisdom  in  action — little  in  his  steadiness  in  Council. 

We  certainly  have  the  mostdifhcult  job  to  tackle  between 
us  that  any  men  ever  had,  and  I  am  sure  it  requires  great 
steadiness  all  round. 

Before  General  Gordon  had  been  long  at  Khar- 
toum, his  combative  spirit  completely  got  the  better 
of  him.  As  a  soldier,  he  could  not  brook  the  idea  of 
retirino^  before  the  Mahdi.  Moreover,  as  a  civilised 
European,  he  winced  at  the  idea  that  a  country, 
in  which  some  germs  of  civilisation  had  been  sown, 
should  relapse  into  barbarism.  On  April  11,  1884, 
he  telegraphed  tome  :  ^  "  Having  visited  the  schools, 
workshops,  etc.,  it  is  deplorable  to  think  of  their 
destruction  by  a  feeble  lot  of  stinking  Dervishes." 
He  wished,  therefore,  to  "  smash  up  "  the  Mahdi, 
and  perhaps  it  was  natural  that  he  should  have 
done  so.  But  in  taking  up  this  attitude,  which 
necessarily  involved  armed  British  interference  in 
the  country,  he  departed  from  the  spirit  of  his 
instructions.  He  was  sent  to  evacuate  the  Soudan. 
A  subsidiary  portion  of  his  instructions — I  look  to 
the  spirit  of  those  instructions  rather  than  to  the 
strict  letter — was  that,  if  possible,  he  was  to  leave 
behind  him  a  fairly  good  government,  which  would 
not  constitute  a  standing  menace  to  Egypt.  It 
is  difficult  to  understand  how  General  Gordon 
could  have  made  his  proposal  to  wage  war  against 

*  I  did  uot  receive  this  message  till  March  26,  1890. 


494  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  hi 

the   Mahdi   with    British   troops  tally   with    these 
instructions. 

It  was  not  until  February  23,  when  I  received 
General  Gordon's  JNIeniorandum  of  February  8 
written  at  Abu  Hamed,  that  I  fully  understood  his 
telegram  of  the  18th  from  Khartoum,  in  which  he 
proposed  to  utilise  Zobeir  Pasha's  services.  I  tlien 
set  myself  to  work  to  consider  what  it  was  that 
General  Gordon  really  wanted.  I  swept  aside  all 
the  minor  contradictions  in  his  proposals.  I  did 
not  consider  that  the  suggestion  about  "  smashing 
up  "  the  Mahdi  was  worthy  of  serious  discussion. 
It  was  obviously  impracticable  without  employing 
British  troops,  a  policy  the  adoption  of  which  the 
British  Government  would  certainly  have  rejected. 
It  appeared  to  me,  however,  that  at  the  bottom 
of  all  General  Gordon's  contradictions  there  was 
an  underlying  vein  of  common  sense.  He  wished, 
in  the  terms  of  his  Memorandum  of  February  8, 
to  advocate  a  policy  of  "  evacuation  but  not 
abandonment."  The  policy  of  setting  up  the 
local  Sultans,  which  he  had  put  forward  at 
Cairo,  was  manifestly  impossible  of  execution,  not 
because  it  was  faulty  in  principle,  but  because 
there  were  no  local  Sultans  to  set  up.  He  wished, 
therefore,  to  carry  out  the  same  principle,  but 
in  a  manner  differing  from  that  which  had  been 
originally  proposed.  One  man,  Zobeir  Pasha, 
was  to  be  set  up,  who  was  to  govern  the  most 
important  portions  of  the  Soudan.  He  was  to 
be  a  feudatory  of  the  Egyptian  Government. 
This  was  a  serious  departure  from  the  policy  of 
reporting,  which  had  been  adopted  in  London. 
It  was  not,  however,  a  serious  departure  from,  but 
rather  a  modification  of  the  policy  embodied  in 
the  instructions  given  to  General  Gordon  at 
Cairo.  Some  two  years  later.  Lord  Nortlibrook 
wrote  to  me  :  *'  INIy  own  opinion  of  the  reason  of 


CH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  495 

the  failure  is  that,  instead  of  doing  as  we  wished, 
viz.,  withdrawing  the  garrison  of  Khartoum, 
Gordon,  on  his  arrival,  hankered  after  the  ignis 
fatiius  of  arranging  for  a  settled  government  of  a 
country,  which  could  not  be  settled  excepting  by  a 
lengthened  and  possibly  a  permanent  occupation  in 
force."  It  may  be  that  this  view  is  right.  But  at 
the  time  it  seemed  to  me  that  it  would  be  a  wise 
policy  to  establish  a  "  buffer  state  "  in  the  Soudan, 
which  would  hold  much  the  same  relation  to  Egypt 
as  Afghanistan  holds  to  British  India.  The  policy 
was,  I  thought,  at  any  rate  worthy  of  a  trial,  and, 
so  far  as  I  could  judge  from  General  Gordon's 
utterances,  he  was  of  opinion  that  the  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  its  accomplishment,  though  great, 
were  not  altogether  insurmountable. 

It  was  with  this  view  uppermost  in  my  mind 
that,  on  February  28,  I  repeated  to  Lord  Granville 
General  Gordon's  telegram  of  the  26th  ^  and  added 
the  following  remarks  : — 

"  I  will  now  submit  to  your  Lordship  my  views 
upon  the  main  points  at  issue,  after  having  care- 
fully considered  the  different  proposals  made  by 
General  Gordon.  There  are  obviously  many  con- 
tradictions in  those  proposals  ;  too  much  import- 
ance should  not  be  attached  to  the  details.  But  I 
venture  to  again  recommend  to  the  earnest  atten- 
tion of  Her  Majesty's  Government  the  serious 
question  of  principle  which  General  Gordon  has 
raised. 

"  Two  alternative  courses  may  be  adopted.  One 
is  to  evacuate  the  Soudan  entirely,  and  to  make 
no  attempt  to  establish  any  settled  government 
tiiere  before  leaving  ;  the  other  is  to  make  every 
effort  of  which  the  present  circumstances  admit  to 
set  up  some  settled  form  of  government  to  replace 
the  former  Egyptian  Administration. 

*   Vide  ante,  p.  487. 


496  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

'*  General  Gordon  is  evidently  in  favour  of  the 
latter  of  these  courses.  I  entirely  agree  with  him. 
The  attempt,  it  is  true,  may  not  be  successful,  but 
I  am  strongly  of  opinion  that  it  should  be  made. 
From  every  point  of  view,  whether  political, 
military,  or  financial,  it  will  be  a  most  serious 
matter  if  complete  anarchy  is  allowed  to  reign 
south  of  Wadi  Haifa.  And  this  anarchy  will 
inevitably  ensue  on  General  Gordon's  departure, 
unless  some  measures  are  adopted  beforehand  to 
prevent  it. 

"  With  regard  to  the  wish  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government  not  to  go  beyond  General  Gordon's 
plan,  as  stated  in  his  Memorandum  of  the  23rd 
ultimo,  I  would  remark  that  he  appears  to  have 
intended  merely  to  give  a  preliminary  sketch  of 
the  general  line  of  policy  to  be  pursued.  Moreover, 
in  that  Memorandum  he  makes  a  specific  allusion 
to  the  difficulty  of  providing  rulers  for  Khartoum, 
Dongola,  and  other  places  where  there  are  no  old 
families  to  recall  to  power. 

"  It  is  clear  that  Her  Majesty's  Government 
cannot  afford  moral  or  material  support  to  General 
Gordon's  successor  as  Ruler  of  the  Soudan,  but 
the  question  of  whether  or  not  he  should  be 
nominally  appointed  by  the  authority  of  Her 
Majesty's  Government  appears  to  me  to  be  one 
of  very  slight  practical  importance. 

"  Whatever  may  be  said  to  the  contrary.  Her 
Majesty's  Government  must  in  reality  be  respon- 
sible for  any  arrangements  which  are  now  devised 
for  the  Soudan,  and  I  do  not  think  it  is  possible  to 
shake  off  that  responsibility. 

"  If,  however,  Her  Majesty's  Government  are 
unwilling  to  assume  any  responsibility  in  the 
matter,  then  I  think  they  should  give  full  liberty 
of  action  to  General  Gordon  and  the  Khedive's 
Government  to  do  what  seems  best  to  them. 


CH.XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  497 

"I  have  no  doubt  as  to  the  most  advisable 
course  of  action.  Zobeir  Pasha  should  be  per- 
mitted to  succeed  General  Gordon.  He  should 
receive  a  certain  sum  of  money  to  begin  with,  and 
an  annual  subsidy  of  about  £50,000  for  the  first 
five  years,  to  depend  upon  his  good  behaviour. 
This  amount  would  enable  him  to  maintain  a 
moderate-sized  army,  and  the  whole  arrangement 
would  be  an  economical  one  for  the  Egyptian 
Government. 

"  The  main  difficulty  lies  in  the  selection  of  the 
man.  It  is  useless  to  send  any  one  who  has 
no  local  influence.  There  are  certain  obvious 
objections  to  Zobeir  Pasha,  but  I  think  too  great 
weight  is  attached  to  them,  and  I  believe  that 
General  Gordon  is  quite  right  when  he  says  that 
Zobeir  Pasha  is  the  only  possible  man.  I  can 
suggest  none  other,  and  Nubar  Pasha  is  strongly  in 
favour  of  him. 

"  It  is  for  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  judge 
of  the  importance  to  be  attached  to  public  opinion 
in  England,  but  I  venture  to  think  that  any 
attempt  to  settle  Egyptian  questions  by  the  light 
of  English  popular  feeling  is  sure  to  be  productive 
of  harm,  and  in  this,  as  in  other  cases,  it  would  be 
preferable  to  follow  the  advice  of  the  responsible 
authorities  on  the  spot." 

On  March  1,  Lord  Granville  replied :  "  I  have 
received  your  telegram  of  the  28th  ultimo,  inform- 
ing me  of  General  Gordon's  views  with  regard  to 
the  proposals  which  he  made  for  placing  Zobeir 
Pasha  in  power  at  Khartoum. 

"  Her  Majesty's  Government  desire  further 
information  as  to  the  urgency  of  any  immediate 
appointment  of  a  successor  to  General  Gordon, 
who  they  trust  will  remain  for  some  time  longer  at 
Khartoum. 

"  If  it  be  found  necessary  to  make  an  arrange- 

voi«  I  2  K 


498  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  in 

ment  of  this  subject  eventually,  Her  INIajesty's 
Government  will  carefully  weigh  your  opinions  as 
to  the  proper  person  for  the  post. 

*'  They  are,  at  the  same  time,  of  opinion  that 
if  such  an  appointment  is  made,  it  might  be 
advantageous  that  it  should  receive  the  confirma- 
tion of  the  Sultan."  I  repeated  this  telegram  to 
General  Gordon. 

Lord  Granville  wrote  me  a  private  letter,  on 
February  29,  which  shows  the  views  entertained 
by  the  Government  at  the  time  this  telegram  was 
despatched.  "Pray  do  not,"  he  said,  "doubt  our 
full  confidence  in  you,  but  as  circumstances 
naturally  sometimes  oblige  you  to  change  the  view 
you  had  taken  when  things  were  in  a  different 
state,  we  often  desire  to  have  your  opinion  before 
a  final  decision.  We  had  a  Cabinet,  and  although 
there  would  have  been  much  reluctance  if  we  had 
been  obliged  to  answer  at  once  categorically  about 
Zobeir,  yet  we  should,  probably,  have  yielded  to 
your,  Gordon's  and  Nubar's  opinion.  If  you 
persist  in  it,  I  am  certain  it  will  be  carefully 
considered.  The  Cabinet  were  startled  at  what 
appeared  to  be  a  change  of  front  as  to  withdrawal 
from  the  Soudan.  I  apprehend  that  your  answer 
would  be  that  you  do  not  propose  an  Egyptian 
Government  administering  the  Soudan  with 
Egyptian  troops  scattered  about  the  desert,  that 
it  is  only  proposed  that  an  individual  should  be 
appointed  with  a  large  salary  to  govern  the  country 
as  best  he  could,  and  in  a  friendly  manner  towards 
Egypt.  But  even  this  offers  many  considerations. 
As  to  the  person,  I  do  not  doubt  that  Zobeir  is 
the  only  man  strong  enough  to  cope  with  the 
iNIahdi.  But  can  you  guarantee  that  tlie  official 
income  will  be  a  sufficient  bribe  to  prevent  his 
embarking  in  his  former  lucrative  pursuits,  or  even 
of  his  not  going  over  to  the  Mahdi  ? " 


OH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  499 

It  was  obvious  that  I  could  give  no  guarantee 
of  the  sort  required  by  Lord  Granville.  As  has 
been  already  mentioned,  the  attitude  of  tlie  British 
Government  in  respect  to  Egyptian  affairs  was 
often  of  an  exclusively  negative  and  hypercritical 
character.  The  objections  to  the  adoption  of  any 
particular  course  were  clearly  seen.  Those  objections 
Avere  allowed  to  prevail.  But  as  no  alternative 
policy  was  adopted,  the  Government  became  tlie 
sport  of  circumstances.  On  April  18,  1884,  Lord 
Granville  wrote  to  me:  "The  misfortune  during 
the  last  two  years  has  been  that  we  hardly  ever 
have  had  anything  but  bad  alternatives  to  choose 
from.  The  objectors  to  whatever  was  decided 
were  pretty  sure  to  have  the  best  of  it." 

In  the  interval  between  the  receipt  of  General 
Gordon's  telegram  of  February  26  ^  and  that  of  Lord 
Granville's  reply  on  March  1,-  General  Gordon  sent 
me  a  large  number  of  telegrams.  It  was  difficult 
to  understand  from  them  what  it  was  he  really 
wanted.  Moreover,  the  language  hi  which  they 
were  couched  led  me  to  the  conclusion  that  he  was 
making  a  number  of  proposals  on  matters  of  general 
policy  without  sufficient  reflection.  On  March  2, 
therefore,  I  telegraphed  to  him :  "  I  am  most 
anxious  to  help  and  support  you  in  every  way,  but 
I  find  it  very  difficult  to  understand  exactly  what 
it  is  you  want.  I  think  your  best  plan  will  be  to 
reconsider  the  whole  question  carefully,  and  then 
state  to  me  in  one  telegram  what  it  is  you  recom- 
mend, in  order  that  1  can,  if  necessary,  obtain  the 
instructions  of  Her  IMajesty's  Government."  I 
added  some  further  observations  drawing  attention 
to  the  main  points  which  required  consideration. 

At  the  same  time  (March  2),  I  sent  the  follow- 
ing telegram  to  Colonel  Stewart:  "Private.  As 
regards  my  long  telegram  to  Gordon,  pray  make 

1  Vide  ante,  p.  487.  ^   ^ide  ante,  p.  497. 


500  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

him  understand  that  my  sole  object  is  to  help  him 
to  the  best  of  my  ability,  but  it  adds  immensely  to 
my  difficulties  to  receive  constant  and  somewhat 
contradictory  telegrams,  apparently  written  on  the 
spur  of  the  moment,  in  respect  to  matters  of 
policy.  What  I  should  like  him  to  do  is  to 
consider  the  whole  question  carefully  and  deliber- 
ately, and  then  to  let  me  know  what  he  thinks  and 
what  he  recommends.  At  present,  with  the  best 
possible  intentions,  I  can  really  do  little  to  help 
him,  for  I  cannot  clearly  miderstand  what  it  is  he 
wants."  * 

Prior  to  the  despatch  of  this  telegram  to  Colonel 
Stewart,  I  had,  on  February  29,  sent  the  following 
private  telegram  to  Lord  Granville :  "  I  have 
received  a  fresh  batch  of  telegrams  from  Gordon. 
His  statements  and  proposals  are  hopelessly 
bewildering  and  contradictory.  I  do  not  mean 
to  say  that  I  have  lost  confidence  in  Gordon. 
Such  is  not  the  case.  But  in  dealing  with  his 
proposals  it  is  often  difficult  to  know  what  he 
means,  and  still  more  difficult  to  judge  what  is 
really  worthy  of  attention,  and  what  is  more  or  less 
nonsense.  It  is  really  of  no  use  my  forwarding  all 
he  sends  home  for  instructions,  for  the  difficulty 
for  you  will  be  even  greater  than  for  me.  I  think, 
on  the  whole,  you  had  better  give  me  full  authority 

'  On  receiving  this  telegram.  Colonel  Stewart  wrote  to  me  (March  4): 
"1  fully  sympathise  with  you  about  the  many  and  rather  divergent 
teleg-rams  you  get.  Gordon  telegraphs  directly  an  idea  strikes  him. 
There  is  no  use  in  trying  to  stop  it.  Were  I  you,  1  should  always  wait 
for  a  few  days  before  acting  unless  the  subject  matter  is  so  evident  that 
there  can  be  no  doubt  about  it." 

Matters  were  so  urgent  tliat  I  was  unable  to  follow  Colonel  Stewart's 
advice  to  the  extent  of  "  waiting  for  a  few  days  before  acting."  But  I 
rarely  acted  on  any  telegram  of  General  Gordon's  directly  I  received  it. 
I  generally  found  a  batch  of  them  waiting  for  me  when  I  began  my 
work  in  the  nioiniiig.  My  practice  was  to  put  them  on  one  side  and 
wait  till  the  afternoon,  by  wliich  time  more  had  generally  arrived.  I 
used  then  to  compare  the  different  telegrams,  to  try  to  extract  from 
them  what  it  was  that  General  Gordon  really  wanted,  and  then  to 
decide  what  could  be  done  towards  carrying  out  his  wishes. 


OH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  501 

to  do  the  best  I  can.  I  fully  understand  the  policy 
of  Her  Majesty's  Government,  and  you  can  rely 
on  my  doing  nothing  contrary  to  it,  but,  of  course, 
I  can  only  do  this  if  I  feel  sure  I  possess  the 
entire  confidence  of  Her  JNIajesty's  Government.  1 
should,  in  any  case,  like  an  answer  about  Zobeir  as  a 
question  of  principle  is  involved."  To  this  telegram 
Lord  Granville  replied  on  March  2  :  "  I  am  not 
surprised  at  your  private  message.  We  have  full 
confidence  in  you  and  give  the  full  discretion  you 
ask.  When  you  have  time,  we  like  to  know  your 
reasons." 

I  received  several  telegrams  from  General 
Gordon  in  reply  to  my  message  of  IMarch  2.  I 
need  not  give  them  in  full.  They  were  to  the 
effect  that  he  maintained  the  policy  of  eventually 
evacuating  the  Soudan,  including  Khartoum  ;  that, 
in  consequence  of  the  evacuation,  anarchy  would 
ensue,  about  which.  General  Gordon  said,  "  I 
would  not  trouble  myself";  and  that  the  imme- 
diate withdrawal  of  all  the  Egyptian  employes 
was  impossible.  General  Gordon  dwelt  strongly 
on  the  necessity  of  sending  Zobeir  Pasha  to 
Khartoum  at  once.  "The  combination,"  he  said, 
"at  Khartoum  of  Zobeir  and  myself  is  an  absolute 
necessity  for  success,  and  I  beg  you  and  Lord 
Granville  to  believe  my  certain  conviction  that 
there  is  not  the  slightest  fear  of  our  quarrelling, 
for  Zobeir  would  know  that  the  subsidy  depended 
on  my  safety.  To  do  any  good  we  must  be 
together,  and  that  without  delay.  .  .  .  Pray 
abandon  fear  of  Zobeir's  hurting  me.  His  interests 
are  bound  up  with  mine.  Believe  me  I  am  right, 
and  do  not  delay.  .  .  .  Things  are  not  serious, 
although  they  may  become  so  if  delay  occurs  in 
sending  Zobeir.  Mv  weakness  is  that  of  bein<r 
foreign  and  Christian  and  jjeaeeful ;  and  it  is  only 
by    sending    Zobeir    that    that    prejudice    can    be 


502  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

removed.  I  wish  you  would  question  Stewart  on 
any  subject  you  like  without  hesitation  and  you 
can  learn  his  views  distinct  from  mine.  This 
would  please  me." 

General  Gordon  also  urged  that  it  was  necessary 
to  open  up  the  road  from  Berber  to  Suakin.  He 
desired  that  200  British  troops  should  be  sent  to 
Wadi  Haifa.  "  It  is  not,"  he  said,  "  the  number, 
but  the  prestige  which  I  need  ;  I  am  sure  the 
revolt  will  collapse  if  I  can  say  that  I  have  British 
troops  at  my  back." 

At  the  same  time,  I  received  the  following  tele- 
gram from  Colonel  Stewart,  dated  JNIarch  4  :  "  The 
principal  desire  of  General  Gordon  is  to  have  Zobeir 
here  as  soon  as  possible.  His  reasons  are  :  Zobeir 
is  the  only  man  with  sufficient  prestige  to  hold 
the  country  together,  at  any  rate  for  a  time,  after 
the  evacuation.  Being  a  Pasha  among  the  Shaggieh 
irregulars,  he  will  be  able  to  get  at  sources  of  in- 
formation and  action  now  closed  to  us.  He  will 
be  opposed  to  the  Mahdi.  I  agree  with  Gordon. 
It  seems  evident  to  me  that  it  is  impossible  for  us 
to  leave  this  country  without  leaving  some  sort  of 
established  government  which  will  last  at  any  rate 
for  a  time,  and  Zobeir  is  the  only  man  who  can 
ensure  that.  Also,  that  we  must  withdraw  the 
Sennar  and  other  besieged  garrisons,  and  here  also 
Zobeir  can  greatly  assist  us.  The  principal  objec- 
tions to  Zobeir  are  his  evil  reputation  as  a  slave 
dealer  and  his  enmity  to  General  Gordon.  As 
regards  the  first,  it  will  have  to  be  defended  on  the 
plea  that  no  other  course  is  open  except  British 
annexation  or  anarchy.  As  regards  the  second,  if 
precautionary  measures  are  taken,  such  as  making 
the  subsidy  payable  through  General  Gordon,  I 
think  Zobeir  will  see  that  his  interests  are  in 
working  with  General  Gordon. 

*'  Of  the  secondary  measures  proposed  by  General 


cH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  503 

Gordon  to  assist  the  evacuation,  they  are  :  When 
the  Berber- Suakin  road  is  clear,  to  send  a  small 
force  of  Indian  or  British  cavalry  to  Berber,  and 
to  send  a  small  force  of  British  cavalry  to  Wadi 
Haifa.  These  measures,  showing  that  we  had 
forces  at  our  disposal,  would  greatly  assist  nego- 
tiations with  rebels,  and  hasten  evacuation.  I 
assure  you  none  are  more  anxious  to  leave  this 
country  than  Gordon  and  myself,  and  none  more 
heartily  approve  the  Government  policy  of  evacua- 
tion. Unless,  however,  Zobeir  is  sent  here,  I  see 
little  probability  of  this  policy  being  carried  out. 
Every  day  we  remain,  finds  us  more  firm  in  the 
country,  and  causes  us  to  incur  responsibilities 
towards  the  people,  which  it  is  impossible  for  us 
to  overlook."^ 

*  Colonel  Stewart's  private  letters  give  some  further  indication  of  his 
views  at  this  time.  On  March  1,  he  wrote  to  me  :  ''As  for  the  future 
of  this  country,  the  clioice  of  a  ruler,  it  would  seem  to  me,  lies  between 
Zobeir  and  the  Mahdi.  Politically  and  socially,  I  should  much  prefer 
the  former.  To  have  a  religious  ruler  here  would  be  a  great  dis- 
advantage to  us  in  Egypt,  not  to  speak  of  the  probable  consequences  in 
other  parts  of  the  Arab  world.  If  once  we  establish  Zobeir  here,  and 
gave  him  something  to  start  upon,  we  might  let  matters  slide,  and  act 
on  the  Darwinian  principle  of  the  '  survival  of  the  fittest.'  ...  It 
seems  to  me  that  the  only  people  here  who  will  suffer  by  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Government  are  the  rich  Arab  merchants  and  the 
Greeks.  I  cannot  say  that  I  have  any  sympathy  with  either  class,  and 
I  should  greatly  grudge  that  any  Englisli  money  should  be  spent  in 
supporting  them.  Let  them  make  tlieir  own  terms  and  get  out  of  the 
mess  as  best  they  can.  The  villagers  and  nomad  tribes  have  an 
organisation  of  their  own,  which  is  independent  of  any  Government. 
They  will  probably  fight  and  squabble  amongst  themselves,  but  that  is 
their  affair.  Of  the  towns,  such  as  Kliartoum,  Kassala,  Berber,  and 
Dongola,  they  are  all  only  collections  of  mud-huts,  which,  if  burnt  one 
day,  can  be  rebuilt  the  next.  Of  the  lot,  Khartoum  is  the  best.  .  .  . 
The  country  is  only  intended  by  nature  for  nomad  tribes  and  a  few 
scattered  Arabs  along  the  banks  of  the  Nile.  It  annoys  me  greatly  to 
see  the  blood  and  treasure  wasted  on  it.  .  .  .  As  regards  Zobeir,  I 
think  you  have  no  option  in  the  matter.  Unless  he  is  sent  up,  I  see  no 
means  of  terminating  the  state  of  affairs  here.  .  .  .  There  is  no  one 
here  we  can  appoint  who  would  stand  for  a  day  ;  hence,  1  see  no  option 
but  Zobeir  witii  a  small  subsidy.  I  think  by  means  of  the  subsidy  j'ou 
would  ensure  his  fidelity.  Of  course,  there  is  always  a  certain  risk  in 
the  matter,  but  we  can  only  do  wliat  is  best.  Every  possible  sclieme 
has  its  advantages  and  its  disadvantages.      How  far  Gordon  and  Zobeir 


504  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

Up  to  this  time,  I  had  pressed  the  British 
Government  to  allow  Zobeir  Pasha  to  succeed 
General  Gordon  at  Khartoum,  but  I  had  opposed 
the  idea  of  sending  him  there  immediately.  My 
reasons  for  making  this  reserve  were  twofold. 
In  the  first  place,  I  feared  that  Zobeir  Pasha's 
old  grudge  against  General  Gordon  would  en- 
danger the  latter's  life.  In  the  second  place,  I 
entertained  greater  confidence  in  the  judgment 
of  Colonel  Stewart  than  in  that  of  his  chief.  Up 
to  IVIarch  4,  Colonel  Stewart  hesitated  as  to  the 
desirability  of  employing  Zobeir  Pasha.  The 
telegrams  which  I  have  given  above,  led  me,  how- 
ever, to  reconsider  the  recommendations  wliich  I 
had  so  far  made.  It  was  clear  that  the  situation 
at  Khartoum  was  becoming  very  critical.  The 
tribes  between  Berber  and  Khartoum  were  waver- 
ing. They  were  being  driven  by  the  force  of 
circumstances  into  the  arms  of  the  Mahdi.  It  was 
evident  that,  if  anything  was  to  be  done  in  the 
way  of  establishing  an  anti-lMahdist  Government 
at  Khartoum,  no  time  was  to  be  lost.  General 
Gordon  was  pressing  strongly  for  the  immediate 
despatch  of  Zobeir  Pasha,  and  argued — as  I  thought 
with  great  force — that,  so  far  as  his  personal  safety 
was  concerned,  Zobeir  Pasha's  interest  would  be 
in  the  direction  of  doino;  him  no  harm.  Colonel 
Stewart  also  had  come  round  to  General  Gordon's 
opinion.  He  now  advocated,  without  reserve  of 
any  kind,  the  immediate  employment  of  Zobeir 
Pasha.  Judging,  not  only  from  the  contents  of 
his  telegram,  but  also  from  what  I  knew  of  the 
cliaracter  of  the  mati,  it  seemed  to  me  certain  that 
Colonel  Stewart  had  not  changed  his  opinion  merely 
in  order  to  be  agreeable  to  his  chief,  but  that  the 

will  be  able  to  work  together,  time  alone  can  say.  I  apprebend,  how- 
ever, Zobeir,  like  the  rest  of  the  world,  knows  what  ia  to  his  own 
advantasre." 


(m.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  505 

change  was  due  to  a  careful  consideration  of  the 
facts  of  the  situation  at  Khartoum.  I  determined, 
therefore,  to  modify  my  own  recommendations 
to  the  British  Government,  and  to  support  the 
proposal  that  Zobeir  Pasha  should  be  sent  to 
Khartoum  at  once. 

On  March  4,  I  repeated  to  Lord  Granville 
General  Gordon's  telegrams  of  the  2nd  and  3rd  and 
Colonel  Stewart's  telegram  of  the  4th.  I  added  : 
"  The  general  substance  of  General  Gordon's  tele- 
gram is  that  he  presses  strongly  for  Zobeir  Pasha 
to  be  sent  to  Khartoum  without  delay.  I  have 
carefully  reconsidered  the  whole  question,  and  I 
am  still  of  opinion  that  Zobeir  Pasha  should  be 
allowed  to  succeed  General  Gordon.  I  do  not 
think  that  anything  would  be  gained  by  post- 
poning a  decision  on  this  point ;  on  the  contrary, 
I  should  say  that  delay  would  be  injurious. 

"  As  regards  the  question  of  when  Zobeir  should 
be  sent — in  the  face  of  the  strong  opinion  expressed 
by  General  Gordon,  I  am  not  inclined  to  maintain 
my  objection  to  his  going  at  once  to  Khartoum. 
But,  before  giving  a  final  opinion  on  this  point,  I 
should  prefer  to  have  another  interview  with  Zobeir 
himself.  It  would  be  useless  for  me  to  do  this 
until  Her  Majesty's  Government  has  decided 
whether,  apart  from  the  question  of  the  time  of 
his  departure,  Zobeir  is  to  be  allowed  to  return  to 
the  Soudan  at  all.  I  await,  therefore,  an  answer 
on  this  latter  point  before  taking  any  further 
action." 

At  the  same  time  (March  4),  I  sent  the  follow- 
ing private  telegram  to  Lord  Granville :  "  My 
official  telegram  of  to-day  gives  the  gist  of  some 
twenty  telegrams  from  Gordon.  I  feel  confident 
that  I  am  stating  his  real  opinion,  and  not  a  mere 
passing  impression.  Do  not  commit  yourself  to 
sending  Zobeir  at  once  until  I  have  seen  the  man 


506  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

again.  What  I  want  to  know  is  whether  your 
objections  to  sending-  him  at  all  are  insuperable." 

AV^hen  I  sent  these  telegrams,  my  intention  was 
to  see  Zobeir  Pasha,  and,  after  hearino;  his  laniiuaoe 
and  observing  his  demeanour,  to  form  a  final 
judgment  as  to  whether  it  would  be  desirable  to 
send  him  to  Khartoum  at  once.  I  should  have 
told  him  that,  if  the  withdrawal  from  the  Soudan 
was  conducted  successfully,  and  especially  if 
General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  returned 
safely  to  Cairo,  he  would  be  named  Governor - 
General  of  the  Soudan,  and  that  he  would  receive 
a  subsidy  of  £100,000  a  year  from  the  Egyptian 
Government,  so  long  as  his  behaviour  was  satis- 
factory ;  on  the  other  hand,  that  if  any  harm  befell 
General  Gordon  or  Colonel  Stewart,  and  in  general, 
if  at  any  subsequent  period  he  adopted  a  hostile 
attitude  towards  Egypt,  he  would  incur  the  dis- 
pleasure of  both  the  British  and  Egyptian  Govern- 
ments, and  that  should  he  fall  into  the  hands  of 
either,  his  life  would  possibly  be  forfeited.  It 
was,  however,  useless  for  me  to  enter  into  any 
negotiations  of  this  sort  until  I  had  received  from 
the  British  Government  a  free  hand  to  act  in  the 
matter  according  to  the  best  of  my  judgment. 

It  will  be  observed  that  both  General  Gordon 
and  Colonel  Stewart  in  their  telegrams  of  JNIarch 
3  and  4  urged  the  desirability  of  opening  up  the 
Berber-Suakin  road.  Colonel  Stewart  also  suggested 
that  a  force  of  British  or  Indian  cavalry  should  be 
sent  from  Suakin  to  Berber.  At  that  time.  General 
Graham  was  at  Suakin,  and  was  about  to  advance 
against  Osman  Digna.  There  was  some  prospect 
that,  when  the  latter  had  been  defeated,  Hussein 
Pasha  Khalifa,  who  was  then  at  Berber,  might  be 
able  to  open  up  the  road  to  Suakin  without  further 
British  military  assistance.  Moreover,  so  long  as 
any  prospect  existed  of  sending  Zobeir  Pasha  to 


cH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  507 

Khartoum,  and  thus  settlmg  the  Soudan  question 
by  diplomacy,  I  was  not  prepared  to  incur  the 
responsibility  of  recommending  that  a  British  force 
should  be  despatched  into  the  interior  of  the 
Soudan.  On  ^larch  4,  therefore,  I  telegraphed  to 
Lord  Granville  :  "  I  cannot  agree  with  the  proposal 
mentioned  in  Colonel  Stewart's  telegram  that  a 
force  of  British  or  Indian  cavalry  should  be  sent 
through  from  Suakin  to  Berber." 

On  March  5,  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  me 
as  follows  :  *'  I  have  received  your  telegram  of  the 
4th  instant  on  the  subject  of  the  proposal  that 
Zobeir  Pasha  should  succeed  General  Gordon  at 
Khartoum,  and  I  iiave  to  inform  you  that  Her 
Majesty's  Government  see  no  reason  at  present  to 
change  their  impressions  about  Zobeir,  which  were 
formed  on  various  grounds,  amongst  others  on  the 
Memoranda,  dated  the  23rd  January,  written  by 
General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  on  board  the 
Tanjore}  Unless  these  impressions  could  be 
removed.  Her  INlajesty's  Government  could  not 
take  upon  themselves  the  responsibility  of  sending 
Zobeir  to  Khartoum. 

"  Her  Majesty's  Government  would  be  glad 
to  learn  how  you  reconcile  your  proposal  to 
acquiesce  in  such  an  appointment  with  the  preven- 
tion or  discouragement  of  slave-hunting  and  Slave 
Trade,  with  the  policy  of  complete  evacuation,  and 
with  the  security  of  Egypt. 

"  They  would  also  wish  to  be  informed  as  to  the 
progress  which  has  been  made  in  extricating  the 
garrisons,  and  the  length  of  time  likely  to  elapse 
before  the  whole  or  the  greater  part  may  be  with- 
drawn. 

"  As  Her  Majesty's  Government  require  details 
as  to  each  garrison,  your  report  should  be  a  full 
one,  and  may  be  sent  by  mail. 

*   Vide  ante,  p.  442. 


508  MODEUN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

*'  In  your  telegram  now  under  reply,  no  allusion 
is  made  to  the  proposal  that  the  local  Chiefs  should 
be  consulted  as  to  the  future  government  of  the 
country,  and  Her  INIajesty's  Government  desire  to 
know  whether  that  idea  has  been  abandoned." 

I  remember  the  feeling  akin  to  despair  with 
which  I  received  this  telegram.  It  was  clear  that 
the  Government  did  not  realise  the  true  nature 
of  the  situation  at  Khartoum.  I  was  asked  to  re- 
concile the  proposal  that  Zobeir  Pasha  should 
be  employed,  (1)  with  the  prevention  or  discour- 
agement of  slave-hunting  and  the   Slave   Trade; 

(2)  with  the   policy  of  complete  evacuation  ;    and 

(3)  with   the    security    of  Egypt.      The    answers 
were  obvious. 

If  the  Soudan  were  abandoned,  slave-hunting 
and  the  Slave  Trade  could  not  be  prevented. 
This  was  clear  from  the  first.  The  fact  was  an 
unpleasant  one,  but  no  object  was  to  be  gained 
by  a  failure  to  recognise  its  existence. 

Again,  it  could  scarcely  be  argued  that  to  set  up 
Zobeir  Pasha  as  a  subsidised  and  semi-independent 
ruler  of  the  Soudan  was  inconsistent  with  the 
policy  of  evacuation.  The  policy,  which  both 
General  Gordon  and  myself  were  at  this  moment 
advocating,  was  one  of  "  evacuation  but  not 
abandonment," — that  is  to  say,  not  complete 
abandonment  to  anarchy. 

As  regards  the  security  of  Egypt,  the  choice 
lay  between  Zobeir  Pasha  and  the  Mahdi,  and  the 
opinion  of  the  best -informed  authorities  on  the 
spot  was  that  the  former  was  less  dangerous  than 
the  latter. 

Again,  I  was  asked  to  furnish  information  "as 
to  the  ])r(\gress  which  had  been  made  in  extricat- 
ing the  garrisons,  and  the  length  of  time  likely  to 
ela{)se  before  the  whole  or  the  greater  part  might 
be  withdrawn." 


CH.XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  509 

The  Government  must  surely  have  known 
that  no  progress  had  been  made  in  extricating 
the  garrisons,  and  that  if  the  remote  garrisons  in 
Sennar  and  the  Equatorial  provinces  Avere  to  be 
withdrawn,  it  was  impossible  to  state  what  length 
of  time  would  elapse  before  the  operation  could 
be  completed.  One  of  the  objects  in  recommend- 
ing the  employment  of  Zobeir  Pasha  was  to 
facilitate  the  extrication  of  the  garrisons  by  pre- 
venting the  wavering  tribes  from  joining  the  Mahdi. 

But  perhaps  the  most  deplorable  part  of  Lord 
Granville's  telegram  was  that  in  which  the  British 
Government,  at  a  time  when  every  moment  was 
precious,  asked  for  a  full  report  to  be  sent  by 
mail  as  to  the  details  of  each  garrison.  These 
details  had  been  already  furnished  to  the  Govern- 
ment three  months  previously  in  a  despatch  which 
fills  five  pages  of  a  blue  book.^ 

My  position  at  this  time  was  one  of  great 
difficulty.  It  was  clear  that  the  situation  at 
Khartoum  was  very  critical.  Every  telegram 
received  from  General  Gordon  and  Colonel 
Stewart  insisted  more  strongly  than  its  precursor 
on  the  necessity  of  sending  Zobeir  Pasha  at 
once  to  Khartoum.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
British  Government  were  evidently  very  averse 
to  the  employment  of  Zobeir  Pasha.  INIoreover, 
General  Gordon's  frequent  changes  of  opinion,  and 
the  number  and  tone  of  his  telegrams,  had  not 
unnaturally  engendered  the  belief  that  he  had 
not  sufficiently  considered  the  nature  of  his 
proposals.  In  spite  of  the  messages  which  had 
been  sent  to  London,  the  Government  evidently 
thought  that  General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart 
were  not  in  any  immediate  danger,  and  that  time  was 
available  to  consider  leisurely  tlie  future  course  of 
action  in  the  Soudan.     After  weiohing;  the  matter 

»  See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1884,  p.  126. 


510  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

carefully,  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  best 
course  to  adopt  would  be  to  make  a  further  en- 
deavour in  the  direction  of  utilising  Zobeir  Pasha's 
services.  I  was  all  the  more  disposed  to  adopt 
this  course  because  just  at  this  moment  (March  7) 
I  received  Lord  Granville's  private  letter  of 
February  29/  from  which  I  gathered  that  the 
Government  were  open  to  conviction  on  the  Zobeir 
question. 

It  seemed  to  me  that  the  best  way  to  induce  the 
Government  to  yield  was  to  get  General  Gordon 
to  send  a  carefully  reasoned  reply  to  the  objections 
raised  in  Lord  Granville's  telegram  of  March  5. 
I  resolved,  therefore,  to  repeat  that  telegram  to 
General  Gordon.  I  added  the  following  observa- 
tions :  "  In  view  of  the  opinions  entertained  by  Her 
Majesty's  Government,  it  becomes  your  duty  and 
mine  to  reconsider  very  carefully  the  two  following 
points  : — 

"  First,  is  it  possible  to  choose  any  other  man 
except  Zobeir  ?  Secondly,  if  it  is  not  possible  to 
do  so,  are  the  arguments  in  favour  of  Zobeir's 
appointment  sufficient  to  outweigh  the  obvious 
disadvantages  ? 

"  As  regards  the  first  point,  would  it  be  possible 
to  place  Hussein  Pasha  Khalifa  at  Khartoum  with 
a  certain  portion  of  territory  northwards,  and  to 
divide  the  rest  of  the  country  amongst  the  heads 
of  tribes  ?  I  do  not  recommend  this  course.  I 
merely  ask  for  your  opinion  on  it. 

"  Further,  will  you  reconsider  the  question  of 
collecting  the  Chiefs  at  Khartoum,  and  coming 
to  an  a<>:reement  with  them  as  to  the  future  of  the 
country  ? 

"  As  regards  the  second  question,  the  following 
points  require  consideration. 

"First,  how  is  the   proposal  to  nominate  and 

*   Vide  ante,  p.  498. 


CH.XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  511 

subsidise  Zobeir  to  be  reconciled  with  the  policy  of 
evacuation  ? 

*'  Secondly,  how  is  it  to  be  reconciled  with  the 
prevention  or  discouragement  of  slave-hunting  or 
the  Slave  Trade  ? 

"Thirdly,  how  is  it  to  be  reconciled  with  the 
security  of  Egypt  ?  In  dealing  with  this  latter 
question,  it  is  desirable  to  consider  how  far  Zobeir 
can  be  trusted  to  remain  friendly  to  Egypt.  Might 
he  not  make  common  cause  with  the  Mahdi,  should 
he  become  powerful,  and  prove  a  source  of  danger, 
on  his  own  account,  rather  than  of  assistance  to 
Egypt  ?  Many  people  think  that  he  has  instigated 
the  revolt  of  the  Mahdi.  Have  you  any  reasons 
to  believe  that  he  has  done  so  ? 

"  Having  answered  these  questions,  please  reply 
fully  to  Lord  Granville's  question  as  to  the 
prospects  of  extricating  the  garrisons,  including 
Darfour." 

My  object  in  sending  this  telegram  was  to  ask 
General  Gordon  a  series  of  leading  questions,  which 
he  might  answer  in  a  form  calculated  to  produce 
an  effect  in  London.  I  felt,  however,  that  some 
further  explanation  was  due  to  him,  for  he  might 
reasonably  cavil  at  questions  being  addressed  to 
him  which,  so  far  as  was  possible,  he  had  already 
answered  several  times.  Simultaneously,  therefore, 
with  the  despatch  of  my  official  telegram,  I  sent 
him  the  following  private  message  :  "Please  under- 
stand, as  regards  my  long  telegram  of  to-day,  that 
I  could  answer  many  of  the  questions  myself,  but 
I  want  to  get  your  opinions  and  then  see  whether 
they  agree  with  mine.  You  can  regard  the  Zobeir 
question  as  still  under  consideration,  but  the  Home 
Government  does  not  like  the  proposal,  and  recpiires 
solid  reasons  to  be  given  before  they  can  accept  it. 
Send  me  a  careful  and  well-argued  answer  on  the 
different  points  I  raise." 


512  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iii 

On  INIarch  8,  I  received  General  Gordon's  reply. 
It  was  as  follows :  *'The  sending  of  Zobeir  means  the 
extrication  of  the  Cairo  employes  from  Khartoum, 
and  the  garrisons  from  Sennar  and  Kassala.  I  can 
see  no  possible  way  to  do  so  except  through  him 
who,  being  a  native  of  the  country,  can  rally  the 
well -affected  around  him,  as  they  know  he  will 
make  his  home  here.  I  do  not  think  that  the 
giving  a  subsidy  to  Zobeir  for  some  two  years 
would  be  in  contradiction  to  the  policy  of  entire 
evacuation.  It  would  be  nothing  more  than  giving 
him  a  lump  sum  in  two  instalments  under  the  con- 
ditions I  have  already  written.  As  for  slave-hold- 
ing, even  had  we  held  the  Soudan,  we  could  never 
have  interfered  with  it.  I  have  already  said  that 
the  Treaty  of  1877  was  an  impossible  one ;  there- 
fore, on  that  head,  Zobeir's  appointment  would 
make  no  difference  whatever.  As  for  slave-hunt- 
ing, the  evacuation  of  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  and 
Equatorial  provinces  would  entirely  prevent  it. 
Should  Zobeir  attempt,  after  his  two  years'  subsidy 
was  paid  him,  to  take  those  districts,  we  could  put 
pressure  on  him  at  Suakin,  which  will  remain  in  our 
hands.  I  feel  sure  that  Zobeir  will  be  so  occupied 
with  the  Soudan  proper,  and  with  consolidating  his 
position,  that  he  will  not  have  time  to  devote  to 
those  provinces.  As  for  the  security  of  Egypt, 
Zobeir's  stay  in  Cairo  has  taught  him  our  power, 
and  he  would  never  dream  of  doing  anything 
against  Egypt.  He  would  rather  seek  its  closest 
alliance,  for  he  is  a  great  trader.  As  to  progress 
made  in  extrication  of  garrisons,  all  I  have  done  is 
to  send  down  from  Khartoum  all  the  sick  men, 
women,  and  children  of  those  killed  in  Kordofan. 
Sennar,  I  heard  to-day,  is  quite  safe  and  quiet. 
Kassala  will  hold  out  without  difficulty  after 
Graham's  victory,  but  the  road  there  is  blocked, 
as  also  is  the  road  to  Sennar.     It  is  quite  impos- 


OH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  513 

sible  to  get  the  roads  open  to  Kassala  and  Sennar, 
or  to  send  down  the  white  troops,  unless  Zobeir 
comes  up.  He  will  change  the  whole  state  of 
affairs.  As  for  the  Equatorial  and  Bahr-el-Ghazal 
provinces,  they  are  all  right,  but  I  cannot  evacuate 
them  till  the  Nile  rises,  in  two  months.  Dongola 
and  Berber  are  quiet ;  but  I  fear  for  the  road 
between  Berber  and  Khartoum,  where  the  friends 
of  the  JNIahdi  are  very  active.  A  body  of  rebels  on 
the  Blue  Nile  are  blockading  a  force  of  1000  men, 
which  have,  however,  plenty  of  food;  till  the  Nile 
rises,  I  cannot  relieve  them.  Darfour,  so  far  as  I 
can  understand,  is  all  right,  and  the  restored  Sultan 
should  now  be  working  up  the  tribes  to  acknow- 
ledge him.  It  is  impossible  to  find  any  other  man 
but  Zobeir  for  governing  Khartoum.  No  one  has 
his  power.  Hussein  Pasha  Khalifa  has  only  power 
at  Dongola  and  Berber.  If  you  do  not  send  Zobeir, 
you  have  no  chance  of  getting  the  garrisons  away ; 
this  is  a  heavy  argument  in  favour  of  sending  him. 
There  is  no  possibility  of  dividing  the  country 
between  Zobeir  and  other  Chiefs ;  none  of  the 
latter  could  stand  for  a  day  against  the  Mahdi's 
agents,  and  Hussein  Pasha  Khalifa  would  also  fall. 
The  Chiefs  will  not  collect  here,  for  the  loyal  are 
defending  their  lands  against  the  disloyal.  There 
is  not  the  least  chance  of  Zobeir  making  common 
cause  with  the  Mahdi.  Zobeir  here  would  be  far 
more  powerful  than  the  Mahdi,  and  he  would 
make  short  work  of  the  Mahdi.  The  JNIahdi's 
power  is  that  of  a  Pope,  Zobeir's  will  be  that  of 
a  Sultan.  They  could  never  combine.  Zobeir  is 
fifty  times  the  Mahdi's  match.  He  is  also  of 
good  family,  well  known  and  fitted  to  be  Sultan  ; 
the  Mahdi,  in  all  these  respects,  is  the  exact 
opposite,  besides  being  a  fanatic.  I  daresay  Zobeir, 
who  hates  the  tribes,  did  stir  up  the  fires  of  revolt, 
in  hopes  that  he  would   be  sent  to  quell  it.     It  is 

VOT,.  1  2  L 


514  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  in 

the  irony  of  fate  that  he  will  get  his  wish  if  he  is 
sent  up." 

At  the  same  time,  I  received  some  further  tele- 
grams from  General  Gordon,  which  showed  that 
the  danger  of  communication  between  Berber  and 
Khartoum  being  cut  off  was  daily  becoming  more 
imminent,  although,  General  Gordon  added,  "for 
Khartoum  itself,  there  is  not  any  fear." 

On  March  9,  I  repeated  to  Lord  Granville 
General  Gordon's  long  telegram  of  the  8th,  adding 
the  following  remarks  : — 

"  I  think  that  the  policy  of  sending  Zobeir  to 
Khartoum  and  giving  him  a  subsidy  is  in  harmony 
with  the  policy  of  evacuation.  It  is  in  principle 
the  same  policy  as  that  adopted  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  India  towards  Afghanistan  and  the  tribes 
on  the  north-west  frontier.  I  have  always  con- 
templated making  some  arrangements  for  the  future 
government  of  the  Soudan,  as  will  be  seen  from 
my  despatch  of  December  22,  1883,  in  which  1 
said  that  it  would  be  'necessary  to  send  an  English 
officer  of  high  authority  to  Khartoum  with  full 
powers  to  withdraw  all  garrisons  in  the  Soudan, 
and  make  the  best  arrangements  possible  for  the 
future  government  of  the  country.' 

"  As  regards  slavery,  it  may  certainly  receive  a 
stimulus  from  the  abandonment  of  the  Soudan  by 
Egypt,  but  the  despatch  of  Zobeir  Pasha  to  Khar- 
toum will  not  affect  the  question  in  one  way  or  the 
other.  No  middle  course  is  possible  so  far  as  the 
Soudan  is  concerned.  We  must  either  virtually 
annex  the  country,  which  is  out  of  the  question,  or 
else  we  must  accept  the  inevitable  consequences  of 
the  policy  of  abandonment. 

"  Your  Lordship  will  see  what  General  Gordon 
says  about  the  question  of  the  security  of  Egypt. 
I  believe  that  Zobeir  may  be  made  a  bulwark 
agahist  the  approach   of  the   INIahdi.     Of  course. 


CH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  515 

there  is  a  risk  that  he  will  constitute  a  danger  to 
Egypt,  but  this  risk  is,  I  think,  a  small  one,  and  it 
is  in  any  case  preferable  to  incur  it  rather  than 
to  face  the  certain  disadvantages  of  withdrawing 
without  making  any  provision  for  the  future 
government  of  the  country,  which  would  thus  be 
sure  to  fall  under  the  power  of  the  Mahdi. 

'*  I  venture  to  urge  upon  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment the  necessity  of  settling  this  question  without 
delay.  General  Gordon's  telegrams  have  latterly 
caused  me  some  uneasiness.  He  evidently  thinks 
that  there  is  a  considerable  dano:er  of  his  bein<>" 
hemmed  in  and  blockaded  by  the  rebels  at  Khar- 
toum, and  he  appears  to  contemplate  the  despatch 
of  British  troops  to  extricate  him.  Moreover,  so  far 
as  I  can  judge.  General  Gordon  exercises  little  or 
no  influence  outside  Khartoum,  and,  altliough  he 
was  at  first  hailed  as  a  deliverer,  his  influence  is 
sure  to  decline  as  time  goes  on."" 

An  incident  now  occurred  which  practically 
destroyed  all  hopes  of  utilising  Zobeir  Pasha's 
services.  Up  to  this  moment,  nothing  definite 
was  known  to  the  public  about  the  proposal  to 
send  Zobeir  Pasha  to  Khartoum.  Mr.  Power  was 
employed  by  the  Times  as  its  special  correspondent 
at  Khartoum.  On  March  8  or  9,  INIr.  Moberly 
Bell,  who  was  Times  correspondent  in  Egypt,  com- 
municated to  me  a  telegram  from  Mr.  Power  for 
transmission  to  the  Times,  from  which  it  appeared 
that  General  Gordon  had  given  to  him  all  the 
information  which  was  contained  in  his  telegrams 
to  me.  I  subsequently  received  a  letter  from 
Colonel  Stewart,  dated  March  8,  which  informed 
me  of  what  had  taken  phice  in  connection  with 
this  subject.  "The  telegram,"  Colonel  Stewart 
wrote,  "  shown  you  by  Bell  this  morning  has,  no 
doubt,  surprised  you.  Gordon  also  sent  you  a  tele- 
gram giving  in  his  resignation  if  his  views  were  not 


516  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

carried  out.  Yesterday  evening,  he  got  very 
irritated  with  me  because  I  did  not  at  once  accede 
to  his  request  to  send  you  a  telegram  about  Zobeir 
and  the  ])ropriety  of  sending  him  up  with  a  British 
force  to  Berber.  I  said  tliat  you  had  ah'eady  told 
us  the  chief  difficulty  was  not  at  Cairo,  but  at 
London,  etc. 

"  I  did  not  refuse  to  write  the  telegram,  I 
merely  asked  for  a  little  time  to  think.  G.  got 
very  impatient  and  finally  left  the  table.  Seeing 
that  he  was  annoyed,  I  got  up  and  wrote  the 
telegram  as  he  desired.  On  returning,  I  found 
him  with  the  Times  correspondent.  Tlie  result 
was  the  telegram  you  have  been  shown.  We  had 
a  discussion  on  the  subject,  but  it  was  of  no  avail. 
He  then  telegraphed  his  resignation  to  you,  but 
this  I  fortunately  succeeded  in  getting  put  into 
cipher.  The  affair  is  very  annoying,  but  I  think 
the  Ministry  at  home  ought  to  let  him  have  his 
wish  and  give  him  Zobeir." 

General  Gordon  wrote  in  his  Journal :  "  Baring 
pitched  into  me  for  indiscretion  in  asking  openly  for 
Zobeir,  which  I  did  on  purpose,  in  order  to  save  Her 
Majesty's  Government  the  odium  of  such  a  step."^ 
As  regards  the  indiscretion,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
whatever.  It  was  not  only  that  the  publication  of 
General  Gordon's  views  raised  a  storm  of  opposition 
in  England  to  Zobeir  Pasha's  a])pointment,  but 
also  that  the  difficulties  of  neffotiatino-  with  Zobeir 
Pasha  were  greatly  increased.  Instead  of  my  being 
able  to  send  for  him  and  point  out  to  him  that 
he  had  hitherto  been  under  a  cloud,  but  that  now 
he  had  an  o})portunity  of  retrieving  his  reputation, 
he  was  placed  in  a  position  in  which  it  would  have 
appeared  possible  to  him  to  dictate  his  own  terms. 

*  Journal,  September  19,  1884,  vol.  i.  p.  67.  I  remember  sending 
a  telegram  urging  on  Genenil  Gordon  the  dcsinibility  of  reticence  in 
his  communications  to  the  press,  but  I  cannot  lay  my  hands  on  it. 


CH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  517 

Indeed,  he  received  advice  to  act  in  this  manner 
from  the  numerous  persons  in  Cairo  who  were 
eager  to  seek  any  and  every  opportunity  for  showing 
hostility  to  England. 

As  regards  the  effect  in  England,  Mr.  Sturge, 
the  Chairman  of  the  Anti-Slavery  Society,  wrote, 
on  March  18,  to  Lord  Granville  that  he  had  been 
instructed  by  a  full  Committee  of  tlie  Society  to 
state  that  they  were  '*  unanimous  in  the  feeling  that 
countenance  in  any  shape  of  such  an  individual 
{i.e.  Zobeir  Pasha)  by  the  i3ritish  Government  would 
be  a  degradation  for  England  and  a  scandal  to 
Europe.  .  .  .  As  yet,  however,  the  Committee  are 
unable  to  believe  that  Her  Majesty's  Government 
will  thus  stultify  that  anti-slavery  policy  which  has 
so  long  been  the  high  distinction  of  England,  or  that 
they  will  thus  discharge  a  trust  which  they  have 
undertaken  on  behalf  of  the  British  people  and  of 
Europe."  The  action  of  the  Anti-Slavery  Society 
was  injudicious.  It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that 
their  opposition,  together  with  the  fact  that  there 
was  every  indication  of  the  matter  being  taken  up 
as  a  party  question  in  England,  greatly  contributed 
to  the  rejection  of  the  views  put  forward  by  General 
Gordon,  Colonel  Stewart,  and  myself. 

Before  dealing  with  the  reply  which  Lord 
Granville  sent  to  my  telegram  of  March  9,  I  must 
describe  the  further  correspondence  which  took 
place  between  General  Gordon  and  myself  on 
March  9,  10,  and  11. 

On  the  9th,  General  Gordon  telegraphed  to  me  : 
**I  shall  await  your  decision  {i.e.  the  decision  about 
Zobeir  Pasha)  ;  if  wire  is  cut,  I  shall  consider  your 
silence  is  consent  to  my  propositions,  and  shall  hold 
on  to  Khartoum  and  await  Zobeir  and  British 
diversion  at  Berber."  I  had  still  some  hope  of  being 
permitted  to  utilise  Zobeir  Pasha,  but,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  telegraphic  communication  with  Khartoum 


518  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  iii 

might  at  any  moment  be  interrupted,  I  did  not 
think  it  was  either  just  or  desirable  to  leave  General 
Gordon  under  tlie  impression  that  the  British 
Government  had  any  intention  of  sending  an 
expedition  to  Berber,  wlien  I  knew  that  they  had 
no  such  intention.  I,  therefore,  replied  at  once : 
"  So  far  as  I  know,  there  is  no  intention  on  the 
part  of  the  Government  to  send  an  English  force 
to  Berber." 

On  JNIarch  10  and  11,  I  received  a  large  number 
of  telegrams  from  General  Gordon.  I  need  not  give 
them  in  full.  They  were  to  the  general  effect  that 
the  Sheikh-el-Obeid  was  undecided  whether  to  join 
the  Mahdi  or  not,^  that  there  was  considerable  risk 
of  communication  between  Berber  and  Khartoum 
being  interrupted,  but  that  Khartoum  itself  was 
not  in  any  danger,  and  that  the  utility  of  Zobeir 
Pasha  had  been  greatly  diminished  by  the  delay  in 
settling  the  question  of  his  employment,  '*  which 
had  forced  the  loyal  to  join  tlie  enemy."  *'  If,'' 
General  Gordon  telegraphed,  "you  mean  to  make 
the  proposed  diversion  to  Berber  (of  British  troops), 
and  to  accept  my  proposal  as  to  Zobeir,  to  install 
him  in  the  Soudan  and  evacuate,  then  it  is  worth 
w  hile  to  hold  on  to  Khartoum. 

"  If,  on  the  other  hand,  you  determine  on 
neither  of  these  steps,  then  I  can  see  no  use  in 
holding  on  to  Khartoum,  for  it  is  impossible  for 
me  to  lielp  the  other  garrisons,  and  I  shall  only  be 
sacrificing  the  whole  of  the  troops  and  employes 
here. 

*'  In  this  latter  case,  your  instructions  to  me 
had  better  be  that  I  should  evacuate  Khartoum, 
and,  with  all  the  employes  and  troops,  remove  the 
seat  of  government  to  Berber.     You  would   under- 

'  The  Sheikh-el-()beid  occupied  a  position  of  importance,  as  his 
tribal  influence  extended  over  the  popul.ition  lyin";'  between  Kliartoum 
and  Berber.  Colonel  Steuart,  in  a  letter  to  me,  described  him  as  "a 
very  lioly  man,  but  a  decided  trimmer." 


CH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  519 

stand  that  such  a  step  would  mean  the  sacrificmg 
of  all  outlymg  places  except  Berber  and  Dongola. 

'*  You  must  give  a  prompt  reply  to  this,  as  even 
the  retreat  to  Berber  may  not  be  in  my  power  in 
a  few  days ;  and  even  if  carried  out  at  once,  the 
retreat  will  be  of  extreme  difficulty. 

"  I  should  have  to  leave  large  stores  and  nine 
steamers,  which  cannot  go  down.  Eventually, 
some  question  would  arise  at  Berber  and  Dongola, 
and  I  may  utterly  fail  in  getting  the  Cairo  em- 
ployes to  Berber. 

"  If  I  attempt  it,  I  could  be  responsible  only  for 
the  attempt  to  do  so." 

In  another  telegram,  General  Gordon  said  :  "  If 
the  immediate  evacuation  of  Khartoum  is  deter- 
mined upon,  irrespective  of  outlying  towns,  I  would 
propose  to  send  down  all  the  Cairo  employes 
and  white  troops  with  Colonel  Stewart  to  Berber, 
where  he  would  await  your  orders.  I  would  also 
ask  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  accept  the  resig- 
nation of  my  commission,  and  I  would  take  all 
steamers  and  stores  up  to  the  Equatorial  and  Bahr- 
el-Ghazal  Provinces,  and  consider  those  provinces 
as  under  the  King  of  the  Belgians. 

*'  You  would  be  able  to  retire  all  Cairo  employes 
and  white  troops  with  Stewart  from  Berber  to 
Dongola,  and  tlience  to  Wadi  Haifa. 

"  If  you,  therefore,  determine  on  the  immediate 
evacuation  of  Khartoum,  this  is  my  idea.  If  you 
object,  tell  me. 

*'  It  is  the  only  solution  that  I  can  see  if  the 
immediate  evacuation  of  Khartoum,  irrespective 
of  the  outlying  towns,  is  determined  upon."  ^ 

Lord  Granville's  reply  to  my  telegram  of 
March  9  was  despatched  to  me  on  the  11th.     It 

*  Some  of  the  telegrams,  which  Gordon  sent  me  at  this  moment,  did 
not  reach  me  till  many  days  later,  owing  to  the  frecjuent  interruptions 
of  telegraphic  communication. 


520  MODERN  EGYPT      .  ft.  hi 

was  to  the  following  effect :  "  Her  Majesty's 
Government  have  carefully  considered  your  tele- 
grams of  the  9th  instant  with  regard  to  the  future 
government  of  Khartoum  and  the  Soudan,  but 
they  do  not  consider  that  the  arguments  against 
the  employment  of  Zobeir  Pasha  have  been  satis- 
factorily answered.  They  are  prepared  to  agree  to 
any  other  Mohammedan  assistance,  as  well  as  to 
the  supply  of  any  reasonable  sum  of  money  which 
General  Gordon  may  consider  necessary  in  order 
to  carry  out  successfully  the  objects  of  his  mission. 

"  Her  Majesty's  Government  are  not  prepared 
to  send  troops  to  Berber.  They  understand  from 
your  telegrams  that  General  Gordon  and  yourself 
are  of  opinion  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  garrisons 
will  take  a  considerable  time,  and  that  the  chief 
difficulty  arises  from  the  uncertainty  felt  by  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Soudan  with  regard  to  the  future 
government  of  the  country.  While  attaching 
great  importance  to  an  early  evacuation.  Her 
Majesty's  Government  have  no  desire  to  force 
General  Gordon's  hand  prematurely,  and  they  pro- 
pose, therefore,  to  extend  his  appointment  for  any 
reasonable  period  wliich  may  be  necessary  to  enable 
him  to  carry  out  the  objects  of  the  mission  with 
which  he  has  been  intrusted.  You  will  communi- 
cate with  General  Gordon  in  the  sense  of  this 
despatch." 

Immediately  afterwards  (March  12),  I  received 
the  following  telegram  from  Lord  Granville:  "Her 
Majesty's  Government  desire  to  learn  whether 
General  Gordon's  proposal  as  to  his  eventual 
successor  refers  to  the  whole  of  the  Soudan,  and, 
if  not,  to  what  districts  of  it.  They  would  also 
be  glad  to  receive  information  as  to  whether  his 
proposed  jurisdiction  would  embrace  points  from 
which  Slave  Trade  or  slave  -  hunting  could  be 
carried  on." 


CH.XXV  ZOBEIR  PASIIA  521 

I  repeated  Lord  Granville's  teleiirams  to  General 
Gordon,  instructing  liini  at  the  same  time  to  hold 
on  to  Khartoum  until  I  could  communicate  further 
with  the  British  Government.  I  also  told  him  "on 
no  account  to  proceed  to  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  and 
Equatorial  provinces." 

I  do  not  think  that  General  Gordon  ever  received 
this  message.  Nevertheless,  I  regret  that  I  sent  it. 
I  have  already  discussed  this  matter  partially  in 
dealing  with  the  question  of  the  prohibition  placed 
on  his  action  in  respect  to  retiring  southwards.^  I 
may  now  add  that,  in  view  of  the  danger  of  tele- 
graphic communication  being  interrupted,  it  would 
have  been  better  for  me,  instead  of  telling  General 
Gordon  to  hold  on  to  Khartoum,  to  have  taken 
upon  myself  the  responsibility  of  directing  him  to 
retire  at  once  to  Berber,  if  he  thought  fit  to  do  so. 
Also,  it  would  have  been  better  for  me  to  have 
accepted  the  conclusion  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment were  determined  not  to  employ  Zobeir  Pasha. 
If  it  could  have  been  announced,  before  the  tribes 
between  Berber  and  Khartoum  rose,  that  Zobeir 
Pasha  was  to  be  installed  as  Governor-General  of  the 
Soudan  with  a  force  of  black  troops  at  his  disposal 
to  maintain  order,  it  is  possible  that  the  Sheikh-el- 
Obeid  and  his  followers  would  never  have  joined 
the  Mahdi.  But  the  favourable  moment  for  in- 
fluencing them  in  this  direction  had  been  allowed  to 
pass  by.  At  the  time,  however,  I  thought  from 
the  tone  of  Lord  Granville's  telegrams  of  the  11th 
and  12th  of  March  that  the  employment  of  Zobeir 
Pasha  was  still  an  open  question.  I,  therefore, 
repeated  to  him  a  summary  of  General  Gordon's 
most  recent  telegrams.  I  also  replied  at  length  to 
the  questions  addressed  to  me,  and  at  the  same 
time  1  sent  to  him  the  following  private  telegram : 
"If  you  eventually  decide  to  send  Zobeir,  please 

»   Vide  ante,  pp.  465-467. 


522  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

keep  it,  if  possible,  secret,  till  I  have  dealt  with 
him  here.  I  am  told  that  he  will  not  fjo  unless 
Gordon  comes  away,  as,  if  Gordon  came  to  any 
harm,  he  thinks  he  would  be  accused  of  causino;  it. 
The  publicity,  which  Gordon  gave  to  this  matter, 
is  most  unfortunate.  Newspaper  correspondents 
are  interviewing  Zobeir,  and  some  people  here  are 
urging  him  to  make  his  own  terms,  as  we  cannot 
get  on  without  him.  All  this  will  make  him 
difficult  to  deal  with." 

Lord  Granville  replied  immediately  (March  13) : 
"I  have  received  your  telegram  of  the  13th 
instant  on  the  subject  of  General  Gordon's  sugges- 
tions with  regard  to  the  appointment  of  Zobeir 
Pasha  as  Governor  of  Khartoum  and  the  despatch 
of  British  troops  to  Berber.  Her  Majesty's 
Government  are  unable  to  accept  these  proposals. 
If  General  Gordon  is  of  o})inion  that  the  prospect 
of  his  early  departure  diminishes  the  chance  of  his 
accomplishing  his  task,  and  that  by  staying  at 
Khartoum  himself  for  any  length  of  time  wiiich  he 
may  judge  necessary  he  would  be  able  to  establish 
a  settled  government  at  that  place,  he  is  at  liberty 
to  remain  there.  In  the  event  of  his  being  unable 
to  carry  out  this  suggestion,  he  should  evacuate 
Khartoum  and  save  that  garrison  by  conducting  it 
himself  to  Berber  without  delay. 

"  Her  Majesty's  Government  trust  that  General 
Gordon  will  not  resign  his  commission.  He  should 
act  according  to  his  judgment  as  to  the  best  course 
to  pursue  with  regard  to  the  steam -vessels  and 
stores."  ^ 


^  On  March  14,  Lord  Granville  wrote  to  me  privately :  "  We  have 
had  two  Cabinets  (at  which  Gladstone  was  not  present)  ;  there  wag 
a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  abstract  advantaj^es  or  disadvantasfeg 
of  Zobeir,  but  the  unanimous  opinion  of  tlie  conunoners  in  the  Cabinet 
was  that  no  Liberal  or  (Joiisorvative  (ioveriimeut  could  appoint 
Zobeir.  And  the  difficulty  of  sending  troojis  to  Berber  is  very  great, 
and  may  entail  unlimited  difficulties  upon  us." 


CH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  523 

On  March  14,  I  replied  to  T^ord  Granville's 
telegram  of  the  13th:  "The  instructions  contained 
in  your  Lordship's  telegram  of  the  13th  are  likely 
to  lead  to  such  very  serious  consequences  that, 
even  if  the  line  were  not  still  interrupted,  I  should 
hesitate  to  repeat  them  to  General  Gordon  until 
I  have  again  asked  your  Lordship  whether 
the  question  has  been  fully  considered  in  all 
its  bearings.  When  it  is  said  that  General 
Gordon  may  stay  at  Khartoum  for  any  length  of 
time  which  he  may  judge  necessary  to  establish  a 
settled  government,  is  it  meant  that  he  may  stay 
an  indefinite  time,  and  that  he  will  be  succeeded 
by  some  other  Governor  -  General  working,  as 
before,  under  orders  from  Cairo  ?  This  is  a  possible 
policy,  but  it  is,  of  course,  a  reversal  of  abandon- 
ment. It  must  lead  either  to  the  Egyptian 
Government  endeavouring  to  govern  the  Soudan 
unaided  (and  this  they  cannot  do,  and  should  not 
be  allowed  to  attempt),  or  it  will  lead  to  the 
appointment  of  a  succession  of  English  Governors- 
General,  and  probably  of  other  English  officials. 
This  must  ultimately  involve  the  English  Govern- 
ment becoming  virtually  responsible  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Soudan.  I  trust  Her  Majesty's 
Government  will  not  for  a  moment  think  of 
adopting  such  a  policy.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
is  merely  intended  to  prolong  General  Gordon's 
period  of  office  for  a  few  months,  then  I  can  assure 
your  Lordship  that  delay  will  not  facilitate  his 
task.  On  the  contrary,  the  difficulty  of  establish- 
ing a  settled  government  will,  I  believe,  increase 
rather  than  diminish  with  time.  The  alternatiA'e, 
which  General  Gordon  will  probably  adopt,  of 
evacuating  Khartoum  at  once  and  retiring  on 
Berber,  is  open  to  very  great  objections,  and  will 
be  most  difficult  to  execute.  It  involves  the 
certainty   of  sacrificing   the   garrisons    of  Sennar, 


524  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  hi 

Bahr-el-Ghazal,  and  Gondokoro.  The  garrisons  of 
Kassala  and  the  neighbourhood  may  perhaps  be 
brought  down  to  JNIassowah,  but  it  is  at  present 
impossible  to  speak  with  certainty  on  this  point. 
I  do  not  think  that  the  retreat  could  be  carried 
out  without  great  personal  risk  to  Gordon  and 
Stewart.  The  ultimate  effect  will  be  that  Khar- 
toum must  fall  to  the  IMahdi,  whose  powers  will 
be  thus  immensely  increased,  and  the  policy  of 
creating  a  bulwark  between  Egypt  and  the  Mahdi, 
which  I  cannot  but  think  is  the  only  wise  course 
to  follow,  will  have  to  be  finally  abandoned.  I 
would  beg  your  Lordship  not  to  attach  undue 
importance  to  some  of  the  minor  contradictions  in 
General  Gordon's  telegrams.  His  main  contentions 
ap])ear  to  me  to  be  perfectly  clear  and  reasonable. 
They  are,  first,  that  the  two  questions  of  with- 
drawing the  garrisons  and  of  arranging  for  the 
future  government  of  the  country  cannot  be 
separated.  Secondly,  that  it  is  most  undesirable, 
even  if  it  be  possible,  for  him  to  withdraw  without 
leaving  some  permanent  man  to  take  his  place. 
I  regret  that  no  one  but  Zobeir  can  be  found 
to  succeed  Gordon,  and  although  I  believe  the 
opinions  held  in  England  as  to  the  effect  of 
Zobeir's  appointment  are  based  on  an  incorrect 
appreciation  of  the  facts,  I  am  nevertheless  fully 
aware  of  the  great  difficulties  which  would  have  to 
be  encountered  in  England,  if  the  appointment  is 
made.  But  the  real  question  is,  not  whether  the 
appointment  of  Zobeir  is  objectionable,  but  whether 
any  other  practical  and  less  objectionable  alter- 
native can  be  suo-jijested.  I  can  su<:^<>est  none.  I 
trust  your  Lordship  will  not  think  that,  after  the 
repeated  telegrams  I  have  received,  I  am  unduly 
pressing  for  the  Zobeir  solution.  I  should  not 
again  urge  it,  if  I  could  see  any  other  less  objection- 
able way  out  of  the  present  very  difficult  position. 


CH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  525 

On  the  other  hand,  I  should  not  be  doing  my 
duty  if  I  did  not  lay  before  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment the  grave  dangers  which  will  result  from, 
and  the  objections  which  may  be  urged  against 
the  alternative  set  forth  in  your  Lordship's  tele- 
gram under  reply." 

Simultaneously  with  the  despatch  of  this  tele- 
gram, news  arrived  from  Berber  which  left  no 
further  doubt  that  the  Sheikh-el-Obeid  had  de- 
clared in  favour  of  the  Mahdi,  and  that  the  tribes 
between  Berber  and  Shendy  were  in  revolt. 

On  March  16,  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to 
me :  "  I  have  received  your  telegram  of  the  14th 
instant,  in  which  you  discuss  the  question  of  the 
future  government  of  the  Soudan  ;  and  after  full 
consideration  of  the  weighty  arguments  put  forward 
therein.  Her  Majesty's  Government  adhere  to  the 
instructions  contained  in  my  telegram  of  the  13th. 
While  the  objections  of  Her  Majesty's  Government 
to  Zobeir  are  unaltered,  the  prospect  of  good 
results  attending  his  appointment  seem  to  be 
diminished.  The  instructions  to  General  Gordon 
to  remain  in  the  Soudan  only  apply  to  the  period 
of  time  which  is  necessary  for  relieving  the  garrisons 
throughout  the  country,  and  for  affording  a  prospect 
of  a  settled  government.  If  General  Gordon 
agrees  with  you  that  the  difficulty  of  establishing 
a  settled  government  will  increase  rather  than 
diminish  with  time,  there  can  be  no  advantage 
in  his  remaining,  and  he  should,  as  soon  as  is 
practicable,  take  steps  for  the  evacuation  of 
Khartoum  in  accordance  with  the  instructions 
contained  in  my  telegram  of  the  13th  instant. 
On  evacuating  Khartoum,  he  should  exercise  his 
discretion  as  to  what  is  to  be  done  with  the 
steamers  and  stores  there." 

Tt  was  evidently  useless  to  continue  the 
correspondence.      The   British    Goverinnent    were 


526  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

determined  not  to  send  Zobeir  Pasha,  and,  moreover, 
now  that  there  was  no  longer  any  doubt  that  the 
tribes  between  Berber  and  Khartoum  had  joined 
the  Mahdi,  the  favourable  moment  for  sending  him 
was  passed.  On  March  17,  therefore,  T  sent  a  long 
telegram  to  General  Gordon,  informing  him  of  the 
result  of  the  correspondence  which  had  taken  place 
between  Lord  Granville  and  myself.  I  added : 
"  I  think  you  must  now  regard  the  idea  of  sending 
Zobeir  as  finally  abandoned,  and  that  you  must  act 
as  well  as  you  can  up  to  the  instructions  contained 
in  Lord  Granville's  telegrams."  I  do  not  think  that 
General  Gordon  ever  received  this  telegram. 

On  JNIarch  17,  I  wrote  a  despatch  to  Lord  Gri.i- 
ville  in  which  I  stated  that  I  did  not  propose  to 
continue  the  correspondence  about  the  employment 
of  Zobeir  Pasha.  I  added :  '*  I  regret  the  decision  at 
which  Her  Majesty's  Government  has  arrived,  and 
I  look  forward  with  considerable  apprehension  to  the 
results  of  the  policy  which  it  has  now  been  decided 
to  adopt.  But  your  Lordship  may  rely  on  my 
using  my  best  endeavours  to  carry  out  the  instruc- 
tions which  I  have  received." 

On  March  28,  Lord  Granville  wrote  to  me  a 
despatch  stating  at  length  the  reasons  which  had 
induced  the  Government  to  reject  the  proposal  that 
Zobeir  Pasha  should  be  employed.  The  despatch 
alluded  to  the  condemnatory  terms  which,  on  various 
occasions,  General  Gordon  had  employed  in  speaking 
of  Zobeir  Pasha.  It  was  pointed  out,  with  perfect 
accuracy,  that  both  Colonel  Stewart  and  myself 
had,  in  the  course  of  the  correspondence,  greatly 
modified  our  original  opinions.  After  giving  a 
summary  of  the  corres})ondence  which  had  taken 
place.  Lord  Granville  went  on  to  say  : 

"  If  reliance  could  safely  have  been  placed  upon 
Zobeir  to  serve  loyally  with  General  Gordon,  to 
act  in  a  friendly  manner  to\vards  Egypt,  and  to 


CH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  527 

abstain  from  encouraging  the  Slave  Trade,  the 
course  proposed  was  undoubtedly  the  best  which 
could  have  been  taken  under  the  circumstances  ; 
but  upon  this  most  vital  point  General  Gordon's 
assurances  failed  to  convince  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment. They  felt  the  strongest  desire  to  comply 
with  his  wishes,  but  they  were  bound,  at  the  same 
time,  to  exercise  their  own  deliberate  judgment 
upon  a  proposal  the  adoption  of  which  might 
produce  such  serious  consequences.  Tliey  could 
not  satisfy  themselves  of  the  probability  that  the 
establishment  of  Zobeir's  authority  would  be  a 
security  to  Egypt ;  on  the  contrary,  his  ante- 
cedents, and  character  and  disposition,  led  them 
to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  probably  constitute 
a  serious  danger  to  Egypt.  There  seemed  to  Her 
Majesty's  Government  to  be  considerable  risk  that 
Zobeir  might  join  with  the  Mahdi,  or  if  he  fought 
and  destroyed  him,  that  he  would  then  turn  against 
Egypt.  The  existence  of  an  outbreak  of  Musul- 
man  fanaticism  was  undoubted  ;  but  the  INIahdi 
had  not  shown  any  personal  qualifications  which 
threatened  to  convert  it  into  a  military  power  and 
organisation.  To  have  let  loose  in  the  Soudan  a 
Musulman  of  undoubted  ability  and  ambition, 
possessed  of  great  military  skill,  and  with  a 
grievance  against  the  Egyptian  Government, 
appeared  to  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  be 
so  perilous  a  course  that  they  were  unable  to 
accept  the  responsibility  of  adopting  it.  They 
were  unable  to  share  General  Gordon's  confidence 
that  Zobeir's  blood  feud  with  him  involved  no 
serious  danger,  and  they  felt  that  the  opinion 
originally  expressed  by  General  Gordon,  by  tlie 
Council  at  Cairo,  and  by  yourself,  was  more  likely 
to  be  correct  than  the  subsequent  one.  The 
chivalrous  character  of  General  Gordon  appeared 
to  be  likely  to  lead  him  into  the  generous  error 


528  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

of  trusting  too  much  to  the  loyalty  of  a  man  whose 
interests  and  feelings  were  hostile  to  him. 

"Besides  these  considerations  affecting  the  in- 
terests of  Egypt  and  the  safety  of  General  Gordon, 
Her  Majesty's  Government  had  further  to  consider 
how  far  it  was  probable  that  his  authority  might 
be  exercised  to  renew  the  slave-hunting  raids  for 
which  he  was  notorious.  The  temptation  to  em- 
bark in  such  lucrative  transactions  would  be  great 
to  himself,  and  there  would  be  the  additional  risk 
that  having  to  rely  on  the  support  of  his  former 
friends  and  dependents,  the  slave-hunters,  he  would 
be  obliged  to  purchase  their  support  by  connivance 
at  their  nefarious  practices.  Her  JM'jesty's  Govern- 
ment understand  the  reasons  which  compelled 
General  Gordon  to  announce  that  the  property  in 
slaves  in  the  Soudan  would  be  recognised  ;  but  this 
is  a  very  different  thing  from  using  the  authority 
of  Great  Britain  to  establish  a  notorious  slave- 
hunter  as  ruler  over  that  country.  General  Gordon, 
indeed,  proposed  that  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  and 
Equatorial  provinces  should  be  excluded  from 
Zobeir's  rule,  but  England  would  have  possessed 
no  power  to  secure  his  adherence  to  such  a  stipula- 
tion. 

"  These  were  the  considerations  which  led  Her 
Majesty's  Government  to  address  to  you  the  in- 
structions of  the  13tli  instant." 

On  April  14, 1  rephed  as  follows  to  this  despatch  : 
"  I  trust  your  Lordship  will  permit  me  to  say  that, 
in  my  opinion,  the  despatch  under  reply  contains  a 
very  fair  statement  of  a  question  which  I  think  was 
beset  with  more  difficulties  than  any  which,  in  the 
course  of  my  experience,  I  have  had  to  consider. 
If  the  arguments  used  in  that  despatch  stood 
alone,  they  would,  I  think,  be  unanswerable ;  but 
the  diflficulty  which  I  experienced  in  treating  this 
question   was    to   suggest   some  alternative  which 


CH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  529 

would  be  preferable  to  that  which  I  recommended. 
If  eventually  any  better  solution  is  found,  I  shall 
be  tlie  first  to  admit  that  I  was  in  error  in  pro- 
posing to  send  Zobeir  Pasha  to  the  Soudan." 

Were  the  British  Government  right  in  their  deci- 
sion not  to  employ  Zobeir  Pasha  ?  It  is,  of  course, 
impossible  to  give  more  than  a  conjectural  answer 
to  this  question.  Reviewing  the  matter  now,  after 
a  lapse  of  many  years,  I  am  still  of  opinion  that 
Zobeir  Pasha  should  have  been  employed.^  I 
believe  that  if,  when  General  Gordon  sent  his 
first  telegram  on  the  subject  from  Khartoum  on 
February  18,  the  Government  had  stated  that 
they  had  no  insuperable  objections  to  the  employ- 
ment of  Zobeir  Pasha,  the  course  of  events  in  the 
Soudan  might  possibly  have  been  changed.  AVhen 
once  General  Gordon  was  supported  by  Colonel 
Stewart,  I  should  have  yielded  to  his  pressure 
that  Zobeir  Pasha  should  have  been  despatched 
to  Khartoum  at  once,  to  which  I  was  at  first 
reluctant  to  consent.  He  could  have  left  Cairo 
before  the  end  of  February,  or  at  all  events  very 
early  in  March.  It  is  not  improbable  that  the 
announcement  of  his  departure  would  have  pre- 
vented the  tribes  round  Khartoum,  who  \.ere 
then  wavering,  from  joining  the  Mahdi.  But  the 
favourable  moment  was  very  fleeting.  Regarded 
by  the  light  of  after  events,  it  is  evident  that  the 
discussion  of  this  subject  was  prolonged  for  a 
fortnight  longer  than  was  necessary.  Even  if  the 
Government  had  yielded  when  the  correspondence 

1  There  can  be  no  question  as  to  the  extent  of  the  influence  which 
Zobeir  Pasha  then  exercised  in  the  Soudan,  more  especially  over  the 
tribes  between  Berber  and  Khartoum.  'When  I  visited  the  Soudan 
thirteen  years  later,  I  found  that  even  tlie  jioorest  classes,  however 
ignorant  of  other  matters,  were  well  acquainted  with  Zobeir  Pasha'a 
name,  and  asked  eagerly  for  news  of  his  welfare.  In  the  spring  of 
1000,  he  was  allowed  to  return  to  the  Soudan. 

VOL.   I  2  M 


530  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  hi 

closed  in  the  middle  of  INTarch,  no  good  would  have 
been  done.  The  propitious  moment  had  been 
allowed  to  pass  by. 

Whilst,  however,  my  personal  opinion  is  that  the 
British  Government  made  a  mistake  in  not  giving 
General  Gordon  and  myself  a  free  hand  in  this 
matter,  the  error  was  one  which  I  do  not  think 
that  any  impartial  critic,  even  supposing  he  adopts 
our  views,  will  be  disposed  to  condemn  severely. 
The  objections  which  Lord  Granville  urged  against 
the  employment  of  Zobeir  Pasha  were,  in  truth,  very 
forcible.  Lord  Northbrook,  for  whose  calm  judg- 
ment and  independence  of  character  I  entertained 
the  highest  respect,  wrote  to  me  two  years  later : 
"  I  believe  that  to  have  sent  Zobeir  would  have 
been  a  gambler's  cast,  and  that  the  probabilities 
were  in  favour  of  his  action  against  Gordon,  and 
of  his  raising  a  power  in  the  Soudan,  which  would 
have  been  a  greater  danger  to  Egypt  than  there 
is  now.  I  can  say  most  positively  that  my  own 
conclusion,  with  every  disposition  to  agree  with 
you,  was  very  deliberately  formed  against  Zobeir, 
and  I  am  still  of  the  same  opinion."  Without 
doubt,  the  risks  involved  in  employing  Zobeir  Pasha 
were  considerable.  My  own  opinion  was,  and  still 
is,  that  the  advantages  which  might  have  accrued 
from  employing  him  were  of  a  nature  to  counter- 
balance those  risks.  Moreover,  my  main  objec- 
tion to  the  policy  of  the  Government  was  that,  as 
so  often  occurred  in  Egyptian  affairs,  the  British 
Government  confined  themselves  to  criticism  on 
what  was  })roposed  without  being  able  to  suggest 
any  alternative  and  less  objectionable  plan.  I  re- 
peat, however,  that  all  this  is  conjectural.  No  one 
can  positively  decide  whether  tlie  British  Govern- 
ment on  the  one  hand,  or  General  Gordon,  Colonel 
Stewart,  and  myself  on  the  other  hand,  showed  the 
greater  amount  of  foresight.     All  that  can  be  said 


CH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  531 

is  that  disastrous  circumstances  ensued  after  the 
refusal  to  employ  Zobeir  Paslia,  but  any  one  who 
asserts  that  those  circumstances  were  due  to  the 
non-employment  of  Zobeir  Pasha  falls  into  the 
post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc  fallacy. 

One  further  point  remains  to  be  examined. 
Were  the  British  Government  really  averse  to  the 
employment  of  Zobeir  Pasha,  or  did  they  merely 
act  under  the  pressure  of  British  public  opinion  ? 
I  will  endeavour  to  answer  this  question. 

On  INIarch  21,  that  is  to  say,  after  the  final 
decision  of  the  Government  had  been  given,  Lord 
Granville  wrote  to  me  privately :  "  There  was 
much  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  abstract  merits 
of  sending  Zobeir,  but  there  was  really  none  as  to 
the  vote  of  the  House  of  Commons.  Three  of  the 
members  of  the  Commons  in  the  Cabinet  who  were 
in  favour  of  Zobeir,^  were  of  opinion  that,  not  only 
would  the  House  of  Commons  pass  a  censure,  but 
that  they  would  do  it  so  immediately  as  to  stop 
the  possibility  of  his  going.  I  should  not  have 
minded  the  vote,  if  I  had  been  sure  the  policy  was 
right,  but  I  see  nothing  in  its  favour,  excepting  the 
great  authority   of  you,  Gordon,  and  Nubar,  and 

1  Mr.  Morley  {Life  of  Gladstone,  vol.  iii.  p.  169)  writes:  "The 
matter  was  considered  at  two  meetings  of  the  Cabinet,  but  the  Prime 
Minister  was  prevented  by  his  physician  from  attending.  A  difference 
of  opinion  showed  itself  upon  tlie  despatch  of  Zobeir  ;  viewed  as  an 
abstract  question,  three  of  the  Commons  members  inclined  to  favour 
it,  but  on  the  practical  question,  the  Commons  members  were  unanimous 
that  no  Government  from  either  side  of  tlie  House  could  venture  to 
sanction  Zobeir.  Mr.  Gladstone  had  become  a  strong  convert  to  the 
plan  of  sending  Zobeir.  .  .  .  One  of  the  Ministers  went  to  see  him  in 
his  bed,  and  they  conversed  for  two  hours.  The  Minister,  on  his 
return,  reported  with  some  ironic  amusement  that  Mr.  Gladstone 
considered  it  very  likely  that  they  could  not  bring  Parliament  to 
swallow  Zobeir,  but  believed  that  he  himself  could.  Wliellier  his 
confidence  in  this  was  right  or  wrong,  he  was  unable  to  turn  his 
Cabinet.  The  Queen  telegraphed  her  agreement  witli  tlie  Prime 
Minister.  But  this  made  no  difierence.  'On  Saturday  15,'  Mr. 
Gladstone  notes,  '  it  seemed  as  if  by  my  casting  vote  Zobeir  was  to  be 

sent  to  Gordon.      But  on  Sunday  and   receded  from  their 

ground,  and  I  gave  way.'" 


532  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

two  of  you  have  supplied  very  strong  arguments 
the  other  way." 

This,  without  doubt,  represented  the  real  state 
of  the  case.  Some  members  of  the  Government 
would  have  had  the  courage  to  face  the  storm  of 
opposition  if  they  had  been  convinced  that  it  was 
wise  to  employ  Zobeir  Pasha.  But  they  entertained 
an  honest  conviction  that  it  was  unwise  to  employ 
him.  Others  were  inclined  to  accept  the  proposal 
of  General  Gordon  and  myself,  but  they  would 
naturally  hesitate  to  insist  on  the  adoption  of  this 
view  in  a  doubtful  case  against  the  adverse  opinions 
of  their  colleagues.  The  opposition,  which  was 
certain  to  be  encountered  in  Parliament  and  in 
the  press,  contributed  to  turn  the  scale.  Whether 
that  opposition  was  in  reality  so  serious  as  it  was 
represented  to  be  is  a  point  on  which,  having  had 
no  personal  experience  of  parliamentary  proceed- 
ings, I  cannot  express  any  valuable  opinion.  But 
I  cannot  help  thinking  that  there  is  a  good  deal 
of  truth  in  the  following  remarks  of  the  Pall 
Mall  Gazette :  "  The  opposition,  getting  wind  of 
Gordon's  application  for  Zobeir,  and  displaying 
their  usual  anxiety  to  damage  the  Government, 
coute  que  coute,  began  to  raise  a  hue  and  cry 
against  Zobeir.  Yet,  it  was  pre-eminently  a  case 
in  which  a  strong  Government  could  and  ought 
to  have  supported  their  agent.  Public  opinion,  no 
doubt  uninformed,  and  unaware  of  the  arguments 
which  were  used  by  General  Gordon  and  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring,  was  outraged  by  the  very  sugges- 
tion of  Zobeir's  appointment.  But,  if  the  ])ublic 
liad  been  phiced  in  possession  of  the  facts  laid 
before  the  Government,  the  appointnicnt  of  Zobeir 
woukl  have  been  aj)proved,  nor  would  it  have 
excited  more  serious  opposition  than  the  Slave- 
holding  Proclamation." 

To  an  outsider,  indeed,  the  case  did  not  seem  hope- 


CH.  XXV  ZOBEIR  PASHA  533 

less  from  a  parliamentary  point  of  view.  I  do  not  say 
that  the  arguments  in  favour  of  employing  Zobeir 
Pasha  were  by  any  means  conclusive,  but  tliey  were 
certainly  strong.  However  high  party  spirit  may 
run,  there  must  surely  always  be  a  certain  number 
of  moderate  men  on  both  sides  of  the  House  of 
Commons,  who  would  pause  before,  in  a  very  serious 
matter  of  this  sort  with  which  they  were  imperfectly 
acquainted,  they  would  deliberately  reject  the 
opinion  of  the  best  qualified  authorities  on  the 
spot.  From  the  point  of  view  of  an  appeal  to 
authority,  the  case  was  a  strong  one.  General 
Gordon's  name  carried  immense  weight  with  the 
public.  Both  Colonel  Stewart  and  myself  were 
less  known,  and  our  opinions  would  have  certainly 
carried  far  less  weight  with  the  general  public  than 
those  of  General  Gordon.  Nevertheless,  we  might 
possibly  have  exercised  some  influence  over  the 
views  of  those  who  may  have  felt,  but  were  re- 
luctant to  express  a  certain  want  of  confidence  in 
General  Gordon  owing  to  the  eccentricities  to 
which  allusion  has  been  made  in  these  pages. 
General  Gordon's  character  and  habits  of  thought 
differed  widely  from  both  Colonel  Stewart's  and 
mine,  but,  as  it  appears  to  me,  the  fact  that  these 
differences  existed  served  rather  to  strengthen 
the  case  in  so  far  as  it  depended  on  an  appeal  to 
authority. 

Mr,  Gladstone,  speaking  in  the  House  of 
Commons  on  February  23,  1885,  said :  "  It  is 
well  known,  that  if,  when  the  recommendation  to 
send  Zobeir  was  made,  we  had  complied  with  it, 
an  address  from  this  House  to  the  Crown  would, 
before  forty-eight  hours  were  over,  have  paralysed 
our  action  ;  and,  although  it  is  perfectly  true  tluit 
the  decision  arrived  at  was  the  judgment  of  the 
Cabinet,  it  was  also  no  less  the  judgment  of 
Parliament  and  of  the  people."     Without  doubt. 


534  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iir 

there  is  much  truth  in  this  argument.  But  there 
was  this  notable  difference  between  the  Govern- 
ment on  the  one  side,  and  ParUament  and  the  people 
on  the  other  side.  The  former  were  well  informed 
of  the  facts  and  arguments ;  the  latter  were,  in 
a  great  degree,  ignorant  of  them.  I  believe 
that  the  final  catastrophe  at  Khartoum  might 
possibly  have  been  averted  if  Zobeir  Pasha  had 
been  employed.  If  I  am  right  in  this  conjecture, 
the  main  responsibility  must  naturally  devolve  on 
Mr.  Gladstone's  Government.  But  it  must  in 
fairness  be  added  that  the  responsibility  must  be 
shared  by  the  British  Parliament  and  by  the  people 
generally,  notably  by  the  Anti- Slavery  Society. 
The  Ministers  who  objected  to  the  employment 
of  Zobeir  Pasha  were  perhaps  in  some  degree  want- 
ing in  imagination  and  elasticity  of  mind.  They 
could  not  transport  themselves  in  spirit  from 
Westminster  to  Khartoum  and  Cairo.  They  do 
not  appear  to  have  shown  the  versatility  necessary 
to  deal  with  the  rapidly  shifting  scenes  in  the 
drama  which  was  being;  unfolded  in  the  Soudan. 
The  arguments  which  they  applied  against  General 
Gordon  and  myself  appear  to  me  to  be  rather  those 
of  debaters  trained  in  the  art  of  dialectics  than 
of  statesmen  whose  reason  and  imagination  enable 
them  to  grasp  in  an  instant  the  true  situation  of 
affairs  in  a  distant  country  widely  differing  from 
their  own.  Nevertheless,  even  supposing  my 
appreciation  of  the  facts  to  be  correct,  it  must 
be  adinitte  1  that  in  a  matter  of  such  difficulty 
an  error  of  judgment  is,  to  say  the  least,  pardon- 
able. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

THE  PROPOSED  DASH  TO  BERBER 

March   16-April  21,  1884 

Sir  Gerald  Graham  proposes  to  move  on  Sinkat — Lord  Granville 
approves — The  proposed  movement  on  Wadi  Haifa — Proposal  to 
send  a  British  expedition  to  Berber — It  is  rejected — The  order  to 
move  on  Sinkat  is  cancelled — Remarks  on  this  decision — Proposal 
to  despatch  a  force  to  VV^adi  Haifa — General  Gordon  recommends 
the  employment  of  a  Turkish  force — The  Government  reject  the 
pi'oposal — Necessity  of  preparing  for  a  Relief  Expedition. 

The  decision  not  to  employ  Zobeir  Pasha,  coupled 
with  the  rising  of  the  tribes  between  Khartoum 
and  Berber,  completely  altered  the  aspect  of  affairs 
in  the  Soudan. 

From  that  moment  it  became  certain  that,  with- 
out external  military  aid,  the  Soudan  must  fall  under 
the  domination  of  the  Mahdi.  No  such  aid  was 
available,  yet  without  it  any  attempt  to  establish 
an  anti-Mahdist  Government  at  Khartoum  was 
merely,  to  use  Lord  Northbrook's  phrase,  to  follow 
a  will-o'-the  wisp. 

This,  however,  did  not  constitute  the  only 
change  in  the  situation.  Communication  with 
Khartoum  was  cut  off.  It  became  clear  that  the 
question  of  employing  British  troops  might  before 
long  present  itself  for  solution  under  different 
aspects  from  those  which  had  heretofore  existed. 
General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  were  sur- 
rounded by  hostile  tribes.  It  miglit  become  neces- 
sary to  consider  whether  an  expedition  should  be 

535 


53G  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

sent,  not  to  re-establish  order  in  the  Soudan,  or  to 
reheve  the  beleaguered  Egyptian  garrisons,  but  to 
bring  away  the  officers  who  had  been  sent  by  the 
British  Government  to  Kliartoum. 

It  was  obviously  desirable  that  the  necessity  for 
sending  any  expedition  to  Khartoum  should  be 
avoided.  The  best  chance  of  avoiding  it  lay  in 
opening  up  the  road  from  Suakin  to  Berber  at  once, 
and  thus  facilitating  General  Gordon's  retreat  before 
the  JNlahdists  could  gather  in  force  to  oppose  it.  It 
was  futile  to  rely  any  longer  on  diplomacy,  on 
political  concessions,  or  on  individual  influence  to 
execute  the  aims  of  British  policy  in  the  Soudan. 
Diplomatists  and  politicians  had  had  their  say. 
Whether  their  efforts  had  been  skilfully  or  unskil- 
fully directed,  was  now  immaterial.  The  political 
concessions  made  by  General  Gordon  immediately 
after  his  arrival  at  Khartoum  merely  produced  a 
temporary  effect.  His  influence,  although  consider- 
able on  those  with  whom  he  was  brought  into  per- 
sonal contact,  was  manifestly  confined  to  the  walls 
of  Khartoum.  It  had  proved  powerless  to  prevent 
the  neighbouring  tribes  from  throwing  in  their  lot 
with  the  JNIahdi.  It  was  becoming  daily  more  and 
more  clear  that  it  was  only  by  the  use  of  force  that 
anything  effective  could  be  done  to  help  General 
Gordon. 

The  course  of  events  in  the  Eastern  Soudan  up 
to  the  middle  of  JNIarch  1884  has  been  already 
described.^  Osman  Digna's  forces  had  been  de- 
feated by  Sir  Gerald  Graham,  first  at  El  Teb  on 
February  29,  and  again  at  Tamai  on  JNIarch  13. 
There  was  at  one  time  some  hope  that,  as  a  result 
of  the  latter  victory,  the  road  from  Suakin  to  Berber 
would  be  opened  without  further  military  operations 
of  a  serious  nature.  It  soon  became  ap})arent,  how- 
ever, that  the  effect  of  the  victories  at  El  Teb  and 

*   y^ide  Chapter  XXI. 


OH.  XXVI    THE  BERBER  EXPEDITION      537 

Tamai  had  not  been  so  great  as  was  anticipated. 
The  Mahdists  were,  indeed,  discouraged,  but  they 
thought  that  the  British  troops  could  do  no  more, 
and  that  they  would  leave  the  country. 

It  would  be  necessary,  therefore,  to  follow  up 
the  victories,  at  all  events  to  the  extent  of  making 
a  demonstration  towards  Berber.  On  March  15, 
Sir  Gerald  Graham  telegraphed  to  Lord  Harting- 
ton  that  both  Admiral  Hewett  and  himself  were  of 
opinion  that  "  an  advance  to  Sinkat  would  now 
have  a  great  effect,  and  ratify  the  late  victories." 
A  copy  of  this  telegram  was  sent  to  me  from 
Suakin.  I  decided  to  support  Sir  Gerald  Graham's 
recommendation.  On  March  16,  I  telegraphed  to 
Lord  Granville :  "  With  reference  to  Graham's 
message  to  the  War  Secretary  recommending  an 
advance  on  Sinkat,  so  far  as  I  can  judge  of  the 
situation  from  here,  I  should  say  it  would  be  a  wise 
measure.  It  will  facilitate  Chermside's  negotiations 
with  the  tribes.^  Chermside  agrees  in  this  view. 
It  has  now  become  of  the  utmost  importance  not 
only  to  open  the  Berber-Suakin  route,  but  to  come 
to  terms  with  the  tribes  between  Berber  and  Khar- 
toum. If  we  fail  in  the  latter  point,  the  question 
will  very  likely  arise  of  sending  an  expeditionary 
force  to  Khartoum  to  bring  away  Gordon.  I  do 
not  think  that  he  is  in  any  immediate  danger.  He 
has  provisions  for  six  months." 

On  the  following  day  (March  16),  Lord  Gran- 
ville replied  :  "  Graham's  movement  on  Sinkat  has 
been  approved,  but  we  cannot  authorise  the 
advance  of  any  troops  in  the  direction  of  Berber 
until  we  are  informed  of  the  military  conditions, 
and  are  satisfied  that  it  is  necessary  for  Gordon's 
safety,  and  confined  to  that  purpose.     Our  present 

^  Major  (subsequently  Sir  Herbert)  Cbermside,  R.E.,  was  attached 
to  Si:-  Gerald  Graham's  staff  with  the  object  of  assisting  in  negotiations 
with  the  tribes. 


538  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

information  is  that  it  would  not  be  safe  to  send 
a  small  body  of  cavalry  as  proposed,  and  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  send  a  large  force." 

No  further  communication  on  this  subject  of  any 
importance  passed  until  March  21,  on  which  day 
Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  me  that  the  British 
Government  "  would  deprecate  the  despatch  of  an 
expedition  against  Osman  Digna,  with  whom  they 
would  be  disposed  to  recommend,  if  possible,  treat- 
ing on  the  basis  of  his  submission,  and  rendering 
himself  answerable  for  the  safety  of  the  Berber 
road  and  the  protection  of  traders  and  other 
travellers."  The  details  of  the  instructions  to  be 
given  to  Sir  Gerald  Graham  were  left  to  my  dis- 
cretion. I,  therefore,  telegraphed  to  the  latter 
(March  21)  the  substance  of  the  instructions 
received  from  Lord  Granville,  and  added :  "  A 
wide  discretion  must  be  left  to  you,  acting  on  the 
best  local  advice  obtainable,  as  to  the  best  method 
of  dealing  with  the  tribes.  .  .  .  You  must  judge 
whether  it  is  necessary  to  send  an  expedition 
against  Osman  Digna,  or  whether  it  is  possible  to 
treat  with  him  on  the  basis  of  submission  and 
becoming  answerable  for  the  peace  of  the  Berber 
road  and  the  protection  of  traders  and  others." 

1  reported  to  Lord  Granville  the  nature  of  the 
instructions  which  I  had  sent  to  Sir  Gerald 
Graham,  and  added :  "  It  appears  to  me  undesir- 
able to  debar  General  Graham  from  attacking 
Osman  Digna,  if  he  thinks  it  necessary  to  do  so  in 
order  to  open  up  the  road  to  Berber." 

On  March  22,  Sir  Gerald  Graham  replied  to  my 
telegram  in  the  sense  which  I  had  anticipated. 
"  It  would  be  useless,"  he  said,  "  to  enter  into  com- 
munication with  Osman  Digna."  I  repeated  tliis 
telegram  to  Lord  Granville,  and  added  that  I  was 
of  opinion  that  Sir  Gerald  Graham  "  should  be 
allowed  to  attack  Osman   Digna  as  he  proposed." 


CH.  XXVI    THE  BERBER  EXPEDITION      539 

On  March  23,  Lord  Granville  replied :  "  Her 
Majesty's  Government  are  averse  to  further  mili- 
tary operations  being  undertaken  without  any 
definite  object ;  but  if  General  Graham  considers 
that  the  security  of  the  Berber  road  will  be  thereby 
ensured,  he  is  authorised  to  advance  to  Tamanib  as 
proposed."  I  repeated  this  to  Sir  Gerald  Graham, 
and  in  reply  received  the  following  message  from 
Admiral  Hewett :  "  In  Graham's  opinion  and  mine 
the  security  of  the  Berber  road  cannot  be  attained 
so  long  as  Osman  Digna  remains  in  arms.  The 
first  object  of  the  advance  on  'J'amanib  is,  therefore, 
to  disperse  him.  No  further  fighting  is  anticipated." 
It  will  be  seen  from  this  correspondence  that, 
whilst  my  opinion  was  veering  round  to  the  neces- 
sity of  employing  force  to  help  General  Gordon,  the 
British  Government,  on  the  other  hand,  were  daily 
becoming  more  reluctant  to  sanction  the  use  of 
force.  The  truth  was  that,  whereas  the  Govern- 
ment had  but  a  few  weeks  before  been  sharply 
criticised  for  their  delay  in  proceeding  to  the  relief 
of  Tokar,  they  were  now  being  attacked  for  having 
caused  the  useless  slaughter  of  a  number  of 
Dervishes.  They  were  unwilling  to  yield  to  the 
pressure  in  the  direction  of  vigorous  action,  which 
was  now  being  applied  from  Cairo  and  Suakin. 
At  the  same  time,  they  wished  to  do  something 
to  help  General  Gordon.  On  March  22,  therefore. 
Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  ask  my  opinion  on  the 
following  points :  first,  whether  it  would  be  desir- 
able to  "  despatch  a  portion  of  the  Egyptian  army 
to  garrison  Wadi  Haifa  in  order  to  lend  moral 
support  to  General  Gordon  at  Khartoum " ; 
secondly,  whether  some  British  officers  "  with  some 
knowledge  of  Arabic  and  experience  in  dealing 
with  natives"  might  not  advantageously  be  sent 
to  Berber,  "  there  to  await  instructions  from 
General  Gordon." 


540  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

I  consulted  Sir  Frederick  Stephenson,  Sir 
Evelyn  \^^ood,  and  Colonel  Watson  on  these 
proposals.  Our  joint  opinion  was  that  the  des- 
patch of  a  handful  of  fellaheen  troops  to  Wadi 
Haifa  was  a  half  measure  which  would  be  of 
little  use.  I,  therefore,  telegraphed  to  Lord 
Granville  in  this  sense.  There  was  more  to  be 
said  in  favour  of  sending  some  officers  to  Berber, 
but  it  was  questionable  whether  they  would  be 
able  to  get  there.  JNIajor  Kitcliener  and  Major 
Rundle  were,  however,  directed  to  proceed  to 
Berber.  By  the  time  they  got  to  Assouan,  it 
became  clear  that  it  would  be  imprudent  to  allow 
them  to  proceed  any  farther.  Their  original 
orders  were,  therefore,  cancelled,  and  it  was 
fortunate  that  this  was  done,  for,  had  they  pro- 
ceeded to  i^>erber,  they  would  certainly  liave  been 
made  prisoners. 

The  more  I  thought  over  the  whole  matter,  the 
more  did  it  seem  to  me,  first,  that  it  was  essential 
not  only  to  open  up  the  Suakin-Berber  road,  but 
also  to  clear  the  road  from  Berber  to  Khartoum ; 
and  secondly,  that  this  could  not  be  accomplished 
without  the  despatch  of  a  British  force  to  Berber. 
I  discussed  with  Sir  Frederick  Stephenson  and 
Sir  Evelyn  Wood  the  question  of  whether  it 
would  be  possible  to  send  a  British  force  from 
Suakin  to  Berber.  They  were  both  of  opinion 
that  the  operation  was  possible,  although  it  was 
attended  with  risk,  and  although  the  health  of  the 
troops  would  suffer  from  the  climate.  On  March 
24,  therefore,  I  telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville : 
"  It  appears  to  me  tliat,  under  present  circum- 
stances. General  Gordon  will  not  be  able  to  carry 
out  your  Lordship's  instructions,  although  those 
instructions  involve  the  abandonment  of  the 
Sennar  garrison  on  the  ]5hie  Nile,  and  the 
garrisons  of   Bahr-el-Ghazal    and    Gondokoro    on 


cH.  XXVI    THE  BERBER  EXPEDITION      541 

the  White  Nile.  The  question  now  is  how  to 
get  General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  away 
from  Khartoum.  In  considering  this  question,  it 
should  be  remembered  that  they  will  not  will- 
ingly come  back  without  bringing  with  them  the 
garrison  of  Khartoum  and  the  Government  officials. 
I  believe  that  the  success  gained  by  General 
Graham  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Suakin  will 
result  in  the  opening  of  the  road  to  Berber,  but 
I  should  not  think  that  any  action  he  can  take 
at  or  near  Suakin  would  exert  much  influence 
over  the  tribes  between  Berber  and  Khartoum. 
Unless  any  unforeseen  circumstance  should  occur 
to  change  the  situation,  only  two  solutions  appear 
to  be  possible.  The  first  is  to  trust  General 
Gordon's  beino^  able  to  maintain  himself  at 
Khartoum  till  the  autumn,  when,  by  reason  of 
the  greater  quantity  of  water,  it  would  be  less 
difficult  to  conduct  operations  on  the  Suakin- 
Berber  road  than  it  is  at  present.  This  he  might 
perhaps  be  able  to  do,  but  it  of  course  involves 
running  a  great  risk.  The  only  other  plan  is  to 
send  a  portion  of  General  Graham's  army  to 
Berber  with  instructions  to  open  up  communica- 
tion with  Khartoum.  There  would  be  very 
great  difficulty  in  getting  to  Berber,  but  if  the 
road  were  once  open,  it  might  be  done  by  sending 
small  detachments  at  a  time.  General  Gordon  is 
evidently  expecting  help  from  Suakin,  and  he  has 
ordered  messengers  to  be  sent  along  the  road  from 
Berber  to  ascertain  whether  any  English  force  is 
advancing.  Under  present  circumstances,  I  think 
that  an  effort  should  be  made  to  help  General 
Gordon  from  Suakin,  if  it  is  at  all  a  possible 
military  operation.  General  Steplienson  and  Sir 
Evelyn  Wood,  whilst  admitting  the  very  great 
risk  to  the  health  of  the  troops,  besides  the  extra- 
ordinary military  risks,    are   of  opinion   that   the 


542  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

undertaking  is  possible.  They  think  that  General 
Graham  should  be  further  consulted.  We  all 
consider  that,  however  difficult  the  operations 
from  Suakin  may  be,  they  are  more  practicable 
than  any  operations  from  Korosko  and  along  the 
Nile.  If  anything  is  to  be  done,  no  time  should  be 
lost,  as  each  week  increases  the  difficulty  as  regards 
climate." 

On  March  25,  Lord  Granville  replied  :  "  Having 
regard  to  the  dangers  of  the  climate  of  the  Soudan 
at  this  time  of  the  year,  as  well  as  the  extraordinary 
risk  from  a  military  point  of  view,  Her  Majesty's 
Government  do  not  tliink  it  justifiable  to  send  a 
British  expedition  to  Berber,  and  they  wish  you  to 
communicate  this  decision  to  General  Gordon,  in 
order  that  he  may  adopt  measures  in  accordance 
therewith.  Her  Majesty's  Government  desire  to 
leave  full  discretion  to  General  Gordon  to  remain 
at  Khartoum,  if  he  thinks  it  necessary,  or  to  retire 
by  the  southern  or  any  other  route  which  might 
be  found  available." 

On  the  following  day  (March  26),  I  received  a 
further  telegram  from  I^ord  Granville,  directing 
me  to  send  the  following  instructions  to  Sir  Gerald 
Grahan  :  "  The  Government  have  no  intention  of 
sending  British  troops  to  Berber.  The  operations 
in  which  you  are  now  engaged  must  be  limited  to 
the  pacification  of  the  district  around  Suakin,  and 
restoring  communication  with  Berber,  if  possible  by 
other  means  and  influence  of  friendly  tribes.  Re- 
ports of  the  effect  of  heat  on  the  troops  strengthen 
the  desire  of  Government  that  your  operations 
should  be  brought  to  a  speedy  conclusion,  and 
preparations  made  for  the  immediate  embarkation 
of  the  bulk  of  your  force.  Report  when  you  can 
dispense  with  the  services  of  regiments  from  India." 

I  confess  that  when  I  received  these  two  tele- 
grams I  found  it  difficult  to  preserve  the  "  diplo- 


CH.  XXVI    THE  BERBER  EXPEDITION      543 

matic  calm,"  which  formed  the  subject  of  General 
Gordon's  sarcasms.^  It  was  not  so  much  that  I 
minded  the  decision  that  no  expedition  should  be 
sent  to  Berber,  in  so  far  as  that  decision  was  based 
upon  military  grounds.  The  militaiy  question  was 
undoubtedly  difficult  of  solution.  There  was 
a  difference  of  opinion  amongst  the  military 
authorities  as  to  the  practicabiHty  of  opening  the 
road  to  Berber.  It  could,  therefore,  be  no  matter 
for  surprise  that  the  Government  should  lean 
preferentially  to  the  side  of  those  who  deprecated 
immediate  action.  The  tone  of  the  telegrams, 
however,  grated  upon  me.  The  question  which  I 
had  propounded  to  Lord  Granville  was  how  to 
get  General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  away 
from  Khartoum.  The  march  of  events  had  been 
rapid,  and  it  was  obvious  that  at  this  moment 
the  relief  of  General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart 
was  the  most  important  point  at  issue.  On 
March  25,  I  telegraphed  to  Lord  GranviUe 
that  Hussein  Pasha  Khalifa,  who  commanded  at 
Berber,  had  reported  that  Khartoum  was  sur- 
rounded, and  that  the  rebels  were  receiving 
reinforcements.  The  only  answer  I  got  was  that 
the  British  Government  left  full  discretion  to 
General  Gordon  either  to  remain  where  he  was  or 
to  retire  by  any  route  which  might  be  found  avail- 
able. The  Government,  therefore,  begged  the 
question.  They  did  not  appear  to  realise  the 
situation.  They  shut  their  eyes  to  the  probability 
that  before  long  no  route  would  be  available  by 
which  to  retreat  from  Kliartoum. 

I,  therefore,  telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville  on 
March  26:  "I  cannot  say  whether  it  will  be 
possible  for  me  to  communicate  your  Lordship's 
message  to  Gordon,  but  in  any  case  I  cannot 
reconcile  myself  to  making  the  attempt  to  forward 

*  Vide  ante,  p.  477,  note. 


544  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

such  a  message  without  again  addressing  your 
Lordship.  Let  me  earnestly  beg  Hor  Majesty's 
Government  to  place  themselves  in  the  position  of 
Gordon  and  Stewart.  They  have  been  sent  on 
a  most  difficult  and  dangerous  mission  by  the 
English  Government.  Their  proposal  to  send 
Zobeir,  which,  if  it  had  been  acted  on  some  weeks 
ago,  would  certainly  have  entirely  altered  the 
situation,  was  rejected.  The  consequences  which 
they  foresaw  have  ensued.  If  they  receive  the 
instructions  contained  in  your  Lordship's  telegram 
of  the  25th,  they  cannot  but  understand  them 
as  meaning  that  they  and  all  with  them  are  to  be 
abandoned  and  to  receive  no  help  from  the  British 
Government.  Coetlogon,  who  is  here,  assures  me 
that  so  long  as  the  rebels  hold  both  banks  of  the 
river  above  the  sixth  cataract,  it  will  be  quite 
impossible  for  boats  to  pass.  He  does  not  believ^e 
that  Gordon  can  cut  his  way  through  by  land.  He 
ridicules  the  idea  of  retreating  with  the  garrison  to 
the  Equator,  and  we  may  be  sure  that  Gordon  and 
Stewart  will  not  come  away  alone.  As  a  matter 
of  personal  opinion,  I  do  not  believe  in  the 
impossibility  of  helping  Gordon,  even  during  the 
summer,  if  Indian  troops  are  employed,  and  money 
is  not  spared.  But  if  it  be  decided  to  make  no 
attempt  to  afford  present  help,  then  I  would  urge 
that  Gordon  be  told  to  try  and  maintain  his 
position  during  the  summer,  and  that  then,  if  he  is 
still  beleaguered,  an  expedition  will  be  sent  as  early 
as  possible  in  the  autumn  to  relieve  him.  This 
would,  at  all  events,  give  him  some  hope,  and 
the  mere  announcement  of  the  intention  of  the 
Government  would  go  a  long  way  to  ensure  his 
safety  by  keeping  loyal  tribes  who  may  be  still 
wavering;.  No  one  can  regret  more  than  1  do  the 
necessity  of  sending  British  or  Indian  troops  to  the 
Soudan,  but,  having  sent  Gordon  to  Khartoum,  it 


CH.  XXVI    THE  BERBER  EXPEDITION      545 

appears  to  me  that  it  is  our  bounden  duty,  both  as 
a  matter  of  humanity  and  pohcy,  not  to  abandon 
him." 

On  March  28,  Lord  Granville  replied :  "  We 
cannot  accede  to  the  proposals  in  your  telegram. 
We  have  given  it  our  most  serious  consideration,  and, 
vi^ith  the  greatest  wish  to  assist  General  Gordon,  we 
do  not  see  how  we  can  alter  our  instructions  of  the 
25th.  Communicate  them  as  soon  as  possible  to 
General  Gordon.  We  are  not  prepared  to  add  to 
them  until  we  hear  what  is  General  Gordon's 
actual  condition  and  prospects  as  to  security,  and 
also,  if  possible,  his  plans  of  proceeding  and  his 
desires  under  present  circumstances."  ^ 

It  was  evidently  useless  to  continue  the 
correspondence  any  further.  I  endeavoured  to 
communicate  to  General  Gordon  the  views  of  the 
British  Government,  as  explained  in  Lord  Gran- 
ville's telegrams  of  the  25th  and  28th  of  March,  but 
I  do  not  think  that  he  ever  received  my  message. 

On  March  27,  Sir  Gerald  Graham  telegraphed 
from  Suakin  :  "  I  consider  that  my  active  operations 
are  now  completed  and  that  I  can  at  once  dispense 
with  the  services  of  the  regiments  Mhich  came 
from  India."  On  JNIarch  29,  he  was  informed  by 
the  War  Office  that  the  Sinkat  expedition  was  not 
to  be  undertaken,  and  that  the  British  troops  were 
to  leave  Suakin  as  soon  as  they  were  relieved  by 

*  On  March  29,  Lord  Granville  wrote  to  me  privately:  "You  shot 
a  heavy  cannon-ball,  —  your  last  protest  as  to  our  instructions  to 
Gordon.  Although  your  proposals  were  a  complete  reversal  of  our 
policy,  we  quite  understood  your  feelings.  We  could  not  agree  to 
pledge  ourselves  to  a  promise  to  Gordon  to  send  a  military  expedition 
to  Khartoum  in  the  autumn.  We  hope  that  the  victories  of  Graham 
may  have  corrected  the  bad  effects  of  Baker's  defeat.  'ITie  military 
authorities  assure  us  that,  unless  the  garrison  rebels  against  Gordon, 
the  Arabs  cannot  take  Khartoum.  He  is  known  to  have  six  months' 
provisions.  The  only  incident,  as  aifecting  the  original  views  with 
which  Gordon  set  out,  and  upon  which  we  consented  to  send  him,  waa 
the  restriction  upon  Zobeir  joining  him,  the  objections  to  which  wer« 
chiefly  furnished  by  you  and  him." 

VOL.  I  2  N 


546  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iii 

Egj^tian  troops  from  Cairo.  Shortly  afterwards, 
the  greater  portion  of  the  British  garrison  of  Suakin 
was  withdraAMi. 

Were  the  British  Government  right  or  wrong 
in  refusing  to  send  a  portion  of  Sir  Gerald 
Graham's  force  from  Suakin  to  Berber  ?  As  in 
the  case  of  the  proposed  employment  of  Zobeir 
Pasha,  it  is  impossible  to  give  more  than  a 
conjectural  answer  to  this  question.  If  it  be 
admitted  that  the  operation  was  practicable  from 
a  military  point  of  view,  there  can  scarcely  be 
any  doubt  that  the  Government  made  a  serious 
mistake.  It  appeared  probable  at  the  time  that 
the  decision  not  to  send  a  small  expeditionary  force 
to  Berber  in  the  spring  of  1884  would  lead  to  the 
despatch  of  a  larger  force  at  a  later  period,  and 
this,  in  fact,  is  what  actually  happened.  The 
arguments  based  on  the  alleged  necessity  of  obtain- 
ing "  a  better  knowledge  of  General  Gordon's 
actual  position,  his  resources  and  his  requirements," 
appeared  to  me  at  the  time  valueless,  and  I  regard 
them  in  the  same  light  on  reading  the  correspond- 
ence over  again  after  a  lapse  of  many  years.  But 
it  carmot  on  that  account  be  stated  positively  that 
the  decision  of  the  Government  was  unwise.  The 
question  was  wholly  military.  Was  the  operation 
practicable  or  not  ?  On  this  point,  the  military 
authorities  were  not  all  of  one  mind.  Sir  Frederick 
Stephenson  and  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  whilst  acknow- 
ledging the  risks  and  the  objections  on  the  score 
of  cHmate,  thought  that  the  operation  should  be 
undertaken.  I  believe  that  I  am  correct  in  stating 
that  the  military  authorities  at  Suakin  were  less 
favourably  disposed  to  undertaking  the  expedition 
than  tliose  at  Cairo.  I  have  always  understood 
tliat  it  was  not  only  the  objections  as  regards  the 
effect  of  the  climate  on  the  health  of  the  British 


OH.  XXVI    THE  BERBER  EXPEDITION      547 

troops,  but  also  the  difficulties  of  providing 
transport  sufficient  even  for  a  small  force,  which 
rendered  them  averse  to  the  expedition.  It  is 
possible  that  they  erred  on  the  side  of  caution,  but 
if  they  did  so  they  can  quote  the  higli  authority  of 
Colonel  Stevi^art  to  justify  the  advice  which  they 
gave.  In  the  last  letter  which  he  wrote  to  me  from 
Khartoum,  dated  March  11,  Colonel  Stewart  said: 
"Notwithstanding  our  telegrams,  I  really  fail  to 
see  how  you  can  at  this  season  of  the  year  send  an 
expedition  from  Suakin  to  Berber.  The  road  is 
bad  enough  in  the  winter,  but  how  any  soldiers, 
but  particularly  English  soldiers,  could  get  along  it 
in  summer,  I  cannot  conceive.  I  cannot  picture  to 
myself  the  English  soldier  getting  over  that  awful 
plain  between  Obok  and  Berber.  Also,  from  the 
time  Ariab  is  left,  there  is  no  water.  Of  all 
animals  in  the  world,  I  think  the  English  soldier 
the  least  suited  for  the  effort.  Turks,  Indians,  etc., 
might  do  it,  but  it  would  be  tough  work."  General 
Gordon  also  recognised  the  difficulty  of  employing 
British  troops  during  the  summer.  The  following 
entry  occurs  in  his  Journal,  dated  September  18, 
1884  :  "  One  cannot  help  seeing  that  it  is  quite  im- 
possible to  keep  British  troops  after  January.  .  .  . 
I  certainly  will,  with  all  my  heart  and  soul,  do  my 
best,  if  any  of  Her  Majesty's  forces  come  up  here, 
or  to  Berber,  to  send  them  down  before  January." 
My  personal  opinion  at  the  time  was  that  a  very 
lightly  equipped  force  of  from  1000  to  1500  men 
might  have  been  sent  on  camels  from  Suakin  to 
Berber,  and  that,  in  spite  of  tlie  risks  and 
difficulties,  the  attempt  should  have  been  made. 
I  remain  of  the  same  opinion  still.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  must  be  admitted  that,  in  view  of  the 
conflicting  nature  of  the  military  opinions  laid 
before  them,  the  Government  had  some  fairly 
good  grounds  for  rejecting  the  advice  tendered  by 


548  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

Sir  Frederick  Stephenson,  Sir  EveljTi  Wood,  and 
myself.  However  this  may  be,  it  is  certain  that 
from  the  moment  the  proposal  to  make  a  dash  to 
Berber  with  a  small  force  was  rejected  as  being 
impracticable,  the  despatch  of  a  larger  expedition 
at  a  later  period  became  an  almost  unavoidable 
necessity.  Some  while  was,  however,  yet  to  elapse 
before  the  Government  fully  realised  the  facts  of 
the  situation. 

On  April  8,  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  me : 
"  General  Gordon  has  several  times  suggested  a 
movement  on  Wadi  Haifa  which  might  support 
him  by  threatening  an  advance  on  Dongola ;  and 
under  present  circumstances  at  Berber,  this  might 
be  found  advantageous."  I  was  instructed  to 
consult  Sir  Frederick  Stephenson  and  Sir  Evelyn 
Wood  with  regard  to  this  proposal.  This  matter 
had  been  already  fully  considered.  On  receipt  of 
Lord  Granville  s  telegram,  however,  a  further 
consultation  took  place  between  Nubar  Pasha,  Sir 
Frederick  Stephenson,  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  and 
myself  General  Stephenson  thought  the  "  step  was 
open  to  great  objections  on  account  of  the  climate 
during  the  summer  months,  and  he  also  considered 
it  unwise  to  leave  a  detachment  at  so  great  a 
distance  from  its  base."  "  On  the  whole,"  1  tele- 
graphed to  Lord  Granville  on  April  10,  "  we  are 
disposed  to  think  that  the  objections  to  undertak- 
ing the  movement  outweigh  the  benefits  Ukely 
to  accrue  from  it.  Those  benefits  are  of  a  very 
doubtful  nature." 

I  am  inclined  to  regret  that  I  expressed  an 
opinion  adverse  to  this  proposal,  but  my  regret  s 
solely  based  on  the  feeling  that,  situated  as  General 
Gordon  then  was,  any  suggestion  emanating  from 
him,  especially  if  he  reiterated  it,  should  have  been 
acted  on  if  it  was  possible  of  execution.     I  did  not 


cH.  XXVI    THE  BERBER  EXPEDITION      549 

believe  at  the  time,  and  I  do  not  believe  now,  that 
the  despatch  of  a  small  body  of  men  to  Korosko  or 
Wadi  Haifa  would  have  affected  the  position  of 
General  Gordon  at  Khartoum.  When,  at  a  later 
period,  a  British  force  was  at  Dongola,  and  was 
preparing  to  march  on  Khartoum,  General  Gordon 
wrote  (November  8,  1884) :  "  It  is  curious  what  a 
very  little  effect  all  our  immense  preparations  at 
Dongola,  etcetera,  have  had  on  the  course  of 
events ;  one  may  say  that  they  have  not  had  up 
to  the  present  time  the  least." 

On  April  9,  I  received  about  thirty  telegrams, 
which  had  been  delayed  in  transmission,  from 
General  Gordon.  They  brought  news  from  Khar- 
toum up  to  April  1.  In  one  of  them  he  said  :  "  I 
wish  I  could  convey  to  you  my  impressions  of  the 
truly  trumpery  nature  of  this  revolt,  which  500 
determined  men  could  put  down.  Be  assured  that, 
for  the  present,  and  for  two  months,  we  are  as  safe 
here  as  at  Cairo.  I  break  my  head  over  our  im- 
potence, and  the  more  so  when  I  feel  that,  once 
the  Soudan  taken,  you  may  expect  such  a  crop  of 
troubles  in  all  Moslem  states.  The  only  worry  I 
have  is  that  you  will  dawdle  away  your  time,  and 
do  nothing  till  too  late.  If  you  would  only  put 
your  pride  in  your  pocket  and  get  by  good  pay 
3000  Turkish  infantry  and  1000  Turkish  cavalry, 
the  affair,  including  the  crushing  of  the  Mahdi, 
would  be  accomplished  in  four  months." 

General  Gordon  attached  great  importance  to 
this  proposal.  He  constantly  alluded  to  the  subject 
in  his  Journal.  "  If,"  he  said,  "  the  Soudan  is  given 
back  to  Egypt,  in  a  couple  of  years  we  would  have 
another  JNIahdi ;  therefore,  our  choice  lies  between 
Zobeir  and  the  Turks.  Now,  the  time  has  gone 
by  when  Zobeir,  almost  alone,  would  suffice.  .  .  . 
Therefore,  give  the  country  to  the  Turks.  If  I 
was  Lord  Wolseley,  /  would  make  Her  JNIajcsty's 


550  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  in 

Government  send  the  Turks  here.  .  .  .  The  Turks 
are  the  best  sohition,  though  most  expensive. 
They  ivoicid  keep  the  Soudan;  give  them  two 
milhons."  "  The  more  I  think  of  it,  the  more  the 
Turk  sohition  appears  Hobson's  choice.  ...  I  get 
out  of  all  my  troubles  if  the  Turks  come,  for  1  shunt 
them  on  the  Turks,  and  so  do  you."  The  Soudan 
"should  be  handed  over  to  the  Sultan  with  a  sub- 
sidy." "  The  only  possible  solution  is  the  Sultan, 
let  the  subsidy  be  what  it  may."  The  reasons  why 
General  Gordon  made  this  proposal  may  be  gathered 
from  his  telegrams  and  his  Journal. 

In  the  first  place,  he  thought  any  solution  was 
better  than  allowing  the  country  to  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  Mahdi.  "  To  give  up  countries,"  he 
said,  "  which  are  to  some  extent  civilised,  which,  if 
properly  governed,  are  quiet  and  orderly,  to  the 
Turks  or  to  Zobeir,  and  to  allow  the  Slave  Trade 
to  flourish  again  in  tenfold  intensity,  is  not  a  very 
high  7-0/e,  but  quoi  faire  ?  We  have  not  the  men 
to  govern  these  lands,  we  cannot  afford  the  money ; 
consequently,  I  advise  what  I  have  said.  ...  It 
would  be  nobler  to  keep  the  Soudan,  but  is  too 
much  to  ex,pect  our  taxpayers  to  agree  to."  His 
whole  energy,  therefore,  was  devoted,  not  so  much 
to  evacuating  the  Soudan  as  to  "  smashing  up  "  the 
Mahdi.  In  two  imdated  telegrams,  which  were 
received  in  Cairo  on  September  18  and  20,  1884, 
respectively,  he  said  :  "  It  would  be  the  best  course 
to  negotiate  with  the  Porte  for  the  despatch  of 
Turkish  troops.  ...  It  is  impossible  to  leave 
Khartoum  without  a  regular  government  estab- 
lished by  some  Power.  .  .  .  Perhaps  tlie  British 
Government  will  be  displeased  with  the  advice 
which  I  have  given.  The  people  of  the  Soudan 
are  also  displeased  with  me  on  account  of  my 
fighting  against  them,  and  on  account  of  their  not 
attaining  their  object  in   following  the  JNIahdi.     I 


cH.  XXVI    THE  BERBER  EXPEDITION      5.31 

wish  for  negotiations  with  the  Sublime  Porte,  so 
that  the  necessary  assistance  may  be  quickly  sent 
here,  so  asy  to  render  it  possible  to  extinguish 
the  flame  of  this  false  Mahdi  before  it  becomes 
difficult." 

In  the  second  place,  General  Gordon  was  greatly 
irritated  with  the  Soudanese  for  continuing  the 
revolt.  On  April  12,  1884,  he  telegraphed  to  me : 
"  I  wonder  you  do  not  give  the  Soudan  to  the 
Sultan  with  a  subsidy  of  £150,000  a  year.  He 
would  finish  the  rebellion  in  three  months,  in- 
cluding the  Mahdi.  After  the  way  these  people 
have  rejected  my  terms,  I  would  be  inclined  to  let 
the  Turkish  harrow  go  over  them.  The  Sultan 
would  need  only  3000  men."^ 

These  extracts  are  sufficient  to  show  that 
General  Gordon  underrated  the  serious  nature  of 
the  revolt  with  which  he  had  to  deal ;  it  was  by  no 
means  a  "trumpery  revolt  which  500  men  could 
put  down."  On  the  contrary,  from  the  local  point  oi 
view  it  was  a  revolt  of  the  most  serious  description, 
for  the  suppression  of  which  a  far  larger  force  than 
that  indicated  by  General  Gordon  would  have  been 
required.  On  the  other  hand,  he  overrated  the 
consequences,  which  would  ensue  in  Eg^^pt  and 
elsewhere,  if  the  JNlahdist  movement  were  crowned 
with  local  success.  He  spoke  of  the  Mahdi  re- 
ceiving "  lots  of  letters  from  Cairo,  Stamboul,  and 
India."  "What,"  he  asked,  "is  to  prevent  the 
Mahdi's  adherents  gaining  Mecca,  where  there  are 
not  2000  men  ?  Once  at  Mecca,  we  may  look  out 
for  squalls  in  Turkey,  etcetera."  He  spoke  of  the 
necessity  of  eventually  "  smashing  up  "  the  Malidi 
if  "peace  were  to  be  retained  in  Egypt."  If  the 
Mahdi  took  Khartoum  he  felt  sure  that  "a  rising 
would  occur  in  Egypt."  We  now  know  that  these 
fears    were    exaggerated.       The    Malidi    obtained 

*  I  did  not  receive  this  telegram  till  March  26,  189.0. 


552  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

supreme  power  in  the  Soudan,  but  the  effect  ol 
the  rebelhon  was  entirely  local.  It  did  not  cause 
any  trouble  in  other  JMohamniedan  countries.  Even 
at  that  time,  it  was  clear  that,  if  the  Mahdists 
attempted  the  invasion  of  Egypt,  their  onward 
march  would  be  arrested  when  once  they  came  in 
contact  with  British  troops.^ 

The  reply  of  the  British  Government  to  General 
Gordon's  proposal  was  contained  in  a  despatch 
addressed  to  Mr.  Egerton  by  Lord  Gran\'ille  on 
May  1 :  '*  The  employment  of  Turkish  troops  in  the 
Soudan,"  Lord  Granville  wrote,  "  would  be  contrary 
to  the  views  advocated  by  General  Gordon  on 
former  occasions.  I  need  not  remind  you  that  in  his 
Proclamations  issued  at  Berber  and  Khartoum,  he 
declared  that  he  had  averted  the  despatch  of  troops 
by  the  Sultan,  and  had  come  in  person  to  prevent 
further  bloodshed.  JSIoreover,  such  a  course  would 
involve  a  reversal  of  the  original  policy  of  Her 
Majesty's  Government,  which  was  to  detach  the 
Soudan  from  Egypt,  and  restore  to  its  inhabitants 
their  former  independence.  ...  It  is  clear  .  .  . 
that  General  Gordon's  object  in  asking  for  these 
troops  is  to  effect  the  withdrawal  of  the  Soudan 
garrisons  by  military  expeditions,  and  to  bring  about 
the  collapse  of  the  Mahdi.  .  .  .  With  respect  to 
General  Gordon's  request  for  Turkish  troops  with 
a  view  to  offensive  operations.  General  Gordon 
cannot  too  clearly  understand  that  these  opera- 
tions cannot  receive  the  sanction  of  Her  Majesty's 

*  Tliere  can  be  no  doubt  tbat  tbe  alleged  necessity  of  "smashing 
the  Mahdi"  on  the  ground  that  his  success  in  the  Soudan  would  be 
productive  of  serious  results  elsewhere,  exercised  a  powerful  influence 
over  British  public  opinion  throughout  the  whole  of  this  period.  Never- 
theless, the  best  authorities  on  Eastern  politics  were  at  the  time  well 
aware  that  these  fears  were  groundless,  or  at  all  events  much  exagger- 
ated. Thus,  on  March  21,  1884,  Sir  Alfred  Lyall  wrote  to  Mr.  Henry 
Reeve  :  "  The  Mahdi's  fortunes  do  not  interest  India.  Tlie  tali<  in 
some  of  the  papers  about  the  necessity  of  smashing  him  in  order  to 
avert  the  risk  of  some  general  Mohammedan  uprising  is  futile  and 
imaginative." — Memoirs  of  Henry  Reeve,  vol.  ii.  p.  329. 


cH.  XXVI    THE  BERBER  EXPEDITION      553 

Government,  and  that  they  are  beyond  the  scope 
of  his  mission." 

So  long  as  General  Gordon  confined  himself  to 
making  proposals  which  could,  even  with  a  certain 
amount  of  straining,  be  made  to  harmonise  with  the 
general  line  of  policy  which  lie  had  been  sent  to 
carry  out,  a  strong  moral  obligation  rested  upon 
the  British  Government  to  adopt  his  suggestions. 
The  proposal  to  hand  over  the  Soudan  to  the 
Sultan  and  to  utilise  Turkish  troops  in  order  to 
crush  the  revolt  of  the  INIahdi  was,  however, 
opposed  both  to  the  spirit  of  his  instructions,  and 
to  the  views  which  he  had  himself  persistently 
advocated  up  to  that  time.  From  whatever  point 
of  view  the  question  be  regarded,  the  Government 
were,  therefore,  fully  justified  in  exercising  their  own 
discretion  as  to  whether  so  complete  a  change  of 
policy  as  that  recommended  by  General  Gordon  was 
either  possible  or  desirable.  It  cannot  be  doubted 
that  the  Government  exercised  a  wise  discretion 
in  declining  to  follow  General  Gordon's  advice  in 
this  particular  connection.  I  doubt  whether  the 
execution  of  the  policy  recommended  by  General 
Gordon  was  possible.  I  have  no  doubt  that, 
supposing  it  to  have  been  possible,  its  execution 
was  undesirable. 

I  base  my  doubts  as  to  the  possibility  of  the 
execution  of  the  policy  on  the  difficulties  of  nego- 
tiating with  the  Sultan  on  a  matter  of  this  sort, 
difficulties  which  were  exemplified  when  there  was 
a  question  of  sending  Turkish  troops  to  suppress 
the  Arabi  revolt ;  on  the  special  difficulty  of 
moving  the  Porte  to  speedy  and  vigorous  action,  such 
as  would  have  been  required  to  ensure  success  in 
this  particular  instance ;  on  the  impecuniosity  of  the 
Ottoman  Treasury  ;  on  the  impossibility  of  tlu'ow- 
ing  the  charge  of  the  expedition  on  the  Egyptian 
Treasury ;   and   on   the   gravity  of  the    rebeUion, 


554  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

the  suppression  of  which  would  have  required  a  far 
larger  force  than  General  Gordon  estimated. 

1  base  my  opinion  on  the  undesirability  of  adopt- 
ing the  policy  recommended  by  General  Gordon 
on  the  fact  that  the  occupation  of  the  Soudan  by 
Turkish  troops  would  assuredly  have  brought  in  its 
train  a  continuance,  and  not  improbably  an  aggra- 
vation of  the  misgovernment  which  was  the  primary 
cause  of  the  rebelHon  ;  and  on  the  further  fact  that 
a  Turkish  occupation  would  not  have  afforded  any 
final  settlement  of  the  Soudan  question.  As  a 
choice  of  evils,  indeed,  it  was  preferable  in  the 
interests  of  England,  of  Egypt,  of  the  civilised 
world  in  general  and  of  the  people  of  the  Soudan, 
that  the  Mahdi  should  obtain  possession  of  the 
country  rather  than  that  it  should  be  handed  over 
to  the  Sultan.  Dervish  rule  in  the  Soudan  was, 
without  doubt,  an  evil,  but  even  at  that  time  it 
could  be  foreseen  that  the  evil  would  in  all  proba- 
bility only  be  temporary.  A  Turkish  occupation 
would  have  been  an  evil  of  a  more  permanent 
nature.  It  was  almost  irreconcilable  with  the  idea 
of  future  Egyptian  reconquest.  It  would  have 
caused  endless  political  and  financial  complications. 
It  is  well,  therefore,  that  the  British  Government 
declined  to  follow  General  Gordon's  suggestions 
in  this  connection. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  situation  at  Khartoum 
was  daily  becoming  more  critical.  On  March  29, 
I  received  a  telegram  from  General  Gordon,  dated 
the  17th,  giving  an  account  of  an  action  which  had 
been  fought  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Khartoum  on 
the  16th,  and  in  which,  owing  apparently  to  the 
treachery  of  two  Pashas,  who  were  subsequently 
executed,  the  Egyptian  troops  suffered  a  severe 
defeat.  Shortly  afterwards,  a  panic  occurred  at 
Berber.  Every  one  who  could  get  away  left  the 
place.     Hussein  Pasha  Khalifa,  who  was  in  com- 


CH.XXVI    THE  BERBER  EXPEDITION      odd 

mand  at  Berber,  telegraphed :  "  The  Government 
having  abandoned  us,  we  can  only  trust  in  God." 

General  Gordon  had  not  received  all  the  tele- 
grams which  had  been  sent  to  him  from  Cairo.  But 
he  was  aware  that  the  Government  had  negatived 
his  proposal  to  employ  Zobeir  Pasha,  and  that  there 
was  no  intention  of  sending  a  relief  expedition 
from  Suakin  to  Berber.  He  was  greatly  irritated 
at  the  rejection  of  these  proposals.  On  April  7,  he 
sent  me  a  telegram  which,  Mr.  Egmont  Hake 
observes,  "at  once  became  historical."  It  was  as 
follows  :  "  As  far  as  I  can  understand,  the  situation 
is  this  :  you  state  your  intention  of  not  sending  any 
rehef  up  here  or  to  Berber,  and  you  refuse  me 
Zobeir.  I  consider  myself  free  to  act  according  to 
circumstances.  I  shall  hold  out  here  as  long  as  I 
can,  and  if  I  can  suppress  the  rebellion  I  shall  do 
so.  If  I  cannot,  I  siiall  retire  to  the  Equator,  and 
leave  you  the  indelible  disgrace  of  abandoning  the 
garrisons  of  Sennar,  Kassala,  Berber,  and  Dongola, 
with  the  certainty  that  you  will  eventually  be 
forced  to  smash  up  the  Mahdi  under  great  diffi- 
culties if  you  would  retain  peace  in  Egypt." 

The  strong  expressions  employed  in  this  telegram 
were  caught  up  by  political  partisans,  who  dwelt 
with  rapturous  emphasis  on  the  "  indelible  dis- 
grace "  which  the  British  Government  was  said  to 
have  incurred.  For  my  own  part,  I  caimot  under- 
stand how  any  impartial  person  can  consider  that 
the  British  Government  were  responsible  for  the 
difficulties  which  at  that  time  beset  the  garrisons 
of  Sennar,  Kassala,  Berber,  and  Dongola.  Those 
who  dwelt  on  the  disgrace  which  Avould  be  incurred 
if  the  garrisons  of  those  places  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  Mahdi,  should  have  had  the  courage  of  their 
opinions.  They  should  have  urged  the  only  pos- 
sible remedy  for  preventing  the  consummation 
which    they    deplored.       That    remedy    was    the 


556  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iii 

despatch  of  a  strong  British  expedition,  or 
perhaps  I  should  rather  say,  several  expeditions, 
to  the  relief  of  the  garrisons.  For  the  most  part, 
however,  the  critics  shrank  from  adopting  the 
logical  consequences  of  their  own  criticisms. 

Although  tlie  British  Government  were  under 
no  moral  obligation  to  relieve  the  Egyptian  garri- 
sons, they  were  under  a  strong  obligation  to  prevent 
General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  from  falling 
into  the  hands  of  the  Mahdi.  It  was  becoming 
more  and  more  probable  every  day  that  a  military 
expedition  would  have  to  be  sent  to  Khartoum  to 
bring  them  away.  I  was  so  impressed  with  the 
necessity  for  timely  preparation  that,  on  April  14,  I 
wrote  the  following  despatch  to  I^ord  Granville: 
"  I  wish  again  to  draw  your  Lordship's  attention 
to  General  Gordon's  position  at  Khartoum.  In 
doing  so,  I  wish  particularly  to  state  that  I  have 
no  sort  of  wish  to  urge  that  an  expedition  should 
be  sent  to  relieve  General  Gordon,  unless,  after 
very  full  consideration,  it  would  appear  that  no 
other  alternative  can  be  adopted.  No  one  can 
entertain  stronger  objections  than  I  do  to  the 
despatch  of  a  force  to  Khartoum,  but,  at  the 
same  time.  Lord  Hartington  has  declared  in  the 
House  of  Commons  that  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment feel  that  '  tliey  are  greatly  responsible  for 
General  Gordon's  safety,'  and,  even  if  no  such 
declaration  had  been  made,  tiie  fact  is  in  itself 
sufficiently  obvious. 

"  I  think  it  my  duty,  therefore,  to  lay  before 
your  Lordship  the  following  remarks,  more  with 
a  view  to  showing  what  the  actual  situation  is,  so 
far  as  can  be  ascertained,  than  with  the  object  of 
making  any  very  definite  proposals  in  connection 
with  it.  That  situation  is  one  of  such  very  great 
difficulty  that  I  frankly  confess  that  I  hesitate  to 
advise  very  positively  on  it. 


OH.  XXVI    THE  BERBER  EXPEDITION      557 

"Your  Lordship  will  observe  that  in  one  of 
General  Gordon's  most  recent  telegrams,  which 
are  enclosed  in  my  despatch  of  the  9th  instant, 
he  says  that  for  the  next  two  months  to  come, 
that  is  to  say,  to  the  end  of  May,  he  is  as  safe 
at  Khartoum  as  at  Cairo. 

"  I  am  not  quite  sure  whether  this  statement 
is  to  be  read  as  signifying  that  General  Gordon 
can  hold  out  for  two  months  and  no  more.  I 
trust  this  is  not  his  meaning,  for  it  would,  I 
conceive,  be  impossible  for  an  expedition  to  reach 
Khartoum  by  the  end  of  JNIay. 

*'  Former  telegrams  had  led  us  to  suppose  that 
General  Gordon  had  provisions  for  six  months,  and 
if  the  Mahdi  makes  any  advance,  it  is  not  probable 
that  he  will  do  so  before  September  or  October. 
I  have  asked  him  to  explain  this  point  more 
fully,  but  the  difficulty  of  communicating  with 
Khartoum  is  very  great,  and  in  any  case  a  con- 
siderable time  must  elapse  before  I  can  get  an 
answer. 

"  In  the  meanwhile,  as  it  appears  to  me,  we 
are  in  this  dilemma — as  a  last  resource  the  Govern- 
ment would,  I  conceive,  be  obliged  to  go  to  the 
help  of  General  Gordon.  All  the  authorities 
whom  I  have  consulted  say  that,  if  any  operations 
are  to  be  undertaken  along  the  valley  of  the  Nile, 
which  is  by  some  considered  the  best  route,  no 
time  should  be  lost  in  making  preparations,  so  as 
to  be  ready  to  move  directly  the  water  rises. 
It  may  be,  and  I  hope  it  will  be,  that  General 
Gordon  will  be  able  to  extricate  himself  without 
any  expedition.  In  that  case,  the  preparations 
will  have  been  useless.  On  the  other  hand,  unless 
they  are  undertaken  now,  it  may  be  that,  when 
the  necessity  for  moving  arises,  so  long  a  delay 
will  ensue  as  to  frustrate  the  objects  of  the 
expedition.     Under  these  circumstances,  I  venture 


558  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  in 

to  think  that  it  is  a  question  worthy  of  considera- 
tion whether  the  naval  and  miUtary  authorities 
should  not  take  some  preliminary  steps  in  the 
way  of  preparing  boats,  etc.,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
move  should  the  necessity  arise.  It  would  be 
better,  I  think,  to  run  the  risk  of  incurring  some 
unnecessary  expenditure  rather  than  to  find  our- 
selves unable  to  seize  the  opportunity  of  moving 
when  the  favourable  moment  arrives." 

1  left  Cairo  for  England  on  April  21  to  attend 
the  Conference,  which  was  about  to  sit  in  London 
to  consider  the  financial  situation  of  the  Egyptian 
Treasury.  Mr.  (afterwards  Sir  Edwin)  Egerton 
was  appointed  to  act  as  Agent  and  Consul- General 
during  my  absence. 


CHAPTER   XXVII 

THE    RELIEF   EXPEDITION 
April  21-October  5,  1884 

General  Gordon's  motives  —  Spirit  in  which  the  question  should  be 
approached—  Did  General  Gordon  try  to  carry  out  the  policy  of 
the  Government? — The  situation  at  Herber — Messages  to  General 
Gordon  and  his  replies — Sir  Frederick  Stephenson  instructed  to 
report  on  the  Relief  E^xpedition — The  Suakin-Berber  Kiiilway — 
The  fall  of  Berber — The  vote  of  credit — Lord  Wolseley  appointed 
to  command  the  Nile  expedition — He  arrives  at  Wadi  Haifa — 
Remarks  on  the  above  narrative. 

Before  proceeding  further  with  the  narrative,  it 
will  be  as  well — even  at  the  risk  of  repeating  some 
remarks  which  have  been  already  made — to  describe 
the  motives  which,  so  far  as  can  be  judged,  actuated 
General  Gordon's  conduct  at  this  time.  Did  he 
make  any  serious  effort  to  carry  out  the  policy 
of  the  British  and  Egyptian  Governments  in  the 
Soudan  ?  Was  that  policy  practicable  ?  More 
especially,  would  it  have  been  possible  for  him  to 
have  retreated  from  Khartoum  without  the  aid  of 
a  relief  expedition  ? 

A  few  preliminary  observations  are  necessary 
before  entering  upon  an  examination  of  these 
questions. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  obvious  that  General 
Gordon's  conduct  should  be  judged  with  the  utmost 
generosity.  I  do  not  consider  that  this  generosity 
need,  or,  in  the  interests  of  liistorical  truth,  sliould 
go  so  far  as  to  exonerate  him  from  blame  if,  on  a 

'     559 


560  ISIOUERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

careful  examination  of  the  evidence,  it  be  found  that 
blame  can  fairly  be  imputed  to  him.  But  I  do  hold 
that,  looking  to  the  very  difficult  situation  in  which 
he  was  placed,  to  the  fact  that  when  he  arrived 
at  Kliartoum  many  circumstances  must  have  been 
brought  to  his  knowledge  of  which  he  was  ignorant 
in  London  and  in  Cairo,  and  to  the  further  fact 
that  neither  he  nor  his  gallant  companion  are  now 
alive  to  answer  criticisms  or  to  affiDrd  explanations, 
it  will  only  be  just  to  his  memory  to  place  the 
most  favourable  construction  on  anything  he  either 
did  or  said,  which  may  appear  blameworthy. 

Again,  looking  to  General  Gordon's  impulsive 
character,  and  to  his  habit  of  recording  any  stray 
idea  which  flashed  through  his  mind,  undue  im- 
portance should  not  be  attached  to  any  chance 
expressions  which  he  may  have  let  fall.  I  have 
endeavoured  to  form  an  idea  both  of  his  motives 
and  of  the  opinions  which  he  held  during  the  siege 
of  Khartoum,  based,  not  so  much  on  any  one  of  his 
utterances,  as  on  the  general  tenor  of  his  Journal, 
letters,  and  telegrams. 

The  action  of  the  British  Government  should 
also  be  judged  in  a  somewhat  similar  spirit.  It  is 
neither  possible  nor  desirable  that  detailed  instruc- 
tions should  be  given  to  an  official  engaged  in  a 
difficult  work  such  as  that  undertaken  by  General 
Gordon.  All  that  the  Government  could  do  was  to 
lay  down  the  general  policy  which  they  wished  to 
pursue,  leaving  to  their  subordinate  a  wide  discretion 
as  to  the  manner  of  its  execution.  In  judging  both 
of  the  action  of  the  Government  and  of  the  conduct 
of  General  Gordon,  regard  should  be  had  to  the 
spirit  rather  than  to  the  text  of  his  instructions. 

Did,  therefore.  General  Gordon  make  any  serious 
effiart  to  carry  out  the  policy  of  the  British  and 
Egyptian  Governments  in  the  Soudan  ? 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  when  General 


CH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  561 

Gordon  left  Cairo  he  agreed  in  that  policy.  Not 
only  did  he  repeatedly  express  his  agreement  in 
expUcit  terms,  not  only  did  he  practically  write  his 
own  instructions  both  in  London  and  in  Cairo,  but 
the  policy,  which  he  was  sent  to  carry  out,  was 
in  conformity  with  the  opinions  to  which  he  had 
frequently  given  utterance  ever  since  his  first  con- 
nection with  the  Soudan.  He  was  never  tired  of 
dwelling  on  the  iniquities  of  Egyptian,  or,  as  he 
usually  called  it,  Turkish  rule  in  the  Soudan. 
He  acknowledged  that  the  country  was  a  "  useless 
possession."  He  exhorted  the  British  Government 
"to  leave  them  (the  people  of  the  Soudan)  as  God 
had  placed  them."^  In  fact,  General  Gordon 
persistently  advocated  the  policy  of  "  The  Soudan 
for  the  Soudanese."  But  General  Gordon  said  of 
himself :  "  No  man  in  the  world  is  more  changeable 
than  I  am."^  There  can,  in  fact,  be  no  doubt  that, 
when  he  arrived  at  Khartoum,  a  complete  revulsion 
took  place  in  his  views  about  the  Soudan.  He  had 
seen  from  the  first  the  desirability  of  endeavourmg 
to  provide  the  country  with  some  settled  form  of 
government,  and  he  clung  to  this  policy  long  after 
its  execution  had  become  wholly  impracticable. 
His  first  intention  was  to  hand  the  country  over 
to  the  local  Sultans,  but  it  soon  became  apparent 
that  there  were  no  local  Sultans  available  who 
could  serve  as  instruments  in  the  execution  of  this 
policy.  Then  he  proposed  to  set  up  Zobeir  Pasha, 
and,  had  his  proposal  been  promptly  adopted,  it 
is  at  least  conceivable  that  the  attempt  to  form 
an  anti-Mahdist  government  in  the  Soudan  would 
have  been  successful.  But  the  opportunity  was 
allowed  to  shp  by.  For  reasons  already  narrated, 
the  proposal  to  utilise  Zobeir  Pasha's  services 
was  rejected.     From  that  moment,  it  was  evident 

*  Memorandum  of  Januurxj  23,  1884. 

*  Gordons  Letters  to  His  tSister,  p.  x. 

VOL.  I  2  o 


562  MODERN  EGVPT  pt.  iii 

that  the  Soudan  iniist  fall  into  the  hands 
of  the  JNIalidi.  Tliis  General  Gordon  failed  to 
recognise,  or  j)erhaps  it  would  be  more  correct 
to  say  that  the  idea  of  admitting  the  JNlahdi's 
supremacy  was  so  distasteful  to  him  that  he 
would  not  recognise  the  inevitable  conclusion, 
which  could  alone  be  drawn  from  a  consideration 
of  the  facts  of  the  situation.  He  clung  to  the  idea 
of  erecting  some  anti-IMahdist  government  in  the 
Soudan  when,  to  use  Lord  Northbrook's  metaphor, 
the  project  had  become  nothing  more  than  an 
ignis  J  at  11  us.  In  order  to  accomplish  this  end,  he 
was  prepared  to  sacrifice  his  most  cherished  con- 
victions. Over  and  over  again  he  proposed  that 
the  Soudan  should  be  handed  over  to  the  Turkish 
administration,  against  whose  malpractices  he  had 
before  inveighed  so  vigorously.  He  was  aware 
that  the  result  would  be  that  the  people  of  the 
Soudan  would  be  oppressed,  but  he  thought  that 
Turkish  oppression  was  preferable  to  a  recognition 
of  the  Mahdi.  At  the  same  time,  with  character- 
istic inconsistency,  whilst  he  was  pressing  for  the 
.country  to  be  handed  over  to  the  Sultan,  he 
admitted  that  it  was  preferable  to  abandon  it  rather 
than  allow  it  to  remain  "under  these  wretched  effete 
Eg^^ptian  Pashas."  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
defects  of  the  Egyptian  Pashas,  there  is  no  reason 
to  suppose  that  Turkish  Pashas  would  have  been 
in  any  way.  superior  to  them.  In  fact,  as  General 
Gordon  well  knew,  the  Egyptian  Pashas  were  at 
that  time  nearly  all  Turks  or  Circassians. 

The  truth  is  that  General  Gordon  was  above  all 
things  a  soldier,  and,  moreover,  a  very  bellicose 
soldier.^  His  fighting  instincts  were  too  strong  to 
admit  of  his  working  heartily  in  the  interests  of 

*  Sir  Samuel  Baker,  who  knew  General  Gordon  well,  said  to  me,  some 
years  after  the  fall  of  Kliartoiim  :  "When  1  lieard  that  Gordon  was 
to  go  to  the  Soudan,  I  knew  there  would  be  a  fight." 


CH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  563 

peace.  The  Arabs,  he  said,  "  must  have  one  good 
defeat  to  wipe  out  Hicks's  disasters  and  my  defeats. 
...  I  do  not  care  to  wait  to  see  the  INIahdi  walk  in 
on  your  heels  into  Khartoum.  One  cannot  tliink 
that  ...  it  is  a  satisfactory  termination  if,  after 
extricating  the  garrisons  and  contenting  ourselves 
with  that,  we  let  the  Mahdi  come  down  and  boast 
of  driving  us  out.  It  is  a  thousand  pities  to  give 
up  Khartoum  to  the  Mahdi  when  there  is  a  chance 
of  keeping  it  under  Zobeir.^  So  long  as  the  JNIahdi 
is  alongside,  no  peace  is  possible." 

In  fact,  General  Gordon  wished  to  "  smash  up  " 
the  Mahdi.  This  was  the  keynote  of  all  his  actions 
in  the  Soudan.  "  If,"  he  wrote  on  November  7, 
"  Zobeir  had  been  sent  to  tlie  Soudan,  we  would 
have  beaten  the  Mahdi  without  any  exterior  help  ; 
it  is  sad,  when  the  Mahdi  is  moribund,  that  we 
should  by  evacuation  of  Khartoum  raise  him  again." 

As  to  his  instructions,  he  threw  them  to  the 
winds.^  Both  the  spirit  and  the  text  of  his  instruc- 
tions were  clear.  "  The  main  end  to  be  pursued," 
he  was  told  in  the  letter  addressed  to  him  on 
January  25,  1884,  "is  the  evacuation  of  the 
Soudan."  The  policy  of  establishing  some  sort  of 
settled  government  in  the  Soudan  was  approved, 
but  this,  though  desirable,  was  considered  a  sub- 
sidiary point.  It  was  specifically  stated  that  it 
must  "be  fully  understood  that  the  Egyptian 
troops  M^ere  not  to  be  kept  in  the  Soudan  merely 
with  a  view  to  consolidate  the  power-  of  the  new 
rulers  of  the  country."  When  it  was  decided  not 
to  employ  Zobeir  Pasha,  General  Gordon  sliould 

*  This  was  written  on  September  24,  1884,  that  is  to  say,  several 
months  after  the  Zobeir  policy  had  been  i-ejected  by  the  Government, 
and  had,  in  fact,  become  quite  impracticable. 

^  On  May  28,  1880,  General  Gordon  wrote  to  his  sister  :  "  Having  the 
views  I  hold,  T  could  never  curb  myself  sufficiently  to  remain  in  Her 
Majesty's  service.  Not  one  in  ten  million  can  a^ree  witji  my  motives, 
and  it  is  no  use  expecting  to  change  their  views." — Letters,  etc.,  p.  158. 


564  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

have  seen  that  all  that  remained  for  him  to  do 
was  to  concentrate  his  efforts  on  evacuation.  He 
did  nothing  of  the  sort.  He  thought  mainly  of  the 
subsidiary  portion  of  his  instructions  and  neglected 
the  main  issue. 

But,  it  may  be  said,  even  if  General  Gordon  had 
abandoned  the  idea  of  establishing  an  anti-INIahdist 
government  in  the  Soudan,  he  would  still  have  been 
unable  to  carry  out  his  instructions,  for  the  garrisons 
of  the  Soudan  were  scattered,  and  it  was  impossible 
to  save  all  of  them.  General  Gordon  appears  to 
have  held  that  it  was  incumbent  on  him  to  save 
the  whole  of  these  garrisons.  "  I  was  named,"  he 
wrote,  "for  EVACUATION  OF  SOUDAN 
(against  which  I  have  nothing  to  say),  not  to  run 
away  from  Khartoum  and  leave  the  garrisons  else- 
where to  their  fate.""  He  reverts  to  this  subject  over 
and  over  again  in  his  Journal.^  He  held  that  it 
was  "  a  palpable  dishonour  "  to  abandon  the  garri- 
sons, and  that  "  every  one  in  the  Soudan,  captive  or 
hemmed  ia,  ought  to  have  the  option  and  power  of 
retreat."  On  November  19,  he  wrote:  "I  declare 
positively  and  once  for  all  that  I  will  not  leave  the 
Soudan  until  every  one  wlio  wants  to  go  down  is 
given  the  chance  to  do  so,  unless  a  government  is 
established  which  reheves  me  of  the  charge  ;  there- 
fore, if  any  emissary  or  letter  comes  up  here  ordering 
me  to  come  down,  I  WILL  NOT  OBEY  IT,  BUT 
WILL  STAY  HERE  AND  FALL  WITH 
THE  TOWN  AND  RUN  ALL  RISKS." 

All  that  can  be  said  about  arguments  of  this 
sort  is  that  they  bring  to  mind  General  Bosquet's 
famous  remark  on  the  Balaklava  charge :  "  C'est 
magnifique,  mais   ce   n'est   pas   la  guerre."^     We 

»  Journal,  pp.  66,  72,  93,  112,  113,  125,  292,  298,  305,  307. 

'  This  remark  is  frequently  attributed  to  Marshal  Canrobert. 
According  to  Kinglake  (Invasion  of  the  Crimea,  vol.  iv.  p.  269),  it  was 
made  by  General  Bosquet  to  Mr.  Layard  la  the  field  and  at  the  time 
of  the  charge. 


CH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  565 

may  admire,  and  for  my  own  part,  I  do  very  much 
admire  General  Gordon's  personal  courage,  his  dis- 
interestedness, and  his  chivalrous  feeUng  in  favour 
of  the  beleaguered  garrisons,  but  admiration  of 
these  quahties  is  no  sufficient  plea  against  a  con- 
demnation of  his  conduct  on  the  ground  that  it 
was  quixotic.  In  his  last  letter  to  his  sister,  dated 
December  14, 1884,  he  wrote  :  "  I  am  quite  happy, 
thank  God,  and,  Hke  Lawrence,  I  have  tried  to  do 
my  duty."^  The  phrase,  which  must  have  occurred 
to  many  a  countryman  of  Sir  Henry  Lawrence 
when  placed  in  a  position  of  difficulty  or  danger,  has 
become  historical.  The  words,  under  the  circum- 
stances in  which  they  were  first  used  by  Sir  Henry 
Lawrence  and  afterwards  "repeated  by  General 
Gordon,  are  particularly  touching.  But,  after  all, 
when  the  emotions  are  somewhat  quelled,  and 
the  highly  dramatic  incidents  connected  with  the 
situation  are  set  aside,  reason  demands  answers 
to  such  questions  as  these :  What  was  General 
Gordon's  duty  ?  Did  he  in  reaUty  try  to  do  his 
duty  ? 

I  am  not  now  dealing  with  General  Gordon's 
character,  which  was  in  many  respects  noble,  or 
with  his  military  defence  of  Khartoum,  which  was 
heroic,  but  with  the  political  conduct  of  his  mission, 
and  from  this  point  of  view  I  have  no  hesitation  in 
saying  that  General  Gordon  cannot  be  considered 
to  have  tried  to  do  his  duty  unless  a  very  strained 
and  mistaken  view  be  taken  of  what  his  duty  was. 
He  appears  to  me  to  have  set  up  for  himself  a  certain 
standard  of  duty  without  any  deliberate  thought  of 
the  means  by  which  his  objects  were  to  be  accom- 
plished, or  of  the  consequences  which  would  prob- 
ably ensue  to  the  British  Government  and  the 
British  nation  from  attempting  to  accomplish 
them.     As  a  matter  of  public  morahty,  I  camiot 

»  Lettem,  etc.,  p.  21)0. 


566  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

think  that  General  Gordon's  process  of  reasoning 
is  defensible.  The  duty  of  a  public  servant  placed 
in  his  position  was  to  sink  his  personal  opinions, 
and  to  consider  the  wishes  and  true  interests  of  the 
Government  and  the  nation  whom  he  was  called 
upon  to  serve.  General  Gordon  was  not  sent  to 
Khartoum  with  orders  that  he  was  to  secure  the 
retreat  of  every  man,  woman,  and  child  who  wished 
to  leave  the  Soudan.  He  was  sent  to  do  the  best 
he  could  to  carry  out  the  evacuation.  Much  was 
left  to  his  own  discretion.  It  was  felt,  when  he 
left  Cairo,  that  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  help 
the  outlying  garrisons,  particularly  those  in  the 
Bahr  -  el  -  Ghazal  and  Equatorial  provinces.  In 
giving  General  Gordon  his  instructions,  therefore, 
attention  ^vas  more  especially  drawn  to  the  garrison 
and  civil  population  of  Khartoum,  which  were 
numerically  larger  than  those  situated  in  any  other 
locality,  and  with  whom  it  was  relatively  easy  to 
establish  communications.  It  appears  to  me  that 
General  Gordon's  principal  duty  was  to  do  his  best 
to  accomplish  his  difficult  mission  and,  at  the 
same  time,  to  avoid  all  the  misery,  bloodshed,  and 
waste  of  money,  which  would  certainly  occur  if 
it  became  necessary  to  send  a  British  expedition 
to  the  Soudan.  The  British  Government  were 
not  responsible  for  the  position  in  which  the 
Soudan  garrisons  were  placed.  They  might, 
indeed,  have  been  made  prisoners,  and  that  was 
the  worst  that  could  have  happened.  As  Lord 
Granville,  with  great  good  sense,  wrote  to  me  on 
March  14:  "If  Gordon  can  save  the  garrisons  of 
Khartoum,  of  Berber,  and  of  Dongola,  it  will  be  in 
itself  a  great  feat.  Gordon  ridiculed  to  us  the  idea 
of  the  garrisons  being  massacred,  and  proved  to  be 
right  as  regarded  Tokar."  The  capture  of  the 
outlying  garrisons  by  the  Mahdi  would  certainly 
have  been  a  much  less  evil  than  the  despatch  of  a 


cfl.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  5G7 

British  expedition  to  relieve  Khartoum.  It  must 
also  be  remembered  that  the  presence  of  a  British 
force  at  Khartoum  would  not  have  assisted  the 
distant  garrisons  in  the  Darfour,  Bahr-el-Ghazal,  and 
Equatorial  provinces.  General  Gordon,  I  conceive, 
would  hardly  have  proposed  to  send  a  British 
expedition  to  those  remote  regions.^ 

General  Gordon,  however,  took  a  different,  and, 
as  I  think,  a  mistaken  view  of  his  duty.  He  wrote 
on  October  1 :  "  /  think  we  are  bound  to  extricate 
the  garrisons  whatever  it  costs."  He  was  aAvare  that 
these  were  not  the  views  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, for  he  added :  "  they  {i.e.  the  Government) 
do  noty^  but  although  his  military  training  had 
instilled  into  him  a  certain  sense  of  discipline, 
which  he  could  not  altogether  shake  off,  he  had 
a  singular  habit,  when  he  felt  that  he  was  acting 
insubordinately,  of  discovering  a  number  of  falla- 
cious arguments — mentis  ^ratissimi  errores — to  still 
the  prickings  of  his  official  conscience.  In  this 
case,  he  appears  to  have  thought  that  his  personal 
responsibility  was  covered  when  he  suggested 
that,  as  he  objected  to  carry  out  the  \'iews  of  the 
British  Government,  Abdul  Kader  Pasha  should 
be  appointed  in  his  place,  but  he  added :  "  I  own 
the  proposition  I  make  is  in  some  degree  a  trap, 
for  I  feel  confident  that  there  will  be  no  end  of 
trouble  even  in  placing  Abdul  Kader  Pasha  in  my 
place  and  trying  to  evacuate." 

The  truth  is  that  General  Gordon  was  so  eag-er  to 
"  smash  the  Mahdi,"  and  so  possessed  with  the  idea 
that  it  was  the  bounden  duty  of  the  Government 
to  extricate  all  the  garrisons,  that  he  tried  to  force 
the  hand  of  the  Goveriniient  and  to  oblige  them  to 
send  an  expedition  to  the  Soudan.     His  personal 

'  In  one  passage  of  his  Journal,  however,  he  speaks  of  the  desir- 
ability of  sending  a  Biitisli  force  to  Kordofan  (p.  86).  He  appears  to 
have  thought  that  it  would  not  be  necessary  "  to  go  fifty  miles  beyond 
Khartoum." 


568  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

reputation  for  good  faith  towards  the  people  of  the 
Soudan  was  involved  in  the  despatch  of  a  British 
expedition.  So  early  as  February  27,  as  has  been 
already  mentioned,^  he  issued  a  Proclamation,  in 
which  the  following  words  occurred :  "  Britisli 
troops  are  now  on  their  way  to  Khartoum."  The 
intention  in  issuing  this  Proclamation  was,  without 
doubt,  to  produce  a  moral  effect,  for  he  was  at 
the  time  perfectly  w^ell  aware  tliat  there  existed  no 
intention  of  sending  a  British  force  to  Khartoum. 
But  the  people  of  tiiat  town  naturally  took  him  at 
his  word.  They  believed  for  a  time  that  British 
troops  were  really  coming,  and  when  they  found 
that  none  arrived,  they  thought  that  the  British 
Government  had  "  deserted  "  them,^  the  fact  being 
that  the  pledge  to  afford  military  assistance  had  been 
given  by  General  Gordon  on  his  own  responsibihty 
without  consultation  of  any  kind  with  either  the 
British  Government  or  their  representative  in  Cairo. 

That  General  Gordon  felt  that  he  was  under  an 
obligation  to  carry  out  the  pledges,  which  he  had  so 
rashly  given,  cannot  be  doubted.  On  October  6, 
he  wrote :  "  The  appearance  of  one  British  soldier 
or  officer  here  settles  the  question  of  reUef  vis-a-vis 
the  townspeople,  for  then  they  know  that  I  have 
not  told  them  lies " ;  and  in  an  undated  telegram, 
received  on  September  18,  1884,  he  said  :  "  Through 
having  so  often  promised  the  people  of  Khartoum 
that  assistance  would  come,  we  are  now  as  bars  in 
their  eyes." 

Obviously,  the  best  thing  General  Gordon  could 
have  done,  after  communication  with  Cairo  was  cut 
off,  would  have  been  to  have  retreated  to  Berber  with 
the  Khartoum  garrison,  and  such  of  the  civil  popu- 
lation as  wished  to  leave  the  place.  But  he  does 
not  appear  to  have  made  any  serious  attempt  to  do 
so,  because  he  thought  that,  if  he  retreated,  there 

»  Vide  ante,  p.  490.  •  Journal,  p.  307. 


cir.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  561) 

would  be  less  probability  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment sending  an  expedition  for  the  relief  of  the 
outlying  garrisons.  On  October  5,  he  made  the 
following  significant  entry  in  his  Journal :  "  It  may 
be  argued,  Why  not  retreat  on  Berber  ?  I  would 
rather  not  do  that,  for  I  would  wish  to  show  in  a 
positive  way,  that  I  had  no  part  or  lot  in  the 
abandoning  of  the  garrisons,"  etc.,  etc.  A  later 
entry  in  his  Journal,  dated  October  29,  puts  the 
case  still  more  clearly  :  "  I  wanted  to  capture  Ber- 
ber, which  was  the  proper  military  operation  to 
undertake.  .  .  .  Perhaps  if  we  had  taken  Berber, 
Her  Majesty's  Government  would  have  said  that 
no  expedition  was  necessary  for  the  relief  of  the 
garrisons  \  but  it  would  not  have  been  correct  to 
reason  thus,  for,  though  Berber  might  have  been 
taken,  we  could  not  have  garrisoned  it ;  and  it 
would  have  been  a  barren  victory,  and  not  have 
done  much  towards  the  solution  of  the  Soudan 
problem,  or  the  withdrawal  of  the  garrisons,  while 
it  might,  on  the  other  hand,  have  stopped  the 
expedition  for  their  relief^ 

I  think  that  this  was  a  wrong  view  to  take. 
Leaving  on  one  side  any  question  of  official  sub- 
ordination, and  leaving  aside  also  the  waste  of 
money,  which  was  subsequently  involved,  and  for 
the  expenditure  of  which  General  Gordon  was 
certainly  in  some  measure  responsible,  I  consider 
that  it  was  of  greater  importance  to  the  British 

'  Another  instance  of  the  curious  arguments  by  which  General  Gor- 
don sought  to  justify  to  himself  his  own  conduct  may  here  be  given.  On 
September  19  lie  wrote  :  "  I  think  1  say  truly,  I  have  never  asked  for 
a  British  expedition.  I  asked  for  200  men  to  be  sent  to  Berber  at  a 
time  when,  Graham  having  beaten  Osman  Digna,  one  might  have  sup- 
posed there  was  no  risk  for  tbose  200  men."  General  Gordon,  as  a 
soldier^  must  have  known  that  the  British  Government  would  never 
have  agreed  to  sending  so  small  a  force  as  200  men  to  Berber.  But,  in 
truth,  General  Gordon's  contention  that  he  never  asked  for  a  British 
expedition  cannot  be  maintained.  Not  only  the  specific  words,  but  the 
whole  tenor  of  his  Journal  shows  that  all  his  actions  and  opinions 
were  of  a  nature  to  force  the  Government  into  sending  an  expedition. 


570  INIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

nation  to  have  been  spared  the  loss  of  such  valu- 
able public  servants  as  General  Gordon  himself,  Sir 
Herbert  Stewart,  General  Earle,  and  the  many  other 
gallant  Englishmen  who  fell  during  the  subsequent 
campaign  in  the  Soudan,  than  to  have  prevented 
the  outlying  garrisons  at  Sennar  and  elsewhere  from 
being  taken  prisoner  by  the  iVIahdi. 

For  these  reasons  I  do  not  think  that  it  can  be 
held  that  General  Gordon  made  any  serious  effort 
to  carry  out  the  main  ends  of  British  and  Egyptian 
policy  in  the  Soudan.  He  thought  more  of  his 
personal  opinions  than  of  the  interests  of  the  State. 
He  did  not  adapt  his  means  to  his  ends.  He  knew, 
or  at  all  events  he  should  have  known,  what  were 
the  main  and  w\vdt  the  subsidiary  objects  of  British 
policy,  and  he  deliberately  ranked  the  second  before 
the  first,  because  his  personal  predilections  tended 
in  that  direction.  He  was  left  a  wide  discretionary 
power,  and  he  used  it  in  a  manner  opposed  to  the 
spirit,  if  not  to  the  actual  text,  of  his  instructions. 
However  much  we  may  admire  his  personal  hero- 
ism, the  facts  narrated  above  are,  in  my  opinion,  a 
conclusive  proof  that  a  more  unfortunate  choice 
could  scarcely  have  been  made  than  that  of  General 
Gordon  to  carry  out  the  policy  of  evacuating  the 
Soudan.  The  execution  of  that  policy  should  have 
been  in  the  hands  of  a  man  who  could  fight  if  neces- 
sary, but  who  would  devote  all  his  efforts  to  turning 
his  mission  into  one  of  peace  rather  than  of  w^ar  ;  he 
should  have  been  cool,  self-controlled,  clear-headed, 
and  consistent,  deliberate  in  the  formation  of  his 
plans  after  a  careful  study  of  the  facts  with  which 
he  had  to  deal,  and  steadfast  in  their  execution 
w^hen  once  his  mind  was  made  up.  He  should 
have  had  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  English  public 
life  to  have  been  able  to  form  some  fairly  accurate 
conjecture  of  the  motives  which  were  likely  to 
guide  the  British  Government,  even  if  no  definite 


OH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  571 

expression  of  opinion  had  been  conveyed  to  him. 
Genera]  Gordon  possessed  none  of  these  quahties. 
He  was  extremely  pugnacious.  He  was  hot-headed, 
impulsive,  and  swayed  by  his  emotions.  It  is  a 
true  saying  that  "  he  that  would  govern  others,  first 
should  be  the  master  of  himself."  One  of  the  lead- 
ing features  of  General  Gordon's  strange  character 
was  his  total  absence  of  self-control.  He  was  liable  to 
fits  of  ungovernable  and  often  of  most  unreasonable 
passion.  He  formed  rapid  opinions  without  delibera- 
tion, and  rarely  held  to  one  opinion  for  long.  His 
Journal,  in  which  his  thoughts  from  day  to  day  are 
recorded,  is,  even  in  the  expurgated  form  in  which  it 
was  published,  a  mass  of  inconsistencies.  He  knew 
nothing  of  English  public  life,  or,  generally,  of  the 
springs  of  action  which  move  governing  bodies. 
He  appears  to  have  been  devoid  of  the  talent,  so 
valuable  to  a  pubhc  servant  in  a  distant  country, 
of  transporting  himself  in  spirit  elsewhere.  His 
imagination,  indeed,  ran  riot,  but  whenever  he 
endeavoured  to  picture  to  himself  what  was  passing 
in  Cairo  or  London,  he  arrived  at  conclusions  which 
were  not  only  unworthy  of  himself,  but  grotesque, 
as,  for  instance,  when  he  likened  himself  to  Uriah 
the  Hittite,  and  insinuated  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment hoped  that  he  and  his  companions  would 
be  killed  or  taken  prisoners  by  the  Mahdi.  In 
fact,  except  personal  courage,  great  fertility  in 
military  resource,  a  lively  though  sometimes  ill- 
directed  repugnance  to  injustice,  oppression,  and 
meaimess  of  every  description,  and  a  considerable 
power  of  acquiring  influence  over  those,  necessarily 
limited  in  numbers,  with  whom  he  was  brought  in 
personal  contact.  General  Gordon  does  not  appear 
to  have  possessed  any  of  the  qualities  which  would 
have  fitted  him  to  undertake  the  difficult  task  he 
had  in  hand. 

I  now  turn  to  the  other  questions  propounded 


572  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter.  Was  the  execu- 
tion of  the  pohcy  laid  down  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment possible?  More  especially,  would  it  have 
been  possible  for  General  Gordon  to  have  retreated 
from  Khartoum  if  no  expedition  had  been  sent  to 
his  relief? 

The  answer  to  the  first  question  depends  on  the 
view  taken  as  to  the  scope  of  British  policy.  If  it 
be  held,  with  General  Gordon,  that  the  British 
Government  were  under  an  obligation  to  withdraw 
every  one  who  vdshed  to  leave  from  the  most 
remote  provinces  of  the  Soudan,  then  there  can 
be  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  the  policy  was  im- 
possible of  execution.  But,  for  reasons  which  have 
been  already  given,  I  do  not  think  that  the  British 
Government  were  under  any  such  obhgation.^  If 
the  garrison  and  civil  population  of  Khartoum 
could  have  been  saved,  a  great  feat  would,  as  Lord 
Granville  said,  have  been  accomplished,  and,  con- 
sidering the  extreme  difficulties  of  the  situation, 
General  Gordon  would  have  done  all  that  could 
reasonably  have  been  expected  of  him. 

It  is  difficult  to  give  a  positive  answer  to  the 
question  of  whether  General  Gordon  could  have 
retreated  from  Khartoum,  if  no  expedition  had 
been  sent  to  his  relief  On  March  27,  1884, 
Colonel  Coetlogon,  who  was  then  at  Cairo,  wrote 
to  me :  "  The  White  Nile  to  Berber  is  very  low, 
and  there  are  only  two  small  steamers  that  can 
make  the  passage ;  the  river  begins  to  rise  about 
the  middle  of  May.  I  consider  that  a  retreat  of  a 
force  by  river  is  now  impossible,  even  if  unopposed, 
on  account  of  the  lowncss  of  the  river." 

*  The  views  of  the  Khedive,  when  General  Gordon  started  from 
Cairo,  were  thus  stated  to  Baron  Malortie  :  ''I  have  no  douht  that 
Gordon  Pasha  will  do  his  best  to  sacrifice  as  few  as  po-sible  ;  and,  should 
he  succeed,  with  God's  help,  in  accomplishinf?  the  evacuation  of  Khar- 
toum and  the  chief  posts  in  the  Eastern  Soudan,  he  will  be  entitled  t« 
the  everlasting  gratitude  of  my  people." — Too  Lute,  p.  4. 


OH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  573 

Would  it,  however,  liave  been  possible  to  have 
effected  a  retreat  by  land  ? 

It  is  almost  certain  that  after  May  26,  on  which 
day  Berber  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Dervishes,  re- 
treat by  land  was  impossible.  When  General  Gordon 
was  asked  his  reasons  for  remaining  at  Khartoum, 
he  wrote  in  his  Journal :  "  The  reasons  are  those 
horribly  plucky  Arabs,"  and  there  cannot  be  any 
doubt  that  at  tlie  time  he  wrote  these  words 
(September  19, 1884),  the  explanation  was  sufficient. 

It  is,  however,  not  so  certain  whether,  prior  to 
May  26,  the  operation  might  not  have  been  under- 
taken with  a  fair  prospect  of  success.  "  I  wanted," 
General  Gordon  wrote,  on  October  29,  "  to  capture 
Berber,  which  was  the  proper  military  operation." 
"  Had  it  not  been,"  he  wrote  on  September  19,  "  for 
the  defeat  of  Mehemet  Ali  Pasha,^  I  should  have  got 
out  at  least  two- thirds  of  those  at  Khartoum  and 
Sennar."  On  the  other  hand,  the  passage  already 
quoted  from  his  Journal  ^  shows  that  he  did  not 
care  for  the  capture  of  Berber  as  it  would  "not 
have  done  much  towards  the  solution  of  the  Soudan 
problem  or  withdrawal  of  the  garrisons,  while  it 
might,  on  the  other  hand,  have  stopped  the  expedi- 
tion for  thei?'  reliefs 

It  is  impossible  to  draw  any  very  definite  con- 
clusions from  the  evidence  which  is  available  on 
this  subject.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that  the 
operation  of  retreat  would  have  been  one  of  very 
great  difficulty,  but  it  is  not  certain  that  it  would 
have  been  altogether  impossible  if  it  had  been 
undertaken  before  the  middle  of  May.  It  is  clear, 
however,  that  inasmuch  as  General  Gordon  con- 
sidered, first,  that  he  was  bound  to  establish  some 
settled   government  at   Khartoum,  and   secondly, 

*  This  was  the  defeat  at  El-Eilafun  on  the  Blue  Nile,  which  took 
place  oil  September  14. — Wiugate,  Mahdiism,  etc.,  p.  167. 

*  y^ide  ante,  p.  569. 


574  JMODERN  EGYPT  in.  iii 

that  he  was  under  an  obligation  to  save  the  garri- 
sons of  Sennar,  Bahr-el-Ghazal,  and  the  Equatorial 
Province,  he  never  contemplated  the  possibility  of 
withdrawing  from  Khartoum  and  leaving  the  other 
garrisons  to  their  fate. 

To  resume  the  narrative.  It  has  been  already 
mentioned  that  by  the  end  of  March  1884,  ail 
regular  communication  with  Khartoum  was  cut 
off.  Then  followed  four  or  five  months  of  fatal 
indecision.  It  was  not  till  August,  or  even 
September,  that  it  was  definitely  decided  to  send  a 
relief  expedition.  I  will  endeavour  to  summarise 
the  correspondence  which  passed  during  that 
period. 

On  April  21,  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to 
Mr.  Egerton  that  '*  the  danger  to  Berber  appeared 
to  be  imminent."  Mr.  Egerton  was,  therefore, 
requested,  at\er  consultation  with  the  authorities 
at  Cairo,  to  report  "  whether  there  was  any  step, 
by  negotiation  or  otherwise,  which  could  be  taken 
at  once  to  relieve  it."  Mr.  Egerton  replied,  on 
April  23,  to  the  effect  that  there  was  no  possibility 
of  effecting  anything  by  negotiation  without  the 
employment  of  force,  that  Nubar  Pasha  wished  to 
send  two  Egyptian  battalions  at  once  to  Berber, 
that  Sir  Frederick  Stephenson  and  Sir  Evehm 
Wood  objected  to  sending  the  Egyptian  troops  by 
themselves,  but  considered  that  it  woidd  be  possible 
to  send  an  Anglo-Eg}"ptian  force  to  Berber  either 
over  the  Korosko  desert,  or  i)id  AVadi  Haifa  and 
Dongola,  but  that,  at  the  most  favourable  com- 
putation, it  would  take  not  less  than  eight  weeks 
to  reach  Berber  by  the  Korosko  route,  or  sixteen 
weeks  via  Dongola.  "  All,"  JNIr.  Egerton  said, 
"  that  can  be  done  for  the  immediate  safety  of 
Berber  is  to  give  the  assurance  that  English 
material  aid  shall  be  rendered  as  soon  as  possible." 
Lord  Granville  replied   that   the   British   Govern- 


CH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  575 

ment  could  not  sanction  the  attempt  to  send  a 
British  force  to  Berber  via  Korosko,  neither  would 
they  allow  Egyptian  troops  to  be  sent  alone.  The 
Governor  of  Berber  was  to  be  informed  that  no 
immediate  assistance  could  be  given  to  him. 

On  the  same  day  (April  23),  I^ord  Granville 
telegraphed  to  Mr.  Egerton  :  "  Gordon  should  be 
at  once  informed,  in  cypher,  by  several  messengers 
at  some  intervals  between  each,  through  Dongola 
as  well  as  Berber,  or  in  such  other  way  as  may  on 
the  spot  be  deemed  most  prompt  and  certain,  that 
he  should  keep  us  informed,  to  the  best  of  his 
ability,  not  only  as  to  immediate,  but  as  to  any 
prospective  danger  at  Khartoum ;  that,  to  be  pre- 
pared for  any  such  danger,  he  should  advise  us 
as  to  the  force  necessary  in  order  to  secure  his 
removal,  its  amount,  character,  route  for  access  to 
Khartoum,  and  time  of  operation  ;  that  we  do  not 
propose  to  supply  him  with  Turkish  or  other  force 
for  the  purpose  of  undertaking  military  expedi- 
tions, such  being  beyond  the  scope  of  the  commis- 
sion he  holds,  and  at  variance  with  the  pacific 
policy  which  was  the  purpose  of  his  mission  to  the 
Soudan ;  that  if  with  this  knowledge  he  continues 
at  Khartoum,  he  should  state  to  us  the  cause 
and  intention  with  which  he  so  continues.  Add 
expressions  both  of  respect  and  gratitude  for  his 
gallant  and  self-sacrificing  conduct,  and  for  the 
good  he  has  achieved." 

Various  unsuccessful  efforts  were  made  to  com- 
municate this  message  to  General  Gordon.  It  was 
not  till  the  third  week  of  May  that  a  messenger  was 
found  who,  it  was  thought,  would  be  able  to  get 
into  Khartoum.  It  was  then  (JNIay  17)  decided  to 
make   the   following    additions   to   the   message ;  ^ 

^  In  the  iuterval  between  April  23  and  May  17,  Nubar  Pasha  and 
Sir  Evelyn  Wood  asked  Mr.  Ej^erton  "  to  request  Her  Majesty's 
Government  to  give  their  opinion  as  to  whether  or  not  the  Moiidir 


576  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iii 

"As  the  original  plan  for  the  evacuation  of  the 
Soudan  has  been  dropped,  and  as  aggressive  opera- 
tions cannot  be  undertaken  with  the  countenance 
of  Her  Majesty's  Government,  General  Gordon  is 
enjoined  to  consider  and  either  to  report  upon,  or 
if  feasible,  to  adopt,  at  the  first  proper  moment, 
measures  for  his  own  removal  and  for  that  of  the 
Egyptians  at  Khartoum  who  have  suffered  for  him 
or  who  have  served  him  faithfully,  including  their 
wives  and  children,  by  whatever  route  he  may 
consider  best,  having  especial  regard  to  his  own 
safety  and  that  of  the  other  British  subjects. 

"  With  regard  to  the  Egyptians  above  referred 
to.  General  Gordon  is  authorised  to  make  free 
use  of  money  rewards  or  promises  at  his  discretion. 
For  example,  he  is  at  liberty  to  assign  to  Egyptian 
soldiers  at  Khartoum  sums  for  themselves  and 
for  persons  brought  ^vith  them  per  head,  contingent 
on  their  safe  arrival  at  Korosko,  or  whatever  point 
he  may  consider  a  place  of  safety ;  or  he  may 
employ  and  pay  the  tribes  in  the  neighbourhood 
to  escort  them.  Her  Majesty's  Government 
presume  that  the  Soudanese  at  Khartoum  are 
not  in  danger.  In  the  event  of  General  Gordon 
having  despatched  any  person  or  agent  to  other 
points,  he  is  authorised  to  spend  any  money  re- 
quired for  the  purpose  of  recalling  them  or  securing 
their  safety."  ^ 

of  Dong-ola  should  be  told  to  make  the  best  terms  he  could  for  his 
safety  and  that  of  the  people  with  him."  Mr.  Egerton,  in  telejfraphing 
this  request  to  Lord  Granville,  added  :  "  I  can  only  explain  their  askinjr 
a  question,  which  has  become  one  of  pure  humanity,  by  their  belief 
that,  if  some  promise  be  obtained  from  Her  Majesty's  Government  to 
send  an  expedition  later  on  to  relieve  General  Gordon,  the  Governor  of 
Don^ola  mi^ht  be  enabled  to  ofi'er  some  resistance  to  the  stream  of 
rebellion."  Tliis  was,  in  effect,  the  same  proposal  which  I  had  made 
in  my  telegram  of  March  2(;  {t-idc  ante,  p.  643-545).  On  May  13,  Lord 
Granville  replied  :  "  Her  Majesty's  Government  can  make  no  promise 
as  to  future  action.  The  Moudir  should  be  told  to  make  the  best 
terms  he  can." 

*  General  Gordon  received  this  telegram.     Allusion  to  it  is  made  on 
pp.  39  and  59  of  his  Journal. 


CH. 


XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  577 


It  was  not  till  July  20  that  a  message  was  re- 
ceived from  General  Gordon,  dated  June  22.  It  was 
evidently  not  in  answer  to  Mr.  Egerton's  messages. 
It  was  addressed  to  the  Moudir  of  Dongola,  and 
merely  stated  that  Khartoum  and  Sennar  were  still 
holding  out,  and  that  General  Gordon  wished  to 
be  informed  of  "the  place  where  the  expedition 
coming  from  Cairo  is,  and  the  numbers  coming." 
In  forwarding  this  letter,  the  Moudir  of  Dongola 
requested  to  be  informed  of  the  nature  of  the 
reply  which  should  be  sent.  Lord  Granville,  to 
whom  the  matter  was  referred,  replied  to  Mr. 
Egerton :  "  Her  Majesty's  Government  desire,  in 
the  first  place,  that  the  messages  sent  to  General 
Gordon  on  the  23rd  April  and  the  17th  May 
should  be  repeated  to  him,  unless  you  are  con- 
vinced that  he  has  already  received  them  ;  and 
he  should  further  be  informed  that  these  com- 
munications will  show  him  the  interest  taken  by 
Her  Majesty's  Government  in  his  safety ;  that 
Her  Majesty's  Government  continue  to  be  anxious 
to  learn  from  himself  his  views  and  position,  so 
that  if  danger  has  arisen,  or  is  likely  to  arise  in 
the  manner  they  have  described,  they  may  be  in 
a  position  to  take  measures  accordingly." 

On  August  17,  another  glimpse  was  obtained 
of  what  was  passing  at  Khartoum.  On  that  day, 
Mr.  Egerton  informed  Lord  Granville  that  the 
Moudir  of  Dongola  had  received  a  letter  from 
General  Gordon,  dated  July  28.  This  letter  stated 
that  Khartoum  and  Sennar  were  safe,  and  asked  for 
information  as  to  "  the  route  and  the  numbers  of 
the  expedition  coming  from  Cairo."  By  that  time, 
preparations  were  being  made  for  the  despatch  of 
a  relief  expedition.  On  August  18,  Mr.  Egerton 
asked  Lord  Granville  whether  he  might  inform 
General  Gordon  of  the  nature  of  these  preparations. 
In   reply,   Lord   Granville   telegraphed  :   "  Inform 

VOL.  I  2  P 


578  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  hi 

General  Gordon  of  the  preparations  for  bis  relief 
in  case  of  need ;  refer  him  to  former  messages, 
with  directions  from  Her  Majesty's  Government 
to  conform  to  them,  and  ask  the  causes  of  our  not 
having  received  any  reply." 

On  August  28,  a  further  letter  was  received 
from  General  Gordon,  dated  July  13,  in  which  he 
said :  "  We  are  all  well  and  can  hold  out  for  four 
months."  On  August  30,  Mr.  Egerton  instructed 
Colonel  Kitchener  in  the  following  sense :  "  Tell 
Gordon  steamers  are  being  passed  over  the  Second 
Cataract,  and  that  we  wish  to  be  informed  exactly, 
through  Dongola,  when  he  expects  to  be  in 
difficulties  as  to  provisions  and  ammunition." 

It  was  not  till  the  17th,  18th,  and  20th  of 
September  that  several  messages  were  received  from 
General  Gordon  via  Dongola,  apparently  in  answer 
to  the  inquiries  made  by  the  British  Government.^ 
A  httle  later  (September  28)  some  letters  were 
received  from  General  Gordon,  via  Suakin,  the 
latest  of  which  was  dated  July  31st.  The  gist  of 
General  Gordon's  answer  to  the  Government  in- 
quiries was  contained  in  the  following  words  : 
"  You  ask  me  to  state  cause  and  intention  in 
staying  at  Khartoum  knowing  Government  means 
to  abandon  Soudan,  and  in  answer  I  say,  I  stay 
at  Khartoinn  because  Arabs  have  shut  us  up  and 
will  not  let  us  out."  In  a  telegram  to  the 
Khe(Hve,  General  Gordon  complained  that  the 
English  telegrams  did  not  state  what  were  the 
intentions  of  the  Government,  "  and  only  ask  for 
information  and  waste  time."  He  insisted  again 
on  tiie  necessity  of  sending  Zobeir  Pasha  and  on 
entering  into  negotiations  with  the  Porte,  "  so  as 
to  render  it  possible  to  extinguish  the  flame  of 
this  false  Mahdi  before  it  becomes  difficult."     He 

*  Tliese  telegrams  are  given  at  length  in  Egypt,  No.  35  of  1884, 
pp.  96-99. 


CH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  579 

expressed  his  intention  of  retaking  Berber,  burning 
the  town,  and  returning  to  Khartoum.  "  Stewart 
Pasha,"  he  said,  "  will  proceed  to  Dongola.  Then 
I  will  send  to  the  Equator  to  withdraw  the  people 
who  are  there.  After  that,  it  will  be  impossible 
for  Mohamed  Ahmed  to  come  here,  and  please 
God,  he  will  meet  his  death  by  the  hands  of  the 
Soudanese.  ...  It  will  be  impossible  to  leave 
Khartoum  without  a  regular  government  estab- 
lished by  some  Power.  I  will  look  after  the 
troops  on  the  Equator,  Bahr-el-Ghazal,  and  in 
Darfour,  although  it  may  cost  me  my  life.  Per- 
haps the  British  Government  will  be  displeased 
with  the  advice  which  I  have  given.  The  people 
of  the  Soudan  are  also  displeased  with  me  on 
account  of  my  fighting  against  them,  and  on 
account  of  their  not  attaining  their  object  in 
following  the  Mahdi." 

The  nature  of  the  military  preparations,  which 
were  being  made  whilst  the  correspondence  summar- 
ised above  was  going  on,  must  now  be  described. 

It  has  been  already  explained  that,  on  April  14, 
I  urged  the  British  Government  to  prepare  for  a 
relief  expedition.^  A  few  days  earlier  (April  8), 
Lord  Wolseley  addressed  a  Memorandum  to  Lord 
Hartington  in  which  he  discussed  the  composition 
of  the  force  which  would  be  required,  and  the  route 
which  it  would  be  advisable  to  take.  In  this 
Memorandum  Lord  AVolseley  said  :  "  Time  is  the 
most  important  element  in  this  question.  ...  I 
recommend  immediate  and  active  preparations  for 
operations  that  may  be  forced  upon  us  by  and  by." 

In  consequence  of  these  recommendations,  Sir 
Frederick  Stephenson  was  instructed,  on  April  25, 
to  report  "  on  the  best  plan  of  operation  for  the 
relief  of  Gordon,  if  necessary."  A  long  inter\al, 
however,   elapsed  before  anything  was  done.      It 

•   Vide  ante,  pp.  550-558. 


580  INIODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iii 

was  at  first  intended  to  despatch  a  force  from 
Suakin  to  Berber,  and,  on  June  14,  Sir  Frederick 
Stephenson  was  directed  to  take  some  preliminary- 
steps  to  facilitate  the  construction  of  a  railway 
from  Suakin,  should  one  eventually  become  neces- 
sary. But  three  weeks  later  (July  4),  it  was  ex- 
plained that  the  Government  had  no  mtention  of 
undertaking  any  expedition  "unless  it  should 
appear  to  be  absolutely  necessary  for  ensuring  the 
safe  withdrawal  of  General  Gordon  from  Khartoum." 
The  Government  were  still  waiting  for  General 
Gordon's  replies  to  the  questions  which  had  been 
addressed  to  him.  So  little  was  known  of  what 
was  going  on  in  the  Soudan  that,  although  reports 
had  reached  Egypt  of  the  fall  of  Berber,  which 
took  place  on  May  26,  all  doubts  as  to  their  truth 
were  not  removed  until  a  month  later,  that  is  to 
say,  on  June  27. 

It  was  not  till  August  8  that,  a  vote  of  credit 
for  £300,000  having  been  obtained  from  ParUa- 
ment,  Lord  Hartington  authorised  Sir  Frederick 
Stephenson  to  take  certain  preliminary  measures 
with  a  view  to  moving  troops  south  of  Wadi 
Haifa.  A  good  deal  of  difference  of  opinion  existed 
amongst  the  military  authorities  as  to  whether  it 
would  be  desirable  to  move  by  Suakin,  or  to  adopt 
the  Nile  route.  Lord  Wolseley  preferred  the  latter 
alternative,  and  his  view  was  eventually  adopted 
by  the  Government. 

Whilst,  however,  authorising  these  preliminary 
measures,  the  Government  only  did  so  under  the 
following  reserve:  "Her  JNI ajesty's  Government 
are  not  at  present  convinced  that  it  will  be  impos- 
sible for  General  Gordon,  acthig  on  the  instructions 
which  he  has  received,  to  secure  the  withdrawal 
from  Khartoum,  either  by  the  employment  of  force 
or  of  pacific  means,  of  the  Egyptian  garrisons,  and 
of  such  of  the  inhabitants  as  may  desire  to  leave. 


CH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  581 

"The  time,  however,  which  has  elapsed  since 
the  receipt  of  authentic  information  of  General 
Gordon's  ^exact  position,  plans,  and  intentions,  is  so 
long,  and  the  state  of  the  surrounding  country,  as 
evidenced  by  the  impossibility  of  communicating 
with  him,  is  so  disturbed,  that  Her  Majesty's 
Government  are  of  opinion  that  the  time  has 
arrived  when  some  further  measure  for  obtaining 
accurate  information  as  to  his  position,  and  if 
necessary,  for  rendering  him  assistance,  should  be 
adopted." 

On  August  26,  Lord  Wolseley  was  appointed 
to  command  the  expedition.  He  arrived  in  Cairo 
on  September  10,  with  Lord  Northbrook^  and 
myself.  On  September  17,  Lord  Hartington, 
whilst  complying  with  a  demand  made  by  Lord 
Wolseley  for  reinforcements,  said  :  "In  arriving  at 
this  decision.  Her  Majesty's  Government  desire  to 
remind  you  that  no  decision  has  yet  been  arrived 
at  to  send  any  portion  of  the  force  under  your 
command  beyond  Dongola.  .  .  .  You  are  fully 
aware  of  the  views  of  Her  Majesty's  Government 
on  this  subject,  and  know  how  averse  they  are  to 
undertake  any  warlike  expedition  not  called  for  b}' 
absolute  necessity." 

It  was  not  till  October  8,  that  is  to  say,  more 
than  five  months  after  communication  between 
Cairo  and  Khartoum  had  been  interrupted,  that  I 
was  authorised  to  issue  to  Lord  Wolseley  instiTic- 
tions,  which  had  been  drafted  in  consultation 
between  him,  Lord  Northbrook,  and  myself  The 
principal  passage  in  these  instructions  was  as 
follows  :  "  The  primary  object  of  the  expedition  up 
the  valley  of  the  Nile  is  to  bring  away  General 
Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  from  Khartoum. 
When  that  object  has  been   secured,   no   further 

^  Lord  Northbrook,  as  will  be  hereafter  explained  (see  Chapter  XLV. ), 
was  at  the  time  sent  on  a  special  mission  to  Egypt. 


582  MODERN  EGYPT  niii 

offensive  operations  of  any  kind  are  to  be  under- 
taken. 

"  Although  you  are  not  precluded  from  advanc- 
ing as  far  as  Khartoum,  should  you  consider  such 
a  step  essential  to  insure  the  safe  retreat  of  General 
Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart,  you  should  bear  in 
mnid  that  Her  IMajesty's  Government  is  desirous 
to  limit  the  sphere  of  your  military  operations  as 
much  as  possible.  They  rely  on  you,  therefore, 
not  to  advance  any  farther  southwards  than  is 
absolutely  necessary  in  order  to  attain  the  primary 
object  of  the  expedition.  You  will  endeavour  to 
place  yourself  in  communication  with  General 
Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  as  soon  as  possible." 

Before  tliese  instructions  were  issued,  Lord 
VVolseley  had  left  Cairo.  On  October  5,  he 
arrived  at  Wadi  Haifa,  and  the  Nile  Campaign 
may  be  said  to  have  definitely  begun. 

I  now  propose  to  make  some  remarks  on  the 
events  narrated  above. 

The  summer  months  of  1884  constitute  the 
most  gloomy  period  of  the  British  connection  with 
Egypt.  It  would  seem,  indeed,  as  if  some  spiteful 
fairy  had  presided  over  the  deliberations  of  the 
Gladstone  Government  when  Egyptian  affairs  came 
under  consideration.  Mr.  Gladstone  said  (February 
23,  1885) :  "  The  difficulties  of  the  case  have  passed 
entirely  beyond  the  limits  of  such  political  and 
military  difficulties  as  I  have  known  in  the  course 
of  an  experience  of  half  a  century."  Under  these 
circumstances,  it  can  be  no  matter  for  surprise  that 
mistakes  were  made.  Subsequent  events  have 
shown  that  the  Government  were  sometimes  right 
and  sometimes  wrong  in  their  decisions.  In  my 
opinion,  in  so  far  as  the  broad  lines  of  their  general 
policy  are  concerned,  they  were  more  right  than 
their  critics.     But  when  it  came  to  a  question  of 


cH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  583 

action,  they  appear,  whether  from  accident  or  want 
of  foresight,  to  have  rarely  done  the  right  tiling 
at  the  right  moment. 

Festinare  nocet,  nocet  et  cunctatio  saepe, 
Tempore  quaeque  suo  qui  facit,  ille  sapit. 

The  Government  were,  indeed,  remarkably  un- 
successful in  avoiding  the  extremes  of  tardiness  and 
precipitation.  If  the  attack  on  the  Alexandria 
forts  had  been  delayed  for  a  day  or  two,  reinforce- 
ments would  have  arrived,  and  the  town  would  not 
have  been  at  the  mercy  of  Arabi's  rabble.  If  the 
expedition  to  Tokar  had  arrived  a  day  or  tw^o 
sooner,  the  Egyptian  garrison  would  have  been 
reheved.  There  can  scarcely  be  a  doubt  that  if  the 
decision  to  send  an  expedition  to  General  Gordon's 
relief  had  been  taken  in  April  or  May,  instead  of 
in  August,  the  objects  of  the  expedition  would 
have  been  attained.  The  main  responsibility  for 
this  delay  rests  on  Mr.  Gladstone.  "  I  want,"  Sir 
Stafford  Northcote  said  in  the  House  of  Commons 
on  February  23,  1885,  "to  see  the  Government  a 
little  inconsistent  and  to  realise  facts."  INIr.  Glad- 
stone was  slow  to  recognise  facts  when  tliey  ran 
counter  to  his  wishes.  The  natural  result  ensued. 
The  facts  asserted  themselves. 

When  a  vote  of  censure  on  the  conduct  of  the 
Government  was  moved  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
Mr.  Gladstone  acknowledged  that  errors  of  judg- 
ment might  have  been  committed.  "  It  is  not 
for  me,"  he  said,  "to  arrogate  to  myself  or  my 
colleagues  infallibility."  But  Mr.  Gladstone  laid 
claim  to  "honesty  of  purpose."  Every  one  who 
is  impartial  ^vill  readily  admit  this  claim.  The 
only  question  which  admits  of  discussion  is 
whether  the  errors  of  judgment,  which  \\ere 
assuredly  committed,  were  excusable  or  the 
reverse. 


584  MODERN  EGYPT  it.  iii 

A  statesman  in  the  responsible  position  which 
Mr.  Gladstone  then  occupied,  does  well  to  pause 
before  he  calls  upon  a  great  nation  to  put  forth  its 
military  strength.  Can,  however,  the  lengthened 
pause,  which  Mr.  Gladstone  made  before  he 
decided  to  send  an  expedition  to  Khartoum,  be 
justified?  I  will  endeavour  to  answer  this 
question. 

Mr.  Gladstone's  principal  reply  to  his  critics  is 
contained  in  the  following  words,  which  he  used  in 
the  House  of  Commons  on  February  23,  1885  : 
"  Our  contention,"  he  said,  "  was  that  we  must  be 
convinced  that  an  expedition  for  the  relief  of 
General  Gordon  was  necessary  and  practicable. 
We  had  no  proof,  as  we  believed,  that  General 
Gordon  was  in  danger  within  the  walls  of  Khar- 
tomn.  We  believed,  and  I  think  we  had  reason 
to  believe  from  his  own  expressions,  that  it  was  in 
the  power  of  General  Gordon  to  remove  himself 
and  those  immediately  associated  with  him  from 
Khartoum  by  going  to  the  south.  .  .  .  General 
Gordon  said  himself,  speaking  of  it  as  a  thing 
distinctly  within  his  power,  that  he  would  in 
certain  contmgencies  withdraw  to  the  Equator." 
I  proceed  to  analyse  these  remarks. 

No  one  will  be  disposed  to  contest  the  state- 
ment that,  before  the  Government  decided  on 
sending  an  expedition,  it  was  incumbent  on  them 
to  be  convinced  that  the  adoption  of  this  measure 
was  both  "  necessary  and  practicable."  It  only 
remains  to  be  considered  whether  the  evidence  in 
respect  to  both  the  necessity  and  the  practicability 
was  not  sufficient  to  justify  action  being  taken 
before  the  month  of  ^iugust. 

The  practicability  argument  may  be  readily 
disposed  of  It  was  conclusively  answered  by 
Lord  Hartington  at  a  later  period  (February  27) 
of  the  debate   in  which  Mr.    Gladstone  used   the 


OH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  58.5 

words  quoted  above.  With  characteristic  honesty, 
Lord  Hartington  said:  "Although  the  difficulties 
of  a  military  decision  were  great,  and  although 
there  was  a  difference  of  opinion  among  military 
authorities,  I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that 
the  justification  or,  if  you  will,  the  excuse  of  the 
Government  has  rested  mainly  on  the  fact,  which 
we  have  never  attempted  to  conceal,  that  the 
Government  were  not,  until  a  comparatively  recent 
period,  convinced  of  the  absolute  necessity  of  send- 
ing a  military  expedition  to  Khartoum."  This 
frank  statement,  coming  from  the  Minister  who 
was  then  responsible  for  the  administration  of  the 
War  Office,  effectually  disposes  of  the  argument 
in  justification  of  delay  based  on  the  doubtful 
practicability  of  the  military  enterprise. 

I  turn,  therefore,  to  the  question  of  necessity. 
"  We  had  no  proof,"  Mr.  Gladstone  said,  "  as  we 
believed,  that  General  Gordon  was  in  danger 
within  the  walls  of  Khartoum."  The  gist  of  the 
Government  case  is  contained  in  these  words.  The 
same  idea  was  embodied  in  all  the  messages,  which- 
Mr.  Egerton  was  instructed  to  send  to  General 
Gordon  during  the  summer  of  1884,  and  which  1 
find  it  difficult,  even  after  the  lapse  of  many  years, 
to  read  without  indignation.  Not  only  does  reason 
condemn  them,  but  their  whole  tone  runs,  without 
doubt  unconsciously,  counter  to  those  feelings  of 
generous  sympathy,  which  the  position  of  General 
Gordon  and  his  companions  was  so  well  calculated 
to  inspire.  Before  General  Gordon  left  London, 
I  had  warned  the  Government  that,  if  he  were  sent 
to  Khartoum,  he  would  "undertake  a  service  of 
great  difficulty  and  danger."  General  Gordon, 
it  is  true,  had,  more  suo,  been  inconsistent  in  his 
utterances  on  this  subject.  He  had,  in  the  first 
place,  greatly  underrated  the  difficulties  of  his  task. 
So  late  as  February  20,  1884,   he  had  spoken  o\ 


586  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iii 

Khartoum  being  "as  safe  as  Kensington  Park." 
But  the  last  messages,  which  he  sent  before 
telegraphic  communication  between  Cairo  and 
Khartoum  was  interrupted,  breathed  a  very 
different  spirit.  He  spoke,  on  jNIarch  8,  of  "  the 
storm  which  was  likely  to  break,"  of  the  prob- 
ability of  his  being  "hemmed  in,"  and  he  added, 
with  something  of  prophetic  instinct,  "  1  feel 
a  conviction  that  I  shall  be  caught  in  Khar- 
toum." Lord  Wolseley,  myself,  and  others  had 
dwelt  on  the  dangers  of  General  Gordon's 
position,  and  even  if  no  such  warnings  had  been 
given,  the  facts  spoke  for  themselves.  General 
Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  were  beleaguered 
in  a  remote  African  town  by  hordes  of  warlike 
savages,  who  were  half  mad  with  fanaticism 
and  elated  at  their  recent  successes.  Yet  JMr. 
Gladstone  wanted  further  proof  tliat  they  were  in 
danger.  If  the  proofs  which  already  existed  in  the 
early  summer  of  1884  were  not  sufficient,  one  is 
tempted  to  ask  w^hat  evidence  would  ha\'e  carried 
conviction  to  Mr.  Gladstone's  mind,  and  the  only 
possible  answer  is  that  Mr.  Gladstone  was  well- 
nigh  determined  not  to  believe  a  fact  which  was, 
naturally  enough,  most  distasteful  to  him,^ 
General  Gordon,  in  a  passage  of  his  Journal, 
which  would  be  humorous  if  it  were  not  pathetic, 
has  himself  described  what  every  one  of  connnon 
sense  must  tliink  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  attitude  during 
this  period.  "  It  is,"  he  wrote  on  September  23, 
"  as  if  a  man  on  the  bank,  having  seen  his  friend  in 
the  river  already  bobbed  down  two  or  three  times, 

'  There  is  a  close  aiialosry  between  Mr.  Gladstone's  attitude  at  this 
time  and  that  of  Lord  Aberdeen  before  the  Crimean  \\^ar.  Hoth  prac- 
tised the  art  of  self-deception.  "Alnidst  to  the  last,"  Mr.  Kinglake 
says  {Invasion  of  the  Crimea,  vol.  i.  p.  3i)7),  "  Lord  Aberdeen  mis-juided 
himself.  Ilis  loathing  for  vv.ir  took  such  a  shape  that  he  could  not  ;ind 
would  not  believe  in  it ;  and  wiien  at  last  the  spectre  was  close  upou 
him,  he  covered  his  eyes  and  refused  to  see." 


-H.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITIOX  587 

hails :  '  I  say,  old  fellow,  let  us  know  when  we  are 
to  throw  you  the  life-buoy ;  I  know  you  have 
bobbed  down  two  or  three  times,  but  it  is  a  pity 
to  throw  you  the  life-buoy  until  you  are  really  in 
extremis,  and  I  want  to  know  exactly,  for  I  am  a 
man  brought  up  in  a  school  of  exactitude.'" 

Mr.  Gladstone  said  that  General  Gordon  spoke  of 
withdrawing  to  the  Equator  "  as  a  thing  distinctly 
in  his  power."  It  is  true  that  in  two  telegrams  of 
March  9  and  of  April  7,  General  Gordon  had  spoken 
of  the  possibility  of  retiring  towards  the  E(piatorial 
Province,  but  I  had  inforined  Lord  Granville,  on 
March  26,  that  Colonel  Coetlogon,  who  spoke  with 
authority  on  this  subject,  ridiculed  the  idea,  and 
although  Colonel  Stewart  had  sadd  at  the  beginning 
of  April :  "  I  am  inclined  to  think  my  retreat  will 
be  safer  by  the  Equator,"  the  context  clearly 
showed  that  he  only  used  these  words  because  he 
considered  retreat  via  Berber  so  difficult,  unless  a 
British  expedition  were  sent  to  open  the  road,  that 
he  preferred  the  desperate  risk  of  a  retreat  in  a 
southerly  direction.  It  was,  in  fact,  only  necessary 
to  look  at  a  map,  to  glance  at  the  accounts  given 
by  Generil  Gordon  himself  and  by  Sir  Samuel 
Baker  of  the  physical  difficulties  to  be  overcome  in 
moving  up  the  White  Nile,  and  to  remember  that 
both  banks  of  that  river  for  a  long  distance  above 
Khartoum  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Dervishes,  to 
appreciate  the  fact  that  retreat  in  the  direction  of 
Gondokoro  was  little  better  than  a  forlorn  hope. 

For  these  reasons,  the  arguments  adduced  by 
Mr.  Gladstone  do  not  appear  to  affi3rd  any  sufficient 
justification  for  the  long  delay  which  ensued  before 
it  was  decided  to  send  an  expedition  to  Khartoum. 

A  different  class  of  argument  may,  however,  be 
advanced  in  favour  of  the  course  adopted  by  the 
Government  at  this  time.  It  may  be  said  that 
General  Gordon  never  attempted  to  carry  out  the 


588  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

policy  of  the  Government,  that  he  was  sent  to 
evacuate  the  Soudan,  that  he  turned  his  peaceful 
mission  into  an  endeavour  to  "smash  the  JMahdi," 
and  that  he  could  have  retreated  from  Khartoum, 
but  that  he  never  attempted  to  do  so.  Little  was 
said  about  this  aspect  of  the  question  at  the  time, 
for  this  line  of  argument  necessarily  involved  reflec- 
tions on  General  Gordon's  conduct,  which,  under 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  would  have  been 
considered  ungenerous,  and  which,  moreover,  would 
have  produced  little  effect,  for  the  pubhc  were  in 
no  humour  to  listen  to  them.  General  Gordon,  in 
Mr.  Gladstone's  words,  was  considered  a  "  hero  of 
heroes,"  and,  at  the  time,  a  defence  based  on 
any  faults  he  might  have  committed  would, 
for  all  Parliamentary  purposes,  have  been  worse 
than  none  at  all.  At  the  same  time,  the 
order  of  ideas  embodied  in  these  arguments  did 
to  a  certam  extent  find  expression.  Whilst  Sir 
Stafford  Northcote  invited  the  House  of  Commons 
to  assert  the  prmciple  that  it  was  incumbent  on 
England  to  secure  "  a  good  and  stable  government 
for  those  portions  of  the  Soudan  which  were 
necessary  to  the  security  of  Egypt,"  Mr.  John 
JNIorley,  in  a  powerful  speech,  moved  an  amend- 
ment which  was  hostile  alike  to  the  Government 
and  to  the  Opposition.  He  invited  the  House  to 
express  its  regret  that  "  the  forces  of  the  Crown 
were  to  be  employed  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
power  of  the  JNI  ahdi."^  Moreover,  although  Mr. 
Gladstone's  parliamentary  position  obliged  him  to 
oppose  jNIr.  5lorley's  amendment,  it  is  perhaps  no 
very  far-fetched  conjecture  to  imagine  that  this 
amendment  embodied  an  opinion,  which  did  not 
differ  widely  from  the  views  which  Mr.  Glad- 
stone personally  entertained.  Mr.  Gladstone  had 
formerly   spoken  of  the  Soudanese  as   a   "people 

*  Mr.  Alorley's  amendment  was  rejected  by  455  to  112  votes. 


CH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  589 

rightly  struggling  to  be  free."  The  phrase  had 
become  historical.  It  was  indiscreet  in  the  mouth 
of  an  English  Prime  Minister,  but  at  one  time  it 
contained  a  certain  element  of  ti'uth.^  JNIoreover,  I 
often  heard  at  the  time  that  Mr.  Gladstone  reasoned 
somewhat  after  this  fashion  :  "  The  Soudanese  wash 
to  get  rid  of  the  Egyptians.  The  Egyptians,  under 
pressure  from  England,  are  prepared  to  leave  the 
Soudan.  It  is  inconceivable  tliat,  if  the  matter 
were  properly  explained  to  the  JNIahdi,  he  would 
not  agree  to  facilitate  the  peaceful  retreat  of  the 
Egyptian  garrisons."  To  the  logical  European 
mind  this  position  appears  unassailable,  but  Mr. 
Gladstone  never  realised  the  fact  that  he  was  deal- 
ing with  a  race  of  savage  fanatics  to  whom 
European  processes  of  reasoning  were  wholly  in- 
comprehensible. The  JNIahdist  movement  was 
not  only  a  revolt  against  misgovernment.  It  was 
also,  in  the  eyes  of  its  followers,  a  religious  move- 
ment having  for  its  object  the  forced  conversion  of 
the  whole  world  to  Mahdiism.  There  can  be  little 
doubt  that  it  would  have  been  practically  impossible 
to  treat  with  tlie  Mahdi  on  the  basis  of  a  peaceful 
withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian  troops. 

The  line  of  argument  to  which  allusion  is  made 
above,  would  appear  more  worthy  of  attention 
than  that  actually  adopted  by  the  Government. 
It  has  been  already  shown  that  General  Gordon 
paid  little  heed  to  his  instructions,  that  he  was 
consumed  with  a  desire  to  "  smash  the  Mahdi,"  and 
that  the  view  that  he  was  constrained  to  withdraw 
every  one  who  wished  to  leave  from  the  most 
distant  parts  of  the  Soudan  was,  to  say  the  least, 
quixotic.  The  conclusion  to  be  dra^vn  from  these 
facts  is  that  it  w^as   a   mistake   to    send    General 

*  I  mean  that  the  Mahdist  revolt  would  never  have  taken  place  if 
the  people  of  the  Soudan  had  not  wished  to  throw  off  the  Egyptian 
yoke. 


590  JNIODERN  EGYPT  ft.  hi 

Gordon  to  the  Soudan.  But  do  they  afford  any 
justification  for  the  delay  m  preparing  and  in 
despatching  the  rehef  expedition  ?  I  cannot  think 
that  they  do  so.  Whatever  errors  of  judgment 
General  Gordon  may  have  committed,  the  broad 
facts,  as  they  existed  in  the  early  summer  of 
1884,  were  that  he  was  sent  to  Khartoum  by 
the  British  Go^'ernment,  who  never  denied  their 
responsibility  for  his  safety,  that  he  was  beleaguered, 
and  that  he  was,  therefore,  unable  to  get  away. 
It  is  just  possible  that  he  could  have  effected  his 
retreat  if,  having  abandoned  the  southern  posts,  he 
had  moved  northwards  with  the  Khartoum  garrison 
in  April  or  early  in  JNlay.  .  As  time  went  on  and 
nothing  was  heard  of  him,  it  became  more  and 
more  clear  that  he  eitlier  could  not  or  would  not, — 
probably  that  he  could  not, — move.  The  most 
indulgent  critic  would  scarcely  extend  beyond 
June  27  the  date  at  which  the  Government  should 
have  decided  on  the  question  of  whether  a  relief 
expedition  should  or  should  not  be  despatched. 
On  that  day,  the  news  that  Berber  had  been 
captured  on  May  26  by  the  Dervishes  was  finally 
confirmed.  Yet  it  was  not  till  six  weeks  later  that 
the  Government  obtained  from  Parliament  the 
funds  necessary  to  prepare  for  an  expedition. 

I  began  the  examination  of  this  branch  of  the 
subject  by  asking  whether  the  errors  of  judgment 
committed  by  Mr.  Gladstone's  Government  in  the 
summer  of  1884  were  excusable.  The  points, 
which  have  been  previously  discussed,  such  as  the 
tacit  permission  given  to  the  Hicks  expedition, 
the  despatch  of  General  Gordon  to  Khartoum,  the 
rejection  of  Zobeir  Pasha's  services,  and  the  refusal 
to  make  a  dash  to  Berber  in  March,  are  questions 
as  to  which  it  may  be  said,  either  that  the  fact  of 
any  error  havdng  been  committed  may  be  contested, 
or  that  any  condemnatory  conclusion  must  in  some 


CH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  691 

degree  be  based  upon  an  after-knowledge  of  events, 
which  was  not  obtainable  when  the  decisive  step  had 
to  be  taken.  The  same  cannot  be  said  of  the  point 
now  under  discussion.  The  facts  were  at  the  time 
sufficiently  clear  to  any  one  who  wished  to  under- 
stand them,  and  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from 
them  were  obvious.  Those  conclusions  were  (1) 
that  unless  a  military  expedition  was  sent  to  Khar- 
toum, General  Gordon  and  his  companions  must 
sooner  or  later  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Mahdi ;  and 
(2)  that  prompt  action  was  needed,  all  the  more  so 
because  it  was  only  during  the  short  period  while 
the  Nile  was  high  that  rapidity  of  movement  was 
possible.  If  Mr.  Gladstone  had  said  that  the 
expenditure  of  blood  and  money  which  would  be 
involved  in  an  expedition  to  Khartoum  was  incom- 
mensurate with  the  objects  to  be  attained,  the 
argument  would,  in  my  opinion  at  all  events,  have 
been  unworthy  of  the  leader  of  a  great  nation,  and 
to  none  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  arguments  does  a 
censure  of  this  description  in  any  degree  apply. 
Moreover,  the  adoption  of  this  attitude  would 
have  probably  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Ministry  in 
forty-eight  hours.  But  such  a  statement  would 
have  had  the  merit  of  being  comprehensible.  The 
argument  that  no  expedition  was  necessary  because 
General  Gordon  was  not  proved  to  be  in  danger 
was  so  totally  at  variance  with  facts,  which  were 
patent  to  all  the  world,  as  to  be  well-nigh  in- 
comprehensible. 

On  these  grounds,  I  maintain  that  of  all  the 
mistakes  committed  at  this  period  in  connection 
with  Egyptian  and  Soudanese  affairs,  the  delay  in 
sending  an  expedition  to  the  relief  of  Khartoum 
was  the  least  excusable.^     The  House  of  Commons 

*  Lord  Northbrook  wrote  to  me  subsequently  (January  13,  1886) : 
"  You  gave  us  very  distinct  warnings  in  time  that  if  Gordon  was  to  be 
rescued  an  expedition  would  have  to  be  sent,  and  no  one  regrets  more 


592  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

practically  condemned  the  conduct  of  the  Govern- 
ment. In  a  full  House,  the  Government  only- 
escaped  censure  by  a  majority  of  14.  *'  If," 
General  Gordon  wrote  on  November  8,  "  it  is  right 
to  send  up  an  expedition  now,  why  was  it  not  right 
to  send  it  up  before  ? "  The  fact  that  General 
Gordon's  pathetic  question  admits  of  no  satisfac- 
tory answer  must  for  ever  stand  as  a  blot  on 
INIr.  Gladstone's  political  escutcheon. 

than  I  do  that  the  preparations  were  delayed  from  May  to  August."  I 
may  add  that,  some  ten  years  later,  I  sent  to  Lord  Northbrook  a  type- 
written copy  of  the  portion  of  this  work  which  deals  with  the  Soudan. 
He  wrote  the  following  words  on  the  margin  opposite  the  passage  to 
which  this  note  is  attached  :  "I  am  afraid  that  all  this  is  quite  true. 
...  As  I  had  the  misfortune  to  be  a  member  of  Mr.  Gladstone's 
Government,  I  have  to  bear  the  blame  with  the  rest  But  1  resolved 
never  to  serve  under  him  again  I " 


CH.  XXVII       RELIEF  EXPEDITION  593 


APPENDIX 

Note  on  the  Khedive  s  telegram  to  General  Gordon  of 
September  14,  1884. 

The  following  entry  occurs  in  General  Gordon'^s  Journal 
(vol.  ii.  p.  359),  dated  November  25,  1884 :  "  Tewfik,  by  a 
telegram,  cancels  his  Firman,  which  gives  up  the  Soudan, 
which  I  have  torn  up. 

*'  A  telegram  to  the  Ulemas  from  Tewfik  says :  *  Baring 
is  coming  up  with  Lord  Wolseley.'' " 

It  appears  from  the  numerous  discussions  which  have  taken 
place  in  connection  with  the  Gordon  mission  that  some 
misapprehension  exists  with  regard  to  the  circumstances 
under  which  the  telegrams  to  which  allusion  is  here  made 
were  sent.  I  propose,  therefore,  to  state  what  actually  took 
place. 

On  September  14,  1884,  the  Khedive  sent  a  telegram  to 
General  Gordon.  The  full  text  of  this  telegram  is  given  in  a 
note  to  an  article  written  by  Sir  Reginald  Wingate,  and  pub- 
lished in  the  United  Service  Magazine  of  July  1892.  For  my 
present  purposes  the  following  extracts  will  suffice :  "  We 
inform  you  now  that  a  great  change  has  taken  place  since 
the  time  that  the  aforenamed  {i.e.  the  British)  Govern- 
ment advised  the  evacuation  of  the  Soudan,  and  com- 
munication with  you  had  been  cut.  .  .  .  But  the  English 
troops  will  shortly  occupy  Dongola,  and  Colonel  Chermside, 
the  Governor  of  Suakin,  has  been  ordered  to  communicate 
with  the  tribes  regarding  Kassala ;  also  Major  Kitchener,  one 
of  the  officers  of  my  new  army,  is  ordered  to  confer  at 
Dongola,  and  we  hope  he  will  shortly  be  able  to  open  com- 
munication with  you.  Again,  it  becomes  necessary,  under 
these  circumstances,  to  modify  the  Firman  which  we  had 
granted  you,  so  that  your  authority  will  now  be  confined  to 
being  Governor  of  the  Soudan,  including  Khartoum,  Sennar, 
Berber,  and  their  present  vicinities.  .  .  .  You  will  also 
receive  the  'necessary  instructions  from  the  British  Govern- 
ment, through  Sir  E.  Baring  and  Lord  Wolseley,  who  has 
been  made  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  English  expedition, 
and  who  is  at  present  in  Cairo."" 

At  the  same  time,  a  telegram  was  sent  to  the  Ulema  of 
Khartoum,  urging  them  to  do  their  utmost  to  maintain  the 
honour  of  the  Government. 

VOL.  I  2  Q 


594  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

So  far  as  I  am  aware,  no  British  authority  was  consulted 
before  these  telegrams  were  sent.  I  certainly  never  saw  them 
until  long  after  General  Gordon's  death.  Inasmuch,  how- 
ever, as  General  Gordon  could  not  know  that  the  Khedive 
had  sent  the  telegrams  solely  on  his  own  authority,  this 
point  is  of  slight  importance. 

On  receipt  of  the  Khedive's  message.  General  Gordon  ap- 
pears to  have  published  the  Proclamation  given  in  Appendix  Y 
to  his  Journal  (vol.  ii.  p.  552).  This  Proclamation  contains 
the  following  passage:  "Formerly  the  Government  had 
decided  to  transport  the  Egyptians  down  to  Cairo  and 
abandon  the  Soudan ;  and,  in  fact,  some  of  them  had  been 
sent  down  during  the  time  of  Hussein  Pasha  Yusri,  as  you 
yourself  saw.  On  our  arrival  at  Khartoum,  on  account  of 
pity  for  you,  and  in  order  not  to  let  your  country  be  destroyed, 
we  communicated  with  the  Khedive  of  Egypt,  our  Effendi, 
concerning  the  importance  and  inexpediency  of  abandoning 
it.  Whereupon,  the  orders  for  abandoning  the  Soudan  were 
cancelled." 

From  a  perusal  of  these  documents,  it  is  easy  to  judge  of 
what  took  place.  On  February  27, 1884,  that  is  to  say,  nine 
days  after  his  arrival  at  Khartoum,  General  Gordon  had 
practically  announced  to  the  public  the  abandonment  of 
the  policy  which  he  was  sent  to  carry  out.  In  a  Proclamation 
issued  on  that  day  he  said :  "  British  troops  are  now  on  their 
way  to  Khartoum."^  He  had  many  misgivings  as  to  the 
correctness  of  this  proceeding.  The  Khedive's  telegram  of 
September  14,  1884,  is  worded  in  such  a  manner  as  to  render 
it  possible  to  misapprehend  its  meaning.  General  Gordon, 
therefore,  readily  seized  the  opportunity  to  put  himself,  as  he 
thought,  in  the  right. 

A  mere  comparison  of  the  dates  of  General  Gordon's 
original  Proclamation  and  of  the  Khedive's  telegrams  is 
sufficient  to  show  that,  as  evidence  as  to  how  far  General 
Gordon  endeavoured  to  carry  out  his  instructions  on  his 
arrival  at  Khartoum,  the  entry  in  the  Journal  on  November 
25, 1884,  is  valueless. 

*  Vide  ante,  p.  490. 


END   OF    VOL.    I 


MODERN    EGYPT 


MODERN  EGYPT 


BY 


THE    EARL   OF   CROMER 


In  his  first  inter--uieiv  'with  the  Go--vernor  of  St.  Helena, 
Napoleon  said  emphatically  .■ '  "  E^ypt  is  the  most  important 
country  in  the  nuorld" 

Rose,  Life  of  Napoleon,  vol.  i.  p.  356. 

Eariitn  proprie  rerum  sit  historia,  quibus  rebus  gerendis 
interfuerit  is  qui  narret. 

Gellius,  Noctes  Atticae,  v.  18. 

TO.  S'  epya  Twi'  Trpa\6i\'TMi'  er  nij  TroAe/x'i)  ovk  €k 
Toii  TrapaTiiyoi'TOS  TTVvdavojievo'i  //^tojcra  ypucfieLV,  ovo 
(US  e/xoi  eSoKft,  aXX  ots  re  arros  irapiji',  Kat  irapa  TdU' 
aAAtoi'  ocrov  Swarov  aKpifiela  irepl  eKacrrov  eTre^eXOwv. 

Thucydides,  i.  22. 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 
VOL.  II 


THE    MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

1916 

./i/t  rights   reser'ved 


Copyright,  1908, 
By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  March,  1908.     Reprinted 
April,  May,  August,  1908  ;   January,  1909;  March,  1916. 


J.  S.  Gushing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 
Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


CONTENTS 

PART    III  (Continued) 

THE    SOUDAN 

1882-1907 

CHAPTER  XXVIII 

The  Fall  of  Khartoum 
October  5,  1884-Januaby  26,  1886 

Murder  of  Oslonel  Stewart— Difficulties  of  the  Expedition — News 
from  General  Gordon — Occupation  of  Jakdul — The  battle  of 
Abu  Klea — Death  of  Sir  Herbert  Stewart — The  column  reaches 
the  Nile — Two  steamers  leave  for  Khartoum — They  arrive  too 
late  —  Events  at  Khartoum  —  General  Gordon's  character  — 
Capitulation  of  Omdurmao — General  Gordon's  death — Effect 
on  public  opinion   .......  9 

CHAPTER  XXIX 

The  Evacuation  of  the  Soudak 
Januaby  26,  1885-Decbmber  30,  1886 

Lord  Wolseley  in-ges  the  necessity  of  an  autumn  campaign — The 
Government  hesitate — And  then  agree — Sir  Redvers  Buller 
retreats  to  Korti  —  Battle  of  Kirbekan  —  The  movement  on 
Berber  arrested — Operations  at  Suakin — Action  at  Hashin — 
And  at  Tofrik — Suspension   of  the   Suakin   operations — The 
autumn  campaign  abandoned — Question  of  holding  Dongola — 
Change  of  Government  in  England — Evacuation  of  Dongola — 
Death  of  the  Mahdi — Battle  of  Ginniss  —  Review  of  British 
policy  ........        19 

▼ 


vi  MODERN  EGYPT 

CHAPTER  XXX 

The  Debris  of  the  Soudan 

PAOl 

The  outlying  provinces  : — 1.  Darfour  :  Surrender  of  the  province — 
The  Senoussieh  sect — The  revolt  of  Abu  Geraaizeh.  2.  Bahr-el- 
Ghazal :  Lupton  Bey  surrenders — His  death.  3.  Equatoria : 
Emin  Pasha  summoned  to  surrender— He  maintains  his  posi- 
tion—The Stanley  expedition.  4.  Sennar :  The  garrison  sur- 
renders. 5.  iTassaia :  The  garrison  surrenders.  6.  The  Abyssinian 
Frontier  Garrisons :  The  Hewett  treaty  —  The  garrisons  of 
Amadib,  Senhit,  Galabat,  Gera,  and  Gedaref.  7.  Berbera: 
Its  political  status — It  is  occupied  by  British  troops.  8.  Ilarrar : 
Withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian  garrison — Installation  of  the  Emir 
Abdullah — King  Menelek  occupies  the  province.  9.  Zeyla : 
It  is  occupied  by  British  troops.  10.  Tajourrah  :  The  French 
occupy  it.  11.  Massowah  :  Its  political  status— Attitude  of  the 
British  Government — The  Italians  occupy  Massowah   •  .85 

CHAPTER   XXXI 

The  Defence  of  Egypt 

1886-1892 

The  Egyptian  army — Negotiations  with  the  Dervishes— Fighting  on 
the  frontier— The  siege  of  Suakin— Defeat  of  Osraan  Digna — 
Wad-el-Nejurai— Nejumi  advances— The  battles  of  Argin  and 
of  Toski— Death  of  Wad-el-Nejumi— Results  of  the  battle- 
Situation  at  Suakin— The  reoccupation  of  Tokar— Defeat  of 
Osman  Digna         .......        flO 

CHAPTER   XXXn 

The  Reconquest  of  Khartoum 

October  1895-September  1898 

Necessity  of  reconquering  the  Soudan — Danger  of  premature  action 
— The  Italian  defeat  at  Adua — It  is  decided  to  advance  on 
Dongola — Provision  of  funds — Sir  Herbert  Kitchener — Indian 
expedition  to  Suakin — Railway  construction — Battle  of  Firket 
— Capture  of  Dongola — The  Egyptian  Government  repay  the 
money  advanced  by  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt — The 
British  Government  advance  £800,000— Question  of  a  further 
oiTensive  movement — Capture  of  Abu  Hamed  and  Berber — 
Reoccupation  of  Kassala— British  troops  sent  to  the  Soudan — 
The  battle  of  the  Atbara— The  battle  of  Omdurman— Cost  of 
the  campaign—The  War  Office — The  policy  of  reconquest         .         79 


CONTENTS  vii 

CHAPTER    XXXIII 

The  New  Soudan 

PAQI 

Question  of  the  future  political  status  of  the  Soudan — Anomalies 
of  the  British  position  —  Objections  to  annexation  —  And  to 
complete  incorporation  with  Egypt — Intricacy  of  the  problem 
— The  two  flags — Speech  at  Omdurman — The  right  of  con- 
quest—  The  Agreement  of  January  19,  1899  —  Its  unusual 
nature — Its  reception  by  Europe — Advantages  of  a  Free  Trade 
policy         ........      HI 


PART    IV 
THE   EGYPTIAN   PUZZLE 

CHAPTER  XXXIV 

The  Dwellers  in  Egypt 

The  Englishman's  mission — Conditions  under  which  it  was  under- 
taken— Population  of  Egypt — Its  mixed  character — Hostility 
to  England  —  Main  tenets  of  Islam  —  Its  failure  as  a  social 
system — Degradation  of  women — Immutabihty  of  the  law — 
Slavery — Intolerance — Incidents  of  religious  belief  and  cere- 
monial— Mental  and  moral  attributes — Seclusion  of  women- 
Polygamy — Divorce — Coarseness  of  literature  and  conversation 
— Filial  piety — Government — Conservatism — Spirit  of  the  laws 
— Language — Art — Music — Customs — Obstacles  to  England's 
mission       ........      189 

CHAPTER  XXXV 

The  Moslems 

Classification  of  the  population  —  The  Turco  -  Egyptians  —  The 
Egyptians — The  hierarchy — The  Grand  Mufti — The  head  of 
the  El-Azhar  University —  The  Grand  Kadi  — The  Sheikh 
el-Bekri — Mohammed  el-Saadat — Abdul-Khalik  el-Saadat  — 
Mohammed  Abdu— Mohammed  Beyram — The  Omdehs  and 
Sheikhs — Their  submissiveness  to  the  Pashas — Their  sympathy 
with  Ardbi — Their  tyranny  over  the  fellaheen — Their  feelings 
towards  England — The  Fellaheen — The  Bedouins  .  .       168 

Appendix. — ^Translation  of  a  Letter  from  a  Sheikh  of  Keneh  to  a 

Sheikh  of  the  Mosque  of  Scyyidna-Hussein  at  Cairo     .  .       200 


viii  MODERN  EGYPT 

CHAPTER  XXXVI 

The  Christians 

PAOI 

The  Cons — The  conservatism  of  their  religion — Their  character — 
Their  attitude  towards  the  English — The  reform  movement — 
The  Syrians  —  Their  position  —  Their  unpopularity  —  Their 
attitude  towards  the  English  —  The  Armenians  —  Their  sub- 
serviency to  the  Turks — Nubar  Pasha — His  son  Boghos — 
Yacoub  Pasha  Artin — Tigrane  Pasha — The  Egyptians  should 
not  be  weighed  in  European  scales  ....      901 

CHAPTER  XXXVn 

The  Europeanised  Egyptians 

The  Europeanised  Egyptians  are  generally  Agnostics — Effects  of 
Europeanising  the  East — Gallicised  Egyptians — Attractions  of 
French  civiUsation  —  Unsuitabihty  of  the  French  system  to 
form  the  Egyptian  character  —  The  official  classes  generally 
hostile  to  England .......      928 

CHAPTER  XXXVIII 

The  Europeans 

Number  of  Europeans — The  Levantines — Their  characteristics^ 
The  Greeks — Their  commercial  enterprise — The  EngUsh — The 
Army  of  Occupation  —  Anglo  -  Egyptian  officials  —  Feelings 
entertained  by  other  Europeans  towards  the  English — Summary 
of  the  classes  friendly  and  hostile  to  England    .  .  .      945 

CHAPTER   XXXIX 
The  Machinery  of  Government 

Nature  of  the  machinery — Parts  of  the  machine — 1.  The  Sulta* 
—The  Firman  of  1892— The  Sinai  Peninsula— 9.  The  Khedivk 
— Rescript  of  August  28,  1878 — Constitutionalism  of  Tewfik 
Pasha — 3.  The  Ministers — The  Departments — Position  of  an 
Egyptian  Minister — 4.  The  Organic  Law  of  May  1,  1883 — 
The  Provincial  Councils  —  The  Legislative  Council  —  The 
Legislative  Assembly        ......      fW 


CONTENTS  ix' 

CHAPTER  XL 

The  British  Officials 

FAOa 

Qualifications  required  of  an  Anglo-Egyptian  official — Positions  of 
the  civil  and  military  officials  —  The  French  in  Tunis  —  The 
Financial  Adviser — Sir  Edgar  Vincent — The  Judicial  Adviser 

—  History  of  his  appointment — Sir  Raymond  West  —  Justice 
under  Egyptian  management — Sir  John  Scott — The  Public 
Works  Department — Sir  Colin  Scott-Moncrieff — Sir  William 
Garstin — The  Financial  Secretary — Blum  Pasha — Lord  Milner 

—  Sir  Eldon  Gorst  —  Sub -Departments  of  Finance  —  The 
Interior — Public  Instruction — European  and  Egyptian  officials       280 

CHAPTER  XLI 

The  International  Administrations 

Internationalism  —  1.  The  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt— 
Functions  of  the  Commission  —  The  Egyptian  Accounts  — 
The  Reserve  Fund — Uselessness  of  the  Commission — 2.  The 
Railway  Administration — 3.  The  Daira  Sanieh  —  4.  The 
Domains  Administration    ......      901 

CHAPTER  XLII 

The  Judicial  System 

The  Mixed  Courts — Nubar  Pasha's  objects  in  creating  them — 
Attributes  and  composition  of  the  Mixed  Courts — Defects  in 
the  institution — The  Consular  Courts — The  Native  Tribunals 
and  the  Kadi's  Courts — Summary  of  jurisdictions  in  Egypt     .      316 

CHAPTER  XLin 

The  Workers  of  the  Machine 

Importance  of  persons  rather  than  of  systems — The  British  Consul- 
General— Tewfik  Pasha— The  Prime  Ministers— Ch^rif  Pasha 
— ^Nubar  Pasha — Riaz  Pasha — Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi  .      S91 


X  MODERN  EGYPT 

PART  V 
BRITISH   POLICY   IN   EGYPT 

CHAPTER  XLIV 

The  Struggle  for  a  Policy 

1882-1883 

r»am 

Intentions  of  the  British  Government  —  Proposal  to  reduce  the 
garrison — Sir  Edward  Malet's  opinion — Difficulty  of  combining 
reform  and  evacuation — I  recommend  reduction  and  concentra- 
tion at  Alexandria — The  Government  approve  of  this  recom- 
mendation— The  reduction  is  countermanded     .  .  .      349 

Appendix. — Despatch  from  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  to  Earl  Granville, 

dated  October  9.  1883 363 

CHAPTER  XLV 

The  Northbrook  Mission 

September-November  1884 

It  is  decided  to  send  a  Special  Commissioner  to  Cairo — The  policy 
of  reporting — Lord  Northbrook  arrives  in  Egypt — His  financial 
proposals — His  General  Report — The  Government  reject  his 
proposals    .....«••      366 

CHAPTER  XLVI 

The  Wolff  Convention 

August  1885-October  1887 

Sir  Henry  Wolff  appointed  Special  Commissioner — Convention  of 
October  24,  1885— Moukhtar  Pasha— Convention  of  May  29, 
1887 — Comparison  of  the  two  Conventions — Frontier  affiiirs — 
The  army — Civil  reforms — Evacuation — France  and  Russia 
oppose  the  Convention — The  Sultan  refuses  to  ratify  it — 
Moukhtar  Pasha  permanently  located  in  Egypt — Results  of 
the  Wolff  mission  .......      371 

CHAPTER  XLVH 

The  Neutralisation  of  the  Suez  Canal 

Neutralisation  of  Egypt — Neutrahsation  of  the  Canal — The  word 
neutrality — Circular  of  January  3,  1883 — The  Suez  Canal  Com- 


CONTENTS  xi 

PAOB 

mission  of  1885— The  Commission  dissolved— The  Wolff  Gjn- 
Tention — Signature  of  the  Canal  Convention — Its  appUcation  .      S8i 

CHAPTER  XLVIII 

The  Anglo-French  Agreement  of  1904 

Apparent  insolubility  of  the  Egyptian  question — Gradual  change 
in  public  opinion — Statement  of  Lord  Ellenborough — The  busi- 
ness of  diplomacy — The  main  facts  of  the  problem— The  events 
of  1904 — Morocco — Signature  of  the  Anglo-French  Agreement 
— Remarks  on  the  Agreement     .  •  •  •  •      386 

PART   VI 
THE    REFORMS 

CHAPTER  XLIX 

The  Courbash 

Universal  nse  of  the  courbash — Lord  Dufferin's  Circular — It  was 

partially  inoperative — Final  abolition  of  the  courbash  .  ,      S97 

CHAPTER  L 

The  Corvee 

Connection  between  the  courbash  and  the  corvee  —  Merits  and 
demerits  of  the  corvee  system — The  corvee  law — Dredging  the 
canals — Proposed  reduction  of  the  land-tax — Proposal  to  abohsh 
the  corvee  instead  of  reducing  the  land-tax — The  Powers  object 
— Action  of  the  British  Government — The  corvee  is  not  called 
out — A  Decree  is  issued  partially  abolishing  the  corvee — Final 
lettlement  of  the  question  in  1892  .  .  •  .      406 

CHAPTER  LI 

Corruption 

Universality  of  corruption — Steps  taken  to  arrest  it — Example  of 

British  officials — Diminution  of  corrupt  practices  .  .       420 


xii  MODERN  EGYPT 

CHAPTER   LH 

European  Privilege 


TAOm 


Origin  of  the  Capitulations — Difference  between  Turkey  and  Egypt 
— Abuse  of  the  Capitulations — Raison  d'etre  of  European  privi- 
lege— Anomaly  of  the  British  position — Impossibility  of  arriving 
at  any  general  solution — Minor  changes — The  right  to  enact  by- 
laws— The  House  Tax — The  Professional  Tax — Proposal  to 
create  a  local  legislature — Internationalism         .  ,  ,      426 


CHAPTER  LHI 
Finance 

The  first  bankruptcy  of  Egypt— Risk  of  a  second  bankruptcy — The 
Race  against  bankruptcy — The  era  of  reform — Fiscal  relief 
— Reduction  of  taxation— Increase  of  revenue — Expenditure — 
Aggregate  surplus  since  1888— The  indebtedness  of  the  fella- 
heen— Distribution  of  land— Importance  of  the  financial  ques- 
tion   443 


CHAPTER  LIV 

Irrigation 

Nature's  bounty  to  Egypt — The  work  of  the  Pharaohs— Turkish 
neglect — Progress  under  British  guidance— Programme  of  the 
future — Causes  of  the  progress— Qualifications  of  the  officers 
selected  —  Absence  of  international  obstruction  —  Loan  of 
f  1,800,000 — Support  of  the  pubhc— Importance  of  the  work    .      456 


CHAPTER   LV 
The  Army 

Disbandment  of  the  army  in  1882— History  of  the  array— Mehemet 
Ali's  Syrian  campaigns- Ismail  Pasha— The  Abyssinian  cam- 
paign—Tel-el-Kebir— It  is  decided  to  form  a  fellaheen  array 
officered  by  Englishmen— The  black  battalions— Will  the  army 
fight  ?— Reasons  why  the  reorganisation  has  been  successfully 
conducted  ........      4^0 


CONTENTS  xiii 

CHAPTER  LVI 

The  Interior 

PAOB 

Uncertainty  of  British  policy — Difficulties  of  administrative  reform 
—  Lord  Dufferin's  Police  proposals  —  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  — 
Changes  made  in  the  Police  organisation  —  Nubar  Pasha's 
conflict  with  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd — The  latter  resigns — Friction  in 
the  Interior — Appointment  of  an  Adviser — And  of  Inspectors — 
Difficulties  of  the  present  moment  ....      478 

CHAPTER  LVn 

Sub-Departments  of  the  Interior 

1.  Prisons— State  of  the  prisons  in  1882— Reform— 2.  Slavery — 
The  Slave  Trade  and  slavery— The  Convention  of  1877— The 
Slave  Home — Change  of  opinion  in  Egypt — Success  of  the 
Convention — 3.  Medical  and  Sanitary  AoMiNiSTRAnoN — 
Egyptian  superstitions — Clot  Bey — State  of  things  in  1883 — 
Improvements  effected  —  Sanitary  reform  —  Impediments  to 
progress — Treatment  of  epidemics  ....      491 

CHAPTER  LVni 

Justice 

Sir  Edward  Malet's  opinion — The  Mixed  and  Consular  Courts^ 
The  Kadis'  Courts  —  The  Native  Tribunals  —  Justice  prior  to 
1883  —  The  French  system  taken  as  a  model  —  The  judicial 
machinery  —  Reforms  instituted  by  Sir  John  Scott  and  Sir 
Malcolm  Mcllwraith  —  Opposition  to  these  reforms — The 
personnel  of  the  Courts — Result  of  the  reforms  .  .  .514 

CHAPTER  LIX 

Education 

Educational  policy — Obstacles  to  progress — Want  of  money — The 
Pashas — Intellectual  awakening  of  Egypt — The  Mosque  schools 
— Primary  and  Secondary  education — Progress  made  in  forming 
the  characters  of  the  Egyptians — Female  education      .  ,      524 


xiv  MODERN  EGYPT 

CHAPTER  LX 

The  Soudan 


PAOB 


The  nature  of  the  Soudan  problem— Extent— Population— Results 
obtained  by  the  Convention  of  1899  — Executive  agency— 
Finance— Ilailways— Slavery         .....      543 

CHAPTER  LXI 

Conclusion 

Summary  of  this  work— Changes  since  the  time  of  Ismail — The 
British  reformers  —  Their  Egyptian  allies  —  Stability  of  the 
reforms       ........      555 


PART  vn 

THE   FUTURE    OF    EGYPT 

CHAPTER  LXn 

The  Future  of  Egypt 

Quo  Vadis?  —  The  question  of  the  occupation  —  Its  duration- 
Egyptian  autonomy— The  Capitulations— Desirability  of  train- 
ing the  Egyptians  —  Importance  of  finance — Display  of  sym- 
pathy—Conclusion ......       563 

APPENDIX 

Khedives  of  Egypt— British  Secretaries  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
—British  Agents  and  Consuls-General  in  Egypt— Chronological 
Table  of  Events     .......      573 

INDEX .685 


PART  III  (Continued) 
THE   SOUDAN 

1882-1907 


VOL.  II 


CHAPTER   XXVIII 

THE   FALL  OF   KHARTOUM 
October  5,  1884-January  26,  1885 

Murder  of  Colonel  Stewart — Difficulties  of  the  Expedition — News  from 
General  Gordon — Occupation  of  Jakdul — The  battle  of  Abu  Klea 
— Death  of  Sir  Herbert  Stewart — The  column  reaches  the  Nile 
— Two  steamers  leave  for  Khartoum — They  arrive  too  late — 
Events  at  Khartoum — General  Gordon's  character — Capitulation 
of  Omdurman — General  Gordon's  death — Effect  on  public  opinion. 

It  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to  write  a 
detailed  history  of  the  military  operations  which 
took  place  in  the  Soudan.  Those  operations  have 
been  recorded  by  others  who  are  more  competent 
than  myself  to  deal  with  military  matters.  I  pro- 
pose, therefore,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Egyptian 
campaign  of  1882,  merely  to  give  a  brief  sum- 
mary of  the  chief  events  connected  with  the  Nile 
Campaign  of  1884-85. 

Scarcely  had  the  campaign  commenced,  when 
news  arrived  that  Colonel  Stewart  had  been  killed. 
On  September  10,  he  left  Khartoum  in  a  steamer 
accompanied  by  Mr.  Power,  M.  Herbin,  the  French 
Consul,  and  about  forty  others.  Colonel  Stewart 
had  been  instructed  by  General  Gordon  to  inform 
the  various  authorities  concerned  of  the  true  nature 
of  the  situation  at  Khartoum.  Berber  and  Abu 
Hamed  were  passed  in  safety,  and  it  was  thought 
that  the  main  difficulties  of  the  voyage  had  been 
overcome,  when,  on  the  18th,  the  steamer  struck 


4  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

on  a  rock  near  the  village  of  Hebbah,  some  sixty 
miles  below  Abu  Hamed.  The  boat  was  hopelessly 
disabled.  Colonel  Stewart  and  his  companions 
landed,  and  were  subsequently  induced  to  lay  aside 
their  arms  and  enter  a  house  in  the  village,  where 
they  were  treacherously  murdered  by  Suleiman 
Wad  Gamr,  the  Sheikh  of  the  JNIonasir  tribe.  It 
is  singular  that  Colonel  Stewart,  who  must  have 
known  the  treacherous  character  of  the  Bedouins, 
should  have  fallen  into  the  trap  which  was  laid 
for  him.  The  explanation  has  probably  been 
afforded  by  General  Gordon,  who  said  that  Colonel 
Stewart  *'  was  not  a  bit  suspicious."  ^ 

I  have  frequently  in  the  course  of  this  narra- 
tive alluded  to  Colonel  Stewart's  high  character, 
judgment,  and  ability.  I  can  only  repeat  that  by 
his  premature  death  the  Queen  and  the  British 
nation  lost  a  most  capable  public  servant.  A  more 
gallant  fellow  never  lived. 

The  Nile  expedition.  Colonel  Colville  says,' 
"was  a  campaign  less  against  man  than  against 
time.  Had  British  soldiers  and  Egyptian  camels 
been  able  to  subsist  on  sand  and  occasional  water, 
or  had  the  desert  produced  beef  and  biscuit,  the 
army  might,  in  spite  of  its  late  start,  have  reached 
Khartoum  in  November."  The  difficulties  of 
supply   and   transport   were,   in  fact,    very  great. 

*  Journal,  p.  281.  The  whole  of  this  passage  is  worth  quoting,  as  it 
shows  what  a  singularly  accurate  forecast  General  Gordon  made  of  the 
manner  in  which  Colonel  Stewart  had  been  murdered,  before  he  had 
learnt  any  of  the  details.  "  I  feel  somehow,"  General  Gordon  wrote  on 
November  5,  ''convinced  they  were  captured  by  treachery — the  Arabs 
pretending  to  be  friendly  —  and  surprising  them  at  night.  I  will 
own  that,  without  reason  (apparently,  for  the  chorus  was  that  the 
trip  was  safe),  I  have  never  been  comfortable  since  they  left.  Stewart 
was  a  man  who  did  not  chew  the  cud,  he  never  thought  of  danger  in 
perspective  ;  he  was  not  a  bit  suspicious  (while  1  am  made  up  of  it). 
I  can  see  in  imajrination  the  whole  scene,  the  Sheikh  inviting  them 
to  land,  saying,  '  Thank  God,  the  Mahdi  is  a  liar/ — bringing  in  wood 
— men  going  on  shore  and  dis])ersed.  The  Abbas  with  her  steam  down, 
then  a  rush  of  wild  Arabs,  and  all  is  over  ! " 

'  Hiatory  of  the  Soudan  Campaign,  p.  61. 


CH.  XXVIII      FALL  OF  KHARTOUM  5 

But  British  energy  and  perseverance  overcame  them. 
By  the  end  of  December,  Lord  Wolseley  was  ready 
to  move  from  Korti  across  the  desert  to  Metemmeh. 
News  had  been  received  that  suppUes  were  run- 
ning short  at  Khartoum,  and  it  was  clear  that,  if 
General  Gordon  was  to  be  saved,  not  a  day 
would  have  to  be  lost  in  estabhshing  communica- 
tions with  him.  It  was  resolved  to  divide  the  British 
force  into  two  portions.  One  division,  under  Sir 
Herbert  Stewart,  was  to  take  the  desert  route. 
The  other,  under  General  Earle,  was  to  follow  the 
course  of  the  Nile  with  a  view  ultimately  to  the 
capture  of  Berber,  which  General  Gordon  had 
warned  Lord  Wolseley  "not  to  leave  in  his  rear." 

On  December  30,  the  day  on  which  Sir  Herbert 
Stewart  left  Korti,  a  messenger  arrived  with  a  piece 
of  paper  the  size  of  a  postage  stamp,  on  which  was 
written,  "Khartoum  all  right.  14.12.84.  C.  G. 
Gordon."  This  was  in  General  Gordon's  hand- 
writing, and  his  seal  was  affixed  to  the  back  of  the 
document.  The  letter  was,  however,  accompanied 
by  a  verbal  message  from  General  Gordon  which 
showed  the  straits  to  which  he  was  reduced. 
"  Our  troops,"  he  said,  "  at  Khartoum  are  suffering 
from  lack  of  provisions.  The  food  we  still  have 
is  Uttle,  some  grain  and  biscuit.  We  want  you 
to  come  quickly.  ...  In  Khartoum  there  is  no 
butter,  no  dates,  little  meat.    All  food  is  very  dear." 

The  force  which  left  Korti  at  3  p.m.  on  December 
80,  under  the  command  of  Sir  Herbert  Stewart, 
consisted  of  about  1100  British  officers  and  men, 
and  2200  camels.  It  reached  the  wells  of  Jakdul, 
ninety-eight  miles  distant,  early  on  the  morning  of 
January  2.  A  garrison  of  422  men  was  left  there 
with  instructions  to  rig  up  pumps  and  otherwise 
improve  the  water-supply.  On  the  evening  of  the 
2nd,  Sir  Herbert  Stewart  left  with  the  remainder 
of  the  force,  and  reached  Korti  at  noon  on  the  5th. 


6  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iii 

On  the  8th,  he  again  started  from  Korti  with  the 
main  body  of  the  desert  column,  consisting  of 
about  1600  eiFective  British  troops,  some  300 
camp-followers,  and  about  2400  camels  and  horses. 
His  orders  were  to  advance  and  occupy  Metemmeh, 
to  leave  a  strong  detachment  there,  and  then  to 
return  to  Jakdul.  Sir  Charles  Wilson  accompanied 
the  column,  and,  after  the  occupation  of  Metemmeh, 
was  to  proceed  to  Khartoum  at  once  with  a  small 
detachment  of  infantry  on  board  the  steamers 
which,  it  was  known,  were  in  the  neighbourhood. 
The  column  reached  Jakdul  early  on  the  morning 
of  the  12th.  After  halting  for  a  day,  the  march 
was  resumed.  On  the  night  of  the  16th,  the  force 
bivouacked  about  three  and  a  half  miles  from  the 
wells  of  Abu  Klea,  which  were  occupied  in  con- 
siderable force  by  the  Dervishes. 

On  the  following  morning  (the  17th),  the  force 
advanced  in  square  to  attack  the  enemy.  A 
desperate  engagement  ensued.  The  Dervishes 
charged  the  square  with  the  utmost  gallantry,  and 
succeeded  in  penetrating  a  gap  which  had  been 
temporarily  caused  in  its  rear  face.  The  camels, 
Colonel  Colville  says,  "  which  up  to  this  time  had 
been  a  source  of  weakness  to  the  square,  now 
became  a  source  of  strength.  The  spearmen  by 
weight  of  numbers  forced  back  the  rear  face  of  the 
square  on  to  the  camels ;  these  formed  a  Uving 
traverse  that  broke  the  rush,  and  gave  time  for  the 
right  face  and  front  face  to  take  advantage  of  find- 
ing themselves  on  higher  ground,  and  to  fire  over 
the  heads  of  those  engaged  in  a  hand-to-hand 
struggle  on  to  the  mass  of  the  enemy  behind. 
A  desperate  conflict  ensued  in  the  centre  of  the 
square,  but  the  slaughter  caused  by  the  musketry 
from  the  rising  ground  caused  the  rearward  Arabs 
to  waver  and  then  to  fall  back.  Within  the  square, 
the    din    of    battle   was   such   that   no   words   of 


CH.  XXVIII     FALL  OF  KHARTOUM  7 

command  could  be  heard,  and  each  man  was  obliged 
to  act  on  the  impulse  of  the  moment.  Officers  and 
men  aUke  fought  well  in  this  short  hand-to-hand 
encounter,  and  many  acts  of  heroism  were  per- 
formed. .  .  .  Before  five  minutes  had  elapsed,  the 
httle  band  of  less  than  1500  British  soldiers  had, 
by  sheer  pluck  and  muscle,  killed  the  last  of  the 
fanatics  who  had  penetrated  into  their  midst." 

The  victory  was  complete,  but  it  had  been 
dearly  bought.  Eighteen  officers  and  150  non- 
commissioned officers  and  men  were  killed  and 
wounded.  The  enemy's  loss  was  heavy;  1100 
bodies  were  counted  in  the  immediate  proximity  of 
the  square,  and  the  number  of  wounded  is  said  to 
have  been  very  great.  On  the  night  of  the  17th, 
the  troops  bivouacked  at  the  Abu  Klea  wells.  The 
baggage  animals  did  not  arrive  till  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  18th.  The  result  was  that  the 
troops  passed  the  night  without  food,  coats,  or 
blankets. 

Sir  Herbert  Stewart  then  determined  to  make  a 
night  march  to  Metemmeh,  about  twenty -three 
miles  distant.  At  4  p.m.  on  the  18th,  the  column 
left  Abu  Klea.  The  night  was  dark.  Many  of 
the  men  had  been  without  sleep  for  two  nights. 
The  camels  were  exhausted.  The  route  lay  for  a 
considerable  distance  through  thick  bush.  Halts 
were  numerous.  At  last,  after  a  toilsome  march 
of  some  sixteen  hours,  the  Nile  appeared  in  sight. 
It  was,  however,  apparent  that  the  river  could  not 
be  reached  without  further  fighting.  Whilst  pre- 
parations were  being  made  for  an  advance,  the 
Dervishes  kept  up  a  hot  fire  from  the  long  grass  in 
which  they  were  concealed.  It  was  at  this  moment 
that  the  gallant  Stewart  received  his  death-wound. 
Colonel  Burnaby,  who  it  had  been  intended  by 
Lord  Wolseley  should  succeed  Sir  Herbert  Stewart 
in  the  event  of  the  latter's  death,  had  been  killed 


8  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

at  Abu  Klea.     The  chief  command  devolved  on 
Sir  Charles  Wilson. 

At  3  P.M.  on  the  19th,  the  force  advanced  in 
square,  and  after  a  sharp  engagement,  in  which  an 
attack  of  the  Dervishes  was  successfully  repulsed, 
occupied  a  position  on  the  Nile  a  short  distance 
north  of  Metemmeh.  The  British  loss  on  this  day 
was  9  officers  and  102  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men  killed  and  wounded. 

On  the  following  morning  (the  20th),  the  force 
moved  to  Gubat.  At  10  a.m.  on  the  21st,  four 
steamers,  which  had  been  sent  by  General  Gordon, 
arrived  from  Khartoum.  They  brought  his  Journal 
and  several  letters,  in  one  of  which,  dated  December 
14,  he  said  that  he  expected  a  catastrophe  in  the 
town  after  ten  days'  time.  The  latest  news  was 
written  on  a  small  scrap  of  paper.  It  was  to  the 
following  effisct :  "  Khartoum  is  aU  right.  Could 
hold  out  for  years.  C.G.Gordon.  29.12.84."  It  was 
known  at  the  time  that  General  Gordon  wrote  this 
so  that,  in  the  event  of  his  letter  falling  into  the 
hands  of  the  Dervishes,  they  would  be  deceived.  In 
reaUty,  he  was  in  the  greatest  straits.  Obviously, 
the  next  thing  to  do  was  to  send  the  steamers  back 
to  Khartoum  with  some  soldiers  on  board  of  them. 
It  was  not,  however,  until  the  morning  of  the  24th 
that  two  steamers,  the  Bordein  and  the  Telaha- 
wiyeh,  left.  The  interval  between  the  21st  and 
the  24th  was  occupied  in  reconnaissances  both  up 
and  down  the  river,  and  in  making  arrangements 
for  the  proper  protection  of  the  force  at  Gubat.  ^ 

Both  the  steamers  carried  smaU  detachments 
of  British  soldiers,  as  well  as  larger  detachments  of 
Soudanese  troops.     Sir  Charles  Wilson  embarked 

*  The  delay  at  Gubat  has  formed  the  subject  of  much  discussion. 
The  conclusion  at  which  I  have  arrived,  after  a  careful  examination  of 
all  the  facts,  is  that  if  the  steamers  had  left  Gubat  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  21st,  they  would  probably  have  arrived  at  Khartoum  in  time  to  save 
the  towa. 


cH.  XXVIII     FALL  OF  KHARTOUM  9 

on  board  the  Bordein.  All  went  well  until,  at 
6  P.M.  on  the  25th,  the  Bordein  struck  on  a  rock 
in  the  Sixth  Cataract,  the  navigation  of  which  is 
intricate.  This  caused  a  delay  of  twenty-four  hours. 
On  the  night  of  the  26th,  the  steamers  were  only 
three  miles  nearer  Khartoum  than  they  had  been  on 
the  previous  evening.  An  early  start  was  made 
on  the  27th.  The  dangerous  gorge  of  Shabluka 
was  passed  without  difficulty.  The  steamers 
continued  their  voyage  under  a  musketry  fire 
from  the  banks,  and  in  the  evening  stopped  near 
the  small  village  of  Tamaniat.  During  the  after- 
noon, a  man  on  the  bank  called  out  that  Khartoum 
had  fallen  and  that  General  Gordon  had  been  killed, 
but  he  was  not  beheved  by  those  on  board.  The 
steamers  started  early  on  the  28th,  hoping  to  reach 
Khartoum  by  the  evening.  They  advanced  under  a 
heavy  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery  until  they  came 
within  sight  of  the  Government  House  at  Khar- 
toum. An  eager  search  was  made  through  glasses 
to  see  whether  the  Egyptian  flag  was  still  flying. 
No  sign  of  it  could  be  discovered.  More  than 
this,  as  the  steamers  advanced  it  was  seen  that 
Government  House  and  the  buildings  near  it 
had  been  wrecked.  The  Khartoum  side  of  the 
White  Nile  was  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy. 
It  was  clear  that  the  indomitable  defender  of 
Khartoum  had  at  last  succumbed.  The  expedition 
had  arrived  too  late.  Sir  Charles  Wilson  ordered 
the  steamers  to  be  put  about  and  to  run  down 
stream.  On  the  return  journey,  both  the  steamers 
were  wrecked,  but  those  on  board  were  rescued 
from  the  perilous  position,  in  which  they  were  at 
one  time  placed,  by  a  party  sent  out  in  the  steamer 
Safieh  under  Lord  Charles  Beresford.  On  the 
afternoon  of  February  4,  Sir  Charles  Wilson  and 
his  companions  rejoined  the  main  body  of  the 
British  troops,  which  were  encamped  at  Gubat. 


10  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

It  is  now  time  to  go  back  to  the  events  which 
were  passing  in  Khartoum. 

In  the  course  of  this  narrative,  I  have  alluded 
to  General  Gordon's  numerous  inconsistencies.  I 
have  pointed  out  errors  of  judgment  with  which  he 
may  justly  be  charged.  I  have  dwelt  on  defects 
of  character  which  unsuited  him  for  the  conduct 
of  political  affairs.  But,  when  aU  this  has  been 
said,  how  grandly  the  character  of  the  man  comes 
out  in  the  final  scene  of  the  Soudan  tragedy. 
History  has  recorded  few  incidents  more  calculated 
to  strike  the  imagination  than  that  presented  by 
this  brave  man,  who,  strong  in  the  faith  which 
sustained  him,  stood  undismayed  amidst  dangers 
which  might  well  have  appalled  the  stoutest  heart. 
Hordes  of  savage  fanatics  surged  around  him. 
Shot  and  shell  poured  into  the  town  which  he 
was  defending  against  fearful  odds.  Starvation 
stared  him  in  the  face.  "  The  soldiers  had  to 
eat  dogs,  donkeys,  skins  of  animals,  gum  and 
palm  fibre,  and  famine  prevailed.  The  soldiers 
stood  on  the  fortifications  Uke  pieces  of  wood. 
The  civilians  were  even  worse  off.  Many  died 
of  hunger,  and  corpses  filled  the  streets — no  one 
had  even  the  energy  to  bury  them."^  Treachery 
and  internal  dissension  threatened  him  from  within, 
whilst  a  waste  of  burning  African  desert  separated 
him  from  the  outward  help  which  his  countrymen, 
albeit  tardily,  were  straining  every  nerve  to  afford. 
"  All  the  anxiety  he  had  undergone  had  gradually 
turned  his  hair  to  silvery  white. "^  "Yet,"  said  an 
eye-witness,  "  in  spite  of  all  this  danger  by  which 
he  was  surrounded,  Gordon  Pasha  had  no  fear." 
"  Go,"  he  said,  "  teU  all  the  people  in  Khartoum 
that  Gordon  fears  nothing,  for  God  has  created 
him  without  fear."^     Nor  was  this  an  idle  boast. 

*  Account  given  by  Bordeini  Bey,  Mahdiism,  etc.,  p.  166. 
"  Mahdiism,  etc.,  p.  169.  *  Ibid.  p.  164. 


CH.  XXVIII     FALL  OF  KHARTOUM  11 

General  Gordon  did  not  know  what  the  word  fear 
meant.  Death  had  no  terrors  for  him.  "  I  would," 
he  wrote  to  his  sister,  "  that  all  could  look  on  death  as 
a  cheerful  friend,  who  takes  us  from  a  world  of  trial 
to  our  true  home."^  Many  a  man  before  General 
Gordon  has  laid  down  his  life  at  the  call  of  duty. 
Many  a  man  too  has  striven  to  regard  death  as  a 
glad  relief  from  pain,  sorrow,  and  suffering.  But 
no  soldier  about  to  lead  a  forlorn  hope,  no  Christian 
martyr  tied  to  the  stake  or  thrown  to  the  wild 
beasts  of  Ancient  Rome,  ever  faced  death  with 
more  unconcern  than  General  Gordon.  His  faith 
was  subhme.  Strong  in  that  faith,  he  could  meet 
the  savage  who  plunged  a  spear  into  his  breast 
with  a  "gesture  of  scorn,"^  and  with  the  sure 
and  certain  hope  of  immortality  which  had  been 
promised  to  him  by  the  Master  in  whose  footsteps 
he  had  endeavoured  to  follow. 

From  a  military  point  of  view,  the  defence  of 
Khartoum  was  a  splendid  feat  of  arms.  When 
Ismail  Pasha  tried  to  use  General  Gordon  as  a 
pawn  on  his  financial  and  political  chessboard, 
kindly  laughter  was  provoked  from  all  who  knew 
the  facts  or  who  knew  the  man.  General  Gordon 
was  too  rash  and  imj.ulsive  for  the  conduct  of 
political  affairs  in  this  work-a-day  world.  But  as 
the  military  defender  of  a  beleaguered  city,  he  was 
in  his  element.  The  fighting  instinct,  which  was 
strong  within  him,  had  full  scope  for  action.  His 
example  and  precept,  his  bravery  and  resource, 
encouraged  the  faint-hearted  and  enabled  him, 
even  with  the  poor  material  of  which  he  disposed, 
to  keep  a  formidable  enemy  at  bay  for  ten  long 
months.  His  personal  influence  was  felt  by  all 
the  inhabitants  of  the  town,  who  regarded  him 
as  their  sole  refuge  in  distress,  their  only  bulwark 
against  disaster. 

*  Letters,  etc.,  p.  xiL  •  Muhdiism,  etc.,  p.  171. 


12  MODERN  EGYPT  pi.  m 

To  return  to  the  narrative.  After  the  defeat 
of  El  Eilafun  on  September  1,  the  position  at 
Khartoum  became  well-nigh  desperate.  AU  the 
tribes  in  the  neighbourhood  submitted  to  the  Mahdi 
and  hurried  to  Khartoum  to  take  part  in  the  siege. 
"  They  fired  projectiles  from  the  guns,  rockets,  and 
fii'earms  of  all  descriptions,  which  fell  on  the  town 
from  all  sides.  From  time  to  time,  the  troops 
made  sorties  out  of  the  city  to  drive  them  off,  but 
almost  each  time  their  efforts  proved  fruitless,  and 
they  had  to  return  to  the  garrison,  for  the  pro- 
jectiles of  the  rebels  were  numerous."  On  January 
5,  1885,  Omdurman  capitulated.  "  Khartoum  then 
fell  into  a  dangerous  state.  The  rebels  surrounded 
it  from  all  sides,  and  cut  off  all  supplies.  .  .  .  The 
soldiers  suffered  terribly  from  want  of  food ;  some 
of  them  deserted  and  joined  the  rebels.  Gordon 
Pasha  used  to  say  every  day,  '  Tliey  [the  English] 
must  come  to-morrow,'  but  they  never  came,  and 
we  began  to  think  that  they  must  have  been 
defeated  after  all.  .  .  .  We  all  became  heart- 
broken, and  concluded  that  no  army  was  coming 
to  relieve  Khartoum."  The  townspeople  began  to 
talk  of  capitulation.  General  Gordon  appealed  to 
them,  on  January  25,  to  make  a  determined  stand 
for  another  twenty-four  hours,  by  which  time  he 
thought  that  the  Enghsh  relief  would  arrive. 
*'  What  more  can  I  say  ? "  were  his  words  to 
Bordeini  Bey.  "  The  people  will  no  longer  believe 
me.  I  have  told  them  over  and  over  again  that  help 
would  be  here,  but  it  has  never  come,  and  now  they 
must  see  I  tell  them  lies.  If  this,  my  last  promise, 
fails,  I  can  do  nothing  more.  Go  and  collect  all 
the  people  you  can  on  the  lines  and  make  a  good 
stand.     Now  leave  me  to  smoke  these  cigarettes.'' 

The  end  was  very  near.  Early  on  the  morning 
of  January  26,  by  which  time  Sir  Charles 
Wilson's   steamers   had   reached   the   foot   of  the 


CH.  XXVIII      FALL  OF  KHARTOUM  13 

Sixth  Cataract,  the  Dervishes  made  a  general  attack 
on  the  lines  and  met  with  but  a  feeble  resistance 
from  the  half- starved  and  disheartened  soldiers. 
Farag  Pasha,  the  commandant,  who  was  suspected 
of  treachery,  escaped  to  the  Mahdist  camp,  and  met 
his  death  a  short  time  afterwards  at  the  hands  of 
an  Arab  with  whom  he  had  a  blood  feud.  The 
Palace  was  soon  reached.  General  Gordon  stood  in 
front  of  the  entrance  to  his  office.  He  had  on  a  white 
uniform.  His  sword  was  girt  around  him,  but  he 
did  not  draw  it.  He  carried  a  revolver  in  his  right 
hand,  but  he  disdained  to  use  it.  The  final  scene, 
in  which  the  civilised  Christian  faced  barbarous 
and  triumphant  fanaticism,  is  thus  described  by 
Bordeini  Bey,  and  it  would  be  difficult,  whether  in 
tales  of  fact  or  of  fiction,  to  find  a  more  pathetic, 
or,  it  may  be  added,  a  more  dramatic  passage : 
"  Taha  Shahin  was  the  first  to  encounter  Gordon 
beside  the  door  of  the  Divan,  apparently  waiting 
for  the  Arabs  and  standing  with  a  calm  and 
dignified  manner,  his  left  hand  resting  on  the 
hilt  of  his  sword.  Shahin,  dashing  forward  with 
the  curse,  '  Malaoun^  el-yom  yomak '  (O  cursed 
one,  your  time  is  come !),  plunged  his  spear  into 
his  body.^  Gordon,  it  is  said,  made  a  gesture  of 
scorn  with  his  right  hand  and  turned  his  back, 
when  he  received  another  spear -wound,  which 
caused  him  to  fall  forward,  and  was  most  likely 
his  mortal  wound.  The  other  three  men  closely 
following  Shahin  then  rushed  in,  and  cutting  at 
the  prostrate  body  with  their  swords,  must  have 
killed  him  in  a  few  seconds.  His  death  occurred 
just  before  sunrise.  He  made  no  resistance,  and 
did  not  fire  a  shot  from  his  revolver.  From  all 
I  know,  I   am  convinced  that  he  never  intended 

*  From  information  subsequently  obtained,  it  would  appear  that 
General  Gordon  received  his  death-blow,  not  from  Taha  Shahin,  as 
stated  above,  but  from  Sheikh  Mohammed  Nebawi,  who  was  eventually 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Omdurmau. 


14  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

to  surrender.  I  should  say  that  he  must  have 
intended  to  use  his  revolver  only  if  he  saw  it 
was  the  intention  of  the  Arabs  to  take  him  prisoner 
aUve  ;  but  he  saw  such  crowds  rushing  on  him 
with  swords  and  spears,  and  there  being  no  im- 
portant Emirs  with  them,  he  must  have  known 
that  they  did  not  intend  to  spare  him,  and  that 
was  most  likely  what  he  wanted  ;  besides,  if  he  had 
fired,  it  could  only  have  delayed  his  death  a  few 
moments,  the  wild  fanatical  Arabs  would  never 
have  been  checked  by  a  few  shots  from  a  revolver. 
Gordon  Pasha's  head  was  immediately  cut  off  and 
sent  to  the  Mahdi  at  Omdurman,  while  his  body 
was  dragged  downstairs  and  left  exposed  for  a  time 
in  the  garden,  where  many  came  to  plunge  their 
spears  into  it."  ^ 

Foul  creatures  were  not  wanting  to  kick  the 
dead  lion.  Bordeini  Bey  goes  on  to  say  :  "  I  saw 
Gordon  Pasha's  head  exposed  in  Omdurman.  It 
was  fixed  between  the  branches  of  a  tree,  and  all 
who  passed  by  threw  stones  at  it.  The  first  to 
throw  a  stone  was  Youssuf  Mansour,  late  IMamour 
of  PoUce  at  El  Obeid,  whom  Gordon  Pasha  had 
dismissed  for  misconduct,  and  who  afterwards  com- 
manded the  Mahdi's  artillery." 

Thus  General  Gordon  died.  Well  do  I  remember 
the  blank  feeling  of  grief  and  disappointment  with 
which  I  received  the  news  of  his  death,  and  even 
now,  at  this  distance  of  time,  I  cannot  pen  the 
record  of  those  last  sad  days  at  Khartoum  without 
emotion.  If  any  consolation  can  be  offered  to 
those  who  strove,  but  strove  in  vain,  to  save  him, 
it  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  it  may  be  said 
of  General  Gordon,  perliaps  more  than  of  any  man, 
that  he  was  Jelia^  oppoi'tunitate  mortis. 

•  The  best  evidence  obtainable  j2:oes  to  prove  that  Bordeini  Bey's 
account  of  General  Gordon's  death  is  substantially  correct.  It  differs, 
however,  in  many  important  particulars  from  the  account  given  by 
M.  Neufeld  in  chap.  xxv.  of  ^  l'ri.soner  of  the  Khali/a. 


CH.  XXVIII      FALL  OF  KHARTOUM  15 

Could  we  but  choose  our  time  and  choose  aright, 
'Tis  best  to  die,  our  honour  at  the  height, 
When  we  have  done  our  ancestors  no  shame, 
But  served  our  friends,  and  well  secured  our  fame. 
Then  should  we  wish  our  happy  life  to  close, 
And  leave  no  more  for  fortune  to  dispose ; 
So  should  we  make  our  death  a  glad  relief 
From  future  shame,  from  sickness,  and  from  grief. 

Dryden's  Imes  may  well  serve  as  General  Gordon's 
epitaph.  He  died  m  the  plenitude  of  his  reputation, 
and  left  a  name  which  will  be  revered  so  long  as  the 
qualities  of  steadfast  faith  and  indomitable  courage 
have  any  hold  on  the  feelings  of  mankind. 

Rarely  has  pubUc  opinion  in  England  been  so 
deeply  moved  as  when  the  news  arrived  of  the  fall 
of  Khartoum.  The  daily  movements  of  the  reUef 
expedition  had  been  watched  by  anxious  multitudes 
of  General  Gordon's  countrymen,  yearning  for  news 
of  one  who  seemed  to  embody  in  his  own  person  the 
pecuhar  form  of  heroism  which  is  perhaps  most  of  all 
calculated  to  move  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.  When 
General  Gordon's  fate  was  known  a  wail  of  sorrow 
and  disappointment  was  heard  throughout  the 
land.  The  Queen's  feelings,  as  a  Sovereign  and  as 
a  woman  of  hvely  sympathies,  were  touched  to  the 
quick.  Her  Majesty  wrote  a  sympathetic  letter 
to  Miss  Gordon,  deeply  lamenting  her  "dear 
brother's  cruel,  though  heroic  fate."  On  this,  as 
on  other  occasions,  the  Queen's  language  truly 
represented  the  feehngs  of  the  nation.^     Yet  the 

*  On  March  19,  1885,  Sir  Henry  Ponsonby,  the  Queen's  Private 
Secretary,  wrote  to  me  :  "  I  now  quite  admit  that  I  did  not  understand 
Gordon,  that  I  did  not  see  what  you  did,  the  force  and  reality  of  liig 
position  and  requirements.  The  Government  were  to  hlame  in  not 
understanding?  this  also,  but  1  tliiuk  we  all  here— the  people,  high  and 
low— should  share  the  responsibility,  for  we  did  not  grasp  the  situation 
as  we  should  have  done.  The  Queen  was  in  a  terrible  state  about  the 
fall  of  Khartoum,  and  indeed  it  had  a  good  deal  to  do  with  making  her 
ill.     She  was  just  going  out  when  she  got  the  telegram,  and  sent  for 


16  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

British  nation  had  done  its  duty.  Parliament  voted 
supplies  in  no  grudging  spirit  to  enable  an  expedition 
to  be  sent  to  General  Gordon's  relief,  and  public 
opinion  ratified  the  vote.  The  British  army  also  sus- 
tained its  ancient  reputation.  Mistakes  may  have 
been,  and,  indeed,  were  made.  But  whatevei  judg- 
ment may  be  pronounced  by  competent  critics  in 
connection  with  some  points  of  detail,  the  true 
reasons  for  the  failure  must  be  sought  elsewhere. 
They  are  thus  stated  by  Sir  Reginald  Wingate : 
'•  To  innumerable  enemies,  flushed  with  victory 
and  ardent  fanaticism,  Gordon  exposed  a  skill  and 
experience  in  savage  warfare  which  few  could  equal. 
Ill-provisioned  in  a  place  naturally  and  artificially 
weak,  Gordon  for  months  preserved  an  undaunted 
front.  Neither  treachery  in  the  besieged  nor  the 
stratagems  of  the  besiegers  caused  the  fall  of 
Khartoum.  The  town  fell  through  starvation,  and 
despair  at  long  neglect.  There  were  no  elements 
of  chance  in  the  expedition  to  relieve  General 
Gordon.  It  was  sanctioned  too  late.  As  day  by 
day  no  Enghsh  came,  so  day  by  day  the  soldiers' 
hearts  sank  deeper  and  deeper  into  gloom.  As  day 
by  day  their  strength  wasted,  so  that  finally  gum, 
their  only  food,  was  rejected,  so  day  by  day  the 
Nile  ebbed  back  from  the  ditch  it  had  filled  with 
mud,  and  from  the  rampart  it  had  crumbled,  and 
left  a  broad  path  for  who  should  dare  to  enter."  * 

me.  She  then  went  out  to  my  cottage,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  off,  walked 
into  the  room,  pale  and  trembling,  and  said  to  my  wife,  who  was 
terrified  at  her  appearance — '  Too  late  ! '  " 

Throughout  the  wliole  of  this  difficult  period,  I  received  the  utmost 
support  from  the  Queen.  On  March  13,  18R5,  the  following  note, 
written  by  Her  Majesty,  was  communicated  to  me  by  my  brother  (Mr. 
Edward  Baring,  subse(iuently  Lord  Revelstoke) :  ''The  concluding 
paragraph  of  Sir  E.  Baring's  telegram"  (I  am  not  quite  sure  to  what 
particular  telegram  allusion  is  here  made)  "  is  admirable.  Let  the 
Queen  have  a  copy.  She  wishes  Mary"  (Lady  Ponsonby,  who  was 
Lady  Revelstoke's  sister)  "  would  tell  Mr.  Edward  Baring  that  the 
Queen  has  endorsed  everything  his  brother  has  said." 

1  Mahdiism,  etc.,  p.  15G. 


CH.  XXVIII     FALL  OF  KHARTOUM  17 

In  a  word,  the  Nile  expedition  was  sanctioned 
too  late,  and  the  reason  why  it  was  sanctioned  too 
late  was  that  Mr.  Gladstone  would  not  accept 
simple  evidence  of  a  plain  fact,  which  was  patent 
to  much  less  powerful  intellects  than  his  own. 
Posterity  has  yet  to  decide  on  the  services  which 
Mr.  Gladstone,  during  his  long  and  brilliant  career, 
rendered  in  other  directions  to  the  British  nation, 
but  it  is  improbable  that  the  verdict  of  his  con- 
temporaries in  respect  to  his  conduct  of  the  affairs 
of  the  Soudan  will  ever  be  reversed.  That  verdict 
has  been  distinctly  unfavourable.  **  Les  fautes  de 
I'homme  puissant,"  said  an  eminent  Frenchman,^ 
"sont  des  malheurs  publics."  Mr.  Gladstone's 
error  of  judgment  in  delaying  too  long  the  despatch 
of  the  Nile  expedition  left  a  stain  on  the  reputa- 
tion of  England  which  it  will  be  beyond  the  power 
of  either  the  impartial  historian  or  the  partial 
apologist  to  efface. 

*  Senancour. 


VOL.  II 


CHAPTER   XXIX 

THE   EVACUATION    OF   THE    SOUDAN 
January  26,  1885-December  30,  1886 

Lord  Wolseley  urges  the  necessity  of  an  autumn  campaign — The 
Governmeut  hesitate  —  And  then  agree  —  Sir  Redvers  Buller 
retreats  to  Korti — Battle  of  Kirhekan — The  movement  on  Berber 
arrested — Operations  at  Suakin — Action  at  Hashin — And  atTofrik 
— Suspension  of  the  Suakin  operations — 'l"he  autumn  campaign 
•  abandoned — Question  of  holding  Dongola — Change  of  Government 
in  England — Evacuation  of  Dongola — Death  of  the  Mahdi — Battle 
of  Ginniss — Review  of  British  policy. 

When  Lord  Wolseley  heard  of  the  battle  of  Abu 
Klea  and  of  Sir  Herbert  Stewart  having  been 
wounded,  he  decided  to  send  Sir  Redvers  Buller  to 
take  command  of  the  desert  column,  and  to  rein- 
force it  by  two  battalions.  Shortly  afterwards,  news 
arrived  of  the  fall  of  Khartoum.  General  Earle  was 
ordered  to  arrest  the  forward  movement  of  the  river 
column  on  Abu  Hamed.  Pending  the  receipt  of 
instructions  from  London  as  to  the  policy  which 
was  now  to  be  pursued,  a  discretionary  power  was 
left  to  Sir  Redvers  Buller  to  act  according  to  local 
circumstances.  General  Earle  accordingly  halted  at 
Berti,  about  midway  between  Korti  and  Abu  Hamed. 
Sir  Redvers  Buller  arrived  at  Gubat  on  February  11. 
He  found  that  there  were  only  about  twelve  days' 
supplies  at  Gubat,  and  another  twelve  days' 
supplies  at  Abu  Klea,  whilst  the  camels  were  in  a 
weak  and   emaciated   condition.     News  had  been 

18 


CH.  XXIX  THE  EVACUATION  19 

received  that  a  Dervish  force  of  about  4000  men 
and  six  guns  was  on  its  way  from  Khartoum  to 
Gubat.  Sir  Redvers  Buller,  therefore,  wisely 
decided  to  fall  back  on  Jakdul.  The  retreat  began 
on  February  14.  Jakdul  was  reached  on  the  26th. 
In  the  meanwhile,  the  British  Government  were 
in  a  position  of  great  difficulty.  The  sole  object 
of  the  expedition  had  been  to  bring  General  Gordon 
and  Colonel  Stewart  away  from  Khartoum.  This 
object  had  not  been  attained.  Obviously,  unless  the 
policy  of  the  Government  was  to  undergo  a  com- 
plete change,  the  most  logical  course  to  have  pursued 
would  have  been  to  desist  from  any  further  inter- 
ference in  the  Soudan,  to  withdraw  the  British 
troops  to  some  good  strategical  position  in  the 
valley  of  the  Nile,  and  there  to  await  the  attack 
of  the  Mahdist  forces.  This  was  what  was 
eventually  done,  and,  judged  by  the  light  of  after 
events  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  it  would 
have  been  better  if  the  Government  had  at  once 
decided  to  take  up  a  defensive  attitude.  It  can, 
however,  be  no  matter  for  surprise  that,  in  the 
first  instance,  the  Government  decided  otherwise. 
British  public  opinion  was  greatly  excited.  Both 
the  natioti  and  the  army  were  smarting  under  a  sense 
of  failure.  The  soldiers  were  burning  to  avenge 
their  comrades,  and  to  show  the  Dervishes  that 
they  were  no  match  for  British  troops.  It  was 
certain  that  the  fall  of  Khartoum  would  increase 
the  influence  and  prestige  of  the  Mahdi ;  neither 
was  it  easy  to  foresee  what  might  be  the  effect  of 
his  success  in  Egypt,^  and  amongst  Mohammedans 
in  other  parts  of  the  world. 

^  Directly  the  news  of  the  fall  of  Khartoum  reached  Cairo  on 
February  6,  1  telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville  as  follows :  "  It  is  too 
early  to  express  any  opinion  worth  having  as  to  the  effect  wl)ich  tlie 
fall  of  Khartoum  will  produce  in  Egypt  proper.  Moreover,  much  will 
no  doubt  depend  on  the  course  which  Her  Majesty's  Government  now 
decide  to  pursue  in  the  Soudan.      But  I  may  say  that,  so  far  as  I  tan 


20  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

General  Gordon's  fame  was  then  at  its  zenith. 
His  Journal,  which  had  been  received,  and  was 
immediately  published,  gave  a  clear  indication 
of  his  views.  He  strongly  advocated  a  policy 
of  "smashing  up"  the  JNJahdi.  The  weight  of 
Lord  Wolseley's  authority  was  thrown  into  the 
same  scale.  He  deprecated  the  adoption  of  a 
defensive  policy.  "  It  must  never  be  forgotten," 
he  said,  *'that  the  question  of  whether  this  war 
shall  or  shall  not  go  on  does  not  rest  with  us, 
unless  we  are  prepared  to  give  up  Egypt  to  the 
False  Prophet.  We  shall  not  bring  about  a  quiet 
state  of  affairs  by  adopting  a  defensive  poHcy. 
The  Mahdi  has  repeatedly  declared  it  to  be  lus 
full  and  settled  intention  to  possess  himself  of 
Egypt,  and  his  followers  look  upon  themselves  as 
engaged  in  a  war  the  object  of  which  is  not  to  rest 
contented  with  the  capture  of  Berber,  but  to  drive 
the  infidels  into  the  sea."  Lord  Wolseley  thought 
that  the  final  struggle  with  Mahdiism  might  perhaps 
be  staved  off  for  a  few  years,  but  these  years,  he 
said,  "will  be  years  of  trouble  and  disturbance 
for  Egypt,  of  burdens  and  strains  to  our  military 
resources,  and  the  contest  that  will  come  in  the 
end  will  be  no  less  than  that  which  is  in  front  of 
us  now.  This  is  all  we  shall  gain  by  a  defensive 
poHcy."  There  could,  he  thought,  be  little  differ- 
ence of  opinion  as  to  the  line  of  action  which  was 
"  most  befitting  our  national  dignity  and  honour." 
The  Mahdi  must  be  crushed.  That,  Lord  Wolseley 
thought,  was  the  only  policy,  "worthy  of  the 
Enghsh  nation." 

Tliese  views  were  shared  by  others  on  the  spot. 
The  Government  had,  therefore,  to  face  a  strong 

at  present  judjre,  I  do  not  anticipate  any  disturbance  so  far  as  the 
Egyptian  population  is  concerned.  The  effect  produced  upon  the 
Bedouins  on  the  frontier  is  more  difficult  to  forecast,  and  it  would  be 
as  well  to  be  prepared  to  send  at  short  notice  another  battalion  to 
Assouan,  as  proposed  some  little  while  ago  by  Lord  ^V'^olseley." 


3H.XXIX  THE  EVACUATION  21 

body  of  local  opinion  favourable  to  offensive  action. 
At  first,  the  Ministers  hesitated,  and  they  might 
well  do  so,  for  they  were  asked  to  embark  on  a 
crusade  against  Mohammedan  fanaticism,  to  adopt 
an  adventurous  policy  of  which  no  one  could  foresee 
the  end,  and  to  wage  a  costly  war  in  a  remote 
country  under  conditions  of  exceptional  difficulty 
imposed  by  the  climate,  by  the  scantiness  of  local 
supplies,  and  by  the  absence  of  facilities  for  trans- 
port and  locomotion.  Lord  Wolseley  had  warned 
them  that  "the  strength  and  composition  of  his 
little  army  was  calculated  for  the  relief,  not  for  the 
siege  and  capture  of  Khartoum,  the  tM^o  operations 
being  entirely  different  in  character  and  magnitude. 
.  .  .  Khartoum  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy  could 
not  be  retaken  until  the  force  under  his  command 
had  been  largely  augmented  in  numbers  and  in 
artillery." 

Lord  Wolseley's  first  instructions,  which  were 
issued  on  February  6,  were  "  to  check  the  advance 
of  the  Mahdi  in  districts  now  undisturbed." 
"Whether,"  it  was  added,  "it  will  be  ultimately 
necessary  to  advance  on  Khartoum  or  not,  cannot 
now  be  decided."  I  was  at  the  same  time  told  to 
give  the  Khedive  general  assurances  of  support, 
and  to  inform  Lord  Wolseley  that  it  was  the 
desire  of  the  Cabinet  "that  if  the  Mahdi  should 
make  any  proposals  he  should  transmit  them 
immediately  to  Her  Majesty's  Government  for 
their  consideration."  The  Mahdi  never  made  any 
proposals,  neither  was  there  at  this  or  any  other 
time  the  smallest  likelihood  of  his  doing  so.  I^ord 
Wolseley  replied  that  Lord  Hartington's  telegram 
gave  him  "  no  information  as  to  the  policy  with 
reference  to  the  Soudan  which  Her  JMajesty's 
Government  meant  to  pursue."  Thus  pressed, 
the  Government  yielded.  On  February  9,  Lord 
Hartington  telegraphed  to  Lord  Wolseley  :  "  Your 


•22  MODERN  EGYPT  Fr.  iii 

military  policy  is  to  be  based  on  the  necessity, 
which  we  recognise  on  the  statement  of  facts  now 
before  us,  that  the  power  of  the  JNIahdi  at  Khartoum 
must  be  overthrown." 

Unquestionably,  it  was  a  mistake  to  issue  these 
orders.  It  is  easy  to  see  now  that  both  General 
Gordon  and  Lord  Wolseley  credited  the  Mahdi  with 
an  amount  of  strength  for  offensive  purposes  which 
he  was  far  from  possessing.  But  this  was  not  so 
clear  then  as  it  became  later.  Lord  Wolseley, 
therefore,  thanked  Lord  Hartington  for  his  "  ex- 
plicit statement  of  policy,"  and  added :  "  I  am 
sure  it  is  the  correct  one,  as  the  JNIahdi's  power 
is  incompatible  with  good  government  in  Egypt." 

The  military  arrangements  necessary  for  giving 
effect  to  the  policy  of  the  Government  had  then  to 
be  settled.  An  immediate  advance  on  Khartoum 
was  out  of  the  question.  Time  would  be  required 
for  the  necessary  reinforcements  to  come  from 
England.  Moreover,  the  hot  season  was  approach- 
ing. Lord  Wolseley,  therefore,  determined  to 
capture  Berber  and  Abu  Hamed  by  a  combined 
movement  of  the  forces  under  Sir  Redvers  Buller 
and  General  Earle,  and  to  hold  those  places  during 
the  summer,  preparatory  to  an  advance  on  Khartoum 
during  the  ensuing  cool  season.  At  the  same  time, 
a  force  was  to  co-operate  from  Suakin  with  a  view 
to  keeping  open  the  road  to  Berber.  "  The  sooner," 
Lord  Wolseley  telegraphed  to  Lord  Hartington, 
"you  can  now  deal  with  Osman  Digna  the  better." 

Sir  Redvers  Buller  was  ordered,  on  February  10, 
to  take  Metemmeh  "as  soon  as  he  felt  himself 
strong  enough  to  do  so,"  and  then  to  combine  with 
General  Earle  in  an  attack  on  Berber.  He  re- 
ceived these  instructions  late  on  the  night  of  the 
13th,  when  he  had  already  partly  evacuated  Gubat, 
and  had  made  all  the  arrangements  necessary  for 
leaving   it   entirely  at   daylight   on   the  following 


CH.  XXIX  THE  EVACUATION  23 

morning.  For  reasons  which  have  been  already 
given,^  Sir  Redvers  Buller  decided  to  continue  the 
retrograde  movement  on  Abu  Klea.  The  course 
he  adopted  met  subsequently  with  the  approval  of 
Lord  Wolseley. 

Orders  were  issued  for  the  desert  column  to 
move  on  Merowi,  but  in  the  meanwhile  it  had 
become  clear  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  under- 
take operations  such  as  those  contemplated  by 
Lord  Wolseley.  Sir  Redvers  Buller  wrote  several 
letters  to  Lord  Wolseley  from  Jakdul  in  which 
"  he  not  only  drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
transport  of  the  desert  column  was  completely 
exhausted,  but  further  stated  that  the  boots  of  the 
men  were  thoroughly  worn  out,  and  that  many  of 
them  were  almost  shoeless."  Sir  Evelyn  Wood, 
who  was  also  at  Jakdul,  confirmed  the  views 
expressed  by  Sir  Redvers  Buller.  "  I  do  not 
think,"  he  wrote  on  February  20,  "  that  the  debili- 
tated state  of  our  transport  is  reaUsed  at  Korti." 
Manifestly,  a  retreat  on  Korti  was  imposed  by  the 
circumstances  of  the  situation.  Lord  Wolseley's 
original  plan,  under  which  a  combined  movement 
of  the  river  and  desert  columns  was  to  be  made  on 
Berber,  was  no  longer  feasible.  The  last  troops  of 
the  desert  column  arrived  at  Korti  on  JNlarch  16. 

I  now  turn  to  the  movements  of  the  river 
column.  Lord  Wolseley's  orders  to  halt  reached 
General  Earle  on  February  5.  On  the  8th,  General 
Earle  received  orders  to  push  on  to  Abu  Hamed. 
These  were  supplemented  later  on  the  same  day  by 
orders  to  advance  on  Berber,  and  to  co-operate  with 
Sir  Redvers  Buller  in  the  capture  of  that  place. 
Shortly  after  leaving  Berti,  the  enemy  were  found  in 
force  occupying  a  ridge  called  Jebel  Kirbckan.  On 
the  10th,  they  were  attacked  and  driven  from  the 
position   with   heavy  loss.     The    British    loss   was 

*   Vide  ante,  p.  18. 


24  INIODERN  EGYPT  ft.  in 

7  officers  and  50  men  killed  and  wounded.  It  was 
in  this  action  that,  to  the  great  sorrow  of  all  who 
knew  him,  General  Earle  lost  his  life.  After  his 
death.  General  Brackenbury  assumed  the  command 
of  the  river  column. 

Subsequently  to  the  action  at  Kirbekan,  the  for- 
ward movement  was  continued.  On  February  24, 
when  the  column  was  about  thirty  miles  from  Abu 
Hamed,  General  Brackenbury  received  a  message 
from  Lord  Wolseley  informing  him  of  the  retreat 
of  the  desert  column.  "  1  have,"  Lord  Wolseley 
said,  "abandoned  all  hope  of  going  to  Berber 
before  the  autumn  campaign  begins."  General 
Brackenbury  was,  therefore,  ordered  to  withdraw 
his  force  to  JNIerowi.     He  arrived  there  on  March  5. 

It  is  now  time  to  describe  the  operations  in 
the  vicinity  of  Suakin.  Sir  Gerald  Graham  was 
appointed  to  the  chief  command.  His  instructions 
were  to  make  the  best  arrangements  he  could  for 
"  the  destruction  of  the  power  of  Osman  Digna." 
When  this  had  been  done,  he  was  to  "  arrange  for 
the  military  occupation  of  the  Hadendowa  terri- 
tory, lying  near  the  Suakin -Berber  road."  He 
was  further  directed  to  do  all  in  his  power  to 
facilitate  the  construction  of  the  Suakin -Berber 
railway.  A  force  of  13,000  men  was  placed  at  his 
disposal,  consisting  of  British  and  British -Indian 
troops,  and  also  of  a  battalion  of  infantry  and  a 
battery  of  artillery,  which  were  lent  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  New  South  Wales. 

By  the  middle  of  INlarch,  the  force  was  ready  for 
action,  and  Sir  Gerald  Graham  proceeded  to  carry 
out  the  first  portion  of  his  instructions,  namely,  to 
crush  Osman  Digna.  It  was  reported  that  the 
main  body  of  the  Dervishes,  in  number  about 
7000,  occupied  Tamai,  whilst  smaller  bodies  held 
Hashin  and  Handoub,  all  places  lying  within  a 
few  miles  of  Suakin.     It  was  decided,  in  the  first 


CH.XXIX  THE  EVACUATION  25 

instance,  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  Hashin.  This 
object  was  effected  on  JNlarch  20  and  21,  with  the 
loss  of  1  officer  and  44  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men  killed  and  womided.  The  force  then 
returned  to  Suakin. 

The  next  step  was  to  crush  the  main  Dervish 
force  at  Tamai.  On  INIarch  22,  a  force  under  Sir 
John  McNeill  left  Suakin.  Sir  John  JNIcNciU's 
orders  were  to  establish  an  intermediate  post  be- 
tween Suakin  and  Tamai.  At  10.30  a.m.  the 
troops  halted  at  a  spot  named  Tofrik,  a  few  miles 
from  Suakin,  and  proceeded  to  entrench  themselves 
in  a  stockade.  Whilst  many  of  the  men  were 
scattered  in  the  act  of  cutting  brushwood,  a  sudden 
attack  was  made  by  a  body  of  about  5000  Dervishes. 
A  scene  of  great  confusion  ensued.  Many  of  the 
Dervishes  penetrated  into  the  half-formed  stockade. 
After  twenty  minutes  of  confused  fighting,  they  were 
driven  back  with  the  loss  of  1500  in  killed  besides 
many  wounded,  but  the  British  force  suffigred 
severely.  Fifteen  officers  and  278  non-commissioned 
officers  and  men  were  killed,  wounded,  or  missing. 
The  camp-followers  suffered  severely.  Five  hun- 
dred camels  were  killed  or  missing.  Shortly  after 
this  engagement,  Osman  Digna  withdrew  his  forces 
from  Tamai,  which  was  occupied  by  Sir  Gerald 
Graham  on  April  3. 

According  to  the  terms  of  his  original  instruc- 
tions. Sir  Gerald  Graham  should  now  have  turned 
his  attention  to  opening  up  the  route  for  the  rail- 
way. On  April  15,  however,  orders  were  issued 
from  London  to  suspend  the  construction  of  the 
railway.  Suakin  was  "  to  be  held  for  the  present, 
as  also  any  position  in  the  neighbourhood  necessary 
for  protection  from  constant  attacks  as  last  year.'* 

Whilst  the  operations  described  above  were 
going  on,  the  policy  of  the  British  Government  had 
undergone  a  complete  change.     In  the  middle  of 


26  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

February,  Lord  AVolseley  wished  to  issue  a  Procla- 
mation to  the  people  of  the  Soudan  to  the  effect 
that  his  mission  was  "  to  destroy  utterly  the  power 
of  the  JNIahdi  at  Khartoum."  ^  The  Government 
agreed  to  the  issue  of  this  Proclamation  with  a 
characteristic  amendment,  which  was  made  at  the 
instigation  of  Mr.  Gladstone.  It  was  stipulated 
that  the  word  "utterly"  should  be  omitted  from 
the  Proclamation.  Two  months  later,  the  Govern- 
ment had  decided  to  go  farther  than  the  omission 
of  the  word  "  utterly  "  from  a  Proclamation.  The 
Mahdi  was  neither  to  be  utterly  destroyed  nor, 
indeed,  destroyed  at  all,  but  was  to  be  left  alone 
for  the  time  being  to  rule  undisturbed  over  the 
inhospitable  deserts  of  the  Soudan. 

Many  considerations  contributed  to  bring  about 
this  change  of  policy,  or  perhaps  it  should  rather 
be  said,  to  bring  about  a  return  to  the  original 
poHcy  of  the  Government,  which  in  a  moment  of 
excitement  had  been  too  hastily  abandoned. 
Pubhc  opinion  in  England,  which  had  been 
violently  excited  when  the  news  of  the  fall  of 
Khartoum  arrived,  had  somewhat  calmed  down. 
It  had  found  its  natural  and  constitutional  safety- 
valve  in  the  shape  of  an  acrimonious  debate  in 
Parliament,  resulting  in  a  division  in  which  the 
Government  narrowly  escaped  defeat.  The  military 
operations  subsequent  to  the  fall  of  Khartoum  had 
shown  that  any  forward  movement  in  the  autumn 
would  be  a  costly  and  difficult  undertaking.     The 

'  This  Proclamation,  as  it  was  originally  drafted,  consisted  of  short, 
crisp  sentences,  with  somewhat  of  a  Napoleonic  ring  about  them,  which,  it 
was  supposed,  would  create  a  deep  impression  on  the  people  of  the  Soudan. 
I  gave  it  to  a  talented  Kgyptian  friend  of  mine,  after  it  had  been  trans- 
lated into  Arabic,  and  asked  him  to  give  me  his  opinion  upon  it.  He 
said  that  he  thorouglily  understood  what  was  meant,  but  that  to  the 
Soudanese  the  Proclamation  would  be  quite  incomprehensible.  At  my 
ri'(]uest,  he  prepared  a  counter  project  conveying  the  same  ideas  in 
dirterent  language.  It  was  an  extremely  eloquent  document,  and 
reminded  me,  more  especially  in  its  vituperative  passages,  of  a  chapter 
in  Isaiah. 


cH.xxix  THE  EVACUATION  27 

voices  of  politicians  and  diplomatists,  which  had  at . 
first  been  hushed  by  the  clang  of  arms,  began  to 
be  heard.  The  disadvantages  of  an  offensive,  and 
the  advantages  of  a  defensive  policy  became  more 
and  more  clear  as  the  matter  was  calmly  considered. 
Further — and  this  exercised  a  very  material  in- 
fluence on  the  views  of  the  Government — affairs 
on  the  Indian  frontier  gave  cause  for  anxiety.^  It 
was,  therefore,  undesirable  to  engage  in  a  campaign 
in  the  Soudan,  which  would  in  some  degree  cripple 
the  military  strength  of  the  nation  in  the  event  of 
the  services  of  the  army  being  required  elsewhere. 
The  sound  good  sense  of  the  British  nation,  which 
was  well  represented  m  the  Gladstone  Cabinet, 
reasserted  itself,  and  a  policy  based  upon  a  sober 
appreciation  of  national  interests  was  eventually 
adopted.^  On  April  21,  it  was  announced  in  both 
Houses  of  Parhament  that  it  was  not  intended  to 
advance  on  Khartoum  or  to  undertake  any  further 
offensive  operations  in  the  Soudan.  Lord  Wolseley 
was  instructed  accordingly. 

The  question  then  arose  whether  the  British 
and  Egyptian  troops  should  continue  to  hold 
Dongola,  or  whether  they  should  fall  back  to 
some  more  northerly  point  along  the  valley  of 
the  Nile. 

Lord  Wolseley 's  opinions  were  expressed  im- 
mediately after  the  Government  had  decided   to 

*  The  news  that  General  Komaroff  had  attacked  and  defeated  the 
Afghans  at  Penjdeh  readied  London  on  April  10. 

2  On  April  3,  I  wrote  a  private  letter  to  Lord  Granville  in  which, 
after  dwelling'  on  the  ambiguity  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  statements  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  I  urged  the  necessity  of  facing  the  facts  and  of 
laying  down  some  definite  Soudan  policy  for  the  future.  I  concluded 
in  the  following  words  :  "Tlie  main  question  which  1  have  propounded 
in  this  letter  is  as  follows : — Do  the  English  Government  intend  to 
establish  a  settled  form  of  government  at  Khartoum  or  not?  My  own 
opinion  is  that  this  question  should  be  answered  in  the  negative. 
Hence,  I  am  of  opinion  tliat  tlie  military  decision  to  advance  to 
Khartoum  should  be  reversed  and  that  no  such  advance  should  take 
place." 


28  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

abandon  the  idea  of  an  autumn  campaign  against 
the  Mahdi.  "  If,"  he  telegraphed  to  Lord  Hart- 
ington  on  April  14,  "  our  position  is  to  be  ex- 
clusively one  of  defence,  I  would  hold  Wadi 
Haifa  and  Korosko  as  outposts,  with  a  strong 
brigade  at  Assouan."  The  next  day  he  added : 
"  Hold  on  to  Dongola  province.  As  long  as 
you  do  this,  you  prevent  Mahdiism  spreadLig  in 
Egypt,  secure  allegiance  of  frontier  tribes,  and 
save  henceforth  trouble,  disturbances,  and  possibly 
local  risings,  which  a  policy  of  retreat  will  prob- 
ably entail,  and  which  will  necessitate  uicreased 
garrisons  in  Egypt  and  mihtary  occupation  of 
the  larger  towns." 

Sir  Redvers  Buller,  Sir  Charles  Wilson,  and 
Colonel  Kitchener  were  asked  their  opinions. 
They  all  deprecated  a  retreat  from  Dongola,  but 
it  was  clear  that  their  reason  for  doing  so  was 
that  they  wished  to  revert  to  the  policy  of 
advancing  on  Khartoum.  "  The  Soudan,"  Sir 
Redvers  Buller  said,  "will  never  be  quiet  till 
the  Mahdi  is  disposed  of."  "  I  still  beUeve,"  Sir 
Charles  AVilson  said,  "  as  always,  that  the  control 
of  the  Soudan  is  necessary  to  Egypt."  "The 
JNIahdi  must  advance  or  disappear,"  Colonel 
Kitchener  said,  "  and  I  deprecate  leaving  him 
this  fresh  lease  of  life  and  power." 

I  did  not  agree  in  the  view  that  Dongola  should 
be  held  with  the  intention  of  advancing  on 
Khartoum.  At  the  same  time,  I  was  fearful  of 
the  political  effect  which  might  be  produced  in 
Egypt  if  an  immediate  retreat  were  carried  out. 
I  did  not  like  letting  the  Dervishes  come  so  far 
down  the  Nile  valley  as  Wadi  Haifa.  I  was 
inclined  to  adopt  a  proposal  put  forward  by  Sir 
Charles  Wilson,  to  the  effect  that  Dongola  should 
be  held  until  some  black  troops  could  be  organised, 
and  that  the  government  should  be  entrusted  to 


CH.  XXIX  THE  EVACUATION  29 

Abdul -Kader  Pasha.  "I  would  earnestly  im- 
press," I  said,  "upon  Her  Majesty's  Government 
that  it  would  be  neither  politically  wise  nor 
dignified  to  carry  out  at  once  the  policy  of  re- 
treat from  Dongola  and  the  immediate  neighbour- 
hood." The  Government,  however,  held  firmly 
to  their  original  opinions.  On  May  8,  Lord 
Hartington  telegraphed  to  Lord  Wolseley :  "  The 
Government,  after  considering  all  reports  received, 
adhere  to  the  decision  to  adopt  the  proposal  for 
the  defence  of  the  Egyptian  frontier  at  Wadi 
Haifa  and  Assouan  contained  in  your  telegram 
of  April  14." 

Whilst  measures  were  being  taken  to  carry  out 
these  instructions,  a  change  of  Government  took 
place  in  England.  On  June  24, 188,5,  the  Ministry 
of  Lord  Sahsbury  succeeded  that  of  Mr.  Gladstone. 
Lord  Wolseley  urged  the  new  Government  to 
abandon  a  defensive  and  to  adopt  an  offensive 
policy.  "  No  frontier  force,"  he  said,  "  can  keep 
Mahdiism  out  of  Egypt,  and  the  Mahdi  sooner  or 
later  must  be  smashed,  or  he  will  smash  you.  .  .  . 
To  advance  on  Khartoum  and  discredit  the  JNIahdi 
by  a  serious  defeat  on  his  own  ground  would 
certainly  finish  him."  After  a  short  interval,  Lord 
Wolseley  was  informed  that  the  new  Government 
adhered  to  the  decision  wliich  had  been  taken 
by  their  predecessors.  The  retreat  was  to  be 
continued. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  British 
Government  acted  wisely  in  deciding  to  retreat 
from  Dongola.  The  views  of  the  military 
authorities  were  based  on  the  presumed  poHtical 
necessity  of  " smashhig  tlie  Mahdi"  at  Khartoum. 
No  such  necessity  existed  in  reality.  It  is  possible 
that  the  policy,  wliich  I  recommended,  of  setting 
up  an  Egyptian  semi  -  independent  Governor  at 
Dongola  might  have  succeeded,  if  British  troops 


30  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  m 

had  been  allowed  to  remain  long  enough  to  enable 
a  black  force  to  be  organised,  but  I  am  glad  that 
tlie  experiment  was  not  tried.  Indeed,  had  I  at 
the  time  thoroughly  appreciated  the  physical 
features  of  the  country  between  Wadi  Haifa  and 
Dongola,  I  do  not  think  I  should  ha\'e  made  the 
proposal.  In  the  autumn  of  1889,  I  visited  Wadi 
Haifa  aiid  went  as  far  as  Sarras,  about  thirty  miles 
south  of  that  place.  I  saw  enough  to  convince 
myself  that,  as  an  advanced  position,  Wadi  Haifa 
is  far  stronger  than  Dongola. 

On  July  5,  the  British  troops  evacuated  Don- 
gola. In  view,  however,  of  the  threatening 
attitude  of  the  Dervishes,  the  movement  north- 
wards took  place  slowly.  The  JNIahdi  died 
suddenly  on  June  20,  and  his  death  exercised 
a  dispiriting  effect  on  his  followers.  His  place 
was  taken  by  the  Khalifa  Abdullah  -  el  -  Taaslii, 
who  proceeded  to  carry  out  his  predecessor's 
intention  of  invading  Egj^t.  It  was  not,  how- 
ever, till  December  30,  1885,  that  a  mixed  British 
and  Egyptian  force,  under  the  command  of  Sir 
Frederick  Stephenson,  met  the  Dervishes  at  Ginniss, 
about  inidway  between  AVadi  Haifa  and  Dongola. 
The  Dervishes  were  defeated  with  a  loss  of  about 
800  killed  and  wounded.  The  British  and  Egyptian 
loss  was  41  killed  and  wounded.  This  action  in- 
flicted a  severe  blow  on  the  Khalifa,  and  for  the  time 
being  allayed  all  fear  of  a  serious  invasion  of  Egypt 
by  the  Dervishes.  By  April  13, 1886,  the  British  and 
Egyptian  troops  were  concentrated  at  Wadi  Haifa. 
\\''adi  Haifa  was  then  left  to  the  care  of  the 
Egyptian  troops,  and  the  British  force  retired  to 
Assouan,  which  place  they  reached  on  May  7. 

With  the  action  at  Ginniss,  purely  British  inter- 
vention in  the  affairs  of  the  Soudan  may  be  said 
practically  to  have  ceased  for  the  time  being.  The 
moment,  therefore,  is  opportune  for  reviewing  the 


CH.  XXIX  THE  EVACUATION  31 

results  attained  by  British  policy  during  the  pre- 
vious two  years.  My  own  belief  is  that  the 
fundamental  principles  of  tliat  policy  were  sound, 
if  once  the  fatal  mistake  of  non-interference  prior 
to  the  Hicks  defeat  be  condoned.  If  a  veto  had 
been  placed  on  the  Hicks  expedition,  the  prob- 
ability is  that  the  Egyptian  Government  would 
never  ha^e  lost  possession  of  Khartoum. 

When  once  General  Hicks's  army  had  been 
destroyed,  the  policy  of  withdrawal  was  enforced 
by  the  circumstances  of  the  situation.  The  British 
Ministers  wisely  set  their  faces  against  reconquest 
by  British  arms.  They  obliged  the  Egyptian 
Government  to  look  the  facts  in  the  face,  and  in 
doing  so  they  rendered  a  great  service  to  the 
Khedive  and  to  the  Egyptian  people. 

But  although  the  fundamental  principles  of 
British  policy  were,  with  the  reserve  stated  above, 
perfectly  sound,  the  execution  of  the  pohcy  was 
defective.  At  almost  every  point,  failure  was 
incurred. 

The  British  Government  endeavoured  to  assist 
the  Egyptian  Government  in  effecting  the  peace- 
able withdrawal  of  the  garrisons  and  Egyptian  civil 
population  from  the  Soudan.  The  withdrawal  was 
for  the  most  part  never  effected  at  all.  Sir  Reginald 
Wingate  estimated  ^  that  the  total  garrisons  in  the 
Soudan,  including  General  Hicks's  army  and  the 
force  sent  under  General  Baker  to  Suakin, 
amounted  to  about  55,000  men.  Of  these,  about 
12,000  were  killed.  11,000  eventually  returned  to 
Egypt,  leaving  about  30,000  who  remained  in  the 
Soudan.  This  figure  is  exclusive  of  civilians, 
women,  and  children,  the  number  of  whom  Sir 
Reginald  Wingate  roughly  estimated  at  5000. 
These  figures  speak  for  themselves. 

Again,  the  Government  sent  two  high  officials 

*  Mahdiism,  etc. 


82  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  in 

on  a  special  mission  to  the  Soudan.  They  failed 
to  accomplish  the  objects  of  their  mission. 

A  military  force  was  then  sent  to  save  the  lives 
of  the  two  British  emissaries.  It  arrived  too  late. 
Both  General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  were 
killed. 

Lastly,  at  one  time  the  Government  intended  to 
deal  a  decisive  blow  to  the  power  of  the  Mahdi. 
The  project  was  abandoned  and,  in  my  opinion, 
wisely  abandoned.  Nevertheless,  the  impression 
was  left  on  the  minds  of  the  Dervishes  that  a 
British  army  had  attempted  to  reconquer  the 
Soudan,  and  had  failed  to  do  so. 

Eventually,  the  Government  fell  back  en  its 
original  pohcy  of  withdrawal,  from  which  it  had 
temporarily  drifted. 

The  Gordon  mission  and  the  Nile  expedition 
were  thus  mere  episodes  in  Egyptian  and  Sou- 
danese history.  They  will  be  remembered  as 
mistakes  accompanied  by  suffering  and  sorrow  to 
individuals,  and  by  failure  in  an  undertaking  on 
which  the  British  nation  had  set  its  heart.  It  is 
melancholy  to  think  of  the  blood  and  treasure 
which  were  wasted.  Few  of  those  who  have  sacri- 
ficed their  hves  for  their  country  have  done  so  to 
so  Httle  purpose  as  the  gallant  soldiers  who  fell  at 
Abu  Klea,  Kirbekan,  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Suakin.  The  only  practical  result  of  the  Nile 
expedition  was  to  inspire  in  the  minds  of  the 
Dervishes  a  wholesome  dread  of  British  soldiers, 
and  to  break  the  force  of  the  Dervish  advance 
when  it  eventually  occurred.  It  would  be  an 
exaggeration  to  say  that  this  result  was  of  no 
utility,  but  it  was  obtained  at  a  cost  altogether 
incommensurate  with  its  real  value.  The  same 
result  would  have  been  more  easily  and  perhaps 
more  thoroughly  obtained  by  the  adoption  of  a 
defensive  policy  from  the  first. 


CH.XXIX  THE  EVACUATION  33 

Looking  more  closely  to  the  details  in  the 
execution  of  the  British  policy,  the  following  are 
the  conclusions  at  which  I  arrive  : — 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  a  mistake  to  send  any 
British  official  to  Khartoum.  The  task  he  had  to 
perform  was  well-nigh  impossible  of  execution,  and 
his  nomination  involved  the  assumption  of  respon- 
sibilities on  the  part  of  the  British  Government, 
which  it  was  desirable  to  avoid. 

Secondly,  if  any  one  was  to  be  sent,  it  was  a 
mistake  to  choose  General  Gordon.  In  spite  of 
many  noble  traits  in  his  character,  he  was  wanting 
in  some  of  the  qualities  which  were  essential  to  the 
successful  accomplishment  of  his  mission. 

Thirdly,  when  once  General  Gordon  had  been 
sent,  he  should  have  been  left  a  free  hand  so  long 
as  he  kept  within  the  main  lines  of  the  pohcy 
which  he  was  authorised  to  execute.  It  is,  in  my 
opinion,  to  be  regretted  that  General  Gordon  was 
not  allowed  to  employ  Zobeir  Pasha,  but  any 
view  held  as  to  the  probable  results  of  employing 
him  must  be  conjectural. 

Fourthly,  the  question  of  whether  an  expedition 
should  or  should  not  have  been  sent  from  Suakin 
to  Berber  in  the  spring  of  1884  depends  on  the 
military  practicability  of  the  undertaking,  a  point 
on  which  the  best  military  authorities  differed  in 
opinion. 

Fifthly,  a  great  and  inexcusable  mistake  was 
made  in  delaying  for  so  long  the  despatch  of  the 
Gordon  relief  expedition. 

Sixthly,  the  Government  acted  vdsely,  after  the 
fall  of  Khartoum,  in  eventually  adopting  a  defen- 
sive pohcy  and  in  ordering  a  retreat  to  Wadi 
Haifa. 

Lastly,  it  may  be  said  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment were  extraordinarily  unlucky.  Whatever 
amount  of  foresight  be  shown,  success  in  doubtful 

VOL.  II  D 


34  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

and  difficult  enterprises,  such  as  the  Gordon  Mission 
and  the  Nile  Expedition,  must  always  depend 
a  good  deal  on  adventitious  circumstances,  which 
cannot  be  foreseen,  and  over  which  no  Govern- 
ment can  exercise  any  control.  I  am  far  from 
saying  that  in  all  the  matters  which  are  dis- 
cussed in  these  pages,  the  British  Government 
exercised  a  proper  amount  of  foresight,  but  it  must 
be  admitted  tliat  whenever  the  goddess  Fortune 
could  play  them  a  trick,  she  appeared,  with  pro- 
verbial fickleness,  to  take  a  pleasure  in  doing  so. 
The  British  Government  made  at  the  time  a  great 
stir  in  the  world.  The  result  in  the  end  was  that 
no  object  of  any  importance  was  attained. 

Gratis  anhelans,  multa  agendo  nihil  agens. 

But  the  situation  was  one  of  inordinate  difficulty, 
and  those  who  have  had  most  experience  in  the 
conduct  of  political  affairs,  and  who  know  how 
difficult  it  is  to  be  right  and  how  easy  it  is  to  make 
mistakes,  will  be  least  of  all  inclined  to  criticise 
severely  the  principal  actors  on  the  scene. 


CHAPTER   XXX 

THE    DEBRIS    OF   THE    SOUDAN 

rhe  outlying  provinces  : — 1,  Darfour  :  Surrender  of  the  province — The 
Senoussieh  sect — The  revolt  of  Abu  Gemaizeh.  2.  Bnhr-el-Ghazal : 
Lupton  Bey  surrenders — His  death.  3.  Equatoria  :  Emin  Pasha 
summoned  to  surrender — He  maintains  his  position — The  Stanley 
expedition.  4.  Sennar :  The  garrison  surrenders.  5.  Ka)s\sula  : 
The  garrison  surrenders.  6.  The  Abyssinian  Frontier  Garrisons : 
The  Hewett  treaty — The  garrisons  of  Amadib,  Senhit,  Galabat, 
Gera,  and  Gedaref.  7.  Berbera  :  Its  political  st<itus — It  is  occupied 
by  British  troops.  8.  Harrar  :  Withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian  garri- 
son— Installation  of  the  Emir  Abdullah — King  Menelek  occupies  the 
province.  9.  Zeyla  :  It  is  occupied  by  British  troops.  10.  Tajour- 
rah:  The  French  occupy  it.  11.  Massowah:  Its  political  stcitus — 
Attitude  of  the  British  Government — The  Italians  occupy  Maa- 
Bowah. 

When  the  collapse  of  Egyptian  authority  in  the 
Soudan  took  place,  the  disjecta  mernbra  of  Ismail 
Pasha's  huge  African  estate  fell  to  those  whose 
interest  it  was  to  pick  them  up,  and  who  had  the 
power  to  give  effect  to  their  wishes.  Those  por- 
tions which  were  remote  from  the  coast  relapsed 
into  barbarism.  Those  which  were  more  easy  of 
access  were  pounced  upon  by  various  European 
Powers,  who  about  this  time  began  what  was  aptly 
called  by  the  British  press  "the  scramble  for 
Africa."  In  the  present  chapter  the  main  facts  as 
regards  all  this  Egyptian  ddbris  will  be  briefly 
stated.* 

*  In  the  preparation  of  this  chapter  I  have  received  great  assistance 
from  Sir  Reginald  Wingate's  work  Mahdiism  and  the  Egyptian  Soudan. 

36 


36  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 


1.  Darfour, 

When  the  Mahdist  rebellion  broke  out,  the 
Governor  of  this  province  was  Slatin  Bey,  an 
Austrian  officer  in  the  Egyptian  service.  His 
position  was  one  of  great  difficulty,  for  from  the 
first  his  own  officers  were  infected  with  the  spirit 
of  revolt.  After  the  destruction  of  General  Hicks's 
army,  the  position  in  Darfour  became  hopeless. 
Slatin  Bey  was  at  Dara,  the  capital  of  the  province, 
against  which  a  force  under  the  command  of  one 
of  the  Mahdi's  heutenants  advanced  towards  the 
end  of  1883.  The  town  at  once  surrendered. 
Slatin  Bey,  writing  to  General  Gordon,  described 
the  capitulation  in  the  following  terms  :  "After  the 
annihilation  of  Hicks's  army,  the  demoralised  troops 
refused  to  fight  any  longer.  .  .  .  Officers  and  men 
demanded  capitulation  and  I,  standing  there  alone 
and  a  European,  was  compelled  to  follow  the 
majority  and  compelled  to  capitulate.  Does  your 
Excellency  believe  that  to  me,  as  an  Austrian 
officer,  the  surrender  was  easy  ?  It  was  one  of  the 
hardest  days  in  my  life."  ^ 

The  events  in  Darfour  during  the  next  few 
years  turned  in  some  degree  upon  the  influence 
exerted  over  that  remote  country  and  its  neighbour- 
hood by  the  celebrated  Sheikh  El  Senoussi.  1  take 
this  opportunity,  therefore,  to  describe  briefly  the 
rise  of  the  Senoussieh  sect. 

There  are  two  main  divisions  of  Moslems, 
namely,  the  Sunnites  and  the  Shiites.  Almost  all 
the   Mohammedan    inhabitants    of    the   Ottoman 

*  After  remaining'  captive  at  Omdurman  for  many  years,  Slatin  Pasha 
succeeded  in  making  his  escape  in  March  1895.  He  was  appointed 
Inspector-General  in  the  Soudan,  and  in  that  capacity  rendered  very 
valuable  services  to  the  Government.  He  is  a  2:allant  and  very  capable 
officer.  Some  derogatory  remarks  made  about  him  by  General  Gordoo 
in  his  Journal  are  wholly  undeserved. 


CH.  XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  37 

dominions  and  of  Africa  are  Sunnites.  They  are 
divided  into  four  Mezhebs,  or  principal  sects,  viz. 
the  Hanafi,  the  Shafai,  the  ]Mahki,  and  the  Han- 
bah.  These  sects  differ  on  points  of  ritual,  and  as 
regards  the  interpretation  of  certain  portions  of  the 
JVIohammedan  law.  The  Turks  in  Egypt  belong  to 
the  Hanafite  sect.  Most  of  the  Egyptians  belong 
to  the  Shafai,  but  some  few  to  the  Maliki  sect. 
Beneath  these  four  main  divisions  are  a  number  of 
Tarikas,  or  minor  sects/  which  were  called  into 
existence  at  a  later  period  of  Islamism  than  the 
Mezhebs.  They  have  generally  been  created,  and 
are  still  being  created,  by  persons  noted  for  their 
piety  and  asceticism,  who  have,  for  the  most  part, 
recommended  some  special  form  of  prayer  or  of 
ceremonial  as  being  particularly  efficacious.  Some 
of  the  Tarikas  have  risen  to  considerable  import- 
ance. Thus,  the  Wahabi  sect  caused  at  one  time 
great  political  disturbance  by  reason  both  of  the 
number  and  of  the  aggressive  spirit  of  the  sectarians. 
The  Sheikh  El  Mirghani  also  founded  a  large 
Tarika  in  the  Eastern  Soudan.  The  Sheikh  El 
Senoussi  is  the  head  of  one  of  the  most  important 
Tarikas  which  now  exist.  It  has  been  estimated 
that  his  followers  number  no  fewer  than  3,000,000, 
who  are  scattered  widely  over  the  whole  of  Northern 
Africa.  They  are  especially  numerous  in  Wadai. 
In  Egypt,  the  followers  of  Senoussi  are  also  fairly 
nmnerous. 

Mohammed  Ben  Ah  El  Senoussi,  the  founder  of 
the  sect,  was  an  Algerian  by  birth,  and  though 
originally  a  Maliki,  did  not  altogether  agree  with 
the  recognised  leaders  of  that  sect.  In  one  respect 
his  teaching  resembled  that  of  Abdul  Wahab,  that 
is  to  say,  he  only  recognised  the  authority  of  the 
Koran  and  the  traditions  which  are  contemporaneous 
with   the   Koran,  rejecting   the   teaching  of  later 

*  The  literal  translation  of  the  word  "  Tarika"  is  a  "  path." 


88  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

commentators.'  In  1853,  he  established  hhnself  in 
an  oasis  of  the  Libyan  desert  named  Jerhboiib,  near 
Siwa  (Jupiter  Amnion).  He  does  not  appear  at  any 
time  to  have  hazarded  a  definite  statement  that  his 
son  would  be  the  JNIahdi,  but  he  gave  several  in- 
dications during  his  lifetime  that  such  a  contin- 
gency was  not  improbable.  For  instance,  on  one 
occasion  the  father  took  off  the  son's  sandals  and 
said  to  those  present :  "  Be  witness  that  I  have 
served  him."  It  is  inferred  that  he  would  not  have 
performed  this  act  of  servitude  if  he  had  not  wished 
it  to  be  believed  that  his  son's  religious  authority 
was  superior  to  his  own.  Further,  it  is  said  that  the 
principal  supporters  of  Mohammed  Ben  All's  son,'^ 
who  succeeded  to  the  headship  of  the  sect  on  his 
father's  death,  constantly  pointed  out  to  others 
that  their  leader  possessed  many  of  the  quahties 
essential  to  the  true  Mahdi.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  view  of  the  difficulty,  not  to  say  the  impossi- 
bility of  fulfilling  the  whole  of  those  conditions,  it 
may  be  confidently  predicted  that,  whenever  and 
wherever  a  Mahdi  is  proclaimed,  a  schism  will  at 
once  occur.  Senoussi  was,  without  doubt,  well 
versed  in  Mohammedan  tradition,  and,  in  spite  of 
the  aspirations  of  a  few  of  his  over -zealous  and 
ambitious  followers,  he  must  have  been  aware 
that  his  claims  to  be  considered  the  true  Mahdi 
would  not  meet  with  general  recognition  from  the 
Mohammedan  world.  He,  therefore,  wisely  resisted 
the  temptation  to  proclaim  himself  as  the  INIahdi. 
It  was,  however,  natural  that  he  should  view  with 
disfavour  the  pretensions  of  any  rival.  Hence, 
from  the  outset,  Senoussi's  influence  was  exercised 
in  a  sense  antagonistic  to  the  movement  of  whicli 
Mohammed  Ahmed  was  the  leader.     His  views  on 

*  An  account  of  the  tenets  of  the  Senoussi  sect  is  given  in  ch.  -\ii. 
of  Mr.  Silva  White's  book  From  Sphinx  to  Oracle.  Mr.  White  visited 
Siwa  in  IBOO.      He  was  unable  to  go  to  Jerhboub. 

»  He  died  in  1<J02. 


CH.XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  39 

this  subject  carried  all  the  more  weight  from  the 
fact  that  his  reputation  for  piety  and  asceticism 
was  higher  than  that  of  Mohammed  Ahmed.  The 
latter  was  also  grasping  and  avaricious,  quahties 
which  compared  unfavourably  with  the  contempt 
for  worldly  riches  attributed  to  Senoussi.^ 

Several  years  of  internal  dissension  followed 
on  Slatin  Bey's  surrender.  As  the  cruelty  and 
rapacity  of  the  Dervish  rule  became  more  and  more 
evident,  the  religious  fervour,  which  had  been  at 
first  excited  by  Mohammed  Ahmed,  waned.  In 
1888,  a  certain  Abu  Gemaizeh  raised  the  standard 
of  revolt.  His  programme  was  "  to  overthrow  the 
Mahdi  imposture  and  to  re-establish  the  true 
religion  of  the  Prophet."  Abu  Gemaizeh  was  not 
a  member  of  the  Senoussi  order,  but  he  attracted 
the  Senoussiyeh  to  him  by  giving  out  that  his 
movement  was  favoured  by  the  Sheikh  of  Jerhboub. 
At  first,  he  gained  some  successes.  "  The  whole 
Soudan,"  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  wrote,  "  echoed 
with  the  wildest  reports ;  even  at  Cairo  it  was 
beheved  that  the  end  of  JNIahdiism  was  near,  and 
that  a  new  Ruler  had  arisen,  who  would  at  least 
open  the  roads  to  Mecca  and  would  no  longer  be 
at  war  with  all  the  world.  Relief  seemed  near. 
Every  arrival  from  the  Soudan  reported  the  grow- 
ing success  of  the  anti-Mahdist  revolt."  One  of  the 
weak  points  in  the  ISIahdist  rehgious  programme, 

'  There  is,  however,  a  practical  as  well  as  a  religious  side  to  tlie 
Senoussi  movement.  Mr.  Weld  Blundell,  who  visited  Siwa  in  18i)4, 
writes  :  "  From  the  practical  side,  the  whole  movement  may  he  desciilted 
as  a  very  large,  well  organised,  slave-owning  and  slave-dealing  cor- 
poration, managed  by  the  heads  of  the  Brotherhood,  witli  local  brandies 
and  establishments  grouped  round  the  various  Zau  yas  or  convents 
of  the  order  in  all  ])arts  of  North  Africa,  Witliout  presumina:  to 
apportion  the  real  religious  sincerity  and  tlie  purely  material  eleniont 
in  the  movement,  it  may  be  taken  for  granted  that,  as  in  similar 
religious  organisations  nearer  home,  religion  and  business  are  liajipily 
combined  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  entire  satisfaction  to  the  leaders 
who  get  the  principal  benefit  of  it  at  present,  and  to  foster  vague  hopes 
among  the  humbler  adherents  of  some  great  triumph  in  the  future." 


40  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

on  which  Abu  Gemaizeh  seized,  was  that  the 
Khahfa  had  placed  obstacles  in  the  way  of  JNloham- 
medans  performing  the  ordinary  Haj,  and  had 
proclaimed  that  a  visit  to  the  shrine  of  JNIohammed 
Ahmed  at  Omdurman  might  be  substituted  for 
the  time-honoured  pilgrimage  to  JNIecca.  When 
Senoussi's  views  were  eventually  made  known,  it 
was  discovered  that  he  gave  full  moral  support  to 
Abu  Gemaizeh,  in  so  far  as  the  latter  opposed  the 
heterodox  views  put  forward  by  the  Ivhalifa  on  the 
subject  of  the  pilgrimage.  But  beyond  this  he  did 
not  go.  He  was,  he  said,  "the  peaceful  pioneer 
of  a  religious  revival,  which  revolted  against  the 
bloodshed  and  rapine  of  the  false  Mahdi  of  the 
Soudan.  He  had  no  intention  or  desire  to  inter- 
fere. Mohammed  Ahmed  and  his  successor  must 
work  their  owii  salvation  or  destruction  ;  he  was  in 
no  way  responsible." 

Thus  the  great  Sheikh  of  Jerhboub  enunciated 
a  policy  of  non-intervention  in  terms  which  might 
have  done  credit  to  Lord  Granville.  The  result 
of  the  attitude  taken  up  by  Senoussi  was  that  the 
influence  of  Abu  Gemaizeh  speedily  waned.  On 
February  22,  1889,  he  was  attacked  by  Osman 
Adam,  one  of  the  Khalifa's  heutenants :  the 
Dervishes  gained  a  complete  victory.  Osman 
Adam's  report  of  this  action,  which  was  unearthed 
by  Sir  Reginald  Wingate,  may  be  quoted  as  a 
characteristic  specimen  of  Mahdist  official  litera- 
ture. "  The  Ansar,"  ^  he  wrote,  "  not  satisfied  with 
their  victory,  pursued  the  retreating  enemy  till 
sunset,  and  after  that  the  cavalry  still  continued 
pursuing  till  almost  all  were  killed.  They  followed 
them  even  as  far  as  the  caves  and  forests,  where 
they  tried  to  conceal  themselves,  but  they  were 

•  The  "Ansar"  (literally  "  Helpers")  was  the  name  given  to  the 
first  converts  to  Islam  m;ide  at  Medina  after  the  Ilcij^ira.  The  applica- 
tion bv  the  Malidi  of  this  name  to  his  followers  was  calculated  to  excite 
tlie  resentment  of  orthodox  Mohammedans. 


CH.XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  41 

all  killed ;  even  those  who  transformed  themselves 
into  apes,  wolves,  dogs,  and  rabbits  (for  the  natives 
of  the  western  countries  can  be  so  transformed) 
were  also  killed  even  to  the  very  last.  .  .  .  Allah 
was  with  us,  and  we  saw  several  miracles  during 
the  battle.  Allah  sent  do\Mi  fire,  which  burnt 
up  the  dead  bodies  of  the  enemy  and  also  their 
wounded,  showing  how  violent  was  His  wrath 
upon  them.  The  brethren  also  saw  some  sixteen 
white  flags  with  green  borders  waving  in  the  air. 
They  also  heard  the  sound  of  drums  beating  in  the 
air,  and  saw  objects  hke  mountains  faUing  upon 
the  enemy.  The  Prophet  also  revealed  himself  to 
many  of  the  followers  previous  to  the  battle.  .  .  . 
It  had  been  my  intention  to  send  the  heads  of  all 
the  chiefs  to  you,  but  as  they  have  by  this  time 
decayed,  and  would  be  heavy  for  messengers,  I 
must  be  satisfied  with  sending  you  only  two  heads, 
viz.  the  head  of  the  devil's  agent,  and  the  head  of 
the  son  of  Sultan  Salih.  .  .  .  The  enemy's  devil, 
Abu  Gemaizeh,  died  from  small-pox  in  his  house 
some  days  ago,  and  thus  Darfour  is  left  without 
a  head."  Father  Ohrwalder,  who  escaped  from 
Omdurman  in  1891,  reported  that  "the  Abu 
Gemaizeh  revolt  depopulated  almost  the  entire 
district.  There  were  but  few  men  to  cultivate, 
and  the  country  became  infested  by  quantities  of 
elephants,  hons,  and  other  wild  animals." 

Further  internal  dissensions  ensued,  with  the 
result  that  the  Khalifa  eventually  withdrew  his 
forces  from  Darfour. 

2.  Bahr-el-Ghazal. 

"  The  province  of  Bahr-el-Ghazal,"  Sir  Reginald 
Wingate  wrote,  "may  be  described  as  about  five 
times  as  big  as  England.  It  is  a  district  covered 
with   forests    and    mountains,   and    seamed    with 


42  MODERN  EG^rT  pt.  iii 

low  valleys  subject  to  inundation.  .  .  .  The  soil  is 
exceptionally  fertile  and  there  are  cattle  in  abun- 
dance, while  the  population  is  estimated  at  between 
three  and  four  millions."  ^  Gessi  Pasha,  General 
Gordon's  Ueutenant,  was  the  first  European 
Governor  of  the  province.  In  1881,  he  was 
succeeded  by  Mr.  Frank  Lupton,  who  had  served 
in  the  British  mercantile  marine,  and  who  subse- 
quently joined  General  Gordon  in  the  Soudan. 

When,  in  1882,  the  news  of  the  Kordofan  re- 
belhon  reached  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  province,  many 
of  the  most  important  Sheikhs  sent  in  their  allegi- 
ance to  the  Alahdi.  Lupton,  however,  amidst 
many  vicissitudes,  held  his  own.  Towards  the  close 
of  1883,  news  arrived  of  the  annihilation  of  General 
Hicks's  army.  This  disaster  was  as  decisive  of  the 
fate  of  Bahr-el-Ghazal  as  it  had  been  of  that  of 
Darfour.  On  April  28,  1884,  Lupton  wrote  to 
Emin  Pasha :  "  It  is  all  up  with  me  here.  Every 
one  has  joined  the  Mahdi,  and  his  army  takes 
charge  of  the  Mudirieh  the  day  after  to-morrow. 
What  I  have  passed  through  these  last  few  days  no 
one  knows.  I  am  perfectly  alone."  On  the  follow- 
ing day,  Lupton  surrendered  to  Karam-AUah,  the 
commander  of  the  Dervish  force.  He  was  invited 
to  embrace  the  faith  of  Islam,  and  to  assume 
the  name  of  Abdullah.  Lupton,  an  eye-witness 
subsequently  reported,  "replied  to  Karam- Allah 
that  he  had  already  adopted  the  Mohammedan 
religion,  but  Karam -Allah  was  not  satisfied  and 
insisted  that  he  should  openly  adopt  the  creed, 
and  bade  Lupton  repeat  after  him :  '  There  is 
no  God  but  God,  and  Mohammed  is  the  Prophet 
of  God,'  and  while  Lupton  was  repeating  this,  the 
Emirs  drew  their  swords,  and  when  he  had  finished, 

*  This  was  probably  an  overestimate.  The  population  of  the  Bahr-el- 
Ghazal  province,  prior  to  the  Dervish  rule,  was  subsequently  estimated 
at  1,500,000.— See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1904,  p.  79. 


CH.XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  43 

shouted  in  one  voice  :  '  Hold  to  your  faith,  you  are 
now  one  of  us  (Ansar)  as  we  are  of  you,  we  are 
brothers  in  the  f^iith.'  "  Lupton  was  shortly  after- 
wards confined  as  a  prisoner  at  Omdurman,  where 
he  subsequently  died. 

Thus  it  was  that,  in  Sir  Reginald  Wingate's 
words,  "in  this  vast  province,  not  a  shred  of 
Egyptian  authority  remained ;  all  had  been  sub- 
merged under  the  waves  of  JNIahdiism,  which  now 
rolled  placidly  over  its  broad  plains,  bearing  on 
their  way  vast  bands  of  slaves  for  the  greatly 
enlarged  households  of  Mohammed  Ahmed,  his 
Khalifas,  and  his  Emirs." 

The  subsequent  history  of  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal 
province  resembles  that  of  Darfour.  jNI ahdist 
misrule  brought  in  its  train  its  natural  accom- 
paniment of  discontent  and  internal  dissensions. 
Eventually,  the  Dervishes  withdrew.  Few,  in  1885, 
would  have  predicted  that  thirteen  years  later  the 
ultimate  fate  of  this  remote  district  would  bring 
the  two  great  Western  Powers  of  Europe  to  the 
verge  of  war.^     Such,  however,  was  to  be  the  case. 

8.  Equatoria. 

To  the  south  and  south-east  of  the  Bahr-el- 
Ghazal  province  lies  that  of  Equatoria,  the  creation 
of  Sir  Samuel  Baker,  whose  work  was  subsequently 
carried  on  by  General  Gordon.  In  1879,  General 
Gordon  named  Edward  Schnitzler,  a  native  of 
Prussian  Silesia,  better  known  as  Emin  Pasha,  to  be 
Governor  of  the  province.  The  latter,  on  assuming 
office,  gave  the  usual  account  of  Egyptian  misride. 

*  I  have  purposely  omitted  any  account  of  what  is  known  as  the 
"  Fashoda  incident"  from  this  work.  I  should  be  most  unwilling- to 
do  anything  which  might  contribute  to  revive  public  interest  in  an 
affair  which  is  now,  happily  for  all  concerned,  well-nigh  forgotten. 

The  word  "  Fashoda "  has  been  erased  from  the  map.  The  place 
is  now  called  by  its  Shillouk  name  of  Kodok. 


44  IMODERN  EGYPT  rr.  iii 

"Since  1877,"  he  wrote,  "no  accounts  have  been 
sent  in  from  or  kept  by  this  administration.  Though 
the  Governors  receive  monies  for  the  payment  of 
wages,  no  one  has  been  paid  a  piastre  for  years  ; 
probably,  however,  the  Governors  have  bought 
goods  with  the  funds  belonging  to  the  Government 
and  sold  them  at  three  times  the  amount.  Slaves 
figure  in  these  accounts  as  oxen,  asses,  etc.  The 
making  of  false  seals  and  fabricating  receipts  by 
their  use  complete  the  picture  of  what  has  been 
going  on  here,  and  with  it  all  the  place  is  full  of 
prayer-places  and  Fikis."^ 

By  the  end  of  1882,  the  whole  country  to  the 
south  of  Khartoum,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Equatorial  pro\dnce,  was  in  open  revolt  against 
Egyptian  authority.  Towards  the  end  of  March 
1884,  the  news  of  the  annihilation  of  General  Hicks's 
army  reached  Emin  Pasha.  Shortly  afterwards,  he 
was  summoned  by  Karam- Allah  to  surrender  his 
province.  "Now  just  think  of  my  position,"  he 
wrote  somewhat  later.  "For  fourteen  months  I 
had  had  no  communication  with  Khartoum,  or 
news  from  there.  The  magazines  were  quite 
empty  of  clothes,  soap,  coffee,  etc.  ...  In  Lado, 
there  was  a  rabble  of  drunkards  and  gamblers, 
most  of  them  fellow-countrymen  of  the  rebels,  the 
clerks  of  my  divan.  The  prospect  was  not  brilliant. 
.  .  .  Accordingly,  I  asked  my  officers  here  in  open 
council  whether  they  considered  it  more  desirable  to 
submit  or  to  prepare  to  fight.  There  could  be  no 
doubt  what  the  answer  would  be ;  the  purport  of 
it  was  submission." 

Emin  Pasha  did  not,  however,  submit.  Karam- 
Allah's  advance  was  stayed  owing  to  disturbances 
in  his  rear.  Nevertheless,  in  the  anarchy  which 
prevailed,  no  effective  control  could  be  exercised 
over  the  outlying  portions  of  the  province.     "  At 

'  A  "  Fiki "  is  a  man  wlio  expounds  the  law  of  Islam. 


CH.XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  45 

the  end  of  1885,"  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  wrote, 
"the  extent  of  Emin's  province  was  about  180 
miles,  a  narrow  strip  from  the  lake  to  Lado,  and 
an  area  of  about  one-seventh  of  the  original  extent 
of  the  province  previous  to  the  revolt." 

In  February  1886,  Emin  Pasha  received  a  letter 
from  Nubar  Pasha  in  which  he  was  informed  that  the 
Egyptian  Government  had  decided  to  abandon  the 
Soudan,  that  they  were  unable  to  afford  him  any 
assistance,  and  that  he  was  authorised  to  take  any 
steps  he  might  consider  advisable  to  leave  the 
country.  At  the  same  time,  Emin  Pasha  heard  of 
the  fall  of  Khartoum  and  of  the  death  of  General 
Gordon.  The  difficulties  of  his  position  were  thus 
increased.  He  decided,  however,  to  remain  where 
he  was.  "  The  greater  part  of  my  men,"  he  wrote, 
"especially  my  officers,  have  no  desire  to  leave 
this  country.  ...  I  shall  remain  here  and  hold 
together,  as  long  as  possible,  the  remnant  of  the 
last  ten  years." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  give  the  detailed  history  of 
all  that  followed.  How,  by  reason  of  rebellion  and 
mutiny,  Emin  Pasha's  position  became  daily  more 
difficult ;  how  his  situation  attracted  the  attention 
and  sympathy  of  the  civilised  world  ;  how  an  expe- 
dition was  eventually  organised  to  relieve  him ; 
how  Stanley  and  his  adventurous  companions  cut 
their  way  through  the  dense  untrodden  forests  of 
Central  Africa ;  how,  when  they  at  last  reached 
Emin,  the  latter  was  unwilling  to  leave ;  how  his 
hesitation  was  eventually  overcome ;  and  how  he 
and  his  companions  were  with  infinite  trouble  at 
last  brought  down  to  the  coast, — these  are  matters 
of  history,  which  have  been  described  by  others 
who  are  better  informed  than  myself  on  the  subject.^ 

The  Lado  Enclave,  as  it  is  now  termed,  was 
leased  to  King  Leopold  II.,  as  Sovereign  of  the 

*  Vide  Stanley's  In  Darkest  AJ'rica,  1890. 


46  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

Independent  State  of  the  Congo,  by  an  Agreement 
signed  at  Brussels  on  JMay  12,  1894.  The  Congo- 
lese occupation  caused  at  one  time  a  good  deal  of 
friction  between  the  British  Government  and  King 
Leopold.^  Eventually,  a  further  Agreement  was 
signed  in  London  on  May  9,  1906.  Under  this 
Agreement,  the  Lado  Enclave  has  to  be  handed 
over  to  the  Soudanese  Government  within  six 
months  after  the  demise  of  King  Leopold. 


4.  Sennar, 

Of  the  fate  of  the  pro\dnce  of  Sennar  and  of  its 
once  celebrated  capital,  little  need  be  said.  In  the 
spring  of  1885,  the  town  was  besieged  by  the 
Mahdists.  The  Egyptian  commander,  Hassan 
Sadik,  made  a  gallant  defence.  On  his  death, 
which  occurred  during  a  sortie,  he  was  succeeded 
by  Nur  Bey,  who  on  several  occasions  repulsed  the 
attacks  of  the  Dervishes  and  inflicted  great  loss  on 
them.  Eventually,  Abdul  -  Kerim,  the  Mahdist 
commander,  "  having  gathered  all  the  neighbour- 
ing tribes,  completely  cut  off  communication,  and 
soon  the  garrison,  weakened  by  continuous  fight- 
ing, was  at  the  last  stage  of  famine.  As  a  final 
effort,  Nur  Bey,  on  August  18,  ordered  a  sortie  to 
be  made  by  Hassan  Bey  Osman  with  1500  of  the 
troops,  but  the  rebels  falling  on  them  at  Kassab 
utterly  defeated  them,  and  the  remnant,  with  their 
leader  killed,  made  their  way  back  to  the  town. 
On  the  following  day,  Nur  Bey,  having  exhausted 
all  the  food  in  tlie  town,  was  obliged  to  capitulate. 
Of  the  original  garrison  of  3000  men,  700  only 
remained, — strong  evidence  indeed  of  the  seventy 
of  the  fighting  and  of  the  siege."     The  province  of 

»  The  facts  are  briefly  stated  in  Egypt,  No.  1  of  lUOU,  pp.  121-123, 
and  E<jiji>t,  No.  1  of  1907,  p.  119. 


CH.  XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  47 

Sermar  remained  under  Dervish  rule  till  the  downfall 
of  the  Khahfa's  power  in  1898. 

5.  Kassala. 

Kassala  is  the  most  important  inland  town  in 
the  Eastern  Soudan.  Its  population  numbers  about 
13,000.  In  November  1883,  it  was  besieged  by- 
one  of  Osman  Digna's  lieutenants.  The  siege 
continued  vdth  varying  fortunes  until  July  1885. 
Hopes  were  from  time  to  time  entertained  that 
relief  would  come  from  Abyssinia.  The  garrison 
was  also  encouraged  to  hold  out  by  the  presence  of 
British  troops  at  Suakin.  But  no  relief  came.  By 
April  13,  1885,  all  the  donkeys  in  the  town  had 
been  eaten.  A  successful  sally,  made  on  June  15, 
in  which  1000  oxen  and  1000  sheep  were  captured, 
enabled  the  defence  to  be  prolonged.  But  the 
relief  was  only  temporary.  By  July  30,  every 
kind  of  food,  including  gum  and  hides,  had  been 
exhausted.  The  garrison  capitulated.  They  re- 
ceived a  promise  that  their  hves  would  be  spared, 
but  the  promise  was  broken.  "  It  Was  believed," 
Sir  Reginald  Wingate  wrote,  "  that  the  inhabitants 
had  secreted  treasure,  and  this  was  made  the  plea  for 
every  description  of  torture,  cruelty,  and  robbery.' 
In  1894,  Kassala  was  occupied  by  the  Italians,  but 
three  years  later  (December  1897)  was  evacuated. 
It  now  forms  part  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian  Soudan. 

6.   The  Abyssinian  Frontier  Garrisons. 

When,  in  the  winter  of  1883,  the  policy  of  with- 
drawal from  the  Soudan  was  adopted,  the  British 
Government  decided  to  send  a  mission  to  King 
John  of  Abyssinia,  with  whom  they  were  on 
friendly  terms,  in  the  hope  that  his  aid  might  be 
enlisted  in  facilitating  the  retreat  of  the  garrisons 


48  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

from  the  Egyptian  posts  adjoining  the  frontier  of 
Abyssinia.  Sir  WilUam  Hewett  was  accordingly 
sent  to  Abyssinia  to  act  on  behalf  of  the  British 
Government.  He  was  accompanied  by  INIason 
Bey,  an  American  officer  in  the  Egyptian  service, 
who  was  well  acquainted  with  the  affairs  of  the 
Soudan,  and  who  acted  on  behalf  of  the  Egyptian 
Government. 

The  result  of  this  mission  was  that  a  Treaty 
was  signed  at  Adowa  on  June  3,  1884.  The  main 
provisions  of  this  Treaty  were  that  the  province  of 
Bogos,  which  the  King  had  for  long  coveted,  was 
to  be  ceded  to  him,  and  that  in  return  he  was  to 
facilitate  the  withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian  frontier 
garrisons,  and  to  permit  their  retreat  through 
Abyssinian  territory. 

Public  attention  at  this  time  was  so  exclusively 
directed  to  the  events  which  were  passing  at 
Khartoum,  that  the  British  Government  never  got 
due  credit  for  the  successful  efforts  which  were  made 
to  save  the  Egyptian  garrisons  on  the  Abyssinian 
frontier. 

On  Septeriiber  12,  1884,  the  province  of  Bogos 
was,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Treaty, 
handed  over  to  Abyssinia. 

During  the  spring  of  1885,  the  Egyptian 
garrisons  of  Amadib  and  Senliit  were  brought 
safely  doAvn  to  Massowah. 

One  of  the  most  important  garrisons  was  that  of 
Galabat.  In  August  1884,  Colonel  Chermside, 
who  was  at  that  time  Governor- General  of  the  Red 
Sea  Littoral,  despatched  Major  Saad  Rifaat  to 
Abyssinia  to  assist  in  the  preparations  which  were 
being  made  for  the  relief  of  Galabat,  which  was 
then  besieged  by  the  Dervishes.  Leaving  Adowa 
with  a  considerable  force  of  Abyssinia ns  on 
January  27,  1885,  Major  Rifaat  shortly  afterwards 
attacked  and  defeated  the  enemy,  and  succeeded  in 


CH.  XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  49 

bringing  the  garrison  and  population,  numbering 
about  3000  men,  women,  and  children,  in  safety  to 
Massowah,  whence  those  who  wished  to  return 
were  sent  back  to  Egypt. 

The  garrison  of  Gera,  which  had  hkemse  been 
besieged  for  some  months,  was  also  extricated  by 
the  Abyssinians,  the  Egyptian  soldiers  being,  more- 
over, subsequently  clothed  and  fed  by  King  John. 
About  5000  men,  women,  and  children  were  brought 
down  to  Massowah  and  despatched  to  Cairo. 

In  fact,  of  the  posts  on  the  Abyssinian  frontier, 
the  only  one  of  which  the  garrison  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Dervishes  was  Gedaref,  called  also 
Suk  Abu  Sin.  The  commandant  of  this  post, 
which  was  garrisoned  by  about  200  men,  capitu- 
lated in  April  1884,  that  is  to  say  two  months 
before  the  Hewett  Treaty  had  been  concluded. 
On  the  whole,  therefore,  the  results  of  the  Treaty 
were  satisfactory. 

7.  Berbera. 

Ismail  Pasha  was  not  content  with  extending 
Egyptian  authority  to  the  sources  of  the  Nile. 
Pash  adorn,  with  its  baneful  accompaniments  of 
misrule  and  oppression,  stretched  its  tentacles  to 
the  Somali  coast  and  inland  to  the  fertile  province 
of  Harrar.  When  the  parent  trunk  rotted,  the 
first  of  the  branches  to  fall  off  was  Berbera.  It 
fell  at  the  feet  of  the  Queen  of  England. 

The  Egyptian  Governor  of  Berbera  was  of  the 
ordinary  type.  Mr.  F.  L.  James,  who  had  travelled 
much  in  the  Soudan  and  in  Somaliland,  wrote  to 
me  on  April  21,  1884  :  "  On  all  hands  we  heard 
nothing  but  the  most  bitter  complaints  as  to  the 
ill-treatment  the  natives  (Somalis)  met  with  at  the 
hands  of  the  Egyptian  Governor  of  Berbera,  Abdul 
Rahman  Bey.  .  .  .  That  he  is  detested  by  the 
people  and  a  very  bad  Governor  is  not  open  to 

VOL.  II  E 


50  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

doubt ;  and  after  wliat  happened  two  years  ago 
to  myself  and  party,  while  travelling  in  the  Soudan, 
I  am  surprised  at  no  enormity  on  the  part  of  an 
Egyptian  Governor." 

Sir  Richard  Burton  wrote  in  1856:  "The 
occupation  of  the  port  of  Berbera  has  been  advised 
for  many  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  Berbera  is  the 
true  key  to  the  Red  Sea,  the  centre  of  East  African 
trafnc,  and  the  only  place  for  shipping  upon  the 
western  Erythraean  shore  from  Suez  to  Guardafui. 
Backed  by  lands  capable  of  cultivation,  and  by  hills 
covered  with  pine  and  other  valuable  trees,  enjoying 
a  comparatively  temperate  climate,  with  a  regular, 
although  thin  monsoon,  this  harbour  has  been 
coveted  by  many  a  foreign  conqueror.  Circum- 
stances have  thrown  it,  as  it  were,  into  our  arms, 
and,  if  we  refuse  the  chance,  another  and  a  rival 
nation  will  not  be  so  blind."  ^  The  Indian  authori- 
ties had  always  been  alive  to  the  desirability  of 
preventing  Berbera  from  falling  into  the  hands  of 
any  European  Power. 

The  political  status  of  the  coast  eastward  of 
Zeyla  was  on  a  different  footing  from  that  portion 
of  the  coast  which  extends  from  Zeyla  to  the 
straits  of  Bab-el-JNIandeb.  The  Sultan  exercised 
rights  of  sovereignty  over  the  territory  between 
Bab-el-Mandeb  and  Zeyla,  which  rights,  although 
never  formally  recognised  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment, had  not  been  disputed.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  sovereign  rights  of  the  Sultan  over  the  Somali 
tribes  lying  between  Zeyla  and  Ras  Hafoun  had 
been  repeatedly  denied  by  the  British  Government. 
In'  1877,  a  Convention  was  negotiated  between 
Ismail  Pasha  and  tlie  British  Government,  the 
main  object  of  whicli  was  to  recognise  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Khedive,  under  the  suzerainty  of 
the  Sultan,  as  far  eastward  as  Ras  Hafoun.     The 

BurtoUj  First  Footsteps  in  East  Africa,  p.  xxxiv. 


CH.  XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  51 

fifth  article  of  this  Convention  stipulated  that  it 
was  not  to  come  into  operation  until  the  Sultan 
gave  a  formal  assurance  to  the  British  Government 
tliat  no  portion  of  the  territory  on  the  Somali  coast 
should  be  ceded  to  any  foreign  Power.  In  spite  of 
repeated  invitations,  the  Sultan  had  never  given 
this  assurance.  The  Convention  was,  therefore, 
invalid,  and  the  hands  of  the  British  Government 
were  free.  Lord  Granville,  accordingly,  on  being 
pressed  by  the  India  Office  to  move  in  the  matter, 
instructed  Lord  Dufferin  on  May  29,  1884,  to 
denounce  the  Convention  and  to  inform  the  Porte 
that  "  with  regard  to  the  coast  eastward  of  Zeyla, 
it  was  the  intention  of  Her  Majesty's  Government, 
on  the  withdrawal  of  the  Egyptians,  to  make  such 
arrangements  as  they  might  think  desirable  for  the 
preservation  of  order  and  the  security  of  British 
interests,  especially  at  Berbera,  from  which  Aden 
drew  its  chief  supplies."  This  communication  drew 
forth  some  remonstrances  from  Constantinople ; 
they  were  set  aside.  In  October  1884,  a  British 
official  was  charged  with  the  administration  of 
Berbera ;  a  small  force  of  police  and  sepoys  was 
placed  at  his  disposal.  A  notification  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  British  Protectorate  over  this  part  of 
the  coast  was  conveyed  to  the  French  Government 
by  Lord  Lyons  on  April  23,  1885.  Thus  Berbera, 
with  the  neighbouring  port  of  Bulbar,  were  peace- 
ably absorbed  into  the  British  dominions. 

8.  Harrar. 

The  fertile  province  of  Harrar  Hes  about  200 
miles  south-west  of  Zeyla.  Sir  Richard  Burton 
visited  it  in  1856.  In  his  time,  the  province  was 
governed  in  a  barbarous  fashion  by  Emir  ^V limed, 
one  of  a  family  whicli  had  for  long  held  dominion 
over  the  country.     The  fertility  of  Harrar  excited 


52  MODERN  EGYPT  pi.  in 

the  ambition  of  Ismail  Pasha.  It  was  annexed, 
and  in  1874  the  reigning  Emir  was  put  to  death  by 
Raouf  Pasha,  himself  a  bad  specimen  of  a  bad  class. 
The  usual  results  followed.  JNIajor  Hunter,  who 
visited  Harrar  early  in  1884,  reported :  "  The 
Khedive's  rule  is  extremely  unpopular,  and  justly 
so,  for  the  admitted  object  of  the  Governors  is  to 
tax  the  inhabitants  to  the  utmost.  No  justice  is 
obtainable,  peculation  is  rife,  trade  is  stifled,  the 
soldiery  pillage  the  villages,  and  the  troops  are 
discontented  owdng  to  deferred  payment  and  pro- 
longed expatriation.  .  .  .  The  Governor,  AU  Pasha, 
is  a  shaky,  garrulous  old  man  of  Turkish  extraction, 
who  has  no  idea  beyond  filling  the  Treasury, 
presumably  for  the  benefit  of  the  Egyptian 
Government." 

JManifestly,  the  only  wise  course  to  pursue,  both 
in  the  interests  of  Harrar  and  of  Egypt,  was  that 
the  Egyptian  Government  should  abandon  a  trust 
which  had  been  so  grossly  abused.  The  evacuation 
of  the  province  was  pressed  upon  the  Egyptian 
Ministers,  who,  albeit  reluctantly,  accepted  the 
inevitable  logic  of  facts. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  garrison,  and  of  others 
who  wished  to  leave,  across  200  miles  of  country, 
inhabited  by  tribes  who  were  far  from  friendly 
to  the  Egyptians,  was  no  easy  matter.  The  duty 
of  executing  this  task  was  entrusted  to  Major 
Hunter,  who  was  assisted  by  two  other  British 
officers.  Radwan  Pasha  was  sent  from  Cairo  to 
act  as  Egyptian  Commissioner ;  he  co-operated 
loyally  with  Major  Hunter.  The  retreat  was 
skilfully  conducted.  The  garrison  and  followers, 
to  the  number  of  8359  persons,  were  marched 
down  to  the  coast  in  detachments  during  the  early 
months  of  1885,  and  embarked  for  Egypt. 

The  government  of  the  province  was  then 
handed  over  to  Abdullah,  a  son  of  the  last  reigning 


CH.XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  53 

Emir.  The  new  Emir  did  not  maintain  his  posi- 
tion for  long.  In  January  1887,  King  Menelek  of 
Shoa  attacked  and  took  possession  of  Harrar. 

9.  Zeyla. 

It  has  been  already  mentioned  that  the  political 
status  of  Zeyla  was  different  from  that  of  Berbera. 
In  the  latter  case,  the  Sultan  could  not  put  forward 
any  vaUd  claim  to  suzerainty.  Zeyla,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  formed  part  of  the  Ottoman  dominions 
before  it  came  under  Egyptian  jurisdiction.  In 
1875,  it  was  farmed  by  the  Sultan  to  Ismail  Pasha, 
on  payment  of  a  tribute  of  £13,500  a  year. 

The  British  Government,  through  their  Ambas- 
sador at  Constantinople,  invited  the  Porte  on  May 
14,  1884,  "to  resume  direct  jurisdiction  over  the 
ports  on  the  Egyptian  coast  of  the  Red  Sea  and 
to  occupy  them  with  Turkish  troops."  On  July  17, 
the  Porte  was  again  invited  to  take  "  the  necessary 
steps,  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  Egyptian  troops, 
to  maintain  its  authority  over  Tajourrah  and 
Zeyla."  It  was,  at  the  same  time,  stated  that  the 
British  Government  were  "  anxious  to  receive  the 
reply  of  the  Porte  with  as  httle  delay  as  possible." 
The  Porte  treated  the  matter  in  its  usual  dilatory 
fashion.  No  definite  answer  was  given.  In  the 
meanwhile,  there  was  an  imminent  risk  of  dis- 
turbances in  the  neighbourhood  of  Zeyla.  On 
August  1,  1884,  therefore.  Lord  Dufferin  was 
instructed  to  "inform  the  Porte  that  unless  the 
Turkish  Government  were  prepared  to  take  imme- 
diate steps  for  the  occupation  of  Zeyla,  it  would 
be  necessary  for  Her  5lajesty's  Government  to 
send  a  force  there  to  preserve  order."  Still  the 
Sultan  did  not  move.  Action  became  necessary 
on  the  part  of  the  British  Government.  On 
August   24,  1884,  Major   Hunter   telegraphed   to 


54  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

me  :  "  Force  landed  at  Zeyla.  Somalis  impressed. 
Governor  oblifj^ino-,"  The  obliu'inf?  Governor  was 
kept  in  his  place  for  a  while,  because  some  dis- 
cussion ensued  as  to  the  future  of  Zeyla.  A 
difference  of  opinion  existed  among  the  British 
authorities  as  to  whether  it  was  worth  keeping  or 
not.     It  is  now  British  territory. 

The  Egyptian  tribute  was  paid  to  the  Porte  for 
some  while  after  the  British  occupation  of  Zeyla. 
Eventually,  in  connection  with  certain  Custom- 
house negotiations,  an  understanding  was  arrived 
at  between  Cairo  and  Constantinople  that  the 
payment  of  the  tribute  should  cease. 

10.   Tajourrah. 

It  was  not  to  be  supposed  that,  whilst  this 
scramble  for  Egyptian  territory  was  going  on, 
the  French  would  remain  idle.  In  1862,  they  had 
taken  possession  of  Obokh,  in  virtue  of  a  Conven- 
tion made  with  some  local  Sheikhs.  The  French 
Government  now  decided  to  annex  the  neigh- 
bouring territory  of  Tajourrah.  Early  in  May 
1884,  a  French  ship  arrived  at  Richal,  a  port  near 
Tajourrah ;  ten  sailors,  accompanied  by  the  Vizier 
of  Tajourrah,  landed,  told  the  local  Sheikhs  that 
the  place  belonged  to  them,  and  that  they  would 
return  to  take  possession  of  it.  JNI.  Barrere,  the 
French  representative  at  Cairo,  "  knew  nothing  of 
the  matter ;  he  knew  Tajourrah  was  Egyptian 
territory."  Mr.  Egerton  "thought  it  possible  that 
there  might  be  some  misunderstanding."  There 
was,  however,  no  misunderstanding.  The  Porte 
uttered  some  feeble  protests,  and  tried  to  excite 
English  jealousy  of  French  extension.  The  British 
Ciovernmcnt,  however,  wisely  remained  indifferent. 
Since  1884,  Tajourrah  has  been  a  French  possession. 


CH.XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  55 

11.  3fassowah. 

Suakin  and  Massowah  were  placed  under 
Egyptian  jurisdiction  by  an  Imperial  Firman 
issued  in  1865.  The  tribute  payable  by  Egypt 
to  the  Sultan  was,  at  the  same  time,  raised  by 
£37,500  a  year. 

The  same  disorder  reigned  at  Massowah  as 
elsewhere.  Colonel  Chermside  telegraphed  from 
Suakin  on  January  22,  1885  :  "  I  do  hope  you  wiU 
take  a  speedy  decision  as  to  the  Massowah  ques- 
tion, as,  without  wishing  to  reflect  on  the  long 
string  of  my  predecessors,  it  is  hard  to  carry  on  at 
all  in  the  chaos  everything  is  in,  police,  pensions, 
establishment  of  employes,  dues,  contracts,  water- 
supply,  public  works,  military  garrison,  every- 
thing is  in  indescribable  confusion,  costly  without 
efficiency."  The  Egyptian  Government  were  in- 
capable of  evolving  order  out  of  this  chaos.  The 
only  possible  course  was  to  let  Massowah  go  the 
way  of  the  other  lost  possessions  of  Egypt.  The 
question  then  arose  as  to  who  should  step  into 
possession  of  the  property,  which  was  about  to 
be  abandoned. 

"  LTtalie,"  a  French  diplomatist  said  at  the 
time  of  the  Berlin  Congress,  "  rode  autour  du 
monde  pour  trouver  un  endroit  quelconque  ou  elle 
pourra  placer  son  drapeau."  The  Italian  nation 
has,  in  fact,  ever  since  its  creation,  shown  a  good 
deal  of  the  restless  ambition  which  often  attaches 
itself  to  youth.  The  desire  manifested  of  late 
years  in  Italy  to  estabhsh  colonies  in  distant  lands 
appears  to  be  based  to  some  extent  on  the  plea 
that  other  great  Powers  have  founded  colonies, 
and  that,  therefore,  Italy  must  do  the  same.  The 
Italians,  in  all  the  exuberance  of  youthful  national 
life,  forgot,  in  1885,  that  the  monk's  cowl  does 
not   necessarily  make  the  monk,  and  rushed  into 


v56  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

African  colonisation  with  all  the  impetuosity  which 
characterises  Southern  nations. 

Some  years  previously,  the  Italians  had  estab- 
Hshed  themselves  at  Assab  Bay,  a  proceeding  wliich 
was  viewed  with  a  good  deal  of  rather  unnecessary 
ill-humour  by  the  Indian  Government  of  the  day. 
When  it  became  apparent  that  the  neighbouiing 
territory  of  JNIassow^ah  was  hkely  to  be  in  the 
pohtical  market,  Italian  ambition  fired  up.  It 
was  thought  necessary  to  acquire  this  desirable 
possession  before  it  could  fall  into  the  hands  of 
any  rival  claimant.  The  first  thing  to  do  was  to 
secure  the  goodwill  of  England ;  Lord  Granville  was 
sounded  on  the  subject.  On  December  22,  1884, 
he  wrote  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Rome :  "  I 
have  informed  Count  Nigra  (the  Italian  Ambassador 
in  London)  that  Her  Majesty's  Government  were 
desirous  of  showing  their  friendly  feeling  towards 
Italy  in  all  ways.  The  Egyptian  Government 
were  unable,  I  said,  to  continue  their  hold  on  all 
the  African  Httoral  of  the  Red  Sea.  Under  these 
circumstances,  the  ports  naturally  reverted  to 
Turkey.  We  had  for  some  time  been  giving 
advice  to  the  Porte  to  retake  possession  of  them. 
I  was  glad,  I  continued,  to  observe  that  M.  INIancini 
fully  recognised  that  we  had  no  right  and  made  no 
pretension  to  give  away  that  which  did  not  belong 
to  us.  If  the  ItaUan  Government  should  desire 
to  occupy  some  of  the  ports  in  question,  it 
was  a  matter  between  Italy  and  Turkey ;  but  I 
was  able  to  inform  him  that  Her  JNIajesty's  Govern- 
ment, for  their  part,  had  no  objection  to  raise 
against  the  ItaHan  occupation  of  ZuUa,  Beilul,  or 
Massowah." 

When,  at  a  subsequent  period,  many  sober- 
thinking  Italians  regretted  the  occupation  of 
Massowah,  it  was  occasionally  alleged  that  England 
had  instigated  the  occupation,  and  that  Italy  had, 


CH.  XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  57 

in  fact,  been  used  as  a  eatspaw  in  order  to  get 
the  British  Government  out  of  a  difficulty.  These 
statements  are  devoid  of  foundation.  The  British 
Government  never  proposed  to  Italy  to  occupy 
Massowah.  All  they  did  was  to  adopt  a  friendly 
attitude  towards  Italy,  and  to  abstain  from  creating 
difficulties  which  might  have  proved  obstacles  to 
the  attainment  of  Italian  aspirations.  The  British 
Government  did  nothing  to  thwart  the  ItaHans  ; 
but  beyond  this  they  did  not  go.  Indeed,  I 
remember  telling  M.  de  Martino,  the  Italian 
Consul- General  at  Cairo,  that  my  personal  opinion 
was  that  the  Italians  were  making  a  mistake  in 
occupying  Massowah.  He  was  inclined  to  share 
my  views,  but  the  matter  was  not  one  for  him  to 
decide.  The  Italian  Government  and  the  Italian 
Parliament  were  naturally  presumed  to  be  the  best 
judges  of  Italian  interests.  M.  INIancini,  who  was 
then  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  warmly  espoused 
the  cause  of  occupation,  and  he  was  at  the  time 
supported  by  public  opinion  in  Italy.  Dissuasion 
or  opposition  on  the  part  of  England  would  have 
been  regarded  as  an  unfriendly  act  dictated  by  an 
unworthy  jealousy  of  Itahan  extension. 

When  the  Italian  Government  were  assured  of 
the  absence  of  objection  on  the  part  of  England, 
they  acted  with  promptitude.  Plausible  excuses 
for  action  were  not  wanting.  Some  Italian 
travellers  had  been  murdered  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Massowah,  and  the  Italian  Government  had 
failed  to  obtain  adequate  satisfaction.  Early, 
therefore,  in  the  month  of  February  1885,  a 
formidable  squadron  appeared  at  Massowah  and 
took  possession  of  the  place.  The  Egyptian 
garrison  was  shortly  afterwards  withdrawn. 

The  Sultan  was  indignant.  For  a  time,  the 
Foreign  Offices  of  Europe  rang  with  angry  but 
ineffectual  protests  from  the  Porte.     The  Powers 


58  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

who  had  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  were  implored  to  interfere.  But  no  one 
had  any  real  interest  in  the  matter.  The 
Cabinets  of  Europe  turned  their  heads  the  other 
way,  and  the  diplomatic  clamour  soon  died  out. 
From  that  time  forth,  Italy  has  been  in  possession 
of  Massowah.  Whether  it  is  worth  while  for  the 
Tuscan  and  Neapohtan  peasant  to  continue  to  pay 
taxes  for  the  maintenance  of  Itahan  authority  over 
a  territory,  which  will  probably  never  be  of  any 
great  value  either  from  a  commercial  or  from  any 
other  point  of  view,  is  a  matter  for  the  Italian 
nation  to  decide.  Nations  are  not,  however, 
entirely  governed  by  considerations  of  material 
interests.  The  national  honour  and  dignity  are 
supposed  to  be  at  stake,  and  they  ^\dll,  without 
doubt,  so  far  carry  the  day  as  to  prevent  Italy 
from  abandoning  territory  v.hich  possibly  many 
Italians  now  think  it  was  unwise  ever  to  have 
seized. 

Thus  it  was  that  the  huge  unwieldy  edifice, 
which  Ismail  Pasha  had  sought  to  erect,  fell  with  a 
crash  which  resounded  throughout  North-Eastern 
Africa.  The  Englishman,  the  Italian,  the  French- 
man, the  Abyssinian,  the  Dervish,  and  the  slave- 
hunter  divided  the  spoils  between  them.  And  why 
did  the  edifice  fall  ?  The  destruction  of  General 
Hicks's  army  precipitated  the  catastrophe.  But 
the  real  reason  w^hy  Ismail  Pasha's  empire  fell  was 
that  it  was  eventually  overtaken  by  the  fate 
inevitably  attending  all  poHtical  fabrics  wliich  are 
rotten  to  the  core.  It  fell  because  it  deserved  to 
fall.  It  may  be  that  the  light  of  Western 
civilisation  will  some  day  be  shed  over  the  whole 
of  Africa,  but  if  this  consummation  is  ever  to  be 
attained,  it  must  be  through  other  agents  than 
the  slave- hunting,  corrupt,  and  tyrannical  Pashas, 


CH.  XXX    DEBRIS  OF  THE  SOUDAN  59 

who  were  employed  by  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment, and  who,  themselves  but  semi -civilised, 
introduced  none  of  the  blessings  but  some  of 
the  curses  of  civilisation  amongst  the  people 
who,  by  a  cruel  fate,  were  for  a  time  placed  under 
their  control 


CHAPTER    XXXI 

THE   DEFENCE    OF   EGYPT 

1886-1892 

The  Egyptian  army — Negotiations  with  the  Dervishes — Fighting  on 
the  frontier — The  siege  of  Suakin — Defeat  of  Osman  Digna — 
Wad-el-Nejumi — Nejumi  advances — The  battles  of  Argin  and  of 
Toski — Death  of  Wad-el-Nejumi — Results  of  the  battle — Situation 
at    Suakin  —  The    reoccupation    of   Tokar — Defeat   of    Osman 


Although  British  military  aid  to  a  very  limited 
extent  was  subsequently  on  one  or  two  occasions 
afforded  to  the  Egyptian  Government,  it  may  be 
said  that  from  the  date  of  the  battle  of  Ginniss 
(December  30,  1885)  the  defence  of  Egypt  against 
the  Dervishes  practically  devolved  on  the  Egyptian 
army.  That  army  was  now  officered  by  a  well- 
selected  body  of  Englishmen.  Its  organisation  had 
been  greatly  improved.  The  men  were  gaining 
confidence  in  themselves.  A  small  Egyptian  Camel 
Corps  had  fought  at  Kirbekan,  and  its  conduct  had 
obtained  General  Brackenbury's  commendations. 
A  more  considerable  Egyptian  force  had  taken  a 
creditable  part  in  the  battle  of  Ginniss.  Hopes, 
therefore,  began  to  be  entertained  that  for  the 
future  the  Egyptian  army  would  of  itself  suffice 
to  repel  any  attack  which  might  be  made  by  the 
Dervishes.  The  sequel  showed  that  these*  hopes 
were  destined  to  be  realised. 

It  has  been  already  sho^vn  that  a  great  shrinkage 

60 


cH.  XXXI     THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT         61 

of  Egyptian  territory  had  taken  place.  The  army 
was  no  longer  called  upon  to  defend  remote  regions 
in  the  centre  of  Africa.  Its  task  was  of  a  more 
modest  nature.  In  the  first  place,  it  had  to  prevent 
the  Dervishes  from  descending  the  valley  of  the 
Nile  farther  than  Wadi  Haifa  ;  in  the  second  place, 
it  had  to  maintain  whatever  was  left  of  Egyptian 
authority  in  the  Eastern  Soudan.  For  the  time 
being,  this  latter  task  was  confined  to  the  defence 
of  the  town  of  Suakin,  for  Egyptian  authority  did 
not  extend  beyond  its  walls.  For  obvious  reasons, 
based  on  the  difficulties  of  communication,  the 
operations  in  the  valley  of  the  Nile  and  at  Suakin 
were  to  a  great  extent  independent  of  each  other. 

Before  entering  upon  a  description  of  the 
miUtary  operations  which  were  about  to  take 
place,  it  will  be  as  well  to  allude  briefly  to  an 
attempt  which  was  made  to  negotiate  with  the 
Dervishes.  A  Convention  between  the  British 
Government  and  the  Porte  was  signed  at  Con- 
stantinople, on  October  24,  1885,  in  virtue  of 
which  two  Commissioners,  one  British  and  one 
Turkish,  were  despatched  to  Cairo. ^  The  second 
article  of  the  Convention  provided  that  the  Ottoman 
Commissioner  was  to  consult  with  the  Khedive 
"  upon  the  best  means  of  tranquillising  the  Soudan 
by  pacific  measures."  After  some  delay,  it  was 
arranged  that  Youssuf  Pasha  Shuhdi  should  be 
sent  to  Wadi  Haifa  in  order  to  try  his  hand  at 
negotiation  with  the  Dervishes.  He  left  Cairo  for 
the  frontier  in  May  1886. 

It  was  as  weU  to  make  an  attempt  to  negotiate, 
if  only  to  show  to  those  who  beheved  in  the 
possibility  of  successful  negotiations  that  it  was 
hopeless  to  attempt  to  come  to  any  arrangement 
with  the  Dervishes.  But  to  all  who  had  any 
appreeiation   of  the   true   nature  of  the   Mahdist 

*  This  subject  is  more  fully  treated  in  Chapter  XLVI 


62  JNIODERN  EGYPT  it.  iii 

movement,  it  was  obvious  that  Youssuf  Pasha 
Shuhdi's  mission  was  foredoomed  to  faihire.  It 
proved,  in  fact,  to  be  wholly  unproductive  of  results. 
A  year  later,  the  Khalifa  addressed  letters  to  the 
Queen,  the  Sultan,  and  the  Khedive,  which 
breathed  the  true  spirit  of  Mahdiism.  The  letter 
to  the  Queen  terminated  in  the  following  eloquent, 
if  somewhat  bombastic  peroration :  "  And  thou, 
if  thou  wilt  not  yield  to  the  command  of  God,  and 
enter  among  the  people  of  Islam  and  the  followers 
of  the  Mahdi — grace  be  upon  him — come  thyself 
and  thy  armies  and  fight  with  the  host  of  God. 
And  if  thou  wilt  not  come,  then  be  ready  in  thy 
place,  for  at  His  pleasure  and  at  the  time  that 
He  shall  will  it,  the  hosts  of  God  will  raze  thy 
dwelling  and  let  thee  taste  of  sorrow,  because 
thou  hast  turned  away  from  the  path  of  the 
Lord,  for  therein  is  sufficiency,  and  salvation  is 
to  him  who  followeth  the  JNlahdi." 

For  three  years  subsequent  to  the  battle  of 
Ginniss,  desultory  fighting  continued  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Suakin,  and  in  the  Nile  valley. 
Notably,  a  brilliant  skirmish  took  place  on  April 
28,  1887,  at  Sarras,  which  resulted  in  the  defeat 
of  the  Dervishes  with  a  loss  of  about  200  men, 
the  Egyptian  loss  being  51  killed  and  woimded. 
It  was  not,  however,  until  December  1888  that 
any  serious  engagement  occurred.  By  that  time, 
the  indigenous  tribes  near  Suakin  had  learnt  to 
appreciate  the  true  character  of  Dervish  rule. 
They  were  either  openly  hostile  to  Osman  Digna, 
or  were  only  prevented  by  fear  from  throwing 
off  tlieir  allegiance  to  the  Mahdi.  Osman  Digna, 
however,  still  terrorised  the  country  with  tribal 
levies  drawn  from  a  distance.  He  obtained  rein- 
forcements and  laid  siege  to  Suakin.  It  was 
eventually  decided  that  he  should  be  attacked, 
and  for  this  purpose  more  Egyptian  troops   were 


cu.  XXXI     THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT         G3 

despatched  from  Cairo.  In  addition  to  these, 
owing  to  pressure  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
Government  in  Parhament,  a  small  British  force 
was  sent  from  Cairo  to  Suakin,  though  its  presence 
was  quite  unnecessary.  Sir  Francis  Grenfell, 
who  had  succeeded  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  as  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Egyptian  army,  conducted 
the  operations  in  person.  On  December  20,  1888, 
the  Dervishes  were  attacked  and  driven  from  their 
entrenchments  with  a  loss  of  500  men.  The  British 
and  Egyptian  loss  was  2  officers  and  50  men  killed 
and  wounded.  The  result  of  this  action  was  to 
relieve  the  pressure  on  Suakin.  Osman  Digna, 
however,  still  maintained  his  hold  over  the  Eastern 
Soudan  generally.  A  further  result  of  no  slight 
importance  was  that  the  Egyptian  troops  acquired 
confidence  in  themselves  and  inspired  confidence 
in  the  minds  of  the  public.  Previous  to  this 
action,  few  believed  in  the  Egyptian  army. 
Subsequent  to  the  action,  the  voice  of  criticism 
was  to  a  certain  extent  silenced.  It  had  been 
proved  that  some  reliance  could  be  placed  on 
Egyptian  troops. 

Afler  this  engagement,  the  valley  of  the  Nile 
became  the  chief  centre  of  interest. 

A  period  of  political  hurricane,  whether  the 
scene  be  laid  in  savage  Africa  or  in  civilised 
Europe,  generally  brings  to  the  front  some 
individual  who  appears  to  embody  in  his  own 
person  the  genius  of  the  principles  which  it  is 
sought  to  assert.  Arabi,  though  no  hero,  was  a 
fitting  representative  of  the  justifiable,  but  blind, 
sullen,  and  unintelligent  discontent  which  prevailed 
amongst  the  Egyptians  at  the  time  of  the  rebellion 
of  which  he  was  the  leader.  The  JNlahdist  Avatar 
was  of  a  different  type.  The  true  incarnation  of 
Mahdiism  was  not  to  be  found  in  Osman  Diffna. 
nor  even  in  the  Mahdi    himself.     Both   of  these 


64  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

men  were  in  some  degree  strutting  on  the  stage. 
It  may  well  be  doubted  whether  either  of  them 
believed  in  himself.  Enlightened  self-interest, 
more  especially  in  the  shape  of  the  acquisition 
of  wealth,  lurked  behind  the  grandiloquent  periods 
of  their  Proclamations,  and  may  be  traced  in  the 
stage  tricks  by  which  it  was  sought  to  strengthen 
the  faith  of  a  credulous  and  fanatical  population. 
When  a  prophet  puts  pepper  under  his  finger-nails 
in  order  to  excite  his  lachrymal  glands^  a  safe 
indication  is  given  that  he  has  descended  from  his 
prophetic  pedestal,  and  that,  by  his  own  confession, 
he  may  be  classed  amongst  P}i:honesses,  the  mani- 
pulators of  Delphic  oracles  and  winking  virgins. 

It  was  reserved  for  Wad-el- Nejumi  to  embody 
in  his  own  person  the  true  principles  of  mihtant 
JNIahdiism.  He  was  at  once  the  Peter  the  Hermit 
of  the  JNIahdist  crusaders  and  the  Prince  Rupert 
of  Dervish  chivalry.  He  believed  in  Mahdiism, 
and  he  believed  in  himself.  When  summoned  by 
Sir  Francis  Grenfell  to  surrender  previous  to  the 
battle  of  Toski,  he  replied,  "  We  are  not  afraid  of 
any  one  ;  we  only  fear  God  ! "  and,  ^vithout  doubt, 
he  spoke  the  truth.  Brave,  resourceful,  and  per- 
tinacious, Nejumi  inspired  amongst  his  followers 
a  confidence  which  he  carried  to  his  grave,  and 
which  stood  the  test  of  mihtary  defeat  and  death. 
Few  pictures  are  more  touching  than  that  of  the 
host  of  wild  Dervish  prisoners  mourning  with  heart- 
felt sorrow  in  the  palm-grove  of  Toski  over  the 
body  of  the  chieftain  who  had  led  them,  their 
companions,  their  wives  and  their  children,  through 
suffering  and  privation,  to  the  destruction  of  their 
poUtical  hopes  and  to  death.     Sir  Reginald  Wingate 

*  "  The  Greek  who  came  in  told  the  Greek  Consul  that  the  Mahdi 
puts  pepper  under  his  finjrer-nails,  and  when  he  receives  visitors  then 
he  touches  liis  eyes  and  weeps  copiously  ;  that  he  eats  a  few  grains  of 
dhoora  openly,  but  in  the  interior  oi"  tlie  house  he  has  tine  feeding  and 
drinks  alcoholic  drinks." — Gordon's  Journal,  vol.  i.  p.  32. 


CH.XXX1     THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT         65 

thus  describes  the  character  of  this  picturesque 
savage :  "  Nejumi's  career  closed  only  at  Toski,  when 
his  devoted  bodyguard  sold  their  hves  dearly  in 
defence  of  his  revered  corpse.  He  was  a  Jaalin, 
but  one  in  whom  the  Baggara  recognised  warhke 
quahties  similar  to  their  own,  and  with  whom  it 
was  important  to  keep  on  good  terms.  In  early 
life  a  Fiki,  like  the  Mahdi,  and  his  devoted  friend, 
stern,  hard,  ascetic,  the  thin  dark  man  was  the 
incarnation  of  a  blind  sincerity  of  conviction.  He 
never  transgressed  the  self-appointed  strictness  with 
which  he  ruled  his  conduct.  Withal,  a  spice  of 
madness  entered  into  his  composition.  There  was 
no  man  but  trusted  his  word,  and  his  was  the 
distant  enterprise,  his  the  forefront  of  danger 
always.  Mahdiism  was  the  natural  outlet  for  his 
wild  temper.  He  was  the  Khalid  of  the  Prophet's 
wars.  He  it  was  who  prepared  the  stratagem 
which  annihilated  Hicks.  He  it  was  who  crept 
silently  round  through  the  shallow  mud  beyond 
the  crumbled  ramparts  of  Khartoum." 

The  defeat  at  Ginniss  checked  the  advance  of 
the  Dervishes,  but  their  leaders  were  not  dis- 
couraged. It  is  probable  that  the  Soudanese 
population  failed  to  reahse  the  fact  that  any 
military  reverse  had  been  sustained.  The  Khahfa 
vied  with  Napoleon  in  the  mendacity  of  his 
bulletins.  Moreover,  the  main  facts,  as  they 
must  have  presented  themselves  to  the  minds  of 
his  followers,  were  that  a  British  force  had  invaded 
the  Soudan,  that  it  had  failed  to  accomplish  its 
object,  that  the  capital  of  the  Soudan  had  fallen 
in  spite  of  British  endeavours  to  save  it,  and  that 
the  British  army  had  then  retired  and  had  assumed 
a  defensive  attitude.  It  can,  therefore,  be  no 
matter  for  surprise  that  "  general  rejoicings  "  took 
place  at  Khartoum.  The  Dervishes,  confident  in 
the  sacred  nature  and   ultimate   success  of  their 

VOL.  II  F 


66  MODERN  EGYPT  Fr.  m 

cause,  were  stimulated  to  fresh  exertions.  As  Lord 
Wolseley,  General  Gordon,  and  others  had  pre- 
dicted, it  was  decided  to  invade  Egypt.  "  Nejumi," 
Sir  Reginald  AVingate  says,  "  burnt  his  house  at 
Omdurman,  and  vowed  that  he  would  not  return 
until  he  had  conquered  Egypt.  On  his  departure, 
the  Khalifa  AbduUah  assembled  the  four  KhaUfas 
and  all  the  Emirs.  They  all  stretched  out  their 
hands  in  the  direction  of  Cairo,  and  called  out 
*Allahu  Akbar,'  three  times.  Then  the  Khalifa 
Abdullah  called  out  in  a  loud  voice,  '  O  Ansar  1 
fear  not  for  the  fight  for  the  land  of  Egypt ;  you 
will  suffer  much  at  the  battle  of  Assouan,  after 
which  the  whole  of  Egypt  will  fall  into  your 
hands.  O  Ansar !  you  will  also  suffer  much  at 
the  battle  of  ISlecca,  after  which  the  whole  country 
will  be  yours.' " 

Some  time,  however,  elapsed  before  any  for- 
ward movement  was  made.  A  revolt  against 
the  Khahfa's  authority  took  place  in  Kordofan ; 
troubles  occurred  in  Darfour,  and  considerable 
bodies  of  men  bad  to  be  detached  for  service  on 
the  Abyssinian  frontier.  Moreover,  the  important 
tribe  of  Kababish  Arabs,  who  inhabit  the  territory 
west  of  Dongola,  assumed  an  attitude  of  hostility 
to  INIahdiism,  nor  was  it  till  1887  that  they  were 
crushed  and  their  chief,  Saleh  Bey,  killed  in  a 
decisive  engagement.  The  Mahdist  leaders,  there- 
fore, had  their  hands  full  for  the  space  of  three 
years.  As  successive  seasons  passed  and  no  forward 
movement  was  made,  it  began  to  be  thought  that 
Dervish  invasion  was  a  mere  bugbear. 

At  last,  however,  the  long-expected  invasion 
took  place.  In  the  summer  of  1889,  Nejumi 
advanced  down  the  valley  of  the  Nile  with  a  motley 
force,  consisting  in  all  of  over  11,000  souls.  He 
was  joined  at  Sarras  by  a  further  body  of  1200 
fighting  men,  of  whom  about  300  were  armed  with 


CH.  XXXI    THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT         07 

rifles,  and  some  1 000  camp  -  followers.  A  short 
distance  south  of  W'adi  Haifa,  Nejumi  left  the 
river.  He  decided  to  turn  Wadi  Haifa,  to  move 
along  the  west  bank  parallel  to,  but  at  some  little 
distance  from  the  Nile,  and  then  to  strike  the  river 
again  at  a  point  somewhere  between  Wadi  Haifa 
and  Korosko.  He  hoped  and  believed  that  he 
would  be  joined  by  the  Nubian  population. 

This  plan  was  faulty  in  its  conception.  It  was 
of  a  nature  to  facilitate  the  conduct  of  defensive 
operations.  It  involved  toilsome  marches  under 
a  burning  sun  over  a  trackless  desert  devoid  of 
water.  The  difficulty  of  obtaining  supplies  was 
great.  Even  before  leaving  the  river,  many  of 
the  horses,  camels,  and  donkeys  had  been  killed 
and  eaten.  Constant  excursions  to  the  river  were 
necessary  in  order  to  obtain  water,  and  the  river 
was  occupied  by  Egyptian  troops,  who  could  be 
moved  from  point  to  point  with  comparative  ease 
by  utilising  the  steamers  and  barges  which  were 
at  the  disposal  of  Colonel  Wodehouse,  the  com- 
mandant of  the  frontier.  In  the  language  of 
strategists,  the  Egyptian  army  was  acting  on 
interior  lines.  By  July  2,  Nejumi's  force  occu- 
pied a  position  in  the  desert  a  sliort  distance  from 
Arguin,  a  village  on  the  river  about  3^  miles  noilh 
of  AVadi  Haifa.  His  movements  were  carefully 
watched  and  followed  by  Colonel  Wodehouse  with 
a  flying  column  of  about  2000  men.  The  Dervishes 
attacked  the  village  and,  after  a  sharp  engagement, 
were  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  about  900  men, 
amongst  whom  were  several  important  Emirs. 
The  Egyptian  loss  consisted  of  4  officers  and 
66  men  killed  and  wounded.  This  spirited  action 
reflected  great  credit  on  Colonel  AVodehouse  and 
the  force  which  he  commanded.  It  discouraged 
the  Dervishes,  and  contributed  materially  to  tlie 
final   and    decisive    victory   at    Toski.      ^lany   of 


68  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

Nejumi's  men  deserted.     Abdul  Halim,  his  prin- 
cipal lieutenant,  ad\dsed  a  retreat.     It  was  futile, 
he   thought,  "to  attempt   an  invasion   of  Egypt 
with    insufficient    men,   no    food,   and    enormous 
difficulties  in  obtaining  water."     Nejumi's  indomit- 
able spirit  was,  however,  not  to  be  broken.     He 
made  an  eloquent  appeal  to  the  religious  zeal  of 
his  followers,  who  resolved  to  go  on,  and  if  needs 
be  to  die  mth  him.     Accordingly,  the  unwieldy 
column,  dogged  at  every  step  by  the  watchful  and 
pertinacious    Colonel   Wodehouse,   moved   slowly 
and  laboriously  northward.    The  Der\ashes  suffered 
greatly.      "  Desultoiy   skirmishes,"    Sir    Reginald 
Wingate  wrote,  "took  place  daily,  and  numbers 
of    camp  -  followers,    women    and    children,   were 
captured.     One  and  all  gave  pitiable  accounts  of 
the   state   of    affairs    in    the    Arab   camp.      The 
numbers   of    camels,    horses,    and    donkeys    were 
rapidly   diminishing,    as   they   constituted    almost 
the   sole   food.     Might   was   right ;    so   the   lion's 
share,  such   as   it  was,  fell  to   the  fighting  men, 
while  the  miserable  camp  -  followers  subsisted  on 
powdered  date-seeds  and  the  core  of  the  date-palm 
tree,  which,  when  ground,  is  said  to  have  certain 
nutritive    properties.      But    many   of    these    un- 
fortunate people  were  reduced  to  a  state  of  starva- 
tion and,  flocking  to  the  river-bank  in  numbers, 
were  received  by  patrolling  gun-boats,  and  brought 
to  the  Egyptian  camp,  where  they  were  fed  and 
cared  for,  and,  if  wounded,  admitted  to  hospital." 

In  the  meanwhile,  reinforcements,  both  British 
and  Egyptian,  were  hurrying  up  from  Cairo.  The 
Eg}^)tians  were  the  first  io  amve,  and  Sir  Francis 
Grenfell,  who  had  assumed  the  command,  seeing 
a  favourable  opportunity,  struck  the  decisive  blow 
before  the  main  body  of  British  troops  came  up.^ 

1  A  small  body  of  British  cavalry,  however,  took  part  iu  the  battle 
of  Toski. 


CH.  XXXI     THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYI'T         69 

On  August  2,  the  Egyptian  force  occupied  Toski, 
a  village  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Nile,  about  mid- 
way between  Wadi  Haifa  and  Korosko.  Nejumi 
camped,  on  the  night  of  the  2nd,  in  the  desert 
about  five  miles  from  the  village.  Early  on  the 
morning  of  the  3rd,  Sir  Francis  Grenfell  made  a 
reconnaissance  in  force,  and,  on  approaching  the 
Dervish  position,  at  once  recognised  that  the 
topographical  features  of  the  ground  were  very 
favourable  to  the  Egyptian  troops. 

I  visited  the  battlefield  of  Toski  a  few  months 
later.  Many  of  the  Dervish  dead  were  still  unburied. 
The  empty  cartridge  cases,  which  were  strewed 
about,  showed  clearly  the  positions  which  had  been 
occupied  by  the  Egyptian  troops.  It  would  be 
difficult  to  conceive  ground  better  calculated  to 
give  disciplined,  well-armed,  and  well -equipped 
troops  every  possible  advantage  over  hordes  of 
courageous  but  iU-disciphned  savages.  The  soil 
of  the  desert,  which  is  here  undulating,  is  composed 
of  hard  shingly  sand,  over  which  infantry,  cavalry, 
and  artillery  can  move  with  ease  and  rapidity. 
Here  and  there,  a  few  rocks  and  boulders,  behind 
which  shelter  can  be  obtained,  rise  up  from  the 
plain.  Save,  however,  in  these  localities,  the  ground 
is  completely  bare.  Once  driven  from  the  shelter  of 
the  rocks,  it  was  clear  that  the  arms  of  precision, 
with  which  the  Egyptian  soldiers  were  furnished, 
would  work  with  deadly  effect  on  the  Dervishes. 
Sir  Francis  Grenfell,  therefore,  with  the  eye  of  a 
true  tactician,  determined  to  bring  on  an  action 
at  once.  Orders  were  sent  to  Toski  for  the 
remainder  of  the  Egyptian  troops  to  come  out. 
In  the  meanwhile,  the  cavalry,  under  Colonel 
Kitchener,  headed  Nejumi,  who  at  first  wished  to 
avoid  an  action,  and  was  endeavouring  to  slip  away 
to  the  north.  It  was  evident  to  Nejumi  that 
he  had  to  accept  Sir  Francis  Grenfell's  challenge. 


70  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

He  gave  his  followers  an  Arab  version  of  Xelson's 
order  at  Trafalgar.  "  We  must  all,"  he  said, 
"  stand  prepared  to  meet  our  Maker  to-day." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  give  a  detailed  account  of 
what  followed.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say  that 
Nejumi's  force  was  routed ;  1200  of  his  followers 
were  killed,  and  the  greater  portion  of  the  remainder 
were  taken  prisoner,  either  immediately  or  during 
the  next  three  days.  Sir  Reginald  AVingate 
estimates  that  the  total  force  with  which  Xejumi 
crossed  the  frontier  on  July  1,  together  with  the 
reinforcements  he  subsequently  received,  amounted 
to  about  5700  fighting  men  and  8000  camp-followers. 
Of  these,  about  1000  fighting  men  and  2000  camp- 
followers  returned  to  their  homes.  The  remainder 
were  either  killed,  died  of  disease  and  starvation,  or 
were  taken  prisoners.  The  Egyptian  loss  at  the 
battle  was  165  killed  and  wounded. 

What,  however,  became  of  him  who  is  the  one 
interesting  figure  in  Dervish  history  ?  AVhat  became 
of  the  savage  chieftain  who  had  looked  down  on 
the  lines  of  Wadi  Haifa  but  a  few  weeks  previously 
and  had  sworn,  in  words  that  bring  back  Border 
minstrelsy  to  the  mind  of  an  EngHshman,  that  he 
would  "  stable  his  steed  in  Wodehouse's  chamber  "  ? 
Nejumi  was  slightly  wounded  at  an  early  stage  of 
the  fight.  One  of  his  relations,  who  was  taken 
prisoner  at  Toski,  said  :  "  On  the  capture  of  the 
first  position,  one  of  the  Emirs  escaped  from  the 
onslaught  and  rushed  breathlessly  by,  crying  to 
Nejumi  that  all  was  over  and  that  he  should  fly. 
Instead  of  listening  to  this  advice,  Nejumi  mounted 
his  horse  and,  dashing  down  to  the  plain,  vainly 
endeavoured  to  rally  his  men."  He  was  again 
^yolUl(led,  this  time  severely,  and  liis  horse  was 
shot  under  him,  but  he  reached  the  shelter  of  the 
hills.  He  appears  then  to  have  been  wounded  yet  a 
third  time.     "  During  the  artillery  attack  on  the 


CH.XXXI     THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT        71 

second  position,"  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  says,  "a 
well-directed  shell  brought  down  the  largest  banner, 
which  was  subsequently  discovered  to  be  Nejumi's, 
and  it  is  probable  that  the  shell  which  broke  his 
flag-pole  also  wounded  Nejumi  again."  He  was 
carefully  tended  by  his  faithful  bodyguard,  who 
placed  him  on  a  rough  camel -litter,  and  en- 
deavoured to  carry  him  to  the  rear.  The  party, 
"  on  being  observed,  was  fired  on  by  a  troop  of 
cavalry  ;  the  camel  fell,  and  most  of  the  men 
appeared  to  have  been  killed ;  the  cavalry  then 
followed  up,  and  called  on  the  remainder  to 
surrender,  but  as  they  approached,  the  Arabs 
supposed  to  have  been  killed,  suddenly  sprang 
up,  and  rushing  at  them,  a  hand-to-hand  encounter 
ensued ;  a  number  were  killed,  and  the  remainder 
returned  once  more  to  their  camel.  They  were 
again  called  upon  to  surrender,  but  their  only 
response  was  a  second  charge,  which  resulted  in 
all  being  killed  except  one,  who,  mounting  a 
passing  horse,  succeeded  in  escaping."  It  was 
then  found  that  the  camel  carried  the  dead  body 
of  Nejumi.  "  One  of  his  sons,  a  boy  of  five  years 
old,  was  found  dead  beside  the  camel,  while  another 
baby  boy  scarcely  a  year  old  was  brought  by  his 
iiurse  into  the  camp  at  Toski  on  the  following 
day." ' 

There  is  a  rude  pathos  about  the  life  and  death 
of  this  savage  warrior,  which  brings  to  the  mind 
an  avrjp  apt(TTo<i  of  Homcric,  or  a  Beowulf  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  times. 

I  have  already  said  that  the  lives  lost  at  Abu 

'  Of  all  the  sons  of  earth,  few  have  had  their  destiny  more  completely 
changed  by  accident  than  this  child.  Instead  of  being  broujilit  up  to 
detest  Christians  amidst  savage  surroundings  in  the  Soudan,  he  was 
handed  over  to  the  tender  care  of  the  English  nursing  sisters  at  the 
principal  hospital  at  Cairo,  by  whom  he  was  a  good  deal  spoilt,  and 
who  were  more  devoted  and  certainly  more  willing  slaves  to  him  than 
any  of  those  whom  his  father  could  have  captured  in  the  centre  of 
Africa. 


72  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

Klea,  Kirbekan,  and  other  previous  battles  in  the 
Soudan  were  wasted,  or  as  good  as  wasted.  The 
same  cannot  be  said  of  those  who  fell  at  Toski. 
In  this  case,  the  soldier  was  the  executive  arm  of  a 
wise  policy.  He  was  defending  the  ground  secured 
to  civilisation  from  the  attacks  of  barbarous  fanatics. 
He  fought  in  a  good  cause.  He  deserved  to 
triumph,  and  his  triumph  was  complete.  The 
victory  of  Toski  brought  important  political  results 
in  its  train.  It  pricked  the  Mahdist  bubble.  It 
showed  that  the  Dervishes,  although  perhaps  still 
strong  for  purposes  of  defence  in  their  own  remote 
and  inhospitable  deserts,  were  no  longer  to  be 
feared  as  aggressors.  It  gave  confidence  to  the 
Egyptian  army,  to  the  Egyptian  people,  and  to 
Europe.  It  showed  that  those  who  had  dwelt 
on  the  necessity  of  "  smashing  up  the  JNIahdi "  at 
Khartoum,  had  been  in  error ;  that,  although  right 
in  supposing  that  the  Dervishes  would  invade 
Egypt,  they  had  overrated  the  Dervish  power  of 
offence ;  that  the  Mahdist  movement  had  less 
cohesion  and  was  less  formidable  than  was 
originally  supposed  ;  and  that  a  small  Egyptian 
force  led  by  British  officers,  with  merely  the  moral 
support  to  be  derived  from  the  presence  of  a 
British  garrison  in  Egypt,  was  sufficient  to  guarantee 
the  integrity  of  the  Khedive's  dominions.  With  the 
defeat  at  Toski,  the  aggressive  power  of  Mahdiism 
collapsed.  Sir  Francis  Grenfell,  and  those  who 
fought  under  him,  gave  tranquillity  to  the  valley 
of  the  Nile,  and  enabled  the  work  of  the  civilian 
reformer  to  proceed  without  fear  of  external 
aggi-ession.  These  were  great  achievements,  which 
deserve  the  acknowledgments  of  all  who  are 
interested  in  the  welfare  of  Eg}^t. 

Tlie  scene  must  now  be  shifted  back  again  to 
the  Eastern  Soudan.  For  more  than  two  years 
after  the  defeat  of  Osman  Digna  on  December  20, 


CH.  XXXI    THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT        73 

1888,  no  events  of  importance  took  place  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Suakin.  Egyptian  authority  was 
limited  to  the  ground  enclosed  by  the  fortifications 
of  the  town.  Any  isolated  wood -cutter  or  culti- 
vator who  roamed  beyond  the  range  of  the  guns  was 
liable  to  be  killed  or  captured  by  the  stray  Dervishes 
who  infested  the  environs.  The  indigenous  tribes 
became  daily  more  hostile  to  Osman  Digna,  but 
they  had  not  the  strength  nor  the  power  of  com- 
bination necessary  to  drive  him  out  of  the  country. 

In  the  meanwhile,  a  lengthened  controversy 
took  place  as  to  whether  it  was  desirable  to 
prohibit  or  to  permit  trade  with  the  interior. 
Considerable  difference  of  opinion  existed  amongst 
the  local  authorities  as  to  the  wisest  course  to  be 
pursued  under  the  circumstances.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  mihtary  authorities  urged  that  if  grain 
were  allowed  to  leave  the  coast,  it  could  not  be 
prevented  from  reaching  the  Dervishes,  and  further, 
that  under  the  cover  of  legitimate  trade,  they 
would  receive  munitions  of  war.  Thus,  attacks 
on  Egyptian  territory  would  be  facilitated.  A 
serious  attack  on  Suakin,  which  was  contemplated 
in  1890,  was,  in  fact,  only  prevented  by  the  with- 
drawal of  the  permission  to  trade,  which  had  been 
previously  accorded.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was 
urged  that  the  Dervishes  were  few  in  number,  that 
they  tyrarmised  over  the  rest  of  the  population, 
and  that  it  was  unjust  and  impolitic  to  make  the 
mass  of  the  people  suffer  for  the  faults  of  a  few, 
who,  moreover,  did  not  form  part  of  the  indigenous 
tribes  of  the  Eastern  Soudan,  but  were  strangers 
coming  from  distant  parts,  whose  presence  was 
unwelcome  to  the  natives. 

A  policy,  which  was  almost  prohibitive  of  trade, 
as  also  one  which  placed  no  hindrance  on  trade, 
were,  therefore,  supported  with  an  equal  degree  of 
conviction  by  competent  authorities.     Under  these 


74  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

circumstances,  the  course  of  action  dictated  from 
Cairo  was  necessarily  vacillating.  At  times,  trade 
was  allowed  ;  at  other  times,  it  was  wholly  or  in 
part  prohibited.  Neither  could  this  be  any  matter 
for  surprise,  for  the  arguments  which  the  advocates 
of  both  policies  were  able  to  advance  were  vahd, 
if  considered  exclusively  on  their  own  merits. 

Another  question,  which  grew  in  importance 
during  the  year  1890,  was  the  Slave  Trade,  to  which 
a  stimulus  was  given  by  the  presence  of  the 
Dervishes  on  the  coast.  The  British  cruisers  in  the 
Red  Sea  were  powerless  to  stop  the  traffic.  Arab 
dhows  would  he  concealed  amongst  the  numerous 
creeks  along  the  coast,  which,  owing  to  the  coral 
reefs,  cannot  generally  be  approached  by  large 
ships.  The  slave  caravans  would  wait  a  short 
distance  inland.  A  favourable  opportunity  would 
be  awaited,  the  slaves  would  be  brought  down  to 
the  shore,  embarked  at  sunset,  and  by  the  following 
morning,  with  a  fair  wind,  the  dhow  would  have 
well-nigh  reached  the  opposite  coast  of  Arabia. 

It  was  frequently  pressed  upon  me  during  the 
year  1889  that  the  only  remedy  for  this  state  of 
things  was  to  reoccupy  Tokar,  which  is  the  granary 
of  the  Eastern  Soudan.  It  was  pointed  out  that, 
if  Osman  Digna  were  once  driven  out  of  Tokar,  he 
would  be  no  longer  able  to  obtain  supplies,  and 
would  perforce  be  obliged  to  evacuate  the  Eastern 
Soudan.  For  some  while,  I  hesitated  to  move.  I 
was  reluctant  to  undertake  offensive  operations  of 
any  kind  in  the  Soudan,  and,  moreover,  I  was  'dwnre 
that  any  proposed  advance  would  be  viewed  with 
great  dislike  in  England.  At  last,  however,  I  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  reoccupation  of  Tokar 
was  desirable,  and  that  as  a  military  operation 
it  presented  no  great  difficulty.  In  the  spring 
of  1890,  I  submitted  these  views  to  the  British 
Government. 


CH.  XXXI     THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT         75 

Lord  Salisbury,  who  then  presided  at  the  Foreign 
Office,  was  not  on  principle  averse  to  the  employ- 
ment of  force,  but,  before  sanctioning  its  employ- 
ment, he  wished  to  be  convinced  that  the  adoption 
of  such  a  course  was  both  necessary  and  desirable. 
He  habitually  viewed  military  arguments  wdth 
suspicion.  At  a  later  period,  when  there  was  a 
question  of  giving  up  to  Turkey  some  forts  garri- 
soned by  Egyptian  troops  on  the  coast  of  Midian, 
Lord  Salisbury  wrote  to  me  privately :  "  I  would 
not  be  too  much  impressed  by  what  the  soldiers 
tell  you  about  the  strategic  importance  of  these 
places.  It  is  their  way.  If  they  were  allowed 
full  scope,  they  would  insist  on  the  importance  of 
garrisoning  the  moon  in  order  to  protect  us  from 
Mars." 

In  the  case  now  under  discussion,  Lord  Salisbury 
was  not  convinced  of  the  desirability  of  departing 
from  a  defensive  attitude.^  The  matter  was,  there- 
fore, allowed  to  drop  for  a  while. 

*  Lord  Salisbury's  objections  to  an  advance  on  Tokar  were  stated  to 
me  in  a  private  letter,  dated  Marcli  28,  1890,  in  the  following-  terms : 
"  The  arguments  against  taking  Tokar  appear  to  me  to  be  that  the 
operation  must  involve  some  money,  and  may  involve  very  much,  and 
that  the  finances  of  Egypt,  though  no  lonirer  in  an  embarrassed 
condition,  are  only  convalescent,  and  a  very  slight  imprudence  might 
throw  them  back  into  the  condition  from  which  they  have  been  so 
painfully  and  laboriously  drawn.  Again,  when  once  you  have  per- 
mitted a  military  advance,  the  extent  of  that  military  advance  scarcely 
remains  witliin  your  own  discretion.  It  is  always  open  to  the  military 
authorities  to  discover  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  area  to  which 
your  orders  confine  them,  some  danger  against  which  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  guard,  some  strategic  position  whose  invaluable  qualities 
will  repay  ten  times  any  risk  or  cost  that  its  occupation  may  involve. 
You  have  no  means  of  arguing  against  them.  They  are  upon  their 
own  territory,  and  can  set  down  your  opposition  to  civilian  ignorance  ; 
and  so,  step  by  step,  the  imperious  exactions  of  military  necessity  will 
lead  you  on  into  tlie  desert.  To  these  considerations  I  must  add  that 
tliey  will  appear  infinitely  magnified  to  the  terrified  minds  of  peo])le 
here  at  home.  They  were  so  deeply  impressed  with  the  disasters  of 
six  years  ago,  and  the  apparently  inexorable  necessity  which  had  driven 
them  into  situations  where  those  disasters  were  inevitable,  that  they 
shrink  instinctively  from  any  proposal  to  advance  into  the  Kg\ptian 
desert.     I  do  not  say  that  this  is  a  sufficient  argument  to  prevent  such 


76  MODERN  EGYPT  n.  in 

In  the  autumn  of  1890,  the  subject  was  again 
brought  to  my  notice.  "  I  am  convinced,"  Sir 
Francis  Grenfell  wrote,  "  that  the  time  has  come 
when,  without  any  strain  on  the  finances  of  the 
country,  and  without  any  assistance  from  Enghsh 
troops,  the  country  as  far  as  Tokar  could  be 
pacified."  I  reconsidered  the  question  care- 
fully. The  evils  resulting  from  the  presence 
of  the  Dervishes  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Suakin 
were  daily  becoming  more  apparent.  I  was  more 
than  ever  convinced  that,  as  a  military  operation, 
the  reoccupation  of  Tokar  presented  no  great 
difficulties,  and  that  it  would  not  involve  any 
considerable  expenditure  of  money.  INIore  than 
this,  I  felt  certain  that  there  was  no  serious  risk  of 
being  dragged  into  offensive  operations  on  a  large 
scale  in  the  Soudan.  No  one  was  more  open  to 
con\dction  than  Lord  Salisbury.  Knowing  this,  I 
pressed  him  to  reconsider  the  matter.  Eventually, 
on  February  7,  1891,  Lord  Sahsbury  telegraphed 
to  me  that  the  Government  sanctioned  the 
occupation  of  Tokar. 

Reinforcements  were  now  sent  to  Suakin.  On 
February  13,  Colonel  Holled  Smith,  with  a  force 
of  about  2000  men,  occupied  Trinkitat  without 
opposition.  On  the  16th,  he  advanced  in  the  direc- 
tion of  El  Teb.  On  the  19th,  he  came  in  contact 
with  the  enemy  at  a  short  distance  from  the  to^vn 
of  Tokar.  A  sharp  engagement  ensued.  "  The 
Dervishes,"  Colonel  Holled  Smith  reported, "pushed 
home  their  attack  with  their  usual  intrepidity  and 
fearlessness.  The  troops,  however,  stood  their 
ground,  and  did  not  yield  one  inch  throughout  the 
line."  Finally,  the  Dervishes  were  routed  with 
heavy  loss.      Osman  Digna  escaped,  but  most  of 

an  advauce,  if  there  is  a  clear  balance  of  undoubted  advantage  in  its 
favour  ;  but,  in  the  absence  of  any  such  evidence,  it  must  be  accepted 
as  a  strong  presumption." 


CH.XXXI     THE  DEFENCE  OF  EGYPT        77 

his  leading  Emirs  were  killed.  The  Egyptian  loss 
was  10  killed,  including  one  English  officer,  and 
48  wounded.  Whatever  remained  of  the  Dervish 
force  fled  in  confusion  towards  Kassala.  The 
defeat  of  the  Dervishes  was  hailed  with  genuine 
satisfaction  by  the  population.  The  number  of 
persons  found  at  Tokar  who  had  been  subjected  to 
mutilation  of  the  most  cruel  description,  bore  ample 
testimony  to  the  barbarity  of  Dervish  rule. 

The  Tokar  expedition  was,  therefore,  a  complete 
success.  It  accomplished  for  the  Eastern  Soudan 
what  Toski  did  for  the  valley  of  the  Nile.  It 
cleared  the  country  of  Dervishes,  and  enabled  the 
work  of  the  civilian  reformer  to  commence.^ 

To  sum  up — the  three  important  military  events, 
which  took  place,  during  the  years  immediately 
following  the  evacuation  of  the  Soudan  in  1885, 
were,  first,  the  defeat  of  the  Dervishes  before  Suakin 
on  December  20,  1888  ;  this  relieved  the  pressure 
on  Suakin,  but  did  not  produce  any  further  result 
of  importance.  Secondly,  the  defeat  of  Nejumi's 
force  at  Toski  on  August  3,  1889;  this  broke  the 
aggressive  power  of  the  Dervishes  and  tranquillised 
the  Nile  valley.  Thirdly,  the  defeat  of  Osman 
Digna  near  Tokar  on  February  19,  1891  ;  this 
permitted  an  Egyptian  reoccupation  of  the  province 
of  Tokar,  and  tranquillised  the  greater  part  of  the 
Eastern  Soudan.  After  many  years  of  painful 
transition,  therefore,  Egypt,  reduced  to  manage- 
able dimensions,  at  last  acquired  a  settled  frontier, 
which  the  Egyptian  Government  were  able  to 
defend  with  the  military  and  financial  resources 
at  their  disposal. 

If  a  regenerated  Egypt  is  now  springing  up,  its 

•  On  February  IS,  Lord  Salisbury  wrote  to  me:  "Up  to  the  time 
when  I  write  all  seems  to  have  gone  well  with  tlie  Tokar  expedition  ; 
very  little  notice  is  taken  of  it  here.  We  are  thinking  of  nothing 
except  strikesj  and  of  the  later  cantos  of  the  epic  of  Kitty  O  Shea.' 


78  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

existence  is  in  a  great  measure  due  to  the  fact  that, 
through  good  and  evil  report,  the  poUcy  of  with- 
drawing from  the  Soudan  and  adhering  to  a  strictly 
defensive  attitude  on  the  Egyptian  frontier  was 
steadily  maintained  for  some  years. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 

THE   RECONQUEST    OF    KHARTOUM 
October  1895-September  1898 

Necessity  of  reconquering  tlie  Soudan — Danger  of  premature  action — 
Tlie  Italian  defeat  at  Adua — It  is  decided  to  advance  on  Dongola 
— Provision  of  funds — Sir  Herbert  Kitcliener — Indian  expedition 
to  Suakin — Railway  construction — Battle  of  Firlcet — Capture  of 
Dongola — The  Egyptian  Government  repay  the  money  advanced 
by  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt — 'i'he  British  Government 
advance  £800,000 — Question  of  a  further  offensive  movement — 
Capture  of  Abu  Hamed  and  Berber — Reoccupation  of  Kassala — 
British  troops  sent  to  the  Soudan— The  battle  of  the  Atbara — The 
battle  of  Omdurman — Cost  of  the  campaign — The  War  Office — The 
policy  of  reconquest. 

The  Soudan  had  been  left  derelict,  not  so  much 
because  the  cargo  was  valueless,  but  rather  because 
no  hands  were  available  to  effect  the  salvage.  It 
was,  however,  certain  from  the  first  that  the  recon- 
quest of  some,  at  all  events,  of  the  lost  provinces 
would,  sooner  or  later,  have  to  be  undertaken. 
To  those  who  were  well  acquainted  with  all 
the  circumstances,  it  might,  indeed,  be  clear  that 
England  was  not  responsible  for  the  loss  of  the 
Soudan,  but  the  broad  fact,  which  had  sunk  into 
the  minds  of  the  British  public,  was  this — that  during 
a  period  when  British  influence  was  paramount  in 
Egypt,  certain  provinces,  which  had  before  been 
open  to  trade,  and  which  might  have  been  subjected 
to  the  influences  of  civilisation,  had  been  allowed 
to  relapse  into  barbarism.  The  national  honour 
was   touched.     It   was   thought   that   the    British 

79 


80  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

Government,  even  if  not  originally  responsible  for 
the  loss  of  the  provinces,  would  become  responsible 
if  no  endeavour  were  made  to  effect  their  recon- 
quest.  A  sense  of  shame  was  very  generally  felt 
that,  under  British  auspices,  Egyptian  territory 
should  have  undergone  such  severe  shrinkage. 
The  popular  sentiment  on  the  subject  found  ex- 
pression in  the  feeling  that  "  Gordon  should  be 
avenged." 

It  was  from  the  first  obvious  that  the  partial 
reconquest  of  the  Soudan  was  not  beyond  the 
military  and  financial  resources  of  England,  but 
little  inclination  was  for  some  while  shown,  either 
by  successive  Governments  or  by  public  opinion,  to 
employ  those  resources  in  order  to  attain  the  object 
in  view.  The  problem,  which  apparently  had  to  be 
faced,  was  how  the  Egyptian  Government,  with  but 
little  or  no  British  help,  could  reassert  their  authority 
in  the  Soudan.  It  was  a  necessary  condition  to 
the  solution  of  this  problem  that  it  should  not 
entail  any  increase  to  the  fiscal  burdens  of  the 
Egyptian  people,  and  that  it  should  not  involve 
any  serious  risk  that  the  affairs  of  Egypt  proper, 
which  were  beginning  to  settle  down,  should  relapse 
into  disorder. 

During  the  years  which  immediately  followed 
the  retreat  of  the  troops  after  the  abortive  Gordon 
expedition,  the  main  danger,  against  which  it  was 
necessary  to  guard,  was  to  prevent  the  British  and 
Egyptian  Governments  from  being  driven  into 
premature  action  by  the  small  but  influential 
section  of  public  opinion  which  persistently  and 
strenuously  advocated  the  cause  of  immediate  re- 
conquest.  During  all  this  period,  therefore,  I  was 
careful  in  all  my  published  reports  to  lay  special 
stress  on  the  desirability  of  inaction.  Indeed,  my 
personal  opinion  was  that  the  period  of  enforced 
inaction  would  last  longer  than  was  actually  the 


CH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM    CAMPAIGN  81 

case.  If,  about  the  year  1886,  I  had  been  asked 
how  long  a  time  would  probably  elapse  before  it 
would  be  possible  for  the  Egyptian  Government 
to  abandon  a  defensive  and  to  assume  an  offensive 
policy  in  the  valley  of  the  Nile,  I  should  have 
conjecturally  fixed  the  period  at  about  twenty-five 
years.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Egyptian  army 
reoccupied  Dongola  and  Berber  about  twelve 
years,  and  Khartoum  thirteen  years  after  their 
abandonment.  The  main  reason  why  my  forecast 
proved  erroneous  was  that  the  conditions  of  the 
problem  were  changed.  The  Eg}^tian  Govern- 
ment were  not  left  to  deal  single-handed  with  the 
military  and  financial  situation.  Valuable  assistance, 
both  in  men  and  money,  was  afforded  by  England. 

Before  any  thought  of  reconquest  could  be 
entertained,  two  conditions  had  to  be  fulfilled.  In 
the  first  place,  the  Egyptian  army  had  to  be 
rendered  efficient.  In  the  second  place,  not  only 
had  the  solvency  of  the  Egyptian  Treasury  to  be 
assured,  but  funds  had  to  be  provided  for  the 
extraordinary  expenditure  which  the  assumption  of 
an  offensive  policy  would  certainly  involve. 

The  engagements  which  took  place  in  1888-89 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Suakin  and  in  the  Nile 
valley,  showed  that  some  confidence  could  be  placed 
in  the  Egyptian  army, 

Financial  rehabilitation  and  material  progress  in 
every  direction  proceeded  at  a  far  more  rapid  pace 
than  had  been  anticipated.  By  1895,  the  recon- 
quest of  the  Soudan  had  begun  to  be  generally 
discussed  as  an  undertaking,  which  would  probably 
be  capable  of  realisation  at  no  very  remote  period. 

In  October  1895,  the  question  was  raised  in  the 
following  form.  For  some  while  previous,  a 
scheme  for  holding  up  the  water  of  the  Nile  in 
a  large  reservoir  had  been  under  consideration. 
By  the  autunan  of  1895,  the  discussions  on  the 

VOL.  II  G 


82  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  in 

technical  aspects  of  the  proposal  were  so  far 
advanced  as  to  justify  the  conclusion  that  action 
might  before  long  be  taken.  It  was  at  the  time 
thought  that  the  Egyptian  Treasury  could  not  deal 
simultaneously  with  both  the  reserv^oir  and  the 
Soudan.^  Unless  financial  help  were  to  be  afforded 
from  England,  the  wisest  plan  would  be  to  con- 
struct the  reservoir,  and  to  postpone  sine  die 
the  question  of  reoccupying  the  Soudan.  Subse- 
quently, the  increase  of  revenue  derived  from  the 
construction  of  the  reservoir  might,  it  was  thought, 
provide  funds  which  would  enable  the  Soudan  to 
be  reconquered.  I,  therefore,  asked  the  British 
Government  what  was  their  view  on  this  subject. 
1  was  told  in  reply  (November  15,  1895)  that  there 
was  not  any  present  prospect  of  the  Government 
consenting  to  the  despatch  of  a  military  expedition 
into  the  Soudan,  and  that,  therefore,  the  financial 
arrangements  of  the  Egj^tian  Government  could 
be  made  without  reference  to  the  cost  of  any  such 
expedition. 

When  I  received  this  communication,  I  thought 
that  the  question  of  reconquering  the  Soudan  had 
been  definitely  postponed  for  some  years  to  come. 
I  was  wrong.  I  was  about  to  receive  another 
object-lesson  on  the  danger  of  indulging  in  political 
prophecy.  The  utterances  of  the  Oracle  of  Dodona 
depended  on  the  breeze  which  stirred  the  branches 
of  the  speaking  oaks  around  the  temple  of  Zeus. 
Those  of  the  London  oracle  are  scarcely  less 
uncertain.  They  depend  on  the  ephemeral  indica- 
tions of  the  political  barometer.  When  I  pro- 
pounded the  question  of  whether  the  construction 
of  the  reservoir  was  to  be  preferred  to  Soudan 
reconquest,  a  steady  breeze  of  caution  was  blowing 

1  Eventually,  an  arrangemeut  was  made  under  which  the  Nile 
reservoir  at  Assouan  was  constructed  einiultaneously  with  the  Soudan 
operations.  Tlie  financial  difficulty  veas  met  by  postponing  payment 
for  the  reservoir  until  it  was  completed. 


CH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM    CAMPAIGN  83 

amongst  the  political  oaks  of  London.  The  oracle 
pronounced,  in  no  uncertain  language,  in  favour  of 
the  reservoir.  But  a  sharp  squall  was  about  to 
come  up  from  an  opposite  direction,  with  the  result 
that  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye  the  decision  was 
reversed,  and  the  oracle  pronounced  as  decisively 
in  favour  of  an  advance  into  the  Soudan  as  it  had 
previously,  under  different  barometrical  indications, 
rejected  any  such  idea. 

The  change  was  in  some  degree  the  outcome  of 
the  rapid  growth  of  the  Imperialist  spirit,  which 
about  this  time  took  place  in  England,  but  the 
more  immediate  cause  was  the  turn  which  affairs 
took  at  Massowah.  The  Italians  were  being 
hard  pressed  by  the  Abyssinians.  Rumours  were 
afloat  that  the  latter  were  in  league  with  the 
Dervishes,  who  were  about  to  attack  Kassala. 
Early  in  January  1896,  some  discussion,  which 
was  not  productive  of  any  practical  result,  took 
place  as  to  whether  a  demonstration,  which  might 
possibly  relieve  the  pressure  on  the  Italian  forces, 
could  not  advantageously  be  made  either  from 
Wadi  Haifa  or  Suakin.  Eventually,  on  March  1, 
the  Italian  army  under  General  Baratieri  was 
totally  defeated  by  King  Menelek's  forces  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Adua. 

This  brought  matters  to  a  crisis.  The  Italian 
Ambassador  in  London  urged  that  a  diversion 
should  be  made  in  Italian  interests.  On  March 
12,  therefore,  it  was  suddenly  decided  to  reoccupy 
Dongola.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  decision 
was  taken  and  publicly  announced  with  some- 
what excessive  haste.  The  financial  and  mihtary 
difficulties,  which  would  have  to  be  encountered, 
were  inadequately  considered.  But  it  is  not  on 
that  account  to  be  inferred  that  the  decision  was 
unwise.  The  absence  of  consistency,  which  is  so 
frequently  noticeable  in  the  aims  of  British  policy, 


84  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  in 

is,  indeed,  a  never-ending  source  of  embarrassment 
to  those  on  whom  devolves  the  duty  of  carrying 
that  pohcy  into  execution.  A  British  Prime 
Minister  appears  to  be  in  the  position  of  the  steers- 
man of  a  surf-boat  lying  outside  the  mouth  of  an 
African  river.  He  has  to  wait  for  a  high  wave  to 
carry  him  over  the  bar.  In  the  particular  instance 
in  point,  it  appeared  at  the  time  that  it  would  on 
many  grounds  have  been  wiser  to  have  delayed 
action.  The  arguments  based  on  the  desirability 
of  helping  the  Italians,  and  of  checking  any  possible 
advance  on  the  part  of  the  Dervishes,  although  of 
some  weight,  were  not  conclusive.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  policy  of  eventual  reconquest  was  sound. 
It  is  not  always  possible  in  politics  to  choose 
beforehand  the  time  and  method  of  action.  The 
opportunity  must  be  seized  when  it  occurs. 
Whether  the  British  steersman  was  right  or  wrong 
in  selecting  the  Italian  wave  to  float  him  over 
the  Soudan  bar,  depended  in  a  great  measure  on 
whether  the  operation  was  or  was  not  successfully 
conducted.  At  the  time,  I  was  mchned  to  think 
the  action  premature,  but  there  could  be  no  doubt 
that,  when  once  it  had  been  decided  to  act,  no 
effort  should  be  spared  to  ensure  success.  It  was 
also  very  necessary  to  combat  the  idea,  which  at  first 
found  some  favour  in  London,  that  the  operations 
should  be  hmited  to  a  mere  demonstration  so  far 
as  Akasha,  a  short  distance  south  of  Wadi  Haifa. 
It  was  manifest  that  the  advance  should  either  not 
be  undertaken  at  all,  or  else  that  it  should  be  made 
with  the  intention  of  permanently  occupying  the 
country  at  once  as  far  as  Dongola,  and  eventually 
at  least  as  far  as  Khartoum.  Tliere  w;is  something 
to  be  said  in  favour  of  delay  before  embarking  on 
a  forward  policy.  There  was  nothing  whatever  to 
be  said  in  favour  of  trifling  with  the  question.  It 
was  essential  to  discard  absolutely  the  vacillation 


CH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM   CAMPAIGN  85 

of  the  past  in  dealing  with  Soudan  matters.  The 
idea  of  limiting  the  operations  to  a  demonstration 
was  speedily  abandoned. 

When  once  it  had  been  decided  to  advance,  one 
of  the  first  questions  which  naturally  arose  was 
how  funds  were  to  be  provided  for  the  expenses  of 
the  expedition. 

Egj^t  has  throughout  the  occupation  benefited 
greatly  by  the  tendency  which  exists  in  England 
towards  administrative  decentralisation.  No  serious 
attempt  has  ever  been  made  to  govern  Egypt  from 
London.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  system  is 
wise.  It  has  enabled  us  to  avoid  the  numberless 
errors  which  generally  result  from  the  highly 
centralised  systems  generally  adopted  on  the  conti- 
nent of  Europe.  But  even  a  sound  system  may 
have  some  disadvantages,  although  of  a  nature  in 
no  serious  degree  to  outweigh  its  merits.  One 
disadvantage  of  the  British  system  is  that,  in- 
asmuch as  the  details  of  all  Egyptian  affairs  are 
managed  in  Egypt,  few,  if  any,  of  the  officials 
employed  in  the  London  public  offices  are  in- 
timately acquainted  with  all  the  intricate  wind- 
ings of  the  Egyptian  financial  and  administrative 
labyrinth.  This  ignorance,  although  ordinarily 
beneficent,  has  at  times  produced  some  strange 
and  even  embarrassing  results.  In  this  par- 
ticular instance,  the  authorities  sitting  in  London 
were  aware  that  Egyptian  finance  was  in  a  flourish- 
ing condition.  Moreover,  they  knew  that  large 
sums  of  money,  the  savings  of  past  years,  had 
accumulated  in  the  Treasury.  They  considered 
that  the  reconquest  of  Dongola  was  an  Egyptian 
interest,  and  that  the  Egyptian  Treasury  might 
justly  be  called  upon  to  bear  the  expenses.  The 
possibihty  of  any  charge  devolving  on  the  British 
Treasury  had  not,  in  the  fii-st  instance  at  all  events, 
been  adequately  considered.     It  was  held  not  only 


86  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

tliat  the  Egyptian  Government  ought  to  pay,  but 
that  they  would  be  able  to  pay.  The  fact  that  the  key 
of  the  Egyptian  Treasure-house  was  in  international 
keeping  had  been  insufficiently  appreciated,  even 
if  it  had  not  been  altogether  forgotten.  It  was 
impossible  to  obtain  access  to  the  accumulations 
of  past  years  without  the  consent  of  the  Commis- 
sioners of  the  Debt. 

Application  was  accordingly  made  to  the  Com- 
missioners for  a  grant  of  £E. 500,000  from  the 
General  Reserve  Fund,  in  order  to  cover  the  ex- 
penses of  the  Dongola  expedition.  By  a  majority 
of  four  to  two,  the  Commissioners  granted  the 
request.  The  money  was  paid  into  the  Egyptian 
Treasury.  The  French  and  Russian  Commis- 
sioners, who  constituted  the  dissentient  minority, 
instantly  commenced  an  action  against  the  Egyptian 
Government  in  the  Mixed  Tribunal  of  First  In- 
stance at  Cairo. 

The  judgment  of  the  Tribunal  was  delivered  on 
June  8.  The  Egyptian  Government  were  directed 
to  repay  the  money  granted  by  the  Commissioners 
of  the  Debt.  An  appeal  was  at  once  made  to  the 
higher  Court  sitting  at  Alexandria,  with  results 
which  will  presently  be  described. 

Simultaneously  with  the  financial  question,  the 
composition  and  command  of  the  force  had  to  be 
considered. 

A  British  battalion  was  sent  from  Cairo  to 
Wadi  Haifa,  more  as  an  indication  that  in  case 
of  need  English  help  would  be  forthcoming  than 
for  any  other  reason.  Some  British  officers  were 
temporarily  lent  to  the  Egyptian  army,  but  beyond 
this  assistance,  it  was  decided  to  employ  only 
Egyptian  troops  in  the  Nile  valley. 

The  command  of  the  force  was  left  to  the  Sirdar 
of  the  Egyptian  army.  Sir  Herbert  Kitchener.  A 
better  choice  could  not  have  been  made.     Young, 


ciL  XXXII     KHARTOUM    CAMPAIGN  87 

energetic,  ardently  and  exclusively  devoted  to  his 
profession,  and,  as  the  honourable  scars  on  his  face 
testified,  experienced  in  Soudanese  warfare.  Sir 
Herbert  Kitchener  possessed  all  the  qualities  neces- 
sary to  bring  the  campaign  to  a  successful  issue. 
Like  many  another  military  commander,  the  bonds 
which  united  him  and  his  subordinates  were  those 
of  stern  disciphne  on  the  one  side,  and,  on  the 
other,  the  respect  due  to  superior  talent  and  the 
confidence  felt  in  the  resourcefuhiess  of  a  strong 
and  masterful  spirit,  rather  than  the  affectionate 
obedience  yielded  to  the  behests  of  a  genial  chief. 
When  the  campaign  was  over,  there  were  not 
wanting  critics  who  whispered  that  Sir  Herbert 
Kitchener's  success  had  been  due  as  much  to  good 
luck  as  to  good  management.  If,  it  was  said,  a 
number  of  events  had  happened,  which,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  did  not  happen,  the  result  might  have  been 
different.  The  same  may  be  said  of  any  military 
commander  and  of  any  campaign.  Fortune  is 
proverbially  fickle  in  war.  The  greatest  captain  of 
ancient  times  spoke  of  "  Fortuna,  quae  plurimum 
potest  quum  in  rehquis  rebus  tum  praecipue  in 
beUo."^  The  fact,  however,  is  that  Sir  Herbert 
Kitchener's  main  merit  was  that  he  left  as  httle  as 
possible  to  chance.  A  first-rate  military  adminis- 
trator, every  detail  of  the  machine,  with  which  he 
had  to  work,  received  adequate  attention.  Before 
any  decisive  movement  was  made,  each  portion  of 
the  machine  was  adapted,  so  far  as  human  foresight 
could  provide,  to  perform  its  allotted  task. 

Sir  Herbert  Kitchener  also  possessed  another 
quality  which  is  rare  among  soldiers,  and  which 
v/as  of  special  value  under  the  circumstances  then 
existing.  He  did  not  think  that  extravagance  was 
the  necessary  handmaid  of  efficiency.  On  the 
contrary,  he   was   a   rigid   economist,   and,   whilst 

*  Caesar,  De  Bdlo  C'ivili,  iii.  68. 


88  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iii 

making  adequate  provision  for  all  essential  and 
necessary  expenditure,  suppressed  with  a  firm  hand 
any  tendency  towards  waste  and  extravagance. 

Although  it  was  intended  that,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  one  British  battalion,  only  Egyptian  troops 
should  be  employed  in  the  advance  on  Dongola,  at 
the  same  time,  in  view  of  the  uncertainty  prevail- 
ing as  to  the  amount  of  resistance  Ukely  to  be 
encountered  from  the  Dervishes,  it  was  thought 
desirable  to  reheve  the  Egyptian  army  temporarily 
of  the  duty  of  guarding  Suakin,  and  thus  enable 
the  Sirdar  to  concentrate  all  his  available  forces  in 
the  valley  of  the  Nile.  An  Indian  force  of  about 
2500  fighting  men  was,  therefore,  despatched  to 
Suakin.  It  arrived  early  in  June,  and  left  in  the 
following  December. 

Although  these  Indian  troops  merely  performed 
garrison  duties,  they  rendered  services  of  great 
value ;  their  presence  at  Suakin  relieved  both  the 
British  and  Egyptian  Governments  of  all  anxiety 
as  regarded  the  affairs  of  the  Eastern  Soudan. 

In  conformity  with  the  plan  adopted  throughout 
this  narrative,  no  attempt  will  be  made  to  give 
a  detailed  account  of  the  campaign  of  1896.  A 
brief  statement  of  the  principal  incidents  wiU 
suffice. 

From  the  first  it  was  manifest  that  one  of  the 
main  difficulties  was  how  to  transport  the  food 
and  stores  for  the  army  whilst  on  the  march  to 
Dongola.  Few  of  those  who  have  not  been 
directly  or  indirectly  concerned  with  the  opera- 
tions of  war,  fully  appreciate  the  fact  that  at  least 
three-fourths  of  the  time  of  a  military  commander 
on  active  service  are  taken  up  with  devising 
means  for  keeping  his  own  troops  alive.  "A 
starving  army,"  the  Duke  of  Wellington  wrote 
from  Portugal,  "  is  actually  worse  than  none  at 
all."     When,  as  in  the  present  case,  the  march  of 


CH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM    CAMPAIGN  89 

the  army  lies  through  a  barren  and  desolate 
country,  and  when,  in  the  absence  of  roads  and 
wheeled  transport,  every  pound  of  biscuit  and 
every  extra  round  of  ammunition  has  to  be  carried 
on  the  backs  of  camels,  whose  slow  uniform  pace 
no  eagerness  on  the  part  of  the  commander  of  the 
force  can  mend,  it  may  readily  be  conceived  that 
the  difficulties  of  supply  and  transport  are  greatly 
increased.  River  transport  could  only  be  used  in 
certain  localities,  that  is  to  say,  where  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Nile  was  unimpeded  by  rapids.  The 
obvious  solution  of  these  difficulties  was  to  con- 
tinue in  a  southerly  direction  the  railway,  which 
already  existed  between  Wadi  Haifa  and  S arras, 
the  most  distant  outpost  held  by  the  Egj^tian 
army.  Akasha,  some  fifty  miles  south  of  S  arras, 
was  accordingly  occupied  without  resistance  on 
March  20.  Work  on  the  railway,  which  was 
eventually  to  terminate  at  Kerma,  a  few  miles 
short  of  Dongola,  was  at  once  commenced.^ 

The  details  of  the  plan  of  campaign  were,  of 
course,  left  entirely  to  the  discretion  of  the  Sirdar. 
I  had,  however,  fully  discussed  the  general  scheme 
of  operations  with  him  before  he  left  Cairo.  The 
main  point  was  to  bring  on  an  action  at  an  early 
period  of  the  campaign.  Once  victorious,  even  on 
a  small  scale,  the  Egyptian  troops  would  acquire 
confidence  in  themselves,  and  the  enemy  would  be 
proportionately  discouraged.  It  was  desirable  not 
to  allow  the  Dervishes  to  retreat  without  fiffhtinfif, 
and  thus  delay  any  action  till  Dongola  was  reached. 
The  smallest  check  had  above  all  things  to  be 
avoided.  It  would  be  magnified  in  the  eyes  of  the 
world,    and   although   perhaps   of    slight    intrinsic 

^  This  line,  which  was  very  roujjhly  constructed,  lias  now  been 
abandoned.  The  produce  of  the  Dongola  Province  will,  in  future,  be 
conveyed  to  Port  Soudan  partly  by  water,  and  partly  by  a  railway 
which  extcTids  from  Abu  Hamed  westwards  along  the  right  bank  ol 
the  Nile  as  far  as  Kereima. 


90  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

importance,  would  produce  a  bad  moral  effect.  In 
waj',  the  moral  is  to  the  physical  as  three  to  one. 
Nowhere  has  the  truth  of  this  celebrated  Napoleonic 
maxim  been  more  fully  exemplified  than  in  the 
successive  petty  campaigns  which  have  been 
conducted  in  the  Soudan.  The  Sirdar's  general- 
ship had,  therefore,  to  be  shown  in  obliging  the 
Dervishes  to  fight  under  conditions  as  regards 
topography  and  relative  numbers,  which  would  be 
favourable  to  the  troops  under  his  command. 

The  general  plan  of  campaign  arranged  in  Cairo 
was  executed  to  the  letter.  By  the  beginning  of 
June,  the  railway  had  been  constructed  to  within 
a  few  miles  of  Akasha,  A  force  of  about  3500 
Dervishes  was  known  to  be  at  Firket,  some  sixteen 
miles  south  of  Akasha.  It  was  determined  to 
surprise  this  force.  The  utmost  secrecy  was  pre- 
served. On  the  night  of  June  6,  two  columns, 
numbering  in  all  about  10,000  men,  marched  by 
convergent  routes,  with  the  object  of  meeting  in 
the  early  morning,  and  surrounding  the  Dervish 
camp  before  a  retreat  could  be  made.  An  opera- 
tion, the  success  of  which  depends  on  the  opportune 
concentration  of  two  separate  columns  at  a  given 
time  and  place,  is  always  difficult  of  execution. 
The  difficulties  are  enhanced  when  the  march 
takes  place  at  night.  So  skilfully,  however,  were 
all  the  arrangements  planned  and  conducted,  that 
the  object  which  it  was  sought  to  attain  was  fully 
secured.  Early  on  the  morning  of  June  7,  the 
Dervishes,  completely  taken  by  surprise,  were 
attacked  and  routed  with  heavy  loss  both  in  killed 
and  prisoners.  The  Egyptian  loss  was  20  killed 
and  80  wounded.  The  cavalry  continued  the 
pursuit  for  some  miles  beyond  the  battlefield. 

Three  laborious  months  followed  the  battle  of 
Firket.  Cholera  broke  out  in  the  camp,  and,  in 
spite  of  the  energy  and  self-sacrifice  of  the  medical 


CH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM    CAMPAIGN  91 

officers,  was  not  suppressed  before  many  valuable 
lives  had  been  lost.  Storms  of  unprecedented 
violence  occurred,  with  the  result  that  large 
stretches  of  the  railway  embankment  were  washed 
away  and  had  to  be  reconstructed.  But  these  and 
many  other  obstacles  were  eventually  overcome. 
The  dogged  perseverance  of  the  British  officers, 
and  the  willing  obedience  of  the  sturdy  black  and 
fellaheen  troops,  were  proof  against  excessive  heat, 
sandstorms,  and  other  incidents  which  had  to  be 
encountered  in  this  inhospitable  region. 

The  whole  force,  from  General  to  private, 
deserved  success,  and  they  succeeded.  After  a 
sharp  conflict  at  Hafir,  on  which  occasion  the  gun- 
boats, which  had  been  dragged  with  much  labour 
up  the  Cataracts,  did  excellent  service,  Dongola 
was  occupied  on  September  23.  The  campaign 
was  virtually  over.  At  a  cost  of  411  lives,  of  whom 
364  died  from  cholera  and  other  diseases,  and  of 
£E.715,000  in  money — a  figure  which  bore  testi- 
mony to  the  Sirdar's  economical  administration — 
the  province  of  Dongola  had  been  reclaimed 
from  barbarism.  On  September  26,  the  furthest 
Egyptian  outpost  was  fixed  at  Merowi,  the  ancient 
capital  of  the  Ethiopian  Queens  of  the  Candace 
dynasty,  situated  at  the  foot  of  the  Fourth  Cataract. 

The  financial  campaign  lasted  rather  longer  than 
the  military.  It  was  not  altogether  inglorious. 
The  Judges  of  the  Court  of  Appeal — or  at  all 
events  the  majority  of  them — could  not  altogether 
shake  themselves  free  from  the  pohtical  electricity 
with  which  the  atmosphere  of  Egypt  was  at  this 
time  so  heavily  charged.  On  December  6,  the 
Court  condemned  the  course  adopted  by  the 
majority  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt  as 
illegal,  and  ordered  the  Egyptian  Government  to 
refund  the  money. 

I  had  anticipated  the  judgment  of  the  Court, 


92  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

and  was,  therefore,  prepared  to  act.  Immediately 
after  its  delivery,  I  was  authorised  to  promise 
the  Egyptian  Government  pecuniary  help  from 
England.  At  that  time,  the  Egyptian  Treasury 
happened  to  be  full.  It  was  desirable  to  act 
promptly  and  thus  bar  the  way  to  international 
complications.  On  December  6,  four  days  after 
the  delivery  of  the  judgment,  the  total  sum  due, 
amounting  to  £E.515,000,  was — somewhat  to  the 
dismay  of  official  circles  in  London — paid  to  the 
Commissioners  of  the  Debt.  Subsequently,  with 
the  consent  of  Parliament,  the  British  Treasury 
advanced  a  sum  of  £800,000  to  the  Egyptian 
Government  at  2j  per  cent  interest. 

Such,  therefore,  are  the  main  political,  military, 
and  financial  facts  connected  with  the  reconquest 
of  Dongola.  The  episode  is  one  to  which  both 
Englishmen  and  Egyptians  may  look  back  with 
pride  and  satisfaction. 

I  conceive  that  in  all  civilised  countries — and 
perhaps  notably  in  England — the  theory  of  govern- 
ment is  that  a  question  of  peace  or  war  is  one  to  be 
decided  by  politicians.  The  functions  of  the  soldier 
are  supposed  to  be  confined,  in  the  first  place,  to 
advising  on  the  purely  military  aspects  of  the  issues 
involved  ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  to  giving  effect 
to  any  decisions  at  which  the  Government  may 
arrive.  It  has,  however,  often  been  said  that  the 
practice  in  this  matter  not  unfrequently  differs 
from  the  theory ;  that  the  soldier,  who  is  generally 
prone  to  advocate  vigorous  action,  is  inclined  to 
encroach  on  the  sphere  which  should  properly  be 
reserved  for  the  politician  ;  that  the  former  is  often 
masterful  and  the  latter  weak,  too  easily  dazzled  by 
the  glitter  of  arms,  or  too  readily  lured  onwards  by 
the  siren  voice  of  some  strategist  to  acquire  an 
almost  endless  set  of  what,  in  technical  language, 
are  called  "  keys  "  to  some  position  ;  and  that  when 


CH.  XXXII     KHAKTOUM    CAMPAIGN  93 

this  happens,  the  soldier,  who  is  himself  uncon- 
sciously influenced  by  a  laudable  desire  to  obtain 
personal  distinction,  practically  dictates  the  policy 
of  the  nation  without  taking  a  sufficiently  compre- 
hensive view  of  national  interests.  Considerations 
of  this  nature  have  more  especially  been,  from  time 
to  time,  advanced  in  connection  with  the  numerous 
frontier  wars  which  have  occurred  in  India.  That 
they  contain  a  certain  element  of  truth  can  scarcely 
be  doubted.  My  own  experience  in  such  matters 
leads  me  to  the  conclusion  that  in  most  semi- 
military,  semi-political  afliiirs  there  is  generally  an 
early  stage  when  the  politician,  if  he  chooses  to  do 
so,  can  exercise  complete  and  effective  control  over 
the  action  of  the  soldier,  but  that  when  once  that 
control  has  been  even  slightly  relaxed,  it  carmot  be 
regained  until,  by  the  course  of  subsequent  events, 
some  fresh  development  occurs  bringing  with  it  a 
favourable  opportunity  for  the  reassertion  of  civil 
and  political  authority. 

Thus,  in  the  case  of  the  Soudan,  so  long  as  the 
frontier  remained  at  Wadi  Haifa,  the  policy  of  the 
British  and  Egyptian  Governments  was  well  under 
control.  It  was  possible  to  weigh  the  arguments 
for  and  against  an  advance,  and  to  deliberate  upon 
the  ultimate  consequences,  mihtary,  political,  and 
financial,  if  an  advance  was  undertaken.  But 
when  once  the  first  onward  step  had  been  made, 
the  period  for  deliberation,  even  in  respect  to 
matters  which  were  not  perhaps  fully  within  the 
original  purview  of  the  two  Governments,  or  at 
all  events  of  the  British  Government,  was  at  an 
end.  No  one,  who  had  seriously  considered  the 
subject,  imagined  for  one  moment  that  any  sure 
halting-place  could  be  found  between  Wadi  Haifa 
and  Khartoum.  In  the  spring  of  189G,  it  was 
possible  to  adduce  reasons  of  some  weight  in  favour 
of  postponing  the  reconquest  of  the  Soudan.     In 


94  MODERN  EGVrT  pt.  in 

the  autumn  of  the  same  year,  it  was  not  possible  to 
adduce  a  single  valid  argument  in  favour  of  remain- 
ing inactive  and  delaying  the  completion  of  the 
work,  which  had  been  already  begun.  A  certain 
amount  of  hesitation  was,  however,  in  the  first 
instance,  displayed  before  the  inevitable  conclusion 
was  accepted  that  the  British  Government  had 
committed  themselves  to  a  policy,  which  involved 
the  reconquest  of  the  whole  of  the  Soudan.  This 
hesitation  was  probably  due  more  to  financial 
timidity,  and  to  the  reluctance  always  felt  by 
British  INIinisters  to  decide  on  anything  but  the 
issue  of  the  moment,  rather  than  to  any  failure  to 
realise  the  true  facts  of  the  situation.  It  was  not 
till  February  5,  1897,  that  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer  (Sir  Michael  Hicks  Beach),  speaking  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  publicly  recognised  that 
"  Egypt  could  never  be  held  to  be  permanently 
secure  so  long  as  a  hostile  Power  was  in  occupation 
of  the  Nile  valley  up  to  Khartoum,"  and  that  the 
duty  of  giving  a  final  blow  to  the  "  baleful  power 
of  the  Khalifa  "  devolved  on  England. 

Some  months  before  this  declaration  w^as  made, 
the  British  Government  were,  however,  practically 
and  irrevocably  committed  to  an  offensive  poHcy. 
Shortly  after  the  capture  of  Dongola,  the  construc- 
tion of  a  railway  to  connect  Wadi  Haifa  and  Abu 
Hamed  was  commenced. 

Thanks  to  the  energy  and  skill  of  the  young 
Engineer  officers  to  whom  this  important  work 
was  entrusted,  two-thirds  of  the  line  were  com- 
pleted by  August  1897.  The  Sirdar  then  deter- 
mined to  occupy  Abu  Hamed.  A  column  under 
General  Hunter  moved  from  Merowi  up  the  river. 
Abu  Hamed  was  occupied,^  on  August  7,  after  a 

'  The  interval  wliich  elapsed  1)etween  the  occupation  of  Abu  Hamed 
and  the  final  advance  on  Khartoum  was  a  period  of  mucii  anxiety.  Sir 
Herbert  Kitchener's  force  depended  entirely  on  the  desert  railway  for 


CH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM    CAMPAIGN  95 

sharp  combat,  in  which  the  Egyptian  army  lost 
27  killed,  including  two  British  officers,  and  61 
wounded.  Almost  the  whole  of  the  Dervish  force 
was  either  killed  or  taken  prisoner.  Evidence  was 
steadily  accumulating  that  the  Egyptian  soldiers 
were  inspired  by  a  very  different  spirit  from  that 
which  prevailed  fifteen  years  previously,  when  the 
troops  of  Arabi  fled  ignominiously  almost  at  the 
first  cannon  shot. 

On  August  31,  Berber,  which  was  evacuated  by 
the  Dervishes,  was  occupied  by  the  Egyptian 
troops.  The  construction  of  the  railway  from  Abu 
Hamed  to  Berber  was  at  once  taken  in  hand. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  Italians,  who  but  a  short 
time  before  had  been  eager  to  occupy  the  Kassala 
district,  were  clamorous  to  abandon  a  possession, 
which  they  found  expensive  and  of  doubtful  utility. 
On  Christmas  Day  1897,  Kassala  was  occupied  by 
an  Egyptian  force  commanded  by  Colonel  I'arsons. 

In  the  Nile  valley,  no  considerable  change  took 
place  in  the  situation  for  some  months  after  the 
occupation  of  Berber.  It  was  clear  that,  without 
the  aid  of  British  troops,  Khartoum  could  not  be 
retaken,  but  nothing  definite  had  as  yet  been 
decided  as  to  their  employment.  All  hesitation 
was  eventually  removed  by  the  force  of  circum- 
stances.     Towards   the   close   of   the    year    1897, 

its  supplies.  I  was  rather  haunted  with  the  idea  that  some  European 
adventurer,  of  the  type  familiar  in  India  a  century  and  more  ago, 
might  turn  up  at  Khartoum  and  advise  the  Dervishes  to  make  frequent 
raids  across  the  Nile  below  Ahu  Hamed,  with  a  view  to  cutting  the 
communication  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian  force  with  VVadi  Haifa.  This 
was  unquestionably  the  right  military  operation  to  have  undertaken  ; 
neither,  I  think,  would  it  have  been  very  difficult  of  accomplisliment. 
Fortunately,  however,  the  Dervishes  were  themselves  devoid  of  all 
military  (]ualities,  with  the  exception  of  undaunted  courage,  and  did 
not  invite  any  European  assistance.  They,  therefore,  failed  to  take 
advantage  of  the  opportunity  presented  to  tliem.  To  myself,  it  was  a 
great  relief  when  tlie  period  of  suspense  was  over.  I  do  not  tliiuk 
that  the  somewhat  perilous  position  in  which  Sir  Herbert  Kitchener's 
army  was  unquestionalily  placed  for  some  time  was  at  all  realised  by 
the  public  in  general. 


96  MODERN  EGYPT  n.  m 

reports  were  rife  of  an  intention  on  the  part  of 
the  Dervishes  to  take  tlie  offensive.  Whatever 
doubt  might  exist  as  to  the  time  when  a  further 
onward  movement  should  be  undertaken,  there 
could  be  but  one  opinion  as  to  the  necessity  of 
defending  the  territory  already  gained.  Retreat 
was  out  of  the  question.  The  Dervish  challenge 
had  to  be  accepted.  I  had  encouraged  the  Sirdar 
to  ask  for  British  troops  directly  he  thought  their 
presence  necessary.  On  the  first  day  of  the  year 
1898,  he  sent  me  an  historic  telegram,  which 
virtually  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Soudan.  "  General 
Hunter,"  he  said,  "  reports  confirming  news  of 
a  Dervish  advance.  I  think  that  British  troops 
should  be  sent  to  Abu  Hamed,  and  that  reinforce- 
ments should  be  sent  to  Egypt  in  case  of  necessity. 
The  fight  for  the  Soudan  would  appear  to  be  likely 
to  take  place  at  Berber."  Four  British  battalions 
were  at  once  sent  up  the  Nile.  The  Caii'o  garrison 
was  increased.  JNIanifestly,  the  curtain  had  gone  up 
on  the  last  scene  in  the  drama,  which  commenced 
with  the  destruction  of  General  Hicks's  army  fifteen 
years  previously. 

A  few  days  after  the  first  demand  for  troops  had 
been  communicated  to  me,  the  Sirdar  telegraphed 
that,  when  the  final  advance  to  Khartoum  was 
made,  he  would  require,  in  addition  to  the  British 
troops  about  to  be  sent  to  the  Soudan,  another 
infantry  brigade  of  four  battalions,  a  regiment  of 
cavalry  and  a  battery  of  field  artillery.  His  fore- 
cast of  the  force  which  would  be  necessary  was 
wonderfully  accurate.  The  force  which  eventually 
advanced  on  Khartoum  some  six  months  later,  was 
precisely  identical  with  that  which  Sir  Herbert 
Kitchener  specified  early  in  January  1898.  To 
have  advanced  with  a  smaller  force  would  have 
been  dangerous.  A  larger  force  would  have  been 
mwieldy,  and  its  employment  would  have  increased 


CH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  97 

the  difficulties  of  transport  and  supply.  Amongst 
other  high  military  quahties,  the  Sirdar  possessed 
the  knowledge  of  how  to  adapt  his  means  to  his 
end. 

The  threatened  Dervish  advance  rendered  neces- 
sary the  despatch  of  British  troops  to  the  Soudan 
six  months  before  the  rise  of  the  Nile  allowed  of 
free  navigation.  Climate,  it  was  thought  at  the 
time,  might  possibly  be  the  most  dangerous  enemy 
which  would  have  to  be  encountered.  Some  dis- 
cussion, therefore,  ensued  as  to  whether  it  would 
not  be  possible  to  send  up  two  British  brigades 
at  once,  and  advance  straightway  on  Khartoum. 
The  idea  was,  however,  speedily  abandoned.  The 
difficulties  of  transport  and  supply  would  have  been 
enormous.  At  least  7000  camels,  which  it  would 
have  been  well-nigh  impossible  to  have  obtained, 
would  have  been  required.  It  was,  therefore, 
decided  to  stand  on  the  defensive,  and  to  await 
the  favourable  season  before  striking  a  final  blow 
at  the  Dervish  stronghold  at  Omdurman. 

By  the  beginning  of  March,  a  force  consisting 
of  one  British  and  two  Egyptian  brigades,  together 
with  a  regiment  of  Egyptian  cavalry,  24  field  and 
horse  artillery  guns,  and  12  Maxims,  had  been 
concentrated  between  Berber  and  the  junction  of 
the  Atbara  and  the  Nile,  where  a  strong  entrenched 
camp  was  formed. 

About  the  middle  of  February,  a  Dervish  force 
of  about  12,000  men,  under  the  command  of  the 
Emir  Mahmoud,  which  had  been  stationed  at 
Metemmeh,  crossed  to  the  right  bank  of  the  river. 
Contradictory  reports  contmued  to  be  received  as 
to  the  intentions  of  this  force.  It  was  known  that 
dissension  existed  amongst  the  Dervish  leaders. 
Eventually,  Mahmoud  abandoned  the  idea  of 
moving  up  the  right  bank  of  the  river.  He 
struck  across  the  desert,  and  estabhshed   himself 

VOL.  II  H 


98  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

at  Nakheila  on  the  Atbara,  some  35  miles  from 
its  mouth.  On  March  20,  tiie  Sirdar  began  to 
move  slowly  up  the  Atbara  to  meet  him. 

A  pause  of  some  duration  then  ensued.  It  was 
hoped  that  JNIahmoud  would  attack,  but  time  went 
on  and  he  showed  no  disposition  to  move. 

On  April  1,  the  Sirdar  telegraphed  to  me  as 
follows : — 

"  I  am  rather  perplexed  by  the  situation  here. 
Mahmoud  remains  stationary  and  his  army  is  very 
badly  off  for  supplies,  and  deserters  keep  coming 
in  to  us,  though  not  in  such  large  numbers  as  I 
expected.  He  is  waiting  apparently  for  instructions 
from  the  Khalifa  before  advancing  or  retiring.  It 
seems  to  be  thought  by  the  deserters  that,  as  a 
retirement  would  be  an  acknowledgment  of  fear,  he 
will  eventually  advance.  Here  we  are  well  off  and 
healthy,  with  sufficient  transport,  fresh  bread  every 
second  day,  and  fresh  meat  every  day.  Yesterday, 
I  discussed  the  situation  with  Gatacre  and  Hunter ; 
the  former  was  inclined  to  attack  Mahmoud's 
present  position,  the  latter  to  wait  here.  \Ye 
should  have  great  advantage  of  ground  if  Mahmoud 
will  advance,  but  if  he  retires  without  our  attacking 
him,  the  opportunity  will  have  been  lost  of  dealing 
a  blow  by  which  future  resistance  in  the  Soudan 
would  probably  be  considerably  affected.  I  have 
httle  doubt  of  the  success  of  our  attack  on  his 
present  entrenched  position,  though  it  would  prob- 
ably entail  considerable  loss.  I  have  decided  not 
to  change  present  policy  for  three  days,  before 
which  somethinor  definite  will,  I  hope,  be  known.  I 
should  be  glad  to  learn  your  \iews  on  the  subject." 

The  point  which  struck  me  most  in  this  message 
was  that  General  Hunter  doubted  the  wisdom  of 
attacking.  I  knew  him  to  be  a  fighting  General. 
Moreover,  he  had  seen  IMahmoud's  position.  On 
the  previous  day  (JNIarch  31),  he  had  returned  from 


cH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  99 

a  cavalry  reconnaissance,  as  to  the  results  of  which 
the  Sirdar  had  reported  to  me :  "  General  Hunter 
was  able  to  get  witliin  300  yards  of  the  enemy's 
trenches.  Position  is  a  strong  one  with  Zariba 
(stockade)  and  in  heavy  bush ;  it  was  so  thick  that 
they  were  unable  to  get  more  than  a  partial  view 
of  the  encampment.  Enemy  was  lying  thick  in  the 
trenches,  which  were  in  some  places  in  three  rows, 
one  behind  the  other."  I  thought  it  not  improbable 
that  General  Hunter,  who  well  knew  the  strong 
and  weak  points  of  the  Egyptian  army,  hesitated 
to  attack  because  he  was  unwilling  to  risk  what 
might  possibly  be  a  hand-to-hand  encounter  between 
the  Egyptian  soldiers  and  the  Dervishes  in  the 
"  heavy  bush  "  to  which  allusion  was  made  in  this 
telegram.  Past  experience  in  Soudanese  warfare 
enjoined  special  caution  in  respect  to  this  point. 

On  April  2,  therefore,  I  sent  the  Sirdar  the 
following  message,  which  represented  the  joint 
opinion  of  Sir  Francis  Grenfell  and  myself : — 

*'  The  following  observations  are  not  to  be 
regarded  as  instructions.  It  is  for  you  to  form  a  final 
opinion  on  their  value,  as  they  are  merely  remarks 
on  the  position  as  it  strikes  me  at  a  distance.  lYi 
case  you  should  think  it  desirable  to  act  contrary 
to  the  view  to  which  I  incline,  1  have  no  desire 
to  cripple  your  full  liberty  of  action.  I  wish  to 
assure  you  that,  whatever  you  may  decide  to  do, 
you  will  receive  full  support  both  from  myself  and, 
I  am  sure  I  may  add,  from  the  authorities  at  home.^ 

"  You  have  the  following  arguments  against  an 
immediate  attack : — 

*  I  repeated  to  London  the  Sirdar's  telegram  of  April  1,  and  at  once 
received  the  following  rej)ly  from  Mr.  Aitliur  Balfour,  who  was  in 
charge  of  the  Foreign  Office  during  tlie  temporary  absence  of  Lord 
Salisbury  : — 

"  The  Sirdar  may  count  on  the  support  of  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment whichever  course  lie  decides  on  a(loi)ting.  Unless  he  wishes  for 
a  military  opinion,  we  refrain  from  offering  any  remarks  which  would 
interfere  with  his  absolute  discretion." 


100  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

"(1)  The  extreme  importance  of  obviating,  sc 
far  as  is  possible,  any  risk  of  reverse,  both  on  local 
and  general  grounds. 

"  (2)  That  it  is  rather  imprudent  to  try  your 
force  too  high  in  view  of  the  composition  of  a 
portion  of  it. 

"  (3)  The  great  importance,  as  has  been  showTi 
by  all  former  experience  of  Soudanese  warfare,  of 
choosing  ground  for  an  engagement  which  will  be 
favourable  to  the  action  of  a  discipUned  and  well- 
armed  force. 

"  (4)  The  weight  of  Hunter's  opinion.  Though 
I  have  the  greatest  confidence  in  Gatacre,  Hunter 
has  more  experience  in  Soudanese  warfare,  is  better 
acquainted  with  the  Egyptian  army,  and  has, 
moreover,  seen  the  present  Dervish  position.  This 
latter  is  more  especially  a  consideration  of  the 
utmost  importance. 

"  (5)  The  fact  that  Mahmoud  probably  cannot 
stay  for  long  where  he  is,  and  that  he  will  be 
discredited  and  liis  men  probably  discouraged  if 
he  retires  vnthout  fighting. 

"  You  have  on  the  other  side  the  argument 
that  Mahmoud's  force,  if  he  now  retires  without 
fighting,  will  go  to  strengthen  the  resistance  to 
be  ultimately  encountered. 

"  The  weight  of  this  argument,  though  un- 
doubted, does  not  appear  to  me  sufficient  to 
counterbalance  the  arguments  on  the  other  side, 
more  especially  if  it  be  remembered  that  your 
British  force  will  be  practically  doubled  in  the 
autumn,  if  the  decisive  moment  is  delayed  till 
then. 

"Patience,  therefore,  is  what  I  am  inclined  to 
advise.  I  am  disposed  to  think  that  you  had 
better  not  attack  for  the  present,  but  wait  your 
opportunity  for  action  and  allow  events  to  develop. 
The  above  is  fully  agreed  in  by  General  Grenfell, 


CH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  101 

with  whom  I  have  discussed  the  whole  question 
thoroughly." 

Before  the  Sirdar  had  received  this  telegram,  he 
sent  me  (April  3)  the  following  further  message : — 

"  The  same  story  of  privation  is  told  by  more 
deserters  who  are  coming  in.  There  is  an  increased 
desertion  of  blacks  resulting  from  the  capture  of 
the  women  at  Shendy,  which  is  now  known. 

"  Generals  Hunter  and  Gatacre  and  myself  now 
think  an  attack  upon  Mahmoud's  position  advisable. 
We  shall  probably  make  it  on  the  6th  April. 

"  I  will  postpone  the  forward  movement  if  your 
answer  to  my  last  telegram,  which  I  have  not  yet 
received,  should  be  against  this  course." 

This  was  followed  by  a  further  telegram  sent 
on  the  same  day  (April  3)  after  receipt  of  my 
reply  to  the  first  inquiry.  "  1  will,"  the  Sirdar 
said,  "for  the  present  postpone  the  attack  on 
Mahmoud's  position,  in  view  of  your  opinion  as 
stated  in  your  telegram.  So  as  to  get  new  ground 
and  water,  we  shall  to-morrow  move  about  2^ 
miles  farther  on." 

When  I  knew  of  the  change  in  General 
Hunter's  opinion,  my  own  hesitation  as  regards 
attacking  completely  disappeared.  I  was  unable  to 
consult  Sir  Francis  Grenfell,  who  was  temporarily 
absent  from  Cairo,  but  I  at  once  telegraphed  to  the 
Sirdar : — 

"  With  reference  to  your  telegram  of  yesterday, 
our  telegrams  crossed.  Do  not  be  deterred  by 
my  first  telegram  from  attacking  if,  after  careful 
consideration,  you  think  it  advisable  to  do  so. 
It  is  very  difficult  to  give  any  valuable  opinion 
from  here.  In  your  first  telegram  the  point  which 
struck  me  most  was  that  Hunter,  who  has  seen  the 
Dervish  position,  was  adverse  to  an  advance.  He 
has  now,  I  understand,  come  round  to  the  other 
view.     The  case  is,  to  my  mind,  materially  altered 


102  MODERN  EGVl'T  pt.  m 

by  this.  I  must  leave  the  decision  to  you,  only 
again  assuring  you  of  full  support  whatever  you 
decide." 

The  next  day  (April  4)  I  received  the  following 
reply  :— 

"  The  confidence  which  yourself  and  the  Home 
authorities  repose  in  me  is  greatly  appreciated  by 
me.  1  propose  to  advance  more  slowly  and  with 
greater  deliberation  than  was  originally  my  inten- 
tion, and  to  make  as  sure  as  it  is  possible  to  do  by 
careful  reconnaissances  of  the  success  of  an  attack. 
I  shall  not  commit  myself  to  a  general  attack  until 
the  right  moment  has,  in  my  opinion,  arrived.  The 
difficulty  is  at  present  to  know  with  any  certainty 
how  long  the  Dervishes  can  hold  out  under  the 
privations  they  are  undergoing.  I  think  that 
by  getting  nearer  to  them  I  shall  have  a  better 
opportunity  of  satisfying  myself  on  this  point."  • 

It  was  clear  that  a  decisive  engagement  was 
imminent.     I  awaited  tlie  result  with  confidence. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  April  8  (Good  Friday), 
the  attack  was  delivered.  After  forty  minutes' 
sharp  fighting,  Mahmoud  was  a  prisoner,  2000 
of  his  men  lay  dead  in  their  entrencliments,  others 
had  surrendered,  whilst  a  large  number  of  those 
who  escaped  subsequently  died  of  wounds  or  thirst 
in  the  thick  bush  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river. 
The  victory  was  complete,  but  it  cost  many 
valuable  lives.  Of  the  British  brigade,  4  officers 
and  104  non-commissioned  officers  and  men,  and 
of  the  Egyptian  army,  5  British  and  16  Egyptian 
officers,  as  well  as  422  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men,  were  killed  and  wounded.  The  brunt 
of  the  Egyptian  fighting  fell  on  the  black  troops. 

Some  faint  hopes  were  at  one  time  entertained 
that  the  Dervishes  would  be  so  demoralised  by  the 
crushing  defeat  they  had  experienced  on  the  Atbara, 
that  no  further  resistance  would  be  offered,  and 


CH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM  CA.ArPAIG:^  103 

that  the  capture  of  Khartoum  would  be  peacefully 
effected.  These  hopes  were  not  destined  to  be 
realised.  Had  not  the  impostor  who  in  cruel  and 
depraved  state  reigned  supreme  at  Khartoum 
promised  his  credulous  followers,  whose  fate  was 
about  to  excite  alike  pity  and  admiration,  that, 
although  the  infidels  would  be  allowed  to  advance 
to  within  a  few  miles  of  the  walls  of  Omdurman, 
their  skulls  in  countless  numbers  would  eventually 
whiten  the  Kereri  plain?  It  soon  became  clear 
that,  in  spite  of  the  recent  victory,  a  further 
application  of  the  Bismarckian  blood -and -iron 
policy  would  alone  suffice  to  shake  the  heroic 
steadfastness  with  which  these  savage  Soudanese 
warriors  clung  to  an  execrable  cause. 

I  need  not  describe  in  detail  the  measures  which 
were  preliminary  to  the  final  effort.  It  ^\'ill  be 
sufficient  for  me  to  say  that  the  first  British  brigade 
— possibly  encouraged  by  achieved  success,  and 
buoyed  up  by  the  hope  of  coming  excitement — 
bore  the  summer  heat  of  the  Soudan  well.  As 
had  been  pre-arranged,  a  second  brigade  was  sent 
up  the  Nile  in  the  course  of  the  month  of  July. 
By  the  end  of  August,  the  Sirdar  had  concentrated 
a  force  of  about  22,000  men  some  40  miles  south  of 
Khartoum. 

As  was  my  custom,  I  had  left  Egypt  in  the 
middle  of  July,  intending  to  return  before  the  final 
blow  was  struck.  On  all  grounds,  it  was  desirable 
to  expedite  matters,  but  the  military  movements 
depended  in  a  great  degree  on  the  rapidity  of  the 
rise  of  the  Nile,  a  point  in  respect  to  which  no  very 
early  forecast  was  possible.  Early  in  August, 
however,  the  Sirdar,  whose  calculations  of  time 
were  never  once  at  fault,  warned  me  that  I  ought 
to  be  back  in  Cairo  by  September  1.  I  had  made 
all  my  preparations  for  departure,  but  I  was  unable 
to  depart.     The  first  news  that  the  goal  which  for 


104  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

so  many  years  I  had  striven  to  reach,  had  at  last 
been  attained,  was  conveyed  to  me  in  a  telegram 
whicli  the  Queen,  with  her  usual  thoughtfulness  for 
others,  sent  to  a  remote  shooting -lodge  in  the 
north  of  Scotland,  where  I  was  watching  the  last 
moments  of  her  who  inspired  me  to  write  this  book. 

The  long-expected  battle  took  place  under  the 
walls  of  Omdurman  on  September  2.  The  Dervish 
leaders  showed  no  tactical  skill.  They  relied  solely 
on  the  courage  and  devotion  of  their  followers  who, 
ignorant  of  the  fearful  powers  of  destruction  which 
science  has  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  European, 
dashed  recklessly  against  the  ranks  of  the  Anglo- 
Egyptian  army,  and  were  swept  away  in  thousands 
by  the  deadly  fire  of  the  rifles  and  the  JNIaxims. 
"  The  honour  of  the  fight,"  said  a  competent  eye- 
witness,^ "  must  still  go  ^^dth  the  men  who  died. 
Our  men  were  perfect,  but  the  Dervishes  were 
superb — beyond  perfection.  It  was  their  largest, 
best,  and  bravest  army  that  ever  fought  against  us 
for  JNlahdiism,  and  it  died  worthily  of  the  huge 
empire  that  Mahdiism  won  and  kept  so  long. 
Their  riflemen,  mangled  by  every  kind  of  death 
and  torment  that  man  can  devise,  clung  round  the 
black  flag  and  the  green,  emptying  their  poor 
rotten,  home-made  cartridges  dauntlessly.  Their 
spearmen  charged  death  at  every  minute  hope- 
lessly. ...  A  dusky  hne  got  up  and  stormed 
forward :  it  bent,  broke  up,  fell  apart,  and  dis- 
appeared. Before  the  smoke  had  cleared,  another 
hne  was  bending  and  storming  forward  in  the  same 
track." 

The  Dervish  loss  was,  in  truth,  terrible.  Out  of 
an  army,  whose  strength  was  estimated  at  from 
40,000  to  50,000  men,  some  11,000  were  killed,  and 
about  16,000  wounded. 

*  Steevens,  With  Kitchener  to  Khartoum,  p.  282.     Mr.  Steevens  was 
the  conespondeiit  of  the  Daily  Mail. 


CH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  105 

On  the  British  side,  9  officers  and  122  men,  and 
on  the  Egyptian  side,  5  British  and  9  Egyptian 
officers  as  well  as  241  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men,  were  killed  and  wounded. 

These  brave  men  fell  in  a  good  cause.  It  will 
be  the  fault  of  their  countrymen,  in  obedience 
to  whose  orders — toi<:  Keivwv  pij/xaa-c  Treido/j^evoi — they 

lie  in  their  distant  graves,  if  their  blood  is  shed  in 
vain. 

On  the  afternoon  of  September  2,  the  victorious 
army  entered  the  filthy  stronghold  of  Mahdiism, 
where,  it  was  said,  "the  stench  ^^^as  unbearable." 
Two  days  later  (September  4),  the  British  and 
Egyptian  flags  were  hoisted  with  due  ceremony  on 
the  walls  of  the  ruined  Palace  of  Khartoum,  close 
to  the  spot  where  General  Gordon  fell.  The  sturdy 
and  reverent  Puritan  spirit,  which  still  animates 
Teutonic  Christianity  and  which  makes  the  soldier, 
at  the  moment  of  action,  look  to  the  guidance  and 
protection  of  a  Higher  Power,  found  expression  in 
a  religious  service  in  honour  of  the  illustrious 
dead. 

The  Khalifa  escaped.  For  more  than  a  year,  he 
wandered  about  the  almost  inaccessible  wilds  of 
Kordofan  at  the  head  of  a  considerable  force.  At 
length,  he  approached  near  enough  to  the  river 
to  enable  a  decisive  blow  to  be  struck.  It  was 
reserved  for  Sir  Reginald  Wingate,  who  succeeded 
Lord  Kitchener  as  Sirdar  of  the  Egyptian  army 
towards  the  close  of  the  year  1899,  to  give  the 
final  cotip  de  gi^dce  to  Mahdiism.  By  a  series  of 
rapid  and  skilful  marches,  he  surprised  the  Dervisli 
camp  on  November  24,  1899.  The  Khalifa  and  all 
his  principal  Emirs  were  killed.  His  whole  force 
surrendered. 

The  financial  success  was  no  less  remarkable 
than  the  military.  The  total  cost  of  the  campaigns 
of  1896-98  was  £E.2,354,000,  of  which  £E.  1,200,000 


106  JNIODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

was  spent  on  railways  and  telegraphs,  and 
£E.  155,000  on  gunboats.  The  "military  ex- 
penditure," properly  so-called,  only  amounted  to 
£E.996,000. 

Of  the  total  sum  of  £E.2,354,000,  rather  less 
than  £E. 800,000  was  paid  by  the  British,  and  the 
balance  of  about  £E.  1,554,000  by  the  Egyptian 
Treasury. 

In  writing  this  work,  I  have  throughout 
endeavoured  to  render  it  as  little  autobiographical 
as  possible.  If  I  now  depart  in  some  degree  from 
this  principle,  my  reason  is  that  I  am  unable  to 
enforce  the  military  lesson  which,  I  believe,  is  to 
be  derived  from  the  Khartoum  campaign  without 
touching  on  my  personal  position.  The  conditions 
under  which  the  campaign  was  conducted  were,  in 
fact,  very  pecuHar.  In  official  circles  it  was  dubbed 
a  "  Foreign  Office  War."  For  a  variety  of  reasons, 
to  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  allude  in  detail,  the 
Sirdar  was,  from  the  commencement  of  the  opera- 
tions, placed  exclusively  under  my  orders  in  aU 
matters.  The  War  Office  assumed  no  responsi- 
bility, and  issued  no  orders.  A  corresponding 
position  was  occupied  by  the  Head-Quarter  Staff 
of  the  Army  of  Occupation  in  Cairo.  Sir  Francis 
Grenfell  and  those  serving  under  him  rendered  the 
most  willing  assistance  whenever  it  was  required  of 
them,  but  beyond  that  point  their  functions  did 
not  extend.  The  result  was  that  I  found  myself 
in  the  somewhat  singular  position  of  a  civihan,  who 
had  had  some  little  military  training  in  his  youth, 
but  who  had  had  no  experience  of  war,^  whose 
proper  functions  were  diplomacy  and  adminis- 
tration, but  who,  under  the  stress  of  circumstances 

*  I  was  present  for  a  few  weeks,  as  a  spectator,  with  Grant's  army 
at  the  siege  of  Petersburg  in  1864,  but  the  experience  was  too  short  to 
be  of  much  value. 


UH.  XXXII     KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  107 

in  the  "Land  of  Paradox,"  had  to  be  ultimately 
responsible  for  the  maintenance,  and  even  to  some 
extent,  for  the  movements,  of  an  army  of  some 
25,000  men  in  the  field. 

That  good  results  were  obtained  under  this 
somewhat  anomalous  system  cannot  be  doubted. 
It  will  not,  therefore,  be  devoid  of  interest  to 
explain  how  the  system  worked  in  practice,  and 
what  were  the  main  reasons  which  contributed 
towards  the  success. 

I  have  no  ^ash  to  disparage  the  strategical  and 
tactical  ability  which  was  displayed  in  the  conduct 
of  the  campaign.  It  is,  however,  a  fact  that  no 
occasion  arose  for  the  display  of  any  great  skill  in 
these  branches  of  military  science.  When  once 
the  British  and  Egyptian  troops  were  brought  face 
to  face  with  the  enemy,  there  could — unless  the 
conditions  under  which  they  fought  were  altogether 
extraordinary — be  Httle  doubt  of  the  result.  The 
speedy  and  successful  issue  of  the  campaign 
depended,  in  fact,  almost  entirely  upon  the  methods 
adopted  for  overcoming  the  very  exceptional  diffi- 
culties connected  with  the  supply  and  transport  of 
the  troops.  The  main  quality  required  to  meet 
these  difficulties  was  a  good  head  for  business. 
By  one  of  those  fortunate  accidents  which  have 
been  frequent  in  the  history  of  Anglo-Saxon  enter- 
prise, a  man  was  found  equal  to  the  occasion. 
Lord  Kitchener  of  Khartoum  won  his  well-deserved 
peerage  because  he  was  an  excellent  man  of 
business  ;  he  looked  carefully  after  every  important 
detail,  and  enforced  economy. 

My  own  merits,  such  as  they  were,  were  of  a 
purely  negative  character.  They  may  be  summed 
up  in  a  single  phrase.  I  abstained  from  a  mis- 
chievous activity,  and  I  acted  as  a  check  on  the 
interference  of  others.  I  had  full  confidence  in  the 
abihties  of  the  commander,  whom  I  had  practically 


108  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

myself  chosen,  and,  except  when  he  asked  for  my 
assistance,  I  left  him  entirely  alone.  I  encouraged 
him  to  pay  no  attention  to  those  vexatious  bureau- 
cratic formalities  with  which,  under  the  slang 
phrase  of  "  red  tape,"  our  military  system  is  some- 
what overburthened.  I  exercised  some  httle 
control  over  the  demands  for  stores  which  were 
sent  to  the  London  War  Office,  and  the  mere  fact 
that  those  demands  passed  through  my  hands,  and 
that  I  declined  to  forward  any  request  unless, 
besides  being  in  accordance  with  existing  regula- 
tions— a  point  to  which  I  attached  but  shght 
importance — it  had  been  authorised  by  the  Sirdar, 
probably  tended  to  check  wastefulness  in  that 
quarter  where  it  was  most  to  be  feared.  Beyond 
this  I  did  nothing,  and  I  found — somewhat  to  my 
own  astonishment — that,  ^dth  my  ordinary  very 
small  staff  of  diplomatic  secretaries,  the  general 
direction  of  a  war  of  no  inconsiderable  dimensions 
added  but  little  to  my  ordinary  labours. 

I  do  not  say  that  this  system  would  always 
work  as  successfully  as  was  the  case  during  the 
Khartoum  campaign.  The  facts,  as  I  have  already 
said,  were  peculiar.  The  commander,  on  whom 
everything  practically  depended,  was  a  man  of 
marked  military  and  administrative  abiUty.  Never- 
theless, I  venture  to  indulge  in  the  hope  that  some 
useful  lessons  for  the  future  may  be  derived  from 
the  Soudan  campaigns  of  1896  to  1898.  It  is  in 
no  spirit  of  conventional  eulogy  that  I  say  that 
the  British  army  consists  of  as  fine  material  as  any 
in  the  world.  Apart  from  any  question  of  national 
honour  and  interests,  it  positively  chills  my  heart 
to  think  that  the  lives  of  the  gallant  young  men 
of  whom  that  army  is  mainly  composed,  may  be 
needlessly  sacrificed  by  defective  organisation  or 
guidance.  I'liis  is  no  place  to  write  a  general 
essay  on  our  military  administration,  but  I  cannot 


CH.  XXXII    KHARTOUM  CAMPAIGN  109 

refrain  from  saying  that,  from  what  I  have  seen  of 
the  administration  of  the  British  War  Office,  it  stood 
at  one  time  in  great  need  of  improvement.  It  was 
costly.  It  was  hampered  by  tradition.  It  was,  to  use 
an  expressive  French  word,  terribly  "  paperassier  "  ; 
neither,  for  many  years,  was  sufficient  care  taken, 
in  every  branch  of  the  military  service,  to  put  the 
right  man  in  the  right  place.  In  order  to  reform 
it,  men  rather  than  measures  were  required.  I 
should  add  that  there  is  reason  to  believe  that, 
since  the  South  African  War,  the  administration 
of  the  War  Office  has  been  greatly  improved.  It 
is,  however,  impossible  to  speak  positively  on  this 
point  until  its  efficiency  has  undergone  the  crucial 
test  of  war. 

The  elation  with  which  the  news  of  the  capture 
of  Khartoum  was  received  in  England  was  in 
direct  proportion  to  the  despondency  which  chilled 
the  heart  of  the  British  nation  when,  thirteen 
years  previously,  it  was  known  that  Mahdiism  had 
triumphed  and  that  General  Gordon  had  been 
killed.  Lord  Kitchener,  on  his  return  to  London, 
was  received  with  an  enthusiastic  and  well-deserved 
ovation.  Indeed,  one  of  the  principal  arguments 
in  favour  of  recapturing  Khartoum  was  that  the 
British  public  had  evidently  made  up  its  mind  that, 
sooner  or  later,  Khartoum  had  to  be  recaptured.  It 
might  have  been  possible  to  have  postponed  decisive 
action.  It  would  probably  have  been  impossible 
to  have  altogether  prevented  it.  The  national 
honour  was  not  to  be  indefinitely  baulked  of  the 
salve  for  which  it  yearned.  An  argument  of  this 
sort,  albeit  it  is  based  on  sentiment,  is  of  intrinsic 
importance.  In  the  execution  of  the  Imperiahst 
policy,  to  which  England  is  pledged  almost  as  a 
necessity  of  her  existence,  it  is  not  at  all  desirable 
to  ehminate  entirely   those   considerations   which 


110  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

appeal  to  the  imaginative,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
material  side  of  the  national  character.  Moreover, 
whatever  may  be  thouglit  of  the  undesirabihty  of 
admitting  any  emotional  lines  of  thought  as  guides 
to  practical  action  in  pohtics,  it  may  be  regarded  as 
certain  that  the  pohtician  who  endeavours  to  run 
absolutely  counter  to  the  impulse  of  the  national 
imagination,  instead  of  seeking  to  guide  it,  will  find 
that  he  is  attempting  an  impossible  task. 

The  policy  pursued  by  the  British  Government 
in  1896  is,  of  course,  capable  of  ample  justification 
on  other  and  less  sentimental  grounds  than  those 
to  which  allusion  is  made  above.  The  effective 
control  of  the  waters  of  the  Nile  from  the 
Equatorial  Lakes  to  the  sea  is  essential  to  the 
existence  of  Egypt. 

Whatever  opinion  may  be  entertained  of  the 
policy  itself,  or  of  whether  the  moment  chosen  for 
its  execution  was  opportune  or  the  reverse,  it 
cannot  be  doubted  that  the  capture  of  Khartoum 
did  more  than  appease  those  sentiments  of  national 
honour  which  had  been  stung  to  the  quick  by  the 
events  of  1885.  The  cannon  which  swept  away 
the  Dervish  hordes  at  Omdurman  proclaimed  to  the 
world  that  on  England — or,  to  be  more  strictly 
correct,  on  Egypt  under  British  guidance  —  had 
devolved  the  solemn  and  responsible  duty  of  intro- 
ducing the  light  of  ^^'^estern  civilisation  amongst 
the  sorely  tried  people  of  the  Soudan. 

My  hope  and  belief  is  that  that  duty  w\\\  be 
performed  in  a  manner  worthy  of  the  best  traditions 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 

THE    NEW   SOUDAN 

Question  of  the  future  political  status  of  the  Soudan — Anomalies  of  the 
British  position — O'ljections  to  annexation — And  to  complete  in- 
corporation with  Efjypt — Intricacy  of  the  problem — The  two  flags 
— Speech  at  Omdurman — The  ria^ht  of  conquest — The  Agreement 
of  January  19,  1H99 — Its  unusual  nature — Its  reception  by  Europe 
— Advantages  of  a  Free  Trade  policy. 

The  Soudan  having  been  reconquered,  the  question 
of  the  future  political  status  of  the  country  naturally 
presented  itself  for  solution. 

British  policy  in  Egypt  since  the  year  1882  may 
be  said  to  constitute  a  prolonged  and,  so  far,  only 
partially  successful  effort  to  escape  from  the  punish- 
ment due  to  original  sin.  The  ancient  adage  that 
truth  is  a  fellow-citizen  of  the  gods  ^  is  as  valid  in 
politics  as  in  morals.  British  statesmen  were  con- 
tinually harassed  by  a  Nemesis  in  the  shape  of  the 
magna  vis  veritatis,  which  was  for  ever  striving  to 
shatter  the  rickety  political  edifice  constructed  at 
the  time  of  the  occupation  on  no  surer  foundations 
than  those  of  diplomatic  opportunism.  At  every 
turn  of  the  political  wheel,  fact  clashed  with  theory. 
Nevertheless,  in  the  year  1898,  of  which  period  I 
am  now  writing,  Ottoman  supremacy  in  the 
Soudan,  whether  in  the  person  of  the  Sultan  or 
the  Khedive,  presented  a  sufficient  character  of 
solidity  to  necessitate  its  recognition  as  a  practical 

*  'AXrideia  OeQiv  ofidwoKn. 
Ill 


112  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

fact.  It  could  not  be  treated  as  a  mere  diplo- 
matic wraith.  However  mucli  it  tended  at  times 
to  evaporate  into  a  phantom,  its  shape  was  still 
sufficiently  distinguishable  through  the  political 
mist  to  enable  the  outline  of  a  kingly  crown  to  be 
clearly  traced.  Hence,  the  necessity  arose  of 
cloaking  the  reality  of  fact  with  some  more  or  less 
transparent  veil  of  theory. 

The  difference  between  the  real  and  the  supposi- 
titious was  brought  prominently  into  relief  imme- 
diately after  the  fall  of  Khartoum.  On  no  occasion 
had  a  greater  amount  of  ingenuity  to  be  exercised 
in  effecting  an  apparent  reconciliation  between  the 
facts  as  they  existed  and  the  facts  as  they  were, 
by  a  pardonable  fiction,  supposed  to  exist.  The 
problem  in  this  instance  might  at  first  sight  appear 
to  have  been  almost  as  insoluble  as  that  of  squaring 
the  circle.  But,  as  Lord  Salisbury  once  remarked 
to  me,  when  one  gets  to  the  foot  of  the  hills,  it  is 
generally  possible  to  find  some  pass  which  will  lead 
across  them.  I  have  now  to  describe  the  pass 
which,  with  some  difficulty,  was  eventually  found 
through  the  political  mountains  in  the  particular 
instance  under  discussion.  It  will  be  seen  that  an 
arrangement  was  made  which  elsewhere  might 
perhaps  have  been  considered  as  too  anomalous 
to  stand  the  wear  and  tear  of  daily  political 
existence.  In  Egypt,  it  was  merely  thought  that 
one  more  paradox  had  been  added  to  the  goodly 
array  of  paradoxical  creations  with  which  the 
political  institutions  of  the  country  already  teemed. 

The  facts  were  plain  enough.  Fifteen  years 
previously,  Egyptian  misgoverrmient  had  led  to 
a  successful  rebelhon  in  the  Soudan.  British  rule 
had  developed  the  military  and  financial  resources 
of  Egypt  to  such  an  extent  as  to  justify  the 
adoption  of  a  policy  of  reconquest.  But  England, 
not  Egypt,  had  in  reality  reconquered  the  country. 


CH.  XXXIII        THE  NEW  SOUDAN  113 

It  is  true  that  the  Egyptian  Treasury  had  borne  the 
greater  portion  of  the  cost,  and  that  Egyptian  troops, 
officered,  however,  by  Enghshmen,  had  taken  a 
very  honourable  part  in  the  campaign.  But,  ahke 
during  the  period  of  the  preparation  and  of  the 
execution  of  the  pohcy,  the  guiding  hand  liad  been 
that  of  England.  It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that 
without  British  assistance  in  the  form  of  men, 
money,  and  general  guidance,  the  Egyptian 
Government  could  have  reconquered  the  Soudan. 

From  this  point  of  view,  therefore,  the  annexation 
of  the  reconquered  territories  by  England  would 
have  been  partially  justifiable.  There  were,  how- 
ever, some  weighty  arguments  against  the  adoption 
of  tliis  course. 

In  the  first  place,  although  in  the  Anglo- 
Egyptian  partnership  England  was  unquestionably 
the  senior  partner,  at  the  same  time,  Egypt  had 
played  a  very  useful  and  honourable,  albeit  auxiliary 
part  in  the  joint  undertaking.  It  would  have  been 
very  unjust  to  ignore  Egyptian  claims  in  deciding 
on  the  future  pohtical  status  of  the  Soudan. 

In  the  second  place,  the  campaign  had  through- 
out been  carried  on  in  the  name  of  the  Khedive. 
If,  immediately  on  its  conclusion,  decisive  action 
had  been  taken  in  the  name  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment acting  alone,  the  adoption  of  such  a  course 
would  have  involved  a  brusque  and  objectionable 
departure  from  the  pohcy  heretofore  pursued. 

In  the  third  place — and  this  consideration  would, 
by  itself,  have  been  conclusive — it  was  not  in  the 
interests  of  Great  Britain  to  add  to  its  responsi- 
bilities, which  were  already  world-wide,  by  assuming 
the  direct  government  of  another  huge  African 
territory. 

These  and  other  considerations,  on  which  it  is 
unnecessary  to  dweU,  pointed  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  Soudan  should  be  regarded  as  Ottoman 

VOL.  II  I 


114  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iii 

territory,  and  that,  therefore,  it  should  be  governed, 
in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Imperial 
Firmans,  by  the  Sultan's  feudatory,  the  Khedive. 

A  very  valid  objection  existed,  however,  to  the 
adoption  of  this  course.  If  the  political  status  of 
the  Soudan  were  to  be  assimilated  in  all  respects 
to  that  of  Egypt,  the  necessary  consequence  would 
be  that  the  administration  of  the  country  would  be 
biu'thened  by  the  introduction  of  the  Capitulations, 
and,  in  fact,  by  all  the  cumbersome  paraphernalia 
of  internationalism,  which  had  done  so  much  to 
retard  Egyptian  progress.  It  was  manifestly  absurd 
that  British  lives  should  be  sacrificed  and  British 
treasure  expended  merely  in  order  to  place  addi- 
tional arms  in  the  hands  of  Powers,  some  one  or 
other  of  whom  might  at  some  future  time  become 
the  enemy  of  England.  Moreover,  the  adoption 
of  this  course  would  have  been  highly  detrimental 
to  Eg}^tian  interests.  Egypt,  more  than  England, 
had  suffered  from  the  international  incubus. 

Hence  there  arose  a  dilemma,  or,  if  it  is  permis- 
sible to  coin  so  unusual  an  expression,  a  trilemma ; 
for  three  arguments,  w^hich  were  in  some  degree 
mutually  destructive,  had  to  be  reconciled. 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  essential  that  British 
influence  should  in  practice  be  paramount  in  the 
Soudan,  in  order  that  the  Egyptians  should  not 
have  conferred  on  them  a  "  bastard  freedom "  to 
repeat  the  misgovernment  of  the  past. 

In  the  second  place,  British  influence  could  not 
be  exerted  under  the  same  ill-defined  and  anomalous 
conditions  as  those  which  prevailed  in  Egypt  with- 
out involving  the  introduction  of  the  baneful  regime 
of  internationalism. 

In  tlie  third  place,  annexation  by  England, 
which  would  have  cut  the  international  knot,  was 
precluded  on  grounds  of  equity  and  policy. 

It    was,   therefore,   necessary   to    invent    some 


CH.  XXXIII        THE  NEW  SOUDAN  115 

method  by  which  the  Soudan  should  be,  at  one 
and  the  same  time,  Egyptian  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  satisfy  equitable  and  political  exigencies,  and 
yet  sufficiently  British  to  prevent  the  administra- 
tion of  the  country  from  being  hampered  by  the 
international  burr  which  necessarily  hung  on  to 
the  skirts  of  Eg)^tian  political  existence. 

It  was  manifest  that  these  conflicting  require- 
ments could  not  be  satisfied  without  the  creation 
of  some  hybrid  form  of  government,  hitherto 
unknown  to  international  jurisprudence. 

The  matter  was  discussed  when  I  was  in 
London  in  July  1898.  At  that  time,  although 
all  saw  clearly  enough  the  objects  to  be  attained, 
no  very  definite  method  for  attaining  them  was 
suggested.  In  order,  however,  to  give  an  outward 
and  visible  sign  that,  in  the  eyes  of  the  British 
Government,  the  political  status  of  the  Soudan 
differed  from  that  of  Egypt,  Lord  Kitchener  was 
instructed,  on  the  capture  of  Khartoum,  to  hoist 
both  the  British  and  Egyptian  flags  side  by  side.^ 
These  orders  were  duly  executed.  Amidst  the 
clash  of  arms  and  the  jubilation  over  the  recent 
victory,  this  measure  attracted  but  little  attention. 
It  was  not  until  five  months  later,  that  its  im- 
portance was  generally  understood.  On  January 
4,  ]  899,  being  then  at  Omdurman,  I  made  a  speech 
to  the  assembled  Sheikhs.  As  I  intended  and 
anticipated,  it  attracted  much  attention.  It  was, 
indeed,  meant  for  the  public  of  Egypt  and  Europe 
quite  as  much  as  for  the  audience  whom  I 
addressed.  In  the  course  of  this  speech  I  said  : 
"  You  see  that  both  the  British  and  Egyptian 
flags   art    floating  over   this    liouse.^     That   is   an 

^  When  Lord  Kitchener  found  liiniself  face  to  face  with  Capt^iin 
Marchand  at  Fashoda,  he  very  wisely  lioistod  tlie  Ef»-v|)tiaii  fla^  only. 

2  The  house,  in  tlie  courtyard  of  uiiicli  I  s|)ol<e,  liad  hut  a  short 
time  before  been  inhabited  by  one  of  the  Klialifa's  leading  Emirs.  At 
the  time  of  my  visit,  it  was  being  used  as  a  public  office. 


116  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  m 

indication  that  for  the  future  you  will  be  governed 
by  the  Queen  of  England  and  by  the  Khedive  of 
Egypt."  There  could  be  no  mistaking  the  signifi- 
cance of  these  words,  and  there  was  no  desire  that 
they  should  be  mistaken.  They  meant  that  the 
Soudan  was  to  be  governed  by  a  partnership  of 
two,  of  which  England  was  the  predominant 
member. 

Before  making  this  speech,  I  had  submitted 
to  Lord  Sahsbury  the  project  of  an  Agreement 
between  the  British  and  Egyptian  Governments 
regulating  the  political  status  of  the  Soudan.  It 
had  been  prepared,  under  my  general  instructions, 
by  Sir  Malcolm  Mcllwraith,  the  Judicial  Adviser 
of  the  Egyptian  Government.  Shortly  after  my 
return  to  Cairo,  I  was  authorised  to  sign  it.  It 
was  accordingly  signed  by  the  Egyptian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  and  myself  on  January  19, 
1899.  I  proceed  to  give  a  brief  summary  of  the 
contents  of  this  document. 

The  first  and  most  important  point  was  to 
assert  a  vahd  title  to  the  exercise  of  sovereign 
rights  in  the  Soudan  by  the  Queen  of  England, 
in  conjunction  with  the  Khedive.  There  could 
be  only  one  sound  basis  on  which  that  title  could 
rest.  This  was  the  right  of  conquest.  A  title 
based  on  this  ground  had  the  merit  of  being  in 
accordance  with  the  indisputable  facts  of  the 
situation.  It  was  also  in  accordance,  if  not  with 
international  law — which  can  obviously  never  be 
codified  save  in  respect  to  certain  special  issues — at 
all  events,  with  international  practice,  as  set  forth 
by  competent  authorities.  It  was,  therefore,  laid 
do\Mi  in  the  preamble  of  the  Agreement  that  it 
was  desirable  "  to  give  effect  to  the  claims  which 
have  accrued  to  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, by  right  of  conquest,  to  share  in  the  present 
settlement  and  future  working  and  development " 


CH.  XXXIII        THE  NEW  SOUDAN  117 

of  the  legislative  and  administrative  systems  of  the 
Soudan. 

This  principle  having  been  once  accepted,  the 
ground  was  cleared  for  further  action.  Tlie 
shadowy  claims  of  Turkish  suzerainty  were  practi- 
cally, though  not  nominally,  swept  away  by  a  stroke 
of  the  pen.  Their  disappearance  connoted  the 
abrogation  of  all  those  privileges  which,  in  other  parts 
of  the  Ottoman  dominions,  are  vested  in  European 
Powers  in  order  to  check  an  abusive  exercise  of 
the  Sultan's  sovereign  rights.  All  that  then  re- 
mained was  to  settle  the  practical  points  at  issue 
in  the  manner  most  convenient  and  most  conducive 
to  the  mterests  of  the  two  sole  contracting  parties, 
namely,  the  British  and  the  Egyptian  Governments. 

The  22nd  parallel  of  latitude  was  fixed  as  the 
northern  frontier  of  the  new  state ;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  southern  frontier  was  left  undefined.  It  was 
provided  that  both  the  British  and  Egyptian  flags 
should  be  used  throughout  the  Soudan ;  ^  that  the 
supreme  military  and  civil  command  should  be 
vested  in  one  officer,  termed  "the  Governor- 
General  of  the  Soudan,"  who  was  to  be  appointed 
by  a  Khedivial  Decree  on  the  recommendation 
of  the  British  Government ;  that  Proclamations 
by  the  Governor-General  should  have  the  force 
of  law;  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  INlixed  Tribunals 
should  "  not  extend  or  be  recognised  for  any  purpose 
whatsoever,  in  any  part  of  the  Soudan  "  ;  and  that 
no  foreign  Consuls  should  be  allowed  to  reside  in 
the  country  without  the  previous  consent  of  the 
British  Government. 

When  this  Agreement  was  published,  it  naturally 
attracted  much  attention.     Diplomatists,  who  were 

*  In  the  first  instance,  the  town  of  Suakin  was  excepted  from  this 
and  from  some  other  portions  of  the  Agreement,  but  this  arrangement 
was  found  to  cause  a  good  deal  of  practical  inconvenience.  By  a 
subsequent  Agreement,  dated  July  10,  1899,  the  status  of  Suakin  was 
in  all  respects  assimilated  to  that  of  the  rest  of  the  Soudan. 


118  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  m 

wedded  to  conventionalities,  were  puzzled,  and 
perhaps  slightly  shocked,  at  the  creation  of  a 
pohtical  status  hitherto  unknown  to  the  law  of 
Europe.  One  of  my  foreign  colleagues  pointed 
out  to  me  that  he  understood  what  British  territory 
meant,  as  also  what  Ottoman  territory  meant,  but 
that  he  could  not  understand  the  status  of  the 
Soudan,  which  was  neither  one  nor  the  other.  I 
replied  that  the  political  status  of  the  Soudan  was 
such  as  was  laid  down  in  the  Agreement  of 
January  19,  1899,  and  that  I  could  give  no  more 
precise  or  epigrammatic  definition.  Again,  I  was 
asked  what,  in  the  absence  of  any  Consuls,  was 
to  happen  to  Europeans  who  were  married  or 
buried  in  the  Soudan  ?  I  could  only  reply  that 
any  European  who  considered  it  essential  that  his 
marriage  or  burial  should  be  attested  by  a  Consular 
representative  of  his  country,  would  do  well  to 
remain  in  the  territory  lying  north  of  the  22nd 
parallel  of  latitude. 

But  the  splutter  of  amazement  caused  by  British 
want  of  political  symmetry  soon  died  out.  It  is 
true  that  the  Sultan  murmured  some  few  words 
of  ineffectual  protest,  but  no  serious  opposition  was 
encountered  from  any  quarter. 

Why  was  this  ?     The  reasons  were  threefold. 

In  the  first  place,  whatever  fine-spun  arguments 
might  be  woven  from  the  loom  of  diplomatic 
technicality,  the  attitude  taken  up  by  the  British 
Government  was  in  substance  manifestly  both  just 
and  reasonable. 

In  the  second  place,  their  attitude  was  firm.  It 
was  clear  that  they  intended  to  carry  out  their 
programme.  The  inevitable  consequence  ensued. 
No  one  was  prepared  to  bell  the  cat,  even  if  he  felt 
any  disposition  to  do  so.  A  mere  platonic  protest 
would  have  caused  irritation,  and  would  have  been 
ineflectual. 


CH.  XXXIII        THE  NEW  SOUDAN  119 

In  the  third  place,  the  Powers  of  Europe, 
possibly  without  meaning  it,  paid  a  compliment 
to  British  rule.  However  much  the  Angiophobe 
press  on  the  Continent  might  at  times  rave,  it  was 
perfectly  well  known  that,  under  the  British  flag, 
Europeans — albeit  they  were  the  subjects  of  Powers, 
some  of  whom  were  animated  by  no  very  friendly 
spirit  towards  England  —  would  be  treated  with 
perfect  justice.  Notably,  Article  VI.  of  the  Agree- 
ment, to  which  at  the  time  I  attached  great 
importance,  tended  greatly  to  allay  any  spirit  of 
opposition  which  might  otherwise  have  been 
aroused.  It  laid  down  that,  in  all  matters  concern- 
ing trade  with,  and  residence  in  the  Soudan,  "no 
special  privileges  would  be  accorded  to  the  sub- 
jects of  any  one  or  more  Power  "  ;  in  other  words, 
the  German,  the  Frenchman,  the  ItaHan  and  others 
were  placed  on  a  precisely  similar  commercial  foot- 
ing to  that  enjoyed  by  a  subject  of  the  Queen 
of  England.  Even  the  most  militant  Angiophobe 
could  not  fail  to  be  struck  by  the  contrast  between 
this  Uberal  attitude  and  the  exclusive  commercial 
policy  adopted  by  other  colonising  European 
Powers.  Thus,  in  laying  the  foundations  of  the 
new  Soudan,  a  Free  Trade  policy — which  I  trust 
will  never  be  dissociated  from  British  Imperialism 
— formed  one  of  the  corner-stones  of  the  political 
edifice. 

After  this  fashion,  the  new  Soudan  was  bom. 
It  was  endowed  with  sufficient  strength  to  support 
existence.  Nevertheless,  it  was  of  necessity  to 
some  extent  the  child  of  opportunism.  Should 
it  eventually  die  and  make  place  for  some  more 
robust,  because  more  real  pohtical  creation,  its 
authors  need  not  bewail  its  fate.^ 

*  At  a  later  period  of  this  work  (vide  Chapter  LX.)  I  shall  give 
a  brief  account  of  the  results  which  have  so  far  l)eeu  obtained  under  the 
Bystem  whose  main  features  are  described  in  this  chapter. 


PART  IV 
THE  EGYPTIAN  PUZZLE 


Quand  un  peuple  a  soyffert  trop  longtemps^  c'est  tout  au 
plus  si,  dans  son  abaissementy  il  a  la  force  de  baiser  la  mam 
qui  le  sauve. 

P.  J.  Stahl. 

This  country  is  a  palimpsest^  in  which  the  Bible  is  written 
over  Herodotus,  and  the  Koran  over  that. 

Lady  Duff  Gordon's  Letters  from  Egypt. 

To  watch  the  immemorial  culture  of  the  East,  slow-moving 
with  the  weight  of  years,  dreamy  with  centuries  of  deep  medi- 
tation, accept  and  assimilate,  as  in  a  moment  of  time,  the 
science,  the  machinery,  the  restless  energy  and  practical  activity 
of  the  West  is  a  fascinating  employment. 

K£NN£TH  J.  Freeman,  The  Schools  of  Hellas, 


121 


CHAPTER    XXXIV 

THE    DWELLERS    IN    EGYPT 

The  Englishman's  mission  —  Conditions  under  which  it  was  under- 
taken—  Population  of  Egypt — Its  mixed  character — Hostility  to 
England — Main  tenets  of  Islam — Its  failure  as  a  social  system — 
Degradation  of  women  —  Immutability  of  the  law  —  Slavery  — 
Intolerance — Incidents  of  religious  belief  and  ceremonial — Mental 
and  moral  attributes— Seclusion  of  women — Polygamy — Divorce — 
Coarseness  of  literature  and  conversation — Filial  piety — Govern- 
ment— Conservatism — Spirit  of  the  laws — Language — Art — Music 
— Customs — Obstacles  to  England's  mission. 

At  the  conclusion  of  Chapter  XVIII.  of  this  work, 
the  narrative  was  brought  down  to  the  time  when 
Kinglake's  Enghshman  had  planted  his  foot  on 
the  banks  of  the  Nile,  and  sat  in  the  seats  of  the 
faithful.  He  came  not  as  a  conqueror,  but  in  the 
familiar  garb  of  a  saviour  of  society.  The  mere 
assumption  of  this  part,  whether  by  a  nation  or  by 
an  individual,  is  calculated  to  arouse  some  degree  of 
suspicion.  The  world  is  apt  to  think  that  the  saviour 
is  not  improbably  looking  more  to  his  own  interests 
than  to  the  salvation  of  society,  and  experience  has 
proved  that  the  suspicion  is  not  unfrequently  well 
founded.  Yet  assuredly  the  Englishman  could  in 
this  case  produce  a  valid  title  to  justify  his  assump- 
tion of  the  part  which  had  been  thrust  upon  him. 
His  advent  was  hailed  with  delight  by  the  lawful 
rulers  of  Egypt  and  by  the  mass  of  the  Egyptian 
people.  The  greater  portion  of  Europe  also 
looked  upon  his  action  without  disfavour,  if  not 
with  positive  approval. 

123 


124  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

I  say  only  the  greater  portion  of  Europe,  for 
there  were  two  notahle  exceptions.  In  the  East  of 
Europe,  the  Turk  chafed  under  the  reflection  that 
the  precious  jewel  of  political  opportunity  had  been 
offered  to  him,  and  that,  Hke  the  "  bird  in  the 
story  "  of  JNloore's  song,  he  had  "  cast  the  fair  gem 
far  away."  In  the  West  of  Europe,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  Frenchman  was  looking  on  askance  with 
a  gradually  awakening  sense  that  he  had  made  a 
mistake  in  allowing  the  Enghshman  to  assume 
alone  the  part  of  the  Egyptian  saviour,  and,  when 
he  once  woke  up  to  a  sense  of  his  error,  he  mani- 
fested his  irritation  in  various  ways. 

With  these  two  exceptions,  which,  however,  for 
the  moment  hardly  caused  any  discordant  note  to 
be  sounded  amidst  the  universal  chorus  of  approba- 
tion, the  Englishman  was  able  to  feel  that  none, 
whether  in  or  out  of  Egypt,  were  inclined  to  gain- 
say the  righteousness  of  his  cause.  More  than  this, 
one  of  the  first  qualifications  necessary  in  order  to 
play  the  part  of  a  saviour  of  society  is  that  the 
saviour  should  believe  in  himself  and  in  his  mission. 
This  the  Enghshman  did.  He  was  convinced  that 
his  mission  was  to  save  Egyptian  society,  and, 
moreover,  that  he  was  able  to  save  it. 

How  was  he  to  accomplish  his  mission  ?  Was 
he,  in  his  energetic,  brisk,  northern  fashion,  to  show 
the  Egyptians  what  they  had  to  do,  and  then  to 
leave  them  to  cany  on  the  work  by  themselves  ? 
This  is  what  he  thought  to  do,  but  alas  I  he  was  soon 
to  find  that  to  fulminate  against  abuses,  which  were 
the  growth  of  centuries,  was  Uke  firing  a  cannon- 
ball  into  a  mountain  of  mud.  By  the  adoption  of 
any  such  method,  he  could  only  produce  a  temporary 
ebullition.  If  he  were  to  do  any  good,  he  must 
not  only  show  what  was  to  be  dono,  but  he  must 
stay  where  he  was  and  do  it  himself.  Or  was  he, 
as  some  fiery  spirits  advised,  to  go  to  the  other 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  125 

extreme  ?  Was  he  to  hoist  the  British  flag  over 
the  citadel  of  Cairo,  and  sweep  Pashadom,  Capi- 
tulations, Mixed  Tribunals,  and  all  the  hetero- 
geneous mass  of  international  cobwebs  to  be  found 
in  Egypt  into  the  political  waste-paper  basket  ? 
Prudence,  which  bade  him  think  of  the  peace  of 
Europe,  and  the  qualms  of  his  political  conscience, 
which  obliged  him  to  be  mindful  of  his  plighted 
word,  albeit  it  had  perhaps  been  too  Hghtly  pledged, 
stopped  the  way. 

Being  debarred  from  the  adoption  of  either 
extreme  course,  the  EngUshman  fell  back  on  the 
procedure,  which  is  endeared  to  him  by  habits  of 
thought  and  national  tradition.  He  adopted  a 
middle  course.  He  compromised.  Far  be  it  from 
his  Anglo-Saxon  mind  to  ask  for  that  "  situation 
nette  "  which  is  so  dear  to  the  logical  Frenchman. 
He  would  assert  his  native  genius  by  working  a 
system,  which,  according  to  every  canon  of  political 
thought,  was  unworkable.  He  would  not  annex 
Egypt,  but  he  would  do  as  much  good  to  the  country 
as  if  he  had  armexed  it.  He  would  not  interfere 
with  the  liberty  of  action  of  the  Khedivial  Govern- 
ment, but  in  practice  he  would  insist  on  the  Khedive 
and  the  Egyptian  Ministers  conforming  to  his 
views.  He  would  in  theory  be  one  of  many 
Powers  exercising  equal  rights,  but  in  practice  he 
would  wield  a  paramount  influence.  He  would 
occupy  a  portion  of  the  Ottoman  dominions  with 
British  troops,  and  at  the  same  time  he  would  do 
nothing  to  infringe  the  legitimate  rights  of  the 
Sultan.  He  would  not  break  his  promise  to  the 
Frenchman,  but  he  would  wrap  it  in  a  napkin  to 
be  produced  on  some  more  convenient  occasion. 
In  a  word,  he  would  act  with  all  the  practical 
common  sense,  the  scorn  for  theory,  and  the  total 
absence  of  any  fixed  plan  based  on  logical  reasoning, 
which  are  the  distinguishing  features  of  his  race. 


126  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

I  propose  eventually  to  answer  the  question  of 
how  the  Englishman  fulfilled  the  mission  which,  if 
it  was  not  conferred  on  him  by  Europe,  was  at  all 
events  assumed  without  protest  from  Europe. 
Before,  however,  grappling  with  this  portion  of  my 
task,  it  will  be  as  well  to  say  something  of  the 
conditions  of  the  problem  which  had  to  be  solved. 
What  manner  of  men  were  tliese  Egyptians  over 
whom,  by  accident  rather  than  by  design,  the 
Englishman  was  called  upon  to  rule  without  having 
the  appearance  of  ruling  ?  To  what  influences  were 
they  subject  ?  What  were  their  national  char- 
acteristics ?  What  part  must  be  assigned  to  the 
foreign,  that  is  to  say,  the  European,  Asiatic,  and 
non- Egyptian  African  races  resident  in  Egypt? 
What  political  institutions  and  administrative 
systems  existed  when  the  English  stepped  upon 
the  Egyptian  scene  ?  In  a  word,  what  was  the 
chaotic  material  out  of  which  the  Enghshman  had 
to  evolve  something  Hke  order  ? 

These  are  important  questions.  It  is  essential 
that  they  should  be  answered  before  the  nature  of 
the  work  accomphshed  by  England  in  Egypt  can 
be  understood. 

Modern  Egypt  measures  about  1000  miles  from 
Alexandria  to  Wadi  Haifa.  Its  breadth  from  Port 
Said  to  Alexandria  is  about  200  miles.  The  apex 
of  the  Nile  Delta  Hes  a  little  north  of  Cairo.  South- 
ward from  that  point,  the  habitable  country  narrows 
rapidly,  and  is  in  places  confined  to  a  few  yards  on 
either  bank  of  the  river.  This  habitable  area 
covers  an  extent  of  33,607  square  kilometres,  or 
about  8,000,000  acres. 

AVho  are  the  inhabitants  of  these  eight  millions 
of  acres  ?  Of  what  was  the  raw  material  composed 
with  which  the  Englishman  luid  to  deal  ? 

It  might  naturally  be  supposed  that,  as  we  are 
dealing  with  the  country  called  Egypt,  the  inhabit- 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  127 

ants  of  whom  the  statesman  and  the  administrator 
would  have  almost  exclusively  to  take  account 
would  be  Egyptians.  Any  one  who  is  inclined  to 
rush  to  this  conclusion  should  remember  that 
Egypt,  as  Lord  Milner  has  stated  in  his  admirable 
work,  is  the  Land  of  Paradox.  If  any  one  walks 
down  one  of  the  principal  streets  of  London,  Paris, 
or  Berlin,  nine  out  of  ten  of  the  people  with  whom 
he  meets  bear  on  their  faces  evidence,  more  or  less 
palpable,  that  they  are  Englishmen,  Frenchmen, 
or  Germans.  But  let  any  one  who  has  a  general 
acquaintance  with  the  appearance  and  physiognomy 
of  the  principal  Eastern  races  try  if  he  can  give  a 
fair  ethnological  description  of  the  first  ten  people 
he  meets  in  one  of  the  streets  of  Cairo,  that  "  maze 
of  old  ruin  and  modern  cafe,  that  dying  Mecca  and 
still-born  Rue  de  Rivoli,"  as  it  has  been  aptly 
termed  by  Sir  William  Butler.^  He  will  find  it 
no  easy  matter,  and  with  all  his  experience  he 
may  not  improbably  make  many  mistakes. 

The  first  passer-by  is  manifestly  an  Egyptian 
fellah  who  has  come  into  the  city  to  sell  his  garden 
produce.  The  headgear,  dress,  and  aquihne  nose 
of  the  second  render  it  easy  to  recognise  a  Bedouin 
who  is  perhaps  come  to  Cairo  to  buy  ammunition 
for  his  flint-lock  gun,  but  who  is  ill  at  ease  amidst 
urban  surroundings,  and  will  hasten  to  return  to 
the  more  congenial  air  of  the  desert.  The  small, 
thick-lipped  man  with  dreamy  eyes,  who  has  a  far- 
away look  of  one  of  the  bas-reliefs  on  an  ancient 
Egyptian  tomb,  but  who  Chanipollion  and  other 
savants  tell  us  is  not  the  lineal  descendant  of 
the   ancient   Egyptians,'^   is   presumably  a   Coptic 

*  The  Campaign  of  the  Cataracts,  p.  95. 

'  Maspero,  Histoire  ancienne  des  peiqiles  de  fOrient,  p.  16.  Cham- 
pollion  le  Jeune's  opinion,  (juoted  by  M.  Maspero,  is  as  follows  :  "  Le& 
Coptes  sont  le  resultat  du  melange  confus  de  toutes  les  nations  (jui  suc- 
cessivement  ont  domine  I'Egypt.  On  a  tort  de  vouloir  retrouver  chez 
eux  les  traits  de  la  vieille  race."     Mr,  S.  Lane  Poole,  however,  sayi 


128  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

clerk  in  some  Government  office.  The  face,  which 
peers  somewhat  loweringly  over  a  heavy  mous- 
tache from  the  window  of  a  passing  brougham,  is 
probably  that  of  some  Turco- Egyptian  Pasha. 
The  man  with  a  bold,  handsome,  cruel  face,  who 
swaggers  by  in  long  boots  and  baggy  trousers,  must 
surely  be  a  Circassian.  The  Syrian  money-lender, 
who  comes  next,  will  get  out  of  his  way,  albeit  he 
may  be  about  to  sell  up  the  Circassian's  property 
the  next  day  to  recover  a  loan  of  which  the  capital 
and  interest,  at  any  ordinary  rate,  have  been  already 
paid  twenty  times  over.  The  green  turban,  digni- 
fied mien,  and  slow  gait  of  the  seventh  passer- 
by denote  some  pious  Sheikh,  perhaps  on  his  way 
to  the  famous  University  of  El-Azhar.  The  eighth 
must  be  a  Jew,  who  has  just  returned  from  a  tour 
in  Asia  INIinor  with  a  stock  of  embroideries,  which 
he  is  about  to  sell  to  the  winter  tourists.  The 
ninth  would  seem  to  be  some  Levantine  nonde- 
script, whose  ethnological  status  defies  diagnosis ; 
and  the  tenth,  though  not  easily  distinguishable 
from  the  latter  class,  is  in  reality  one  of  the  petty 
traders  of  whom  Greece  is  so  prolific,  and  who  are 
to  be  found  dotted  all  over  the  Ottoman  dominions. 
Nor  is  the  Ust  yet  exhausted.  Armenians,  Tunisians, 
Algerians,  Soudanese,  INIaltese,  half-breeds  of  every 
description,  and  pure-blooded  Europeans  pass  by  in 
procession,  and  all  go  to  swell  the  mass,  if  not  oi 
Egyptians,  at  all  events  of  dwellers  in  Egypt. 

The  compiler  of  the  census  of  1897  appears  to 
have  felt  a  difficulty  which  must  surely  have  weighed 
still  more  heavily  on  those  amateur  politicians  who, 
like  Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt,  have  from  time  to  time 
advocated  a  policy  of  Egypt  for  the  true  Egyptians. 
Who,  in  fact,  is  a  true  Egyptian  ?     The  compiler 

{Cairo,  p.  205) :  **  Copts,  Gypts,  Egyptians,  they  are,  indeed,  the  true 
survivors  of  the  people  vvliom  Pharaoh  ruled  j  and  who  built  the  Pyramids 
of  Giza." 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  129 

of  the  census  very  wisely  did  not  attempt  to  define 
the  term ;  he  must  have  been  aware  that  precise 
definition  was  impossible.  At  the  same  time,  the 
instincts  of  his  craft  appear  to  have  rebelled  at  the 
idea  of  lumping  the  whole  population  of  Eg\^t, 
exclusive  of  Europeans,  into  one  seething  statis- 
tical mass  and  calling  them  Egyptians.  So  he 
divided  the  Egyptians  as  well  as  he  could  into, 
first,  natives  ;  secondly,  persons  born  in  other  parts 
of  the  Ottoman  dominions,  who,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  are  for  the  most  part  Syrians  and  Armenians  ; 
thirdly,  semi -sedentary  Bedouins,  that  is  to  say, 
the  hybrid  between  the  fellah  and  the  Bedouin, 
who  has  one  foot  on  the  cultivated  land  of  the 
Nile  Valley,  and  the  other  on  the  desert ;  and, 
fourthly,  Nomad  Bedouins,  who  are  Bedouins  pure 
and  simple. 

The  census  of  1897^  informs  us,  therefore,  that 
at  that  time  there  were,  in  round  numbers, 
9,621,000  Ottoman  subjects  dwelling  in  Egypt, 
who  were  divided  into  the  following  categories  : — 

Natives          ....  9,008,000 
Persons  born,  not  in  Egypt,  but  in 

other  parts  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  40,000 

Semi-sedentary  Bedouins       ,             ,  485,000 

Nomad  Bedouins       .             ,             ,  88,000 


Total        .        9,621,000  2 

These,  with  113,000  Europeans  and  protected 
subjects  of  European  Powers,  brought  the  dwellers 

*  I  am  obliged  to  use  the  1897  figures,  as  those  of  the  census  of  1907 
are  not  yet  available.  I  am,  however,  informed  that  the  provisional 
figures  work  out  to  a  total  of  about  11,206,000. 

^  According  to  the  census  of  1882,  the  population  was  0,814,000. 
There  was,  therefore,  including  Europeans,  an  increase  of  43  per  cent 
in  fifteen  years.  It  is,  however,  generally  supposed  that  the  census 
of  1882,  which  was  conducted  with  very  inadequate  machinery,  under- 
estimated the  population  at  the  time. 

VOL.   II  K 


130  MODERN  EGYPT  rr.  iv 

in  Egypt,  male  and  female,  up  to  a  grand  total  of 
9,734,000. 

The  Englishman,  I  have  said,  came  to  Egypt 
with  the  fixed  idea  that  he  had  a  mission  to  perform, 
and,  with  his  views  about  individual  justice,  equal 
rights  before  the  law,  the  greatest  happiness  of  the 
greatest  number,  and  similar  notions,  he  will  not 
unnaturally  interpret  his  mission  in  this  sense,  that 
he  is  to  benefit  the  mass  of  the  population.  There 
lie  those  nine  or  ten  million  native  Egyptians  at 
the  bottom  of  the  social  ladder,  a  poor,  ignorant, 
credulous,  but  withal  not  unkindly  race,  being  such 
as  sixty  centuries  of  misgovernment  and  oppression 
by  various  rulers,  from  Pharaohs  to  Pashas,  have 
made  them.  It  is  for  the  civilised  Englishman  to 
extend  to  them  the  hand  of  fellowship  and  encour- 
agement, and  to  raise  them,  morally  and  materially, 
from  the  abject  state  in  which  he  finds  them.  And 
the  Englishman  looks  towards  the  scene  of  other 
administrative  triumphs  of  world-wide  fame,  which 
his  progenitors  have  accomplished.  He  looks 
towards  India,  and  he  says  to  himself,  with  all 
the  confidence  of  an  imperial  race, — I  can  perform 
this  task ;  I  have  done  it  before  now ;  I  have 
poured  numberless  blessings  on  the  heads  of  the 
ryots  of  Bengal  and  Madras,  who  are  own  cousins 
to  the  Egyptian  fellaheen  ;  these  latter  also  shall 
have  water  for  their  fields,  justice  in  their  law- 
courts,  and  immunity  from  the  tyranny  under 
which  they  have  for  so  long  groaned ;  the  reign  of 
Pashadom  shall  cease. 

But  the  Englisliman  will  find,  when  he  once 
applies  himself  to  his  task,  that  there  is,  as  it  were, 
a  thick  mist  between  him  and  the  Egyptian, 
composed  of  religious  prejudice,  antique  and  semi- 
barbarous  customs,  international  rivalry,  vested 
interests,  and  aspirations  of  one  sort  or  another, 
some   sordid,  others,   it   may  be,  not  ignoble  but 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  131 

incapable  of  realisation.  He  will  find,  in  the  first 
place,  that  those  113,000  Europeans,  although 
constituting  only  1"16  per  cent  of*  the  total  popu- 
lation, represent  the  greater  part  of  the  wealth 
and  intelligence,  and  no  small  proportion  of  the 
rascality  and  aggressive  egotism  of  the  country  ; 
further,  that  whether  their  views  be  right  or  wrong, 
just  or  unjust,  these  113,000  elect  often  have  the 
power  to  enforce  their  behests,  for  are  they  not 
the  salt  of  the  Egyptian  earth,  the  Brahmins  of 
Egypt,  and  have  they  not  behind  them  the  diplo- 
matists, and  it  may  even  be,  the  soldiers  and  sailors 
of  every  State  of  Europe  ?  In  this  respect,  the 
Englishman  will  find  that  he  has  to  deal  with  a 
problem  for  the  solution  of  which  his  Indian 
experience  will  avail  him  but  little.  In  the 
second  place,  he  will  find  that  a  majority  of 
the  large  landowners  and  all  the  most  important 
officials  are  Turco- Egyptians  in  various  stages 
of  Egyptianisation,  who  enjoy  privileges  which 
are  wholly  inconsistent  with  Benthamite  principles, 
notably  the  privilege  of  oppressing  those  9,000,000 
Egyptians  whose  woes  wring  the  heart  of  their 
English  would  -  be  benefactor.  Obviously,  the 
Englishman  is  not  hkely  to  get  much  sympathy  or 
support  from  this  quarter.  In  the  third  place,  he 
will  find  a  host  of  minor  officials,  many  of  whom 
are  of  non- Egyptian  origin,  and  who,  for  various 
reasons,  are  indisposed  to  co-operate  loyally  in  the 
improvement  of  their  country  at  the  hand  of  the 
just,  well-intentioned,  but  somewhat  unsympathetic 
alien.  In  fact,  the  Englishman  wiU  soon  find  that 
the  Egyptian,  whom  he  wishes  to  mould  into  some- 
thing really  useful  with  a  view  to  his  becoming 
eventually  autonomous,  is  merely  the  rawest  of  raw 
material,  and  that  the  principal  tools,  with  which 
he  will  have  to  work,  and  on  which  the  excellence 
of  the  finished  article  must  largely  depend,  may  be 


132  MODERN  EGYPT  pr.  iv 

British,  French,  Turkish,  Syrian,  Armenian,  or  of 
half-a-dozen  other  nationahties,  but  they  will  rarely 
be  Egyptian.^ 

This,  therefore,  is  the  central  feature  of  the  local 
situation  which  the  English  found  in  existence  when 
they  took  in  hand  the  solution  of  the  Egyptian 
question.  The  Egyptians,  properly  so  called,  were 
numerous,  but  were,  from  the  pohtical  and  superior 
administrative  point  of  view,  httle  more  than  ciphers. 
The  main  difficulties  of  the  English  politician  and 
of  the  Enghsh  administrator  will  arise  from  the 
fact  that  the  minority,  consisting  of  non-Egyptians 
or  of  what,  for  want  of  a  better  term,  may  in  some 
instances  be  called  semi-Egyptians,  were  relatively 
powerful,  and  not  unfrequently,  for  one  reason  or 
another,  hostile. 

I  have  said  that  religious  prejudice  constituted 
one  of  the  barriers  which  were  interposed  between 
the  Englishman  and  the  Egj^tian  ;  for,  on  the  one 
hand,  besides  being  one  of  the  European  family  in 
respect  to  general  civilisation,  the  Enghshman, 
amidst  many  deviations  from  the  path,  will  strive, 
perhaps  to  a  greater  extent  than  any  other  member 
of  that  family,  to  attain  to  a  high  degree  of  eminently 
Christian  civilisation ;  that  is  to  say,  although  he 
will  in  his  official  capacity  discard  any  attempt 
to  proselytise,  he  will  endeavour  to  inculcate  a 
distinctly  Christian  code  of  morahty  as  the  basis  for 
the  relations  between  man  and  man.  He  is,  indeed, 
guided  in  this  direction  by  the  hghts,  which  have 
been  handed  down  to  him  by  his  forefathers,  and  by 
the  Puritan  blood  which  still  circulates  in  his  veins. 

The  Egyptian,  on  the  other  hand,  holds  fast  to 
the  faith  of  Islam,  that  noble  monotheism,  behef  in 
which  takes  to  a  great  extent  the  place  of  patriotism 

*  I  am,  of  course,  speaking  here  of  the  state  of  things  which  existed 
in  1882,  Since  then,  the  proportion  of  Egyptian  employes  in  th« 
Government  service  has  very  largely  increased. 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  135 

in  Eastern  countries,^  and  which  serves  as  a  common 
bond  of  union  to  all  Moslems  from  Dellii  to  Fez, 
from  Stamboul  to  Zanzibar,  as  they  turn  to  pray 
towards  the  cradle  of  their  creed.^ 

And  what  are  the  main  tenets  of  this  creed, 
which  has  exercised  so  mighty  an  influence  on  the 
destinies  of  mankind  ?  They  are  set  forth  in  the 
Sacred  Book  of  the  Moslems.  They  have  been 
explained  in  many  languages  by  learned  men  of 
many  nations.  But  their  original  grandeur  and 
simpHcity  have  never  been  more  eloquently  ex- 
pounded than  by  those  early  followers  of  the 
Prophet,  who  threw  themselves  at  the  feet  of  the 
Christian  King  of  Abyssinia  to  implore  his  protec- 
tion against  the  persecution  of  the  Koreish  Arabs. 
"O  King,"  they  said,  "we  lived  in  ignorance, 
idolatry,  and  unchastity ;  the  strong  oppressed  the 
weak ;  we  spoke  untruth ;  we  violated  the  duties 
of  hospitality.  Then  a  Prophet  arose,  one  whom 
we  knew  from  our  youth,  with  whose  descent  and 
conduct  and  good  faith  and  truth  we  are  all  well 
acquainted.  He  told  us  to  worship  one  God,  to 
speak  truth,  to  keep  good  faith,  to  assist  our 
relations,  to  fulfil  the  rights  of  hospitality,  and  to 
abstain  from  all  things  impure,  ungodly,  unrighteous. 
And  he  ordered  us  to  say  prayers,  give  alms,  and  to 
fast.     We  beheved  in  him  ;  we  followed  him." ' 

These  are  the  main  tenets  of  the  Moslem  faith.* 

*  Some  observers  think  that  association  with  Europe  has  to  some 
extent  resulted  in  substituting  the  bond  of  nationality  for  that  of 
religion  in  Moslem  countries.  Tlius  M.  Le  Cliatelier,  in  a  work 
published  in  1888,  and  entitled  Islam  au  XlXeme  Siecle,  says  (p.  180)  : 
'' L'e'volution  contemporaine  de  I'Europe  a  introduit  dans  celle  de 
rislam  un  facteur  commun,le  developpement  de  I'espritde  nationalite', 
qu'elle  a  d'ailleurs  propage  dans  le  nioiide  eiitier."  Recent  events, 
not  only  in  Egypt  but  elsewhere,  tend  rather  to  confirm  M.  Le 
Chatelier's  view. 

^  See  Studies  in  a  Mosque,  p.  96. 

'  Ibid.  p.  48,  and  Muir's  Life  of  Mahomet,  p.  89. 

*  Mr.  Badger,  in  his  admirable  article  on  Mohammed  in  the  Dictionary 
of  Christian  Biography,  says:  "Surah   CXIl.,  the  shortest  chapter  of 


134  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  d» 

To  the  many  hundreds  of  millions  who  have 
embraced  Islam,  and  more  especially  to  the  poor 
amongst  them,  the  adoption  of  these  tenets  has 
afforded  not  only  spiritual  consolation  but  material 
blessings  in  this  world,  as  well  as  the  hope  of 
immortality  in  the  world  to  come.  It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  a  primitive  society  benefits  greatly 
by  the  adoption  of  the  faith  of  Islam.^  Sir  John 
Seeley,  speaking  of  what  he  aptly  terms  "  the  state- 
building  power  of  religion,"  says :  "  Wherever  a 
barbarous  tribe  has  raised  itself  at  all  above  the 
level  of  barbarism  and  taken  any  development,  it 
has  done  so  usually  through  conversion  to  Islam." '^ 

Unfortunately,  the  great  Arabian  reformer  of 
the  seventh  century  was  driven  by  the  necessities 
of  his  position  to  do  more  than  found  a  rehgion. 
He  endeavoured  to  found  a  social  system,  with 
results  which  are  thus  stated  by  a  close  observer  of 
the  strong  and  weak  parts  of  Islamism.  "As  a 
religion,"  Mr.  Stanley  Lane-Poole  says,  "  Islam  is 
great ;  it  has  taught  men  to  worship  one  God  with  a 
pure  worship  who  formerly  worshipped  many  gods  im- 
purely.   As  a  social  system,  it  is  a  complete  failure."  ^ 

The  reasons  why  Islam  as  a  social  system  has 
been  a  complete  failure  are  manifold. 

First  and  foremost,  Islam  keeps  women  in  a 
position  of  marked  uiferiority.*  In  the  second  place, 
Islam,  speaking  not  so  much  through  the  Koran  as 

the  Koran,  is  regarded  by  Moslems  as  containing  the  essence  of  the 
whole  book  :  'Say,  God  is  one;  God  the  eternal;  He  begetteth  not, 
neither  is  He  begotten  ;  neither  is  there  any  one  like  Him.'  " 

^  ''  L' Islam  est  un  progres  pour  le  negre  qui  I'adopte." — Renan, 
Hintoire  du  Peuple  d' Israel,  vol.  i.  p.  60. 

2  Introduction  to  Political  Science,  p.  63.  Miss  Kingsley  {West 
AJrican  Studies,  ch.v.)  makes  some  very  apposite  remarks  on  the  adapt- 
ability of  Islamism  to  the  present  condition  of  African  society. 

2  Studies  in  a  Mosque,  p.  101. 

*  "  The  degradation  of  women  in  the  East  is  a  canker  that  begins  its 
destructive  work  early  in  childhood,  ;ind  has  eaten  into  the  whole  system 
of  Islam." — Stanley  I^ane- Poole,  Islam,  a  Prelection  delivered  be/ore  the 
University  of  Dublin. 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  135 

through  the  traditions  which  cluster  round  the 
Koran,  crystallises  religion  and  law  into  one  in- 
separable and  immutable  whole,  with  the  result 
that  all  elasticity  is  taken  away  from  the  social 
system.  If  to  this  day  an  Egyptian  goes  to  law 
over  a  question  of  testamentary  succession,  his  case 
is  decided  according  to  the  antique  principles  which 
were  laid  down  as  applicable  to  the  primitive  society 
of  the  Arabian  Peninsula  in  the  seventh  century. 
Only  a  few  years  ago  (1890),  the  Grand  JNIufti  of 
Cairo,  who  is  the  authoritative  expounder  of  the 
law  of  Islam,  explained  how  bands  of  robbers 
should  be  treated  who  were  found  guilty  of  making 
armed  attacks  on  a  village  by  night.  The  con- 
demned criminal  might  be  punished  in  six  different 
ways.  He  might  have  his  right  hand  and  left  foot 
cut  off  and  then  be  decapitated ;  or  he  might  be 
mutilated,  as  before,  and  then  crucified ;  or  he 
might  be  mutilated,  decapitated,  and  eventually 
crucified ;  or  he  might  be  simply  decapitated  or 
simply  crucified,  or  decapitated  first  and  crucified 
afterwards.  Full  details  were  given  in  the  Mufti's 
report  of  the  mode  of  crucifixion  which  was  to  be 
adopted.  The  condemned  person  was  to  be  attached 
to  a  cross  in  a  certain  manner,  after  which  "  il  sera 
perc^  a  la  mamelle  gauche  par  une  lance,  qui  devra 
etre  remuee  dans  la  blessure  jusqu  a  ce  que  la  mort 
ait  Ueu."  ^  These  terrible  penalties  could  not,  how- 
ever, for  some  reason,  which  at  first  sight  appears 
incomprehensible,^  be  incurred  if  a  dumb  man  were 
one  of  the  band  of  robbers.  In  this  latter  case  the 
lex  talionis  was  to  be  applied.  The  next-of-kin  of 
any  one  who  might  have  been  murdered  could 
demand  a  Hfe  for  a  life,  or  could  claim  blood- 
money  in  lieu  of  expiation. 

•  Tlie  original  was,  of  course,  in  Arabic,  but  the  French  translation, 
which  is  quoted  above,  was  published  in  the  Official  Journal  of  tlie 
Egy])tian  (Government. 

^  See  p.  loG,  note. 


136  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

The  rigidity  of  the  Sacred  Law  has  been  at 
times  shghtly  tempered  by  well  -  meaning  and 
learned  Moslems  who  have  tortured  their  brains 
in  devising  sophisms  to  show  that  the  legal  prin- 
ciples and  social  system  of  the  seventh  century  can, 
by  some  strained  and  intricate  process  of  reasoning, 
be  consistently  and  logically  made  to  conform  with 
the  civihsed  practices  of  the  twentieth  century.^ 
But,  as  a  rule,  custom  based  on  the  religious  law, 
coupled  mth  exaggerated  reverence  for  the  original 
lawgiver,  holds  all  those  who  cUng  to  the  faith  of 
Islam  with  a  grip  of  iron  from  which  there  is  no 
escape.  "During  the  Middle  Ages,"  it  has  been 
truly  said,^  "  man  lived  enveloped  in  a  cowl."  The 
true  Moslem  of  the  present  day  is  even  more  tightly 
enveloped  by  the  Sheriat. 

In  the  third  place,  Islam  does  not,  indeed, 
encourage,  but  it  tolerates  slavery.  "  Mohammed 
found  the  custom  existing  among  the  Pagan  Arabs  ; 
he  minimised  the  evil."^     But  he  was  powerless  to 

*  A  curious  instance  of  the  processes  of  reasoning'  sometimes  adopted 
in  order  to  evade  the  rigidity  of  the  Sacred  Law  is  to  he  found  in  the 
provision,  to  which  allusion  is  made  above,  tliat  the  barbarous  punish- 
ments of  mutilation  and  crucifixion  cannot  be  inflicted  on  a  band  of 
brigands  if  a  dumb  man  forms  one  of  the  band.  The  reason  is  rather 
abstruse.  It  appears  that  certain  classes  of  ofl'ences,  such  as  robbery, 
adultery,  etc.,  are  specially  provided  for  by  the  Koran,  the  penalties 
being  generally  excessively  severe,  and,  as  no  mitigation  is  permissible, 
those  penalties  have  to  be  applied  in  tlieir  entirety.  Thus,  for  brigand- 
age the  penalty  is  mutilation,  crucifixion,  etc.,  as  described  by  the 
Mufti.  But,  in  order,  in  some  degree,  to  leave  a  loophole  for  escape 
from  the  compulsory  infliction  of  these  punishments  in  all  cases,  the 
law  doctors  discovered  that  it  was  only  intended  that  they  should  be 
inflicted  when  all  the  parties  were  quite  sound  and  in  a  state  to  speak 
in  their  own  defence.  For  this  reason,  the  presence  of  a  child,  au 
idiot,  or  a  dumb  man  enables  the  Sacred  Law  to  be  put  aside  and  a 
milder  kind  of  punishment  inflicted  on  the  whole  party  under  the 
ordinary  law,  i.e.  the  will  of  the  Sovereign  or  of  his  delegate,  the  Kadi. 
If  I  understand  rightly,  the  Mufti  did  not  mean  that  the  dumb  man 
saved  all  his  associates  from  punishment,  but  only  that  they  were 
thereby  transferred  from  the  province  of  the  Divine  law  to  that  of  their 
human  authorities. 

2  Symfflnds,  Renaissance  in  Italy,  p.  14. 

'  Sj-ed  Ameer  Ali,  Personal  Law  of  the  Mohammedans,  p.  38. 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  137 

abolish  it  altogether.  His  followers  have  forgotten 
the  discouragement,  and  have  very  generally  made 
the  permission  to  possess  slaves  the  practical  guide 
for  their  conduct.  This  is  another  fatal  blot  in 
Islam. 

TJfiiav  yap  t   aperrj<;  aTToaivvrat,  evpvoTra  Zey? 
dvepo<i,  evT   av  /jllv  kutcl  BovXiov  rffjuap  e\r)cnv. 

The  Christian,  to  his  shame  be  it  said,  has  before 
now  been  not  only  a  slave-owner,  but,  which  is 
much  worse,  a  slave-hunter.  The  Christian  reHgion 
has,  however,  never  sanctioned  slavery. 

Lastly,  Islam  has  the  reputation  of  being  an 
intolerant  religion,  and  the  reputation  is,  from 
some  points  of  view,  well  deserved,  though  the 
bald  and  sweeping  accusation  of  intolerance  requires 
quahfication  and  explanation.  The  followers  of 
the  Prophet  have,  indeed,  waged  war  against  those 
whom  they  considered  infidels.  They  are  taught 
by  their  religious  code  that  any  unbelievers,  who 
may  be  made  prisoners  of  war,  may  rightly  be 
enslaved.^  Moreover,  sectarian  strife  has  not  been 
uncommon.  Sunni  has  fought  against  Shiah.  The 
orthodox  JNloslem  has  mercilessly  repressed  the 
followers  of  Abdul  Wahab.  Further,  apostasy  from 
Islam  is  punishable  with  death,  and  it  is  not  many 
years  ago  that  the  sentence  used  to  be  carried  into 
effect.^     On  the  other  hand,  the  annals  of  Islam  are 

*  The  Hidayah,  which  is  regarded  by  the  Sunn  is  as  the  standard 
commentary  on  the  Sheriat,  or  religious  code,  says:  "The  Imam, 
with  respect  to  captives,  has  it  in  his  choice  to  slay  them,  because  the 
Prophet  put  captives  to  death,  and  also  because  slaying  them  terminates 
wickedness  ;  or,  if  he  chooses,  he  may  mal<e  them  slaves,  because  by 
enslaving  them  the  wickedness  of  them  is  remedied,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  Moslems  reap  an  advantage." 

2  Lane  saw  a  woman  stripped,  strangled,  and  thrown  into  the  Nile 
for  apostasy  {Modem  Egj/ptitins,  vol.  i.  p.  13(5).  To  the  best  of  my 
belief,  the  last  person  executed  for  apostesy  in  virtue  of  a  decision  of  an 
Ottoman  law-court  was  an  Armenian,  who  in  1843  adopted  the  faith  of 
Islam,  subsequently  repented,  and  returned  to  the  Christian  Church. 
Lord  Stratford,  who  was  then  Ambassador  at  Constantinople,  rose  in 


138  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

not  stained  by  the  history  of  an  Inquisition.*  More 
than  this,  when  he  is  not  moved  by  any  circum- 
stances specially  calculated  to  rouse  his  rehgious 
passions,  the  JNIoslem  readily  extends  a  half-con- 
temptuous tolerance  to  the  Jew  and  the  Christian.'^ 
In  the  villages  of  Upper  Egypt,  the  Crescent  and 
the  Cross,  the  Mosque  and  the  Monastery,  have 
stood  peacefully  side  by  side  for  many  a  long  year. 
Nevertheless,  the  general  tendency  of  Islam  is  to 
stimulate  intolerance  and  to  engender  hatred  and 
contempt  not  only  for  polytheists,  but  also,  although 
in  a  modified  form,  for  all  monotheists  who  will 
not  repeat  the  formula  which  acknowledges  that 

all  his  wrath,  and,  after  some  sharp  diplomatic  passages,  extracted  a 
declaration  from  the  Porte  that  for  the  future  no  apostate  should  be 
put  to  death.  The  incident  is  related  in  Chapter  XV^III.  of  the  Li/e 
of  Stratford  Cmming.  Relifi;ious  freedom  was  further  assured  by 
Articles  X.-Xll.  of  the  Khatt-i-Humayoun  of  February  28,  1856,  which 
was  issued  after  the  Crimean  AV^ar. 

1  once  asked  a  hig^h  Moslem  authority  in  Cairo  how  he  reconciled 
the  fact  that  an  apostate  could  now  no  long^er  be  executed  with  tlie 
alleged  immutability  of  the  Sacred  Law.  The  casuistry  of  his  reply 
would  have  done  honour  to  a  Spanish  Inquisitor.  The  Kadi,  he  said, 
does  not  recognise  any  change  in  the  Law.  He  would,  in  the  case  of  an 
apostate,  pronounce  sentence  of  death  according  to  tlie  Law,  but  it  was 
for  the  secular  authorities  to  carry  out  the  sentence.  If  they  failed  in 
their  duty,  the  sin  of  disobeying  the  Law  would  lie  on  their  heads. 
Cases  of  apostasy  are  very  rare,  but  during  my  tenure  of  office  in 
Egypt,  I  had  to  interfere  once  or  twice  to  protect  from  maltreatment 
Moslems  who  had  been  converted  to  Christianity  by  the  American 
missionaries. 

'  Mr.  Pickthall  {Folk-Lore  of  the  Holy  Land,  p.  xv),  speaking  of  the 
capture  of  Jerusalem  by  the  Khalif  Omar,  says :  "  Omar's  severity 
towards  the  Christians  was  so  much  below  their  anticipations  that  he 
figures  in  the  popular  memory  almost  as  a  benefactor  of  their  religion. 
They  were  deprived  of  their  church-bells,  but  kept  their  churches  ;  and 
if  large  numbers  of  them  embraced  El  Islam,  it  was  through  self-interest 
(or  conviction)  and  not  at  the  point  of  the  sword,  as  has  been  repre- 
sented. Indeed,  the  toleration  displayed  by  the  Moslems  towards  the 
vanquished,  though  less  than  we  should  practise  nowadays,  is  without 
a  parallel  in  Europe  till  many  centuries  later.  It  was  not  emulated  by 
the  Crusaders,  who,  rushing  to  wrest  the  Holy  Sepulchre  from  the 
clutch  of  the  '  foul  Paynim,'  were  astonished  to  find  it  in  the  hands 
of  Christians,  whom,  to  cloak  their  disconcertion,  they  denounced  as 
heretics." 

2  Upon  the  toleration  accorded  to  the  Jews  by  Moslems,  see  Milman'a 
History  of  the  Jews,  bk.  xxiii. 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  139 

Mohammed  was  indeed  the  Prophet  of  God.  Neither 
can  this  be  any  matter  for  surprise.  The  faith  of 
Islam  admits  of  no  compromise.  The  Moslem  is 
the  antithesis  of  the  pantheistic  Hindoo.  His  faith 
is  essentially  exclusive.  Its  founder  launched  fiery 
anathemas  against  all  who  would  not  accept  the 
divinity  of  his  inspiration,  and  his  words  fell  on 
fertile  ground,  for  a  large  number  of  those  who 
have  embraced  Islam  are  semi-savages,  and  often 
warlike  savages,  whose  minds  are  too  untrained  to 
receive  the  idea  that  an  honest  difference  of  opinion 
is  no  cause  for  bitter  hatred.  More  than  this,  the 
Moslem  has  for  centuries  past  been  tauglit  that 
the  barbarous  principles  of  the  lex  tali  on  is  are 
sanctioned,  and  even  enjoined  by  his  religion.  He 
is  told  to  revenge  himself  on  his  enemies,  to  strike 
them  that  strike  him,  to  claim  an  eye  for  an  eye, 
and  a  tooth  for  a  tooth.  Islamism,  therefore,  unlike 
Christianity,  tends  to  engender  the  idea  that  re\'enge 
and  hatred,  rather  than  love  and  charity,^  should 
form  the  basis  of  the  relations  between  man  and 
man ;  and  it  inculcates  a  special  degree  of  hatred 
against  those  who  do  not  accept  the  Moslem  faith. 
"  When  ye  encounter  the  unbelievers,"  says  the 
Koran,  "  strike  off  their  heads  until  ye  have  made 
a  great  slaughter  among  them,  and  bind  them  in 
bonds.  .  .  .  O  true  believers,  if  ye  assist  God,  by 
fighting  for  his  religion,  he  will  assist  you  against 
your  enemies  ;  and  will  set  your  feet  fast ;  but  as 
for  the  infidels,  let  them  perish  ;  and  their  works 
God  shall  render  vain.  .  .  .  Verily,  God  will  intro- 
duce those  who  believe  and  do  good  works  into 
gardens  beneath  which  rivers  flow,  but  the  un- 
believers indulge  themselves  in  pleasures,  and  eat 
as    beasts    eat ;    and    their    abode    shall    be    hell 

^  "\jQ  Christianisme  a  ete  intolerant,  mais  I'intolerance  u'est  pas 
un  fait  essentiellement  chretien.  C'est  un  fait  juif." — Renan,  Vie  de 
Jesus,  p.  425. 


140  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

fire."  ^  It  is  true  that  when  Mohammed  denounced 
unbehevers  he  was  alluding  more  especially  to  the 
pagans  who  during  his  lifetime  inhabited  the 
Arabian  Peninsula,  but  later  commentators  and 
interpreters  of  the  Koran  appUed  his  denunciations 
to  Christians  and  Jews,  and  it  is  in  this  sense  that 
they  are  now  understood  by  a  large  number  of 
Mohammedans.  Does  not  the  word  "  Ghazi,"  which 
is  the  highest  title  attainable  by  an  officer  of  the 
Sultan's  army,  signify  "  one  who  fights  in  the  cause 
of  Islam ;  a  hero ;  a  warrior ;  one  who  slays  an 
infidel "  V  Does  not  every  MoUah,  when  he 
recites  the  Khutbeh  at  the  Mosque,  invoke  Divine 
wrath  on  the  heads  of  unbelievers  in  terms  which 
are  sufficiently  pronounced  at  all  times,  and  in 
which  the  diapason  of  invective  swells  stiU  more 
loudly  when  any  adventitious  circumstances  may 
have  tended  to  fan  the  flame  of  fanaticism  ?  Should 
not  every  non-Moslem  land  be  considered  in  strict 
parlance  a  Dar-el-Harb,  a  land  of  warfare  ?  ^  When 
principles  such  as  these  have  been  dinned  for 
centuries  past  into  the  ears  of  Moslems,  it  can 
be  no  matter  for  surprise  that  a  spirit  of  intolerance 
has  been  generated. 

The  Englishman  in  Egypt  will  find  that,  in  the 

*  On  the  other  hand,  Surah  ii,  257,  says :  "  Let  there  be  no  com- 
pulsion in  religion."  Tlie  numerous  contradictory  utterances  and 
inconsistencies  of  tlie  Koran  cannot  be  reconciled.  They  are  probably 
due  to  the  fact  that  Mohammed's  teaching  was  greatly  influenced  by  pass- 
ing events  as  well  as  by  the  personal  episodes  of  his  own  career. 

*  Hughes'  Dictionarii  of  Lslum,  p.  lo9. 

3  Tliere  is,  however,  considerable  difference  of  opinion  amongst 
Moslem  authorities  as  to  the  precise  definition  of  a  Dar-el-IIarb.  The 
question  is  one  of  considerable  importance  to  the  rulo-s  of  India.  It 
is  discussed  in  Sir  William  Hunter's  work  entitled  Indian  Musulmans. 
The  highest  Moslem  authorities  liave  expressed  opinions  that  India  is  a 
Dar-el-Isl;im,  and  not  a  Dar-el-IIarb.  Hence,  it  is  not  incumbent  on 
the  Moslems  of  India  to  carry  on  a  Jihad  against  the  infidels.  The 
truth  is  that  wlien,  twelve  centuries  airo,  these  words  came  into  use,  it 
was  never  contemplated  that  sixty  millions  of  Moslems  would  be  living 
peacefully  under  tbe  rule  of  a  Christian  King  or  Queen.  Hence,  some 
modus  Vivendi  had  to  be  found,  which  would  bring  the  facts  of  the 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  141 

practical  everyday  work  of  administration,  this  in- 
tolerant spirit,  though  it  may  not  always  find  expres- 
sion in  word  or  deed,  is  an  obstacle  to  the  reformer 
of  which  it  is  difficult  to  overrate  the  importance. 
He  will  find  that  he  has  not,  as  in  India,  to  deal 
with  a  body  of  Moslems,  numerically  strong,  but 
whose  power  of  cohesion  is  enfeebled  from  their 
being  scattered  broadcast  amongst  a  population 
five  times  as  numerous  as  themselves,  who  hold  to 
another  and  more  tolerant  creed.  He  will  have  to 
deal  with  a  smaller  but  more  compact  body  of 
Moslems,  who  are  more  subject  to  the  influences 
of  their  spiritual  leaders  than  their  co-religionists 
in  India.  The  Englishman  will  do  his  best  under 
these  circumstances.  He  will  scrupulously  abstain 
from  interference  in  religious  matters.  He  will 
be  eager  to  explain  that  proselytism  forms  no 
part  of  his  political  programme.  He  will  look 
the  other  way  when  greedy  Sheikhs  swallow  up 
the  endowments  left  by  pious  Moslems  for  chari- 
table purposes.  His  Western  mind  may,  indeed, 
revolt  at  the  misappropriation  of  funds,  but  he 
would  rather  let  these  things  be  than  incur  the 
charge  of  tampering  with  any  quasi-religious  in- 
stitution. For  similar  reasons,  he  will  abstain 
from  laying  his  reforming  hand  on  the  iniquities 
of  the  Kadi's  courts.  The  hired  perjurer  will  be 
allowed  full  immunity  to  exercise  his  profession,^ 

{(resent  day  into  apparent  conformity  with  the  doctrines  of  Islam.  The 
aw  doctors  of  Nortliern  India  wisely  laid  down  the  principle  that  no 
Jihad  was  justifiable  unless  it  was  likely  to  he  successful.  This  view 
was  conformable  to  the  worldly  interests  both  of  the  rulers  of  India 
and  of  their  Moslem  subjects,  but  there  is  a  somewhat  secular  ring 
about  an  utterance  of  this  sort.  It  commends  itself  to  the  politician 
rather  than  to  the  uncompromising-  divine.  Even  the  exponents  of 
unbending  Islam  seem,  however,  prepared  at  times  to  admit  tlie 
principle  quit  y  a  des  accomruodevicnts  avec  le  del. 

'  A  number  of  false  witnesses  ply,  or,  at  all  events,  used  to  ply  for 
hire  about  the  precincts  of  the  Kadi's  court  at  Cairo.  They  are  pre- 
pared, on  payment,  to  swear  to  anything.  I  have  been  informed  that 
when  the  British  Government  took  over  the  administration  of  Cyprus 


142  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  i^ 

for  the  Englishman  is  informed  that  the  criminal 
cannot  be  brought  to  justice  without  shaking  one 
of  the  props  which  hold  together  the  religious 
edifice  founded  twelve  centuries  ago  by  the  Prophet 
of  Arabia.  He  did  not  for  many  years  allow  a 
murderer,  whose  offence  was  clearly  proved,  to  be 
hanged  because  Islam  declared — or  was  supposed 
by  many  ill-informed  INIoslems  to  declare — that  such 
an  act  is  unlawful  unless  the  murderer  confesses 
his  crime,  or  unless  the  act  is  committed  in  the 
presence  of  two  witnesses ;  and  he  accepted  this 
principle  in  deference  to  JNIoslem  sentiment,  with 
the  full  knowledge  that,  in  accepting  it,  he  was 
giving  a  direct  encouragement  to  perjury  and  the 
use  of  torture  to  extract  evidence/  In  the  work 
of  civdl  juridical  reform,  he  will  bear  with  all  the 
antiquated  formalities  of  the  Mehkemeh  Sheraieh. 
He  will  scrupulously  respect  all  Moslem  observ- 
ances. He  will  generally,  amidst  some  twinges 
of  his  Sabbatarian  conscience,  observe  Friday  as  a 
holiday,  and  perform  the  work  of  the  Egyptian 
Government  on  Sunday.^  He  will  put  on  slippers 
over  his  boots  when  he  enters  a  Mosque.  He  wall 
pay  his  respects  to  Moslem  notabilities  during  the 
fast  of  Ramazan  and  the  feast  of  Bairam.  He 
will,  when  an  officer   of  the  army,  take  part   in 

it  was  found  that  the  profession  of  false  witness  had  been  officially 
recognised  by  the  Turkish  Government.  Perjurers  took  out  licenses 
for  the  exercise  of  their  profession.  A  good  account  of  the  proceed- 
ings of  these  professional  witnesses  is  given  in  Senior's  Journal  in 
Turkey  and  Greece,  p.  80. 

It  ought  in  fairness  to  be  added  that  hired  perjurers  existed  at  one 
time  in  England.  The  literature  of  the  Elizabethan  period  abounds 
with  allusions  to  "Knights  of  the  Post,"  as  they  were  then  termed. 

•  'Die  law  on  this  sulyect  was  eventually  changed.  After  prolonged 
inquiry,  it  was  ascertained  beyond  doubt  that  the  view  commonly  held 
in  Egypt  was  not  in  conformity  with  Moslem  law  or  tradition.  In 
1897,  therefore,  a  law  was  passed  in  virtue  of  which  the  special  pro- 
vision as  regards  the  evidence  necessary  in  order  to  permit  of  a  capital 
punishment  being  inflicted  in  a  case  of  murder  was  abolished. 

^  Some  British  officials  have  declined  to  work  on  Sundays,  and  have 
made  up  the  hours  thus  lost  by  working  extra  hours  on  week-days. 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  143 

Moslem  religious  ceremonies,  fire  salutes  at  religious 
festivals,  and  sometimes  expose  his  life  under  the 
burning  rays  of  an  African  sun  rather  than  substi- 
tute a  Christian  helmet  for  the  tarboush,  which  is 
the  distinctive  mark  of  the  Moslem  soldier  in  the 
Ottoman  dominions.  And  when  he  has  done  all 
these  things  and  many  more  of  a  like  nature,  they 
will  only  avail  him  so  far  that  they  may  perhaps 
tend  to  obviate  any  active  eruption  of  the  volcano 
of  intolerance.  They  will  acquire  for  him  a  grudg- 
ing acknowledgment  that  he  is  content  to  let  well 
alone,  and  that  he  does  not  endeavour  to  evangelise 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  He  will  not  be  able 
to  inspire  any  strong  feehng  of  gratitude  beyond 
this  limit.  The  English  engineer  may  give  the 
Egyptian  fellah  water  for  his  fields,  and  roads 
and  railways  to  enable  him  to  bring  his  produce 
to  market ;  the  English  financier  may  afford 
him  fiscal  relief  beyond  his  wildest  hopes ;  the 
English  jurist  may  prevent  his  being  sent  to 
death  or  exile  for  a  crime  of  which  he  is  innocent ; 
the  English  schoolmaster  may  open  to  him  the  door 
of  Western  knowledge  and  science ;  in  a  word,  his 
material  comfort  may  be  increased,  his  intellect 
may  be  developed,  and  his  moral  being  elevated 
under  British  auspices,  but  the  Egyptian  Moslem, 
albeit  he  hates  and  fears  the  Turkish  Pasha, 
that  he  recognises  the  benefits  conferred  on 
him  by  the  Englishman  and  acknowledges  his 
superior  ability,  can  never  forget  the  fact  that 
the  Englishman  wears  a  hat  whilst  he,  him- 
self, wears  a  tarboush  or  a  turban.  Though  he 
accepts  the  benefits  willingly  enough,  he  is  always 
mindful  that  the  hand  which  bestows  them  is  not 
that  of  a  co-religionist,  and  it  is  this  which  affects 
him  far  more  than  the  thought  that  the  Er.glish- 
man  is  not  his  compatriot.  Do  what  he  will, 
through  the  combined  channels  of  sympathy  and 


144  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

of  reason,  the  Englishman  will  never  be  able  to 
break  down  this  barrier,  that  whereas  both  he  and 
the  Eg}^tian  JNIoslems  are  prepared  to  aver  that 
there  is  no  God  but  God,  the  Egyptian  is,  and  the 
Englishman  is  not  prepared  to  subscribe  to  the 
latter  part  of  the  formula,  which  lays  down  that 
INIohammed  was  the  Prophet  of  God.  "  Islam  is  all 
in  all  to  the  fellah ;  the  unbelievers  he  looks  on  as 
a  miserable  minority  ;  and  it  is  only  the  unpleasant 
fact  that  they  cannot  be  crushed ,  at  present  that 
prevents  his  crushing  them,  and  asserting  the 
supremacy  of  Islam."  ^ 

Neither  is  this  the  sole  barrier  which  is  inter- 
posed between  the  two  races.  Look,  not  only  to 
the  leading  dogma,  but  to  the  incidents  of  Divine 
worship  associated  with  Islamism  as  opposed  to 
those  of  Christianity.  Examine  the  consequences 
which  the  degradation  of  women  brings  in  its  train. 
Consider  the  mental  and  moral  attributes,  the 
customs,  art,  architecture,^  language,  dress,  and 
tastes  of  the  dark-skinned  Eastern  as  compared 
with  the  fair-skinned  Western.  It  will  be  found 
that  on  every  point  they  are  the  poles  asunder.' 
It  would  seem,  mdeed,  as  if  even  in  the  most 
trivial  acts  of  life  some  unfelt  impulse,  for  which 
no  special  reason  can  be  assigned,  drives  the 
Eastern  to  do  the  exact  opposite  to  that  which 
the  Western  would  do  under  similar  circumstances.* 

*  W.  Flinders  Petrie,  Ten  Years  Digging  in  Egypt,  p.  180. 

"  Dean  Milman  says;  ''The  East,  having  once  wrought  out  its 
architectural  type  and  model,  settled  down  in  unprogressive,  un- 
creative  acquiescence,  and  went  on  copying  that  type  with  servile  and 
almost  undeviating  uniformity.  In  the  West,  within  certain  limits, 
with  certain  principles,  and  witli  a  fixed  aim,  tliere  was  freedom,  pro- 
gression, invention." — Ili.sfon/  0/  Lit  tin  Christianity,  vol.  ix.  270. 

3  Sir  George  Cornewall  Lewis  {On  the  Method  of  Observation  and 
Reasoning  in  Politics,  voL  ii.  ch.  xvi.)  lias  some  interesting  remarks  on 
this  subject. 

*  An  Englishman,  who  was  a  keen  observer  of  Eg}^tian  manners  and 
customs,  told  me  that,  as  a  test  of  intelligence,  he  once  asked  a  fellah 
to  point  to  his  left  ear.     A  European  would  certainly  have  taken  hold 


CH.  xxxiv     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  145 

It  will  be  interesting  to  dwell  on  this  point  at  some- 
what greater  length. 

Consider  first  differences,  some  of  great,  some 
of  trifling  importance,  which  hinge  on  rehgious 
beHef  and  ceremonial. 

The  Christian  cHngs  to  the  hope  that,  in  the 
spiritual  heaven  to  which  he  looks  forward,  he  will 
meet  with  those  with  whom  he  has  been  associated 
in  this  world.  This  hope  is,  indeed,  one  of  the 
most  beautiful  and  consolatory  features  of  his 
faith.  The  Moslem's  belief  in  immortality  is  dis- 
sociated from  any  ideas  of  this  nature.  The  Houris, 
who  people  the  Paradise  which  he  hopes  to  gain, 
were  never  inhabitants  of  this  world. 

The  Christian  prays  for  certain  quahties  to  be 
granted  to  him,  or  for  certain  specific  objects  to 
be  accomphshed.  The  Moslem  generally  utters 
certain  set  formulae  of  adoration ;  he  rarely  prays 
for  specific  objects. 

The  Christian  will  say  his  daily  prayers  in 
private.  The  Moslem  will  say  them  in  pubhc. 
He  has  no  false  shame  about  bearing  public  testi- 
mony to  the  fact  that,  in  every  act  he  performs, 
he  is  in  the  hands  of  God.  "  God,"  said  an  English 
divine  who  had  made  a  study  of  Eastern  rehgions, 
"  is  present  to  Mohammedans  in  a  sense  in  which 
He  is  rarely  present  to  us  amidst  the  hurry  and 
confusion  of  the  West."^ 

The  Christian,  when  he  fasts  at  all,  fasts 
moderately  by  day  and  sleeps  at  night.  The 
Moslem,  during  his  fast,  neither  eats,  nor  drinks, 
nor  smokes  by  day,  but  indulges  without  restraint 
at  night. 

The  Christian  religion  encourages  the  fine  arts, 

of  the  lobe  of  his  left  ear  with  his  left  hand.  The  Egyptian  passed  hia 
right  hand  over  the  top  of  his  head  and  with  that  hand  grasped  the 
upper  part  of  his  left  ear. 

*  Dean  Stanley's  Lectures  on  the  Eastern  Church,  p.  334. 
VOL.  II  L 


14G  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

and  draws  a  potent  influence  from  them.  The 
INlohamniedan  religion  is  iconoclastic.  Painting  and 
sculpture,  when  they  represent  any  living  creature, 
are  condemned.    Music  is  never  heard  in  a  INlosque. 

The  Christian  will  sometimes  be  cleanly  because 
he  thinks  that  it  conduces  to  his  health  and  com- 
fort. He  puts  cleanliness  next  to  godliness,  but 
does  not  associate  the  two  ideas  together.  The 
Moslem  will  be  cleanly  after  a  fasliion  because  his 
rehgion  enjoins  him  to  be  so. 

Turn  now  to  the  mental  and  moral  attributes 
of  the  two  races.  It  will  be  found  that  the  anti- 
theses are  striking. 

Sir  Alfred  Lyall  once  said  to  me :  "  Accuracy 
is  abhorrent  to  the  Oriental  mind.  Every  Anglo- 
Indian  official  should  always  remember  that 
maxim."  Want  of  accuracy,  which  easily  degen- 
erates into  untruthfuhiess,^  is,  in  fact,  the  main 
characteristic  of  the  Oriental  mind. 

The  European  is  a  close  reasoner ;  his  state- 
ments of  fact  are  devoid  of  ambiguity ;  he  is  a 
natural  logician,  albeit  he  may  not  have  studied 
logic ;  he  loves  symmetry  in  all  things ;  he  is  by 
nature  sceptical  and  requires  proof  before  he  can 
accept  the  truth  of  any  proposition ;  his  trained 
intelhgence  works  like  a  piece  of  mechanism.  The 
mind  of  the  Oriental,  on  the  other  hand,  hke 
his  picturesque  streets,  is  eminently  wanting  in 
symmetry.  His  reasoning  is  of  the  most  slip- 
shod description.  Although  the  ancient  Arabs 
acquired  in  a  somewhat  high  degree  the  science  of 

*  "  Pour  nous,  races  profondement  serieuses,  la  conviction  sig;nifie 
la  sincerite  avec  soi-mcme.  iMais  la  sincerite  avec  soi-meme  n'a  pas 
beaucoup  de  sens  cliez  les  peuples  Orieiitaux,  peu  habitue's  aux 
dc'licatesses  de  I'esprit  critique.  Bonne  foi  et  imposture  sont  des 
mots  qui,  dans  notre  conscience  riifide,  s'opposent  comme  deux  termes 
iuconciliables.  En  Orient,  il  y  a  de  I'un  a  I'autre  niille  fuites  et  mille 
detours.  ...  La  verito  matcrielle  a  tres  peu  de  prix  pour  rOrieiital ; 
il  voit  tout  a  travers  ses  prejuges,  sea  interets,  ses  passions." — ReuaUi 
Vie  de  Jeaus,  p.  263. 


cH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  147 

dialectics,^  their  descendants  are  singularly  deficient 
in  the  logical  faculty.  They  are  often  incapable 
of  drawing  the  most  obvious  conclusions  from  any 
simple  premises  of  which  they  may  admit  the  truth. 
Endeavour  to  elicit  a  plain  statement  of  facts 
from  an  ordinary  Egyptian.  His  explanation  will 
generally  be  lengthy,  and  wanting  in  lucidity.  He 
will  probably  contradict  himself  half-a-dozen  times 
before  he  has  finished  his  story.  He  will  often 
break  down  under  the  mildest  process  of  cross- 
exammation.  The  Egyptian  is  also  eminently 
unscepticaL  He  readily  becomes  the  dupe  of 
the  magician  and  the  astrologer.  Even  highly 
educated  Egyptians  are  prone  to  refer  the  com- 
mon occurrences  of  life  to  the  intervention  of 
some  supernatural  agency.  In  political  matters, 
as  well  as  in  the  affairs  of  everyday  life,  the 
Egyptian   will,    without    inquiry,    accept    as    true 

^  It  is  well  known  that  the  Arabs  of  the  eleventh  and  twelfth 
centuries  exercised  a  considerable  influence  on  European  thought  by 
their  teaching  of  the  Aristotelian  philosophy.  See,  inter  alia,  Milman's 
History  of  Latin  Christianity,  vol.  Lx.  ciii.  Also  Symonds'  Renaissance 
in  Italy,  p.  68.  Dante  (Inf.  c.  iv.  143)  speaks  of  Avicenna  and  of 
"  Avverroes,  che  '1  gran  commento  feo." 

Renan  (Averroes  et  l' Averroisme,  pp.  ii.  and  iii.)  makes  the  following 
remarks: — '' Les  Arabes  ne  firent  qu'adopter  I'ensemble  de  leucyclo- 
pedie  grecque  telle  que  le  monde  entier  I'avait  acceptee  vers  le  Vlleme 
et  le  Vllleme  siecle.  ...  La  philosophie  Arabe  oflre  I'exemple  a  peu 
pres  unique  d'une  tres  haute  culture  supprimee  presque  iustantanement 
sans  laisser  de  traces,  et  a  peu  pres  oubliee  du  peuple  qui  I'a  cre'ee. 
L'Islamisme  devoila  en  cette  circonstance  ce  qu'il  y  a  d'irremediable- 
«ient  etroit  dans  son  genie.  Le  Christianisme,  lui  aussi,  a  ete'  peu 
favorable  au  de'veloppement  de  la  science  positive ;  il  a  re'ussi  a 
I'arreter  en  Espagne  et  a  I'entraver  beaucoup  en  Italic,  mais  il  ne  I'a 
pas  etouffee,  et  meme  les  branches  les  plus  elevees  de  la  famille 
chretienne  ont  fini  par  se  recoucilier  avec  elle.  Incapable  de  se 
transformer  et  d'admettre  aucun  element  de  vie  civile  et  profane, 
rislamisme  arracha  de  son  sein  tout  genre  de  culture  rationelle. 
Cette  tendance  fatale  fut  combattue  tandis  que  rhe'ge'mouie  de 
rislamisme  resta  entre  les  mains  des  Arabes,  race  si  fine  et  si 
spirituelle,  ou  des  Persans,  race  tros  portee  a  la  speculation  ;  mais 
elle  regua  sans  contrepoids  depuis  que  des  barbares  (Turcs,  Berbers, 
etc.)  prirent  la  direction  de  I'lslam.  Le  monde  Musulman  eutra  des 
lors  dans  cette  periode  d'ignorante  brutalite,  d'ou  il  u'est  sorti  qua 
pour  tomber  dans  la  morne  agonie  ou  il  se  debat  sous  nos  yeux." 

Averroes  is,  of  course,  a  Sj)aiiisli  corruption  of  Ibu-Rushd. 


148  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  nr 

the  most  absurd  rumours.^  He  will,  indeed,  do 
more  than  this.  He  will  often  accept  or  reject 
such  rumours  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  their  prob- 
ability, for,  true  to  his  natural  inconsistency  and 
want  of  rational  discrimination,  he  will  occasionally 
develop  a  flash  of  hardy  scepticism  when  he  is 
asked  to  believe  the  truth. 

Contrast  again  the  talkative  European,  bursting 
with  superfluous  energy,  active  in  mind,  inquisitive 
about  everything  he  sees  and  hears,  chafing  under 
delay,  and  impatient  of  suffering,  with  the  grave 
and  silent  Eastern,  devoid  of  energy  and  initiative, 
stagnant  in  mind,  wanting  in  curiosity  about 
matters  which  are  new  to  him,  careless  of  waste 
of  time  and  patient  under  suffering. 

Or,  again,  look  at  the  fulsome  flattery,  which 
the  Oriental  will  offer  to  his  superior  and  expect 
to  receive  from  his  inferior,  and  compare  the 
general  approval  of  such  practices  with  the 
European  frame  of  mind,  which  spurns  both  the 
flatterer  and  the  person  who  invites  flattery.  This 
contemptible  flattery,  "the  nurse  of  crime,"  as  it 
was  called  by  the  poet  Gay,  is,  indeed,  a  thorn  in  the 
side  of  the  Englishman  in  Egypt,  for  it  prevents 
Khedives  and  Pashas  from  hearing  the  truth  from 
their  own  countrymen.* 

'  "The  note  of  the  primitive  mind  is  amazing  inaccuracy,  coupled 
with  wonderful  receptivity." — Lyall,  Asiatic  Studies,  Second  Series, 
p.  ]!)8. 

2  Tlie  extent  to  which  servile  flattery  may  be  carried  at  an  Oriental 
court  is  well  illustrated  by  the  account  ^iven  by  Creasy  (Ottoman  Turks, 
p.  2G1)  of  the  relations  between  Sultan  Ibrahim  (a. d.  1640-48)  and  his 
Grand  Viziers.  His  first  Vizier  was  Kara-Mustapha,  an  honest  M:.d 
couratjeous  man,  who  dared  to  tell  the  truth  to  his  Sovereiffn.  After 
a  short  career,  he  was  dismissed  from  office  and  strangled.  His 
successor,  Sultanzade  Pasha,  determined  not  to  err  on  the  side  of 
frankr.ess.  Even  Ibrahim,  who  was  one  of  the  worst  of  the  degenerate 
Sultans,  could  not  help  noticing  bis  servility.  "  How  is  it,"  he  said, 
"  that  thou  art  able  always  to  approve  of  my  actions,  whether  good  or 
evil?"  "My  Padishah!"  replied  the  Minister,  "thou  art  Khalif; 
thou  art  God's  shadow  upon  earth  Every  idea  which  thy  spirit  enter- 
tains is  a  revelation  from  Heaven.     Thy  orders,  even  when  they  appear 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  149 

Perhaps  there  is  no  point  as  to  which  the  differ- 
ence between  Eastern  and  Western  habits  of 
thought  comes  out  into  stronger  rehef  than  in  the 
views  which  are  respectively  entertained  by  the 
Oriental  and  the  European  as  regards  provision 
for  the  future  in  this  world.  The  European, 
especially  if  he  be  a  Frenchman,  is  usually 
economical,  and  his  economy  will  not  unfrequently 
degenerate  into  meanness.  He  will  pause  before 
he  gives  pledges  which,  whilst  providing  for  his 
immediate  wants,  may  embarrass  him  or  even 
reduce  Kim  to  penury  at  no  distant  date.  He  will 
usually  make  provision  for  his  old  age,  for  the 
wife,  who  may,  and  for  the  children,  who  probably 
will  survive  him.  The  Egyptian  generally  cares 
for  none  of  these  things.  He  takes  Httle  heed  for 
the  morrow  which  will  dawn  on  himself,  and  none 
for  the  days  which  are  in  store  for  those  whom 
he  will  leave  behind  him.  He  is,  perhaps,  un- 
consciously influenced  by  the  frame  of  mind 
engendered  in  himself  and  his  progenitors  from 
having  Uved  for  centuries  under  a  succession  of 
Governments,  which  afforded  no  security  to  the 
rights  of  property.^  Whether  he  occupies  the 
palace  or  the  mud  hut,  he  will  often  pledge  his 
future  with  scarcely  a  thought  of  how  his  pledges 
may  be  redeemed.  His  life  is  in  the  past  and 
in  the  present.  The  morrow  must  take  care  of 
the  things  of  itself. 

unreasonable,  have  an  innate  reasonableness,  which  thy  slave  ever 
reveres,  though  he  may  not  always  understand." 

Ibrahim^  Creasy  adds,  "  accepted  these  assurances  of  infallibility  and 
impeccability  ;  and  thenceforth  spoke  of  himself  as  divinely  inspired, 
in  the  midst  of  the  most  disgraceful  scenes  of  folly,  vice,  and  crime." 
He  was  eventually  deposed  and  murdered. 

*  Indications  are  not  wanting  that,  under  the  influence  of  good 
government,  the  improvident  habits  of  the  Egyptian  papulation  are 
being  sensibly  modified.  I  have  alluded  to  this  subject  several  times 
in  successive  Annual  Reports  in  connection  with  the  scheme  which  has 
been  introduced  with  a  view  to  lending  small  sums  to  the  fellaheen, 
and  thus  liberating  them  from  the  grip  of  the  village  usurers. 


150  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

But  these  same  habits  of  improvidence  tend 
perhaps  to  develop  a  quaHty  which  is  worthy  of 
praise.  The  Oriental  may  often  be  blamed  for 
prodigahty,  but  he  rarely  incurs  the  charge  of 
meanness.  He  is  charitable  to  his  neighbours,  and 
the  fact  may  be  recorded  to  his  advantage  without 
stopping  to  inquire  whether  his  charity  is  due  to 
kindliness  of  heart,  or  to  the  self-interest,  which 
impels  him,  at  the  dictates  of  his  religion,  to  lay 
up  riches  in  the  world  to  come.  Moreover,  the 
Oriental  is  proverbially  hospitable.  Indeed,  his 
hospitality  often  errs  on  the  side  of  being  too  la\ish. 

It  may  be  added,  whilst  on  the  subject  of  kind- 
hness  of  heart,  that  the  cruelty  to  animals,  which 
so  often  shocks  Wsitors  to  Egy^pt,  is  no  worse  than 
that  which  may  be  ^^^tnessed  amongst  Christian 
nations  in  the  south  of  Europe,  and  is  probably, 
as  Lane  observed  in  1835,  not  a  plant  of  indigenous 
growth,  but  is  rather  due  to  association  with  low- 
class  Europeans.  The  JNIoslem  religion  enjoins 
kindness  to  animals.  "  There  is  no  religion  which 
has  taken  a  higher  view  in  its  authoritative  docu- 
ments of  animal  life.  '  There  is  no  beast  on  earth,' 
says  the  Koran,  '  nor  bird  which  flieth  with  wings, 
but  the  same  is  a  people  like  unto  you, — unto  the 
Lord  shall  they  return.'  "  ^ 

Passing  on  to  the  consideration  of  another  differ- 
ence between  the  Oriental  and  the  European, 
which  will  prove  a  perpetual  stumbling-block  to 
the  Englishman  in  Egypt,  it  is  to  be  observed  that 
the  ways  of  the  Oriental  are  tortuous ;  his  love  of 
intrigue  is  inveterate  ;  centuries  of  despotic  govern- 
ment, during  which  his  race  has  been  exposed  to 
the  unbridled  violence  of  capricious  and  headstrong 
Governors,  have  led  him  to  fall  back  on  the  natural 
defence  of  the  weak  against  the  strong.  He 
reposes  unlimited   faith   in  his  own  cunning,  and 

*  Bosworth  Smith,  Mohammed  and  Mohammedanism,  p.  255. 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  151 

to  some  extent  his  chosen  weapon  will  stand  him 
in  good  stead.  But  its  employment  will  widen  the 
breach  between  him  and  his  protectors,  for  fate 
has  willed  that  the  Egyptians  should  be  more 
especially  associated  with  those  members  of  the 
European  family  who,  perhaps  more  than  any 
others,  loathe  and  despise  intrigue ;  who,  in  their 
dealings  with  their  fellow-men,  are  frank  and  blunt, 
even  at  times  to  brutality ;  and  who,  though  not 
difficult  to  beguile,  are  apt  unexpectedly  to  turn 
round  and  smite  those  who  have  beguiled  them  so 
hardly  as  to  crush  them  to  the  dust.  From  this 
point  of  view,  one  of  the  more  subtle  Latin  races, 
had  it  occupied  the  predominant  position  held 
by  the  English  in  Egypt,  would  probably  have  had 
more  sympathy  with  the  weaknesses  of  Egyptian 
character  than  the  Anglo-Saxon. 

Look,  agam,  to  the  high  powers  of  organisation 
displayed  by  the  European,  to  his  constant  endea- 
vours to  bend  circumstances  to  suit  his  will,  and 
to  his  tendency  to  question  the  acts  of  his  superiors 
unless  he  happens  to  agree  with  them,  a  tendency 
which  is  especially  marked  in  Englishmen,  and 
which  is  only  kept  in  subjection  by  the  trained 
and  intelKgent  discipline  resulting  from  education. 
Compare  these  attributes  with  the  feeble  organising 
powers  of  the  Oriental,  with  his  fatalism  which 
accepts  the  inevitable,  and  with  his  submissiveness 
to  all  constituted  authority. 

And  if  it  be  held  that  powers  of  organisation 
are  only  required  amongst  the  educated  classes, 
look  to  what,  for  want  of  a  more  appropriate  term 
to  express  the  idea,  may  be  called  the  general 
muddle -headedness  of  the  ordinary  uneducated 
Egyptian,  of  which  a  few  instances  may  be  given. 

On  more  than  one  occasion,  a  pointsman  in  the 
Eg}^tian  railway  service  has  been  known  to  turn 
his  points  when  the  passing  train  had  been  half 


152  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

transferred  from  one  line  to  the  other,  with  the 
natural  result  that  the  train  was  upset.  A  n  Egyp- 
tian engine-driver  has  been  known  to  forget  which 
handle  to  turn  in  order  to  stop  his  locomotive. 
On  several  occasions,  railway  employes  have 
been  killed  owing  to  their  having  gone  to  sleep 
with  their  heads  on  the  rail,  that  special  position 
having  been  adopted  in  order  to  ensure  their 
being  awakened  by  the  noise  of  an  approaching 
train.  A  European  would  think  that,  where  a 
road  and  a  paved  side-walk  existed,  it  required  no 
great  effort  of  the  reasoning  faculty  to  perceive 
that  human  beings  were  intended  to  pass  along  the 
side- walk,  and  animals  along  the  road.  The  point 
is  not  always  so  clear  to  the  Egyptian.  He  will 
not  unfrequently  walk  in  the  middle  of  the  road,  and 
will  send  his  donkey  along  the  side-path.  Instances 
of  this  sort  might  be  multiplied.  Compare  the 
habits  of  thought  which  can  lead  to  actions  of 
this  nature  with  the  promptitude  with  which  the 
European  seizes  on  an  idea  when  it  is  presented 
to  him,  and  acts  as  occasion  may  demand. 

Then,  again,  side  by  side  with  the  European's 
appreciation  of  arithmetic,  consider  that  in  all 
matters  connected  with  number  or  quantity,  the 
ordinary  Egyptian  goes  hopelessly  astray.  Few 
uneducated  Egyptians  know  their  own  age.  The 
usual  reply  of  an  Egyptian,  if  asked  the  age  of 
some  old  man,  is  that  he  is  a  hundred  years  old. 
What  importance,  he  thinks,  can  be  attached  to 
precision  about  a  matter  of  this  sort,  or,  indeed, 
to  any  scientific  or  quasi -scientific  subject  ?  I 
once  asked  a  former  head  of  the  El-Azhar  Uni- 
versity whether  his  professors  taught  that  the  sun 
went  round  the  earth  or  the  earth  round  the  sun. 
He  replied  that  he  was  not  sure,  that  one  nation 
thought  one  way,  and  another  another  way, — 
his  natural  politeness  possibly  forbidding  him  to 


cH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  153 

express  to  me  what  he  really  thought  of  the  infidels 
Kepler  and  Copernicus  and  their  doctrines, — that 
his  general  impressioti  was  that  the  sun  went  round 
the  earth,  but  that  he  had  never  paid  much  atten- 
tion to  the  matter,  and  that  the  subject  was  too 
unimportant  to  merit  serious  discussion.  Tell  an 
Egyptian  cook  that  he  puts  too  much  salt  into  the 
soup.  He  will  abstain  altogether  from  the  use  of 
salt.  Or,  on  the  other  hand,  tell  him  that  he  does 
not  use  salt  enough ;  he  will  throw  in  a  bucketful. 
He  cannot  hit  the  happy  mean  ;  moderation  in  the 
use  of  salt,  or  in  anything  else,  is  foreign  to  his 
nature ;  he  cannot  grasp  the  idea  of  quantity. 
Again,  ask  an  Arab  from  the  Soudan  how  many 
men  were  killed  at  one  of  the  numerous  battles 
which  have  taken  place  in  that  country.  The  only 
thing  which  is  certain  is  that  he  will  not  state  the 
precise  truth,  or  anything  near  it,  except  by 
accident.  Neither  will  he  reply  that  he  cannot 
answer  the  question  addressed  to  him.  He  will, 
without  hesitation,  blurt  out  the  first  conjecture, 
which  flashes  across  his  brain,  as  a  fact  coming 
within  his  personal  knowledge.  He  may  say  100, 
or  he  mi-y  say  2000.  He  has  a  very  faint  concep- 
tion of  what  either  figure  represents,  and  he  will 
be  prepared  to  bring  the  original  100  up  to  2000, 
or  the  original  2000  down  to  100,  according  to  the 
views  which,  by  the  light  of  subsequent  conversa- 
tion, would  appear  gratifying  to  his  interrogator. 

Again,  consider  the  manners  of  the  Oriental  as 
contrasted  with  those  of  the  European.  We  hear 
a  great  deal  in  praise  of  Oriental  courtesy,  and  the 
praise  is  in  some  respects  well  deserved.  A  high- 
class  European  will  be  charmed  with  the  manners 
of  a  high-class  Oriental,  albeit  he  is  aware  that  the 
exaggerated  compliments  common  in  the  East  are 
merely  figurative,  and  caimot  be  taken  to  represent 
the  real  sentiments  of  the  speaker.      But  look  a 


154  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

little  deeper  and  examine  the  ground  on  which 
these  outward  forins  of  courtesy  are  based.  The 
examination  will  bring  out  a  somewhat  unpleasant 
feature  of  the  Egyptian  character.  For  one  of  the 
main  reasons  why  an  Egj^tian,  if  he  is  in  any 
position  of  authority,  is  courteous  is  that  he  thinks 
it  his  interest  to  be  so.  In  spite  of  this  outside 
courtesy  to  his  superiors,  he  will  not  unfrequently 
be  harsh  and  tyrannical  to  his  inferiors,  to  whose 
feelings  and  interests  he  is  often  indifferent.  There 
are,  however,  exceptions.  Slaves  are  more  often 
treated  with  kmdness  than  severity,  although  in 
this  case  motives  of  self-interest  may  perhaps  be 
traced.  Amongst  the  middle  and  lower  classes 
of  Egyptians  a  spirit  of  real  courtesy,  not  based 
on  self-interest,  is  often  to  be  found  in  their 
hospitality  towards  strangers.  JNIoreover,  among 
equals  of  all  classes,  the  outward  forms  of  courtesy 
are  preserved. 

These  points  have  been  indicated  at  some 
length  because  the  differences  between  Eastern 
and  Western  habits  of  thought  constitute  a  barrier 
interposed  between  the  Egj^tian  and  the  Eng- 
lishman almost  as  great  as  that  resulting  from 
differences  of  religion,  ideas  of  government,  and 
social  customs.  Indeed,  this  difference  of  mental 
attributes  constitutes  perhaps  the  greatest  of  all 
banders.  It  prevents  the  Englishman  and  the 
Egyptian  from  understanding  each  other.  Never- 
theless, there  is  one  saving  clause,  which  serves  in 
some  respects  as  a  bond  of  union  between  the  two 
races.  Once  explain  to  an  Egyptian  what  he  is  to 
do,  and  he  will  assimilate  the  idea  rapidly.  He 
is  a  good  imitator,  and  will  make  a  faithful,  even 
sometimes  a  too  servile  copy  of  the  work  of  his 
European  teacher.  His  civilisation  may  be  a 
veneer,  yet  he  will  readily  adopt  the  letter,  the 
catchwords     and    jargon,    if    not     the    spirit    of 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  155 

European  administrative  systems.  His  movements 
will,  it  is  true,  be  not  unfrequently  those  of  an 
automaton,  but  a  skilfully  constructed  automaton 
may  do  a  great  deal  of  usefid  work.  This  feature 
in  the  Egyptian  character  is  of  great  importance  in 
connection  with  the  administration  of  the  country. 
It  is  a  source  of  strength,  and  also  a  source  of 
weakness ;  for,  so  long  as  British  supervision  is 
maintained,  the  Egyptian  will  readily  copy  the  prac- 
tices and  procedures  of  his  English  teachers.  No 
necessity  mil,  therefore,  arise  for  employing  any 
large  number  of  English  subordinates.  On  the 
other  hand,  inasmuch  as  the  Egyptian  has  but  Uttle 
power  of  initiation,  and  often  does  not  thoroughly 
grasp  the  reasons  why  his  teachers  have  impelled 
him  in  certain  directions,  a  relapse  will  ensue  if 
English  supervision  be  withdrawn. 

Look  now  to  the  consequences  which  result 
from  the  degradation  of  women  in  JNlohammedan 
countries.  In  respect  to  two  points,  both  of  which 
are  of  vital  importance,  there  is  a  radical  difference 
between  the  position  of  Moslem  women  and  that 
of  their  European  sisters.  In  the  first  place,  the 
face  of  the  Moslem  woman  is  veiled  when  she 
appears  in  public.  She  lives  a  life  of  seclusion. 
The  face  of  the  European  woman  is  exposed  to 
view  in  public.  The  only  restraints  placed  on  her 
movements  are  those  dictated  by  her  own  sense 
of  propriety.  In  the  second  place,  the  East  is 
polygamous,  the  West  is  monogamous. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  seclusion  of 
women  exercises  a  baneful  effect  on  Eastern 
society.  The  arguments  on  this  subject  are, 
indeed,  so  commonplace  that  it  is  unnecessary  to 
dwell  on  them.  It  will  be  sufRcient  to  say  that 
seclusion,  by  confining  the  sphere  of  woman's 
interest  to  a  very  limited  horizon,  cramps  the 
intellect  and  witliers  the  mental  development  of 


156  MODERN  EGVrT  pt.  iv 

oiie-lialf  of  the  population  in  Moslem  coinitries. 
"  An  Englishwoman  asked  an  Egyptian  lady  how 
she  passed  her  time.  *  I  sit  on  this  sofa,'  she 
answered,  '  and  when  I  am  tired,  I  cross  over  and 
sit  on  that.'"^  Moreover,  inasmuch  as  women, 
in  their  capacities  as  wives  and  mothers,  exer- 
cise a  great  influence  over  the  characters  of  their 
husbands  and  sons,  it  is  obvious  that  the  seclusion 
of  women  must  produce  a  deteriorating  effect  on 
the  male  population,  in  whose  presumed  interests 
the  custom  was  originally  established,  and  is  still 
maintained. 

When  an  Egyptian  woman  interferes  in  politics, 
her  interference  is  almost  always  mischievous. 
The  information  she  obtains  is  necessarily  com- 
municated to  her  through  a  variety  of  distorted 
media.  The  fact  of  her  seclusion  renders  it  well- 
nigh  impossible  for  her  to  hear  both  sides  of  a 
question.  The  most  trumpery  gossip  will  be 
sufficient  to  set  her  suspicions  ablaze,  and  to  con- 
vince her  that  some  danger,  which  is  often 
imaginary,  hangs  over  the  head  of  herself  or  her 
relatives.  Ignorance  of  any  world  beyond  that  of 
the  harem  renders  it  impossible  for  her  to  dis- 
criminate between  truth  and  falsehood,  between 
what  is  within  the  bounds  of  possibility  and  what 
is  so  manifestly  absurd  as  to  be  impossible. 

I  need  not  dwell  on  the  causes  which,  in  Egypt, 
as  in  other  Oriental  countries,  have  led  to  the 
seclusion  of  women,  nor  on  the  extent  to  which 
this  practice  is  due  to  the  prevalence  of  the 
Mohammedan  religion.^  From  the  point  of  view  of 
the  politician  and  administrator,  the  consideration 
of  these  questions,  interesting  though  they  be,  is 

'  Cairo,  p.  140. 

^  "  The  system  of  the  harem  is,  in  its  orifrin,  not  Moslem,  but  simply 
Oriental.  The  only  reproach  that  can  be  made  ag-ainst  thj  Prophet  la 
that,  by  too  definite  legislation,  he  rendered  subi^equeut  development 
and  reform  impossible." — Turkey  in  Europe,  p.  190. 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  157 

of  little  more  than  academic  interest.  I  am  not 
endeavouring  in  this  work  to  discuss  the  effects 
of  Islamism  upon  progress  and  civilisation  in 
general.  My  task  is  of  a  more  humble  nature. 
I  am  merely  attempting  to  describe  the  state  of 
things  which  the  English  found  in  existence  when 
they  took  in  hand  the  rehabilitation  of  Egypt. 
Amongst  other  social  difficulties  it  has,  therefore, 
to  be  noted  that  Moslem  women  in  Egypt  are 
secluded,  and  that  their  influence,  partly  by  reason 
of  their  seclusion,  is,  in  all  political  and  adminis- 
trative matters,  generally  bad. 

The  effects  of  polygamy  are  more  baneful  and 
far-reaching  than  those  of  seclusion.  The  whole 
fabric  of  European  society  rests  upon  the  preserva- 
tion of  family  life.  Monogamy  fosters  family  life, 
polygamy  destroys  it.  The  monogamous  Christian 
respects  women ;  the  teaching  of  his  religion  and 
the  incidents  of  his  religious  worship  tend  to 
elevate  them.  He  sees  in  the  Virgin  Mary  an 
ideal  of  womanhood,  which  would  be  incompre- 
hensible in  a  Moslem  country.^  The  Moslem,  on 
the  other  hand,  despises  women ;  both  his  religion 
and  the  example  of  his  Prophet,  the  history  of 
whose  private  life  has  been  handed  down  to  him, 
tend  to  lower  them  in  his  eyes.  Save  in  excep- 
tional cases,  the  Christian  fulfils  the  vow  which 
he  has  made  at  the  altar  to  cleave  to  his  wedded 
wife  for  life.  The  Moslem,  when  his  passion  is 
sated,  can  if  he  likes  throw  off"  his  wife  like 
an  old  glove.     According  to   the   Sunnis,  whose 

*  See  Lecky,  History  of  European  Morals,  vol.  ii.  p.  367.  No 
Moslem  could  appreciate  the  beauty  of  Wordsworth's  sonnet  on  the 
Virgin : — 

Thy  image  falls  to  earth.     Yet  some,  I  ween. 
Not  unforgiven  tlie  suppliant  knee  might  bend 
As  to  a  visible  Power,  in  which  did  blend 
All  that  was  mixed  and  reconciled  in  thee. 
Of  Mother's  love  with  maiden  purity. 
Of  high  with  low,  celestial  with  terrene. 


158  ISIODERN  EGYPT  rx.  iv 

doctrines  are  quoted  because  the  Egyptians  are 
Sunnis,  "  A  husband  may  divorce  his  wife  without 
any  misbehaviour  on  her  part,  or  without  assigning 
any  cause.  The  divorce  of  every  husband  is 
effective  if  he  be  of  sound  understanding  and  of 
mature  age."  ^  There  is,  however,  a  good  deal  of 
difference  of  opinion  amongst  legal  authorities 
as  to  the  law  of  divorce.^  The  general  principle 
inculcated  by  JVIohammed  on  this  subject  is  thus 
explained  in  the  Traditions :  *'  The  thing  which 
is  lawful,  but  disliked  by  God,  is  divorce."'  The 
practice  of  monogamy  has  of  late  years  been 
gaining  ground  amongst  the  more  enlightened 
Egyptians.  The  late  and  the  present  Khedive, 
the  late  Chdrif  Pasha,  and  Riaz  Pasha  may  be 
cited  as  monogamous  notabilities.  The  movement 
in  this  direction  may  be  attributed  to  several  causes. 
In  the  first  place,  education  and  association  with 
Europeans  may  have  induced  the  conviction  that 
it  is  more  respectable,  and  generally  more  con- 
ducive to  domestic  happiness,  to  marry  one  wife 
rather  than  to  take  advantage  of  the  permission 
granted  by  Mohammed  to  "  marry  what  seems  good 
to  you  of  women,  by  twos,  or  threes,  or  fours,  or 
what  your  right  hand  possesses  "  {Surah,  iv.  3). 
In  the  second  place,  polygamy  is  expensive.  Lane 
said,  so  long  ago  as  1835,  "  I  believe  that  not  more 
than  one  husband  among  twenty  has  two  wives,"  * 
and  since  Lane's  time,  the  practice  of  polygamy 
has  certainly  diminished.  Nevertheless,  the  move- 
ment in  favour  of  monogamy  caimot  be  as  yet 
called  general.  The  first  thing  an  Egyptian  of 
the  lower  classes  will  do  when  he  gets  a  little 
money  is  to  marry  a  second  wife.     A  groom  in 

*  Dictionary  of  Islam,  p.  88. 

'  This  question  is  fully  discussed  by  Syed  Ameer  Ali  in  his  PersoruU 
Law  of  the  Mohammedans,  chapters  xi.-xiii. 

*  Dictionary  of  Islam,  p.  87. 

*  Modem  Egyptians,  vol.  i.  p.  231, 


UH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  159 

my  stables  was  divorced  and  re -married  eleven 
times  in  the  course  of  a  year  or  two.  I  remember 
hearing  of  an  old  Pasha  who  complained  pee\'ishly 
that  he  had  to  go  to  the  funeral  of  his  first  wife,  to 
whom  he  had  been  married  forty  years  previously, 
and  whose  very  existence  he  had  forgotten.  The 
great  facility  given  to  divorce  necessarily  weakens 
the  strength  of  the  family  tie.  Further,  in  the 
West,  a  wife,  whose  personal  attractions  have  dis- 
appeared under  the  hand  of  time,  can  often,  in 
default  of  other  influences,  maintain  her  hold  over 
her  husband's  affections  through  the  children  which 
she  has  borne  to  him. 

Femina  quum  senuit,  retinet  connubia  partu, 
Uxorisque  decus  matris  reverentia  pensat. 

The  hold  which  the  discarded  or  neglected  Moslem 
wife  might  maintain  on  grounds  such  as  these  is 
weakened  by  the  presence  of  younger  and  more 
attractive  rivals,  who  have  perhaps  borne  other 
children  to  her  husband. 

Amongst  other  consequences  resulting  from 
polygamy  and  the  customs  which  cluster  round 
polygamy,  it  may  be  noted  that,  whereas  in  the 
West  the  elevation  of  women  has  tended  towards 
the  refinement  both  of  hterature  and  of  con- 
versation, in  the  East  their  degradation  has 
encouraged  hterary  and  conversational  coarseness. 
This  coarseness  has  attracted  the  attention  of 
all  who  have  written  on  Egyptian  manners  and 
customs.^  It  is  true  that  the  Moslem  may  fairly 
argue  that  he  started  600  years  later  than  the 
Christian  in  the  race  to  attain  civilisation,  and  that, 
apart  from  the  English  dramatists  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  the  writmgs  of  Boccaccio  and  of 
Rabelais  denote  a  state  of  society  no  more  refined 
than  that  which  at  present  exists  in  Egypt ;  and 

*  Lane's  Modem  Egyptians,  vol.  i.  pp.  260  and  273. 


160  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

he  may  use  this  argument  with  all  the  greater 
reason  inasmuch  as  the  class  of  humour  which 
finds  most  favour  in  Egyptian  society  is  very 
much  akin  to  that  which  we  may  now  read  in  the 
Decameron.  But,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  the  Decameron  is  a  model  of 
refinement  as  compared  mth  many  works  in 
Arabic ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  it  may  be 
doubted  whether,  even  in  the  INIiddle  Ages,  the 
general  coarseness  of  European  society  was  ever 
on  a  par  with  that  of  the  modern  Egyptians. 

There  is,  however,  one  feature  in  connection  with 
family  life  in  the  East,  where  the  Oriental  contrasts 
very  favourably  with  the  European.  "  Paradise," 
the  Prophet  finely  said,  "lies  under  the  feet  of 
mothers."  Greater  outward  respect  is,  in  fact, 
shown  to  parents,  and  to  old  age  in  general, 
by  Eastern  than  by  Western  races.  "  Thou 
shalt  rise  up  before  the  hoary  head  and  honour 
the  face  of  the  old  man  and  fear  thy  God." 
Egyptians  have  from  time  immemorial  acted  on 
this  Levitical  principle.  Herodotus  says  :  "  Their 
(the  Egyptian)  young  men  when  they  meet  their 
elders  in  the  streets,  give  way  to  them  and  step 
aside ;  and  if  an  elder  man  comes  in  where  young 
men  are  present,  these  latter  rise  from  their  seats."^ 
Young  Egyptians  generally  respect  and  obey  their 
parents  and  are  well  treated  by  them,  unless, 
indeed,  both  parents  and  children  occupy  very 
high  positions,  in  which  case,  the  principle  laid 
down  by  the  Prophet  Micah  rather  than  that 
prescribed  by  Moses  forms  the  basis  of  the  family 
connection :  "A  man's  enemies  are  the  men  of  his 
own  house." 

Consider  also  the  different  standpoints  from 
which  the  European  and  the  Oriental  approach 
the  subject  of  government. 

^  Book  ii.  chapter  132, 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  161 

The  point  of  view  of  the  Eastern  is  wholly 
different  from  that  of  the  Western.  I  speak,  of 
course,  of  the  true  Eastern,  free  from  European 
alloy  ;  for  when  once  the  Eastern,  and  notably  the 
E'^yptian,  has  been  semi  -  Europeanised,  he  will 
often  develop  with  amazing  rapidity  into  a  root- 
and  -  branch  reformer.  He  will  not  understand 
moderation  in  reform  any  more  than  the  Egyptian 
cook,  who  was  recently  mentioned,  will  under- 
stand moderation  in  the  use  of  salt.  The  true 
Eastern  is  a  staunch  conservative.  He  would 
probably  look  upon  an  Oriental  Lord  Eldon  as  a 
rash  innovator.  European  affairs  appear  to  him 
to  be  in  a  constant  state  of  flux  ;  his  frame  of 
mind  is  fitly  represented  by  Matthew  Arnold's 
fine  lines : — 

The  East  bowed  low  before  the  blast 
In  patient  deep  disdain  ; 
She  let  the  legions  thunder  past, 
And  plunged  in  thought  again. 

The  mind  of  the  true  Eastern  is  at  once  lethargic 
and  suspicious ;  he  does  not  want  to  be  reformed,  and 
he  is  convinced  that,  if  the  European  wishes  to  re- 
form him,  the  desire  springs  from  sentiments  which 
bode  him  no  good.  Moreover,  his  conservatism 
is  due  to  an  instinct  of  self-preservation,  and  to 
a  dim  perception  that,  if  he  allows  himself  to  be 
even  slightly  reformed,  all  the  things  to  which  he 
attaches  importance  will  be  not  merely  changed  in 
this  or  that  particular,  but  will  rather  be  swept  off 
the  face  of  the  earth.  Perhaps  he  is  not  far  wrong. 
Although  there  are  many  highly-educated  gentle- 
men who  profess  the  Moslem  religion,  it  has  yet 
to  be  proved  that  Islam  can  assimilate  civilisation 
without  succumbing  in  the  process.  It  is,  indeed, 
not  improbable  that,  in  its  passage  through  the 
European  crucible,  many  of  the  distinctive  features 

VOL.  II  M 


162  MODERN  EGYPT  rr  rv 

of  Islam,  the  good  alike  with  the  bad,  will  be 
volatilised,  and  that  it  will  eventually  issue  forth 
in  a  form  scarcely  capable  of  recognition.  "  The 
Egyptians,"  JNloses  said,  "whom  ye  have  seen  to-day, 
ye  shall  see  them  again  no  more  for  ever."  ^  The 
prophecy  may  be  approaching  fulfilment  in  a  sense 
different  to  that  in  which  it  was  addressed  to  the 
TsraeUtes. 

Look,  moreover,  not  only  to  the  spirit  of  the 
lawgivers,  but  to  the  general  principles  on  which 
the  laws  are  based.  The  tendency  in  all  civilised 
European  States  is  to  separate  religious  from  civil 
laws.  In  Moslem  States,  on  the  other  hand, 
religious  and  civil  laws  are  inextricably  mterwoven. 

In  the  AVest,  the  law  recognises  and  encourages 
the  use  of  credit,^  and  protects  the  creditor.  It 
may  be  remarked  incidentally  that,  in  respect  to 
this  point  perhaps  more  than  any  other,  the 
ignorant  and  improvident  Egyptian  suffered  when 
the  Code  Napoleon,  like  a  Juggernaut's  car,  passed 
over  his  back.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Moslem 
law  condemns  usury,  and  thus  discourages  the 
outlay  of  capital.^  The  lax  Egyptian  Moslem  is 
obliged  to  have  recourse  to  all  sorts  of  subter- 
fuges in  order  to  lend  money  without  violating 
the  letter  of  the  law.  The  presence  of  the  Chris- 
tian usurer,  with  whom  it  is  at  times  possible 
for  the  Moslem  to  form  an  unnatural  alliance 
based  on  a  community  of  interest,  facilitates 
subterfuges  of  this  sort. 

Again,  in  the  East  the  theory  and  practice  that 
the  Government  is  the  sole  proprietor  of  tlie  soil 
survives   to   a  certain   extent.     In  the  West,  on 

1  Exodus  xiv.  13. 

*  It  should,  however,  be  remembered  that,  during-  the  Middle  Ages, 
the  Christian  Church  exerted  its  influence  against  usury,  with  the 
result  that  the  money-lending  business  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Jews. 

'  'ITie  Moslem  depositors  in  the  Government  Savings  fiauks  often 
decline  to  accept  interest  on  their  deposits. 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  163 

the  other  hand,  the  theory  has  been  well-nigh  for- 
gotten, and  the  practice  no  longer  survives.  Save 
in  the  least  civilised  portions  of  Europe,^  land  is 
held  to  be  the  private  property  of  individuals. 

So  also  as  regards  criminal  laws,  tlie  differences 
are  striking.  The  Moslem  code  is  based  upon  the 
principle,  long  since  abandoned  in  the  V^^est,  that 
it  is  the  business  of  the  State  to  oblige  its  citizens 
to  be  religious  and  moral.  A  sentence  of  death 
for  blasphemy  could  not,  of  course,  at  present  be 
carried  out,  but  a  case  occurred  in  Egypt,  shice 
the  British  occupation,  of  a  man  who  received 
eighty  blows  with  a  courbash,  under  sentence 
from  the  Kadi,  for  smoking  a  cigarette  in  the 
streets  during  the  Ramazan  fast.  In  general 
also,  Oriental  punishments  are  cruel,^  whilst  Euro- 
pean punishments  are  mild.  This  fact  tends 
towards  brutalising  the  population  and  rendering 
them  cruel  to  each  other. 

Compare,  again,  the  languages,  art,  architecture, 
and  music  of  the  Oriental  with  those  of  the  Euro- 
pean. It  will  be  found  that  on  almost  every 
point  the  practices  and  the  tastes  of  the  one  are 
opposed  to  those  of  the  other. 

Oriental  alphabets  are  intricate.  The  Turk,  the 
Arab,  and  the  Persian  begin  to  write  on  the  right 
side  of  the  page ;  the  short  vowels  are  almost 
always  omitted.  European  alphabets,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  simple.  The  Eiu'opean  begins  to  write 
on  the  left-hand  side  of  the  page. 

Orientals  continue  to  copy  from  one  style  of  art. 
European  art  is  various  and  constantly  develops 
new  forms. 

Oriental  music,  which  is  much  the  same  in  all 
parts   of  the   East,   is   wanting   in    harmony   and 

1  See  Sir  Donald  Mackenzie  Wallace's  Russia. 

2  Moltke,  who  wrote  in  183G,  says  (Bric/h,  etc.,  in  der  Tiirkei,  p.  iiCy) 
that  lie  had  been  a  personal  witness  of  the  barbarous  puuishnieut 
inflicted  in  Turkey  on  uufailhful  wives. 


164  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

monotonous  to  the  ears  of  most  Europeans.^ 
European  music,  on  the  other  hand,  generally 
fails  to  please  Orientals. 

Turn,  again,  to  the  most  ordinary  customs  and 
expressions,  the  dress,  etc.,  of  the  Oriental  as  com- 
pared with  the  European.  It  will  be  found  that, 
even  in  the  most  trivial  matters,  the  Oriental  will 
generally  do  or  say  the  opposite  to  what  the 
European  would  do  or  say  under  similar  circum- 
stances. Numerous  instances  in  point  will  readily 
occur  to  any  one  who  has  even  a  slight  acquaint- 
ance with  Eastern  social  life. 

The  ethnologist,  the  comparative  philologist, 
and  the  sociologist  would  possibly  be  able  to  give 
explanations  as  regards  many  of  the  differences 
which  exist  between  the  East  and  the  West.  As  I 
am  only  a  diplomatist  and  an  administrator,  whose 
proper  study  is  also  man,  but  from  the  point  of 
view  of  governing  him  rather  than  from  that  of 
scientific  research  into  how  he  comes  to  be  what  he 
is,  I  content  myself  with  noting  the  fact  that  some- 
how or  other  the  Oriental  generally  acts,  speaks, 
and  thinks  in  a  manner  exactly  opposite  to  the 
European.  "  Tout,  chez  ce  peuple,  porte  Fempreinte 
d'un  contraste  frappant  avec  les  habitudes  des 
nations  Europeennes.  Cette  difference  est  I'ouvrage 
du  cUmat,  des  institutions  civiles  et  des  pr^jug^s 
reHgieux."  ^ 

Many  of  the  observations  contained  in  this 
chapter  may  be  considered  commonplace.  Nothing, 
indeed,  has  been  stated  which  will  be  new  to  tliose 
who  have  paid  attention  to  Eastern  affairs,  or  who 
are  in  any  degree  familiar  with  the  social  life  of  the 
East.  I  have,  however,  thought  it  desirable  to 
make  a  catalogue — and,  I  may  add,  a  very  incom- 

*  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  from  the  earliest  times  the  Arabs  have 
taken  extreme  delight  in  their  own  music.  See  Krenier's  CulturycAchichte 
des  Orients,  vol.  i.  p.  149.  '^  Description  de  f  Eyypte,  p.  83- 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  105 

plete  catalogue — of  the  main  points  as  to  which 
Egyptian  and  European  habits  of  thought  and 
customs  diverge,  for,  although  each  detail  taken  by 
itself  may  be  well  known,  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  even  those  Englishmen  who  have  been 
actively  engaged  in  the  work  of  Egyptian  adminis- 
tration have  always  recognised  to  the  full  that,  in 
taking  in  hand  Egyptian  reform,  they  had  to  deal 
with  a  society  which  was  not  only  in  a  backward 
state  of  civilisation,  but  which  was  also,  from  their 
point  of  view,  well-nigh  incomprehensible.  They 
were  brought  face  to  face  with  a  population  which, 
in  the  eyes  of  the  European,  was,  morally  and 
politically  speaking,  walking  on  its  head.  Lord 
Dalling,  at  one  time  Ambassador  at  Constantinople, 
is  credited  with  saying :  "  When  you  wish  to  know 
what  a  Turkish  official  is  likely  to  do,  first  consider 
what  it  would  be  his  interest  to  do  ;  next,  what  any 
other  man  would  do  in  similar  circumstances  ;  and 
thirdly,  what  every  one  expects  him  to  do.  When 
you  have  ascertained  these,  you  are  so  far  advanced 
on  your  road  that  you  may  be  perfectly  certain  he 
will  not  adopt  any  of  these  courses."  Often  have  I 
thought  that  an  Egyptian  would  take  a  certain 
view  of  a  question  based  on  my  idea  of  the  manner 
in  which  he  would  interpret  either  his  own  or 
Egyptian  interests.  And  often  have  I  found  that 
he  interpreted  those  interests  in  some  strange  and 
fanciful  manner,  which  would  never  have  entered 
into  the  head  of  any  European. 

All  these  considerations,  however,  affected  the 
Englishman  but  slightly  when,  in  1882,  he  under- 
took the  regeneration  of  Egypt.  When  it  is 
remembered  that,  in  addition  to  the  difficulties 
arising  from  the  causes  to  which  allusion  is  made  in 
this  chapter,  the  country  had,  for  at  least  a  century 
previous  to  1882,  been  governed  under  a  system 
which  exhibited  the  extremes  of  savage  cruelty  and 


1C6  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

barbarity ;  ^  that  the  impulse  towards  ci\ihsation 
%st  imparted,  and  not  unintelhgently  imparted  by 
the  rough  men  of  genius  who  founded  the  Khedivial 
dynasty,  was  continued  on  principles,  which  may 
almost  be  characterised  as  insane,  by  the  incapable 
Said,  and  the  spendthrift  Ismail ;  that  under  their 
auspices  all  that  was  least  creditable  to  European 
civilisation  was  attracted  to  Egypt,  on  wdiose  carcase 
swarms  of  needy  adventurers  preyed  at  will ;  that,  as 
a  consequence  of  these  proceedings,  the  very  name 
of  European  stank  in  the  nostrils  of  the  Egyptian 
population ;  that  w^iatever  European  ideas  had 
taken  root  in  the  country  had  been  imported  from 
France  ;  that  the  French  Government  and  French 
public  opinion  w^ere  at  the  outset  bitterly  opposed 
to  the  action  of  England  in  Egj^t ;  that,  through 
the  medium  of  an  unscrupulous  press.  Englishmen 
were  vilified  and  their  actions  systematically  misre- 
presented ;  that,  under  the  pressure  of  Europe  and 
the  European  creditors  of  Egypt,  a  variety  of  com- 
pUcated  institutions  had  been  created  which  were 
in  advance  of  the  requirements  and  state  of  civilisa- 
tion of  the  country ;  that  the  Treasury  was  well- 
nigh  bankrupt ;  that  the  army  had  been  disbanded  ; 
that  no  law-courts  w^orthy  of  the  i;iame  existed ; 

*  Bruce,  writing  of  his  visit  to  Cairo  in  1768,  says:  "The  Govern- 
ment of  Cairo  is  much  praised  by  some.  It  may  perhaps  have  merit 
when  explained,  but  I  never  could  understand  it,  and  therefore  cannot 
explain  it.  But  a  more  brutal,  unjust,  tyrannical,  oppressive,  avari- 
cious set  of  infernal  miscreants  there  is  not  on  earth  tlian  are  the 
members  of  the  Government  of  Cairo"  {Travels  to  discover  the  Source  of 
the  Nile,  vol.  i.  p.  26).  Volney,  who  visited  Egypt  in  1783-5,  wrote : 
"Tout  ce  que  Ton  voit,  ou  que  Ton  entend,  annouce  (jue  Ion  est  dans 
le  pays  de  I'esclavage  et  de  la  tyrannie.  On  ne  parle  que  de  troubles 
civils,  que  de  misere  publique,  que  d'extorsions  d'argent,  que  de 
bastonnades  et  de  meurtres.  Nulle  surete  j)our  la  vie  ou  la  proprie'te'. 
On  verse  le  sang  d'un  homme  comme  celui  dun  boeuf.  La  justice 
mt-me  le  verse  sans  formalite.  L'officier  de  nuit  dans  ses  rondes, 
I'officier  de  jour  dans  ses  tourn^es,  jugent,  condamnent  et  font  executer 
en  un  cliu  d'oeil  et  sans  appel.  Des  bourreaux  les  accompagnent,  et 
au  premier  ordre  la  tete  d'un  malheureux  tombe  dans  le  sac  de  cuir,  ou 
on  la  re9oit  de  peur  de  souiller  la  place." — Voyage  en  Syrie  et  en  ^gypte, 
p.  162. 


CH.  XXXIV     DWELLERS  IN  EGYPT  167 

that  the  Englishman's  own  countrymen,  who, 
accordmg  to  their  custom,  judged  mainly  by 
results,  expected  that  at  the  touch  of  his  adminis- 
trative wand  all  abuses  would  forthwith  disappear  ; 
that  the  fellah  expected  immediate  relief  from 
taxation  and  oppression ;  that  the  Levantine  con- 
tractor expected  to  dip  his  itching  palm  into  the 
till  of  the  British  Treasury;  that  the  Enghshman's 
position  was  undefined,  and  that  he  was  unable  to 
satisfy  all  these  expectations  at  once ;  that,  having 
just  quelled  a  rebellion  in  Egypt,  he  was  con- 
fronted with  a  still  more  formidable  rebellion  in 
the  Soudan ;  and,  lastly,  that  before  he  had 
seriously  begun  the  work  of  reform,  he  was  con- 
stantly pressed  by  Frenchmen,  and  by  some  of  his 
own  countrymen,  to  declare  his  conviction  that  the 
work  was  accomplished, — when  all  these  points  are 
remembered,  the  difficulty  of  the  task  which  Eng- 
land undertook  may  be  appreciated  in  its  true  light. 
But  the  task  was  ennobled  by  its  difficulty.  It  was 
one  worthy  of  the  past  history,  the  might,  the 
resources,  and  the  sterling  national  qualities  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  race.  I  shall  presently  endeavour  to 
show  how  it  was  accomplished.  Before,  however, 
dealing  with  this  portion  of  my  task,  the  component 
parts  of  the  population  of  Egypt  require  some 
further  analysis. 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

THE    MOSLEMS 

Classification  of  the  population — The  Turco-Egyptians — The  Egyptians 
— The  hierarchy — 1  he  Grand  Mufti — The  head  of  the  El-Azhar 
University — The  Grand  Kadi — The  Sheikh  el-Bekri — Mohammed 
el-Saadat  —  Abdul  -  Khalik  el  -  Saadat  —  Mohammed  Abdu  — 
Mohammed  Beyram — The  Omdehs  and  Sheikhs  —  Their  sub- 
missiveness  to  the  Pashas — Their  sympathy  with  Arabi — Their 
tyranny  over  the  Fellaheen — Their  feelings  towards  England — 
The  fellaheen — The  Bedouins. 

AccouDiNG  to  the  census  of  1897,  the  dwellers  in 
Egypt  were  at  that  time  9,734,000  in  number. 
These  9,734,000  souls  may  be  classified  in  various 
ways. 

In  the  first  place,  they  may  be  considered  as,  on 
the  one  side,  Ottoman  subjects,  a  category  which 
would  include  almost  every  species  of  semi-Egyptian 
hybrid,  and  on  the  other  side,  Europeans,  a  cate- 
gory which  would  include  every  nondescript  who 
could,  by  hook  or  by  crook,  get  his  name  registered 
at  some  European  Consulate.  Or,  they  may  be 
classified  as  officials  and  non-officials,  a  classification, 
the  discussion  of  which  would  bring  into  relief  the 
fact  that,  when  the  British  occupation  commenced, 
it  had  not  yet  been  realised  by  the  native  officials 
of  Egypt  that  they  were  the  trustees  of  the 
non-otficial  classes  ;  rather  were  the  latter  considered 
to  be  the  legitimate  prey  of  the  former.  Or,  they 
may  be  classified  as  JNIoslems  and  Christians,  a 
distinction  wliich,  being  converted  from  terms  of 

168 


CH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  1G9 

religious  belief  into  those  of  political  and  social  life, 
would  differentiate  the  ignorant,  conservative  nruiss 
from  the  more  subtle,  more  superficially  intellectual, 
but,  if  the  true  Europeans  be  excluded,  by  no 
means  more  virile  minority.  In  the  following 
remarks,  the  last  of  these  three  classifications  will 
be  adopted. 

The  Moslems  consist,  first,  of  Turks  and  Turco- 
Egyptians  ;  secondly,  of  Egyptians  ;  and  thirdly,  of 
Bedouins.  A  few  Moslems  resident  in  Egypt  will 
thus  remain  unclassified ;  for  instance,  there  are  a 
few  Algerians  and  Tunisians,  who  are  French,  and 
a  few  natives  of  India,  who  are  British  subjects. 
There  are  also  a  considerable  number  of  Soudanese, 
an  element  which  was  found  of  importance  when 
the  reorganisation  of  the  Egyptian  army  was  taken 
in  hand.  But,  for  the  purposes  of  the  present 
argument,  it  will  suffice  to  deal  with  the  Moslems 
under  the  three  main  heads  given  above. 

The  Turk  was  the  conqueror  of  Egypt,  and 
within  the  memory  of  persons  still  living  behaved 
as  such.  But  there  are  now  but  few  pure  Turks 
left.  In  the  absence  of  fresh  importations  from 
Turkey,  a  process  of  Egyptianisation  set  in. 
Absence  from  the  headquarters  of  Ottoman 
thought  and  action,  and  intermarriage  with  Eg}^- 
tians,  produced  their  natural  results.  It  is  thought 
that  no  such  thing  as  a  pure  Turk  of  the  third 
generation  is  to  be  found  within  the  length  and 
breadth  of  the  land.  It  is,  indeed,  a  misnomer  to 
speak  of  Turks  in  Egypt.  By  the  time  the  English 
occupied  the  country  in  1882,  all  the  Turks  had 
blossomed  or,  as  some  would  say,  degenerated  ijito 
Turco  -  Egyptians.  This  is  a  point  which  the 
English  politician  had  to  bear  carefully  in  mind, 
for  as  each  year  of  the  British  occupation  passed 
by,  the  Turco  -  Egyptian  element  in  Egyptian 
society  became  more  Egyptian  and  less  Turkish 


170  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

in  character  and  habits  of  thought.  In  common 
with  other  Moslems,  the  Turco-Egyptians  looked 
to  the  Sultan  as  their  Pope.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  were  year  by  year  less  inclined  to 
regard  him  as  their  King.  When,  in  1892,  the 
British  Government  stepped  in  and  prevented  a 
Firman  of  the  Sultan  from  being  promulgated,  they 
rallied  in  a  half-hearted  and  platonic  manner  round 
the  Commander  of  the  Faithful.  They  winced  at 
the  spectacle  of  his  humiliation  at  the  hands  of  a 
Christian  Power.  But,  even  then,  the  feelings  of 
indignation  excited  in  their  breasts  were  probably  no 
stronger  than  those  which  would  be  felt  by  an  Italian 
patriot,  who  was  also  a  devout  Cathohc,  and  who 
saw  the  Vatican  obliged  to  yield  to  the  Quirinal. 

Again,  in  1906,  when  the  relations  between 
England  and  Turkey  were  strained  by  the  occur- 
rence of  what  is  known  as  the  "  Sinai  Peninsula  " 
incident,  a  strong  wave  of  pro-Turkish  feehng 
seemed  to  sweep  over  Egypt,  but  it  was  a  purely 
fictitious  movement,  manufactured  by  the  Anglo- 
phobe  press.     It  speedily  died  a  natural  death. 

In  truth,  religious  conviction,  backed  by  racial 
prejudices  and  by  the  sympathy  generally  entertained 
amongst  Orientals  for  a  theocratic  form  of  govern- 
ment, may  for  a  while  wrestle  with  personal  interest 
and  political  associations,  but  the  chances  are  that, 
if  the  struggle  is  continued,  religious  conviction  will 
get  a  fall.  Pro-Turkish  sentiment  will,  therefore, 
smoulder  and  occasionally  flicker  up  sufficiently  to 
show  some  feeble  light,  but  it  will  never  burst  into 
a  blaze.  For,  in  fact,  many  considerations  are 
constantly  dragging  the  Turco  -  Egyptian  in  a 
direction  away  from  Constantinople.  Although 
he  may  try  to  deceive  others,  he  cannot  deceive 
himself.  He  knows  well  enough  what  he  would 
do  if  he  got  the  upper  hand  ;  he  would  plunder 
every  one  he  could  indiscriminately.      He  knows 


ijH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  171 

that  his  own  brethren,  whom  his  ancestors  left 
behind  at  Constantinople,  are  prepared  to  act  on 
precisely  similar  principles,  and  he  feels  that  if 
they,  who  are  certainly  the  most  powerful  of  the 
sons  of  Islam,  were  once  to  step  on  the  scene,  his 
affinity  of  race  would  avail  him  little  ;  he  would 
take  rank  with  the  plundered  rather  than  with  the 
plunderers  ;  or,  at  best,  he  would  have  to  stand  by 
and  see  the  Egyptians  robbed  without  obtaining 
any  adequate  share  of  the  plunder.  Rather  than 
submit  to  this  fate,  it  were  perhaps  better  to  take 
the  good  things  the  Englishmen  offer  to  him  ;  it  is 
true  that  they  will  not  let  him  spoil  the  Egyptian, 
but  they  will  prevent  the  Constantinopolitan  Turk 
from  spoiling  him ;  they  give  him  wealth  and 
security  for  his  life  and  property ;  perhaps  it  will 
be  as  well  to  pause  before  throwing  away  these 
benefits  in  order  to  obtain  the  doubtful  advantages 
of  being  governed  by  a  number  of  co-rehgionists, 
whose  community  of  religion  will  in  no  degree 
temper  their  rapacity.  Then,  again,  as  time 
went  on,  a  few  Turco- Egyptians  were  animated 
by  sentiments  which,  however  unpractical,  were 
by  no  means  ignoble.  They  became  identified 
with  Egyptian  aspirations,  and  wished  to  estabHsh 
a  government  free  from  the  interference  of  either 
Turk  or  European.  A  few  also  recognised  the 
benefits  conferred  on  the  country  by  the  British 
occupation,  and  loyally  co  -  operated  with  the 
British  officials  in  furthering  the  cause  of  reform. 

Thus,  in  1882,  the  Enghsh  found  a  body  of 
Turco-Egyptians  who  occupied  the  principal  places 
imder  Government ;  who  were  the  chief  land- 
owners m  the  country ;  who  disliked  the  English, 
inasmuch  as  they  knew  by  intuition  that  their 
intervention  would  save  the  Egyptians  from  being 
plundered ;  who  occasionally  cast  a  glance  towards 
Constantinople,  and  were  willing  enough  to  try  and 


172  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  iv 

scare  the  Englishman  with  the  bugbear  of  the  Khalif  s 
spiritual  authority;  who  would  have  been  bitterly  dis- 
appointed if  their  political  flirtations  with  the  Porte 
had  been  taken  seriously,  and  if  the  Mohammedan 
Pope,  doffing  his  mitre,  had  assumed  the  cro^vn, 
handled  the  sword,  and  commenced  to  assert  his 
authority  in  temporal  affairs ;  and  who,  lastly,  in 
the  presence  of  the  alien  and  the  Christian,  showed 
a  tendency  to  amalgamate  with  the  other  dwellers 
on  Egyptian  soil  in  the  creation  of  a  sort  of 
spurious  patriotism.  I  say  spurious  patriotism, 
because  the  alliance  between  the  semi-Egyptianised 
Turk  and  the  pure  Egyptian  is  unnatural.  The 
people  of  Egypt  are  not  really  with  the  repre- 
sentative Turco-Egyptians.  The  peculiar  character- 
istic of  the  typical  Turco-Egyptian  is  his  catholic 
capacity  for  impotent  hatred.  He  hates  the 
Englishman,  because  the  Englishman  curbs  him. 
He  hates  and  fears  the  pure  Turk,  because  the 
pure  Turk  is  difficult  to  curb.  He  despises  the 
Egyptian,  whom  he  regards  as  his  prey,  and  who, 
in  fact,  would  be  his  prey  were  it  not  for  the 
English  watchdog  who  keeps  him  off. 

Amongst  the  many  vague  ideals  incapable  of 
realisation  which  are  floating  about  in  the  Egyptian 
political  atmosphere,  nothing  is  more  certain  than 
that  the  ideal  of  the  Turco-Egyptian  can  never 
be  realised.  He  can  never  be  restored  to  the 
position  of  trust,  which  he  formerly  occupied  and 
abused. 

But,  with  all  this,  the  Turco-Egyptian  has  some 
redeeming  qualities.  The  glamour  of  a  dominant 
race  still  hovers  as  an  aureole,  albeit  a  very  dimmed 
aureole,  round  his  head.  He  is  certainly  not  more 
corrupt  than  the  Eg>^tian  ;  he  is  more  manly,  and 
the  greater  the  quantity  of  Turkish  blood  running 
in  his  veins,  the  more  will  his  manly  qualities 
appear.     He  is  sometimes  truthful  and  outspoken 


CH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  173 

after  his  own  fashion.  He  has  a  rude  standard  of 
honour.  Go  where  you  will  in  Egypt,  if  any  bit  of 
administrative  work  requiring  a  certain  amount  of 
energy  has  been  well  done  by  a  native  official,  it 
will  generally  be  found  that  the  official  in  question 
is  a  Circassian  or  a  Turco-Egyptian,  who  is  probably 
more  Turk  than  Egyptian.  The  Turco-Egyptian 
can,  in  fact,  still  to  a  certain  extent  command,  and 
that  is  why,  with  all  his  defects,  and  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  class  to  which  he  belongs  is  generally 
Anglophobe  —  although  there  are  some  notable 
exceptions, — it  will  often  be  found  that  the  in- 
dividual Englishman  will  get  on  well  with  the 
individual  Turk,  and  better  with  the  Turco- 
Egyptian  than  with  the  pure  Egyptian,  the  Syrian 
or  the  Armenian.  The  northerner  and  the  Oriental 
meet  on  the  common  ground  that  the  Englishman 
is  masterful,  and  that  the  Turco-Egyptian,  though 
less  masterful  than  the  pure  Turk,  is  more  so  than 
the  pure  Egyptian.  The  Englishman  belongs  to 
an  imperial  race,  and  the  Turco-Egyptian  to  a 
race  which  but  yesterday  was  imperial.  The 
English,  Nubar  Pasha  once  said  to  me,  "  are  the 
Turks  of  the  West." 

The  second  category  of  Egyptian  Moslems  may ' 
be  divided  into  three  heads.     These  are — first,  the 
hierarchy ;  second,  the  squirearchy ;  and  third,  the 
feUaheen. 

The  Ulema — the  learned  men^ — of  the  El- 
Azhar  Mosque  constitute  a  distinct  religious  cor- 
poration, which  is  divided  into  grades,  and  which 
is  officially  recognised  by  the  Government.  A 
University  is  attached  to  the  JNIosque.  The 
number  of  Ulema  is  limited  ;  in  order  to  qualifv 
for  the  rank  of  "  Alim,"  which  carries  with  it  the 
right  to  wear  a  pelisse  conferred  by  the  Khediv;e, 

'  "Ulema"  is  tlie  plural  of  the  Arabic  word  "Alim,"  signifying 
learned,  a  doUor  of  laws. 


174  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

a  candidate  must  have  studied  at  the  University, 
and  have  passed  certain  examinations  to  test  his 
knowledge  of  the  Koran,  the  Traditions  (Hadith), 
and  the  Sacred  Law  of  Islam.  Many  a  Moslem 
may  be  learned  in  the  ordinary  acceptation  of  the 
term  ;  he  may,  for  instance  be  a  "  Hafiz,"  who  can 
repeat  the  whole  Koran  by  heart,  or,  at  all  events, 
is  supposed  to  be  able  to  do  so ;  but  unless  he 
has  undergone  the  necessary  examination  at  the 
El-Azhar  University,  he  is  not,  technically  speak- 
ing, considered  an  "Alim."  He  may  officiate  at 
religious  services,  but  he  will  not  have  acquired 
the  right  to  expound  either  the  tenets  of  Islam 
or  the  Sacred  Law  at  any  of  the  principal  Mosques. 

The  three  chief  Ulema  are  the  Grand  Mufti, 
the  head  of  the  El-Azhar  University,  and  the 
Grand  Kadi.  The  last  named  takes  what  is  the 
equivalent  of  his  degree,  not  at  Cairo,  but  at 
Constantinople. 

The  Grand  JNlufti  is  the  chief  law-doctor  of  the 
country.  It  is  his  duty  to  pronounce  ex  cathedra 
opinions  (Fetw^as)  upon  any  doubtful  points  of  the 
Sacred  Law,  w^iich  may  be  submitted  to  him. 
He  is  a  magnate  of  whose  spiritual  authority  the 
temporal  rulers  of  the  country  must  take  account. 
Despotic  Khedives  and  even,  it  is  said,  Suleiman 
the  Magnificent,^  have  tried  to  force  the  hand  or 
override  the  decisions  of  the  Grand  Mufti,  and  hke 
their  Christian  prototype  who  tried  to  throw  off 

•  It  is  related  that  Sultan  Suleiman  the  Magnificent  asked  Sheikh 
Ahu  Saoud,  who  was  one  of  the  f^reatest  of  the  Ottoman  Muftis,  to  issue 
a  Fetua  declaring  it  lawful  to  put  to  death  all  the  inhahitants  of  con- 
quered European  pi-ovinces  who  refused  to  emhrace  the  fa,ith  of  Islam. 
ITie  Grand  Mufti  would  not  comply  with  this  request. 

Abhas  I.  is  said  to  have  requested  the  Grand  Mufti  (Sheik)i-el- 
Abbasi,  who  died  in  18!}.3  at  the  age  of  ninety)  to  issue  a  Fetwa  s(;iting 
that  the  power  of  ratifying  a  sentence  of  death  lay  not,  as  was  then  the 
practice,  with  the  Sultan,  but  with  the  Viceroy.  'Hie  Grand  Mufti 
refused.  He  was  exiled  to  the  Soudan,  hut,  in  the  face  of  the  strong 
protests  made  by  many  of  the  leading  Mohammedans  of  Cairo,  eveu 
^-9spotic  Abbas  was  ol)liged  to  yield.     The  Mufti  "vas  recalled. 


CH.XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  175 

the  spiritual  yoke,  they  have  generally  been 
obliged  to  go  to  Canossa.^  The  English  politician 
also  has  to  recognise  the  Mufti's  existence.  When, 
indeed,  the  venerable  old  man,  who  at  one  time 
occupied  the  post  of  Grand  Mufti,  advocated,  as 
the  most  natural  thing  in  the  world,  the  crucifixion 
of  criminals,^  it  was  scarcely  necessary  for  the 
Englishman  to  raise  his  httle  finger  in  order  to 
remind  the  Egyptian  world  that,  although  the 
onward  tramp  of  civilisation  might  be  heard  but 
faintly  within  the  sacred  precincts  of  the  Mosque, 
he  was  nevertheless  standing  outside  its  walls  with 
his  treaties,  his  newspapers,  and  if  needs  be,  his 
soldiers,  to  assert  the  validity  of  anti-crucifixionist 
principles.  But,  though  in  an  extreme  case  such  as 
this  the  Englishman  could  impose  a  veto  on  some 
barbarous  act,  he  could  not  do  much  more.  He 
could  not  make  the  Egyptian  horse  drink  of  the 
waters  of  civilisation,  albeit  the  most  limpid  streams 
of  social  and  juridical  reform  were  turned  into  the 
trough  before  him,  if  the  Mufti  condemned  the  act 
of  drinking  as  impious.  Popes  and  other  ecclesi- 
astical dignitaries  have  before  now  shown  that  they 
cannot  be  dragooned  into  submission.  Neither  do 
Muftis  fear  red-coated  soldiers.  Moreover,  they 
fear  *iie  wrath  of  the  European  press  even  less  than 
the}'  fear  redcoats. 

The  head  of  the  famous  El-Azhar  University 
exercises  a  certain  degree  of  control  in  temporal 
matters  over  those  of  the  Ulema  who  lecture  in  the 
mosques,  and  must  himself  be,  par  excellence,  an 
"  Alim."  The  incumbent  of  this  office  during  the 
first  few  years  of  my  residence  in  Egypt  was  a 
worthy  old  man,  with  whom  I  entertained  excellent 
personal  relations,   although,   as  has   been  already 

^  I  say  "  generally"  because  there  have  been  exceptions  to  the  rule. 
Thus,  in  1G37,  Amurath  IV.  put  the  Grand  Mutti  to  death. — Creasy. 
Ottoman  Turks,  p.  253.  *   Vide  ante,  p.  136 


176  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

mentioned,^  our  views  as  to  the  movements  of  the 
planets  were  not  identical. 

The  Grand  Kadi  is  perhaps  the  greatest  of  the 
Ulema.  Up  to  the  present  time,  he  has  always 
been  a  Turk  from  Constantinople.  He  pronounces 
final  judgment  on  all  subjects  which  come  within 
the  domain  of  personal  law,  having  been  bereft  of 
criminal  and  civil  jurisdiction  by  the  progress 
which  is  constantly  kibing  the  heel  of  his  decadent 
system.  I  well  remember  the  Grand  Kadi  who 
was  in  office  when  I  first  went  to  Cairo.  His 
venerable  face,  long  white  beard,  small  hands, 
dignified  mien,  and  graceful  robes  rendered  him 
a  striking  figure.  Such,  I  can  fancy,  were  the 
Pharisees  who  were  members  of  the  Jewish  Sanhe- 
drim. His  manners  were  perfect,  perhaps  more  so 
than  his  judgments.  His  successor  was  a  younger 
man  with  a  fine  intelliofcnt  face.  He  arrived  at 
Cairo  with  excellent  intentions ;  he  was  going  to 
purify  his  court  of  false  witnesses,  and  he  was 
delighted  when  he  found  that  I  was  able  to  talk 
to  him  in  Turkish,  albeit  very  bad  Turkish,  on  the 
subject.  I  welcomed  an  ally,  and  awaited  the 
result  with  interest.  I  had  not  long  to  wait.  The 
Kadi  soon  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Egyptians 
were  an  uninteresting  race.  As  they  appeared  to 
like  the  corrupt  system  to  which  they  were  accus- 
tomed, why  should  he  kick  against  the  pricks  in 
trying  to  reform  it  ? 

Tliese  three  are,  from  their  official  positions,  the 
most  important  of  the  class,  who,  by  reason  of  their 
acquaintance  ^vith  theological  lore  and  ancient 
custom,  are  termed  "  learned."  It  may,  however, 
be  interesting  to  sketch  a  few  other  types  of  their 
class. 

The  Sheikh  el-Bekri  is  an  "  Alim,"  and  a  notable 
one  of  his  class.     The  first  incumbent  of  the  office 

*   Vide  ante,  p.  163. 


CH.XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  177 

during  my  residence  in  Cairo  was  a  small  wizened 
man  with  a  pock-marked  countenance,  who,  when  I 
paid  him  my  Ramazan  visit,  used  to  peer  at  me 
through  a  pair  of  cunning  little  eyes,  in  which  fear 
and  hatred  of  his  visitor  seemed  to  be  struggling 
for  predominance.  I  always  felt  that,  when  I  left 
his  house,  he  cursed  me,  my  race,  and  my  rehgion, 
and  I  never  entertained  the  least  ill-will  against  him 
for  doing  so.  When  he  died,  liis  brother,  a  much 
younger  man,  succeeded  him.  It  soon  became 
apparent  that  a  new  Sheikh  el-Bekri  had  arisen. 
When  the  spiritual  head  of  a  variety  of  Moslem 
sects  boasted  of  his  acquaintance  with  Lord 
SaHsbury  and  Mr.  Gladstone ;  when  he  quoted 
Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  to  me  on  the  Rights  of  Man 
in  excellent  French ;  when  he  indulged  in  platitudes 
on  the  blessings  of  parHamentary  government ;  and 
when  he  asked  me  to  lend  him  a  few  books  which 
might  enable  him  to  understand  the  "philosophy 
of  the  French  Revolution," — then  I  asked  myself 
whether  I  was  in  a  dream.  Was  this  Jin  de  siecle 
Sheildi,  this  curious  compound  of  INIecca  and  the 
Paris  Boulevards,  the  latest  development  of 
Islamism  ?  I  should  add  that  the  combination 
produced  no  results  of  any  importance.  The  new 
Sheikh  soon  sank  into  political  insignificance. 

I  can  best  describe  another  "  Ahm"  by  relating  an 
anecdote  about  him.  Sheikh  JNIohammed  el-Saadat, 
as  his  name  signifies,  was  a  Seyyid,  a  descendant 
of  the  Prophet.^  He  was,  moreover,  w^ealthy  and 
influential.  I  happened  to  hear  at  one  time  that 
he  was  raving  against  the  English.  My  experience 
had  taught  me  that  political  opinions  in  Egypt  are 
not  unfrequently  connected  with  some  personal 
grievance.  I  called  on  the  Sheikh,  and  asked 
him    how   he    thought    matters   were    going    on. 

*  "Saadat"  is  the  plural  form  of  the  Arabic  word  "Seyyid,"  which 
means  a  descendant  of  the  Prophet,  an  aristocrat,  lord,  master. 
VOL.  II  N 


178  MODEKN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

Everything,  he  said,  was  very  bad.  I  encouraged 
him  to  talk.  Then  he  burst  out  into  a  long  tirade 
about  the  desperate  state  of  the  country.  Could 
he,  I  asked,  point  out  any  particular  abuse,  for  it 
was  difficult  to  deal  with  generaUties  ?  Certainly 
he  could  do  so ;  he  had  no  water  for  a  portion  of 
his  property,  whereas  he  always  got  water  before 
the  English  came  into  the  country.  I  inquired 
into  the  matter.  As  I  had  expected,  I  found  that 
the  Sheikli's  statement  was  quite  correct.  He 
belonged  to  the  privileged  class.  Under  the  old 
regime,  he  always  got  water,  although  his  neighbours 
often  went  without  it.  Since  the  English  engineers 
had  taken  the  irrigation  of  the  country  in  hand, 
they  had  recognised  no  privileges.  All  were  treated 
alike.  The  Sheikh  had  to  await  his  turn.  Naturally 
enough,  he  did  not  like  this  levelling  process. 
Fortunately,  shortly  after  my  interview  with  him, 
the  Sheikh's  turn  came.  He,  of  course,  attributed 
this  to  the  exercise  of  my  influence  on  his  behalf. 
I  heard  afterwards  that  his  language  at  once 
changed.  He  spoke  in  terms  of  warm  commenda- 
tion of  the  British  administration. 

Sheikh  Abdul- Khalik  el-Saadat,  a  nephew  of 
the  last-named  Sheikh,  is  the  head  of  one  of  the 
oldest  purely  Egyptian  families  in  Egypt.  Napoleon 
made  great  efforts  to  ingratiate  himself  with  one  of 
this  Sheikh's  ancestors,  who  was  at  first  decorated 
with  the  Legion  of  Honour,  and  on  this  treatment 
proving  ineffectual  to  produce  the  required  results, 
was  bastinadoed.  The  present  Sheikh  is  a  member 
of  the  Legislative  Council.  He  is  ignorant  of 
public  affairs,  but,  by  reason  of  the  respect  in 
which  his  family  is  held,  exerts,  or  at  all  events 
might  exert  a  certain  amount  of  influence.  I 
used  to  see  a  good  deal  of  him  at  one  time,  but 
eventually,  for  reasons  on  which  I  need  not  dwell, 
I  had  to  drop  his  acquaintance. 


CH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  179 

Sheikh  Mohammed  Abdu  was  an  *'  Alim  "  of  a 
different  and,  I  should  add,  a  very  superior  type 
to  those  of  his  brethren  whom  I  have  so  far 
described.  He  was  one  of  the  leading  spirits  of 
the  Arabi  movement.  When  I  came  to  Egypt 
in  1883,  he  was  under  a  cloud.  Good-natured 
Tewfik,  acting  under  British  pressure,  pardoned 
him,  and  made  him  a  judge.^  He  did  his  work 
well  and  honestly.  Sheikh  Mohammed  Abdu  was 
a  man  of  broad  and  enlightened  views.  He  ad- 
mitted the  abuses  which  have  sprung  up  under 
Oriental  Governments.  He  recognised  the  neces- 
sity of  European  assistance  in  the  work  of  reform. 
But  he  did  not  belong  to  the  same  category  as  the 
Europeanised  Egyptian,  whom  he  regarded  as  a 
bad  copy  of  the  original.  He  was  anti-Khedivial 
and  anti-Pasha,  not  that  he  would  have  objected 
to  a  certain  degree  of  Pashadom  if  he  could  have 
found  good  Pashas,  but  in  his  experience  he  had 
met  but  few  Pashas  who  were  good.  In  fact, 
Sheikh  Mohammed  Abdu  was  a  somewhat  dreamy 
and  unpractical  but,  nevertheless,  genuine  Egyptian 
patriot ;  it  were  perhaps  well  for  the  cause  of 
Egyptian  patriotism  if  there  were  more  like  him. 
But,  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  possible 
politicians  of  the  future,  there  were  some  weak 
points  in  the  armour  of  Mohammed  Abdu,  and 
of  those  who  follow  his  teaching.  Mr.  Stanley 
Lane  Poole  remarks  that  an  upper-class  Moslem 
must  be  "  a  fanatic  or  a  concealed  infidel."  ^  This 
dilemma,  in  a  somewhat  different  form,  has 
presented  difficulties  to  those  Christians  who  look 
to  the  letter  rather  than  to  the  spirit  of  Christ's 
teaching.  It  presents  far  greater  difficulties  to 
strictly  orthodox  Moslems,  who  look  almost 
exclusively  to  the  letter  rather  than  to  the  spirit 

*  Mohammed  Abdu  was,  in  1899,  appointed  Grand  Mufti.     He  died 
in  1906.  ^  Studies  in  a  Monquef  p.  111. 


180  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

of  their  faith.  I  suspect  that  my  friend  Abdu, 
although  he  would  have  resented  the  appellation 
being  applied  to  him,  was  in  reality  an  Agnostic. 
His  associates,  although  they  admitted  his  ability, 
were  inclined  to  look  askance  at  him  as  a  "filosouf." 
Now,  in  the  eyes  of  the  strictly  orthodox,  one  who 
studies  philosophy  or,  in  other  words,  one  who  recog- 
nises the  difference  between  the  seventh  and  the 
twentieth  centuries,  is  on  the  high  road  to  perdition. 
The  political  importance  of  Mohammed  Abdu's 
life  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  may  be  said  to  have 
been  the  founder  of  a  school  of  thought  in  Egypt 
very  similar  to  that  established  in  India  by  Syed 
Ahmed,  the  creator  of  the  Alighur  College.  The 
avowed  object  of  those  who  belong  to  this  school 
is  to  justify  the  ways  of  Islam  to  man,  that  is  to 
say,  to  Moslem  man.  They  are  the  Girondists  of 
the  Egyptian  national  movement.  They  are  too 
much  tainted  with  a  suspicion  of  heterodoxy  to 
carry  far  along  with  them  the  staunch  conservative 
Moslem.  On  the  other  hand,  they  are  often  not 
sufficiently  Europeanised  to  attract  the  sympathy 
of  the  Eg}^tian  mimic  of  European  ways.  They 
are  inferior  to  the  strictly  orthodox  Moslem  in 
respect  to  their  Mohammedanism,  and  inferior  to 
the  ultra  -  Europeanised  Egyptian  in  respect  to 
their  Europeanisation.  Their  task  is,  therefore, 
one  of  great  difficulty.  But  they  deserve  all  the 
encouragement  and  support  which  can  be  given  to 
them.  They  are  the  natural  allies  of  the  European 
reformer.  Egyptian  patriots — sua  si  bona  norint — 
will  find  in  the  advancement  of  the  followers  of 
Mohammed  Abdu  the  best  hope  that  they  may 
gi-adually  carry  out  their  programme  of  creating 
a  truly  autonomous  Egypt.  ^ 

1  For  many  years,  I  ^ave  to  Mohamined  Abdu  all  the  encouragement 
in  my  power  ;  but  it  was  uphill  work,  for,  besides  the  stronj;^  antagonism 
which  he  encountered  from  conservati\e  Moslems,  he  was  unfortunately 


CH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  181 

I  give  yet  one  further  sketch  of  a  typical 
"AHm."  Sheikh  Mohammed  Beyram,  who  is 
now,  alas !  dead,  was  one  of  my  best  friends  in 
Egypt.  He  was,  moreover,  one  of  the  most  re- 
markable t)^es  with  which  I  have  met  in  the 
course  of  my  Eastern  experience.  He  looked  like 
a  thorough  gentleman.  I  have  rarely  seen  a  more 
striking  figure  than  that  of  this  grave  Oriental, 
with  his  high  intellectual  forehead,  refined  features, 
melancholy  eyes,  dignified  mien,  exquisite  manners, 
and  graceful  costume,  who  would  sit  mth  me  by 
the  hour^  and  sing  a  dirge  over  the  decadence 
of  Islam.  Moreover,  Sheikh  Mohammed  Beyram 
not  only  looked  a  gentleman ;  he  was  one.  In 
no  country  have  I  come  across  a  man  of  more 
elevated     and    refined     feelings,    or     one     whose 

on  very  bad  terms  with  the  Khedive,  and  vi'as  only  able  to  retain  his 
place  as  Mufti  by  relying  on  strong  British  support. 

In  my  Annual  Reports  I  frequently  spoke  of  him  in  high  terms,  and 
no  one  regretted  his  premature  death  more  sincerely  than  myself.  At 
the  same  time,  I  must  confess  that  I  experienced  a  shock  in  reading 
some  of  the  revelations  in  Mr.  Wilfrid  Blunt's  book.  Mr.  Blunt's  views 
on  Egyptian  affairs  appear  to  have  been  mainly  based  on  wliat  he  heard 
from  Mohammed  Abdu,  whom  he  calls  (Secret  Hhtory,  etc.  p.  7)  a  "great 
philosopher  and  patriot."  Notably,  I  read  with  surprise  and  regret 
(p.  489)  the  following  statement  of  Mohammed  Abdu's:  "ISheykh  Jemal 
ed  Din  proposed  to  me,  Mohammed  Abdu,  that  Ismail  should  be  assas- 
sinated some  day  as  he  passed  in  his  carriage  daily  over  tlie  Kasr-el-Nil 
bridge,  and  I  strongly  approved,  but  it  was  only  talk  between  ourselves, 
and  we  lacked  a  person  capable  of  taking  lead  in  the  aHair."  Without 
going  into  the  ethics  of  tyrannicide,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  say  that  the 
civilised  world  generally  is  disposed  to  look  askance  at  patriots,  and 
still  more  at  pliilosophers,  who  are  prepared  to  further  their  political 
aims  by  resorting  to  assassination. 

'  One  of  the  obstacles  which  lie  in  the  path  of  the  European  when 
he  wants  to  arrive  at  the  true  opinion  of  the  Oriental  is  that  the 
European,  especially  if  he  be  an  official,  is  almost  always  in  a  hurry. 
If,  he  thinks,  the  Oriental  has  anything  to  say  to  me,  why  does  he  not 
say  it  and  go  away?  I  am  quite  prepared  to  listen  most  attentively, 
but  my  time  is  valuable  and  I  have  a  quantity  of  other  business  to  do  ; 
I  must,  therefore,  really  ask  him  to  come  to  the  point  at  once.  This 
frame  of  mind  is  quite  fatal  if  one  wishes  to  arrive  at  the  truth.  In 
order  to  attain  this  object,  the  Oriental  must  be  allowed  to  tell  his 
story  and  put  forward  his  ideas  in  his  own  way  ;  and  his  own  way  is 
generally  a  lengthy,  circuitous,  and  very  involved  way.  But  if  any 
one  has  tlie  patience  to  listen,  he  will  sometimes  be  amply  rewarded 
for  his  pains. 


182  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  rv 

opinions  and  actions  were  less  tainted  with  worldly 
self-interest,  than  this  Tunisian  aristocrat.^  Few 
things  have  given  me  a  more  unfavourable  im- 
pression of  native  Egyptian  society  than  that  the 
fine  qualities  of  this  really  eminent  man — whose 
appearance  and  character  /ere  alike  remarkable, 
whose  private  Ufe  was  irreproachable,  whose 
religious  faith  was  fouried  on  a  rock,  whose 
patriotism  was  enlightened,  and  whose  public 
aims  were  noble  —  should  have  been  scarcely 
recognised  by  the  herd  of  Pashas,  place-hunters, 
and  greedy  Sheikhs,  who  were  not  worthy  to  un- 
loose the  latchet  of  his  shoe.  When  he  went 
down  to  his  grave,  none  but  a  few  knew  that  a 
star,  which  under  happier  auspices  might  perhaps 
have  been  of  some  magnitude,  had  fallen  from  the 
political  firmament  of  Egypt,  or  perhaps,  it  would 
be  more  correct  to  say,  of  Islam.  Pope's  fine  lines 
well  describe  my  honoured  friend  : — 

Statesman,  yet  friend  to  truth  !  of  soul  sincere, 
In  action  faithful,  and  in  honour  clear ! 
Who  broke  no  promise,  served  no  private  end, 
AVho  gained  no  title,  and  who  lost  no  friend. 

Mohammed  Beyram  was  a  devout  Moslem.  His 
faith  was  far  more  earnest  than  that  of  Mohammed 
Abdu,  and  men  of  a  similar  type.  The  subject 
which  mainly  interested  him  was  how  to  bring 
Islam  and  its  ways  into  harmony  with  modern 
society ;  in  other  words,  how  to  square  the  circle ; 
and  in  discussing  the  sundry  and  manifold  branches 
of  this  question  with  him,  any  tendency  to  dispar- 
age the  Mohammedan  religion  at  once  disappeared. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  moralist,  criticism 

'  Mohammed  Reyram  belonged  to  the  Beylu^l  family  of  Tunis,  and, 
on  his  mother's  side,  was  descended  from  the  Moorish  kings  of  Spain. 
His  ancestors  h&i  :he  highest  offices  in  Tunis  without  inteiinission  for 
300  years. 


CH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  183 

cannot  be  directed  against  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  the  faith,  but  only  against  the  abuses 
which  have  sprung  up  and  which  now  obscure 
its  primitive  simplicity.  Mohammed  Beyram,  re- 
garded, not  as  a  practical  politician,  but  as  a 
believer  in  the  faith  of  Islam,  was,  in  fact,  a 
type  of  the  best  class  of  Moslem,  a  type  w^hich  is, 
unfortunately,  of  rare  occurrence.  He  looked 
sadly  out  over  a  world  which  appeared  to  him  to 
have  gone  mad  ;  he  saw  all  that  was  noble  in  the 
faith  which  he  revered  stifled  by  parasitic  growths ; 
he  noted  that  Islam  was  tottering  to  its  fall  by 
reason  of  internal  decay ;  he  did  not  so  much  fear 
the  advance  of  needy  disreputable  Europe,  for  he 
knew  that,  though  the  Moslem  might  be  robbed 
and  cheated,  there  was  still  a  hope  for  Islam  so 
long  as  its  moral  code  and  the  material  benefits  it 
conferred  were  only  contrasted  with  the  practice 
and  principles  of  adventurers  who  were  the  dregs  of 
European  civilisation  ;  but  he  knew  that  the  tap 
of  the  northern  drum,  which  had  been  heard  in 
the  streets  of  Cairo  and  might  ere  long  be  heard 
in  those  of  Stamboul,  brought  more  than  the 
dragoon  and  the  rifleman  in  its  wake ;  his  instinct 
taught  him  that  the  institutions,  which  his  fore- 
fathers had  cherished,  must  in  time  crumble  to 
the  dust  when  they  were  brought  face  to  face 
with  the  lofty  principles  w^hich  were  inscribed 
on  the  Englishman's  banner.  He  was  not  blind 
to  these  things  and,  albeit  he  still  clung  tenaciously 
to  the  skirts  of  the  Prophet  of  Arabia,  he  crieS 
out  in  the  agony  of  his  spirit :  "  Where  shaL 
wisdom  be  found  ?  and  where  is  the  place  of 
understanding  ? "  And  the  answer  he  gave  to 
himself  was  that  which  was  delivered  by  the 
patriarch  Job  w^hen  the  world  was  young :  "  The 
fear  of  the  Lord,  that  is  wisdom :  and  to  depart 
€rom  evil,  that  is  understanding."    On  that  common 


184  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

ground,  the  Moslem  of  the  Mohammed  Beyram 
type  could  meet  the  Christian,  and  discuss  matters 
of  common  interest  without  stirring  the  fires  of  re- 
ligious strife.  But  when  the  discussion  took  place, 
how  melancholy  was  the  result !  The  Moslem  and 
the  Christian  would  agree  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
fungus  which  was  stifling  all  that  was  at  one  time 
healthy  in  the  original  growth ;  they  would 
appreciate  in  like  fashion  the  history  of  its  exten- 
sion ;  but,  whilst  the  sympathetic  Christian  would 
point  out  with  courteous  but  inexorable  logic  that 
any  particular  remedy  proposed  would  be  either 
inefficacious  or  would  destroy  not  only  the  fungus 
but  at  the  same  time  the  parent  tree,  the  Moslem, 
too  honest  not  to  be  convinced,  however  much  the 
conviction  might  cost  him  pain,  could  only  utter  a 
bitter  wail  over  the  doom  of  the  creed  which  he 
loved,  and  over  that  of  the  baneful  system  to  which 
his  creed  has  given  birth.  We  may  sympathise, 
and,  for  my  own  part,  I  do  very  heartily  sympathise, 
vn^th  the  Mohammed  Beyrams  of  Islam,  but  let 
no  practical  politician  think  that  they  have  a  plan 
capable  of  resuscitating  a  body,  which  is  not, 
indeed,  dead,  and  which  may  yet  linger  on  for 
centuries,  but  which  is  nevertheless  politically  and 
socially  moribund,  and  whose  gradual  decay  cannot 
be  arrested  by  any  modern  palliatives  however 
skilfully  they  may  be  applied. 

I  have  dwelt  on  the  characters  of  these  few 
individuals,  not  in  order  to  disparage  some,  or  in 
order  to  deliver  a  panegyric  on  others,  but  because 
each  of  those  who  have  been  depicted  may  to  some 
extent  be  regarded  as  one  type  of  the  hierarchical 
class.  It  must  not,  however,  be  supposed  that  the 
Ulema  are  the  only  members  of  the  hierarchy.  A 
crowd  of  Imams  (preachers),  inferior  Kadis,  and 
others  may  be  considered  as  affiliated  to  the  Ulema. 
These  are  all  so  many  agents  scattered  over  the 


CH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  185 

face  of  the  country  who  keep  alive  religious  senti- 
ment and  hierarchical  influence.  The  special  point 
to  be  noted  for  the  purpose  of  the  present  argument 
is  that  the  attitude  of  the  whole  of  the  hierarchy, 
from  the  highest  "  Alim  "  to  the  smallest  teacher  in 
a  "  Kuttab,"  ^  has  generally  been  more  or  less  hostile 
to  the  work  of  the  British  reformer  in  Egypt. 
This  was,  indeed,  inevitable.  The  hostility  of  the 
hierarchy  is,  however,  based  on  somewhat  different 
grounds  from  that  of  the  Pashas.  In  respect  to 
one  point,  indeed,  the  sentiments  of  the  two  classes 
coincide.  Both  are  inspired  by  an  instinct  of  self- 
preservation.  At  the  time  when  the  British  occupa- 
tion took  place,  both  were  in  the  enjoyment  of 
privileges  which  they  had  abused,  and  the  con- 
tinuance of  which  they  thought  was  threatened. 
Both  had  a  pecuniary  interest  in  resisting  reform. 
Whilst  the  Pasha  feared  lest  the  fellaheen,  whom 
he  had  for  so  long  plundered,  should,  under  the 
aegis  of  England,  escape  from  his  grasp,  the 
"  Alim,"  on  the  other  hand,  was  somewhat  nervous 
lest  the  Englishman,  in  spite  of  his  protestations 
that  he  would  not  interfere  in  religious  matters, 
might  some  day  begin  to  ask  unpleasant  questions 
about  the  appropriation  of  funds  belonging  to 
rehgious  endowments  and  such  like  matters ;  and 
the  "  Alim  "  would  resent  this,  for  although  there 
are  some  honourable  exceptions,  he  is  but  too 
often  so  profoundly  self-deceived  that  he  considers 
it  an  essential  portion  of  the  relations  between  man 
and  his  Maker  that  a  few  privileged  persons  should  be 
allowed  to  appropriate  to  their  own  use  funds  which 
were  intended  to  be  applied  to  the  maintenance  of 
Mosques,  the  feeding  of  the  poor,  or  other  charitable 
objects.  But,  in  addition  to  this  cause  of  suspicion, 
based  on  self-interest,  there  is  this  further  point  to 
be  borne  in  mind  that,  as  guardians  of  the  citadel  of 

'  The  school  attached  to  a  Mosque,  where  the  Koran  is  taught. 


186  MODERN  EGYPT  rr.  iv 

Islam,  the  hierarchy  naturally  represent  the  ne 
plus  ultra  of  conservatism.  Hence,  the  representa- 
tives of  the  Mohammedan  rehgion  mistrusted  the 
English  reformer  even  before  he  began  to  reform, 
both  by  reason  of  his  creed,  and  because  they  could 
not  help  suspecting  him  of  some  sinister  intentions 
in  the  direction  of  shaking  the  foundations  of  their 
ancient  faith.  In  spite  of  the  Englishman's  care 
and  tenderness  in  dealing  with  them,  their  religion, 
and  their  vested  interests,  some  of  them  will  mis- 
trust him  all  the  more,  the  more  he  succeeds  in 
introducing  reforms  for  which  they  have  no 
sympathy.  They  will  continually  expect  that  their 
turn  is  coming  next. 

Turning  from  the  hierarchy  to  the  squirearchy, 
it  vsdll  be  found  that,  as  we  descend  the  social 
ladder,  we  enter  strata  where  the  prejudice  enter- 
tained against  the  alien  and  the  Christian  is  more 
or  less  mitigated  by  recognition  of  the  material 
benefits  conferred  by  the  reformer.  The  squire- 
archy consists,  for  the  most  part  of  Omdehs  (village 
mayors)  and  Sheikhs  of  villages.  These  are  gener- 
ally landed  proprietors  on  a  small  scale.  They 
occupy  a  position  midway  between  the  Pasha  and 
the  fellah.  Many  of  them  are  sturdy,  honest 
yeomen  who  are  well  deserving  of  respect.  Others 
are  inclined  to  cringe  before  the  Pashas  and  to 
bully  the  fellaheen.  I  should  add  that  these 
latter  tendencies,  which  were  especially  marked 
in  the  pre-reforming  days,  are  rapidly  disappearing. 

As  to  the  submissiveness  of  the  village  Sheikhs, 
the  following  picture  drawn  by  a  careful  observer 
of  Egyptian  social  life  was,  at  one  time,  by  no  means 
exaggerated.  The  scene  is  the  court  of  a  Mudirieh. 
The  Pasha  is  presiding.  "  Gradually  the  court 
becomes  more  and  more  crowded  with  brown - 
skinned  and  brown-mantled  country  people.  The 
village   mayors    and    village    patriarchs   (Sheikhs) 


cH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  187 

are  summoned  into  the  divan.  With  a  deep 
obeisance,  they  go  through  the  usual  form  of 
lifting  dust  from  the  smooth  marble  floor  and 
pressing  it  to  their  lips  as  a  mark  of  respect.  .  .  . 
A  Decree  is  read,  and  the  people  are  required 
*",o  signify  their  assent  to  it,  and  bind  themselves 
to  obey  it.  *  Right  willingly,'  answer  the  honour- 
able village  mayors  with  one  voice,  'as  your 
Excellency  commands ;  we  are  thy  slaves  and 
the  slaves  of  our  Sovereign ;  nothing  but  good 
comes  from  thee ;  thy  opinion  is  our  opinion.' 
'  Then  seal  the  document,'  says  the  Governor ;  and 
the  heads  of  the  communes,  one  after  the  other, 
give  their  brass  seal  to  the  scribe,  who  smears  it 
with  ink,  and  fills  the  sheet  with  their  important 
names.  When  the  Sheikh  has  sealed,  the  villager 
does  so  likewise,  although  he  has  only  a  glimmering 
of  what  it  is  that  he  has  pledged  himself  to."  ^ 

When  the  English  took  Egyptian  affairs  in 
hand,  the  submissiveness  of  the  Sheikhs  to  the 
Pashas  had  been  somewhat  tempered  by  recent 
events,  for  the  backbone  of  the  Arabist  party,  in  so 
far  as  that  party  represented  a  national  movement 
and  not  a  military  mutiny,  was  to  be  found  amongst 
this  class.  The  greater  part  of  the  yeomanry  of 
the  country  were  sympathisers  with  Arabi ;  he  was 
of  their  kith  and  kin ;  they  looked  to  him  to 
deliver  them  from  the  usurer  and  the  Pasha.  Arabi 
ruled  for  a  moment.     During  that  short  period, 

Chaos  umpire  sat. 
And  by  decision  more  embroiled  the  fray 
By  which  he  reigned. 

Though,  at  the  time  of  the  Arabi  revolt,  the  Sheikh 
class  suffered  from  the  general  disorder,  though 
even  the  short  experience  which  they  gained  of  the 
maimer  in  which   Arabist  principles  were  put  in 

•  Klunzinger,  Upper  Egypt,  p.  73. 


188  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

practice  led  the  most  intelligent  amongst  the 
Sheikhs  to  doubt  whether  it  was  wise  to  hand  them- 
selves and  their  cause  over  to  a  mutinous  army, 
nevertheless,  when  order  was  restored,  they  fell 
back  on  the  recollection  that  Arabi  to  some  extent 
represented  the  ascendency  of  Sheikhdom  in  sub- 
stitution for  that  of  Pashadom.  They  never  forgot 
that,  had  not  England  thrown  her  weighty  sword 
into  the  scale,  the  Turco-Egyptian  Pasha  and  his 
satellites  would  have  been  swept  into  the  sea,  and 
that  the  Sheikh  class  would  have  thus  been  left  to 
plunder  the  fellaheen  alone,  instead  of  being  obliged 
to  content  itself  with  whatever  escaped  from  the 
rapacity  of  the  Pashas.  To  all  outward  appearance, 
the  ancient  submissiveness  to  Pashadom  returned 
after  Tel-el- Kebir.  When  the  Pasha  gave  the 
order,  the  village  Sheikh,  with  smiles  on  his  lips 
and  curses  in  his  heart,  would  pay  considerable 
sums  of  money,  which  the  Pasha,  after  levying  a 
contribution  for  his  personal  use,  would  devote  to 
fireworks  in  honour  of  a  ruler  for  whom  the  Sheikh 
in  reality  felt  but  httle  sympathy.  AVhen,  in  1893, 
the  relations  between  the  British  Government  and 
Abbas  II.  were  somewhat  strained,  the  Sheikh, 
always  acting  under  orders,  would  form  part  of  a 
deputation  to  congratulate  the  ruler  of  his  country 
on  his  courage  and  patriotism.^  But  for  all  that, 
his  submissiveness  was  the  old  submissiveness  with 
a  difference.  He  was  anxious  to  have  it  whispered 
behind  the  scenes  to  the  diplomatic  representative 
of  England  that,  though  he  was  constrained  to  all 
this  lip-service,  in  reality  he  meant  nothing  by  it ; 
that  he  was  in  deadly  fear ;  and  that  his  one  hope 
was  that  England  would  stand  firm  and  save  him 
from  being  again  cast  into  the  jaws  of  Pashadom. 

*  I  give  in  an  Appendix  to  this  cliapter  one  anioufrst  many  letters 
from  the  Slieikh  class,  which  was  shown  to  me  at  this  time.  It  8ho\»\' 
•  capacity  for  trimming  which  is  characteristic. 


CH.XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  189 

Moreovei,  when  Moukhtar  Pasha,  the  representa- 
tive of  the  KhaUf,  came  to  Egypt,  very  mixed 
feehngs  were  excited  in  the  minds  of  the  village 
Sheikhs,  who  let  the  British  Consul-General  know 
that,  in  spite  of  the  spiritual  connection,  they  did 
not  want  to  be  brought  into  any  closer  connection 
with  their  Khalif  or  his  agents ;  on  the  contrary, 
that  they  preferred  to  receive  water  for  their  fields 
at  the  hands  of  the  English  engineer.  JMoreover, 
as  time  went  on,  the  minds  of  the  squirearchy 
underwent  some  change.  In  spite  of  all  outward 
and  visible  signs  of  submissiveness,  they  are  now 
no  longer  mere  Egyptian  clay  in  the  hands  of  the 
Turkish  potter,  as  in  the  pre-reforming  days.  Years 
of  British  rule  have  taught  them  that  they  too 
have  their  rights,  and  it  may  be  that  they  would 
not  remain  so  passive  as  of  yore  if  those  rights 
were  infringed. 

I  have  said  that  when  the  English  came  to 
Egypt,  many  of  the  village  Omdehs  and  Sheikhs, 
though  they  cringed  before  the  Pashas,  revenged 
themselves  by  bullying  the  fellaheen.  The  latter 
part  of  this  statement  merits  some  further  develop- 
ment. 

The  village  is  the  administrative  unit  in  Egypt. 
The  Omdehs  and  Sheikhs  are  the  corner-stone  on 
which  the  edifice  of  provincial  society  rests.  They 
have  certain  duties  to  perform.  They  are  con- 
sidered responsible  for  public  security.  If,  in  past 
times,  a  crime  was  committed  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  village,  and  if  the  criminal  was  not 
forthcoming,  the  imperious  rulers  of  the  country 
had  some  rude  methods  for  ensuring  his  arrest. 
The  usual  practice  was  to  make  the  Sheikhs 
suffer  vicarious  punishment,^  until  the  criminal  was 

'  Sir  Donald  Mackenzie  Wallace  [Egypt  and  the  Egyptian  Question, 
p.  261)  tells  a  characteristic  story,  which  was  related  to  him  by  au  old 
fellah,  of  how  Mehemet  Ali  paid  a  visit  to  his  village  and  ordered  the 


190  MODERN  EGYPT  .r.iv 

produced.  This  generally  had  the  desired  effect. 
The  head  of  the  village  was  responsible  for  the 
assessment  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  for  the  collec- 
tion of  the  taxes.  He  furnished  gangs  for  the 
corvee.  He  was  answerable  for  obtaining  recruits 
for  the  army.  The  exercise  of  these  functions 
supplied  him  with  opportunities  for  illicit  gain , 
for,  provided  the  taxes  were  paid,  the  corvee  gangs 
forthcoming,  and  a  sufficient  number  of  youths 
delivered  annually  to  feed  the  vultures  of  the 
Soudan,  no  questions  were  asked.  The  village 
Sheikhs  were  practically  uncontrolled.  They 
naturally  abused  the  privileges  of  their  position, 
and  developed  into  petty  tyrants. 

The  village  Sheikh,  like  the  Pasha  and  the 
"Alim,"  felt  an  instinct  of  self-preservation  alive 
within  him  at  the  approach  of  the  English  reformer. 
He  foresaw  that  his  privileged  position  would  be 
shaken.  Neither  did  his  prophetic  instinct  err. 
For,  before  the  Englishman  had  been  long  at 
work,  the  corvee  was  abolished ;  the  assessment 
and  collection  of  the  taxes,  as  well  as  the  recruit- 
ing for  the  army,  were  taken  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  village  authorities.  So  far,  indeed,  did  the  zeal 
of  the  English  reformer  go,  that  the  Sheikli  began 
to  mutter  Nolo  episcopari.  The  position  of  the 
head  of  a  \dllage  became  no  longer  lucrative.  The 
Sheikh  class  began  to  doubt  whether,  under  these 
circimistances,  it  was  worth  w^iile  to  assume 
responsibilities  from  which  little  or  no  compensa- 
ting advantage  was  to  be  derived.  The  English- 
man, on  the  other  hand,  found  that  not  the  least 

Sheikhs  to  produce  two  robl)ers,  who  were  supposed  to  be  hidino^  in  the 
neifrhl)ourhood.  The  Sheikhs  stated  that  they  were  unable  to  do  so. 
"  In  the  twinkling  of  an  eye,  all  six  Sheikhs  were  lyinj"^  on  the  ground, 
face  downwards,  receiviiijj  the  bastinado  from  a  dozen  of  His  Hij^hness' 
stalwart  attendants."  Hefore  the  bastinadoinsr  process  had  proceeded 
far,  one  of  the  Sheikhs  said  that  he  knew  where  the  criminals  were 
'I'wo  men  were  accordingly  produced^  and  at  once  hanged. 


cH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLExMS  191 

difficult  part  of  his  administrative  task  was  to 
preserve  what  was  good  and  useful  in  the  village 
system,  whilst  purging  it  of  all  that  was  bad. 

It  may,  therefore,  be  said  that  in  the  pre-reform- 
ing  days,  the  tyranny  of  the  Sheikhs  over  the 
fellaheen  was  only  one  degree  less  oppressive  than 
that  of  the  Pashas.  In  some  respects,  indeed,  the 
oppression  of  the  former  was  more  burdensome 
and  more  irksome  than  that  of  the  latter ;  for  the 
Sheikh  was  always  present  in  the  village,  whilst 
the  Pasha  was  distant,  and  only  swooped  down 
occasionally  to  plunder  and  to  flog.  There  are  a 
number  of  Arabic  proverbs  which  owe  their  origin 
to  the  sentiments  entertained  by  the  fellaheen  as 
regards  the  Pasha  and  the  Sheikh  respectively. 
For  instance,  "  Let  the  lion  eat  me  at  a  mouthful 
rather  than  the  mosquito  piecemeal."  Another  is, 
"  The  tyranny  of  the  cat  is  better  than  the  justice 
of  the  mouse." 

The  feelings  of  the  Sheikh  class  towards  the 
English  were,  therefore,  divided.  On  the  one  hand, 
they  were  willing  to  rely  on  English  aid  for  pro- 
tection against  the  tyranny  of  the  Pashas  ;  on  the 
other  hand,  they  resented  the  interference  which 
curbed  the  exercise  of  their  own  time-honoured 
tyi-anny  over  the  fellaheen.  As  time  went  on,  and 
the  benefits  of  the  British  occupation  became  year 
by  year  more  apparent,  the  former  of  these  two 
sentiments  probably  predominated  over  the  latter ; 
but  any  praise  which  the  Sheikh  class  might  perhaps 
otherwise  have  accorded  to  English  efforts  on 
behalf  of  the  Egyptian  population,  was  tempered 
by  the  idea  that  the  Englishman  was,  after  all, 
only  carrying  out  the  original  programme  of  Arabi. 
A  few  of  the  most  observant  did,  hideed,  recognise 
that  in  Arabi's  hands  the  programme  would  not 
have  been  executed  with  so  much  skill  and  in- 
telligence.    On  the  other  hand,  no  inconsiderable 


192  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

number  regretted  that  Arabi  was  not  allowed  to  have 
his  way,  not  only  because  he  was  then-  compatriot 
and  co-religionist,  but  also  because  they  thought, 
and  perhaps  with  some  degree  of  reason,  that  whilst 
Arabi  would  have  executed  that  portion  of  the 
EngUsh  programme  wliich  involved  placing  a 
restraint  upon  the  Turco-Egyptian  Pasha,  he  would 
have  been  more  careful  of  their  interests  in  that 
he  would  have  allowed  the  tyramiy  of  the  Sheikh 
to  continue  unchecked.^ 

I  now  turn  to  that  class  of  Egyptian  society 
which,  if  not  the  most  interesting,  is  certainly  more 
deserving  of  sympathy  than  any  other.  It  is  un- 
necessary to  describe  at  any  length  the  character 
and  condition  of  the  blue-shirted  Egyptian  fellah. 
Every  Nile  tourist  knows  what  he  is  hke.  Any 
handbook  of  Egypt  can  tell  all  that  the  practical 
pohtician  need  know  of  his  past  history.  Every 
writer  on  Egyptian  affau's  has  touched,  m  a  gi'cater 
or  less  degree,  on  the  sufferings  which  he  has 
undergone  at  the  hands  of  a  long  succession  of 
despotic  rulers.  From  time  immemorial,  his  main 
end  in  life  has  been  to  find  some  means  for  evading 
the  extortionate  demands  of  the  tax-gatherer. 
"  The  Romans,"  Mommsen  says,  '*  assure  us  that 
the  Egyptians  were  proud  of  the  scourge-marks 
received  for  perpetrating  frauds  in  taxation."^  As 
it  was  in  the  days  of  Augustus,  so  was  it  in  the 
days  of  Ismail.  "  It  is  a  point  of  honour,"  Mr. 
McCoan  wrote  in  1877,  "to  bear  any  amount  of 
'  stick,'  if,  by  so  doing,  the  impost  or  any  part  of 
it   can   be   evaded.     The  fellah,  mdeed,  who  will 

^  Tliese  remarks  were  written  some  few  years  ago,  I  leave  them 
unaltered,  as  they  were  at  one  time  quite  correct.  But  they  are  so  to 
a  less  extent  now.  The  recollection  of  the  events  of  1882  is  rapidly 
dying  out.  Other  influences  have  taken  the  place  of  the  Arabi  myth. 
P'urther,  whatever  defects  may  still  exist  generally  amongst  the  Sheikh 
class,  I  have  little  douht  that  their  moral  and  intellectual  standard  is 
now  considerably  higlier  tliau  was  the  case  in  1882. 

*  The  Provinces  of  the  Roman  Empire,  voL.  ii,  p.  268. 


OH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  193 

not  do  so  is  despised  by  even  his  own  Avife  as  a 
poltroon,  and  if,  after  only  a  dozen  or  score  of 
blows,  he  disgorges  the  coin  which  endurance  of 
fifty  might  perhaps  have  saved,  the  conjugal 
estimate  of  his  spirit  is  generally  shared  by  his 
fellows."^  Next  to  evading  taxation,  the  fellah 
above  all  things  wishes  to  evade  mih'tary  service. 
His  favourite  method  of  attaining  this  object  was, 
at  one  time,  not  to  cut  off  a  finger,  as  was  done  by 
the  poltroons  "^  of  the  Roman  army,  but  to  sacrifice 
an  eye. 

In  dealing  vvdth  the  fellah,  the  English  politician 
had  mainly  two  points  to  bear  in  mind.  The  first 
point  was  that  the  immense  majority  of  the  popula- 
tion of  Egypt  are  fellaheen.  The  fellaheen,  there- 
fore, deserve  consideration  on  account  of  their 
numbers.  This  fact  would  at  first  sight  appear 
sufficiently  obvious,  but  it  was  at  one  time 
frequently  forgotten  by  Pashas  and  others. 

The  second  point  was  that,  as  the  fellah,  at  the 
time  of  the  British  occupation,  possessed  no 
privileges,  unless  the  Hability  to  be  indiscriminately 
robbed  and  flogged  can  be  called  a  privilege,  there 
would  be  no  difficulty  in  dealing  with  him  on  the 
ground  that  the  reformer  was  laying  a  rash  hand 
on  his  vested  rights.  As  he  stood  on  the  lowest 
rung  of  the  social  ladder,  there  was  no  one  below 
him  over  whom  he  could  tyrarmise. 

The  main  problem  which  the  EngUshman  had 
to  solve  was  this  :  How  to  confer  on  the  fellah  the 
privilege  of  no  longer  being  robbed  and  flogged, 
without  shattering  the  edifice,  which,  rotten  as  it 
was,  had  still  kept  Egyptian  society  together  for 
centuries  past.  In  dealing  with  this  problem,  one 
thing  was  certain.     The  fellah  had  everything  to 

^  Egypt  as  it  is,  p.  26. 

^  The  derivation  usually  given  for  the  word  "  poltroon "  ^jt>o//ic« 
truncus — is,  however,  more  than  douhtful.  See  Skeat's  Etymologicai 
Dictionary. 

VOL.  II  O 


194  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

gain  and  nothing  to  lose  by  the  work  of  the  English 
reformer.  There  cannot,  in  fact,  be  a  shadow  of 
doubt  that  the  fellah  has  gained  enormously  owing 
to  the  efforts  made  on  his  behalf  by  the  EngUsh- 
man.  He  has  gained  far  more  than  any  other  class 
of  society,  because  in  his  case  there  is  absolutely 
no  disadvantage  to  throw  into  the  scale  against  the 
immense  benefits  which  he  has  received. 

Does  the  Egyptian  fellah  appreciate  the  benefits 
which  have  been  conferred  on  him  ?  Does  he 
entertain  any  feelings  of  gratitude  towards  his 
benefactor  ?  These  are  questions  which  are  inter- 
esting in  themselves,  and,  moreover,  are  not 
altogether  devoid  of  political  importance. 

After    a    fashion,    the    fellah    appreciates  very 
highly  the  benefits  which  have  been  conferred  on 
him.     Ignorant  though  he  be,  he  is  wise  enough  to 
know  that  he  is  now  far  better  off  than  he  was  prior  to 
the  British  occupation.     He  would  shudder  at  any 
notion  that  the  old  regime  was  to  be  re-established. 
Moreover,  in  a  vague  sort  of  way  he  probably  recog- 
nises that  these  benefits  have  been  conferred  upon 
him  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.     But  he  is  singularly 
wanting  in  the  logical  faculty.     He  is  incapable  of 
establishing  clearly  in  his  mind  that,  for  the  time 
being  at  all  events,  good   administration  and  the 
exercise  of  a  paramount  influence  by  England  are 
inseparably  linked  together.     It  has  been  the  mis- 
fortune of  the  English  in  Egypt  that  the  classes 
who,  under  their  political  programme,  most  bene- 
fited by  British  rule,  were  those  who  were  least  of 
all  able  to  make  their  voices  heard.     The  fellaheen 
are,   politically  speaking,   ciphers.      They  are   too 
apathetic,  too  ignorant,  and  too  little  accustomed  to 
take  the  initiative,  to  give  utterance  in  any  politi- 
cally audible  form  to  their  opinions  even  when  they 
have  any.     Moreover,  in  the  event  of  a  premature 
withdrawal    of   the    British    garrison,  they   would 


CH.XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  195 

probably  not  form  any  definite  opinion  as  to  the 
results  of  the  measure  until  positive  proof  had  been 
afforded  to  them  that  a  fatal  mistake  had  been 
made.  Then  it  is  possible  that,  having  tasted  the 
fruits  of  good  administration  and  being  emboldened 
by  the  freedom  conferred  on  them  by  the  English- 
man, they  might  turn  round  and  rend  the  Pashas. 

As  to  whether  the  fellaheen  are  grateful  or  the  re- 
verse, it  is  to  be  observed  that  gratitude  is  not,  gener- 
ally speaking,  a  national  virtue.  Moreover,  many 
of  those  who  have  mixed  in  native  society  in  Egypt 
consider  that  ingratitude  is  one  of  the  predominant 
features  of  the  Egyptian  character.^  However  this 
may  be,  the  ordinary  fellah  is  kindly  and  jovial. 
If  he  were  left  to  himself  he  would  certainly  not 
entertain  any  unfriendly  feelings  towards  the 
Englishman,  in  spite  of  the  difference  of  race  or 
creed ;  indeed,  although  he  might  not  be  effusively 
grateful,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  on  his  own 
initiative  he  would  ever  do  anything  to  render 
himself  open  to  the  charge  of  ingratitude.  Unfor- 
tunately, he  is  emotional,  ignorant,  and  credulous. 
He  is  easily  led  away  by  lying  agitators  and 
intriguers.  Under  the  influence  of  ephemeral 
passion,  his  sense  of  gratitude  for  past  favours  would 
disappear  like  chaff  before  the  wind.  At  such  a 
moment,  the  same  man,  who  was  but  yesterday 
blessing  the  English  engineer  for  watering  his 
fields,  might  to-morrow,  should  the  occasion  arise, 
brain  his  benefactor  with  a  "  nabout "  ^  in  a  fit  of 
savage  passion.  It  should  be  added  that,  imme- 
diately afterwards,  he  would  probably  be  very  sorry 
for  what  he  has  done. 

My  reason  tells  me  that  this  is  so.     Yet  I  hate 

'  "  The  natives  of  Egypt  in  general,  in  common  with  the  Arabs  of 
otlier  countries,  are  (according  to  our  system  of  morals)  justly  charge- 
able with  a  fault,  wliich  is  regarded  by  us  as  one  of  great  magnitude  ; 
it  is  want  of  gratitude." — Lane,  Modern  Egyptians,  vol.  i.  p.  366. 

*  A  "  nabout"  is  a  staff,  which  is  sometimes  loaded  with  lead 


196  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

to  believe  it.  A  diplomatist,  and  especially  a  diplo- 
matist in  Egypt,  sees  a  good  deal  of  the  ignoble 
side  of  life.  Constant  dealings  with  corrupt  Pashas, 
scheming  adventurers,  and  other  hostile  elements, 
who  tliink  that  all  is  fair  in  business  or  politics,  are 
apt  to  shake  one's  faith  in  the  goodness  of  human 
nature.  JNIore  than  this,  the  question  of  whether 
the  fellaheen  of  Egypt  are  happy  or  unhappy, 
grateful  or  ungrateful,  though  a  matter  of  some 
interest  to  themselves  and  of  somewhat  more  than 
philanthropic  interest  to  others,  is,  after  all,  only 
one  of  the  factors  which  must  contribute  to  guide 
the  action  of  the  British  diplomatist.  He  has  to 
think,  or  at  all  events  the  Government  whom  he  is 
serving  has  to  think  of  the  interests  of  the  farmers  of 
Yorkshire,  the  fishermen  of  Yarmouth,  the  artisans 
of  Sheffield,  and  their  brother  taxpayers,  who  are 
his  own  countrymen,  and  he  has  to  ask  himself, 
what  is  it  to  these  whether  or  not  the  Egyptian  fella- 
heen are  flayed  alive  by  greedy  Pashas  and  tyrannical 
Sheikhs  ?  All  this  I  know.  Mais  pour  ctre  diplo- 
mate^  on  nest  pas  moins  liomme.  Even  a  matter-of- 
fact  official  may  be  allowed  to  cherish  what  is 
perhaps  an  illusion.  He  may  be  pardoned,  especially 
if  he  has  lived  much  in  the  inconsistent  East,  if  he 
nourishes  a  trace  of  inconsistency  in  the  recesses  of 
his  heart,  if  he  struggles  against  being  reasoned  out 
of  a  noble  hope.  Often  during  the  long  period 
when  my  countrymen  and  myself  were  engaged  in 
what  at  one  time  seemed  the  hopeless  task  of 
evolving  order  out  of  the  Egyptian  chaos,  have  I 
repeated  to  myself  those  fine  lines  of  the  Latin  poet 
which  Pitt  quoted  when  he  dealt  the  first  blow 
to  the  infamous  traffic  in  slaves  : 

Nosque  ubi  primus  equis  Oriens  afflavit  anhelis, 
Illic  sera  rubens  accendit  lumina  Vesper.^ 

*  Stanhope's  Life  of  Pitt,  p.  146.     The  quotation  is  from  the  first 

Georgic,  260-261. 


(ir.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  197 

Was  the  prophecy  of  the  Enghsh  statesman,  I 
asked  myself,  about  to  be  fulfilled  ?  Is  it  destined 
that,  under  the  guiding  hand  of  England,  the  rays 
of  true  civilisation  shall  at  last  pierce  into  the  oldest 
and  most  interesting  corner  of  the  dark  African 
continent,  and  lighten  with  their  sunshine  even  the 
mud  hut  of  the  Egyptian  fellah  ?  Is  the  English- 
man to  show,  by  precept  and  example,  that  usury 
and  drunkenness  are  not  the  only  handmaids  of 
Christian  education  ?  Pray  Heaven  it  may  be  so  ! 
When  Sir  Robert  Peel  committed  that  great  and 
wise  act  of  political  apostasy  for  which  his  name  will 
ever  live  in  English  history,  he  said  that  although 
he  had  suffered  much  in  separating  himself  from 
his  former  political  friends,  he  still  hoped  that  he 
would  "  leave  a  name  sometimes  remembered  with 
expressions  of  goodwill  in  those  places  which  are 
the  abode  of  men  whose  lot  it  is  to  labour  and  to 
earn  their  daily  bread  by  the  sweat  of  their  brow." 
I  may  perhaps  be  permitted  to  paraphrase  this 
memorable  passage.  In  spite  of  the  ignorance  and 
alleged  ingratitude  of  the  Egyptians,  I  still  dare  to 
cherish  a  hope  that  the  present  and  future  genera- 
tions of  fellaheen,  who  certainly  earn  and  will 
continue  to  earn  their  daily  bread  by  the  sweat  of 
their  brow,  will  remember  with  some  feeling  akin 
to  gratitude  that  it  was  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  who 
first  delivered  them  from  the  thraldom  of  their 
oppressors,  who  taught  them  that  they  too  had  the 
right  to  be  treated  like  human  beings,  who  conferred 
upon  them  the  material  blessings  which  follow  in 
the  train  of  true  Western  civilisation,  and  who 
opened  out  to  them  the  path  which  leads  to  moi^l 
progress  and  elevation  of  thought.  The  time,  it 
may   be    hoped,    is    past   when    Egypt  ^   and   the 

*  Hoary  Memphis  boasts  her  tombs  alone, 
The  mournful  types  of  mighty  power  decayed. 

Shenstone,  Elegy  XJY, 


108  MODERN  EGYPT  fi.  iv 

Egyptians  could  be  cited  as  one  of  the  most  striking 
contrasts  the  world  has  ever  known  between  past 
grandeur  and  modern  decadence. 

In  any  case,  whether  the  Egyptian  fellah  be 
capable  or  incapable  of  gratitude,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  it  was  the  hand  of  England  which  first 
raised  him  from  the  abject  moral  and  material 
condition  in  which  he  had  for  centuries  wallowed. 
If,  now  that  he  is  beginning  to  emerge  from  his 
slough  of  despond,  I  thought  that  he  would  be 
permitted  to  relapse  into  his  former  state,  and  that 
the  work  on  which,  in  common  with  many  of  my 
countrymen,  I  have  spent  the  best  years  of  my  Ufe 
woidd  be  undone,  then  would  I  say  rore  fioc  x'^voi 
evpela  x^^^-  I  hasten  to  add  that  I  not  merely 
hope,  but  strongly  believe  that  no  such  disappoint- 
ment of  my  political  hopes  is,  in  the  smallest  degree, 
probable. 

The  last  category  of  INIoslem  dwellers  in  Egypt 
of  whom  it  is  necessary  to  speak  is  the  Bedouins, 
semi-sedentary  and  nomad.  Of  these,  but  little 
need  be  said.  A  number  of  proverbs  are  current 
in  Egypt  indicative  of  the  dislike  entertained  by 
the  dwellers  in  the  \'alley  of  the  Nile  to  those  in 
the  desert.  Of  these,  the  best  known  is,  "  Better 
tlie  tyranny  of  the  Turk  than  the  justice  of  the 
Bedouins."  The  Bedouins  are,  in  fact,  supposed 
to  be  very  cruel  and  unjust.  Another  proverb  is 
in  the  form  of  a  narrative  :  "  The  Bedouin  told  my 
wife  tliat  there  was  no  water  in  the  well.  She  at 
once  went  hastily  to  the  well  with  four  buckets." 
Tliis  is  in  allusion  to  the  alleged  selfishness  and 
untruthfulness  of  the  Bedouins.^ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Bedouins  despise  the 
fellaheen,  whom  they  consider  an  unmanly  race. 
The  Bedouins  occasionally  complain   that  in   the 

*  Burckhardt  (Amhic  Prorerhs,  p.  123)  gives  another:  "Eutertai 
the  Bedouin,  lie  will  steal  thy  clothes." 


CH.  XXXV  THE  MOSLEMS  199 

matter  of  military  service,  from  which  they  are 
exempted,  the  Egyptian  Government  wish  to 
"reduce  them  to  fellaheen."  It  is  wise  policy  to 
keep  them  contented  and  to  encourage  them  to 
settle  on  the  cultivated  lands.  Otherwise,  they 
are  apt  to  turn  into  marauders  and  to  cause 
disturbances  of  various  sorts.  Their  ancient 
privileges  have,  therefore,  for  the  most  part,  been 
preserved  to  them.  This  treatment  has  proved 
effective.  The  figures  of  the  census  of  1897 
compared  with  those  of  1882  show  that,  since 
the  British  occupation,  there  has  been  a  strong 
tendency  on  the  part  of  the  Bedouins  to  abandon 
their  nomadic  habits,  and  to  settle  in  the  villages 
bordering  on  the  desert.  Broadly  speaking,  the 
Bedouins,  for  the  purposes  of  the  present  narrative 
and  argument,  may  be  considered  a  quantite 
negligeable.  They  did  not  exercise  any  consider- 
able influence  on  the  course  of  British  policy  in. 
Egypt. 


200  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 


APPENDIX 

Translation  of  a  Letter  from  a  Sheikh  of  Keneh  to  a 
Sheikh  of  the  Mosque  of  Seyyidna-Hussein  at  Cairo. 

February  2,  1894. 

During  these  days,  the  talk  has  been  great  among  the 
people,  and  tongues  have  wearied  as  to  the  difference  which 
had  sprung  up,  so  they  said,  between  our  Lord  the  Khedive 
and  Barino;.  There  were  those  who  said :  "  The  English 
have  many  soldiers,  and  must  prevail."  Others  said,  and 
among  these  many  of  the  Ulema :  "  HE  has  said  (Grace  be 
on  Him  !)  how  often  hath  a  small  force  overcome  a  great  one 
by  the  aid  of  the  Almighty,  be  His  name  exalted  ! " 

Then  it  was  reported  in  our  districts  :  "  Behold  the  Infidel 
is  overcome,  and  Baring  has  fled  in  haste  to  his  own  country. 
The  days  of  Abbas  shall  be  like  those  of  his  forefathers  ;  the 
people  and  the  Pashas  shall  be  bread  for  him  to  eat ;  the 
foreigner  will  be  his  servant," 

So  we  took  counsel,  and  thought  to  send  a  mission  from 
Keneh  to  say  :  "  Good  news  !  Effendina  has  returned  to  his 
fit  place ! "  For  the  poet  has  said :  "  The  wise  man  gives 
honey  to  the  bear  in  the  day  of  his  fatness,  but  the  fool 
smites  him  on  the  head  with  a  pole." 

Then,  while  we  still  pondered,  came  a  message  from  Cairo 
that  Baring  and  his  English  walked  in  the  city  like  leopards 
among  dogs,  and  that  Abbas  had  withdrawn  into  his 
castle  and  sat  scowling,  for  the  Government  of  Baring  had 
said  :  "  Be  meat  that  we  may  devour  you  ! "  So  we  were 
hushed,  and  resolved  to  say  nothing  of  any  deputation. 
And,  of  a  truth,  I  think  that  it  is  not  easy,  and  will  be  less 
30  in  time  to  come,  to  send  deputations  of  good  tidings  to 
our  Lord  the  Khedive. 

Now,  I  had  myself  thought  that  the  end  could  only  be 
thus,  for  I  have  seen  the  English  and  I  know  them.  But 
aloud  1  said  :  "  The  blessing  of  God  on  the  deputation,  and 
the  aid  of  His  mighty  arm  !  for  are  we  not  all  Moslems  and 
brethren  ?     (God  increase  the  might  of  Islam  !)  " 

But,  O  my  friend  !  I  beg  you  to  keep  this  letter  very 
secret,  for  the  poet  has  said:  "III  is  his  lot  in  the  court 
whom  the  Kadi  has  heard  to  whisper,  '  There  is  justice 
amongst  the  unbelievers,"'  "^ 

'  A  change  has  been  made  in  the  last  paragraph  without  alteriug 
the  general  sense.     The  o:iginal  was  too  course  to  be  reproduced. 


CHAPTER   XXXVI 

THE    CHRISTIANS 

TTie  Copts — The  conservatism  of  their  religion — TTieir  character — 
Thrir  attitude  towards  the  Eiif^lish — The  reform  movement — 
The  Syrians — Their  position — Their  unpopularity — Their  attitude 
towards  the  Eng:lish — The  Akmenians — Tlieir  subserviency  to  the 
Turks — Nubar  Pasha— His  son  Boghos — Yacoub  Pasha  Artin — 
Tigraue  Pasha — The  Egyptians  should  not  be  weighed  in  European 
scales. 

The  Egyptian  native  Christians  may  be  divided  into 
three  categories,  viz.  (1)  the  Copts  ;  (2)  the  Syrians  ; 
and  (3 )  the  Armenians.  Of  these,  the  most  important 
in  point  of  numbers  are  the  Copts.  The  census  of 
1897  showed  that  there  were  at  that  time  608,000 
Copts  in  Egypt.  Of  these,  some  few  are  Cathohcs 
and  some  Protestants,  but  by  far  the  greater  number 
belong  to  what  is  termed  the  Orthodox  Church. 

Beyond  mentioning  that  the  Orthodox  Copts 
are  Monophysites,  and  that  they  separated  from 
the  main  body  of  the  Christian  Church  subsequent 
to  the  Council  of  Chalcedon  in  a.d.  451,  it  is 
needless  to  dwell  on  the  special  tenets  of  the 
Coptic  creed.  One  point  in  connection  with  the 
religion  of  the  Copts  should,  however,  be  men- 
tioned, inasmuch  as  it  is  intimately  connected  with 
an  understanding  of  tlie  general  cliaracteri sties  of 
the  Coptic  community.  The  Christianity  of  the 
Copt  has  been  as  conservative  as  the  Islamism 
of  the  Moslem.  "The  Eastern  Church,"  Dean 
Stanley  says,  "was,  like  the  East,  stationary  and 

•201 


202  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  iv 

immutable ;  the  Western,  like  the  West,  pro- 
gressive and  flexible.  .  .  .  The  theology  of  the 
East  has  undergone  no  systematising  process.  The 
doctrines  remain  in  the  same  rigid  yet  undefined 
state  as  that  in  which  they  were  left  by  Constantine 
and  Justinian."  If  a  religious  belief  cannot  adapt 
itself  to  the  requirements  which  are  constantly 
cropping  up  as  the  world  grows  older,  one  of 
two  things  will  probably  happen.  Either  society 
advances  and  the  religious  belief  is  stranded  and 
eventually  forgotten,  or  the  creed  holds  society  in 
its  grip  and  bars  the  way  to  advancement.  It  is 
the  proud  boast  of  the  Christian  religion,  and 
more  especially  of  the  Protestant  variety  of  that 
religion,  that  it  is  not  obliged  to  choose  between 
either  of  these  alternatives.  It  possesses  sufficient 
elasticity  to  adapt  itself  to  modern  requirements. 

It  is  true  that  the  Coptic  Christian  has  remained 
stagnant,  but  there  is  this  notable  difference  between 
the  stagnation  of  the  JNIoslem  and  that  of  the  Copt. 
The  Moslem  stands  in  everything  on  the  ancient 
ways  because  he  is  a  Moslem,  because  the  customs 
which  are  interwoven  with  his  religion,  forbid  him 
to  change.  "  Swathed  in  the  bands  of  the  Koran, 
the  Moslem  faith,  unlike  the  Christian,  is  powerless 
to  adapt  itself  to  varying  time  and  place,  keep 
pace  with  the  march  of  humanity,  direct  and  purify 
the  social  life,  or  elevate  mankind."^  The  Copt, 
on  the  other  hand,  has  remained  immutable,  or 
nearly  so,  not  because  he  is  a  Copt,  but  because 
he  is  an  Oriental,  and  because  his  religion,  which 
admits  of  progress,  has  been  surrounded  by  associa- 
tions antagonistic  to  progress.  In  the  case  of 
the  Copt,  it  is  not  necessary,  as  in  that  of  the 
Moslem,  to  strike  off  any  rehgious  shackles  before 
he  can  proceed  along  tlie  path  of  political  and 
social   advancement.      The   reformer   in   temporal 

*  fcjir  William  Muir,  T}ie  Caliphate,  p.  594. 


on.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  203 

matters  does  not  at  every  turn  find  himself  face 
to  face  with  the  priest,  who  in  tlie  name  of  rehgion 
or  rehgious  custom  bars  the  way  to  progress. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  principle,  the  difference 
is  immense.  From  the  point  of  view  of  practice, 
the  difference  has  so  far  been  slight.  In  spite  of 
his  religion  which,  as  the  history  of  the  world  has 
shown,  admits  of  progress,  the  Copt  has  been  arrested 
by  barriers  very  similar  to  those  which  have  appUed 
in  the  case  of  the  Moslem.  It  is,  indeed,  natural 
that  such  should  have  been  the  case.  The  minority 
must  of  necessity  submit  to  the  influence  of  the 
majority.  In  India,  the  Moslems  have  to  a  certain 
extent  become  Brahminised.  In  spite  of  the 
unbending  tenets  of  their  creed,  custom  and  asso- 
ciation have  been  too  strong  for  them.  The 
Hindoos,  being  in  a  majority  of  five  to  one,  have 
copied  nothing  from  the  Moslems.  The  INloslems, 
on  the  other  hand,  have  insensibly  assimilated 
certain  Hindoo  ideas,  notably  the  idea  of  caste. 
The  Indian  Moslem  will  not  eat  with  the  Chris- 
tian, although  there  is  nothing  in  his  religious  code 
which  forbids  him  to  do  so,  and  although  his 
brother- Moslem,  who  is  not  exposed  to  Hindoo 
association,  does  so  willingly.  The  same  principle 
has  applied  in  the  case  of  the  Egyptian  Copts. 
The  Moslem  has  in  no  way  become  Christianised. 
The  Copt,  on  the  other  hand,  has,  without  know- 
ing it,  assimilated  himself  to  the  Moslem.  "  The 
modern  Copt  has  become  from  head  to  foot,  in 
manners,  language,  and  spirit,  a  Moslem,  however 
unwilling  he  may  be  to  recognise  the  fact."^  Coptic 
women  are  almost  as  secluded  as  INIoslems.  Coptic 
children  are  generally  circumcised.  The  marriage 
customs  and  funeral  ceremonies  of  the  Copts  are 
very  similar  to  those  of  JNloslems. 

Much    has    been    written    about    the    general 

*  Upper  Egypt,  etc.,  p.  89. 


204  MODERN  EGYPT  it.  iv 

characteristics  of  the  Copts.  All  generalisations 
about  the  attributes  of  a  nation  or  of  a  class  are 
apt  to  be  imperfect,  and  must  necessarily  do 
injustice  to  exceptional  mdividuals.  The  Copts 
have  somewhat  specially  suffered  from  hasty 
generalisation.  Until  of  recent  years,  when  by 
reason  of  the  British  occupation  a  flood  of  Hght  has 
been  thrown  on  everything  connected  with  Egypt, 
most  Englishmen  who  paid  any  attention  to  the 
national  characteristics  of  the  "Modern  Egyptians" 
took  their  ideas  from  the  classic  work,  which 
has  immortalised  the  name  of  Lane.  Now  Lane 
was  a  strong  Mohammedan  sympathiser.  He  knew 
but  little  about  the  Copts.  All  the  information  he 
supplies  about  them  appears  to  have  been  based  on 
the  testimony  of  one  "  respectable  Copt "  whose 
acquaintance  he  happened  to  make,^  and  who 
certainly  gave  a  most  unfavourable  account  of  his 
co-religionists.  "  One  of  the  most  remarkable 
traits,"  Lane  says,  "  in  the  character  of  the  Copts 
is  their  bigotry.  They  bear  a  bitter  hatred  to  all 
other  Christians,  even  exceeding  that  with  which 
the  Moslems  regard  the  unbelievers  in  El- Islam. 
.  .  .  They  are,  generally  speaking,  of  a  sullen 
temper,  extremely  avaricious,  and  abominable 
dissemblers  ;  cringing  or  domineering  according  to 
circumstances.  The  respectable  Copt,  to  whom  I 
have  already  acknowledged  myself  chiefly  indebted 
for  the  notions  which  I  have  obtained  respecting 
the  customs  of  his  nation,  gives  me  a  most 
unfavourable  account  of  their  character.  He  avows 
them  to  be  generally  ignorant,  deceitful,  faithless, 
and  abandoned  to  the  pursuit  of  worldly  gain,  and 
to  indulgence  in  sensual  pleasures."'^ 

*  "  I  had  the  g'ood  fortune  to  become  acquainted  with  a  character 
of  which  1  had  doubted  tlie  existence,  a  Copt  of  a  liberal  as  well  as  an 
intelligent  mind  ;  and  to  his  kindness  I  am  indebted  for  the  knowledge 
of  most  of  the  facts  related  in  the  foUowiiiir  brief  memoir." — Modem 
Egyptians,  vol.  ii.  p.  273.  ^  Modern  Egyptians,  vol.  ii.  p.  295. 


CH.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  205 

This  judgment  appears  to  err  greatly  on  the  side 
of  severity.  Even  if  it  be  admitted  that  the  un- 
pleasing  quahties,  which  I^ane  indicates,  are  some- 
times to  be  found  amongst  the  Copts,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  the  Copts  have  no  monopoly  of  those 
qualities.  Bigotry,  ignorance,  dissimulation,  deceit, 
faithlessness,  the  pursuit  of  worldly  gain,  and  in- 
dulgence in  sensual  pleasures,  may,  to  a  certain 
extent,  be  Egyptian,  but  it  can  scarcely  be  held 
that  they  are  especially  Coptic  attributes.  They 
are  to  be  found  in  an  equal  degree  amongst 
Egyptian  JMoslems. 

Sir  John  Bowring,  who  next  to  Lane  is  probably 
the  best  of  the  less  recent  authorities  on  Egyptian 
national  characteristics,  passes  a  more  kindly  judg- 
ment on  the  Copts.  Although,  he  says,  the  Turks 
have  always  considered  the  Copts  as  "the  parialis 
of  the  Egyptian  people,  yet  they  are  an  amiable, 
pacific,  and  intelligent  race,  whose  worst  vices 
have  grown  out  of  their  seeking  shelter  from 
wrong  and  robbery." 

Lane  appears  to  me  to  be  prejudiced  in  this 
matter.  His  statement  is,  to  say  the  least,  much 
too  highly  coloured  as  regards  the  present  race 
of  Egyptians,  whether  Moslems  or  Copts.  Bow- 
ring,  on  the  other  hand,  hardly  states  the  whole 
case.  My  own  experience  leads  me  to  the  follow- 
ing conclusions :  first,  that,  owing  to  circum- 
stances uncomiected  with  the  difference  of  religion, 
the  Egyptian  Copt  has  developed  certain  moral 
attributes  which  also  belong  to  the  Eg3^ptian 
Moslem ;  secondly,  that,  owing  to  circumstances 
which  are  accidentally  connected  with,  but  which 
are  not  the  consequences  of  his  religion,  the  Copt 
has  developed  certain  in^tellectual  qualities,  in 
which,  mainly  from  want  of  exercise,  the  Egyptian 
Moslem  seems  to  be  deficient ;  thirdly,  that  for 
all    purposes    of    broad    generalisation,    the    only 


206  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

difference  between  the  Copt  and  the  Moslem  is 
that  the  former  is  an  Egyptian  who  worships  in 
a  Christian  church,  whilst  the  latter  is  an  Egyptian 
who  worships  in  a  IMohamniedan  mosque. 

The  question  now  under  discussion  is  one  of 
great  interest,  for  it  involves  nothing  less  than 
this — has  the  Christian  religion,  taken  by  itself 
and  apart  from  all  other  influences,  been  able  in 
the  course  of  centuries  to  develop  moral  qualities 
in  the  Coptic  community  superior  to  those 
generally  attributable  to  the  non-Christian  com- 
munity by  which  the  Copts  have  been  surrounded  ? 

I  am  reluctantly  constrained  to  answer  this 
question  in  the  negative.^  It  is,  so  far  as  I  am 
aware,  impossible  to  mdicate  any  moral  quality 
in  respect  to  which  the  Copt,  with  his  1500  years 
of  Christianity  behind  him,  is  notably  superior 
to  the  Moslem.  The  moral  code  by  which  the 
relations  between  man  and  man  are  regulated  is, 
in  the  case  of  the  Copt,  no  more  ele\ated  than 
in  the  case  of  the  Moslem.  In  spite  of  his  religion 
and  his  monogamous  habits,  the  Copt  has  developed 
no  high  ideal  of  womanhood.  More  than  this, 
in  respect  to  one  important  point  the  Moslem 
occupies  a  more  elevated  moral  position  than  the 
Copt.  The  former,  when  untainted  by  European 
association,  is  distinguished  for  his  sobriety — a 
moral  quality  which  is  noticeable  to  a  less 
extent  amongst  the  Copts. ^  It  is,  of  course, 
true  that  the  defects  of  Coptic  character  are  not 
attributable  to  their  religion.     It  is  also  true  that 

*  It  is,  however,  to  be  rememljered,  looking'  to  the  past  history  of 
the  Copts,  that  they  deservi'  ufieat  credit  for  the  steadfastness  with 
whicli  they  liave  adhered  to  tlieir  faith  in  tlie  face  of  persecution.  As 
to  the  persecution  see,  inter  uliu,  Makrizi's  //?5/or//  (Maian's  transhition), 
p.  88.  lu  Dr.  Butler's  admirable  work,  The  Arab  (.'onqnext  of  Egypt,  a 
full  account  is  given  of  the  persecution  to  which  the  Copts  were  at  cue 
time  subject. 

^  "  Intoxication  is  a  frequent  vice  amongst  the  Copts."— Bowring'g 
Report,  p.  8.     See  also  Cairo,  p.  206. 


CH.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  207 

the  Copt  has  been  exposed  to  the  influence  of  a 
somewhat  debased  form  of  Christianity ;  that 
that  influence  has  been  exerted  under  specially 
unfavourable  conditions ;  and  that  the  defects  in 
the  Coptic  character  are,  more  often  than  not, 
"the  vices  of  servitude."^  Nevertheless,  to  those 
who  beheve  in  the  morahsing  and  civihsing 
influence  of  the  Christian  religion,  it  is  dis- 
appointing to  find  that,  in  differentiating  the 
Egyptian  Copt  from  his  compatriots  who  are 
Moslems,  it  is  not  possible  to  indicate  any  one 
special  virtue,  and  to  say  that,  in  spite  of  every 
adventitious  disadvantage,  the  Christian  religion 
has  fostered  and  developed  that  virtue,  and  has 
thus  given  a  certain  moral  superiority  to  the 
Christian  over  the  Moslem.  Such,  however, 
appears  to  be  the  case.  I  fear  it  must  be  admitted 
that  so  far  the  Copt  has  stood  before  the  world 
as  a  Christian  who,  by  reason  of  adverse  circum- 
stances, has  been  unable  to  profit  to  any  great 
extent  by  his  Christianity. 

Turning  from  moral  attributes  to  mental  quali- 
ties, it  cannot  be  said  that,  in  any  of  the  higher 
branches  of  intellectual  life,  the  Copts  have  shown 
any  superiority  over  the  Moslems.  But,  under  the 
stress  of  circumstances,  they  have  developed  certain 
mediocre  aptitudes.  As  compared  with  the  un- 
bending Moslem,  they  have  shown  a  greater  degree 
of  flexibility  m  adapting  themselves  to  a  few  of 
the  elementary  requirements  of  civilisation.  They 
have  seized  on  those  crumbs  from  the  Moslem 
table  which  the  Moslem  was  too  proud,  too 
careless,  or  too  unintelligent  to  appropriate  to 
himself  They  made  themselves  useful,  indeed 
almost  indispensable  to  their  oppressors,  aj  d 
the  aptitudes  which  they  thus  acquired  during 
the  period  of  oppression,  ought  to  have  stood  them 

1  Cairo,  p.  208. 


208  INIODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

ill  good  stead  when  the  flood -tide  of  European 
civilisation  set  in.  For  the  European  will  recog- 
nise that  the  Copt  possesses  in  some  degree  that 
accurate  habit  of  thought  which  is  wanting  in 
the  JMoslem,  and  which  is  the  god  at  whose  altar 
the  logical  European  is  an  unceasing  devotee.  He 
will  accord  a  lukewarm  welcome  to  the  Copt,  not 
on  account  of  his  religion,  but  because  the  Copt 
can  add  and  subtract,  because  he  knows  his 
multiplication  table,  because  he  can  measure  the 
length  and  breadth  of  a  plot  of  ground  without 
making  any  gi'oss  error  in  the  measurement,  and 
because,  although  his  system  of  accounts  is  archaic, 
at  the  same  time  it  is  better  to  be  in  possession 
of  a  bad  system  of  accounts  than,  like  the  Egyptian 
Moslem,  to  have  scarcely  any  system  at  all.  "  The 
Copts,"  Bowring  said,  "  are  the  surveyors,  the 
scribes,  the  arithmeticians,  the  measurers,  the 
clerks,  in  a  word,  the  learned  men  of  the  land. 
They  are  to  the  counting-house  and  the  pen  what 
the  fellah  is  to  the  field  and  the  plough." 

What,  however,  was  the  attitude  of  the  Copts 
towards  the  English  reformer  ? 

The  question  is  of  some  interest  and  import- 
ance, for  although  the  Englishman,  strong  in  the 
righteousness  of  his  cause,  was  confident  of  the 
ultimate  result,  at  the  same  time,  looking  to  all 
the  obstacles  in  his  path,  to  the  inertia  of  the  mass 
of  the  population  whom  he  wished  to  befriend, 
and  to  the  activity  of  various  hostile  elements  of 
Egyptian  society,  who  would  assuredly  never  cease 
from  harrying  him,  he  would  have  been  glad  to 
welcome  the  most  humble  allies.  And  where 
would  the  Englishman  more  probably  find  allies 
than  amongst  a  body  of  persons  who  were  bound 
to  him  by  a  general  community  of  religion,  who 
had  suffered  from  the  oppression  of  the  Moslem 
and  notably  from  that  of  the  Moslem  Pasha,  and 


CH.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  209 

who  possessed  various  humble  aptitudes,  which  it 
would  be  in  the  interest  of  the  Englishman  to  turn 
to  account,  and  in  that  of  the  Copt  to  display  to 
the  best  advantage  in  the  presence  of  the  Enghsh- 
man  ?  The  premises  of  this  argument  were  seem- 
ingly correct ;  the  inference  was  plausible  ;  but,  as 
we  are  dealing  with  the  illogical  East,  we  need  not 
be  surprised  to  find  that  it  was  erroneous.  For, 
in  fact,  the  Copt  was,  in  the  first  instance  at 
all  events,  animated  by  no  very  friendly  feehngs 
towards  the  English  reformer. 

The  principles  of  strict  impartiality  on  which 
the  Englishman  proceeded  were  foreign  to  the 
nature  of  the  Copt.  When  the  British  occupation 
took  place,  certain  hopes  began  to  da^^ii  in  his 
mind.  I,  said  the  Copt  to  himself,  am  a  Christian ; 
if  I  had  the  power  to  do  so,  I  would  favour 
Christians  at  the  expense  of  Moslems  ;  the  English 
are  Christians  ;  therefore — and  it  was  here  that  the 
Copt  was  guilty  of  a  sad  ignoratio  elenchi — as  the 
English  have  the  power,  they  will  assuredly  favour 
Christians  at  the  expense  of  Moslems.  When  the 
Copt  found  that  this  process  of  reasoning  was 
fallacious,  and  that  the  conduct  of  the  Englishman 
was  guided  by  motives  which  he  had  left  out  of 
account,  and  which  he  could  not  understand,  he  was 
disappointed,  and  his  disappointment  deepened  into 
resentment.  He  thought  that  the  Enghshman's 
justice  to  the  Moslem  mvolved  injustice  to  liimself, 
for  he  was  apt,  perhaps  unconsciously,  to  hold  that 
injustice  and  absence  of  favouritism  to  Copts  were 
well-nigh  synonymous  terms. 

The  Copt,  moreover,  had  another  cause  of  com- 
plaint against  the  Enghsh  reformer.  Not  only 
was  he  disappointed  that  no  special  favours  were 
accorded  to  him,  but  he  saw  with  dismay  that, 
under  British  auspices,  he  was  in  danger  of  being 
supplanted    by    his    rival,   the    Syrian    Christian. 

VOL.  II  P 


210  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  im 

When  the  English  took  Egyptian  affairs  in  hand, 
the  accountants  in  the  employment  of  the  Egyp- 
tian Government  were  ahuost  exclusively  Copts. 
Their  system  of  accounts  v^^as  archaic.  Moreover, 
it  was  well-nigh  incomprehensible  to  any  but 
themselves.  All  tendencies  in  the  direction  of 
reform  were  resisted,  partly  from  conservatism, 
and  partly  from  instincts  of  self-preservation,  for 
it  was  clear  that  if  the  system  were  simplified  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  be  comprehensible  to  the 
uninitiated,  the  monopoly,  which  the  Copts  had 
heretofore  enjoyed,  would  be  endangered.  Finding 
that  he  could  not  untie  the  knot,  the  Enghshman, 
with  characteristic  energy,  cut  it.  The  Coptic 
system  of  accounts  had  manifestly  to  be  abolished, 
and  as  the  Copts  either  could  not  or  would  not 
assist  in  the  work  of  abohtion,  they  had  to  give 
way  to  other  agents.  In  the  early  days  of  the 
English  occupation  a  good  many  Syrians,  there- 
fore, took  the  places  of  Copts.  The  reform  was 
necessary,  but  it  naturally  caused  much  dissatis- 
faction amongst  the  Coptic  community. 

The  English,  therefore,  found  that  the  Copts 
were,  during  the  early  days  of  the  occupation, 
generally  unfriendly,  but  they  did  not  show  their 
unfriendliness  in  any  very  overt  form,  for  there  is 
one  quahty  in  which  the  Copt  excelled.  He  was 
an  accomplished  trimmer.  He  wished  to  pose  both 
as  Anglophobe  and  as  an  Anglophile  according  to 
the  requirements  of  his  audience,  and  according 
to  the  part  which  for  the  moment  appeared  to 
be  most  in  harmony  with  his  personal  interests. 
His  remarkable  powers  of  intrigue,  which  were 
developed  in  the  days  of  Moslem  oppression,  here 
came  to  his  assistance.  I  should  add  that,  as  the 
occupation  was  prolonged,  the  benefits  derived 
from  the  British  administration  of  Egypt  were 
gradually  more  and  more  recognised  by  the  Copts. 


cH.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  211 

They  began  to  understand  that  they  had  to  rely 
mainly  on  their  own  efforts,  and  those  efforts  were 
often  crowned  with  success.  Many  of  the  Copts 
now  in  the  Government  service  are  very  capable 
men.  A  Copt  of  marked  ability  (Boutros  Pasha 
Ghali)  has  occupied  for  a  long  time,  and  with 
great  credit  to  himself,  the  post  of  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs. 

Before  leaving  this  branch  of  the  subject,  it 
should  be  mentioned  that  for  many  years  past  a 
large  number  of  Copts  have  been  educated  in  the 
excellent  schools  established  throughout  Egypt  by 
the  American  missionaries.  Many  of  the  younger 
generation  speak  English,  and  show  a  tendency  to 
develop  moral  and  intellectual  qualities  greatly 
superior  to  those  of  their  fathers,  to  whom  the 
description  given  above  mainly  applies.  This  pro- 
cess of  education  has  produced  its  natural  result. 
The  young  Copts  see  that,  unless  they  wish  to  be  left 
behind  in  the  race  of  life,  they  must  bestir  them- 
selves. Once  having  eaten  of  the  tree  of  know- 
ledge, they  begin  to  recognise  the  decrepitude  of 
their  antique  hierarchical  and  educational  systems, 
and  they  are  stimulated  in  the  acquirement  of  this 
knowledge  by  the  fact  that  the  Syrian,  by  reason 
of  his  superior  intellectual  attainments,  is  taking 
away  the  birthright  of  the  Copts.  The  young 
Copt,  starting  with  Christianity  developed  by 
Western  education  in  his  favour,  has  sufficient 
versatility  to  draw  from  this  fact  the  conclusion 
at  which  the  slow-thinking  Moslem,  weighted  by 
his  leaden  creed,  arrives  more  tardily.  If  I  am  to 
outstrip  the  Syrian,  the  young  Copt  says,  it  is  of  no 
use  simply  cursing  him ;  I  must  abandon  my  ancient 
ways,  and  strive  to  be  his  equal.  So  a  movement 
has  been  developed,  the  object  of  which  is  to  apply 
Coptic  religious  endowments  to  useful  purposes ; 
to  question  the  necessity  of  devoting  funds,  dru^vn 


212  MODERN  EGYPT  ft  iv 

from  the  general  body  of  the  community,  exclu- 
sively to  the  maintenance  of  a  number  of  priestly 
sinecures  ;  to  establish  seminaries,  where  those  who 
wish  to  enter  holy  orders  may  learn  something 
more  than  how  to  mumble  a  few  set  formulse 
expressed  in  an  archaic  language,  which  has  been 
dead  for  the  last  two  centuries ;  ^  to  devote  any 
surplus  funds  to  secular  education  ;  and,  generally, 
to  instil  life  into  a  body  which  has  been  stagnant 
since  its  earliest  creation.  The  movement  natur- 
ally meets  with  resistance  from  the  hierarchy.  At 
first,  it  appeared  as  if  this  resistance  would  be  at 
once  overcome.  The  crisis  happened  to  take 
place  at  the  moment  when  Abbas  II.  succeeded 
to  Tewfik  I.  An  enlightened  Prime  JMinister 
(JNIustapha  Pasha  Fehmi),  acting  in  general  con- 
formity mth  English  ideas,  favoured  the  views  of 
the  Coptic  reformers.  The  Coptic  Patriarch,  who 
was  the  incarnation  of  the  most  stolid  form  of 
conservatism,  was  sent  to  one  of  those  desert 
monasteries,  where  in  the  early  days  of  Christianity 
the  misguided  anchorites  of  Egypt  tortured  their 
bodies  m  the  behef  that  they  were  doing  God 
service.  But  a  turn  in  the  political  wheel  brought 
about  a  different  order  of  things.  Riaz  Pasha,  who 
was  a  conservative  Moslem,  succeeded  to  power. 
Moslem  opinion  was  adverse  to  the  cause  of  the 
Coptic  reformers.  This  opposition  was  based  on 
two  grounds.  In  the  first  place,  the  staid  INIoslem 
was  shocked  at  rebellion  against  legitimate  hier- 
archical authority,  neither  did  he  care  to  inquire 
whether    that   authority   was   wisely   or   unwisely 

^  M.  Cogordan,  at  onetime  French  Consul-General  in  Egypt,  whose 
premature  death  was  deplored  by  all  who  were  privileged  to  know  him, 
wrote  :  "  Le  Pere  Vansleb  a  vu  a  Assiout,  en  1(572,  un  vieillard  qu'on 
lui  pre'sentait  com  me  le  dernier  Egyptien  parlant  le  Copte.  Mais  il 
est  probable  que  bieu  d'autres  le  jKirlcrent  apres  celui-ci ;  la  petite 
ville  de  Nagadeh  passe  pour  etre  celle  on  cet  idiome  se  conserva  le 
plus  tard,  jusqu'a  la  fin  du  XVIlIe  siede  probablemeut." — Relation  du 
Voyage /ait  au  Convent  de  Saint  Antoine,  p.  116. 


b^.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  213 

exercised.  In  the  second  place,  the  Moslem,  con- 
scious of  his  own  defects,  was  alarmed  at  the 
appearance  of  a  new  rival  in  the  shape  of  a  Coptic 
progressionist.  These  influences  being  in  the 
ascendart,  the  Patriarch  was  recalled  from  his 
eremitic  retreat.  The  British  diplomatist,  who 
alone  could  have  prevented  this  consummation, 
stood  aside.  However  much  he  might  sympathise 
with  the  cause  of  Coptic  reform,  his  worldly  know- 
ledge told  him  that  he  would  act  unwisely  in 
thrusting  himself  into  the  midst  of  a  quarrel 
between  the  temporal  and  spiritual  authorities  of  a 
creed  which  was  not  his  own.  For  the  time  being, 
therefore,  the  anti-reformers  triumphed.  But  the 
triumph  is  assuredly  but  temporary.  Time  is  on 
the  side  of  the  reformers ;  they  must  eventually 
gain  the  day  in  spite  of  Patriarchal  opposition. 
The  reformers  themselves  are  not  without  the 
faults  which  belong  to  political  youth  and  inexperi- 
ence. Their  self-esteem  is  somewhat  inflated. 
Nevertheless,  we  may  wish  them  well.  "  The 
Copts,"  Bowring  said,  "will  probably  occupy  no 
small  part  of  the  field  in  the  future  history  of 
Egypt."  Until  recently,  there  appeared  but  little 
prospect  of  this  prophecy  being  fulfilled ;  but  this 
latter-day  movement  of  the  young  Copts  affords 
ground  for  hope.  If  it  be  continued,  the  Coptic 
community  may  in  time  develop  attributes  which 
win  generate  and  foster  self-respect.  When  they 
have  done  this,  they  will  deserve  and  will  obtain 
the  respect  of  others.  They  will  be  carried  on  by 
the  stream  of  social  and  political  progress,  instead 
of  being  engulfed  or  remaining  stranded  on  the 
shore. 

Turning  from  the  Copts  to  the  Syrians,  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  there  are  a  certain  number  of 
Moslem  Syrians  resident  in  Egypt,  but,  from  a 
political  point  of  view,  the  Christian  Syrians  are 


214  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

far  more  important  than  the  Moslems.  In  the 
following  remarks,  therefore,  attention  will  be 
confined  to  the  Christians. 

It  is  not  possible  to  state  how  many  Syrian 
Christians  there  are  in  Egypt.  Without  doubt,  the 
Syrians  constitute  a  very  small  community  as  com- 
pared with  the  Copts.  They  derive  their  import- 
ance, however,  not  from  their  numbers,  but  from 
the  positions  which  they  occupy.  Considerable 
numbers  of  upper  and  upper-middle  class  Syrians 
are  Government  employes.  In  almost  every 
village  in  Egypt,  a  usurer  is  to  be  found  who, 
if  he  is  not  a  Greek,  is  generally  a  Syrian. 
There  are  numerous  Jews  in  Egypt ;  nevertheless, 
it  is  correct  to  say  that  the  Syrians  occupy  to  a 
great  extent  in  Egypt  the  positions  held  by  the 
Jews  in  many  countries  of  Europe.  Thus,  on  the 
one  hand,  the  Syrians  encounter  the  jealousy  of 
those  JNloslems  and  Copts  who  are  aspirants  for 
public  employment.  On  the  other  hand,  they  are 
regarded  by  the  mass  of  the  population  with  those 
feeUngs  of  dislike  which  improvident  debtors 
usually  entertain  towards  creditors  who  hold  them 
in  their  grip.  The  Syrian  moneylender  has  the 
reputation  of  being  singularly  grasping  and  merci- 
less. Moreover,  his  exactions  have  been  facilitated 
by  the  onward  march  of  civilisation  in  Egypt,  for 
the  Code  Napoleon,  which  was  suddenly  applied 
without  sufficient  modification  to  the  regulation  of 
the  monetary  transactions  of  the  country,  affords 
little  protection  to  the  poor  and  ignorant  debtor, 
whilst  it  is  capable  of  becoming  a  terrible  engine 
for  legalised  oppression  in  the  hands  of  a  grasping 
creditor. 

It  is  only  of  recent  years  that  the  Syrians  have 
acquired  their  present  position  in  Egypt.  Lane 
and  Bowring  scarcely  allude  to  them.  When, 
however,  Ismail  Pasha  began  to  Europeanise  the 


cH.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  215 

Egyptian  administrative  services,  it  was  natural 
that  a  demand  should  arise  for  intelligent  em- 
ployes, who  could  speak  both  Arabic  and  French, 
in  which  latter  language  most  of  the  European 
work  of  the  country  was  conducted,  and  who,  from 
their  training  and  habits  of  thought,  possessed  some 
aptitude  for  assimilating  European  administrative 
procedures.  It  was  at  the  time  hopeless  to  expect 
much  assistance  from  the  ordinary  unassimilative 
Moslem  who,  as  the  movement  swept  by  him, 
merely  looked  up  for  a  moment  with  a  scowl 
from  the  Koran,  and  then  relapsed  into  a 
state  of  political  torpor.  The  Copt  was  a  Httle 
more  helpful,  but  he  also  had  developed  no  high 
degree  of  versatiUty,  and,  moreover,  was  rarely 
acquainted  with  any  foreign  language.  When  the 
demand  for  employes  was  first  felt,  the  supply 
of  Europeanised  Egyptians  was  insufficient,  and 
further,  the  Europeanised  Egyptian  was  often  a 
less  useful  agent  than  his  social  and  political  kins- 
man, the  Syrian.  The  Syrian's  opportunity,  there- 
fore, came,  and  he  profited  by  it.  He  possessed  all 
the  quahfications  required.  Arabic  was  his  mother 
tongue.  He  was  generally  familiar  with  French, 
having  been  educated  at  some  French  college  in 
Syria.  He  was  versatile,  pushing,  and  ambitious. 
His  confidence  in  his  own  capacity  was  as  bound- 
less as  that  of  the  esurient  Greek  of  the  Roman 
satirist.  He  possessed  in  no  small  degree  the 
talent,  which  was  particularly  useful  in  a  cosmo- 
pohtan  society,  of  being  all  things  to  all  men.  He 
found,  therefore,  little  difficulty  in  jostling  himself 
into  some  position  of  authority,  and  once  there, 
being  animated  by  strong  feelings  of  race  affinity, 
he  opened  the  door  to  others  amongst  his  country- 
men, and  took  little  heed  of  the  charges  of  nepotism 
which  were  brought  against  him. 

When   the   English    took    Egyptian   affairs    in 


216  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

hand,  circumstances  again  favoured  the  Syrian. 
For  the  Englishman,  himself  generally  ignorant  of 
Arabic  and  only  semi  -  conversant  with  French, 
looked  over  the  Eg^^tian  administrative  chaos,  and 
said  to  himself:  Where  am  I  to  find  subordinates 
who  will  assist  me  ?  The  Moslem  is  for  the  time 
being,  useless ;  the  Copt  is  little  better.  I  am 
debarred  by  political  and  financial  reasons  from 
employing  Europeans.  Under  these  circumstances, 
the  Syrian  was  a  godsend. 

It  is  probable  that  the  employment  of  Syrians 
did  at  one  time  more  towards  rendering  the  British 
regime  unpopular  amongst  certain  classes  in  Egypt 
than  anything  else.  For  the  more  intelligent 
Moslem,  when  he  gradually  woke  up  to  what  was 
going  on  around  him,  said  to  himself:  The  Eng- 
lishman I  understand ;  I  recognise  his  good  qualities ; 
he  brings  to  bear  on  his  work,  not  only  knowledge, 
but  energy  superior  to  my  own ;  I  do  not  like  him, 
but  I  am  aware  that  he  means  well  by  me,  and  I 
see  that  he  confers  certain  material  benefits  on  me, 
which  I  am  very  willing  to  accept ;  but  what  of 
this  Syrian  ?  Am  I  not  as  good  as  he  ?  If  native 
agents  be  required,  why  should  not  my  kinsman 
be  employed  rather  than  this  alien,  who  possesses 
neither  the  advantages  of  the  European  nor  those 
of  the  true  Egyptian  ?  Accordingly,  the  Moslem, 
followed  at  no  great  distance  by  the  Copt,  poured 
forth  all  the  vials  of  his  wrath  on  the  Syrian. 
Even  Tewfik  Pasha,  whose  views  were  habitually 
temperate,  warmed  to  fever-heat  when  he  spoke  of 
the  Syrians,  whilst  the  same  subject  roused  Riaz 
Pasha's  more  sturdy  Islamism  to  the  boiling-point 
of  vituperation.  In  1890,  Riaz  Pasha  proposed  to 
issue  an  edict,  wliich  virtually  prohibited  all  Syrians 
from  entering  the  Egyptian  service.  Then  the 
British  diplomatist  had  to  step  forward  and  to 
point   out  in  a  cold-blooded,  accurate,  European 


CH.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  217 

fashion  that,  so  long  as  red-coated  soldiers  were 
walking  about  the  streets  of  Cairo,  no  absolute 
proscription  on  the  ground  of  race  or  creed  could 
be  tolerated ;  moreover,  that,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  equity  and  common  sense,  a  distinction 
should  be  drawn  between  those  Syrians  whose 
families  resided  in  Syria,  and  who  had  merely  come 
to  Egypt  to  make  their  fortunes,  and  those  who, 
though  of  Syrian  origin,  had  been  born  and  bred  in 
Egypt,  and  who  were,  therefore,  to  all  intents  and 
purposes,  Egyptians.  The  result  was  a  compro- 
mise. Syrians  who  had  hved  for  fifteen  years  in 
Egypt  were  admitted  to  the  pubUc  service  on  the 
same  terms  as  Egyptians. 

The  JNIohammedan  sentiment  on  this  subject  is 
very  natural.  The  Egyptian  Moslems  are,  in  fact, 
now  in  the  transitionary  phase  through  which  their 
co-religionists  in  India  have  already  passed.  When, 
after  the  events  of  1857,  all  the  paraphernalia  of 
European  administrative  systems  were  introduced 
into  India,  the  more  subtle  and  assimilative  Hindoo 
everywhere  got  the  better  of  the  slow -moving 
Moslem.  In  course  of  time,  however,  the  latter 
woke  up  to  the  fact  that  there  was  need  for  self- 
exertion  ;  and  accordingly,  if  all  accounts  be  true, 
he  is  now  running  neck  and  neck  with  the  Hindoo, 
having  possibly  cast  aside  some  of  the  obstructive 
customs  which  hang  on  to  the  skirts  of  his  creed 
before  he  could  attain  the  goal.  The  Egyptian 
'Moslem  must  of  necessity  undergo  the  same  pro- 
cess. He  will  find  that  protective  laws  against 
Syrian  and  Coptic  encroachments  will  be  of  little 
avail,  but,  if  he  braces  himself  to  the  work,  he 
may  yet  beat  the  Syrian  with  the  latter's  o\\ti 
weapons.  He  must,  however,  bestir  himself,  or 
he  will  be  outstripped  in  the  race.  It  is  difficult 
to  predict  what  will  become  of  the  JNIoham- 
medan   religion    if    the    Moslem    wins.       It    will 


218  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

possibly  suffer  slightly  in  the  excitement  of  the 
contest. 

The  Syrian,  equally  with  the  Copt,  has  to  a 
certain  extent  developed  "the  vices  of  servitude." 
He  has  been  obliged  to  bend  before  Moslem 
oppression  or  European  intellectual  superiority, 
and  the  process  of  adapting  himself  to  Moslem 
caprice,  or  of  imitating  European  procedures  and 
habits  of  thought,  is  not  calculated  to  develop 
the  manly  qualities.  Nevertheless,  whether  from 
a  moral,  social,  or  intellectual  point  of  view,  the 
Syrian  stands  on  a  distinctly  high  level.  He 
is  rarely  corrupt.  There  are  many  gradations  of 
Syrian  society.  A  high-class  Syrian  is  an  accom- 
plished gentleman,  whose  manners  and  general 
behaviour  admit  of  his  being  treated  on  a  footing 
of  perfect  social  equaUty  by  high-class  Europeans. 
His  intellectual  level  is  also  unquestionably  high. 
He  can  do  more  than  copy  the  European.  He 
can  understand  why  the  European  does  what  he 
does,  and  he  is  able  to  discuss  with  acuteness 
whether  what  is  done  is  wisely  or  unwisely  done. 
He  is  not  by  any  means  wanting  in  the  logical 
faculty.  It  would,  in  a  word,  be  wholly  incorrect 
to  say  that  he  merely  apes  civilisation.  It  may 
be  said  with  truth  that  he  really  is  civilised.  In 
this  respect,  he  is  probably  superior,  not  only  to  the 
Copt,  but  also  to  the  Europeanised  Egyptian,  who 
is  but  too  often  a  mere  mimic. 

There  is  yet  one  further  point  to  be  considered 
as  regards  the  Syrians.  AVhat  was  the  attitude 
of  the  Syrian  towards  the  British  reformer  ?  This 
question  was  at  one  time  a  never-ending  source 
of  difficulty  to  the  Syrian  himself,  for  he  was 
torn  with  conflicting  emotions.  His  French 
education  had  predisposed  him  to  look  askance 
at  everything  English.  The  Englishman's  direct, 
common -sense  mode  of  procedure,  and  his  scorn 


CH.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  219 

for  formalities,  were  foreign  to  the  subtle,  formal- 
istic  mind  of  the  Syrian,  whose  tendencies  were 
ultra -bureaucratic.  These  considerations,  coupled 
with  a  certain  amount  of  resentment  at  insular 
haughtiness,  led  the  Syrian  to  dislike  the  English- 
man. On  the  other  hand,  was  it  not  possible 
that  in  the  long  run  it  would  pay  better  to 
show  English  rather  than  French  prochvities  ? 
Amidst  the  doubts  which  hung  over  the  future 
of  Egypt,  it  was  difficult  to  give  any  positive 
answer  to  this  question.  Under  the  circum- 
stances, the  best  thing  the  Syrian  could  do  was 
to  be  Anglophile  or  Francophile  according  to  the 
requirements  of  the  moment.  He  would  even, 
under  the  pressure  of  self-interest,  occasionally  emit 
sparks,  which  to  the  uninitiated  might  appear  to 
emanate  from  the  forge  of  Egyptian  patriotism. 
But  in  reahty  his  heart,  or  perhaps  it  should  rather 
be  said  his  head,  was  attracted  by  the  theoretical 
perfection  of  French  administrative  systems.  He 
had  no  sympathy  with  the  English  or  with  English 
methods,  though  he  rendered  lip-service  to  the 
Englishman  and  gladly  accepted  anything  which 
the  Englishman  had  to  give  him.  This  view 
held  good  more  especially  at  the  commencement 
of  the  British  occupation,  for,  as  time  went  on, 
the  Anglophobia  of  the  Syrians  was,  to  say  the 
least,  greatly  diminished  in  intensity. 

Lastly,  something  should  be  said  of  the 
Armenians.  The  Armenian  community  in  Egypt 
is  small.  It  consists  for  the  most  part  of  shop- 
keepers. The  political  importance  of  the  Armenians, 
however,  is  derived  from  the  fact  that,  almost  ever 
since  the  dynasty  of  Mehemet  Ali  was  founded,  a 
few  Armenians  of  distinction  have  occupied  high 
positions  under  the  Egyptian  Government.  The 
Copts  have,  for  the  most  part,  never  occupied 
any  but  subordinate  posts  in  the  Egyptian  adminis- 


220  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  iv 

tration.  The  Syrians,  in  spite  of  their  abiUty, 
have  so  far  never  been  able  to  push  beyond  places 
of  secondary,  though  considerable,  importance. 
Armenians,  on  the  other  hand,  have  attained  the 
highest  administrative  ranks,  and  have  at  times 
exercised  a  decisive  influence  on  the  conduct  of 
public  affairs  in  Egypt. 

The  number  of  upper-class  Armenians  in  Egypt 
is  insufficient  to  justify  my  attempting  any  broad 
generalisation  of  Armenian  characteristics  based  on 
personal  observation.  But  I  may  say  that  those 
few  Armenians  with  whom  I  have  been  brouofht  in 
contact  appear  to  me  to  constitute,  with  the  Syrians, 
the  intellectual  cream  of  the  near  East. 

There  is  one  point  about  the  Armenians  which  is 
worthy  of  note.  Observe  a  middle-class  Armenian 
enter  the  room  of  a  Turkish  Pasha.  On  arriving  at 
the  door,  he  will  make  several  profound  obeisances. 
The  Pasha,  without  rising  from  his  seat,  will,  with 
contemptuous  condescension,  motion  to  him  to  sit 
down,  but  the  Armenian  will  not  do  so  at  once ; 
he  will  cross  his  hands  in  front  of  his  body,  cast  his 
eyes  on  the  ground,  sidle  along  the  wall  or  shuffle 
gradually  forward  without  ever  lifting  his  feet  from 
the  floor ;  at  last,  he  will  sink  slowly  down  on  the 
edge  of  a  chair  or  divan,  join  his  knees  in  front 
of  him,  cross  his  hands  on  his  breast,  and  in  this 
attitude  of  profound  humility  will  wait  until  the 
lordly  Pasha  thinks  fit  to  address  a  few  words  to 
him.  A  highly  educated  or  highly  placed  Armenian 
will  not,  indeed,  go  through  all  this  pantomime. 
Moreover,  the  younger  Armenians  are  less  defer- 
ential to  the  Turks  than  their  fathers.  But  no 
Armenian,  in  the  presence  of  a  Turkish  Pasha,  can 
ever  forget  that  he  is  a  Christian  raya  and  that  the 
Turk  is  his  oppressor ;  neither  can  this  be  any  matter 
for  surprise,  for  the  oppression  of  the  Turk  has,  in« 
deed,  in  the  case  of  the  Armenians,  been  extreme. 


CH.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  221 

The  most  distinguished  of  the  present  generation 
of  Armenians  in  Egypt  was  unquestionably  Nubar 
Pasha,  to  whose  character  and  aptitudes  incidental 
allusion  has  ah'eady  been  made,  and  of  whom  it 
will  become  necessary  to  speak  more  fully  at  a 
later  period  of  this  narrative. 

Nubar  Pasha's  son,  Boghos  Pasha  Nubar,  is  a 
man  of  marked  ability.  He  at  one  time  occupied, 
with  great  credit  to  himself,  the  post  of  Egyptian 
member  of  the  Railway  Administration,  and,  since 
his  retirement  from  the  service,  has  taken  a  most 
useful  and  intelligent  interest  in  public  affairs. 

Yacoub  Pasha  Artin  is  a  highly  cultivated  gentle- 
man, who  has  done  excellent  work  in  the  cause  of 
educational  reform. 

But  perhaps  one  of  the  most  typical  Armenians 
in  Egypt  was  Nubar  Pasha's  son-in-law,  Tigrane 
Pasha,  who  for  a  long  time  occupied  the  post  of 
Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  who  sub- 
sequently became  Foreign  JNIinister.^  He  was  a 
highly  educated  gentleman  of  polished  manners. 
He  spoke  French  perfectly ;  in  fact,  French  was 
the  language  in  which  he  was  most  at  home. 
He  spoke  English  well.  He  knew  no  Arabic, 
and  but  little  Turkish.  Without  being,  from  a 
political  point  of  view,  a  Gallophile,  his  habits 
of  thought  were  cast  in  a  French  mould.  Most 
of  the  young  Egj^tians  of  the  early  days  of  the 
occupation,  although  by  no  means  always  sjtii- 
pathisers  with  the  aims  and  pohcy  of  the  French 
Government,  were  saturated  with  ideas  which  had 
their  origin  in  French  education,  in  association  with 
Frenchmen,  and  in  the  fact  that  they  were  more 
conversant  with  French  than  any  other  European 
literature. 

'  Tigrane  Pasha,  to  the  great  regret  of  all  who  knew  him,  died  in 
1904.  Although  I  often  disagreed  with  him,  I  preserve  the  most 
pleasant  recollection  of  our  long  and  intimate  personal  relations. 


222  MODERN  EGYPT  rx  iv 

One  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
race  is  that  when  they  take  possession  or  semi- 
possession  of  a  country,  which  does  not  belong  to 
them,  they  are  apt  in  one  respect  to  forget  the 
position  which  they  occupy  towards  the  inhabitants. 
They  are  conscious  of  their  own  good  intentions ; 
they  earnestly  desire  to  govern  the  people  of  the 
country  well  and  justly ;  they  cannot  understand 
how  any  one  can  question  the  excellence  of  their 
motives  ;  and  they  look  with  much  disUke  and 
suspicion,  which  is  not  at  all  unnatural,  on  all  who 
place  obstacles  in  the  way  of  their  praiseworthy 
designs  being  executed.  Thus,  forgetful  of  the 
fact  that  they  are  not  dealing  with  the  mhabitants 
of  Kent  or  Norfolk,  the  English  speedily  apply  the 
term  "  loyal "  to  those  who  co-operate  with  them, 
and  the  term  "  disloyal "  to  those  who  display 
hostility  or  merely  lukewarm  friendship. 

From  this  point  of  view,  Tigrane  Pasha  was  far 
from  being  "loyal,"  neither  can  any  moral  blame 
be  imputed  to  him  for  the  degree  of  disloyalty 
which  he  at  times  displayed.  He  was  not  an 
Anglophobe  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term, 
but  he  disagreed  with  the  broad  lines  of  British 
poHcy  in  Egypt.  Personal  ambition  may  have 
had  something  to  do  with  this  mental  attitude. 
It  is  possible  that  the  class  to  which  Tigrane  Pasha 
belonged, — unless,  indeed,  as  is  not  improbable,  it 
was  swept  away  at  the  first  breath  of  discontent 
from  the  alumni  of  the  El-Azhar  University, — 
would  occupy  positions  of  greater  importance  in 
the  world  of  Egyptian  poHtics  if  British  influence 
were  diminished  than  those  to  which  they  can 
attain  whilst  that  influence  remains  paramount.  It 
may  be,  also,  that,  in  order  to  remove  the  taint 
of  being  a  Christian  and  an  alien  ignorant  of  the 
vernacular  language,  Tigrane  Pasha  was  obliged 
to    display   a    somewhat    more    ardent    degree   of 


.11.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  223 

patriotism  in  the  cause  of  his  adopted  country 
than  would  have  been  necessary  had  he  been,  in 
fact  as  w^ell  as  in  name,  a  real  hall-marked  Egyptian 
struggling  for  the  cause  of  Egypt.  But  it  is 
doubtful  whether  Tigrane  Pasha  was  consciously 
influenced  by  either  of  these  considerations.  It 
is  more  probable  that  he  honestly  thought  that 
the  Egyptians,  that  is  to  say,  the  Europeanised 
Egyptians,  of  whom  for  all  practical  purposes  he  may 
be  said  to  have  been  one,  were  capable  of  governing 
Egypt  without  any  considerable  degree  of  British 
assistance,  and  certainly  without  the  presence  of 
a  British  garrison  in  the  country.^  In  holding 
this  opinion  he  was  certainly  wrong,  but  the  fact 
that  he  did  entertain  an  opinion  of  this  sort,  though 
it  may  have  afforded  ground  for  criticising  his 
reasoning  powers,  afforded  no  ground  whatever  for 
moral  reprobation.  Tigrane  Pasha  was,  in  fact, 
a  perfectly  honourable  and  straightforward  gentle- 
man, with  somewhat  doctrinaire  views,  whose 
standard  of  public  and  private  morality  was  in 
no  way  inferior  to  that  of  men  of  honour  in  any 
European  country. 

It  is,  however,  from  the  intellectual  and  not 
from  the  moral  point  of  view  that  the  study  of 
Tigrane  Pasha's  character  was  mainly  of  interest.  It 
is  here  that  his  national — that  is  to  say,  Armenian, 
not  Egyptian — characteristics  came  out  in  strong 
relief.  Tigrane  Pasha's  mind  may  be  characterised 
as  having  been  Franco- Byzantine,  that  is  to  say,  the 
foundation  was  Byzantine,  whilst  the  superstructure 
was  French.  He  was,  intellectually  speaking,  the 
direct  descendant  of  those  Orientals  who,  in  the 

*  There  is  some  reason  for  believing  that  Tigrane  Pasha's  political 
views  were  a  good  deal  modified  before  his  death.  During  the  last  few 
years  of  his  life,  he  was  not  in  office,  and,  moreover,  suffered  from 
very  bad  health.  The  consequence  was  that,  to  my  great  regret,  I  saw 
less  of  him  than  at  previous  periods.  I  cannot,  therefore,  speak  with 
confidence  on  this  point. 


224  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.iv 

early  days  of  Christianity,  engaged  in  endless  dis- 
putes over  barren  and  almost  incomprehensible 
points  of  theology.  He  would  have  revelled  in 
the  subtleties  submitted  to  the  decision  of  the 
Council  of  Nice,  but  he  would  probably  never 
have  come  to  any  definite  conclusion  as  to  whether 
Arius  or  Athanasius  was  in  the  right.  He  was 
very  intelhgent,  particularly  about  matters  of 
detail,  and  quick-witted,  but  was  often  incapable 
of  grasping  the  true  point  at  issue.  When  any 
plain,  practical  question  had  to  be  decided,  he 
would  sometimes  rush  off  into  an  a  piiori  dis- 
cussion of  some  principle,  which  was  only  remotely 
connected  with  the  matter  in  hand.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  some  broad  question  of  principle  was 
at  stake,  Tigrane  Pasha  would  spht  hairs  over  a 
minor  issue,  which  was  almost  incomprehensible,  or 
which  was  at  all  events  devoid  of  importance  to 
the  non- Byzantine  mind.  In  political  affairs,  he 
had  but  little  idea  of  proportion.  He  endeavoured 
to  understand  European,  and  especially  British 
politics, — a  rock  on  which  many  Orientals  have 
split, — and  as  the  result  of  his  studies,  he  was 
generally  able  to  give  the  most  plausible  reasons 
for  arriving  at  conclusions,  which  were  usually 
erroneous.  To  make  use  of  a  French  expression, 
Ilprenait  des  vessies  pour  des  lant ernes.  His  minor 
premiss  appeared  to  him  to  be  of  such  importance, 
that  he  was  apt  to  forget  the  existence  of  liis  major 
premiss.  His  mind  refused  to  accept  a  simple 
inference  from  simple  fsicts,  which  were  patent 
to  all  the  world.  The  very  simplicity  of  the 
conclusion  was  of  itself  enough  to  make  him  reject 
it,  for  he  had  an  elective  affinity  for  everything 
that  was  intricate.  He  was  a  prey  to  intellectual 
over-subtlety — Graecorum  ille  morbus,  as  it  was 
termed  by  Seneca. 

Tigrane  Pasha  was  the  dme  damnee  of  a  succession 


CH.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  225 

of  Egyptian  Ministries.  He  always  proffered 
advice,  which  he  honestly  considered  was  in  the 
best  interests  of  Eg3^t ;  yet  on  most  occasions 
of  importance,  the  result  of  following  his  advice 
was  to  produce  an  effect  the  opposite  of  that 
which  he  had  intended.  His  main  desire  for  many 
years  was  to  diminish  the  power  of  the  English 
in  Egypt,  and  he  became  instrumental  in  aug- 
menting their  power.  From  time  to  time,  he 
laboriously  constructed  a  diplomatic  house  of 
cards,  which  he  thought  must  produce  the  required 
result.  When  one  house  of  cards  was  overturned 
by  a  movement  of  the  Englishman's  little  finger, 
he  was  not  dismayed.  He  did  not  see  that  the 
way  to  get  rid  of  the  Englishman  was,  not  to 
oppose  him,  but  to  co-operate  with  him.  Untaught 
by  experience,  he  set  to  work  to  construct  some 
other  flimsy  fabric,  which  also  disappeared  at  the 
first  tiny  blast  of  the  British  diplomatic  horn.  The 
motives,  which  led  Tigrane  Pasha  into  a  number 
of  honest  but  very  palpable  errors,  are  worthy  of 
respect.  Those  errors  were  due  to  the  Franco- 
Byzantine  frame  of  mind,  which  is  hypercritical, 
and  which  is,  moreover,  unwilling  to  adopt  a 
severe  process  of  inductive  reasoning.  In  politics, 
it  is  essential  to  ascertain  the  facts  correctly  before 
coming  to  any  conclusion.  This  Tigrane  Pasha 
was  apt  to  forget.  His  sympathies  drove  him  to  a 
certain  conclusion  ;  he  was  wont  to  accept  that 
conclusion,  and  to  let  the  facts,  on  which  the  con- 
clusion ought  to  have  been  based,  take  care  of 
themselves. 

With  one  exception,  to  which  allusion  \^^ll 
presently  be  made,  the  various  elements  which 
make  up  native  Egyptian  society  have  thus  been 
described.  Some  of  the  judgments  which  have 
been    passed     may    appear    harsh.      They    have, 

VOL.  II  Q 


226  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

however,  been  written  with  an  object,  which  will 
now  be  explained. 

At  the  period  of  history  of  which  this  narra- 
tive treats,  it  happened  that  Egypt  had  to  be 
Europeanised.  The  Englisli  were  the  main  agents 
in  this  process  of  Europeanisation.  It  is  true  that 
the  English  reformers  attempted  in  some  measure 
to  Egyptianise  themselves.  They  were  possessed 
of  little  social,  but  of  much  political  and  adminis- 
trative elasticity,  which  enabled  them  to  adapt 
themselves  and  their  procedures  to  strange  circum- 
stances more  readily  than  would  have  been  the 
case  with  some  other  members  of  the  European 
family.  At  the  same  time,  the  Egyptian  had  to 
meet  the  Englishman  more  than  half-way. 
European  civilisation,  though  not  absolutely  a  bed 
of  Procrustes,  is  not  very  elastic.  Broadly  speaking, 
in  spite  of  every  effort,  the  bed  could  not  be  made 
to  fit  the  Egyptian ;  the  Egyptian  had  to  adapt 
himself  to  lying  on  the  bed.  Viewed  in  this  light, 
it  is  more  important  to  know  what  the  Egyptian  is 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  educated  European, 
than  it  is  to  inquire  what  Europeans,  whether 
educated  or  the  reverse,  are  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  Egyptian.  I  have,  therefore,  en- 
deavoured to  depict  the  Egyptians  of  different 
classes  of  society  as  they  appear  in  the  eyes  of 
an  educated  European.  I  have  attempted  to  show 
how  little  suited  the  Eg}^:)tian  is  to  lie  on  the 
bed  which,  as  an  incident  of  modern  progress,  has 
been  prepared  for  him.  I  have  wished  to  bring 
into  relief  how  his  religion,  his  history,  his  moral 
and  intellectual  attributes,  and  his  social  customs 
contribute  to  establish  a  gulf  between  him  and  his 
European  guides.  But  I  have  no  wish  whatever 
to  blame  the  individual  Egyptian,  be  he  Moslem 
or  Christian,  for  being  that  which  I  find  him  to  be. 
An  Englishman  who  had  been   long  resident  in 


cH.  XXXVI  THE  CHRISTIANS  227 

China,  once  said :  "  It  is  the  misfortune  of  the 
Chinese  Government  and  people  to  be  weighed  in 
a  balance,  which  they  have  never  accepted,  and  to 
have  their  shortcomings,  so  ascertained,  made  the 
basis  of  reclamations  of  varying  degrees  of  gravity."^ 
This  observation  holds  as  gOod  about  Egypt  as  it 
does  about  China.  I  am  aware  that  in  the  remarks 
made  in  this  and  the  two  preceding  chapters,  the 
Egyptian  has  been  weighed  in  a  balance  which  he 
has  never  accepted,  and  in  which,  moreover,  it  is 
somewhat  unjust  to  weigh  him  ;  for,  from  whatever 
point  of  view  we  look  at  the  Egyptian,  we  should 
never  forget  that  he  is  what  the  accidents  of  his 
history,  climate,  religion,  and  geographical  position 
have  made  him.  It  is  useless  and,  indeed,  hurtful 
to  hide  his  defects,  or  to  disguise  from  ourselves 
the  fact  that  the  reception  of  true  European 
civilisation  by  a  population  such  as  that  which  is 
described  above  must  be  the  work  of  generations. 
But  there  is  no  occasion  to  poipt  the  finger  of 
Pharisaical  scorn  at  the  Egyptians,  whilst  any  feel- 
ing of  self-congratulation  that  we  are  not  as  these 
less  fortunate  political  publicans  should  surely  be 
checked  by  the  reflection  that  some,  at  least,  of  the 
defects  in  the  Egyptian  character  are  due  to  associa- 
tion with  European  civilisation  in  a  debased  form. 
Rather  let  us,  in  Christian  charity,  make  every 
possible  allowance  for  the  moral  and  intellectual 
shortcomings  of  the  Egyptians,  and  do  whatever 
can  be  done  to  rectify  them. 

*  Mr.  Alexander  Michie,  China  and  Christianity,  p,  1,  1892. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 

THE   EUROPEANISED    EGYPTIANS 

rhe  Europeanised  Egyptians  are  generally  Agnostics — Effects  of 
Europeanising  the  East — Gallicised  Egyptians — Attractions  of 
French  civilisation — Unsuitability  of  the  French  system  to  form 
the  Egyptian  character — The  official  classes  generally  hostile  to 
England, 

A  moment's  reflection  will  show  how  it  is  that, 
in  the  peculiar  political  phase  through  which  Egypt 
is  now  passing,  the  Europeanised  Egyptian  occupies 
a  position  of  somewhat  special  importance.  If  the 
country  were  still  governed  on  the  lines  of  the  old 
Oriental  despotisms,  a  small  number  of  educated 
Egyptians  might  perhaps  be  employed  in  sub- 
ordinate positions,  but  they  would  be  mere 
adjuncts  ;  they  would  not  truly  represent  the  spirit 
of  the  Government.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Government  and  society  of  Egypt  were  farther 
advanced  on  the  road  to  civiUsation,  the  Euro- 
peanised Egyptian  would  probably  be  something 
different  from  what  he  actually  is ;  he  would  have 
become  in  spirit,  though  not  necessarily  in  senti- 
ment, less  Egyptian  and  more  thoroughly  European. 
But  inasmuch  as  Egyptian  society  is  in  a  state  of 
flux,  the  natural  result  has  been  to  produce  a  class  of 
individuals  many  of  whom  are,  at  the  same  time,  de- 
moslemised  Moslems  and  invertebrate  Europeans. 

In    deahng  with   the   question   of  introducing 
Eurv^)ean  civilisation  into  Egypt,  it  should  never 

228 


CH.  XXXVII  YOUNG  EGYPT  229 

be  forgotten  that  Islam  cannot  be  reformed ;  that 
is  to  say,  reformed  Islam  is  Islam  no  longer ;  it  is 
something  else ;  we  cannot  as  yet  tell  what  it  wiU 
eventually  be.  "  Christian  nations,"  Sir  William 
Muir  says,  "  may  advance  in  civilisation,  freedom, 
and  morality,  in  philosophy,  science,  and  the  arts, 
but  Islam  stands  still.  And  thus  stationary,  so  far 
as  the  lessons  of  history  avail,  it  will  remain."  ^  But 
little  assistance  in  the  work  of  reform  can,  therefore, 
be  expected  from  the  steady  orthodox  Moslems,  who 
cling  with  unswerving  fidelity  to  their  ancient  faith, 
and  whose  dislike  to  European  civilisation  often 
increases  as  that  civilisation  advances.  The  Syrians 
and  Armenians  are  foreigners.  The  Copts,  besides 
being  Christians,  are — or,  at  all  events,  in  1882, 
were — but  little  better  educated  than  the  ordinary 
Moslems.  Having  regard,  therefore,  to  the  dis- 
qualifications of  his  competitors,  the  Europeanised 
Egyptian  naturally  becomes,  if  not  the  only  possible, 
at  all  events  the  principal  agent  for  administering 
the  country,  except  'in  so  far  as  it  is  administered 
by  Europeans. 

Nominally,  the  Europeanised  Egyptian  is  in  the 
majority  of  cases  a  Moslem.  In  reality,  he  is 
generally  an  Agnostic.  The  gulf  between  him 
and  Jthe  "  Alim  "  of  the  El-Azhar  University  is  as 
great  as  between  the  "  Alim  "  and  the  European. 
Indeed,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  gulf  is  not 
in  reality  greater  in  the  former  than  in  the  latter 
case.  For  a  thoughtful  European  will  not  only 
look  with  interest  at  the  *'  Alim  "  as  the  representa- 
tive of  an  ancient  faith,  which  contains  much  that 
is  highly  deserving  of  respect ;  he  will,  if  the 
"Alim"  is  a  worthy  specimen  of  his  class,  sympathise 
with  him  because  he  is  religious,  albeit  his  religion 
is  not  that  of  Christ.  The  Europeanised  Egyptian, 
on  the  other  hand,  will  often  look  on  the  *'  Alim  " 

»  The  Caliphate,  p.  697. 


230  MODERN  EGYr  r  pt.  iv 

with  all  the  pride  of  an  intellectual  paTvenu.  From 
the  pedestal  of  his  empirical  knowledge,  he  will 
regard  the  "  Alim  "  as  a  social  derelict,  who  has  to 
be  tolerated,  and  even  occasionally,  for  political 
purposes,  to  be  utilised,  but  who  need  not  be 
respected. 

The  truth  is  that,  in  passing  through  the 
European  educational  mill,  the  young  Egyptian 
Moslem  loses  his  Islamism,  or,  at  all  events,  he 
loses  the  best  part  of  it.  He  cuts  himself  adrift 
from  the  sheet-anchor  of  his  creed.  He  no  longer 
believes  that  he  is  always  in  the  presence  of  his 
Creator,  to  whom  he  will  some  day  have  to  render 
an  account  of  his  actions.  He  may  still,  however, 
take  advantage  of  the  least  worthy  portions  of  his 
nominal  religion,  those  portions,  namely,  which, 
in  so  far  as  they  tolerate  a  lax  moral  code,  adapt 
themselves  to  his  tastes  and  to  his  convenience  in 
the  affairs  of  this  world.  Moreover,  in  losing  his 
Islamism,  the  educated  Egyptian  very  rarely  makes 
any  approach  towards  Christianity.  There  are 
practically  no  cases  of  Christian  converts  amongst 
the  educated  classes.  INIore  than  this,  although 
the  Europeanised  Egyptian  is  no  true  Moslem,  he 
is  often  as  intolerant,  and  sometimes  even  more 
intolerant  of  Christianity  than  the  old  orthodox 
Moslem,  who  has  received  no  European  education. 
He  frequently  hates  Christians  with  a  bitter  hatred, 
and  he  does  so  partly  because  many  of  the  Christians 
with  whom  he  has  been  brought  in  contact  deserve 
to  be  hated,  and  partly  because  the  Christian,  in 
his  capacity  of  being  a  European,  is  a  rival  who 
occupies  positions,  which  tlie  Europeanised  Egyptian 
thinks  he  should  himself  occupy. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  the  price  which  is  being 
paid,  or  which,  at  all  events,  may  have  to  be  paid 
for  introducing  European  civilisation  into  these 
backward  Eastern  societies   is   always  recognised 


CH.  XXXVII  YOUNG  EGYPT  231 

so  fully  as  it  should  be.  The  material  benefits 
derived  from  Europeanisation  are  unquestionably 
great,  but  as  regards  the  ultimate  effect  on  public 
and  private  morality  the  future  is  altogether 
uncertain.^  European  civilisation  destroys  one 
religion  without  substituting  another  in  its  place. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  code  of 
Christian  morality,  on  which  European  civilisation 
is  based,  can  be  dissociated  from  the  teaching  of 
the  Christian  religion.  This  question  can  only 
be  answered  by  generations  which  are  now  un- 
born. For  the  present,  there  is  little  to  guide 
us  in  any  forecast  as  to  what  the  ultimate  result 
will  be. 

It  may,  however,  be  noted  that  there  is  an 
essential  difference  between  the  de-moslemised 
Moslem  and  the  free-thinker  in  Europe.  The 
latter  is  surrounded  by  an  atmosphere  of  Chris- 
tianity :  he  will  often,  sometimes  with  a  pang  of 
envy,  admire  trustfulness  and  faith,  in  which 
qualities  his  reasoning  faculties  forbid  him  to  share ; 
if  he  is  a  politician,  he  will,  or  at  all  events  he 
should  recognise  the  utilitarian  side  of  Christianity  ; 
he  will,  more  often  than  not,  reject  the  idea  that 
there  is  no  alternative  presented  to  him  but  that 
of  being  either  an  atheist  or  a  full  believer  in  the 
Christianity  of  the  schools  ;  the  fact  that  he  is  a 
free-thinker  does  not  cut  him  off  from  association 
and  co-operation  with  his  friends,  who  may  not 
share  his  disbelief  or  his  doubts ;  his  reason,  his 
associations,  and  his  hereditary  qualities  alike  impel 
him  to  assert,  no  less  strongly  than  the  orthodox 
Christian,  that  the  code  of  Christian  morality  must 

*  The  whole  of  this  question  has  been  admirably  treated,  from  the 
Hindoo  point  of  view,  in  the  second  series  of  Sir  Alfred  Lyall's  brilliant 
Asiatic  :^tiidies.  Every  European  wlio  occupies  a  high  position  in 
the  East  should  study  Sir  Alfred  Lyall's  works.  They  display  a  pro- 
found knowledge  of  Eastern  habits  of  thought,  and  a  remarkable 
gra,s^  of  the  difficulties  underlying  the  treatment  of  Eastern  problems. 


232  JNIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

form  the  basis  to  regulate  the  relations  between 
man  and  man  in  modern  society.  That  morality 
has,  indeed,  taken  such  deep  root  in  Europe  that 
if,  as  would  appear  probable,  the  hold  which 
revealed  religion  and  theological  dogma  has  on 
mankind  is  destined  to  be  gradually  relaxed,  no 
moral  cataclysm  is  to  be  anticipated. 

Far  different  is  the  case  of  the  Egyptian  free- 
thinker. He  finds  himself  launched  on  a  troubled 
sea  without  any  rudder  and  without  any  pilot. 
Neither  his  past  history  nor  his  present  associations 
impose  any  effective  moral  restraint  upon  him.  He 
finds  that,  amongst  many  of  his  own  countrymen, 
the  cause  of  religion  is  often  identified  with  opposi- 
tion to  the  most  reasonable  reforms,  and  in  trampling 
indignantly  on  the  particular  religion  which  can  lead 
to  such  results,  he  is  disposed  to  cast  aside  religion 
altogether.  Having  cut  himself  loose  from  his 
creed,  no  barrier,  save  that  of  cynical  self-interest, 
serves  to  keep  him  within  the  limits  of  the  moral 
code  which  is  in  some  degree  imposed  on  the 
European,  whose  system  he  is  endeavouring  to 
copy.  The  society  in  which  he  moves  does  not 
seriously  condemn  untruthfulness  and  deceit.  The 
social  stigma  with  which  vice  of  various  kinds  is 
visited  is  too  feeble  to  exercise  much  practical  effect. 
As  he  leaves  the  creed  of  his  forefathers,  he  casts  no 
lingering  look  behind.  He  not  only  leaves  it,  but 
he  spurns  it.  He  rushes  blindfold  into  the  arms 
of  European  civilisation,  unmindful  of  the  fact  that 
what  is  visible  to  the  eye  constitutes  merely  the 
outward  signs  of  that  civilisation,  whilst  the  deep- 
seated  ballast  of  Christian  morality,  which  regulates 
the  occasionally  eccentric  movements  of  the  vessel, 
is  hidden  beneath  the  surface,  and  is  difficult  of 
acquisition  by  the  pseudo-European  imitator  of  the 
European  system.  He  calls  Heaven  to  witness 
that   he   has    cast   aside   all   prejudices   based    on 


CH.  XXXVII  YOUNG  EGYPT  233 

religion,  and  that  he  despises  the  teachings  of  his 
forefathers.  See,  he  says  to  the  European,  I  have 
my  railways,  my  schools,  my  newspapers,  my  law- 
courts,  and  all  the  other  things  which,  as  I  can 
plainly  see,  go  to  make  up  your  boasted  civilisation  ; 
in  what,  then,  am  I  inferior  to  you  ?  Alas !  the 
de-moslemised  Moslem,  although  he  is  wholly  un- 
aware of  the  defect,  is  inferior  in  one  respect  wherein 
his  inferiority  cannot  be  removed  by  a  stroke  of  the 
pen,  for  the  civilised  European,  as  we  understand 
him,  though  he  may  not  be  an  orthodox  Christian, 
is  in  spite  of  himself  to  a  great  extent  the  outcome 
of  Christianity,  and  would  not  be  what  he  is  had 
he  not  1900  years  of  Christianity  behind  him.  "  No 
hostility  to  Christian  doctrine  can  justify  indiffer- 
ence to  the  truth,  that  the  world  owes  to  Chris- 
tianity the  matured  idea  of  Progress,  and  the  one 
serious  attempt  to  realise  it."  ^ 

It  is  at  present  useless  to  speculate  on  the 
ultimate  product  of  the  forces  which  are  now 
being  brought  into  play  in  the  Moslem  world.^ 
That  any  great  accession  of  strength  wiU  accrue 
to  Christianity  is  improbable.  A  revival  of  Islam, 
that  is  to  say,  the  Islam  of  the  Koran  and  the 
Traditions,  is  nothing  but  the  dream  of  poetic 
natures  whose  imaginations  are  carried  away  by 
the  attractions  which  hover  round  some  incidents 
of  this  faith.  Yet,  as  has  been  often  observed, 
history  records  no  instance  of  a  nation  being 
without    a    religion.       "  Man    everywhere    shows 

'  Liddon,  University  Sermons,  1873,  p.  33. 

2  M.  Leroy-Beaulieu  makes  the  following  remarks  as  regards  the 
dissolvent  effect  exercised  by  Western  civilisation  on  Judaism  :  "  Qu'est 
ce  qui  a  conserve  le  juif  a  travers  les  siecles  et  I'a  empeche  de  dispa- 
raitre au  milieu  des  nations  ?  C'est  sa  religion.  Or,  ces  rites  protecteiiis, 
cette  cuirasse  ou  cette  carapace  d'ol)servances  qui  I'a  defendu  duiant 
deux  mille  ans,  et  que  rien  ne  pourrait  traiispercer,  notre  esprit  occi- 
dental I'a  entamee.  .  .  .  Si  le  judaisme,  dcbilite',  vcnait  k  se  decomposer 
et  a  se  dissoudre,  qu'advieudrait-il  du  juif?  Forme  et  saufgarde  par  sa 
religion,  le  juif  ne  risque-t-il  point  de  s'e'vanouir  avec  le  judaisme?" — 
Israel  chez  les  Nations,  p.  77. 


234  MODERN  EGVrT  pt.  iv 

invincible  religious  tendencies."  ^  It  is  conceivable 
that,  as  time  goes  on,  the  Moslems  will  develop  a 
religion,  possibly  a  pure  Deism,  which  will  not 
be  altogether  the  Islamism  of  the  past  and  of 
the  present,  and  which  will  cast  aside  much 
of  the  teaching  of  Mohammed,  but  which  will 
establish  a  moral  code  sufficient  to  hold  society 
together  by  bonds  other  than  those  of  unalloyed 
self-interest.  The  Europeanised  Egyptian,  as  we 
now  see  him,  is  the  first,  not  the  last,  word  of 
reformed  Moslem  society.  It  is  possible  that,  in 
course  of  time,  some  higher  moral  and  intellectual 
ideal  will  be  developed.  In  the  meanwhile,  let  the 
European  politician  bear  this  in  mind,  that  in  the 
process  of  his  well-intentioned  and  very  necessary 
reforms  he  will  do  well  to  abstain,  on  utilitarian 
grounds,  from  any  measure  which  is  calculated  to 
undermine  the  Moslem  faith  more  than  the  strict 
requirements  of  the  case  demand.  The  missionary, 
the  philanthropist,  the  social  reformer,  and  others 
of  the  same  sort,  should  have  a  fair  field.  Their 
intentions  are  excellent,  although  at  times  their 
judgment  may  be  defective.  They  will,  if  under 
some  control,  probably  do  much  good  on  a  small 
scale.  They  may  even,  being  carried  away  by  the 
enthusiasm  which  pays  no  heed  to  worldly  pru- 
dence, effect  reforms  more  important  than  those  of 
the  administrator  and  politician,  who  will  follow 
cautiously  in  their  track,  and  perhaps  reap  the 
results  of  their  labours.  Nevertheless,  let  those 
who  have  to  guide  the  machine  of  state  beware 
how  they  wittingly  shake  the  whole  mQral  fabric  of 
Eastern  society.  It  is  dangerous  work,  politically, 
socially,  and  morally,  to  trifle  with  the  religious 
belief  of  a  whole  nation. 

The  first  point,  therefore,  to  be  borne  in  mind 
in  dealing  with  the  Europeanised  Egyptian  is  that 

'  Boyd  Carpenter,  The  Permanent  Elements  of  Religion,  p.  77. 


cH.  XXXVII  YOUNG  EGYPT  235 

he  is  generally  an  Agnostic.  The  second  point  is 
that  the  term  Europeanised,  when  applied  to  the 
Egyptian  educated  in  Europe,  though  not  a  mis- 
nomer, is  lacking  in  precision.  For  the  majority 
of  Europeanised  Egyptians  at  the  commencement 
of  the  British  occupation,  and  for  some  years 
subsequent  to  that  event,  were,  in  truth,  Gallicised 
Egyptians. 

When  Mehemet  Ali  took  some  tentative  steps 
towards  introducing  European  civilisation  into 
Egypt,  he  naturally  turned  to  France  for  assist- 
ance. He  was  haunted  with  the  idea  that 
England  would  one  day  take  possession  of 
Egypt.  ^  An  increase  of  French  influence  in 
Egypt  would,  he  thought,  constitute  some  barrier 
against  British  aggression.  A  number  of  young 
Egyptians  were,  therefore,  sent  to  France  to  be 
educated,  and  several  schools  were  established  in 
Egypt  at  the  heads  of  which  French  professors 
were  placed.  Thus,  the  first  impress  of  civiUsa- 
tion  given  to  Egypt  was  through  the  medium  of 
the  French  language,  which,  it  may  be  added,  has 
during  the  latter  part  of  the  last  century  been 
supplanting  Italian  as  a  common  language  for  the 
use  of  divers  nationalities  throughout  the  Levant. 
The  French  thus  obtained  a  start  which  they  have 
never  lost.  The  Government  and  the  people  of 
France,  being  gifted  with  more  political  foresight 
of  a  certain  kind,  and  being  more  capable  of 
grasping  a  general  idea  than  the  English,  saw 
their  advantage,  and  followed  it  up.  They  were 
aware  that,  if  the  youth  of  Egypt  learnt  the 
French  language,  they  would,  as  a  necessary  con- 
sequence, be  saturated  with  French  habits  of  thought, 
and  they  hoped  that  sympathy  with  France  and 

*  Vide  ante,  vol.  i.  p.  16,  note.  Sir  Charles  Murray,  in  his  Short 
Memoir  (p.  5),  says  that  Mehemet  All's  sympathy  for  the  French  was  in 
some  degree  due  to  the  kindness  shown  to  him  when  a  child  by  a  French 
resident  at  Cawala^  named  Lion. 


236  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

French  political  aims  would  ensue.  For  half  a 
century  prior  to  the  British  occupation,  therefore, 
during  ^vhich  time  the  British  Government  were 
wholly  inactive  in  respect  to  Egyptian  education, 
no  effort  was  spared  to  propagate  a  knowledge  of 
French  in  Egypt.  The  agents  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  this  object  have  been  mainly  Catholic 
priests.  The  great  apostle  of  anti- clericalism  in 
France,  INI.  Gambetta,  was  careful  to  explain  that 
his  anti-clerical  ideas  were  only  intended  for  home 
consumption ;  they  were  not  meant  for  export. 
The  French  Republic  claims  to  be  the  defender  of 
the  Catholic  Church  in  the  East,  and  is  very  sensi- 
tive if  its  rigiit  to  do  so  is  in  any  way  questioned. 
A  Republican  Go^'ernment  and  their  agents,  be 
they  never  so  anti-clerical  at  home,  are  fully  alive 
to  the  advantages  of  taking  clericaUsm  by  the  hand 
abroad  as  a  useful  instrument  to  further  their 
political  aims. 

Apart,  however,  from  any  consequences  re- 
sulting from  the  action  taken  either  by  Mehemet 
Ali  or  by  the  French  Government,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  French  civilisation  possesses  a 
special  degree  of  attraction,  not  only  to  the 
Asiatic,  but  also  to  the  European  races  of  the 
Levant.  This  point  is  one  of  considerable  im- 
portance, for  amongst  the  obstacles,  which  have 
stood  in  the  way  of  the  British  reformer  in  Egypt, 
none  is  more  noteworthy  than  that  both  Euro- 
peanised  Egyptians  and  Levantines  are  impregnated 
with  French  rather  than  with  English  habits  of 
thought. 

The  reasons  why  French  civilisation  presents  a 
special  degree  of  attraction  to  Asiatics  and  Levant- 
ines are  plain.  It  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  more 
attractive  than  the  civilisations  of  England  and 
Germany,  and,  moreover,  it  is  more  easy  of  imita- 
tion.    Compare  the  undemonstrative,  shy  EngUsh* 


CH.  XXXVII  YOUNG  EGYPT  237 

man,  with  his  social  exclusiveness  and  insular  habits, 
with  the  vivacious  and  cosmopolitan  Frenchman, 
who  does  not  know  what  the  word  shyness  means, 
and  who  in  ten  minutes  is  apparently  on  terms  of 
intimate  friendship  with  any  casual  acquaintance 
he  may  chance  to  make.  The  semi -educated 
Oriental  does  not  recognise  that  the  former  has,  at 
all  events,  the  merit  of  sincerity,  whilst  the  latter 
is  often  merely  acting  a  part/  He  looks  coldly  on 
the  Enghshman,  and  rushes  into  the  arms  of  the 
Frenchman. 

Look,  again,  to  the  relative  intellectual  attrac- 
tions which  the  two  Western  races  present.  The 
Englishman  is  a  follower  of  Bacon  without  knowing 
it.  Inductive  philosophy  has  become  part  of  his 
nature.  He  instinctively  rejects  a  priori  reasoning. 
He  will  laboriously  collect  a  number  of  facts  before 
arriving  at  any  conclusion,  and,  when  he  has 
collected  his  facts,  he  will  limit  his  conclusion  to 
the  precise  point  which  is  proved.  Compare  this 
frame  of  mind  with  that  of  the  quick-witted 
Frenchman,  who,  on  the  most  slender  basis  of  fact, 
will  advance  some  sweeping  generalisation  with  an 
assurance  untempered  by  any  shadow  of  doubt  as 
to  its  correctness.  Can  it  be  any  matter  for 
surprise  that  the  Egyptian,  with  his  light  intel- 
lectual ballast,  fails  to  see  that  some  fallacy  often 
lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  Frenchman's  reasoning,  or 
that  he  prefers  the  rather  superficial  brilliancy  of  the 
Frenchman  to  the  plodding,  unattractive  industry 
of  the  Englishman  or  the  German  ?  Look,  again, 
at  the  theoretical  perfection  of  French  administra- 
tive systems,  at  their  elaborate  detail,  and  at  the 

^  Shortly  after  the  Franco-German  AVar,  in  defending  the  French 
against  General  Blumenthal,  I  said,  "You  must  admit.  General,  that 
the  French  are  good  actors."  The  sturdy  old  Gallophobe  replied,  "  It 
is  the  only  thing  they  can  do.  They  aie  always  acting."  I  do  not  at 
all  agree  with  the  first  part  of  the  distinguished  General's  view.  'ITi© 
French  can  do  a  great  many  things  besides  act  welL 


238  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

provision  which  is  apparently  made  to  meet  every 
possible  contingency  which  may  arise.  Compare 
these  features  with  the  Englishman's  practical 
systems,  which  lay  down  rules  as  to  a  few  main 
points,  and  leave  a  mass  of  detail  to  individual 
discretion.  The  half-educated  Egyptian  naturally 
prefers  the  Frenchman's  system,  for  it  is  to  all 
outward  appearance  more  perfect  and  more  easy 
of  application.  He  fails,  moreover,  to  see  that 
the  Englishman  desires  to  elaborate  a  system 
which  will  suit  the  facts  with  which  he  has 
to  deal,  whereas  the  main  objection  to  applying 
French  administrative  procedures  to  Egypt  is 
that  the  facts  have  but  too  often  to  conform  to 
the  ready-made  system.  From  whatever  point  of 
view  the  subject  be  regarded,  the  same  contrast  will 
be  found.  On  the  one  side,  is  a  damsel  possessing 
attractive,  albeit  somewhat  artificial  charms ;  on 
the  other  side,  is  a  sober,  elderly  matron  of  perhaps 
somewhat  greater  moral  Morth,  but  of  less  pleasing 
outward  appearance.  The  Egyptian,  in  the  heyday 
of  his  political  and  intellectual  youth,  naturally 
smiled  on  the  attractive  damsel,  and  turned  his 
back  on  the  excellent  but  somewhat  ill-favoured 
matron. 

In  some  respects  it  is,  for  his  own  sake,  greatly 
to  be  regretted  that  he  did  so.  What  the  Egyptian 
most  of  aU  requires  is,  not  so  much  that  his  mind 
should  be  trained,  as  that  his  character  should  be 
formed.  It  is  certain  that  a  \^ery  high  tone  of 
morality  pervades  those  admirable  educational 
institutions  which  spring,  Pallas-like,  from  the 
fertile  brain  of  tlie  \'atican,  and  most  of  which,  in 
Egypt,  are  under  French  control.  It  is  also  certain 
that  those  who  base  their  opinion  of  French 
character  and  morals  on  the  light  French  literature 
of  the  day  are  wholly  in  error.  I  believ^e  that  ij; 
no  country  are  the  domestic  virtues  more  generally 


CH.  xxxvn  YOUNG  EGYPT  239 

cherished  than  in  France.  It  has,  however,  to 
be  remembered  ^  that  the  Oriental  has  a  remark- 
able capacity  for  assimilating  to  himself  the  worst 
and  rejecting  the  best  parts  of  any  European 
civilisation  with  which  he  may  be  brought  in 
contact.  It  is  not  from  the  best,  but  rather  from 
the  least  admirable  traits  in  the  French  character 
that  those  young  Egyptians  who  have  been  brought 
under  French  influences,  have  generally  drawn 
their  moral  inspirations. 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  educated 
Egyptian  fails  to  note  the  defects  of  his  European 
monitors,  be  they  French  or  English.  He  often 
sees  those  defects  clearly  enough,  and  the  result 
not  unfrequently  is  that,  even  though  he  may 
himself  become  partially  Europeanised,  he  will 
despise  European  civilisation.  In  what  respect, 
he  says  to  himself,  are  we  Egyptians  morally 
inferior  to  our  teachers  ?  We  may  be  deceitful, 
untruthful,  and  unchaste,  but  we  are  not  one 
whit  worse  than  those  whom  we  are  told 
to  regard  as  the  ultimate  product  of  European 
civilisation.^  The  result  is  that  the  Europeanised 
Egyptian  often  returns  to  Egypt  in  order  to 
become,  both  by  precept  and  example,  an  apostle 
of  anti-European  ideas.  The  conservatism  of  older 
Moslems,  who  regard  him  as  a  living  warning  that 
they    should    beware    of    European     civilisation, 

^   Vide  ante,  vol.  i.  p.  59. 

'  The  moral  superiority  of  English  over  French  training  is  recognised 
by  the  Egyptians  themselves,  and  has  at  times  been  recognised  by  culti- 
vated Frenchmen.  Senior  (Conversations,  etc.,  vol.  i.  p.  213)  relates  the 
following  conversation :  "  Uekeki/an.  It  is  remarkable  that  all  the 
Egyptians  and  Asiatics  whom  Mehemet  Ali  sent  to  England  for 
education  came  back,  like  myself  and  young  Stephan,  Anglonianiacs ; 
while  all  whom  he  sent  to  France  returned  disgusted  with  Europe.  .  .  . 
Clot  (the  founder  of  the  Egyptian  School  of  Medicine).  I  have  niade 
the  same  remark.  .  .  .  Our  students  see  only  bad  company  in  Paris, 
and  are  disgusted  with  it.  In  London  they  get,  if  not  into  the  fashion- 
able world,  at  least  into  a  respectable  world,  infinitely  superior  in 
•morals,  knowledge,  and  intelligence  to  anything  in  the  East." 


240  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

becomes  stereotyped  on  observing  his  behaviour 
and  on  hearing  his  language  ;  whilst  he  himself,  in 
spite  of  his  partial  Europeanisation,  will,  with  an 
inconsistency  which  would  be  strange  were  we  not 
dealing  with  the  "  Land  of  Paradox,"  hate  the 
Europeans  quite  as  much  as  the  less  educated 
sections  of  his  own  countrymen. 

The  question  of  the  effect  of  European,  and 
notably  French  education  on  the  rising  generation 
of  Egyptians  has  to  be  considered  from  another 
point  of  view.  The  tendency  of  every  Egyptian 
official  is  to  shirk  responsibility.  He  thinks  less 
of  what  should  be  done  than  of  acting  in  such  a 
manner  that  no  personal  blame  can  be  attached 
to  himself.  This  habit  of  thought  makes  the 
Egyptian  official  instinctively  shrink  from  the  British 
system  of  administration,  for  under  that  system 
much  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  individual,  who 
is,  therefore,  obliged  to  think  for  himself.  He 
flies  for  refuge  to  the  French  system,  and  there 
he  finds  administrative  procedures  prescribed  which 
exactly  suit  his  character  and  habits  of  thought. 
He  finds  that  provision  is  apparently  made  for 
everything,  to  the  most  minute  detail,  in  a  series 
of  elaborate  codes.  Entrenched  behind  these 
codes,  the  Europeanised  Egyptian  is,  to  his  joy, 
relieved  in  a  great  degree  from  the  necessity 
of  thinking  for  himself.  Some  emergency  may, 
indeed,  occur  which  requires  prompt  action  and 
the  exercise  of  common  sense.  The  Europeanised 
Egyptian,  however,  but  too  often  does  not  recog- 
nise emergencies,  and  he  spurns  common  sense. 
He  refers  to  some  article  in  his  regulations,  and 
maintains  that  he  cannot  depart  from  the  provisions 
of  that  article  by  one  hair's -breadth.  The  result 
may  be  disastrous,  but  he  is  indifferent  as  to  the 
result ;  for,  having  conformed  strictly  to  his  orders, 
he    caimot     be    blamed    by    his    superiors.     The 


CH.  XXXVII  YOUNG  EGYPT  241 

Egyptian  official  was  always  predisposed  to  be  an 
automaton/  Once  Europeanised — more  especially 
if  he  be  Gallicised — his  automatic  rigidity  becomes 
more  wooden  than  it  was  before. 

It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that,  from  this  point 
of  view,  French  training  has  done  little  to  rectify 
the  defects  of  the  Egyptian  national  character.  In 
everything,  it  has  tended  to  stereotype  the  Egyptian 
predisposition  to  look  to  the  letter  which  killeth, 
and  neglect  the  spirit  which  giveth  life. 

Scores  of  cases  could  be  mentioned  illustrative 
of  the  tendency  to  which  allusion  is  here  made. 
One  or  two  instances  will,  however,  suffice. 

A  case  occurred  of  a  stationmaster  declining  to 
send  a  fire-engine  by  a  train  which  was  about  to 
start,  in  order  to  help  in  putting  down  a  serious 
fire.  He  pointed  with  inexorable  logic  to  the 
regulations,  which  did  not  permit  of  trucks  being 
attached  to  that  particular  train.  No  exception 
was  to  be  found  in  the  code,  with  which  he  had 
been  furnished,  to  meet  the  case  of  a  burning  town 
to  which  a  fire-engine  had  to  be  despatched. 
Again,  at  one  time  it  was  the  practice,  if  an 
accident  occurred  in  the  streets,  not  to  transport 
the  individual  who  had  been  injured  at  once  to  the 
hospital,  but  to  leave  him  lying  on  the  ground, 
whatever  might  be  his  condition,  until  the  proper 
official  had  arrived  to  make  a  "  Proces-verbal "  of  the 
facts  connected  with  the  accident.  On  one  occasion, 
a  doctor  was  sent  to  examine  into  the  condition 

*  It  has  been  conclusively  shown  by  Taine  and  others  that  many  of 
the  administrative  methods  generally  practised  on  the  continent  of 
Europe  are  not,  as  is  very  commonly  supposed,  the  result  of  the  French 
Revolution,  but  that  they  existed — often  under  a  different  form — in 
pre-Revolutionary  days.  Similarly,  the  idea,  whicli  is  somewhat 
prevalent,  that  the  extreme  formalism  which  characterises  Egyptian 
official  life  is  the  result  of  contact  with  Europe,  though  it  may  be 
partially  correct,  does  not  convey  the  whole  truth.  Mr.  St.  John 
{Egypt  and  Mohammed  AH,  vol.  ii.  p.  419)  gives  a  remarkable  instance 
of  the  extreme  formalism  with  which  Egyptian  official  work  was  con- 
ducted in  his  time. 

VOL.  II  R 


242  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

of  a  stationmaster,  supposed  to  be  insane.  On 
entering  the  room,  he  was  attacked  and  nearly 
strangled  by  the  madman.  He  was  able,  after  a 
sharp  struggle,  to  call  on  two  orderhes,  who  had 
been  present  all  the  time,  to  seize  the  man.  They 
saluted  and  did  so.  On  being  asked  why  they  had 
not  interfered  sooner,  they  replied  that  they  had 
received  no  orders  to  that  effect.  Without  doubt, 
they  considered  that  the  struggle  on  the  floor, 
which  they  had  witnessed,  was  part  of  some  strange 
European  process,  with  which  they  were  unfamiliar, 
for  dealing  with  insane  stationmasters.^ 

I  may  mention  that  a  subordinate  Egyptian 
official,  notably  a  policeman,  regards  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  "  Proces- verbal"  as  a  proceeding  of 
peculiar  sanctity.  It  matters  little  what  the  docu- 
ment contains.  Provided  he  can  get  a  "Proc^s- 
verbal "  prepared  in  due  form,  the  Egyptian  official 
considers  that  he  is  free  from  responsibility,  and  he 
is,  therefore,  happy.  Other^dse,  he  feels  that  a 
certain  amount  of  personal  responsibility  weighs 
upon  him,  and  he  is  miserable.  This  plethora 
of  "  Proces  -  verbaux "  has  done  a  good  deal  to 
nip  in  the  bud  any  feeble  tendencies  towards 
individualism  which  might  otherwise  have  been 
developed. 

In  a  word,  the  French  bureaucratic  and  legal 
systems,  although  there  is  much  to  be  said  in  their 
favour  when  they  are  carried  into  execution  by  a 
highly  civilised  and  intelligent  race  such  as  the 
French,  are  little  adapted  to  the  formation  of  either 
competent  officials  or  useful  citizens  in  a  country 
such  as  Egypt. 

Such,  therefore,  is  the  Europeanised  Egyptian. 
His    intellectual    qualities    have,    of    late    years, 

^  These  cases  have  already  been  cited  in  my  Report  for  the  year 
1903  {Egypt,  No.  1,  of  190-1,  p.  7^)-  An  endless  number  of  similar 
illustrations  of  the  tendency  to  which  allusion  is  made  above,  might 
be  given. 


CH.  XXXVII  YOUNG  EGYPT  24;j 

certainly  been  developed.  His  moral  attributes 
have  generally  been  little,  if  at  all,  improved  by 
contact  with  Europe.  The  old  orthodox  Moslem 
is  bound  hand  and  foot  by  ancient  custom  based  on 
his  religion.  The  Europeanised  Egj'ptian  is  often 
bound  almost  as  fast  by  a  set  of  rigid  formulas, 
which  he  mistakes  for  the  substance,  whereas  they 
are  in  reality  but  some  fortuitous  hicidents  of 
European  civilisation. 

Although  the  description  given  above  holds 
generally  good  as  regards  the  class  now  under 
discussion,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  there  are  excep- 
tions, and,  moreover,  that  the  exceptions  are  year 
by  year  becoming  more  numerous.  Some  of  the 
younger  generation  of  Egyptians  are  turning  into 
excellent  officials,  especially  those  employed  under 
the  Department  of  Justice.  In  view  of  the 
character  of  the  modern  Egyptian,  it  is  obviously 
more  easy  to  develop  a  certain  amount  of  judicial 
capacity  than  it  is  'to  train  good  executive  officers. 
The  judge  merely  has  to  interpret  his  code.  The 
executive  official  must  of  necessity  rely  to  a  greater 
extent  on  his  individual  resource  and  judgment. 

One  point  remains  to  be  considered.  What 
was  the  attitude  of  the  Europeanised  Egyptian 
towards  the  British  reformer  ?  After  what  has 
been  already  said,  it  is  needless  to  dilate  on  this 
subject.  Envy,  dislike  of  British  administrative 
systems,  ignorance  of  the  English  language,^  jesent- 
ment  at  the  stand-off  manners  and  at  the  airs  of 
conscious  superiority  which  the  Englishman,  some- 
what unwisely,  is  prone  to  give  himself,  and  want 
of  appreciation  of  the  better  side  of  tlie  Enghsh 
character,  all  drove  the  Europeanised  Egyptian 
in  one  direction.     With  a  few  exceptions,  the  whole 

*  This  fertile  source  of  misunderstanding  is,  it  may  be  hoped,  rapidly 
disappearing.  The  number  of  young  Egyptians  who  understand  Knglish 
is  steadily  increasing,  as  also  the  number  of  Britisli  officials  who  speak 
Arabic. 


! 


244  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

class  was,  at   the   commencement   of  the    British 
occupation,  Anglophobe. 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  of  late  years  this 
Anglophobia  has  diminished.  Indeed,  indications 
are  not  wanting  that,  mainly  by  reason  of  the 
misrepresentations  of  the  vernacular  press,  it  has 
somewhat  increased  in  intensity.  It  is  the  duty  of 
the  British  officials  in  the  service  of  the  Egyptian 
Government  to  use  their  utmost  endeavours  to 
mitigate  feelings  of  this  description  by  sympathetic 
treatment,  and  by  abstaining  from  passing  too  harsh 
a  judgment  on  whatever  defects  they  may  find  to 
exist  amongst  the  rising  generation  of  Egyptians. 
Those  defects  are  the  natural  outcome  of  the  pecu- 
liar political  conditions  under  which  the  country  is 
governed,  and  of  the  unhealthy  influences  to  which 
the  young  Egyptians  are  often  exposed. 


CHAPTER   XXXVIII 

THE   EUROPEANS 

Number  of  Europeans — The  Levantines — Their  characteristics — The 
Greelis — Their  commercial  enterprise — The  English — The  Army 
of  Occupation — Anglo-Egyptian  officials — Feelings  entertained  by 
other  Europeans  towards  the  English — Summary  of  the  classes 
friendly  and  hostile  to  England. 

According  to  the  census  of  1897,  there  were  at  that 
time  about  113,000  Europeans  resident  in  Egypt.^ 
These  113,000  persons  were  divided  as  follows  : 

Greeks  ...,,.  38,000 

Italians              .....  24,000 

French.             .....  14,000 

Austrians          .....  7,000 

English  (including  Maltese  and  other  British 

subjects,  as  well  as  the  Army  of  Occupation)  20,000 

Other  nationalities        ....  10,000 


Total         .  .  .    113,000 

The  classification  by  nationalities,  though  im- 
portant in  many  respects,  is  misleading  to  this 
extent,  that  when  it  is  said  that  there  are  24,000 
Italians,  14,000  Frenchmen,  7000  Austrians,  and 
so  on  in  Egypt,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  there 
are  that  number  of  Italians,  Frenchmen,  or  Aus- 
trians in  the  country  possessing  the  special  national 

^  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  since  the  census  of  1897  was  taken,  the 
number  of  Europeans  in  Egypt  has  largely  increased.  I  have  already 
stated  (mde  ante,  p.  129,  note)  that  the  detailed  figures  of  the  census 
taken  in  1907  are  not  yet  available. 

246 


246  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

characteristics,  which  are  generally  held  to  belong 
to  the  inhabitants  of  Italy,  France,  or  Austria. 
Apart  from  the  fact  that  there  are  a  large  number  of 
protected  subjects,  who  are  often  Orientals,  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  in  many  cases  the  Frenchman  resi- 
dent in  Egypt  is  only  technically  a  Frenchman,  the 
Italian  may  in  reality  be  only  half  an  Italian  in  so 
far  as  his  national  characteristics  are  concerned,  the 
Austrian  is  often  merely  a  subject  of  the  Emperor 
of  Austria  for  purposes  of  Consular  protection  and 
nothing  more.  For,  in  truth,  many  individuals  of 
these  and  of  other  nationalities  are,  above  all 
things,  Levantines,  and  the  Levantines,  though  not 
a  separate  nation,  possess  characteristics  of  their 
own  which  may  almost  be  termed  national. 

Every  one  who  has  lived  in  the  Eastern  part  of 
the  Mediterranean  knows  what  is  meant  by  a 
Levantine,  though  a  precise  definition  of  tliis  term 
is  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  The  Levantine  can, 
of  course,  be  described  as  a  European  resident  in 
the  Levant,  generally  in  the  Ottoman  dominions 
situated  in  the  Levant.  This  definition  is,  how- 
ever, not  satisfactory,  for  some  Europeans  may  be 
born  and  bred  in  the  East  and  pass  all  their  lives 
in  the  Levant,  without  losing  the  special  character- 
istics of  their  country  of  origin,  or  acquiring  in  any 
considerable  degree  those  of  the  Levantine.  In 
the  case  of  others,  a  short  residence  in  the  Levant 
will  suffice  to  produce  t}^ical  Levantine  character- 
istics. Others,  again,  already  approached  so  nearly 
to  Levantines  in  their  country  of  origin,  that  they 
may  almost  be  said  to  have  been  Levantines  before 
they  emigrated  to  the  Levant.  In  fact,  inasmuch 
as  the  Levantines  are  more  or  less  Orientalised 
Europeans,^  just  as  Egyptian  Moslems  educated  in 

*  The  process  of  manufacturing  Levantines  is  at  least  as  old  as  the 
Crusades.  Thus,  Mr.  Stanley  Lane  Poole  says  (S'a/«iym,  p.  28):  "The 
early  Crusaders,  after  thirty  years'  residence  in  Syria,  had  become  very 
much  assimilated  in  character  aud  habits  to  the  people  whom  they  had 


CH.  XXXVIII         THE  EUROPEANS  247 

France  are  Gallicised  Egyptians,  they  necessarily 
present  every  gradation  of  character,  from  the 
European  v^ath  no  trace  of  the  Oriental  about  him, 
to  the  European  who  is  so  thorouglily  orientalised 
as  scarcely  to  have  preserved  any  distinctive 
European  characteristics.  A  considerable  number 
of  Levantines  lie  midway  between  these  two 
extremes.  Starting  sometimes  with  national  char- 
acteristics which  bear  some  resemblance  to  those 
of  Easterns,  they  develop  those  characteristics  to  a 
still  greater  degree  by  residence  in  the  East.  They 
become  semi-orientalised  Europeans.  If  compared 
with  the  northern  races  of  Europe,  the  predomi- 
nance of  the  Oriental  portion  of  their  characters 
will  come  out  in  strong  relief.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  are  compared  with  the  southern  Euro- 
pean races,  any  process  of  differentiation  will  bring 
out  their  distinctive  Oriental  characteristics  in  a  less 
striking  manner.  The  majority  of  Levantines  are 
recruited  from  the  southern  races  of  Europe,  and, 
in  respect  to  these  more  especially,  their  technical 
nationality  is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  present 
argument,  of  slight  importance.  The  particular 
Consulate  at  which  the  Levantine  is  inscribed  is  a 
Aiere  accident.  He  is,  above  all  things,  a  Levan- 
tine, though  he  dislikes  to  be  designated  by  that 
appellation  ;  for,  partly  because  he  is  aware  that  the 
Levantines  do  not  generally  bear  a  high  character, 
partly  because  he  dislikes  to  merge  his  national 
individuality  in  a  cosmopolitan  expression,  and 
partly  because  he  is  sensible  of  the  material  benefits 
which  he  derives  from  his  foreign  nationality,  the 
Levantine  will  often  develop  a  specially  ardent 
degree  of  patriotism  for  the  country  which  affords 
him  Consular  protection. 

partly  conquered,  among  whom  they  lived,  and  whose  daughters  they 
did  not  disdain  to  marry  ;  they  were  growing  into  Levantines ;  they 
were  known  as  Pullani  or  Creoles." 


248  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

Germans  and  Englishmen,  however  long  they 
may  reside  in  the  Levant,  rarely  become  typical 
Levantines.  Starting  with  strongly  marked  national 
characteristics,  they  generally  preserve  those  char- 
acteristics more  or  less  intact.  As  a  class,  they  do 
not  differ  materially  from  their  fellow-countrymen 
of  the  same  social  standing  in  Germany  or  England, 

The  case  of  the  Italians,  of  whom  there  are  a 
large  number  in  Eg}^t,  is  different.  Many  of  the 
skilled  artisans  in  Egypt,  the  bricklayers,  masons, 
carpenters,  etc.,  are  Italians.  They  are,  as  a  rule,  a 
steady,  industrious  race,  whose  presence  is  very  use- 
ful to  the  Egyptians,  as  it  enables  the  latter  to  learn 
various  crafts  requiring  skill  in  their  application. 
As  a  body,  these  Italians  do  not  differ  from  their 
countrymen  of  the  same  social  position  in  Italy. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  some  middle-class 
Italians,  who,  with  their  famihes,  have  been  long 
resident  in  Eg}^t,  and  who  may,  as  a  class,  be  con- 
sidered representative  Levantines.  The  transition 
from  being  Italian  to  being  Levantine  is,  in  these 
cases,  more  easy  than  in  the  case  of  the  Englishman 
or  the  German. 

Much  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  Austrians, 
who  do  not  generally  come  from  Austria  proper, 
but  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Trieste.  Many  of 
these  are  Jews.  Their  language  is  generally  not 
German  but  Itahan. 

The  French  occupy  a  pecuHar  position.  The 
French  colony  contains  every  gradation  of  type, 
from  the  most  GaUic  Gaul  to  the  ultra-Levantinised 
Levantine.  In  respect  to  the  latter  class,  however, 
the  question  arises  of  whether  the  Frenchman  has 
become  Levantinised,  or  whether  the  counter- 
process  has  not  taken  place ;  whether  it  is  not 
that  the  Levantine  has  become  Gallicised.  The 
fact  is  that  both  processes  are  constantly  in 
operation. 


cH.  XXXVIII        THE  EUROPEANS  249 

Next,  what  are  the  main  characteristics  of  the 
Levantines  ?  There  are,  of  course,  many  Levan- 
tines— merchants,  professional  men,  shopkeepers, 
and  others — who  are  higlily  respectable  members 
of  society,  and  who  carry  on  their  business  upon 
the  same  principles  as  they  would  adopt  were  they 
living  at  Trieste,  Genoa,  or  Marseilles.  But  these 
are  not  representatives  of  the  class,  which  is  con- 
jured up  in  the  mind  of  the  Egyptian  JNIinister 
or  his  British  adviser,  when  the  word  Levantine 
is  mentioned.  It  is  the  misfortune  of  the  Levan- 
tines that  they  suffer  in  reputation  by  reason  of 
qualities  which  are  displayed  by  only  a  small 
minority  of  their  class.  It  cannot,  in  fact,  be 
doubted  that  amongst  this  minority  are  to  be 
found  individuals  who  are  tainted  with  a  remark- 
able degree  of  moral  obliquity.  These  are  the 
Levantines  who  regard  the  Egyptians,  from  prince 
to  peasant,  as  their  prey.  In  days  now  happily 
past,  they  brought  all  their  intellectual  acuteness, 
which  is  of  no  mean  order,  to  bear  on  the  work 
of  depredation.  Whatever  national  defects  they 
may  have  possessed  in  their  country  of  origin, 
appear  to  have  been  enhanced  when,  on  arrival  in 
Egypt,  they  had  to  deal  with  a  people  who  were 
ignorant,  credulous,  and  improvident,  and,  there- 
fore, easily  despoiled ;  who,  by  reason  of  their  oviTi 
low  moral  standard,  seemed,  to  a  perverted  mind,  in 
some  degree  to  justify  reciprocity  of  low  morals  in 
dealing  with  them ;  and  who,  being  weak  and 
defenceless,  invited  spoliation  at  the  hands  of  the 
unprincipled  adventurer  armed  with  all  the  strength 
which  he  drew  from  intellectual  superiority,  diplo- 
matic support,  and  intimate  acquaintance  mth  all 
the  forms  and  back-alleys  of  the  Civil  Code.  This 
is  the  class  which  has  to  a  certain  extent  made 
European  civilisation  stink  in  the  nostrils  of  the 
Egyptians.      The   Levantines   of  this   description 


250  INIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

have  done  a  small  amount  of  good  by  introducing 
European  capital  on  a  limited  scale  into  the 
country.  They  have  done  a  vast  amount  of 
harm  by  associating  the  name  of  European  in 
the  minds  of  the  Egyptians  with  a  total  absence 
of  scruple  in  the  pursuit  of  gain.  The  upper-class 
Levantine  naturally  used  to  consider  the  upper- 
class  Egyptian  as  his  prey.  The  lower-class 
Le\'antine  tricked  the  fellaheen. 

The  Greeks  are  so  numerous  that  they  deserve 
consideration  by  themselves.  In  1897,  there  were 
38,000  Greeks  in  Egj^t.  The  question  of  who  is 
and  who  is  not  a  subject  of  the  King  of  the 
Hellenes  is  a  never  -  ending  cause  of  dispute 
between  the  Ottoman  and  Greek  Governments. 
Under  what  conditions  of  birth  and  residence  are 
the  Greeks,  who  were  born  and  bred  outside 
Greece  and  who  have  only  casually  lived  in  that 
country,  to  be  considered  Greek  subjects  ?  It  is 
needless  to  dwell  on  the  details  of  this  wearisome 
question.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say  that,  in  spite 
of  the  resistance  of  the  Egyptian  authorities,  most 
Greek-speaking  Greeks  generally  manage  to  produce 
sufficient  evidence  to  enable  them  to  claim  the 
privileges  attaching  to  Greek  nationality. 

In  Alexandria,  which  may  almost  be  said  to 
be  a  Greek  town,  a  gi-eat  many  influential  and 
highly  respectable  Greeks  are  to  be  found.  Their 
presence  in  Egypt  is  an  unmixed  benefit  to  the 
country.^      More   than   this,   many   of   the    smaU 

'  I  wish  to  insist  very  strongly  on  this  point.  None  have  suffered 
more  tlian  the  Greeks  from  the  practice,  which  is  but  too  common,  of 
coinleiimiiijr  a  whole  class  or  community  because  the  conduct  of  certain 
individuals  belonging  to  it  is  worthy  of  condemnation.  I  have  the  best 
reasons  for  knowing  that  none  regret  more  than  the  very  numerous 
high -class  Greeks  established  in  Egypt  the  fact  that  their  national 
reputation  should  at  times  be  tiirnished  by  the  behaviour  of  some 
individuals  belonging  to  their  nation.  In  spite  of  the  blemishes 
recorded  in  these  pages,  it  may  be  said  with  truth  that  the  Greeks 
in  Egypt  have,  as  of  old,  carried  high  the  torch  of  civilisation  in  their 
adopted  country. 


GH.  XXXVIII         THE  EUROPEANS  251 

Greek  traders  are  fully  deserving  of  respect.  Still 
the  fact  remains  that  a  portion  of  the  Greek  colony 
in  Egypt  consists  of  low-class  Greeks  exercising  the 
professions  of  usurer,  drink-seller,  etc.  The  Greek 
of  this  class  has  an  extraordinary  talent  for  retail 
trade.  He  will  risk  his  life  in  the  pursuit  of 
petty  gain.  It  is  not  only  that  a  Greek  usurer 
or  a  bakal  (general  dealer)  is  established  in  almost 
every  village  in  Egypt ;  the  Greek  pushes  his  way 
into  the  most  remote  parts  of  the  Soudan  and  of 
Abyssinia.  Wherever,  in  fact,  there  is  the  smallest 
prospect  of  buying  in  a  cheap  and  selhng  in  a  dear 
market,  there  will  the  petty  Greek  trader  be  found. 
In  1889,  I  visited  Sarras,  some  thirty  miles  south 
of  Wadi  Haifa.  It  was  at  that  time  the  farthest 
outpost  of  the  Egyptian  army,  and  is  situated  m.  the 
midst  of  a  howhng  wilderness.  The  post  had  only 
been  established  for  a  few  days.  Nevertheless,  there 
I  found  a  Greek  already  selling  sardines,  biscuits, 
etc.,  to  a  very  limited  number  of  customers,  out  of 
a  hole  in  a  rock  in  which  he  had  set  up  a  temporary 
shop. 

We  may,  therefore,  give  the  low-class  Greek 
credit  for  his  enterprising  commercial  spirit. 
Nevertheless,  his  presence  in  Egypt  is  often  hurtful. 
Whatever  healthy  moral  and  political  influences 
remain  untouched  after  the  Turco-Egyptian  Pasha, 
the  tyrannical  Sheikh,  and  the  fanatical  "Alim" 
have  done  their  worst,  these  the  low-class  Greek 
seeks  to  destroy.  He  tempts  the  Egyptian  peasant 
to  borrow  at  some  exorbitant  rate  of  interest,  and 
then,  by  a  sharp  turn  of  the  legal  screw,  reduces 
him  from  the  position  of  an  allodial  proprietor  to 
that  of  a  serf.  He  undermines  that  moral  quality 
of  which  the  Moslem,  when  untainted  by  European 
association,  has  in  some  degree  a  speciality.  That 
quality  is  sobriety.  Under  Greek  action  and 
influence,   the   Egyptian   villagers   are    taking    to 


252  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

drink.  Mr.  Gladstone,  in  a  speech  which  has 
become  historical,  once  said  that  it  would  be  a 
good  thing  if  the  Turks  were  turned  "  bag  and 
baggage  "  out  of  Europe.^  This  may  or  may  not 
be  the  case.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  a 
counter -proposition  of  a  somewhat  similar  nature 
holds  good.  It  would  be  an  excellent  thing  for 
Turkey  and  its  dependencies  if  some  of  the  low- 
class  Greeks,  who  inhabit  the  Ottoman  dominions, 
could  be  turned  bag  and  baggage  out  of  Turkey. 

Before  passing  on  to  a  consideration  of  the 
sentiments  entertained  by  the  Europeans  resident 
in  Egypt  towards  the  English  reformer,  it  will  be 
as  well  to  say  something  of  the  English  themselves. 

The  English  in  Eg}^t  may  be  divided  into 
three  categories,  viz.  (1)  the  non-official  residents; 
(2)  the  army  of  occupation ;  (3)  the  officials  in  the 
Egyptian  service. 

The  permanent  British  colony  in  Egypt  is 
small.  It  consists  mainly  of  a  few  merchants 
who  reside  at  Alexandria,  and  who  employ  a 
small  number  of  subordinate  English  agents  to 
watch  over  their  business  in  the  provinces.  The 
greater  part  of  the  export  trade  is  in  the  hands 
of  British  firms.  The  Alexandrian  Englishman, 
like  most  of  his  countrymen,  is  somewhat  exclusive. 
He  mixes  Uttle  in  foreign  society.  The  general 
standard   of  probity  in  business  matters  amongst 

•  Mr.  Gladstone  was  guilty  of  an  unconscious  plagiarism.  Few 
people  probably  know  that  the  expression,  as  applied  to  the  Turks, 
originated  with  Lord  Stratford  de  Redcliffe,  whose  opinions  have  passed 
down  to  posterity  as  representing  the  ne  p/ua  ultra  of  Turcophilism. 
Such,  however,  is  the  case.  Writing  to  Mr.  Canning  on  September  29, 
1821,  Lord  Stratford  said  :  "As  a  matter  of  humanity,  I  wish  with  all 
my  soul  that  the  Greeks  were  put  in  possession  of  their  whole  patri- 
mony, and  that  the  Sultan  was  driven,  bag  and  baggage,  into  the  lieart 
of  Asia"  (77(«  Life  of  Stratford  Canning,  vol.  i.  p.  307).  Canon 
MacCoU  says  {Fortnightly  Rei^iew,  June  1808)  :  "  \Vhat  Mr.  Gladstone 
proposed  was  that  the  Turkish  administration  should  'all,  bag  and 
baggage,  clear  out  '—not  '  from  Kurope,  but  from  the  provinces 
which  they  had  desolated  and  profaned.'"  The  difference  does  not 
appear  very  material. 


CH.  XXXVIII         THE  EUROPEANS  253 

the  English  in  Egypt  is  high.  The  Enghsh  are, 
for  the  most  part,  eminently  fair  and  reasonable. 
They  never  give  any  trouble.  They  have  the 
great  merit  of  attending  exclusively  to  their  own 
affairs.  During  the  many  years  that  I  was'  Consul- 
General  in  Egypt,  I  do  not  remember  an  instance 
in  which  I  was  asked  by  an  Englishman  resident  in 
Egypt  to  support  any  manifestly  unfair  or  pre- 
posterous claim.  The  Englishman  knows  his  rights ; 
he  knows  that  if  they  are  infringed  he  has  his  legal 
remedy,  and  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  apply  for  the 
support  of  his  Consul- General.  I  doubt  whether 
the  representative  of  any  other  Power  in  Egypt 
could  say  the  same. 

Passing  to  a  different  stratum,  there  are  a 
certain  number  of  Englishmen  in  Egypt,  who  are 
employed  in  various  unofficial  capacities,  and  who 
are  generally  vigorous,  honest,  straightforward 
specimens  of  humanity,  but  who  in  exceptional 
cases  sometimes  make  the  British  race  unpopular 
by  their  bad  manners  and  self-assertion.  Their 
conduct  is  in  this  respect  highly  reprehensible. 
Nevertheless,  taken  as  a  whole,  the  English 
dwellers  in  Egypt  are  a  sturdy,  self-respecting, 
and,  therefore,  respected  race,  who  do  credit  to 
their  country  of  origin,  and  whose  presence  is  useful 
to  their  country  of  adoption. 

Little  need  be  said  of  the  army  of  occupation. 
The  discipline  and  good  conduct  of  the  British 
army  in  all  its  ranks  are  recognised  by  the  most 
bitter  Anglophobes.  The  worst  that  can  be  said 
of  the  soldiers  is  that  some  of  them  disgrace  them- 
selves by  getting  drunk  off  the  vile  liquor  supplied 
to  them  in  the  bazaars.  From  the  political  point 
of  view,  the  main  characteristic  of  the  British 
officer  is  his  exclusiveness.  In  whatever  clime  he 
may  serve,  he  carries  his  uisular  habits  and  national 
pastimes  with  him.     In  Egypt,  he  rarely  mixes  in 


254  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

any  society  which  is  not  English,  and  he  abstains 
from  doing  so,  partly  because  of  his  ignorance  of 
any  language  but  his  own,  and  partly  because  his 
social  habits  differ  from  those  of  the  cosmopolitan 
society  of  the  Egyptian  towns.  A\"hat  does  the 
Frenchman  or  Italian  care  for  horse-races,  polo, 
cricket,  golf,  and  all  the  other  quasi -national 
institutions,  which  the  British  officer  establishes 
wherever  he  goes,  whether  his  residence  be  in  the 
frigid  or  the  torrid  zone  ?  This  exclusiveness  has 
its  advantages  and  also  its  disadvantages.  If  a 
French  army  had  been  in  Egypt,  the  officers  would 
have  fraternised  mth  the  European  residents. 
They  would  have  been  seen  sitting  outside  every 
cafe.  The  result  would  have  been,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  creation  of  greater  social  sympathy 
between  the  army  and  certain  classes  of  the  urban 
population,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  occurrence 
of  more  fi-equent  quarrels.  The  British  officer  does 
not  attract  the  sympathy,  but  he  avoids  the  quarrels. 
He  is  respected.  On  the  other  hand,  he  does  not 
excite  any  lively  sentiment  of  sympathy  or  friend- 
ship. On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  politician,  the  advantages 
predominate  over  the  disadvantages.  Tlie  British 
officers  obey  orders ;  they  neither  know,  nor  care 
to  know  anything  about  local  politics ;  they  rarely 
cause  any  trouble ;  they  behave  for  the  most  part 
like  English  gentlemen.  Under  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  these  are  ideal  qualities.  They 
are  qualities  which  were  appreciated  by  the  most 
astute  of  Egyptian  statesmen,  Xubar  Pasha. 

I  was  once  talking  to  a  Levantine  in  a  Cairo 
street  when  a  young  British  officer  rode  by.  ]\Iy 
friend  stopped  in  the  middle  of  his  conversation 
and  said :  "  Che  bella  razza !  Come  sono  forti  e 
puliti  I "  That  was  what  most  struck  him — that 
the   British   officers   were   physically   strong,  and, 


cu.  XXXVIII         THE  EUROPEANS  255 

moreover,  that  they  were  washed.  I  was  struck 
with  the  expression.  I  fancy  it  represents  the 
opinions  of  a  good  many  Southerners. 

At  a  later  period  of  this  narrative,  the  positions 
held  by  the  British  officials  in  the  Egyptian  service 
will  be  more  fully  treated.  For  the  present  all 
that  need  be  said  is  that,  being  for  the  most  part 
better  linguists,  they  are  generally  less  exclusive 
than  the  officers  of  the  army  of  occupation.  At 
the  same  time,  the  society  in  which  they  move  is 
mainly  English. 

The  next  point  to  consider  is  the  attitude  of  the 
Europeans  resident  in  Egypt  towards  the  English, 
and  more  particularly  towards  the  small  band  of 
Englishmen  who  were  instrumental  in  carrying  out 
the  work  of  Egyptian  reform. 

Enough  has  been  already  said  to  show  that 
there  is  little  social  sympathy  between  the  English, 
and  any  class  of  Europeans  in  Egypt.  The  best 
amongst  the  Europeans  respect  the  British  officials ; 
they  admire  their  good  qualities — their  honesty, 
their  energy,  and  above  all  their  tenacity.  But 
few  like  them.  Moreover,  few  understand  them. 
To  the  European  resident  in  Egypt  the  British 
officials  were,  in  the  first  instance  at  all  events, 
somewhat  of  an  enigma.  Being  generally  accus- 
tomed to  Continental  official  procedure,  they  could 
not  understand  a  member  of  a  bureaucracy  who 
rather  despised  forms  and  had  no  bureaucratic 
tendencies,  and  who,  moreover,  did  his  work  in  an 
unobtrusive  way  without  any  unnecessary  fuss. 
But  as  the  occupation  was  prolonged,  and  the 
effects  of  British  predominance  became  year  by 
year  more  apparent,  the  ways  of  the  British  official 
became  better  understood. 

The  usurer,  the  drink  -  seller,  and  others  of 
the  same  species,  naturally  looked  askance  at 
the  Englishman    and    his   reforms    from   the  very 


256  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 


first.  Though  these  classes  recognised  that  the 
presence  of  a  British  army  in  Egypt  afforded 
security  to  their  Uves  and  properties,  and  though 
they  were  aware  that,  in  the  event  of  an  ebullition 
of  Moslem  fanaticism,  they  would  be  the  first  to 
suffer,  still  they  would  not  readily  forgive  the 
Englishman  for  standing  between  them  and  their 
prey ;  they  could  not  forget  that,  had  British 
influence  not  been  predominant,  the  rate  of  interest 
would  have  been  quadrupled ;  they,  therefore,  at 
one  time  looked  back  regretfully  to  those  halcyon 
days  before  the  British  occupation,  when  they 
were  able  to  plunder  the  Egyptian  Government  at 
will,  and  when  they  and  the  Egyptian  Government 
agreed  together  to  plunder  the  Egyptians. 

The  political  sympathies  of  the  various  nation- 
alities count  also  for  a  good  deal  in  the  formation 
of  European  public  opinion  as  regards  the  action 
of  the  British  officials  in  Egypt.  On  these,  I 
need  not  dwell.  Inasmuch  as  they  depend  on 
the  occurrence  of  political  events  outside  Egypt, 
they  naturally  varied  greatly  during  the  period  of 
my  tenure  of  office. 

In  this,  and  in  the  four  preceding  chapters,  an 
attempt  has  been  made  to  describe  the  principal 
elements  of  Egyptian  society  with  special  reference 
to  the  attitude  which  each  section  assumed  towards 
the  English  reformer,  more  especially  in  the  early 
days  of  the  occupation.  It  is  now  possible  to 
marshal  the  opposing  forces  and  to  distinguish 
between  friends  and  foes.  Some  were  avowedly 
hostile.  Some  vacillated  between  lukewarm  friend- 
ship and  covert  hostility.  Others,  constituting  a 
large  numerical  majority,  were  friendly,  but  dared 
not  give  expression  to  their  friendship,  and  were, 
moreover,  powerless  to  help  the  cause  of  their 
benefactors.    Lastly,  a  small  minority  were  friendly 


oH.xxxvm         THE  EUROPEANS  257 

and  had  the  courage  of  their  opinions,  but  the 
occasion  for  asserting  them  was  generally  wanting. 

The  Turco  -  Egyptian  Pashas,  the  jMoslem 
hierarchy,  the  Europeanised  Egyptians,  and  the 
French  were,  in  the  first  instance,  for  various 
reasons  hostile. 

The  squirearchy,  the  Copts,  the  Syrians,  and 
the  Levantines  hovered  between  friendship  and 
hostility,  being  torn  by  conflicting  sentiments  and 
driven  hither  and  thither  by  every  passing  breeze  of 
self-interest. 

The  mass  of  the  population,  that  is  to  say,  the 
fellaheen,  were  certainly  from  the  very  first  friendly, 
but  they  were  politically  speechless,  and,  moreover, 
were  so  credulous  and  ignorant  that,  had  they 
attempted  to  make  their  voices  heard,  they 
would  just  as  hkely  as  not  have  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  frothy  demagogues  or  unprincipled  news- 
paper editors,  who  would  have  made  them  say  the 
opposite  of  what  they  really  thought. 

A  small  body  of  respectable  and  intelligent 
Europeans  were  friendly,  but  their  friendship  was 
platonic.  They  took  little  part  in  local  politics, 
and  were,  for  the  most  part,  mere  spectators  of 
what  was  passing  on  the  political  stage. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  hostile,  quasi -hostile: 
and  apathetic  forces,  though  less  numerous,  were 
more  powerful  than  those  who  were  friendly.  On 
the  one  side,  stood  the  stolid  conservatism  of  the 
East,  religious  prejudice,  ignorance,  international 
jealousy,  and  a  number  of  powerful  vested  interests, 
some  of  an  ignoble  type.  On  the  other  side,  stood 
the  force  derived  from  an  honest  endeavour  to 
secure  the  well  -  being  of  a  whole  population, 
which  had  been  trodden  under  foot  for  centuries. 

The  battle  seemed  in  some  respects  unequal. 
Vet  the  Englishman  took  heart  of  grace.  He 
proceeded    with    caution    and    he   won    the    day. 

VOL.  II  s 


258  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

He  felt  from  the  first  that  he  was  fighting 
in  a  good  cause.  He  liad  the  goodwill  of 
intelligent  and  impartial  Europe.  He  had  a  mili- 
tary force  behind  him  to  prevent  any  premature 
upset  of  the  whole  machine.  He  was  able  to 
employ  agents  of  experience  trained  in  all  the 
intricacies  of  Oriental  government.  Ten  years  after 
the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir  a  competent  observer 
was  able  to  write :  "  Even  our  superb  administra- 
tion of  India  is  hardly  a  brighter  jewel  in  our 
imperial  crown  than  the  marvellous  regeneration  of 
Egypt."  ^  More  than  this.  As  the  occupation 
continued,  a  great  change  came  over  the  opinions 
of  various  sections  of  Egyptian  society.  The 
benefits  conferred  by  the  exercise  of  British 
influence  were,  indeed,  so  palpable  that  they  could 
not  be  denied.  Amongst  both  European  and 
Eg}^tian  society,  all  but  a  very  small  class  ranged 
themselves,  either  actively  or  passively,  on  the  side 
of  England.^  Notably,  both  ItaUan  and  Greek 
sympathy  was  on  many  occasions  displayed  in  a 
very  remarkable  degree.  The  representatives  of 
the  various  Christian  conmiunities  resident  in 
Egypt  seized  every  possible  opportunity  for  ex- 
pressing their  friendliness  to  England.  With  a 
few  exceptions,  even  the  Moslems  acquiesced  in 
the  policy  of  reform. 

The  open  or  covert  hostility  of  various  sections 
of  society  in  Eg}^t  has  not  been  the  only,  neither, 
indeed,  has  it  been  the  principal  difficulty  which 
has  beset  the  path  of  the  English  reformer.    Under 

»  Cairo,  p.  243. 

*  I  wrote  tliese  remarks  in  190,3,  and,  in  spite  of  any  appearances  to 
the  contrary,  my  conviction  is  that  they  still  (1907)  lioid  good.  During 
the  last  three  or  four  years,  a  strong  and  very  legitimate  desire  to  take 
a  greater  part  than  heretofore  in  the  administration  of  tiie  country  has 
made  itself  felt  among  intelligent  Egyptians,  hut  my  belief  is  that  the 
number  of  those  who  would  really  wish  the  reforming  work  of  England 
in  Egypt  to  be  brought  prematurely  to  a  close  still  comprise  a  "very 
small,"  and,  1  may  sJiA,  a  wholly  unrepresentative,  class. 


CH.  XXXVIII        THE  EUROPEANS  259 

the  combined  influences  of  rival  diplomatists, 
bondholders,  foreign  jurists,  and  others,  who  have 
from  time  to  time  borne  a  part  in  Egyptian  affairs, 
a  variety  of  fantastic  institutions  grew  up,  many  of 
which  were  originally  devised  to  check  misgovern- 
ment,  but  wliich,  under  altered  circumstances, 
have,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  acted  as  powerful  obstacles 
to  reform.  An  endeavour  will  now  be  made  to 
guide  the  reader  through  some  of  the  intricate 
windings  of  this  administrative  labyrinth. 


CHAPTER    XXXIX 

THE   MACHINERY    OF   GOVERNMENT 

Nature  of  the  machinery — Parts  of  the  machine — 1.  The  Suttan — 
The  Firman  of  1892 — The  Sinai  Peninsula — 2.  The  Khedive — 
Rescript  of  August  28,  1878 — Constitutionalism  of  Tewfik  Pasha 
— 3.  The  Ministers — ^The  Departments — Position  of  an  Egyptian 
Minister — 4.  The  Organic  Law  of  May  1,  1883 — The  Provincial 
Councils — The  Leg'islative  Council — The  Legislative  Assembly. 

If  any  one  unacquainted  with  mechanics  enters  a 
factory  where  a  quantity  of  steam  machinery  is  at 
work,  he  is  for  a  moment  deafened  with  the  noise, 
and  his  first  impression  will  not  improbably  be  one 
of  surprise  that  any  delicate  bit  of  workmanship 
can  result  from  the  apparent  confusion  which  he 
sees  before  him.  Gradually,  however,  he  comes  to 
understand  that  the  rate  at  which  each  wheel  turns 
is  regulated  to  a  nicety,  that  the  piston  of  the 
steam-engine  cannot  give  a  stroke  by  one  hairs- 
breadth  shorter  or  longer  than  that  which  it  is 
intended  to  give,  that  the  strength  with  which  the 
hammer  is  made  to  descend  is  capable  of  the  most 
perfect  adjustment,  that  safety-valves  and  a  variety 
of  other  checks  and  counterchecks  exist  which  are 
sufficient  guarantees  against  accident,  and  that, 
generally,  each  portion  of  the  machinery  is  adapted 
to  perform  a  certain  specified  bit  of  work  and  is 
under  such  perfect  control  that  it  cannot  interfere 
with  the  functions  of  any  other  portion.  He  will 
then  no  longer  be  surprised  that,  with  a  little  care 
in  oiling  the  difTcrent  parts  of  the  machinery,  a 

260 


CH.  XXXIX        THE  GOVERNMENT  261 

highly  finished  piece  of  workmanship  is  eventually 
produced. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  finds  on  examination 
that  the  confusion  is  even  worse  than  at  first  sight 
appeared,  that  the  movement  of  each  wheel  is 
eccentric  in  the  highest  degree,  that  the  piston  is 
hable  at  any  moment  to  stop  working,  that  there  is 
no  adequate  machinery  for  adjusting  the  strength 
of  the  stroke  to  be  given  by  the  hammer,  that 
safety-valves  and  other  guarantees  against  accident 
are  wanting,  that  the  work  to  be  performed  by 
each  separate  portion  is  uncertain  and  variable, 
that  some  portions  are  of  the  latest  and  most 
improved  patterns  whilst  others  are  old,  rusty,  and 
obsolete,  that  a  strong  centrifugal  force  is  con- 
stantly at  work  impelling  the  different  parts  of  the 
machinery  to  fly  out  of  their  own  orbits,  and  that 
a  mistake  on  the  part  of  the  engineer  in  not 
removing  any  small  particle  of  grit  betimes,  or  not 
applying  the  right  amount  of  oil  at  the  right 
moment,  may  bring  about  a  collapse  of  the  whole 
fabric, — he  will  then  no  longer  look  for  the 
production  of  any  highly  finished  article.  Indeed, 
he  will  be  surprised  that  the  mechanical  chaos 
before  him  is  capable  of  producing  any  article 
at  all. 

The  Egyptian  administrative  system  bears  to 
the  administration  of  any  higlily  civilised  European 
State  much  the  same  relation  as  the  second  factory 
described  above  bears  to  the  first.  In  Europe,  we 
know  what  a  despotism  means,  and  we  know  what 
constitutional  government  means.  The  words 
absolute  monarchy,  limited  monarchy,  republic, 
parliamentary  government,  federal  council,  and 
others  of  a  like  nature,  when  applied  to  the 
government  of  any  country,  will  readily  convey 
to  an  educated  European  a  general  idea  of  how  the 
government  of  the  particular  country  in  question 


262  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

is  conducted.  But  the  political  dictio!iary  may  be 
ransacked  in  v^ain  for  any  terse  description  of  the 
Government  of  Egypt. 

In  the  first  place,  tliat  Government  is,  in 
reality,  not  a  Government  at  all.  Nubar  Pasha 
frequently  said  :  "  Ce  nest  pas  un  Gouvernement ; 
c'est  une  administration."  This  is  quite  true.  The 
Khedive  is  deprived  by  the  Egyptian  constitutional 
charter  of  all  rights  of  external  sovereignty,  neither 
does  he  possess  to  the  full  those  rights  of  mternal 
sovereignty  which  are  inherent  in  the  rulers  of  all 
independent,  and  even  of  some  semi-independent 
states. 

In  the  second  place,  the  manner  in  which  the 
legislative  power  is  exercised  in  the  Ottoman 
dominions,  of  which  Egypt  forms  a  part,  is  unique. 
We  readily  ufiderstand  what  a  Ukase  issued  by 
the  Czar  of  Russia  means.  An  intelligent  foreigner 
will  at  once  seize  on  what  is  meant  when  it  is  said 
that  the  King  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  has  given  his  assent  to  a  Bill 
which  has  passed  through  both  Houses  of  Parlia- 
ment. But  the  Khedive's  power  is  dissimilar  to 
that  of  either  a  despotic  or  a  constitutional  ruler. 
He  cannot,  on  his  own  authority,  issue  any  Decree 
the  provisions  of  which  will  be  binding  on  all 
the  inhabitants  of  Egypt.  Legislation  has  to  be 
conducted  by  diplomacy.  The  President  of  the 
United  States  and  the  King  of  Sweden  have  to 
give  their  consent  before  the  provisions  of  any  new 
law  can  be  applied  to  the  subjects  of  the  Emperor 
of  Austria  or  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  for  in 
legislation  by  diplomacy  unanimity  amongst  the 
diplomatic  legislators  is  required ;  otherwise  no 
legislation  can  take  place.  The  system,  as  Lord 
Salisbury  once  wrote  to  me,  "is  like  the  liherum 
veto  of  the  Polish  Diet,  without  the  resource  of 
cutting  off  the  dissentient's  head." 


SH.  XXXIX        THE  GOVERNMENT  263 

In  the  third  place,  the  executive  power  is  so 
disseminated  as  to  render  it  impossible  to  say 
where  it  resides.  In  certain  matters,  the  Khedive 
and  his  Ministers  are  practically  vested  with 
despotic  power.  .In  others,  their  hands  are  tied  to 
a  greater  extent  than  those  of  the  Governors  of 
the  most  democratic  States.  Moreover,  it  often 
happens  that,  although  the  text  of  the  document 
which  confers  some  special  power  may  be  clear, 
it  will  be  found,  on  closer  inspection,  that  some 
international  or  other  hgament  exists,  which  is 
apparently  so  flimsy  as  to  be  only  visible  to  the 
eye  of  a  trained  diplomatist,  but  which  is  in  reality 
of  so  tough  a  texture  as  to  place  an  effectual 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  practical  exercise  of  the 
power. 

In  the  fourth  place,  the  judicial  system  is  a 
tangle  of  conflicting  jurisdictions.  The  law  is  at 
times  apphed  by  a  body  of  foreign  judges  who, 
being  free  from  the  restraints  of  any  legislature, 
are  practically  a  law  unto  themselves.  At  times, 
again,  the  law  is  administered  by  Eg}^tian  judges. 
Each  Consul  judges  his  own  countrymen  for  crimmal 
offences  according  to  the  laws  of  his  own  country, 
whilst  close  by  the  Kadi  is  endeavouring  to  settle 
some  dispute  over  a  will  according  to  the  rusty 
principles  laid  down  thirteen  centuries  ago  by 
Mohammed. 

The  complicated  machinery,  whose  general  nature 
is  described  above,  will  now  be  explamed  in  detail. 
It  will  be  as  well,  in  the  first  instance,  to  enimierate 
the  parts  of  the  machine.     They  are  as  follows  : — 

1.  The  Sultan.  2.  The  Khedive.  3.  The 
Ministers.  4.  The  Legislative  Council  and  As- 
sembly. 5.  The  superior  European  officials,  mostly 
British,  who  are  attached  in  various  capacities  to 
the  different  JNIinistries. 

The  above  constitute  the  Turkish,  Egyptian,  and 


264  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

Anglo -Egyptian,  as  opposed  to  the  International 
portions  of  the  administration.  The  International, 
or,  as  they  are  usually  called,  the  IMixed  Administra- 
tions were  created  in  virtue  of  arrangements  made, 
from  time  to  time,  between  the  ^Egyptian  Govern- 
ment and  the  Powers.  Neither  their  functions  nor 
their  constitution  can  be  changed  without  the 
assent  of  the  Powers.  In  1882,  when  the  British 
occupation  commenced,  they  were  as  foUows : — 
1.  The  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt.  2.  The 
Railway  Board,  under  which  was  also  placed  the 
administration  of  the  Telegraph  Department  and 
of  the  Port  of  Alexandria.  3.  The  Daira  Ad- 
ministration.    4.  The  Domains  Administration. 

Lastly,  justice  is  administered  by  the  following 
law-courts : — 1.  The  Mixed  Tribunals.  2.  The 
Native  Tribunals.  3.  The  Consular  Courts.  4. 
The  Mehkemeh  Sheraieh. 

1.  The  Sultan, 

The  relations  between  the  Sultan  and  the 
Khedive  are  laid  down  in  a  variety  of  Firmans 
dating  from  1841  to  1892.  Of  these,  the  most 
recent  is  naturally  the  most  important.  It  was 
issued  to  Abbas  II.  on  March  27,  1892.  Save  in 
respect  to  one  point,  to  which  allusion  will  presently 
be  made,  this  Firman  does  not  differ  from  that  of 
August  7,  1879,  granted  to  Tewfik  Pasha. 

The  main  provision  of  the  Firman  of  1892  is 
that  under  certain  restrictions,  the  civil  and  financial 
administration  of  Egypt  is  confided  to  the  Khedive 
Abbas  II.  and  his  male  descendants  taken  in  order 
of  primogeniture.   The  restrictions  are  as  follows : — 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  laid  down  that  all 
Egyptians  are  Ottoman  subjects.  The  taxes  are 
to  be  levied  in  the  name  of  the  Sultan.  There  can, 
therefore,    conformably   with    the   Firman,   be   no 


CH.  XXXIX        THE  GOVERNMENT  265 

such   thing    as   a   separate   Egyptian   State,   or   a 
separate  Egyptian  nationality. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  taken  for  granted  that 
the  Khedive  has  no  right  to  make  political  Treaties 
with  foreign  states.  Conventions  dealing  with  com- 
mercial affairs,  or  with  those  which  relate  solely  to 
matters  of  purely  internal  administration,  may, 
however,  be  made.  Mr.  James  Scott,  the  lecturer 
at  the  Khedivial  School  of  Law,  says  :  "  In  regard 
to  the  right  of  the  Egyptian  Government  to  make 
International  Conventions,  it  would  appear  that  it 
has  power  to  make  Conventions  in  reference  to 
every  question  except  the  cession  of  territory,  or 
the  making  of  peace  or  war."^  As  a  natural 
result  of  this  political  relationship,  the  Khedive 
has  no  right  to  appoint  a  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative to  any  European  court.  Further,  as 
a  general  rule,  when  the  European  Powers  meet 
in  conclave,  Egypt  is  represented  by  the  Ottoman 
delegate.  Separate  Egyptian  representation  has, 
however,  been  allowed  at  Conferences  assembled 
to  deal  with  special  subjects,  in  which  Egypt 
is  interested.  It  is  not  easy  to  lay  down  any 
very  precise  rule  on  this  subject.  Thus,  when, 
in  1884,  a  Conference  was  assembled  in  London 
to  consider  the  financial  affairs  of  Egypt,  the 
Egyptian  Government  were  denied  any  separate 
representation.  Musurus  Pasha,  the  Turkish  Am- 
bassador in  London,  sat,  and  often  slept  at  the 
Council    table,^    whilst    the    Egyptian    delegates, 

•  The  Law  affecting  Foreigners  in  Egypt,  as  the  Result  of  the 
Capitulations,  p.  145. 

2  I  cannot  refrain  from  relating  a  somewhat  amusing  incident  which 
happened  at  this  Conference.  At  that  time,  all  the  Powers,  except 
perhaps  Italy,  were  acting  in  concert  against  England.  England  was 
defending  Egyptian  interests.  Count  Munster  proposed  that  the 
quarantine  question,  in  which  Germany  at  that  moment  took  much 
interest,  should  be  discussed.  Lord  Granville  pointed  out  that,  if  once 
the  Conference  went  beyond  the  limits  for  which  it  had  been  assembled, 
there  was  no  reason  why  every  description  of  Eastern  question  should 
not  be  brought  within  its   cognisance.      Thus,  an  undesirably  wide 


266  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

Tigrane  Pasha  and  Blum  Pasha,  occupied  a  side 
table,  and  were  not  allowed  to  take  any  direct  part 
in  the  discussions.  On  the  other  hand,  at  the 
Conference,  which  met  at  Venice  in  1892  to  discuss 
quarantine  affairs,  the  Egyptian  Government  were 
accorded  the  right  of  separate  representation  to 
this  extent,  that  the  Egyptian  delegates  could 
speak  but  could  not  vote.  A  further  step  in 
advance  was  made  at  the  Sanitary  Conference  held 
at  Paris  in  1904.  The  Egyptian  delegates  were 
accorded  the  right  of  voting  in  Committee,  but  not 
at  the  plenary  sittings  of  the  Commission. 

In  the  third  place,  the  Khedive  cannot  abandon 
to  a  third  party  any  of  the  territorial  rights  of  the 
Sultan.  In  respect  of  this  matter,  theory  and  fact 
came  into  collision  when  the  Italians  occupied 
Massowah. 

In  the  fourth  place,  traditional  Turkish  jealousy 
of  Egypt  is  shown  by  the  provision  that  the 
Egyptian  army  cannot,  under  ordinary  circum- 
stances, exceed  18,000  men.  If,  however,  Turkey 
is  at  war,  the  Egyptian  army  may  be  called  upon 
to  fight  in  the  cause  of  the  Sultan,  in  which  case  it 
may  be  increased  according  to  the  requirements  of 
the   moment.     Following   on   the   same   order   of 

field  would  be  opened  up  for  discussion.  The  French  and  Russian 
representatives  pointed  out  that  no  dang-er  of  this  sort  was  to  be  feared, 
for  that  no  one  wished  to  raise  any  other  question  save  that  of 
quarantine.  Tlie  question  was  put  to  the  vote,  which  proceeded  on 
what  ma)'  be  termed  strictly  party  lines,  until  it  came  to  the  turn  of 
Musurus  Pasha.  A  true  emblem  of  the  country  which  he  represented, 
Musurus  Pasha  was  fast  asleep,  and  had  heard  nothing  of  the  discussion 
which  led  to  the  vote.  He  was  awakeneil,  and  was  informed  that  he 
had  to  vote  on  the  question  of  wliether  quarantine  matters  should  or 
should  not  be  brought  before  the  Conference.  He  was  at  the  time 
acting  in  general  concert  witli  tlie  anti-Knglish  j)arty,  but,  as  he  had 
not  been  told  beforehand  wliat  he  had  to  do,  he  gave  utterance  to  a 
perfectly  independent  opinion.  "  Parfaitement,"  he  said,  "je  suis  de 
cet  avis  ;  mais  alors  j'ai  bcaucoup  d'autres  questions  que  je  voudrais 
porter  a  la  coniiaissance  de  la  Conference."  Lord  Granville  had  found 
an  unconscious  and  involuntary  ally.  He  curried  his  point.  (Quarantine 
affairs  were  not  discussed. 


jH.  XXXIX        THE  GOVERNMENT  267 

ideas,  it  is  provided  that  the  Khedive  cannot 
construct  any  ironclads  {bdtiments  hlindcs)  without 
the  authority  of  the  Sultan.  The  Turkish  flag 
is  to  be  the  Egyptian  flag.  The  distinctive  marks 
of  mihtary  rank  are  to  be  identic  in  the  two  armies. 
The  Khedive  may  grant  the  rank  of  Colonel  to 
military,  and  that  of  Sanieh  (second-class  Bey)  to 
civil  officials,  but  he  may  not  confer  any  higher 
titles. 

In  the  fifth  place,  the  coinage  of  Egypt  is  to  be 
issued  in  the  name  of  the  Sultan. 

In  return  for  concessions  made  at  various  times 
by  the  Sultans,  Ismail  Pasha  undertook  to  pay  a 
Tribute  of  £682,000  a  year  to  the  Porte.'  The 
original  sum  paid  in  1841  by  JNlehemet  Ali  was 
£377,000,  but  under  the  combined  influence  of 
ambitious  Khedives  and  of  impecunious  Sultans, 
the  figure  was  nearly  doubled  at  subsequent 
periods. 

It  has  been  already  stated  that,  save  in  respect 
to  one  point,  the  Firman  of  1892  was  a  repro- 
duction of  that  of  1879.  It  will  be  as  well  to 
allude  briefly  to  the  exception. 

The  Firman  of  1879  laid  down  that  the 
Khedivate  of  Egypt  was  to  be  "  tel  qu'il  se  trouve 
forme  par  ses  anciennes  hmites  et  en  comprenant 
les  territoires  qui  y  ont  ^te  annexes."  When  the 
Firman  of  1892  was  in  course  of  preparation,  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Constantinople  was  assured 
that  it  was  identic  with  that  of  1879.  There  w^as, 
however,  reason  to  believe  that  this  statement  was 
incorrect.  The  Porte  had  always  been  sensitive 
as  regards  European  interference  in  or  near  the 
Hedjaz.  Indeed,  the  law  allowing  foreigners  to 
acquire  real  property  in  the  Ottoman  dominions 
forbids   any   European   to   settle   in   the    Hedjaz. 

*  Practically  the  whole  of  the  Tribute  is  mortgaged  to  the  Ottoman 
bondholders. 


268  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

More  than  this,  the  Sultan's  suspicions  had  been 
aroused  by  two  recent  incidents.  One  was  tliat 
Turkish  misgovernment  had  produced  a  revolt 
in  the  province  of  the  Yemen,  which  was,  without 
a  shadow  of  foundation,  attributed  to  British 
intrigue.  The  second  was  that  a  well-intentioned 
German  enthusiast,  named  Friedmami,  of  Jewish 
origin,  was,  at  the  moment  when  the  Firman 
was  under  discussion,  endeavouring  to  establish 
a  settlement  of  some  couple  of  dozen  Jews, 
who  had  been  expelled  from  Russia,  on  the 
eastern  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Akaba.  This  was 
suspicious.  INIoukhtar  Pasha  pointed  out  that  the 
Jews  had  always  been  waiting  for  a  Messiah  to 
reconquer  Jerusalem,  and  that,  without  doubt,  they 
would  think  he  had  now  appeared  in  the  person  of 
Mr.  Friedmami.  It  was  not  difficult  to  convince 
Moukhtar  Pasha  that  Mr.  Friedmann  was  devoid  of 
any  such  pretensions.^  But  the  suspicions  of  the 
Sultan  were  not  so  easily  calmed.  The  result  was 
that  the  Firman  laid  down  the  Egyptian  frontier 
as  drawn  from  Suez  to  El-Arish.  The  Peninsula 
of  Sinai,  which  had  been  administered  by  the 
Khedives  of  Egypt  for  the  last  forty  years,  would 
thus  have  reverted  to  Turkey.  It  was  undesirable 
to  bring  Turkish  soldiers  down  to  the  banks  of  the 
Suez  Canal.  When,  therefore,  the  Firman  arrived, 
the  British  Government  interposed  and  placed  a 
veto  on  its  promulgation.  After  a  short  dela} ,  the 
Grand  N^izier  telegraphed  to  the  Khedive  accepting 
a  proposal,  which  had  been  offered  to  the  Sultan 
some  weeks  previously,  but  which  His  Imperial 
Majesty  had   then   refused  to  entertain.^     Under 

*  Mr.  Friedmann  may  be  known  to  some  Englishmen  as  the  author 
of  a  history  of  Anne  Boleyn. 

^  'I'he  settlement  of  this  question  was  in  a  great  measure  due  to  the 
skill  with  which  the  negotiations  at  Constantinople  were  conducted  by 
the  late  Sir  Edmund  Fane,  who  was  at  the  time  in  charge  of  the 
Embassy. 


CH.  XXXIX        THE  GOVERNMENT  269 

this  arrangement,  the  frontier  of  Egypt  was  drawn 
from  El-Arish  to  the  head  of  the  Gulf  of  Akaba. 
The  incident  was  thus  for  the  time  being  termin- 
ated, and  tlie  Firman  was  promulgated  with  all 
customary  pomp.  Occasion  was  taken  to  lay  down 
again  the  prmciple  that  "no  alteration  could  be 
made  in  the  Firmans  regulating  the  relations 
between  the  Sublime  Porte  and  Egypt  without  the 
consent  of  Her  Britannic  JNIajesty's  Government." 

In  1905,  another  and  more  determined  effort 
was  made  by  the  Sultan  to  occupy  the  Sinai 
Peninsula,  but  after  a  brief,  and  somewhat  stormy 
negotiation,  the  arrangement  made  in  1892  was 
confirmed.  Shortly  afterwards,  the  Turco-Egyptian 
frontier  was  delimitated  by  a  Joint  Commission. 

Such,  therefore,  are  the  official  relations  between 
the  Sultan  and  the  Khedive.  From  the  observa- 
tions which  have  been  made  in  the  course  of  this 
narrative,  it  will  have  been  gathered  that  the 
constant  endeavour  of  the  Sultan  has  been  to 
encroach  on  the  rights  of  the  Khedive.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  sentiments  of  the  ruling  classes  in 
Egypt  towards  the  Sultan  may  be  described  as  a 
compound  of  fear,  religious  sympathy,  and  political 
dislike.  Which  of  these  sentiments  is  predominant 
depends  on  the  fleeting  circumstances  of  the 
moment. 

2.   The  Khedive. 

It  was  explained  in  the  first  part  of  this  work 
how  an  unwilling  recognition  of  the  principle  of 
ministerial  responsibility  was  wrung  from  Ismail 
Pasha.  Ismail's  Rescript  of  August  28,  1878,^  was, 
indeed,  violated  almost  immediately  after  its  issue. 
Nevertheless,  it  forms  to  this  day  the  JMagna 
Charta  of  Egypt. 

Naturally  enough,  more  depends  on  the  spirit 

*   Vide  ante,  vol.  i.  p.  62. 


270  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

in  which  the  Rescript  is  applied  than  on  the  terms 
of  the  document  itself.  By  a  fortunate  accident, 
Ismail  Pasha  was  succeeded  by  a  Khedive  who 
had  a  natural  turn  for  constitutionahsm.  Tewfik 
Pasha  acted  up  to  the  spirit  of  his  father's  declara- 
tions. He  asserted  his  legitimate  prerogatives,  but 
he  governed  "  through  and  with  his  Council  of 
Mmisters."  The  terms  of  the  Rescript  are,  how- 
ever, sufficiently  elastic  to  enable  all  the  most 
objectionable  abuses  of  personal  government  to  be 
re-established  without  any  apparent  violation  of 
the  letter  of  Ismail  Pasha's  declaration.  So  long 
as  the  British  occupation  lasts,  a  solid  guarantee 
exists  that  any  tendency  towards  the  re-establish- 
ment of  a  bad  form  of  personal  government  will  be 
checked  before  disastrous  consequences  ensue. 

3.   The  Ministers. 

The  Egyptian  administrative  machine  is  divided 
into  seven  Departments,  over  each  of  which  a 
Minister  presides.  These  are  Foreign  AHairs, 
Finance,  Justice,  War,  Pubhc  Works,  Education, 
and  the  Interior. 

The  Post  Office,  the  Customs,  and  the  Light- 
houses are  under  the  Financial  Department.  The 
Sanitary  Department  and  the  Prisons  are  attached 
to  the  Interior.  The  Wakfs  (religious  endowments) 
are  administered  by  a  Director- General,  who  in 
practice  takes  his  orders  direct  from  the  Khedive. 

The  proceedings  of  the  Council  are  conducted 
partly  in  Arabic  and  partly  in  French,  the  latter 
language  being  em})loyed  to  suit  the  convenience 
of  those  European  officials  who  have  a  right  to  be 
present  at  the  meetings  of  Council,  and  of  Egyptian 
Ministers^  who  are  not  acquainted  with  the  Arabic 
language. 

*  E.g.  Nubar  and  Ti^raiie  Paslias. 


CH.  XXXIX        THE  GOVERNMENT  271 

The  position  of  an  Egyptian  Minister  is  difficult 
and  delicate.  There  are  usually  in  his  Department 
one  or  more  high  European  officials,  who  are 
subordinate  to  him.  The  ideal  state  of  things 
would  be  if  the  INIinister  showed  no  jealousy  of  his 
subordinate,  worked  cordially  with  him,  followed 
his  advice  when  it  was  sound,  and  stated  his  objec- 
tions intelligently  when  he  thought  it  was  question- 
able ;  and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  European 
official  was  careful  never  to  be  aggressive,  or  to  press 
unduly  for  the  adoption  of  his  views  in  doubtful 
cases.  It  has  not  always  been  easy  to  find  Egyptian 
Ministers  who  will  carry  out  the  first,  or  Europeans 
who  will  carry  out  the  second  part  of  this  pro- 
gramme. Nevertheless,  the  system  has  on  the 
whole  worked  smoothly.  More  especially  of  late 
years,  the  relations  between  the  Egyptian  Ministers 
and  their  British  coadjutors  have  been  most  cordial 
and  friendly. 

4.   The  Organic  Law  of  May  1,  1883. 

Briefly  stated,  the  provisions  of  the  Organic 
Law  of  May  1,  1883,  which  was  framed  under 
Lord  Dufferin's  auspices,  are  as  follows  : — 

A  Provincial  Council,  composed  of  from  eight 
to  three  members,  according  to  the  size  of  the 
province,  is  established  in  each  Moudirieh.  The 
Moudir  is  the  President.  The  functions  of  these 
Councils  are  to  deal  with  local  matters,  such  as  the 
alignment  of  roads  and  canals,  the  establishment 
of  markets,  etc.  The  total  number  of  Provincial 
Councillors  is  seventy.  When  we  are  liberal  in 
Egypt,  we  do  not  content  ourselves  with  half- 
measures.  The  members  of  the  Council  are  elected 
by  universal  suffi-age. 

The  Legislative  Council  is  composed  of  thirty 
members.      Of    these,    fourteen,     including     the 


272  MODERN  EGYPT  m.  iv 

Tresident,  are  named  by  the  Egyptian  Government. 
Of  the  remainder,  fourteen  are  elected  by  the  Pro- 
vincial Councils  from  amongst  their  own  members, 
one  is  elected  by  the  town  of  Cairo,  and  one  by 
Alexandria  and  some  other  less  important  towns. 
No  Law  or  Decree  "  portant  reglement  d'adminis- 
tration  publique"  can  be  promulgated  without  its 
having  been  previously  submitted  to  the  Council. 
The  Government  are  not  obhged  to  adopt  the  views 
of  the  Council,  but,  in  the  event  of  their  not  doing 
so,  the  reasons  for  the  rejection  must  be  com- 
municated to  the  Council.  "  L'exposition  de  ces 
motifs  ne  pent  donner  lieu  a  aucune  discussion." 
The  Budget  has  to  be  submitted  to  the  Council, 
who  may  "emettre  des  avis  et  des  vceux  sur 
chaque  chapitre  du  Budget."  The  Government  are, 
however,  not  obliged  to  conform  to  any  views 
which  may  be  expressed  by  the  Council  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Budget,  nor  may  tlie  latter  discuss 
any  financial  charge  incumbent  on  the  Egyptian 
Treasury,  which  results  from  an  international 
arrangement.  The  Egyptian  Ministers  may  take 
part  in  the  discussions  of  the  Council,  or  may 
cause  themselves  to  be  represented  by  any  high 
functionaries  of  their  respective  Departments. 

The  Legislative  Assembly  consists  of  eighty-two 
members,  viz. :  The  six  Ministers,  the  thirty  members 
of  the  Legislative  Council,  and  forty-six  delegates 
who  are  elected  by  the  population.  Certain  (juali- 
fications  are  necessary  in  order  to  become  a  candidate 
for  election  to  the  Assembly.  The  candidate  must 
be  not  less  than  thirty  years  old,  he  must  be  able 
to  read  and  write,  and  he  must  pay  direct  taxes 
to  the  amount  of  not  less  than  £E.30  a  year.  No 
new  direct  tax  can  be  imposed  without  the  approval 
of  the  Assembly.  The  Assembly  must  also  be 
consulted  about  any  public  loans,  about  the  con- 
struction    of  canals    and   railways,   and  about  the 


CH.  XXXIX        THE  GOVERNMENT  273 

classification  of  lands  in  connection  with  the  pay- 
ment of  the  land-tax.  The  Assenibl}  may  also 
spontaneously  express  its  views  on  all  economic, 
administrative,  and  financial  questions.  As  in  the 
case  of  the  Legislative  Council,  the  Government 
are  not  under  any  obligation  to  adopt  the  opinions 
of  the  Assembly  in  such  matters,  but  the  reasons 
for  not  adopting  them  must  be  stated.  The 
Assembly  must  meet  at  least  once  in  two  years. 
The  public  are  not  admitted  to  the  sittings  either 
of  the  Council  or  of  the  Assembly. 

In  the  last  Report  I  wrote  before  leaving  Egypt  * 
I  expressed  myself  favourably  to  the  proposal  that 
reporters  should  be  admitted  to  the  sittings  of  the 
Council.  If  this  proposal  encounters  opposition, 
it  will  come,  not  from  any  European  authority, 
but  from  the  members  of  the  Council  themselves. 
I  have  reason  to  believe  that,  amongst  these,  a 
good  deal  of  difference  of  opinion  exists  as  to  the 
desirability  of  effecting  this  reform. 

Besides  these  institutions,  the  Organic  Law  of 
May  1,  1883,  provided  for  the  establishment  of  a 
Council  of  State  (Conseil  d'Etat)  whose  organisa- 
tion and  functions  were  to  be  explained  in  a 
subsequent  Decree.  This  institution  was  borrowed 
from  France.  Its  alleged  object  was  to  prepare 
draft  laws  for  submission  to  the  legislature.  When 
I  arrived  in  Egypt,  in  September  1883,  I  found 
that  the  formation  of  the  Council  of  State  was  a 
burning  question.  It  very  soon  became  apparent 
that,  under  cover  of  this  institution,  international 
government  was  to  be  introduced  into  every  branch 
of  the  Egyptian  administration.  The  discussion 
went  on  for  several  months  until,  on  January  19, 
1884,  I  informed  Lord  Granville  that  the  Council 
of  State  would  be  a  useless  and  expensive  body. 
Nubar   Pasha  was   of  the  same  opinion.     Egypt 

1  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  p.  29. 
VOL.  II  T 


274  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

was  thus  mercifully  saved  from  this  particular 
form  of  international  plague. 

Such,  therefore,  are  the  constitution  and  func- 
tions of  the  Egyptian  Houses  of  Parliament. 
Lord  DufFerin's  law  was  conceived  in  a  liberal 
and  statesmanlike  spirit.  The  leading  idea  was 
to  give  the  Egyptian  people  an  opportunity  of 
making  their  voices  heard,  but  at  the  same  time 
not  to  bind  the  executive  Government  by  parlia- 
mentary fetters,  which  would  have  been  out  of 
place  in  a  country  whose  political  education  was 
so  little  advanced  as  that  of  Egypt. 

The  question  of  the  extension  of  representative 
institutions  in  Egypt  has  recently  formed  the 
subject  of  much  public  discussion.  I  do  not 
propose  to  deal  with  this  question  at  any  length. 
The  main  object  of  this  work,  which  will,  I  fear, 
extend  to  greater  length  than  I  originally  intended, 
is  to  narrate  the  history  of  the  past,  rather  than  to 
discuss  questions  which  now  occupy  the  attention 
of  the  public,  and  of  the  responsible  Egyptian 
authorities.  Moreover,  my  views  on  this  particular 
issue  have  already  been  fully  and  publicly  ex- 
pressed.* My  remarks  will,  therefore,  be  very 
brief. 

In  the  first  place,  I  vdsh  to  say  that  Lord 
Dufferin  was  under  no  delusion  as  to  the  time 
which  would  elapse,  and  as  to  the  difficulties  which 
would  have  to  be  encountered  before  free  institu- 
tions could  take  root  in  the  somewhat  uncongenial 
soil  of  Egypt.  All  he  hoped  to  do  was  "  to  erect 
some  sort  of  barrier,  however  feeble,  against  the 
intolerable  tyranny  of  the  Turks."  He  hoped  that, 
"under  British  superintendence,"  the  legislative 
bodies  which  he  created  "might  be  fostered,  and 
educated  into  fairly  useful  institutions,  proving  a 

*  Vide,  inter  alia,  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1906,  pp.  11-13  ;  Egypt,  No.  1  of 
1907,  pp.  3-8,  26-d2,  and  66 ;  and  Egypt,  No.  3  of  1907. 


CH.  XXXIX        THE  GOVERNMENT  275 

convenient  channel  through  which  the  European 
element  in  the  Government  might  obtain  an 
insight  into  the  inner  mind  and  the  less  obvious 
wants  of  the  native  population."  ^  There  cannot 
be  a  shadow  of  doubt  that,  far  from  considering 
that  progress  had  been  objectionably  slow,  Lord 
DufFerin  was  not  merely  gratified,  but  also  some- 
what astonished  at  the  extent  to  which,  up  to  the 
time  of  his  death,  the  services  of  the  institutions, 
of  which  he  was  the  creator,  had  been  utilised. 

Next,  I  have  to  observe  that,  if  anything  is  to 
be  done  in  the  direction  of  a  further  development 
of  the  institutions  created  in  1883,  by  far  the 
wisest  course  will  be  to  begin  at  the  bottom  of 
the  legislative  ladder.  "  It  is  certain,"  Lord 
Dufferin  very  truly  said  in  his  Report,  "  that  local 
self-government  is  the  fittest  preparation  and  most 
convenient  stepping-stone  for  anything  approaching 
to  a  constitutional  regime."  During  the  last  twenty- 
four  years,  a  good  deal  more  has  been  done  in  the 
way  of  developing  local  self-government  than  many 
of  those  who  write  on  Egyptian  affairs  seem  to  be 
aware  of.^ 

In  many  of  the  most  important  provincial  towns. 
Mixed  Municipalities  —  that  is  to  say,  municipal 
bodies  of  which  some  of  the  members  are  European 
and  others  are  Egyptian — have  been  estabHshed. 
The  difficulty  of  extending  the  system  lies  in  the 
fact  that  whilst,  on  the  one  hand,  no  very  great  or 
rapid  progress  can  be  made  unless  the  JNIujiicipal 
Commissioners  are  invested  with  certain  powers  of 
local  taxation,  on  the  other  hand,  no  local  taxes 
can  be  imposed  on  Europeans  without  the  consent 
of  the  Powers.     Hence,  until  the  regime  of  tlie 

*  These  passages  are  quoted  from  a  letter  addressed  to  me  by  Lord 
Dufferiu.  It  is  given  in  Sir  Alfred  Lyall's  Life  of  the  Marquis  of 
Dufferin,  vol.  ii.  p.  260. 

*  This  branch  of  the  subject  is  more  fully  treated  in  my  Report  for 
the  year  1906.     See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  pp.  29-32. 


276  MODERN  EGYrT  ft.  iv 

Capitulations  is  modified,  it  will  not  be  possible  to 
create  Mixed  Municipalities  in  any  towns  unless 
the  whole  of  the  population  are  willing  to  submit 
to  a  system  of  voluntary  taxation. 

In  a  large  number  of  other  towns,  Local  Com- 
missions have  been  appointed  who  administer  the 
funds  placed  at  their  disposal  by  the  Egyptian 
Government. 

It  is,  I  think,  in  the  direction  of  increasing  the 
numbers  and  extending  the  powers  of  the  Munici- 
palities and  Local  Commissions  that  the  principal 
development  of  local  self-government  is,  in  the  near 
future,  to  be  anticipated.  Care,  however,  will  have 
to  be  taken  in  dealing  with  this  matter.  One  of 
the  greatest  errors  into  which  Europeans  employed 
in  the  East  are  liable  to  fall  is  to  imagine  that 
Orientals  are  as  much  impressed  as  they  are  them- 
selves with  the  necessity  of  speedily  providing 
roads,  drains,  lighting,  and  all  the  other  parapher- 
nalia of  civilisation.  The  present  race  of  Egyptians 
are,  indeed,  willing  enough  to  profit  by  all  these 
things,  if  they  are  provided  for  them  from  the  pro- 
ceeds of  general  taxation,  but  the  crucial  ques- 
tion is  whether  they  are  themselves  willing  to 
pay  additional  taxes  in  order  to  attain  these 
objects.  They  have  not,  up  to  the  present  time, 
shown  much  disposition  to  do  so.  It  will  be  wise, 
therefore,  not  to  force  the  pace.  It  should  always 
be  remembered  that  what  the  mass  of  tlie  popula- 
tion in  a  backward  Eastern  country  care  for  above 
almost  all  things  is  that  taxation  sliould  be  light. 

As  regards  the  Provincial  Councils,  a  detail 
which  slipped  into  the  Organic  Law  of  1883 — very 
possibly  without  its  effect  being  fully  realised — has 
done  a  good  deal  to  nnpair  their  utility.  It  was 
hiid  down  tliat  no  I'rovincial  Council  could  meet 
without  being  convoked  by  the  Moudir,  and  that 
the  latter  could  not  convoke  the  Council  without  the 


CH.  XXXIX        THE  GOVERNMENT  277 

issue  of  a  Khedivial  Decree,  laying  down  both  the 
time  and  duration  of  the  meeting.  The  practical  re- 
sult of  this  arrangement  has  been  that  the  Councils 
have  never  met  more  than  once  a  year.  The  time 
has  certainly  come  when  the  whole  of  this  question 
may  usefully  be  considered.  One  of  the  last  pro- 
posals I  made  before  leaving  Egypt  ^  was  that  the 
Provincial  Councils  should  be  reorganised,  their 
powers  somewhat  increased,  and  that  steps  should 
be  taken  to  carry  out  more  fully  what  was  unques- 
tionably Lord  DufFerin's  intention,  viz.  that  the 
Councils  should  be  real  working  bodies,  acting  as 
advisers  to  the  Moudir.  Sir  Eldon  Gorst  has  this 
matter  in  hand,  and  will,  I  do  not  doubt,  with  the 
help  of  the  British  and  Egyptian  officials,  be  able 
to  devise  a  scheme  suitable  to  the  requirements 
and  present  condition  of  the  country. 

The  question  of  whether  the  powers  and  con- 
stitution of  the  Legislative  Council  may  advan- 
tageously be  changed  is  one  of  far  greater  difficulty. 
As  I  have  already  said,  I  do  not  propose  to  discuss 
it  at  length.  I  will,  therefore,  only  say  that  whilst 
I  am  not  prepared  to  maintain  that  some  cautious 
steps  in  this  direction  might  not  before  long  be 
prudently  taken,  I  am  very  strongly  of  opinion 
that  any  attempt  to  confer  full  parliamentary 
powers  on  the  Council  would,  for  a  long  time  to 
come,  be  the  extreme  of  folly  and  would  be  highly 
detrimental  to  the  true  interests  of  the  Egyptians 
themselves.  The  facts  that  many  of  the  members 
of  the  Council  are  men  of  unquestionable  honesty 
and  intelligence,  and  that  some  are  personal  friends 
,  of  my  own,  cannot  blind  me  to  the  fact  that,  as  a 
whole,  the  Council, — as  would,  indeed,  be  the  case 
with  any  similar  body  which  could,  under  present 
circumstances,  be  constituted  in  Egypt, — possesses 
two  great  defects. 

»  See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  pp.  29-32. 


278  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

The  first  is  one  which  they  share  with  repre- 
sentative bodies  in  some  other  countries.  It  is 
that,  acting  under  pubHc  pressure,  they  are  too  apt 
to  propose  important  changes  in  tlie  fiscal  system, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  to  advocate  large  additional 
expenditure  on  public  objects,  without  sufficient  con- 
sideration of  the  financial  results  which  would  ensue 
were  effect  given  to  their  proposals.  It  should 
never  be  forgotten  that  any  extension  of  repre- 
sentative institutions,  which  was  obtained  at  the 
risk  of  again  plunging  Egypt  into  all  the  financial 
embarrassment  from  which  the  country  has  been 
so  hardly  and  so  recently  rescued,  would  be  far  too 
dearly  bought. 

The  second  defect,  which  in  the  eyes  of  any  one 
acquainted  with  the  past  history  of  modern  Egypt  is 
extremely  pardonable,  is  that  the  most  enlightened 
members  of  the  Council  have  not,  as  yet,  acquired 
all  those  qualities  necessary  to  give  them  the  moral 
courage  to  assert  their  true  opinions  fearlessly. 
Notably,  many  of  them  are  terrorised  by  the  local 
press.  To  the  European  mind,  it  may  seem  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms  to  say  that  freedom  of  speech  is 
checked  by  the  freedom  of  the  press.  But  in  the 
Land  of  Paradox  all  things  are  possible.  I  have 
no  doubt  whatever  that  a  large  number — probably 
a  majority  —  of  the  members  of  the  Legislative 
Council  would  welcome  the  enactment  of  a  rigorous 
press  law  as  a  measure  calculated  to  free  them  from 
the  moral  shackles  which  now  hamper  their  liberty 
of  speech  and  action. 

Of  all  the  institutions  created  by  Lord  Dufferin, 
the  Legislative  Assembly  has,  in  practice,  turned 
out  to  be  the  least  useful  and  efficient.  It  was, 
and  still  is,  too  much  in  advance  of  the  require- 
ments and  political  education  of  the  country.  No 
real  harm  would  be  done  if  it  were  simply  abolished, 
and,  indeed,  the  cause  of  representative  government 


CH.  XXXIX        THE  GOVERNMENT  279 

would,  I  believe,  benefit  if,  simultaneously  with 
its  abolition,  the  Legislative  Council  were  re- 
organised, and  its  powers  somewhat  increased. 
Without  doubt,  however,  the  adoption  of  this 
course  would  be  regarded  by  many — erroneously, 
in  my  opinion — as  a  retrograde  measure.  It  ma)', 
therefore,  be  politically  desirable  not  to  entertain 
the  idea.  In  that  case,  I  hold  that,  for  the  time 
being,  the  Legislative  Assembly  should  be  left 
alone.  I  deprecate  any  attempt  to  enlarge  its 
powers,  and  I  think  it  would  be  extremely  difficult 
to  amend  its  constitution. 

The  purely  Egyptian  portion  of  the  machinery 
of  government  has  now  been  described.  This  part 
of  the  machinery  would,  however,  never  get  into 
motion  were  it  not  impelled  by  some  strong  motive 
power.  That  motive  power  is  furnished  by  the 
British  officials  in  the  service  of  the  Egyptian 
Government.  The  special  functions  of  these 
officials  will  be  described  in  the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER    XL 

THE    BRITISH    OFFICIALS 

Qualifications  required  of  an  Ang-lo-E^yptian  official — Positions  of  the 
civil  and  military  officials — The  French  in  Tunis — The  Financial 
Adviser — Sir  Edg^ar  Vincent — Tlie  Judicial  Adviser — History  of 
his  appointment — Sir  Raymond  West — Justice  under  Eg-yptian 
management — Sir  John  Scott — The  Public  Works  Department — 
Sir  Colin  Scott-Moncrieif — Sir  William  Garstin — The  Financial 
Secretary  —  Blum  Pasha  —  Lord  Milner — Sir  Eldon  Gorst  —  Sub- 
Departments  of  Finance — The  Interior — Public  Instruction — 
European  and  Egyptian  officials. 

It  is  related  that  a  lady  once  asked  Madame  de 
Stael  to  recommend  a  tutor  for  her  boy.  She 
described  the  sort  of  man  she  wished  to  find.  He 
was  to  be  a  gentleman  with  perfect  manners  and  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  world  ;  it  was  essential 
that  he  should  be  a  classical  scholar  and  an  accom- 
plished linguist ;  he  was  to  exercise  supreme 
authority  over  his  pupil,  and  at  the  same  time 
he  was  to  show  such  a  degree  of  tact  that  his 
authority  was  to  be  unfelt ;  in  fact,  he  was  to 
possess  almost  every  moral  attribute  and  intellectual 
faculty  which  it  is  possible  to  depict,  and,  lastly, 
he  was  to  place  all  these  qualities  at  the  service 
of  Madame  de  Stael's  friend  for  a  very  low  salary. 
The  witty  Frenchwoman  listened  with  attention 
to  her  friend's  list  of  indispensable  qualifications 
and  eventually  replied  :  *'  INla  chere,  je  comprends 
parfaitement  bien  le  caractcre  de  I'homme  qu'il 
vous  faut,  mais  je  dois  vous  dire  que  si  je  le  trouve, 
je  I'epouse." 

280 


CH.XL       THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  281 

This  story  is  applicable  to  the  qualifications 
demanded  of  an  ideal  Anglo-Egyptian  official. 

The  Anglo-Egyptian  official  must  possess  some 
technical  knowledge,  such  as  that  of  the  engineer, 
the  accountant,  or  the  lawyer ;  otherwise,  he  will 
be  unable  to  deal  with  the  affairs  of  the  Depart- 
ment to  which  he  is  attached.  At  the  outset  of 
his  career,  he  is  usually  ])laced  at  a  great  disadvan- 
tage. He  must  often  explain  his  ideas  in  a  foreign 
language,  French,  with  which  he  has  probably  only 
a  limited  acquaintance.  Unless  he  is  to  run  the 
risk  of  falling  into  the  hands  of  some  subordinate, 
often  of  doubtful  trustworthiness,  it  is,  at  all  events 
in  respect  to  many  official  posts,  essential  that  he 
should  acquire  some  knowledge  of  a  very  difficult 
Oriental  language,  Arabic.  These,  however,  are  all 
faculties  to  which  it  is  possible  to  apply  some  fairly 
accurate  test.  The  Anglo-Egyptian  official  must  be 
possessed  of  other  qualities,  which  it  is  moi-e  difficult 
to  gauge  with  precision,  but  which  are  in  reality  of 
even  greater  importance  than  those  to  which  allusion 
is  made  above.  He  must  be  a  man  of  high  character. 
He  must  have  sufficient  elasticity  of  mind  to  be 
able  to  apply,  under  circumstances  which  are 
strange  to  him,  the  knowledge  which  he  has 
acquired  elsewhere.  He  must  be  possessed  of  a 
sound  judgment  in  order  to  enable  him  to  distin- 
guish between  abuses,  which  should  be  at  once 
reformed,  and  those  which  it  will  be  wise  to 
tolerate,  at  all  events  for  a  time.  He  must  be 
versatile,  and  quick  to  adapt  any  local  feature  of 
the  administration  to  suit  his  own  reforming 
purposes.  He  must  be  well-mannered  and  con- 
ciliatory, and  yet  not  allow  his  conciliation  to 
degenerate  into  weakness.  He  must  be  firm,  and 
yet  not  allow  his  firmness  to  harden  into  dictation. 
He  must  efface  himself  as  much  as  possible.  In 
fact,  besides   his  special  technical   knowledge,  he 


282  MODERN  EGYPT  pimv 

must  possess  all  the  qualities  which  we  look  for  in 
a  trained  diplomatist,  a  good  administrator,  and  an 
experienced  man  of  the  world. 

It  is  not  easy  in  any  country  to  produce  a 
number  of  officials,  who  have  undergone  a  depart- 
mental training,  and  who  at  the  same  time  possess 
all  these  qualities.  It  is  especially  difficult,  when 
they  are  found,  to  attract  them  to  Egypt  on 
salaries  of  £2000  a  year  and  less.  The  efficient 
working  of  the  administrative  machine  depends, 
however,  mainly  on  choosing  the  right  man  for  the 
right  place.  What  often  happens  when  any  place 
has  to  be  filled  is  this, — on  the  one  hand,  are  a 
number  of  candidates  who  wish  to  occupy  the  post, 
but  who  do  not  possess  the  qualifications  necessary 
to  fill  it  with  advantage  to  the  public  interests  ; 
on  the  other  hand,  are  a  very  small  number  of 
persons,  who  possess  the  necessary  qualifications, 
but  who,  for  one  reason  or  another,  are  reluctant 
to  accept  the  appointment.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, it  is  a  matter  for  congratulation  that 
administrative  successes  have  been  the  rule,  whilst 
the  failures  have  been  the  exceptions. 

Looking  to  the  anomalous  positions  occupied 
by  the  Anglo -Egyptian  officials,  it  is,  indeed, 
greatly  to  their  credit  that,  as  a  body,  they  should 
have  succeeded  in  performing  the  several  tasks 
allotted  to  them.  Without  doubt,  they  have  had 
diplomatic  support  behind  them.  JNIoreover,  and 
this  is  perhaps  more  important  than  the  support 
itself,  it  has  been  felt  by  all  concerned  that  the 
possibility  of  stronger  support  than  that  which  was 
actually  afforded  lay  in  the  background.  Neverthe- 
less, the  British  officials  in  Egypt  have  had  to  rely 
mainly  on  their  individual  judgment  and  force  of 
character.  The  l^ritish  Consul-General  can  occa- 
sionally give  advice.  lie  may,  when  speaking  to 
the  British  official,  temper  the  zeal  of  the  latter  for 


CH.XL       THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  283 

reform,  or,  when  talking  to  the  Egyptian  ^linister, 
advocate  the  views  of  the  reformer.  But  he  cannot 
step  seriously  upon  the  scene  unless  there  is  some 
knot  to  be  untied  which  is  worthy  of  a  serious 
effort.  He  cannot  at  every  moment  interfere  in 
matters  of  departmental  detail.  The  work  done 
by  the  Anglo-Egyptian  official  is,  therefore,  mainly 
the  outcome  of  his  own  resource  and  of  his  own 
versatility.  If  he  is  adroit,  he  can  make  the  fact 
that  the  soldiers  of  his  nation  are  in  occu})ation  of 
the  country  felt  without  flaunting  their  presence  in 
any  brusque  fashion  before  the  eyes  of  his  Egyptian 
superior.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  most  successful 
Anglo-Egyptian  officials  have  been  those  who  have 
relied  most  on  their  own  powers  of  persuasion,  and 
have  rarely  applied  for  diplomatic  support. 

In  describing  more  particularly  the  position  of 
the  Anglo-Egyptian  officials,  a  distinction  must  be 
drawn  between  civilians  and  soldiers.  The  British 
officers  of  the  Egyptian  army  have  had  to  contend 
against  considerable  difficulties,  but,  as  compared 
with  their  civilian  colleagues,  they  have  from  one 
important  point  of  view  been  at  an  advantage. 
There  is  a  reality  about  the  position  of  the  soldier 
which  does  not  exist  in  the  case  of  the  civilian. 
The  Egyptian  Commander-in-Chief,  or,  to  call  him 
by  his  Egyptian  title,  the  Sirdar,  not  only  com- 
mands the  army.  It  is  recognised  by  the  Egyptian 
Government  and  by  the  public  that  he  commands  it. 
There  is  thus  no  flagrant  contradiction  between  his 
real  and  his  nominal  position.  Most  of  the  superior 
officers  of  the  army,  whether  departmental  or  regi- 
mental, are  British.  The  Sirdar  is,  therefore, 
master  of  the  situation.  He  can  decide  on  what 
orders  to  give,  and  he  can  rely  on  his  orders  being 
obeyed,  not  only  in  the  letter  but  in  the  spirit. 
He  is  not  obliged  to  trim  his  sails  to  every  passing 
political  breeze. 


284  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  iv 

Far  otlier  is  the  position  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian 
civilian.  Some  of  the  most  important  civil 
functionaries  possess  no  executive  functions.  They 
can  only  advise.  No  special  system  exists  to 
enforce  the  acceptance  of  their  advice.  All  that 
can  be  said  is  that,  in  the  event  of  their  advice 
being  systematically  rejected,  the  British  Govern- 
ment will  be  displeased,  and  that  they  will  probably 
find  some  adequate  means  for  making  their  dis- 
pleasure felt.  Further,  of  those  Anglo-Egyptian 
civil  officials  who  possess  executive  power,  few  can 
be  certain  that  their  power  is  effective  ;  they  cannot 
rely  confidently  on  their  subordinates,  who  are 
rarely  British,  to  carry  out  the  letter,  and  still  less 
the  spirit  of  their  instructions.  The  Anglo- 
Egyptian  official  is  also  driven  by  tlie  necessities  of 
his  position  into  being  an  opportunist.  The  least 
part  of  his  difficulties  lies  in  deciding  what  should 
be  done.  That  is  usually  easy.  AVlien  once  he 
clearly  sees  before  him  the  action  which  ought  to 
be  taken,  he  has  to  decide  the  more  difficult 
questions  of  when  to  act  and  how  to  conduct 
himself  in  order  to  get  others  to  act  with  him. 
And,  in  deciding  on  these  latter  points,  he  often 
has  to  take  into  consideration  matters  which  at 
first  sight  appear  to  be  not  even  remotely  connected 
with  the  immediate  subject  under  discussion. 
Every  Anglo-Egyptian  civil  official,  therefore,  has 
not  only  to  be  guided  by  the  general  impulse  given 
by  British  diplomacy  to  Egyptian  affairs,  but  he 
also  has  to  do  a  good  deal  of  diplomatic  work  on 
his  own  account. 

Comparisons  have  been  occasionally  instituted 
between  the  position  of  the  English  in  Egypt  and 
that  of  the  French  in  Tunis.  In  1890,  a  report  on 
Tunisian  affairs  was  prepared  by  IVI.  Ribot.  A 
glance  at  this  report  is  sufficient  to  show  that,  for 
all  practical  purposes,  the  French  Government  have 


CH.XL       THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  285 

annexed  Tunis.  Scarcely  a  semblance  of  native 
authority  remains.  The  French  officials  have  a 
free  hand  in  dealing  with  the  administration  of  the 
country.  The  French  Resident-General  presides 
at  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  directs  the  Ministry 
of  Foreiffn  Affairs.  No  law  is  valid  which  has  not 
been  countersigned  by  him.  The  Ministry  of  \Var 
is  in  the  hands  of  the  General  in  command  of  the 
French  army  of  occupation.  All  the  important 
offices  of  the  State  are  held  by  Frenchmen.  A 
French  Secretary-General  receives  all  the  letters 
addressed  to  the  Tunisian  Government  and  pre- 
pares the  answers.  "Ainsi,"  it  is  said,  "aucune 
affaire  ne  pent  echapper  a  sa  surveillance,  et  dans 
toutes,  il  peut  donner  ses  conseils  et  faire  prevaloir 
la  pensee  du  Protectorat."  By  the  side  of  each  of 
the  "  Caids,"  who  answer  to  the  Egyptian  Moudirs, 
is  placed  a  French  Controller  who,  amongst  other 
functions,  has  the  Police  under  his  command. 

M.  Ribot  concluded  his  account  of  the  system 
of  administration  in  the  following  terms :  "  II 
fallait  ensuite  qu'aucun  detail  dans  I'application  de 
ces  decisions  ne  put  nous  echapper.  Aucun  docu- 
ment n'entre  dans  les  bureaux  de  I'Administration 
centrale  ou  n'en  sort,  aucune  lettre  n'est  presentee 
a  la  signature  du  Premier  JNIinistre,  aucune  corre- 
spondance  n'est  envoyee  aux  destinataires  sans 
passer  par  Tintermediaire  du  Secretaire  general  et 
etre  sou  mis  a  son  examen.  Tout  ce  qui  arrive 
aux  Caids  ou  dmane  d'eux  est  de  la  meme  maniere 
soumis  a  I'examen  des  Controleurs  civils.  Rien  ne 
peut  done  se  faire  dans  la  Regence  qui  ne  soit 
approuve  par  nous."  This  is  sufficiently  explicit. 
In  point  of  fact,  Tunis  is  just  as  much  a  part 
of  France  as  the  Department  of  the  Seine.  A 
qualified  Tunisian  has  explained  the  position  of 
the  Bey  of  Tunis  in  the  following  terms  :  "  Les 
attributions  du  Bey  de  Tunis  se  reduisent  seule- 


286  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.iv 

ment  a  la  nomination  de  quelques  employes  sub- 
alternes  et  meme  ces  nominations  sont  soumises 
a  Tapprobation  du  JNIinistre  Resident  de  France,  ou 
de  son  premier  secretaire,  qui  est  en  meme  temps 
Secrdtaire-General  du  Gouvernement  Tunisien." 

More  than  this,  the  attitude  of  the  other 
Powers,  and  notably  of  England,  towards  the 
French  administration  of  Tunis  has  been  per- 
sistently friendly.  The  British  Government 
speedily  abandoned  the  Capitulations  at  the 
instance  of  France,  an  example  which  was  followed 
by  Italy  and  other  Powers.^ 

It  is,  therefore,  clear  that  no  analogy  exists 
between  the  conditions  under  which  France  took 
in  hand  the  Tunisian  problem  and  those  which 
obtained,  and  still  obtain,  in  respect  to  the  Anglo- 
Egyptian  administration  of  Egypt. 

The  most  important  British  official  in  Egypt  is 
the  Financial  Adviser.  After  the  Arabi  revolt,  the 
question  of  how  to  place  the  financial  administra- 
tion of  Egypt  under  European  control  had  to  be 
reconsidered.  It  was  decided  to  appoint  a  British 
official  with  the  title  of  Financial  Adviser.  He 
was  to  have  no  executive  functions,  but  he  was 
to  be  present  at  the  meetings  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  No  attempt  has  ever  been  made  to 
define  his  duties  in  any  very  precise  manner. 
Broadly  speaking,  however,  it  may  be  said  that, 
as  his  official  title  implies,  he  has  to  advise  on 
all  important  financial  matters,  without  unduly 
encroaching  on  the  prerogatives  of  the  Finance 
Minister.  Outside  his  special  duties,  his  position 
is  also  of  importance.  As  he  is  present  at  all  the 
meetings  of  the  Council,  he  has  the  best  oppor- 
tunities for  knowing  what  is  going  on  in  Egyptian 

^  The  friendly  attitude  of  England  and  Germany  towards  France  in 
I'unis  has  been  recognised  in  a  work  entitled  La  Politique  Franfaise  en 
Tiinisie  (p.  374),  wliicli,  though  published  anonymously,  was,  it  is  well 
known,  written  by  a  member  of  the  French  diplomatic  corps. 


cii.  XL       THE  BRITISFI  OFFICIALS  287 

ministerial  circles.  He  can  often  guide  the  INIinis- 
ters  on  matters  which  are  unconnected  with  finance. 
He  can  keep  the  British  Consul-General  well  in- 
formed. Being  an  Egyptian  official,  he  can  often 
give  advice  on  his  own  behalf  in  a  form  which  is 
more  palatable  than  if  it  were  tendered  with  all 
the  weight  of  the  British  diplomatic  representative 
speaking  on  behalf  of  his  Government. 

Sir  Auckland  Colvin  was  the  first  Financial 
Adviser.  In  the  autumn  of  1883,  he  was  succeeded 
by  Sir  Edgar  Vincent.  At  the  time,  some  doubts 
were  expressed  as  to  whether  Sir  Edgar  Vincent 
was  not  too  young  for  the  post.  These  doubts 
were  soon  removed.  A  more  fortunate  selection 
could  not  have  been  made.  Sir  Edgar  Vincent 
possessed  in  a  high  degree  the  quality  specially 
necessary  for  the  performance  of  his  duties.  He 
was  eminently  resourceful ;  he  never  despaired 
daring  the  blackest  period  of  the  Egyptian  financial 
chaos.  He  was  sanguine  of  ultimate  success,  and 
as  at  every  turn  new  and  unexpected  difficulties 
had  to  be  encountered,  he  was  always  ready  with 
some  ingenious  device  to  stave  off  the  evil  day  of 
bankruptcy,  and  thus  to  gain  breathing  time  during 
which  the  financial  ship  would,  at  all  events,  have 
a  chance  of  righting  herself.  He  stayed  long 
enough  to  see  that  his  labours  had  not  been  in 
vain.  The  rehabilitation  of  Egyptian  finance  is 
in  a  large  degree  the  work  of  Sir  Edgar  Vincent. 
After  his  departure  in  October  1889,  he  was 
succeeded  by  Sir  Elwin  Palmer,  who  again  was 
succeeded  in  1898  by  Mr.  (afterwards  Sir  Eldon) 
Gorst.  In  1904,  Sir  Eldon  Gorst's  place  was  taken 
by  Sir  Vincent  Corbett.  On  the  latter's  resigna- 
tion in  1907,  he  was  succeeded  by  Mr.  Harvey. 

I  now  turn  to  the  Judicial  Department.  When 
I  arrived  in  Egypt,  in  September  1883,  I  found 
that  Native  Tribunals,  based  on  a  French  model, 


288  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

were  about  to  be  establislied,  and  that  Sir  Benson 
Maxwell  had  been  a])pointed  to  the  post  of 
Procureur- General.  He  did  not  remain  long. 
JNIr.  (afterwards  Sir)  Raymond  West,  an  Indian 
judge  of  distinction,  was  named  to  succeed  him. 
He  was  a  man  of  great  learning  and  capacity. 
No  one  could  be  better  qualified  to  devise  a  sound 
judicial  system  for  Egypt.  For  several  months, 
he  studied  his  subject,  and  then  produced  a 
voluminous  report.  It  contained  many  valuable 
suggestions,  some  of  which  were,  after  a  consider- 
able lapse  of  time,  carried  into  execution.  Nubar 
Pasha,  who  was  at  the  time  in  office,  did  not, 
however,  concur  in  Mr.  West's  views.  The  result 
was  that  the  latter  returned  to  India. 

This  happened  in  1885,  that  is  to  say,  at  the 
most  involved  period  of  Egyptian  history  since  the 
British  occupation.  It  was  necessary  to  throw 
overboard  a  certain  amount  of  cargo  in  order  to 
lighten  the  political  ship.  Nubar  Pasha  enjoyed  a 
reputation  as  a  judicial  reformer.  There  was  much 
to  be  said  in  favour  of  leaving  the  Department  of 
Justice  in  Egyptian  hands.  It  was  resolved,  there- 
fore, not  to  press  for  any  British  successor  to  Mr. 
West,  but  to  see  what  the  Egyptians  could  do  in 
the  way  of  judicial  reform  if  left  to  themselves. 

The  experiment  had  a  fiiir  trial,  and  proved  a 
complete  failure.  For  the  next  five  years,  con- 
stant complaints  were  made  as  regards  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice,  but  it  was  desirable  to  give 
public  opinion  time  to  mature  before  taking  any 
definite  action  in  the  matter.  In  the  meanwhile, 
Nubar  Pasha,  fearful  of  English  interference, 
named  a  Belgian,  M.  Le  Grelle,  to  be  Procureur- 
General.^      M.    Le    Grelle   brought    to   light   the 

*  M.  Le  Grelle  resip^ned  his  appointment  in  1895,  and  was  succeeded 
by  an  Ep:yptian.     In  1897>  an  Englishman  (Mr.  Corbet)  was  appointed 
•  to  the  place. 


CH.  XL       THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  289 

existence  of  some  serious  abuses.  Notably,  he  dis- 
covered that  for  several  years  past  the  ordinary 
Tribunals  had  not  been  dealing  with  the  most 
important  cases  of  crime  which  occurred  in  the 
country.  They  had  been  practically  superseded 
by  certain  "  Commissions  of  Brigandage,"  which 
were  in  reality  Courts -Martial  sitting  under  the 
presidency  of  the  Moudirs.  Under  the  auspices 
of  these  Commissions,  every  species  of  abomina- 
tion had  been  committed.  Witnesses  had  been 
tortured.  Some  700  or  800  people  had  been  con- 
demned to  imprisonment,  and  a  certain  number  had 
been  hung.  In  many  cases,  the  evidence  was  wholly 
insufficient  to  justify  a  conviction  ;  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  a  good  many  innocent  persons  were 
punished.  After  a  good  deal  of  rather  acrimonious 
discussion,  the  Commissions  of  Brigandage  were 
abolished.  The  evidence  in  the  most  doubtful 
cases  was  re-examined  ;  some  of  the  prisoners  were 
released,  either  at  once  or  subsequently.^ 

*  Mr.  Morice,  an  English  official  attached  to  the  Department  of 
Justice,  who  was  subsequently  deputed  to  inquire  into  the  cases  of 
these  prisoners,  reported  as  follows : — "  I  may  here  state  that  in  tlie 
126  cases  examined,  I  have  never  once  come  across  any  witnesses  I'oi 
the  defence  ;  it  would,  therefore,  seem  to  have  been  generally  decided 
that  this  was  not  of  any  importance  ;  individuals  once  arrested  and 
brought  before  the  Commission  seem  to  have  had  very  little  chance  of 
regaining  their  liberty.  1  was  so  struck  by  the  total  absence  of  any 
defence  being  set  up  by  the  accused,  apart  from  a  denial  of  the  charge, 
that  1  closely  questioned  those  men  in  whose  cases,  after  a  careful 
examination  of  the  documents,  I  had  formed  a  conviction  tliat  they 
had  been  most  unjustly  sentenced,  and  I  was  invariably  informed  that 
although  they,  at  the  time  of  their  trial,  stated  that  they  could  produce 
witnesses  to  prove  their  innocence,  their  demands  were  never  listened 
to,  but  they  were  informed  that  one  thief's  word  was  as  good  as 
another's,  and  that  witnesses  produced  would  be  treated  as  accomplices, 
etc.  Indeed,  it  was  sufficient  for  one  man,  whose  guilt  was  fully 
established,  either  by  recognition  on  the  part  of  tlie  victim  of  the 
assault  or  robbery,  or  by  the  finding:  of  stolen  property  in  his  posses- 
sion, to  accuse  another,  for  tliis  latter  to  be  sentenced  to  a  very  severe 
term  of  imprisoimient.  I  have  been  told  the  most  pitiful  stories  by 
convicts  I  have  interrogated  concerning  the  horrible  treatment  they 
received  when  in  prison,  a  treatment  which,  it  is  needless  to  say,  in- 
variably ended  in  a  confession  being  obtained.  One  has  only  to 
examine  the  preliminary  inquiries  in  order  to  be  convinced  of  this." 
VOL.  II  U 


290  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

This  episode  is  very  Egyptian,  and  is  illustrative 
of  the  extent  to  which  an  Egyptian  Minister  often 
cares  more  for  theory  than  for  practice.  An 
elaborate  system  of  justice  existed  in  aj)pearance. 
In  reality,  the  system  was  inoperative.  Persons 
accused  of  crime  were  condemned  to  death  or  to 
lifelong  imprisonment  at  the  will  of  some  ignorant 
and  tyrannical  Moudir. 

With  the  suppression  of  the  Commissions  of 
Brigandage,  crime  of  a  serious  natin-e  increased. 
This  had  been  anticipated.  It  became  daily  more 
and  more  clear  that  no  Egyptian  Minister  was 
capable  of  coping  with  the  situation.  The  Egyp- 
tian Government,  therefore,  reluctantly  consented 
to  appoint  an  Englishman  to  the  post  of  Judicial 
Adviser.  It  was  not  easy  to  find  a  competent 
man,  for  few  English  lawyers  have  made  a  study 
of  the  French  legal  system.  A  fortunate  selection 
was,  however,  made  in  the  person  of  Mr.  (after- 
wards Sir  John)  Scott.  His  appointment  created 
a  flutter  in  the  Egyptian  political  dovecot.  Riaz 
Pasha  shortly  afterwards  resigned,  and  his  resigna- 
tion was  in  some  measure  due  to  his  dislike  to 
Sir  John  Scott's  nomination.  The  establishment 
of  a  sound  judicial  system  in  Egypt  may  be  said 
to  date  from  the  time  of  Sir  John  Scott's  assump- 
tion of  the  office  of  Judicial  Adviser.  In  1898, 
Sir  John  Scott  resigned  his  place  to  take  up  an 
appohitment  in  London.  He  was  succeeded  by 
Sir  Malcolm  Mcllwraith. 

Previous  to  the  British  occupation,  the  Public 
Works  Department  had  been  mainly  in  French 
hands.  In  1883,  it  was  resolved  to  appoint  a 
British  Under-Secretary  to  this  Department,  and 
to  brin":  a  staff  of  British  officials  from  India  to 
superintend  the  improvements  in  the  canalisation 
of  the  country.  Sir  Colin  Scott -Moncrieff  was 
named    Under  -  Secretary.       The   selection    was   a 


CH.XL       THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  291 

most  happy  one.  Apart  from  his  very  remarkable 
technical  attainments,  Sir  Colin  Scott- Moncrieff 
was  a  man  of  the  highest  character.  The  most 
prejudiced  Pasha  respected  qualities  which  were 
so  dissimilar  to  any  which  he  himself  possessed. 
The  most  venomous  journalist  paused  before  he 
threw  his  political  vitriol  over  a  character  so  trans- 
parently honest.  No  Englishman  employed  in  the 
Egyptian  service  during  the  early  days  of  the 
occupation  did  more  to  make  the  name  of  England 
respected  than  Sir  Colin  Scott-MoncriefF,  who,  by 
the  way,  is  not  an  Englishman,  but  one  of  that 
race  which  so  frequently  succeeds  in  foreign  parts 
by  virtue  of  its  sterling  good  qualities.  Sir  Colin 
Scott-MoncriefF  comes  from  well  north  of  the 
Tweed. 

In  1892,  Sir  Colin  Scott-MoncriefF  found  a 
very  worthy  successor  in  the  person  of  Sir  William 
Garstin,  under  whose  intelligent  auspices  very  large 
sums  of  money  were,  to  the  great  advantage  of 
the  country,  spent  on  public  works  of  various 
descriptions.  It  would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate 
the  debt  of  gratitude  which  the  people  of  Egypt 
owe  to  Sir  William  Garstin. 

The  Financial  Secretary  also  occupies  a  post  of 
great  importance.  He  is  an  executive  officer.  He 
performs  the  duties  of  the  Financial  Adviser  when 
the  latter  is  absent.  During  the  early  days  of  the 
occupation  this  post  was  held  by  Blum  Pasha,  a 
very  intelligent  Austrian,  who  had  the  rare  merit 
of  having  served  the  Egyptian  Government  during 
the  lax  and  corrupt  rule  of  Ismail  Pasha  without 
the  most  censorious  critic  being  able  to  whisper  a 
word  against  his  honesty.  He  was  a  most  capable 
official  and  worked  cordially  with  the  English. 
On  his  retirement  in  1889,  he  was  succeeded  by 
Mr.  (now  Lord)  Milner,  the  well-known  author  of 
England  in  Egypt.     Of  Lord  Milner  all  that  need 


292  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

be  said  in  this  place  is  that  he  is  one  of  the  most 
able  Englishmen  who  have  served  the  Egyptian 
Government.  Not  only  was  he  versed  in  all  the 
technicalities  of  his  own  Department,  but  he  had 
a  wide  grasp  of  the  larger  aspects  of  Egyptian 
affairs.  On  his  being  named,  in  1892,  to  an 
appointment  in  England,  he  was  succeeded  by  Sir 
Eldon  Gorst,  who  belonged  to  the  diplomatic 
service.  Sir  Eldon  Gorst  had  occupied  his  leisure 
time  in  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  Arabic.  Being 
endowed  with  a  singular  degree  of  tact  and 
intelligence,  he  generally  managed  to  get  all  he 
wanted  done  without  applying  for  diplomatic 
support.  Since  1894,  when  Sir  Eldon  Gorst  was 
appointed  Adviser  to  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior, 
the  post  of  Financial  Secretary  has  changed  hands 
more  than  once,  but  it  has  always  been  held  by  a 
very  carefully  selected  British  official. 

There  are  three  sub -departments  attached  to 
the  Ministry  of  Finance.  These  are  the  Customs, 
the  Lighthouses,  and  the  Post  Office.  The  first 
two  of  these  are  under  superior  British  super- 
vision. The  Post  Office  was  reorganised  by  an 
English  Director- General,  who  was  eventually 
succeeded  by  an  extremely  competent  Syrian, 
Saba  Pasha,  under  whose  direction  various  postal 
reforms  of  great  importance  and  utility  have  been 
introduced. 

Until  1894,  the  Police  was  commanded  by  an 
English  Inspector-General  who  had  a  small  staff 
of  British  officers  under  him.  In  the  autumn  of 
1894,  a  change  of  system  was  effected.  The 
post  of  Inspector- General  was  abolished  and  an 
Adviser  (Sir  Eldon  Gorst)  was  appointed  to  the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior.  In  1898,  Mr.  Machell 
was  appointed  to  succeed  Sir  Eldon  Gorst.  The 
duties  attached  to  the  post  of  Adviser  underwent, 
at  the  same  time,  some  modifications  of  no  great 


CH.XL       THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  293 

importance.  The  head  of  the  Sanitary  Depart- 
ment is  EngUsh,  as  is  also  the  Director-General  of 
Prisons. 

The  supreme  direction  of  the  Educational 
Department  has  always  been  in  Egyptian  hands, 
but,  in  1906,  an  English  Adviser  (Mr.  Dunlop) 
was  appointed  to  this  Department.  A  considerable 
number  of  Europeans  are  employed  as  school- 
masters.^ 

Allusion  has  so  far  only  been  made  to  the 
highest  appointments.  It  will,  however,  be  as  well 
to  speak  briefly  of  the  total  number  of  Englishmen 
employed  in  Egypt.  The  subject  is  one  of 
importance,  for  it  has  at  times  given  rise  to  much 
exaggeration,  and,  moreover,  the  employment  of 
Europeans  is  naturally  viewed  with  jealousy  by 
those  Egyptians  who  are  aspirants  for  official 
positions. 

It  is  generally  recognised  that  European  assist- 
ance, to  a  certain  extent,  is  necessary  to  carry  on 
the  work  of  government  in  Egypt.  Differences 
of  opinion,  however,  arise  when  any  attempt  is 
made  to  lay  down  with  any  degree  of  precision  the 
extent  to  which  recourse  should  be  had  to  European 
agency.  Weighty  arguments  may  be  advanced  on 
both  sides.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  frequently 
urged  that  the  efficiency  of  the  service  suffers  by 
reason  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  European  staff ; 
that  the  welfare  of  the  mass  of  the  population  must 
be  placed  before  all  other  considerations ;  that  the 
vast  majority  of  voiceless  Egyptians  prefer  good 
administration  to  national  government ;  and  that, 
therefore,  for  the  present,  and  probably  for  a  long 
time  to  come,  the  employment  of  a  large  number 
of  Europeans  is  absolutely  necessary.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  stated  that  the  Egyptians  prefer 

*  The  numbers  were,  in  1896,  Egyptians,  631  ;  Europeans,  92 ;  and, 
in  1906,  Egyptians,  794  ;  Europeans,  160. 


294  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  rv 

a  defecth  e  system  of  government  administered  by 
their  own  countrymen  to  a  relati\  ely  perfect  system 
administered  by  aliens ;  that  it  is  in  the  highest 
degree  impolitic  to  push  on  education  and  at  the 
same  time  to  close  the  door  of  hi<>h  Government 
employment  to  the  educated  classes  ;  that  the 
Egyptians  can  n^ver  learn  to  govern  themselves 
unless  they  are  allowed  to  make  the  attempt ;  that 
any  causes  which  tend  towards  maladministration 
will  be  temporary  and  will  gradually  disappear  as  a 
result  of  the  experience  which  will  be  gained  ;  and 
that,  therefore,  the  number  of  Europeans  in  the 
service  of  the  Government  should  not  merely 
be  reduced  to  the  lowest  limit  compatible  with 
efficiency,  but  that  that  limit  should  be  exceeded, 
and  that  temporary  inefficiency,  even  in  a  somewhat 
marked  degree,  should  be  tolerated  in  order  to 
attain  the  desired  end. 

There  is  not  much  to  be  gained  by  dwelling  at 
length  on  the  abstract  principles  enunciated  above. 
The  subject  under  discussion  is  eminently  one  as 
to  wliich,  for  all  purposes  of  practical  politics,  a 
compromise  has  to  be  effected  between  the  extremes 
of  the  conflicting  principles  invoked  on  either  side. 
What  is  quite  clear  is,  that  if  AVestern  civilisation 
is  to  be  introduced  into  Egypt,  it  can  only  be  done 
by  Europeans,  or  by  Egyptians  who  have  imbibed 
the  spirit  of  that  civilisation,  and  have  acquired  the 
knowledge  necessary  in  order  to  apply  Western 
methods  of  government.  The  extent  to  which 
Europeans,  or  Egyptians  who  have  received  a 
European  training,  should  respectively  be  employed, 
depends  mainly  on  the  supply  which  is  available  of 
the  latter  class.  The  main  difficulty  of  dealing 
with  the  question  is  that,  for  the  present,  the 
demand  for  qualified  Egyptians  of  this  class  is 
greatly  in  excess  of  the  supply. 

The  general  policy  which  has  been  pursued  since 


CH.  XL       THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS  295 

the  British  occupation  of  the  country  took  place, 
in  1882,  has  been  to  hmit  the  number  of  Europeans 
in  the  employment  of  the  Government  as  much  as 
possible,  to  employ  Egyptians  in  the  very  great 
majority  of  the  subordinate  and  in  a  large  number 
of  the  superior  administrative  posts,  and  gradually 
to  prepare  the  ground  for  increasing  the  number  of 
Egyptians  in  high  employment.  This  policy  is 
thoroughly  understood  by  all  the  leading  British 
officials  in  Egypt.  Some,  possibly,  have  been  more 
successful  than  others  in  training  their  Egyptian 
subordinates.  Some,  again,  may  be  inclined  to  insist 
on  a  rather  excessive  standard  of  efficiency  on  the 
part  of  the  Egyptian  before  they  will  readily 
acquiesce  in  foregoing  the  appointment  of  a  Euro- 
pean. But  the  higher  British  officials  in  Egypt 
have  never  shown  any  tendency  to  question  the 
wisdom  of  the  policy,  or  the  least  reluctance  to 
give  effect  to  it  when  once  they  were  convinced 
that  a  qualified  Egyptian  could  be  found  to  take 
any  post  which  might  happen  to  be  vacant. 

This  matter  is  frequently  discussed  on  the 
assumption  that  a  number  of  places  under  Govern- 
ment are  now  occupied  by  Europeans  for  which 
competent  Egyptians  could,  without  difficulty,  be 
found.  I  will  not  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  this 
assumption  is  absolutely  unfounded,  but  it  certainly 
gives  a  very  incorrect  view  of  the  facts  of  the 
situation.  I  do  not  doubt  that  there  are  a  few 
cases  as  to  which  it  may  be  said  that,  if  the 
European  occupant  of  some  post  vacated  his  place, 
a  competent  Egyptian  might  at  once  be  found  to 
replace  him.  But,  in  the  very  large  majority  of 
cases,  the  reason  why  the  European  holds  the  post 
is  that  to  which  I  have  already  alluded,  namely, 
that  the  supply  of  competent  Egyptians  is  not 
nearly  equal  to  the  demand. 

To   any  one   who   will    calmly  and    impartially 


296  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

consider  the  recent  history  and  the  present  situation 
in  Egypt,  the  state  of  things  which  I  have  described 
above  can  be  no  matter  for  surprise.  Rather  would 
it  be  astonishing  if  the  difficulties  to  which  I  have 
alluded  had  not  occurred. 

European  agency  is  required  in  Egypt  for  two 
reasons  :  in  the  first  place,  to  supply  the  technical 
knowledge,  which,  until  very  recently,  the  Egyptians 
liave  had  no  opportunity  of  acquiring  ;  in  the  second 
place,  to  remedy  those  defects  in  the  Egyptian 
character  which  have  been  developed  by  a  long 
course  of  misgovernment. 

In  so  far  as  numbers  are  concerned,  the  first  is 
by  far  the  more  contributory  cause.  The  rapidity 
with  Which  the  material  prosperity  of  Egypt  has 
advanced  during  the  last  fifteen  or  twenty  years 
is  probably  without  a  parallel  in  history.  The 
suddenness  of  the  movement  has  proved  by  no 
means  an  unmixed  blessing  to  the  country.  I  will 
not  dwell  on  the  moral  aspect  of  this  question 
beyond  saying  that  it  is  a  commonplace  of  economics 
to  hold  that  a  great  and  sudden  accretion  of  wealth, 
without  any  corresponding  increase  of  knowledge 
as  to  how  the  newly  acquired  wealth  should  be 
used,  is  a  very  doubtful  benefit,  whether  to  an 
individual  or  a  nation. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  question  im- 
mediately under  discussion,  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  this  sudden  leap  from  poverty  to  affluence 
greatly  increased  the  difficulties  of  executing  the 
policy  of  employing  Egyptian  rather  than  European 
agency  in  administrative  work.  For,  when  once 
the  full  tide  of  prosperity  set  in,  demands  arose  on 
all  sides  for  the  employment  of  agents  possessing 
technical  knowledge  of  all  sorts.  European  lawyers 
were  re({uired  to  deal  with  the  numerous  legal 
questions  which  arose,  and  in  which  a  knowledge 
of  Europeans    and   their   laws  was   indispensable. 


CH.XL       THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS         297 

Hydraulic  engineers  were  required  to  deal  with 
irrigation  questions ;  medical  men,  to  look  after  the 
hospitals  and  the  sanitary  condition  of  the  country  ; 
veterinary  surgeons,  to  arrest  the  cattle  plague ; 
trained  surveyors,  to  map  the  fields ;  mechanical 
engineers  and  mechanics,  to  perform  a  great  variety 
of  work  —  and  so  on.  All  these  demands  fell 
suddenly  on  a  country  almost  wholly  unprepared 
to  meet  them.  Neither,  although  the  difficulties 
which  have  subsequently  arisen  were  in  some 
degree  foreseen,  were  the  British  advisers  of  the 
Egyptian  Government  able,  during  the  early  years 
of  the  occupation,  to  do  much  towards  providing 
for  them.  For  at  least  six  years,  all  that  could  be 
done  was  to  struggle  against  bankruptcy,  to  throw 
off  the  incubus  of  the  Soudan,  and  by  scraping 
together  funds  in  order  to  improve  the  system  of 
irrigation,  to  lay  the  foundations  of  the  prosperity 
which  the  country  now  enjoys. 

I  shall,  at  a  later  period  of  this  work,  deal  more 
fully  with  the  question  of  education.  Here  I  will 
only  say  that,  for  some  years,  educational  progress 
was,  owing  to  tlie  financial  difficulties  against  which 
the  Government  had  to  contend,  necessarily  slow. 
Recently  it  has  been  more  rapid,  and  I  now  take 
a  somewhat  sanguine  view  of  the  possibility  of 
gradually  substituting  Egyptian  for  European 
agency  in  those  offices  wiiere  the  necessity  for 
employing  Europeans  is  at  present  based  on  the 
want  of  technical  knowledge  on  the  part  of  tiie 
Egyptians.  But  any  attempt  to  hurry  can  only 
lead  to  disappointment,  and,  eventually,  in  all  prob- 
ability, to  a  reaction  which  will  be  to  the  detriment 
of  Egyptian  interests. 

I  liave  said  that,  besides  those  Europeans  who 
are  employed  on  the  ground  that  their  technical 
knowledge  is  indispensable,  the  services  of  others 
are   necessary   to   act   as   some    corrective  to  the 


298  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

defects  of  the  Egyptian  character.  The  number 
of  those  who  may  be  classed  in  this  category  is 
comparatively  small.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
often  occupy  positions  of  greater  importance  than 
those  who  are  employed  merely  by  reason  of  their 
technical  skill.  The  substitution  of  Egyptian  for 
European  agency  must  necessarily  take  even  more 
time  in  these  cases  than  in  those  where  the  transfer 
depends  on  the  acquisition  of  technical  knowledge 
by  the  Egyptians.  National  character  is  a  plant 
of  slow  growth.  Such  instruction  as  can  be  afforded 
in  schools  and  colleges  only  constitutes  one  of  the 
elements  which  contribute  to  its  modification  and 
development.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that  no  effort 
should  be  spared  to  foster  the  growth  of  all  those 
moral  and  intellectual  qualities  which,  collectively, 
tend  to  the  formation  of  character.  I  may  add 
that  amongst  the  defects  which,  for  purposes  of 
administration,  appear  most  of  all  to  require  recti- 
fication, are,  the  fear  of  assuming  individual  re- 
sponsibility ;  the  absence  of  adequate  capacity  to 
exercise  with  firmness,  intelligence,  and  considera- 
tion for  others,  such  functions  as  are  usually  vested 
in  responsible  agents  ;  and  the  tendency,  so  common 
amongst  Egyptians,  of  running  to  extremes  both 
in  thought  and  action. 

Before  leaving  this  branch  of  the  subject,  it  may 
be  as  well  that  I  should  give  some  figures  showing 
the  extent  to  which  Europeans  are  now  employed 
in  the  Egyptian  service.^ 

The  following  table  shows  the  composition  of 
the  Egyptian  Civil  Service  at  the  close  of  the  years 
1896  and  1906  respectively  :— 

*  A  more  detailed  analysis  of  tliese  figures  was  given  in  my  Report 
for  the  year  1006,  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1!)()7,  pp.  33-44.  The  remarks 
made  above  are  quoted  almost  textually  from  this  Report. 


OH.  XL       THE  BRITISH  OFFICIALS 


299 


Year. 

Egyptians. 

Europeans. 

Total. 

1896 
1906 

8444 
12,027 

690 
1252 

9134 
13,279 

In  the  course  of  the  decade,  therefore,  the  total 
number  of  officials  increased  by  4145.  Of  these, 
3583  were  Egyptians,  and  5G2  were  Europeans. 
I  should  mention  that,  out  of  the  total  increase  of 
562  Europeans,  no  less  than  303  belonged  to  the 
Railway  Administration,  over  which,  until  quite 
recently,  the  Egyptian  Government  have  been  able 
to  exercise  little  or  no  control.  Further,  it  is  to 
be  remembered  that  not  only  the  convenience,  but 
also,  to  a  great  extent,  the  lives  of  the  travelling 
public  depend  on  efficient  railway  administration. 
Hence,  there  is  in  this  case  relatively  little  scope 
for  the  application  of  the  general  and  semi-political 
arguments  involved  in  the  issues  now  under  dis- 
cussion. 

These  figures  bear  eloquent  testimony  to  the 
fact  that  the  number  of  Europeans  appointed  to 
the  Egyptian  public  service  has  been  strictly  con- 
trolled. It  may  be  that  in  some  few  cases  addi- 
tional Europeans  will  be  required,  but  these  will 
be  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  increase 
of  Egyptians  in  other  Departments.  In  view  of 
the  rapid  strides  being  made  in  education — more 
especially  in  technical  education — there  now  appears 
for  the  first  time  to  be  a  prospect  of  carrying  out 
more  fully  than  heretofore  what  has  always  been 
the  real  policy  of  the  British  Government  in  Egypt. 
The  execution  of  that  policy  was  retarded  by 
financial  difficulties  which,  since  the  Anglo-French 
Agreement  was  signed,  have  been  to  a  great  extent 
removed. 


300  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

One  observation  may  be  added  before  leaving 
this  branch  of  the  subject.  It  is  that  in  countries 
such  as  India  and  Egypt  the  best  poHcy  to  pursue 
is  to  employ  a  small  body  of  well-selected  and  well- 
paid  Europeans,  Everything  depends  on  finding 
the  right  man  for  the  right  place.  If  he  can  be 
found,  it  is  worth  while  to  pay  him  well.  It  is  a 
mistake  to  employ  second  or  third-rate  Europeans 
on  low  salaries.  They  often  do  more  harm  than 
good.  Public  opinion  generally  condemns  high 
salaries,  but  on  this  particular  point  the  European 
administrator  in  the  East  will  do  well  to  follow 
his  own  judgment  and  not  to  be  unduly  influenced 
by  outside  criticism.  It  is  worth  while  to  pay 
something  extra  in  order  to  secure  the  services 
of  a  really  competent  and  thoroughly  trustworthy 
official. 


CHAPTER  XLI 

THE    INTERNATIONAL   ADMINISTRATIONS 

Internationalism — 1.  The  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt — Functions 
of  the  Commission — The  Egyptian  Accounts — The  Reserve  Fund 
— Uselessness  of  the  Commission — 2.  The  Railway  Administua- 
TioN — 3.  The  Daira  Sanieh— 4.  The  Domains  Administration. 

Cosmopolitanism,  as  opposed  to  exclusive  patriot- 
ism, has  ever  been  the  dream  of  theorists  and  the  butt 
of  practical  statesmen.  Probably,  few  lines  of  any 
British  poet  have  been  more  frequently  quoted — 
especially  of  late  years — than  those  in  which  Can- 
ning ridiculed  the  "friend  of  every  country  but  his 
own."  Of  recent  years,  although  there  has  been 
no  diminution  but  rather  a  recrudescence  of  inter- 
national rivalry,  a  tendency  towards  the  inter- 
national treatment  both  of  European  and  of 
extra -European  questions  has  become  manifest, 
not  only  amongst  theorists,  but  amongst  practical 
statesmen.  This  tendency  is  the  natural  outcome 
of  the  circumstances  Avhich  obtained  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  nineteenth  century.  There  appears 
little  prospect  that  the  Utopia  of  the  early  free- 
traders will  be  realised.  Trade,  with  its  hand- 
maids, the  railway  and  the  telegraph,  does  not  so 
far  appear  to  have  bound  nations  together  in  any 
closer  bonds  of  amity  than  existed  in  the  days  of 
slow  locomotion  and  communication.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  European  body  politic  has  become 

801 


302  MODERN  EGYTT  pt.  rv 

more  sensitive  than  heretofore.  National  interests 
tend  towards  cosmopoHtanism,  however  much 
national  sentiments  and  aspirations  may  tend 
towards  exclusive  patriotism.  The  whole  world  is 
quickly  informed  of  any  incident  which  may  occur 
in  any  part  of  the  globe.  Not  only  in  the  cabinet 
of  every  JNIinister,  but  in  the  office  of  every  news- 
paper editor  the  questions  to  which  its  occurrence 
instantly  give  rise  are,  how  does  this  circumstance 
affect  the  affairs  of  my  country  ?  What  course 
should  be  taken  in  order  to  safeguard  our  interests  ? 
It  is  more  difficult  than  heretofore  to  segregate  a 
quarrel  between  any  two  States.  In  a  certain  sense 
Europeans,  in  spite  of  themselves,  have  become 
members  of  a  single  family,  though  not  always  of 
a  happy  family.  They  are  all  oppressed  by  one 
common  dread,  and  that  is  that  some  accident  may 
precipitate  a  general  war,  of  which  not  the  wisest 
can  foretell  the  final  issue.  If  any  minor  State 
shows  a  tendency  to  light  the  match  which  may 
lead  to  a  general  conflagration,  the  voice  of  inter- 
national  rivalry  is  to  some  extent  hushed  in 
presence  of  the  danger,  and  the  diplomatic  fire- 
engine  is  turned  on  from  every  capital  in  Europe 
in  order  to  quench  the  flame  before  it  can  spread. 
A  certain  power  of  acting  together  has  thus  been 
developed  amongst  the  nations  and  Governments 
of  Europe,  and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 
world  has  benefited  by  the  change.  In  all  the 
larger  affairs  of  state,  internationalism  constitutes 
a  guarantee  for  peace.  It  in  some  measure  obliges 
particular  interests  to  yield  for  the  general  good  of 
the  European  community. 

Internationalism  has,  however,  done  more  than 
group  together  certain  States  and  ensure  common 
or  quasi-common  action  on  occasions  of  supreme 
importance.  Semi-civilised  countries,  in  which  the 
rulers  are  sometimes  only  possessed  of  incomplete 


CH.  xLi  INTERNATIONALISM  303 

sovereign  rights,  open  up  a  wide  field  for  the  de- 
velopment of  internationalism.  In  such  countries, 
some  European  Powers  have  interests  which  they 
wish  to  safeguard  without  arousing  the  jealousy  of 
their  rivals  by  too  open  an  assertion  of  strength, 
whilst  others  are  led  to  claim  a  seat  at  the  inter- 
national table  in  order  to  assert  their  political  exist- 
ence and  to  remind  the  world  that  their  interests, 
albeit  they  are  of  relatively  slight  importance,  cannot 
be  altogether  neglected.  Cases  sometimes  arise 
which  involve  prolonged  supervision  and  control  in 
the  interests  of  the  European  Powers,  but  which  do 
not  justify  exclusive  action  on  the  part  of  any  one 
of  them,  or  which,  if  they  justify  it,  are  of  a 
nature  not  to  allow  of  exclusive  action  without 
a  risk  of  discord  in  respect  to  the  particular  nation 
by  whom  it  is  to  be  exercised.  What  can  be 
more  natural  in  cases  of  this  kind  than  for  the 
Powers  to  say — we  are  agreed  as  to  all  that  is 
essential ;  certain  points  of  detail  remain  to  be 
settled  locally ;  let  us  each  appoint  an  expert 
who  will  represent  our  interests  and  see  that 
they  get  fair  play,  but  who  at  the  same  time 
will  have  no  very  marked  political  bias,  and 
who  will  treat  the  technical  questions  which  come 
under  his  consideration  on  their  own  merits  ? 
Nothing  could  in  appearance  be  more  equitable 
or  more  calculated  to  obviate  the  risk  of  serious 
friction. 

But  alas !  however  much  exclusiveness  may  in 
appearance  be  expelled  by  the  cosmopolitan  pitch- 
fork, it  but  too  often  comes  back  apain  to  its 
natural  resting-place.  The  experiment  of  adminis- 
trative internationalism  has  ]:)robably  been  tried  in 
the  No  Man's  Land  of  which  this  history  treats  to 
a  greater  extent  than  in  any  other  country.  The 
result  cannot  be  said  to  be  encouraging  to  those 
who  believe  in  tlie  efficacy  of  international  action 


304  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

in  administrative  matters.  What  has  been  proved 
is  that  international  institutions  possess  admirable 
negative  qualities.  They  are  formidable  checks  to 
all  action,  and  the  reason  why  they  are  so  is  tliat, 
when  any  action  is  proposed,  objections  of  one  sort 
or  another  generally  occur  to  some  member  of  the 
international  body.  Any  action  often  involves  a 
presumed  advantage  accorded  to  some  rival  nation, 
and  it  is  a  principle  of  internationalism,  which  is 
scornfully  rejected  in  theory  and  but  too  often 
recognised  as  a  guide  for  practical  action,  that  it  is 
better  to  do  nothing,  even  though  evil  may  ensue, 
than  to  allow  good  to  be  done  at  the  expense  of 
furthering  the  interests,  or  of  exalting  the  reputa- 
tion of  an  international  rival.  For  all  purposes 
of  action,  therefore,  administrative  international- 
ism may  be  said  to  tend  towards  the  creation  of 
administrative  impotence. 

1.  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt 

The  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt  originally 
consisted  of  four  members,  an  Englishman,  a 
Frenchman,  an  Austrian,  and  an  Italian.  In 
1885,  a  German  and  a  Russian  Commissioner 
were  added,  thus  bringing  the  total  number 
of  Commissioners  up  to  six.  Until  1904,  the 
functions  of  the  Commission  were  briefly  as 
follows. 

The  officials  responsible  for  the  collection  of 
the  revenues  pledged  to  the  service  of  the  Debt 
were  under  an  obligation  to  pay  all  monies 
collected  by  them  into  the  hands  of  the  Com- 
missioners, and  to  furnish  them  with  the  informa- 
tion necessary  in  order  to  enable  an  effective 
financial  control  to  be  exercised.  The  Commis- 
sioners had  a  right  to  name  and  dismiss  their 
own    employes.       No    loan    could    be    contracted 


cH.  xLi  INTERNATIONALISM  305 

without  their  consent.  Lastly,  and  this  was  a 
provision  of  the  higliest  imj)ortance,  the  Com- 
missioners, in  their  capacity  of  legal  representatives 
of  the  bondholders,  were  empowered  to  sue  the 
Egyptian  Government  in  the  Mixed  Courts  in 
the  event  of  any  infringement  of  the  Law  of 
Liquidation  taking  place. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  powers  thus  conferred 
on  the  Commissioners  were  extensive.  Neverthe- 
less, those  portions  of  the  Law  of  Liquidation  to 
which  allusion  has  so  far  been  made,  did  not  in 
practice  give  rise  to  much  difficulty  subsequent  to 
the  British  occupation.  They  were  provisions  in- 
tended to  guard  against  an  act  of  bankruptcy,  and 
inasmuch  as  the  result  of  the  British  occupation  was 
to  place  the  Egyptian  Treasury  in  a  state  of  assured 
solvency,  any  preventive  action  on  the  part  of  the 
Commission  of  the  Debt  became  unnecessary  when 
once  the  first  few  years  of  acute  crisis  were  passed. 

Other  functions  were,  however,  vested  in  the 
Commissioners,  which  were  of  greater  practical 
importance. 

The  Law  of  Liquidation,  coupled  with  the 
Decree  of  July  27,  1885,  which  was  promulgated 
on  the  occasion  of  the  issue  of  an  Egyptian  Loan 
of  £9,000,000  guaranteed  by  the  Powers  of  Europe, 
laid  down  a  method  for  balancing  the  accounts  of 
the  Egyptian  Treasury  at  the  end  of  each  year 
which  was  a  triumph  of  financial  cumbersomeness 
and  ineptitude.  At  the  time  of  the  London  Con- 
ference, the  French,  who  were  supported  by  some 
other  Continental  Powers,  were  politically  hostile 
to  England,  and,  moreover,  looked  almost  ex- 
clusively to  the  interests  of  the  bondholders. 
The  British  Treasury  officials  could  see  but  one 
point,  namely,  that  the  Government  of  Egypt  were 
embarrassed  by  having  spent  too  much  money  in 
the  past ;  therefore,  it  was  held,  a  stringent  control 

VOL.  II  X 


306  INIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

should  be  exercised  to  prevent  extravagant  ex- 
penditure in  tlie  future.  The  argument  was 
sound,  but  it  was  forgotten  at  the  time  that  the 
expenditure  was  being  incurred  under  conditions 
wholly  different  from  those  which  had  obtained  in 
the  past.  A  wise  foresight  would  have  given  greater 
latitude  to  the  British  advisers  of  the  Egyptian 
Government  than  could  have  been  prudently 
accorded  to  Ismail  Pasha.  It  was,  however,  im- 
possible to  obtain  a  hearing  for  arguments  of  this 
nature.  The  Egyptian  Government  did,  indeed, 
manage  to  obtain  a  sum  of  £1,000,000  to  spend  on 
Irrigation,  but  beyond  this  it  was  found  impossible 
to  shake  the  mistrust  of  the  French  and  the  pre- 
conceived ideas  of  the  British  Treasury  officials. 
The  latter  aided  in  establishing  a  system  which 
proved  subsequently  to  be  a  fertile  source  of 
embarrassment  to  their  own  countrymen  in  Egypt. 
It  had  been  laid  down  by  the  Decrees  of  1876 
that  certain  revenues  should  be  pledged  to  the 
service  of  the  Debt,  whilst  other  revenues  should 
be  left  at  the  disposal  of  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment to  provide  for  their  administrative  expenditure. 
AVhen  the  Guaranteed  Loan  of  1885  was  contracted, 
the  distribution  of  what,  in  Gallicised  English,  are 
called  the  "affected"  and  the  "  non  -  affected  " 
revenues,  had  to  be  reconsidered.  Care  was  taken 
to  increase  the  relative  amount  of  the  former,  so 
that  the  bondholders  should  not  run  any  risk,  with 
the  result  that  the  amount  of  the  latter  was  rela- 
tiv^ely  diminished.  The  administrative  expenditure 
was  fixed  at  a  certain  figure,  the  only  concession, 
which  was  with  difficulty  obtained,  being  that  the 
working  expenses  of  the  Railway  administration 
should  not  be  unalterable,  but  should  be  taken  at 
45  per  cent^  of  the  gross   receipts.     If  the  non- 

*  In  1902,  after  prolonged  negotiations,  this  figure  was  increased  to 
a  maximum  of  55  per  cent. 


CH.  xLi  INTERNATIONALISM  307 

affected  revenues  did  not  yield  the  sum  at  which 
the  administrative  expenditure  was  fixed,  the 
deficit  had  to  be  made  good  from  the  affected 
revenues.  The  surpkis  on  the  whole  account  con- 
sisted of  the  money  remaining  in  the  hands  of  the 
Commissioners  of  the  Debt  from  the  affected 
revenues  after  the  deficit  in  the  non  -  affected 
revenues,  if  any,  had  been  made  good.  This 
surplus  was  divided  into  two  portions.  One 
portion  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Commis- 
sioners ;  the  other  was  paid  to  the  Egyptian 
Government.  The  result  was  that,  if  the  Govern- 
ment wished  to  spend  £lO  in  excess  of  the  adminis- 
trative limit  prescribed  by  international  agreement, 
revenue  to  the  extent  of  £20  had  to  be  collected 
in  order  to  meet  the  expenditure.  As  the  country 
progressed,  legitimate  demands  for  fresh  expendi- 
ture arose,  but  under  the  system  devised  in  1885, 
the  anomaly  was  presented  that  the  Government 
had  to  pay  double  for  everything  in  the  nature  of 
an  improvement  involving  fresh  expenditure ;  that 
the  administration  was  starved  ;  that  money  was 
plentiful ;  but  that  no  one  benefited  in  any 
adequate  degree  from  its  abundance. 

It  would  be  tedious  to  describe  in  detail 
the  involved  calculation  which  had  to  be  made 
before  the  true  surplus  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Egyptian  Treasury  could  be  ascertained.  It  will 
be  sufficient  to  quote  the  figures  of  one  year 
as  an  example  of  the  results  obtained  under  the 
system. 

In  1892,  the  revenue  of  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment amounted  to  £E.  10,304,000,  and  the  expen- 
diture to  £E.9,595,000.  It  would  naturally  be 
supposed  by  any  one  unacquainted  with  the  intri- 
cacies of  Egyptian  finance  that  a  surplus  remained 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Government  amounting  to 
the  difference  between  these   two   sums,  namely, 


308  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

£E. 769,000.  Any  such  conclusion  would  have 
been  altogether  erroneous. 

After  winding  through  the  financial  labyrinth, 
which  was  constructed  by  the  Powers,  and  which 
is  a  typical  instance  of  the  results  of  international 
administration,  it  was  found  that  the  real  surplus 
in  the  hands  of  the  Egyptian  Treasury  was  only 
£E.  179,000,  a  difference  of  no  less  than  £E.590,000. 
Appearances  in  Egypt  are  deceptive. 

It  was  originally  intended  that  any  surplus 
remaining  in  the  hands  of  the  Commissioners 
should  be  applied  to  the  extinction  of  debt.  For 
the  first  few  years  of  the  British  occupation,  this 
matter  was  not  of  much  ])ractical  importance,  as  no 
surplus  was  available.  But  when  financial  affairs 
became  more  settled,  Sir  Edgar  Vincent's  inven- 
tive mind  gave  birth  to  a  scheme  under  which 
the  surplus  at  the  end  of  each  year  was  to  be 
allowed  to  accumulate  in  a  Reserve  Fund.  Extinc- 
tion of  debt  was  not  to  begin  until  the  Reserve 
Fund  amounted  to  £E.2,000,000.  Thus,  the 
Treasury  would,  it  was  hoped,  eventually  have  a 
large  sum  of  money  in  hand  to  guard  against  any 
unforeseen  contingencies  which  might  occur. 

The  idea  was  excellent.  It  obtained  the  assent 
of  the  Powers,  and  was  embodied  in  a  Decree  dated 
July  12,  1888.  Article  3  of  this  Decree  described 
how  the  money  belonging  to  the  Reserve  Fund 
might  be  spent.  Inter  alia,  it  was  to  be  applied 
to  "  extraordinary  expenditure  undertaken  with 
the  previous  assent  of  the  Commission  of  the 
Debt."  This  was  a  provision  of  great  importance, 
for  as  the  Reserve  Fund  increased,  it  was  found 
possible  to  turn  the  money  over,  and,  by  making 
advances  to  the  Government,  to  allow  various 
works  of  public  utility  to  be  constructed.  As, 
however,  it  rested  with  the  Commission  to  decide 
whether  any  advance  should  be  made,  it  is  obvious 


CH.  xLi  INTERNATIONALISM  309 

that,  under  the  Decree  of  1888,  the  powers  vested 
in  the  Commissioners  were  notably  increased.^ 

Such,  therefore,  were  the  attributes  of  the 
Commission  of  the  Pubhc  Debt.  During  Ismail 
Pasha's  time,  this  institution,  though  its  organisa- 
tion was  in  many  respects  defective,  played  an 
important  and  useful  part  in  Egyptian  affairs. 
Subsequent  to  the  British  occupation,  the  inutility 
of  the  Commission  became,  year  by  year,  more 
apparent.  It  cost  the  Treasury  some  £E.  40,000 
a  year.  All  the  necessary  work  of  a  National  Debt 
Office  could  have  been  done  by  one  official  and  a 
small  staff  of  clerks. 

In  blaming  the  institution,  however,  it  would 
be  unjust  to  cast  indiscriminate  blame  on  the 
individuals  concerned.  Some  of  the  Commis- 
sioners have  been  intelligent  and  capable  men  who 
have  performed  their  duties  in  a  reasonable  spirit 
of  impartiality.  Indeed,  the  Egyptian  authorities 
have  always  preferred  dealing  with  the  Commission 
of  the  Debt  to  dealing  with  the  Powers.  The 
Commissioners,  being  on  the  spot,  are  exposed 
to  local  influences,  and  possess  a  certain  amount 
of  local  knowledge.  They  are,  therefore,  more 
likely  to  judge  financial  matters  on  their  own 
merits  than  those  who,  sitting  at  a  distance, 
look  at  Egyptian  affairs  from  a  wholly  political 
point  of  view.  It  is,  however,  none  the  less  true 
that  whatever  reforms  have  been  accomplished 
with  the  co-operation  of  the  Caisse  could  have 
been  equally  well  and  probably  better  accomplished 
had  the  Caisse  not  existed.  The  only  purpose 
which  this  institution  eventually  served  was  to 
act  as  an  obstacle  to  progress,  and  occasionally 
as  an    agency  for   the   manifestation    of  hostility 

*  Tlie  question  of  how  this  Decree  should  be  interpreted  gave  rise  to 
a  lawsuit  when,  in  189G,  a  majority  of  the  Commissioners  of  tlie  Debt 
made  a  grant  of  £E.  500,000  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  Dougola 
campaign. —  Vide  p.  85  et  seq. 


310  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

towards  England.  It  often  happens  that  an 
institution  survives  after  the  circumstances  to 
which  it  owes  its  origin  have  passed  away.  The 
result  is  that  the  institution  becomes  hurtful, 
although  the  individuals  associated  with  it  may- 
be deserving  of  respect.  This  is  what  took  place 
with  regard  to  the  Commission  of  the  Public 
Debt 

In  1904,  as  a  result  of  negotiations  with  the 
Powers,  the  functions  of  the  Commission  of  the 
Debt  underwent  a  radical  change.  Without 
going  into  any  elaborate  detail,  it  may  be  said 
that  the  Commissioners  are  now  merely  receivers 
on  the  part  of  the  bondholders.  They  cannot  in 
any  way  interfere  with  administrative  affairs. 

In  1912,  the  Egyptian  Government  will  be  free 
to  convert  the  whole  of  the  Debt.  If  the  con- 
version takes  place,  the  Commission  of  the  Debt 
will  presumably  disappear  altogether. 

2.  Railway  Administration, 

Under  the  Decree  of  November  18,  1876,  a 
Board  was  constituted  to  administer  the  Railways, 
the  Telegraphs,  and  the  Port  of  Alexandria.  It 
originally  consisted  of  two  Englislmien,  of  whom 
one  was  President,  a  Frenchman,  and  two  Egyp- 
tians. Subsequently,  the  number  of  English  and 
of  Egyptian  members  was  reduced  to  one  of  each 
nationality. 

The  English  and  French  members  were  named 
on  the  proposal  of  their  respective  Governments. 
The  Board  made  appointments  to  all  subordinate 
places  in  the  administration.  The  superior  officials 
were  nominated  by  the  Khedive  on  the  proposal 
of  the  Board.  Changes  of  tariff  were  made 
by  the  Board  with  the  sanction  of  the  Egyptian 
Government. 


CH.  xLi  INTERNATIONALISM  311 

Two  very  competent  Englishmen,  Colonel 
Marindin  and  Mr.  (now  Lord)  Farrer,  were  em- 
ployed in  1887  to  report  on  the  Egyptian  Railways. 
This  is  the  judgment  which  they  passed  on  the 
system  of  administration  : — 

"  The  administration  of  the  Egyptian  Railways, 
as  at  present  constituted,  differs  considerably  from 
any  with  which  we  are  acquainted.  The  control 
is  vested  in  three  members  whose  functions  are 
midefined  as  regards  the  different  branches  of  the 
working  of  the  railway.  We  understand  that 
there  is  no  one  individual  who  is  separately 
responsible  for  the  management  of  the  railways. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  result  of  this  divided 
responsibility  has  been  especially  injurious  to  the 
working  of  a  commercial  business  such  as  railways 
must  necessarily  be,  and  we  are  of  opinion  that  it 
is  absolutely  essential  for  the  satisfactory  working 
of  the  Egyptian  Railways,  and  for  the  maintenance 
of  discipline  upon  them,  that  the  management  of 
them,  as  a  whole,  together  with  the  control  of 
heads  of  Departments,  should  be  vested  in  one 
person  with  a  position  analogous  to  that  of  the 
Managing  Director  or  General  Manager  of  Rail- 
ways in  other  countries." 

Obviously,  the  management  should  have  been 
vested  in  one  person,  but  internationalism  abhors 
the  one-man  system  as  much  as  nature  abhors  a 
vacuum.  The  sheet-anchor  of  internationalism  is, 
indeed,  that  several  men  should  be  set  to  do  the 
work  of  one. 

It  was,  however,  said  of  Richelieu,  by  one  of 
his  enemies,  *'il  est  capable  de  tout,  meme  du 
bien."  So  also  it  may  be  noted  that  international 
administration,  although  it  can  never  yield  fruits 
at  all  comparable  with  those  which  may  be 
obtained  under  more  rational  administrative 
systems,    may    at    times    be    forced    into    some 


312  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.iv 

degree  of  action,  and  will  then  produce  results 
which  the  casual  observer  may  think  are  due  to 
the  excellence  of  the  system,  whereas  they  are 
in  reality  for  tlie  most  part  obtained  by  the 
occurrence  of  adventitious  circumstances  in  spite 
of  the  system.  Administrative  internationalism, 
like  Richelieu,  is  occasionally  capable,  if  not  of 
absolute  good,  at  all  events  of  assuming  a  fictitious 
appearance  of  goodness. 

Thus,  the  Egyptian  Railways  benefited  by  the 
increase  of  prosperity  and  by  the  general  reform- 
ing impulse  which  was  imparted  to  the  Egyptian 
administrative  macliine  by  the  predominance  of 
British  influence  in  the  country.  They  would 
have  benefited  still  more  had  the  British  reformers 
been  from  the  first  allowed  a  free  hand  in  dealing 
with  their  administration. 

In  1904,  as  a  consequence  of  the  arrangements 
with  the  Powers,  to  which  allusion  has  already 
been  made,  the  Egyptian  Government  acquired 
full  right  to  deal  with  the  Railway  Administration 
in  any  way  they  might  think  fit. 

Few,  save  those  behind  the  scenes,  have  prob- 
ably recognised  fully  that  the  Anglo  -  French 
Agreement  was  only  signed  just  in  time  to  prevent 
a  complete  breakdown  of  the  Railway  Administra- 
tion. Such,  however,  is  unquestionably  the  case. 
If  means  had  not  been  found  to  spend  a  large 
amount  of  capital  on  developments  and  improve- 
ments, the  railways  of  Egypt  would  have  been 
wholly  unable  to  cope  with  the  growing  require- 
ments of  the  country. 

Towards  the  close  of  1905,  Sir  Charles  Scotter 
visited  Egypt  and  made  a  full  report  on  the  con- 
dition of  the  Egyptian  Railways.^  His  suggestions 
are  now  being  carried  out.  The  Railway  Adminis- 
tration is  being  thoroughly  reorganised.      Capital 

»  See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1906,  pp.  110-113. 


CH.  xLi  INTERNATIONALISM  313 

expenditure  to  the  extent  of  £3,000,000  has  been 
sanctioned,  of  which  £1,635,000  was  ex])ended 
before  the  close  of  1906.  It  is  probable  that  an 
additional  grant  of  £1,000,000  will  be  eventually 
required.  Thus,  it  may  be  hoped  that  before  long 
the  Egyptian  Railway  Administration  will  be  in 
thoroughly  good  order. 

Looking  back  to  one  of  my  earliest  Reports  ^  I 
notice  that  in  1890,  the  Egyptian  Railways  carried 
4,700,000  passengers  and  1,683,000  tons  of  goods. 
In  1906,  they  carried  no  less  than  22,550,000 
passengers  and  20,030,000  tons  of  goods.  These 
figures  serve  as  a  striking  illustration  of  the  im- 
mense improvement  in  the  material  condition  of 
the  country  Avhich  has  taken  place  during  the  last 
few  years.  They  also  afford  an  ample  justification 
for  the  large  reductions  which  have  been  made  in 
the  rates. ^ 

In  addition  to  the  State  Railways,  a  network  of 
1145  kilometres  of  Agricultural  Railways,  which 
are  owned  by  private  companies,  exists  in  Egypt. 
These  railways  are  largely  used.  In  1906,  they 
carried  6,924,000  passengers  and  929,000  tons  of 
goods. 

3.  Daira  Sanieh. 

The  Daira  properties  formed  part  of  the  huge 
estates  which  Ismail  Pasha  contrived,  generally  by 
illicit  and  arbitrary  methods,  to  accumulate  in  his 
own  hands.  They  originally  extended  over  an 
area  of  more  than  half  a  million  of  acres.  When 
Ismail  got  into  financial  difficulties,  he  borrowed 

>  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1802,  p.  20. 

2  1  may  remark  that  the  same  lesson  is  to  be  learnt  from  an 
examination  of  the  statistics  of  the  Post  Office  and  Teleji^raph  Depart- 
ments, in  both  of  which  the  rates  liave  been  largely  reduced.  In  1885, 
only  12,500,000  letters  and  83,000  parcels  passed  throuj^h  the  Post 
Office.  In  1905,the  figures  were  :  letters,  .50,700,000  ;  parcels,  250,000. 
In  1906,  no  less  than  1,925,000  telegrams,  of  which  1,248,000  were  io 
Arabic,  passed  over  the  lines,  as  compared  to  about  311,000  in  1890. 


314  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.iv 

£9,500,000  on  the  security  of  these  properties. 
They  were  administered  by  a  Board  of  Directors, 
consisting  of  an  Egyptian  Director-General,  and 
two  Controllers,  one  British  and  one  French.  The 
Director-General  was  the  executive  officer,  but  the 
Controllers  had  ample  powers  of  supervision  and 
inspection.  They  alone  were  the  legal  representa- 
tives of  the  bondholders. 

Until  the  year  1891,  the  Daira  expenditure 
was  always  in  excess  of  the  revenue.  On  several 
occasions  the  deficits  exceeded  £200,000.  With 
the  exception  of  the  year  1895,  when  there  was  a 
deficit  amounting  to  £102,000,  the  accounts  of 
every  year  subsequent  to  1890  showed  a  surplus. 
In  the  two  years  1904-5,  the  revenue  exceeded 
the  expenditure  by  no  less  than  £817,000. 

In  1898,  an  arrangement  was  made  under  which 
the  Daira  estates  were  sold  to  a  company,  who 
again  resold  them  in  lots.  The  sales  are  now  com- 
plete. Most  of  the  purchasers  were  Egyptians. 
The  Government  share  in  the  profits  of  the 
liquidation  amounted  to  about  £3,280,000. 

4.   The  Domains  Administration, 

The  properties,  known  by  the  name  of  the 
Domains,  comprise  the  estates  ceded,  under  pres- 
sure, by  Ismail  Pasha  in  1878.^  On  the  security 
of  these  estates,  a  loan  of  £8,500,000  was  negoti- 
ated with  Messrs.  Rothschild.  It  was,  at  the  same 
time,  arranged  that  the  Domains  should  be  ad- 
ministered by  a  Commission  consisting  of  an 
Englishman,  a  Frenchman,  and  an  Egyptian. 

Up  to  the  year  1899,  the  reveinie  yielded  by 
the  estates  was  invariably  less  than  the  expendi- 
ture. In  one  year  (1885)  the  deficit  amounted  to 
no  less  than  £275,000.      From    1900   onwards,   a 

*  Vide  ante,  \o\.  i.  p.  63. 


CH.  xLi  INTERN ATIONALISJSl  315 

surplus,  varying  from  £26,000  to  £150,000,  was 
always  realised. 

By  gradual  sales  ^  the  extent  of  the  Domains 
properties,  which  originally  consisted  of  nearly 
426,000  acres  of  land,  was  reduced  by  the  close  of 
1906  to  about  147,000  acres.  Simultaneously,  the 
outstanding  capital  of  the  loan  was  reduced  from 
£8,500,000  to  about  £1,316,000.^  It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  the  whole  of  this  loan  will  be  paid 
off  before  long,  and  that,  when  this  is  done,  some 
very  valuable  lands  will  remain  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Government.^ 

With  the  sale  of  the  Daira  and  Domains  lands, 
almost  the  last  traces  of  the  injury  which  Ismail 
Pasha  inflicted  on  his  country,  by  accumulating 
1,000,000  acres  of  the  best  land  in  Egypt  in  the 
hands  of  himself  and  his  family,  will  disappear. 

Some  comprehension  of  these  institutions  is 
necessary  in  order  to  understand  the  extent  to 
which  the  freedom  of  action  of  the  British  officials 
in  Egypt  was  at  one  time  crippled.  A  brief 
examination  of  that  curious  mosaic  termed  the 
Judicial  System  of  Egypt  will  tend  to  bring  into 
still  stronger  relief  the  anomalous  position  occupied 
by  the  Anglo-Egyptian  reformer.  In  the  case  of 
those  institutions  of  which  I  have  so  far  treated,  the 
shackles  have  now  been,  for  the  most  part,  struck 
off.  In  the  case  of  those  with  which  I  am  about  to 
deal,  they  still  remain  and  bar  the  way  to  reform. 

^  The  great  majority  of  the  purchasers  have  been  Egyptians.  The 
land  was,  for  the  most  part,  sold  in  small  lots. 

2  On  November  30,  1907,  the  outstanding  capital  of  this  loan 
amounted  to  only  £1,050,940. 

^  If  the  present  price  of  land  is  maintained,  the  value  of  the  estates 
which  will  remain  over  after  the  complete  liquidation  of  the  loan  will 
probably  be  about  £6,000,000. 


CHAPTER    XLII 

THE   JUDICIAL    SYSTEM 

The  ?/Hxed  Courts — Nubar  Pasha's  objects  in  creating  them — Attributes 
and  composition  of  the  Mixed  Courts — Defects  in  the  institution — 
Tlie  Consular  Courts — The  Native  Tribunals  and  the  Kadi's  Courts 
— Summary  of  jurisdictions  in  Egypt. 

In  creating  the  International  Tribunals,  or,  as 
they  are  more  frequently  called,  the  Mixed  Courts, 
Nubar  Pasha  had  two  objects  in  view.  In  the 
first  place,  he  was  struck  with  the  fact  that, 
inasmuch  as  the  European  adventurers  who  flocked 
to  Egypt  during  the  reigns  of  Said  and  of  Ismail  had 
no  legal  means  for  obtaining  a  redress  of  any  real  or 
imaginary  grievances,  they  fell  back,  in  case  of  need, 
on  diplomatic  support,  with  results  that  were  not 
unfrequently  disastrous  to  the  Egyptian  Treasury. 
Nubar  Pasha,  therefore,  conceived  the  statesmanlike 
project  of  creating  law-courts,  which  should  com- 
mand the  confidence  of  Europe,  and  which  should 
be  empowered  to  try  civil  suits  between  Europeans, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Egyptians  or  the  Egyptian 
Government,  on  the  other  hand.  In  the  second 
place,  although  in  dealing  with  Ismail  Pasha  this 
aspect  of  the  case  was  kept  in  the  background, 
Nubar  Pasha  wished  to  erect  a  legal  barrier  between 
the  population  of  Egypt  and  the  capricious 
despotism  of  the  Khedive.  His  original  intention 
was  to  place  all  the  inhabitants  of  Egypt,  whether 
Europeans  or  Egyptians,  under  the  jurisdiction  of 

316 


CH.XLII      THE  JUDICIAL  SYSTEM  317 

the  Mixed  Courts.  This  part  of  the  project, 
however,  fell  to  the  ground  owing  to  the  strong 
opposition  which  it  encountered  at  Constantinople, 
and  perhaps  it  was  as  well  that  it  did  so,  for  the 
complete  realisation  of  Nubar  Pasha's  idea  would 
have  entailed  the  internationalisation  of  the  whole 
judicial  system  of  the  country. 

Nubar  Pasha's  first  object  was,  however,  attained. 
From  1875  onwards,  any  European  who  has  had  a 
claim  either  against  an  Egyptian  or  against  the 
Egyptian  Government,  has  no  longer  been  under  the 
necessity  of  seeking  diplomatic  support.  He  has 
been  referred  both  by  the  Egyptian  Government 
and  by  the  diplomatic  agent  of  his  country  to  a 
properly  constituted  law-court  in  which  it  was  com- 
petent for  him  to  make  good  his  claim,  if  it  was  a 
just  one.  From  every  point  of  view,  the  result  has 
been  beneficial.  The  claimant,  with  the  Egyptian 
code  before  him,  has  been  able  to  form  a  fair  idea  of 
what  he  might  expect  from  the  law-courts.  The 
Egyptian  Government  have,  on  the  one  hand,  been 
obliged  to  acknowledge  their  legal  and  contractual 
obligations ;  on  the  other  hand,  they  have  been  re- 
lieved from  capricious  diplomatic  pressure  on  behalf 
of  individuals,  and  they  have  not  unfrequently  in- 
voked the  law  with  success  in  order  to  be  saved  from 
the  exorbitant  demands  of  contractors  and  others. 
The  diplomatic  agent  has  been  relieved  from  the 
unpleasant  obligation  of  supporting  claims,  which 
were  often  of  doubtful  validity  from  a  technical, 
and  of  more  than  doubtful  morality  from  an 
equitable  point  of  view. 

By  the  irony  of  fate,  the  institution  to  which 
Ismail  Pasha  was  induced  to  assent,  probably  with 
only  a  half  knowledge  of  what  it  meant,  was  the 
instrument  which  dealt  him  his  political  death- 
blow. When  the  law-courts,  to  whose  creation 
the  Powers  of  Europe  had  been  parties,  condemned 


318  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

him  to  pay  certain  sums  of  money,  and  wlien  he 
found  himself  unable  to  pay  them,  the  cup  of  his 
iniquity  overflowed,  and  Europe — legally  outraged, 
and  politically  timorous  of  what  the  future  might 
bring  forth — spoke  out  and  said,  "  You  must  pay 
or  go."  Ismail  Pasha  could  not  pay.  After  a  few 
ineffectual  struggles,  he  went. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  at  length  the  attri- 
butes and  composition  of  the  Mixed  Courts.  It 
will  be  sufficient  to  say  that  a  Court  of  Appeal 
sits  at  Alexandria,  and  that  three  Courts  of  First 
Instance  exist,  one  at  Cairo,  one  at  Alexandria, 
and  one  at  Mansourah.  Egyptian  judges  sit  on 
all  these  Courts,  but  most  of  the  real  work  is  done 
by  Europeans.  The  European  judges  of  the 
Court  of  Appeal  are  for  the  most  part  chosen  from 
amongst  the  subjects  of  the  Great  Powers.  All  the 
Powers,  without  distinction,  are  represented  on 
the  Courts  of  First  Instance.  The  choice  of  judges 
rests  nominally  with  the  Egyptian  Government. 
In  reality,  the  judges  have  until  quite  recently 
been  nominated  by  their  respective  Governments. 
The  jurisdiction  of  the  Mixed  Courts  extends  over 
all  civil  cases  between  Europeans  and  Egyptians, 
whether  the  European  appears  as  plaintiff  or 
defendant ;  also,  over  civil  cases  between  Europeans 
of  different  nationalities. 

The  principal  defect  of  the  Mixed  Courts  is 
that  the  judges  are  not  merely  interpreters  of  the 
law ;  they  are  also  to  a  great  extent  makers  of  it. 
They  are  not  under  the  effective  control  of  any 
legislature.  If,  as  is  both  natural  and  occasionally 
almost  unavoidable,  they  attempt,  by  a  some- 
what strained  interpretation  of  their  charter, 
to  usurp  functions  which  do  not  belong  to  them, 
there  is  no  one  to  restrain  them.  In  order 
that  any  new  law  should  be  recognised  by  the 
Mixed  Courts,  it  must  receive  the  assent  of  all  the 


CH.  xLii      THE  JUDICIAL  SYSTEM  319 

Powers,  and  experience  has  shown  that  it  is 
generally  impossible,  and  always  dijEficult  and 
tedious,  to  ensure  the  required  unanimity.  Legis- 
lation by  diplomacy  is  probably  the  worst  and 
most  cumbersome  form  of  legislation  in  the  world. 
Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  easy  to  understand 
that  the  judges  of  the  Mixed  Courts  are  practically 
a  law  unto  themselves. 

When  the  Indian  code  was  framed,  some  of 
the  most  acute  intellects  of  the  time  devoted 
themselves  to  a  lengthy  examination  of  the 
subject  with  a  view  to  deciding  what  provisions 
of  European  law  and  procedure,  whether  British 
or  Roman,  could  be  adapted  to  the  circumstances 
and  requirements  of  India.  The  result  was  the  pro- 
duction of  an  admirable  code,  which  was  essentially 
Indian.  No  such  care  was  taken  in  Egypt.  The 
Egyptian  code  was  originally  little  more  than  a 
textual  copy  of  the  French  code,  and,  moreover, 
it  was  applied  by  judges  who,  although  in  some 
instances  men  of  ability,  were  necessarily  ignorant 
of  Egyptian  manners  and  customs.  The  result 
was  that  great  hardship  was  at  times  inflicted, 
more  especially  in  respect  to  the  application  of  the 
laws  regulating  the  relations  between  debtor  and 
creditor.  The  ignorant  Egyptian  debtor  found 
himself,  before  he  was  aware  of  it,  gripped  in  the 
iron  hand  of  the  law,  which  was  mercilessly  applied 
by  his  Levantine  creditor.  Eventually,  some 
modifications  were  made,  but  even  now  the  law 
and  procedure  are  too  European  for  the  country. 

The  Mixed  Courts  only  exercise  criminal  juris- 
diction over  Europeans  in  a  certain  number  of 
specified  cases,  most  of  which  are  of  rare  occurrence. 
For  the  most  ])art,  any  European  resident  in  Egypt 
who  is  accused  of  crime  is  tried  by  his  Consul 
according  to  the  laws  of  his  own  country. 

The   Native   Tribunals    instituted    under   Lord 


320  MODERN  EGYPT  pr.rf 

Dufferin's  auspices  exercise  civil  and  criminal 
jurisdiction  over  Ottoman  subjects,  save  in  respect 
to  matters  relating  to  personal  status,  which  are 
decided  by  the  Kadi  according  to  the  system  of 
ecclesiastical  jurisprudence  embodied  in  the  Sacred 
Law  of  Islam.  The  working  of  these  Tribunals 
will  be  discussed  at  a  later  period  of  this  work. 

To  sum  up,  if  an  Egyptian  and  a  European 
wish  some  civil  cause  of  dispute  between  them  to 
be  decided,  they  go  to  the  ^lixed  Courts.  If  an 
European  commits  a  criminal  offence  against  an 
Egyptian,  he  is  tried  by  his  Consul,  with  an  appeal 
possibly  to  Aix,  Ancona,  Odessa,  or  elsewhere, 
according  to  the  nationality  of  the  accused. 
If  an  Egyptian  brings  a  civil  suit  against  another 
Egyptian,  or  if  he  commits  any  criminal  offence 
whether  against  a  European  or  another  Egyptian, 
he  comes  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Native 
Tribunals,  which  administer  the  French  code, 
modified  in  some  respects  to  suit  Egypt.  If  an 
Egyptian  wishes  to  prove  a  will  or  to  dispute  a 
succession,  he  has  to  go  to  the  Kadi,  who  will 
decide  according  to  the  Sheriat. 

Enough  has  now  been  said  to  give  an  idea  of 
the  main  features  of  the  judicial  labyrinth  which 
time  and  international  rivalry  have  built  up  in 
Egypt. 


CHAPTER   XLIII 

THE  WORKERS  OF  THE  MACHINE 

Importance  of  persons  rather  than  of  systems — The  British  Consul- 
General — Tewfik  Pasha — The  Prime  Ministers — Cherif  Pasha — 
Nubar  Pasha — Riaz  Pasha — Mustapha  Pasha  FehmL 

An  endeavour  has  been  made  in  the  four  preceding 
chapters  to  give  some  idea  of  the  machinery  of 
Government  in  Egypt  in  so  far  as  the  different 
parts  of  the  machine  can  be  described  by  reference 
to  documents  setting  forth  the  official  functions 
which  are  assigned  to  the  various  individuals  and 
corporations  who  collectively  make  or,  at  one  time, 
made  up  the  governing  body.  This  description  is, 
however,  incomplete ;  indeed,  in  some  respects  it 
is  almost  misleading ;  for  allusion  has  so  far  only 
been  made  to  those  portions  of  the  State  machinery 
whose  functions  can  be  described  with  some  deo-ree 
of  precision.  There  are,  however,  other  portions 
of  that  machinery  whose  functions  are  incapable  oi 
exact  definition,  but  whose  existence  is  none  the 
less  real.  Whether,  in  fact,  the  whole  machine 
works  well  or  ill  depends  in  no  small  degree  upon 
the  action  of  those  parts  of  the  machinery  which, 
to  a  superficial  observer,  might  appear  unnecessary, 
if  not  detrimental  to  its  efficient  working.  In  the 
Egyptian  body  politic,  the  unseen  is  often  more 
important  than  the  seen.  Notably,  of  late  years 
a  vague  but  preponderant  power  has  been  vested 
in  the  hands  of  the  British  Consul-GeneraL     The 

VOL.  II  821  T 


322  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

defects  in  this  system  of  government  are  obvious. 
Its  only  justification  is  that,  under  the  existing 
condition  of  affairs  in  Egypt,  it  is  impossible  to 
substitute  anything  better  in  its  place. 

I  proceed  to  give  a  sketch  of  the  duties  of  the 
British  Consul-General,  but  inasmuch  as  during  the 
greater  portion  of  the  period  of  which  this  history 
treats,  I  occupied  the  post  of  Consul-General,  I 
must,  for  obvious  reasons,  leave  it  to  others  to 
appreciate  the  manner  in  which  those  duties  were 
performed. 

Looking  to  the  general  condition  of  Egyptian 
society ;  to  the  unscrupulous  methods  by  which  it 
was  customary  to  advance  personal  aims ;  to  the 
untruthfulness,  corruption,  and  intrigue  with  which 
Egyptian  society  was  honeycombed  ;  and  finally,  to 
the  fact  that  whatever  pseudo-civilisation  existed 
in  Egypt  was  often  tainted  by  reason  of  its  having 
drawn  its  inspirations  from  those  portions  of  the 
European  social  system  which  are  least  worthy  of 
imitation, — it  always  appeared  to  me  that  the  first 
and  most  important  duty  of  the  British  representa- 
tive in  Egypt  was,  by  example  and  precept,  to  set 
up  a  high  standard  of  morality,  both  in  his  public 
and  private  life,  and  thus  endeavour  to  raise  the 
standard  of  those  around  him.  If  I  have  in  any 
way  succeeded  in  this  endeavour ;  if  I  have  helped 
to  purge  Egyptian  administration  of  corruption  ;  if 
it  is  gradually  dawning  on  the  Egyptian  mind  that 
honesty  is  not  only  the  most  honourable  but  also 
the  most  paying  policy,  and  that  lying  and 
intrigue  curse  the  liar  and  intriguer  as  well  as  his 
victim, — I  owe  the  success,  in  so  far  as  public 
matters  are  concerned,  to  the  co-operation  of  a 
body  of  high-minded  British  officials  who  have 
persistently  held  up  to  all  with  whom  they  have 
been  brought  in  contact  a  standard  of  probity 
heretofore   unknown   in   Egypt,   and,  in   so  far  as 


CH.  xLiii  THE  WORKERS  323 

social  life  is  concerned,  T  owed  it,  until  cruel  death 
intervened  to  sever  the  tie  which  bound  us  together, 
mainly  to  the  gentle  yet  commanding  influence  of 
her  who  first  instigated  me  to  write  this  book. 

The  duty  of  a  diplomatic  agent  in  a  foreign 
country  is  to  carry  out  to  the  best  of  his  ability 
the  policy  of  the  Government  which  he  serves. 
My  main  difficulty  in  Egypt  was  that  the  Britisli 
Government  never  had  any  definite  policy  which 
was  capable  of  execution ;  they  were,  indeed,  at 
one  time  constantly  striving  to  square  the  circle, 
that  is  to  say,  they  were  endeavouring  to  carry  out 
two  policies  which  were  irreconcilable,  namely,  the 
policy  of  reform,  and  the  counter-policy  of  evacua- 
tion. The  British  Government  are  not  to  be  blamed 
on  this  account.  The  circumstances  were  of  a 
nature  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  adopting  a 
clear-cut  line  of  action,  which  would  have  enabled 
the  means  to  be  on  all  occasions  logically  adapted 
to  the  end. 

I  never  received  any  general  instructions  for  my 
guidance  during  the  time  I  lield  the  post  of  British 
Consul-General  in  Egypt,  and  I  never  asked  for 
any  such  instructions,  for  I  knew  that  it  was 
useless  for  me  to  do  so.  IMy  course  of  action  was 
decided  according  to  the  merits  of  each  case  with 
which  I  had  to  deal.  Sometimes  I  spurred  the 
unwilling  Egyptian  along  the  path  of  reform.  At 
other  times,  I  curbed  the  impatience  of  the  British 
reformer.  Sometimes  I  had  to  explain  to  the  old- 
world  Mohammedan,  the  Mohammedan  of  the 
Sheriat,  the  elementary  differences  between  the 
principles  of  government  in  vogue  in  the  seventh 
and  in  the  nineteenth  centuries.  At  other  times,  I 
had  to  explain  to  the  young  Gallicised  Egyptian  that 
the  principles  of  an  ultra-Republican  Government 
were  not  applicable  in  their  entirety  to  the  exist- 
ing phase  of  Egyptian  society,  and  that,  when  we 


324  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.iv 

speak  of  the  rights  of  man,  some  distinction  has 
necessarily  to  be  made  in  practice  between  a  Euro- 
pean spouting  nonsense  through  the  medium -of 
a  fifth -rate  newspaper  in  his  own  country,  and 
man  in  the  person  of  a  ragged  Egyptian  fellah, 
possessed  of  a  sole  garment,  and  who  is  unable  to 
read  a  newspaper  in  any  language  whatsoever.  I 
had  to  support  the  reformer  sufficiently  to  prevent 
him  from  being  discouraged,  and  sufficiently  also 
to  enable  him  to  carry  into  execution  all  that  was 
essential  in  his  reforming  policy.  I  had  to  check 
the  reformer  when  he  wished  to  push  his  reforms 
so  far  as  to  shake  the  whole  political  fabric  ^  in  his 
endeavour  to  overcome  the  tiresome  and,  to  his 
eyes,  often  trumpery  obstacles  in  his  path,  and 
thus  lay  bare  to  the  world  that  measures  which 
were  dictated  in  the  true  interests  of  Egypt  were 
opposed  by  many  who  had,  by  accident  or  by 
the  political  cant  of  the  day,  been  elevated  to  the 
position  of  being  the  putative  representatives  of 
Egyptian  public  opinion.  I  had  to  support  the 
supremacy  of  the  Sultan  and,  at  the  same  time, 
to  oppose  any  practical  Turkish  interference  in  the 
administration,  which  necessarily  connoted  a  relapse 
into  barbarism.  I  had  at  one  time  to  do  nothing 
inconsistent  with  a  speedy  return  to  Egyptian  self- 
government,  or,  at  all  events,  a  return  to  govern- 
ment by  the  hybrid  coterie  of  Cairo,  which  flaunts 
before  the  world  as  the  personification  of  Egyptian 
autonomy ;  whilst,  at  the  same  time,  I  was  well 
aware  that,  for  a  long  time  to  come,  European 
guidance  will  be  essential  if  the  administration  is  to 
be  conducted  on  sound  principles.    I  had  at  times  to 

1  Sir  John  Seeley  (Growth  of  British  Policy,  ii.  p.  323),  speaking  of 
William  III.,  says:  "The  main  reason  why  his  work  has  proved  so 
stranii^ely  durable  is  that  it  was  never  excessive.  He  had  a  wise 
parsimony  in  action.  .  .  .  The  masterpieces  of  the  statesman's  art  are 
for  the  most  part  not  acts,  but  abstinences  from  action."  A  somewhat 
eimilar  view  was  frequently  advanced  by  Burke. 


cH.  xLiii  THE  VVOUKEKS  325 

retire  into  my  diplomatic  shell,  and  to  pose  as  one 
amongst  many  representatives  of  foreign  Powers. 
At  other  times,  I  had  to  step  forward  as  the 
representative  of  the  Sovereign  whose  soldiers  held 
Egypt  in  their  grip.  At  one  time,  I  had  to  deftnd 
Egypt  against  European  aggression,  and,  not  un- 
frequently,  I  had  in  the  early  days  of  the  occupa- 
tion to  defend  the  British  position  against  foreign 
attack.  I  had  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  well- 
intentioned,  generally  reasonable,  but  occasionally 
ill-informed  public  opinion  of  England,  when  I 
knew  that  the  praise  or  blame  of  the  British 
Parliament  and  press  was  a  very  faulty  standard 
by  which  to  judge  the  wisdom  or  unwisdom  of  my 
acts.  I  had  to  maintain  British  authority  and,  at 
the  same  time,  to  hide  as  much  as  possible  the  fact 
that  I  was  maintaining  it.  I  had  a  military  force 
at  my  disposal,  which  I  could  not  use  save  in  the 
face  of  some  grave  emergency.  I  had  to  work 
through  British  agents  over  whom  I  possessed  no 
control,  save  that  based  on  personal  authority  and 
moral  suasion.  I  had  to  avoid  any  step  which 
might  involve  the  creation  of  European  difficulties 
by  reason  of  local  troubles.  I  had  to  keep  the 
Egyptian  question  simmering,  and  to  avoid  any 
action  which  might  tend  to  force  on  its  premature 
consideration,  and  I  had  to  do  this  at  one  time  when 
all,  and  at  another  time  when  some  of  the  most 
important  Powers  were  more  or  less  opposed  to 
British  policy.  Lastly,  the  most  heterogeneous 
petty  questions  were  continually  coming  before  me. 
If  a  young  British  officer  was  cheated  at  cards,  I  had 
to  get  him  out  of  his  difficulties.  If  a  slave  girl 
wanted  to  marry,  I  had  to  bring  moral  pressure  on 
her  master  or  mistress  to  give  their  consent.  If  a 
Jewish  sect  wished  for  official  recognition  from  the 
Egyptian  Government,  I  was  expected  to  obtain 
it,  and  to  explain  to  an  Egyptian  Minister  all  I 


326  MODERN  EGYPT  va.  iv 

knew  of  the  difference  between  Ashkenazian  and 
Sephardic  practices.  If  the  inhabitants  of  some 
remote  village  in  Upper  Egypt  were  discontented 
witli  their  Sheikh,  they  a})pealed  to  me.  I  have 
had  to  write  telegrams  and  despatches  about  the 
most  miscellaneous  subjects — about  the  dismissal 
of  the  Khedive's  English  coachman,  about  pre- 
serving the  lives  of  Irish  informers  from  the  Clan- 
na-Gael  conspirators,  and  about  the  tenets  of  the 
Abyssinian  Church  in  respect  to  the  Procession  of 
the  Holy  Ghost.  I  have  been  asked  to  interfere 
in  order  to  get  a  German  missionary,  who  had  been 
guilty  of  embezzlement,  out  of  prison ;  in  order  to 
get  a  place  for  the  French  and  Italian  Catholics  to 
bury  their  dead ;  in  order  to  get  a  dead  Mohammedan 
of  great  sanctity  exhumed  ;  in  order  to  prevent  a 
female  member  of  the  Khedivial  family  from  striking 
her  husband  over  the  mouth  with  a  slipper ;  and  in 
order  to  arrange  a  marriage  between  two  other 
members  of  the  same  family  whom  hard-hearted 
relatives  kept  apart.  I  have  had  to  take  one 
English  maniac  in  my  own  carriage  to  a  Lunatic 
Asylum  ;  I  have  caused  another  to  be  turned  out  of 
the  English  church ;  and  I  have  been  informed 
that  a  tliiid  and  remarkably  muscular  madman  was 
on  his  way  to  my  house,  girt  with  a  towel  round 
his  loins,  and  bearing  a  poker  in  his  hands  with  the 
intention  of  using  that  implement  on  my  head.  I 
have  been  asked  by  an  Egyptian  fellah  to  find  out 
the  whereabouts  of  his  wife  who  had  eloped  ;  and 
by  a  German  professor  to  send  him  at  once  six  live 
electric  shad-fish,  from  the  Nile.  To  sum  up  the 
situation  in  a  few  words,  I  had  not,  indeed,  to 
govern  Egypt,  but  to  assist  in  the  government  of 
the  country  without  the  appearance  of  doing  so 
and  without  any  legitimate  authority  over  the 
ajxents  with  whom  I  had  to  deal. 

Under    these    somewhat    bewildering    circum- 


CH.  xLiii  THE  WORKERS  327 

stances,  the  only  general  principles  which  I  was 
able  to  lay  down  for  my  own  guidance  were, 
first,  to  settle  all  purely  local  matters  on  the  spot, 
with  as  little  reference  as  possible  to  London ; 
secondly,  to  refer  for  instructions  in  respect  to  any 
matter  which  was  calculated  either  to  raise  diplo- 
matic questions  outside  the  local  sphere  of  interest, 
or  to  attract  serious  attention  in  Parliament.  On 
the  whole,  I  think  it  may  be  said  that  this  system 
worked  as  well  as  could,  under  the  very  peculiar 
circumstances  of  the  situation,  have  been  expected. 
A  middle  course  was  steered  between  the  extremes 
of  centralisation  and  decentralisation. 

It  is  clear  that  the  working  of  a  nondescript 
Government,  such  as  that  which  has  existed  in 
Egypt  since  1882,  must  depend  mainly  on  the 
personal  characteristics  of  the  individuals  who  are 
at  the  head  of  affairs.  The  principal  person  who 
figured  on  the  Egyptian  stage  during  the  first 
nine  years  of  the  British  occupation  was  the  late 
Khedive,  Tewfik  Pasha. 

The  best  friends  of  Tewfik  Pasha  would  probably 
not  contend  that  he  was  a  great  man  or  an  ideal 
Khedive.  There  was,  in  fact,  no  real  greatness 
about  him.  He  was  a  monogamist,  and  thus  set 
a  good  example  to  his  countrymen.  He  was  an 
indulgent  and  well-intentioned  father  who  en- 
deavoured to  educate  his  children  well.  He  acquired 
a  reputation  for  devotion,  whilst  he  was  devoid  of 
any  tinge  of  the  intolerance  with  which  devout 
Islamism  is  sometimes  tainted.  His  piety  kept 
him  in  touch  with  his  Moslem  subjects,  and  thus 
constituted  a  political  factor  of  some  importance. 
Judged  by  the  standard  of  his  surroundings,  he 
was  loyal  and  straightforward.  Like  most  of  liis 
countrymen,  he  would  shirk  responsibility,  and 
would  endeavour  to  throw  as  much  as  he  could  on 
the  shoulders  of  others,     He  would  complain  of  the 


328  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  nr 

number  of  Europeans  in  the  Egyptian  sen  ice,  and 
when  any  European  asked  him  for  a  place,  he 
would  reply  that  personally  he  would  be  delighted 
to  grant  the  request,  but  that  some  British 
authority  prevented  him  from  following  the 
benevolent  dictates  of  his  heart.  He  was  apathetic, 
and  wanting  in  initiative,  but,  when  forced  to  take 
a  decision,  would  not  unfrequently  show  a  good 
deal  of  dignified  common  sense  and  shrewdness. 
He  was  kind-hearted,  and  even  at  times  displayed 
some  signs  of  gratitude  for  services  rendered  to 
him,  a  quality  which  is  rare  in  an  Oriental  ruler. 
Warned  by  the  example  of  his  father,  he  shunned 
extravagance  to  the  extent,  indeed,  of  being 
occasionally  accused  of  avarice,  but  he  sometimes 
performed  acts  of  real  generosity.  There  was 
little  of  the  typical  Oriental  despot  in  Tewfik 
Pasha's  character.  He  professed  a  deep,  and, 
without  doubt,  genuine  dislike  to  all  arbitrary, 
oppressive,  or  cruel  acts.  He  was  never  personally 
responsible  for  the  commission  of  any  such  act, 
although  it  may  well  be  that  from  apathy  and 
negligence  he  allowed  injustice  to  be  occasionally 
perpetrated  in  his  name.  He  was  not  highly 
educated.  He  rarely,  if  ever,  read  a  book,  but  he 
studied  the  newspapers ;  he  conversed  with  all 
sorts  and  conditions  of  men ;  he  was  fairly  quick 
in  mastering  any  facts  which  were  explained  to 
him,  and  in  picking  up  the  thread  of  an  argument. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  intellectual  acuteness, 
he  was  probably  rather  above  the  average  of  his 
countrymen.  He  obtained,  not  by  study  but  by 
practical  experience  in  dealing  with  men  and  things, 
a  fair  education  of  a  nature  which  is  useful  to  a 
man  occupying  a  high  public  position.  I^ike  most 
of  his  countrymen,  he  would  yield  a  ready  assent 
to  any  high-sounding  general  principle.  In  practice, 
he  would  often  fail  to  see  that  some  action,  which 


CH.  xLiii  THE  WORKERS  329 

it  was  proposed  to  take,  was  at  variance  with  the 
principle  to  whicli  he  had  assented  ;  nevertheless, 
when  the  dissonance  between  the  particular  act 
and  the  principle  was  brought  home  to  him,  he 
would  generally,  by  some  process  of  reasoning, 
which  would  be  unfamiliar,  if  not  incomprehensible, 
to  the  clear-cut  European  mind,  arrive  at  the 
conclusion  that  the  commission  of  the  act 
was  reprehensible.  His  conduct  during  the  events 
of  1882  showed  that  he  was  not  wanting  in 
courage.  On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that,  if 
Tewfik  Pasha's  virtues  were  mediocre,  his  faults 
were  of  a  venial  character.  If  he  excited  none  of 
the  admiration  due  to  moral  greatness  or  to  high 
intellectual  qualities,  neither  did  he  excite  repro- 
bation by  sinking  below  the  moral  and  intellectual 
standard  of  his  surroundings.  He  was  morally 
and  intellectually  respectable,  and,  considered  as  a 
man  rather  than  as  a  ruler  of  men,  he  met  with  the 
qualified  commendation  which  is  usually  meted 
out  to  respectability.  His  character  and  conduct 
were  not  of  a  nature  to  excite  enthusiasm  on  his 
behalf.  On  the  other  hand,  they  rarely  formed 
the  subject  of  severe  condemnation.  In  the 
majority  of  cases  which  attracted  })ublic  attention, 
the  faint  praise,  which  is  scarcely  distinguishable 
from  an  implication  of  blame,  was  accorded  to  him. 
He  probably  deserved  more  praise  than  he  ever 
obtained.  He  honestly  wished  to  do  his  duty. 
He  was  really  interested  in  the  welfare  of  his 
subjects,  but  he  was  bewildered  by  the  involved 
nature  of  his  position,  and  did  not  see  clearly  how 
his  duty  could  best  be  performed.  For  this  he 
may  be  pardoned,  more  especially  when  it  is 
remembered  that  he  had  no  ex])erience  of  the 
world  outside  Egypt.  Tewfik  Pasha  never  visited 
Europe. 

If  he  was  not  a  great  man,  neither  was  he  an 


330  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

ideal  Khedive.  If  he  had  been  a  man  of  excep- 
tionally firm  will,  high  character,  and  acute 
intellect,  he  would  have  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  the  policy  of  reform  in  Egypt ;  he  would  have 
asserted  his  own  authority ;  he  would  have  shown 
no  jealousy  of  the  Englishmen  who  were  employed 
in  his  service ;  he  would  have  co-operated  actively 
with  them  in  the  cause  of  reform,  and  he  would 
have  forced  the  Egyptians  in  his  service  to  yield 
a  similar  loyal  co-operation.  Tewfik  Pasha  did 
not  possess  the  strength  of  character  to  adopt  a 
bold  policy  of  this  sort,  and  perhaps  it  would  have 
been  Utopian  to  expect  that  he  should  have 
done  so. 

Although,  however,  Tewfik  Pasha  was  not  an 
ideal  Khedive,  nevertheless,  looking  to  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  time,  and  to  the  character- 
istics of  Oriental  rulers  generally,  it  may  be  said 
that  he  possessed,  in  a  somewhat  exceptional 
degree,  many  qualities  which  singularly  fitted  him 
to  occupy  the  post  he  held  during  the  time 
he  held  it.  Under  the  regime  of  a  fanatical 
Moslem,  or  of  a  man  of  arbitrary  temperament 
and  despotic  tendencies,  or  of  a  feeble  voluptu- 
ary indifferent  to  everything  which  did  not 
minister  to  his  own  pleasures— all  types  which  are 
common  in  the  history  of  Oriental  countries — the 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  launching  Egypt  on  the 
path  of  progress  would  have  been  greatly  increased. 
Tewfik  Pasha  possessed  the  negative  virtue  that  he 
answered  to  none  of  these  descriptions,  and,  under 
the  circumstances,  this  was  a  virtue  of  incalculable 
value.  But  he  possessed  more  than  negative 
virtues.  He  could  lay  claim  to  some  good  qualities 
of  a  positive  character.  If  he  did  not  take  any 
active  part  in  initiating  reforms,  he  was  content 
that  others  should  do  so  for  him.  If  he  could  not 
lead  the  reformers,  he  had  no  objection  to  follow- 


cii.  xLiii  THE  WORKERS  331 

ing  their  lead.  If  he  did  not  afford  any  very  active 
assistance  to  the  small  band  of  Englishmen  who 
were  laying  the  foundations  of  a  prosperous  future 
for  Egypt,  neither  did  he  interfere  actively  to 
place  obstacles  in  their  path  ;  indeed,  he  often 
used  his  influence  to  remove  obstacles.  His 
position  was  one  of  great  difficulty.  On  the  one 
hand,  it  was  dangerous  to  oppose  the  English,  and, 
moreover,  he  was  sufficiently  intelligent  to  see  that 
it  was  contrary  to  his  own  interests  and  to  those  of 
his  country  to  do  so.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he 
threw  himself  into  the  arms  of  the  English,  he  was 
sure  to  lose  popularity  amongst  certain  influential 
sections  of  his  own  countrymen.  The  natural 
result  was  that  Tewfik  Pasha  developed  a  consider- 
able talent  for  trimming.  The  circumstances  of 
the  time  were,  indeed,  such  that  he  could  scarcely 
with  prudence  adopt  any  other  line  of  policy  ;  and, 
as  a  trimmer,  he  played  his  part  remarkably  well. 
He  afforded  an  admirable  link  between  the 
Englishman  nnd  the  Egyptian,  and  he  often  per- 
formed useful  work  in  moderating  the  views  of 
either  side.  In  the  performance  of  this  task,  he 
naturally  came  in  for  a  good  deal  of  criticism  from 
both  quarters.     He  might  often  have  said  : 

In  moderation  placing  all  my  glory, 

While  Tories  call  me  Whig,  and  Whigs  a  Tory, 

Moreover,  Tewfik  Pasha  possessed  another  very 
valuable  quality.  He  knew  his  country  and  his 
countrymen  well.  It  was  not  in  vain  tliat  Arslbi 
had  marched  with  horse,  foot,  and  artillery  into  the 
square  of  Abdin  Palace,  and  had  imposed  his  will 
on  his  reluctant  Sovereign.  It  was  not  in  vain  that 
he  had  listened  to  the  inflated  rubbish  talked  by 
would-be  patriots  about  free  institutions,  which  were 
uncongenial  to  the  soil  of  Egypt.  He  had  laid 
these  matters  to  heart.     He  knew  the  ignorance 


332  IMODERN  EGYPT  pi.  iv 

and  credulity  of  the  mass  of  the  population.  He 
recognised  the  danger  of  fanning  the  smoulder- 
ing embers  of  Moslem  fanaticism.  He  apj^reciated 
the  difficulties  of  his  position,  and  he  knew  that  if  he 
did  not  lean  on  the  strong  arm  of  England,  many 
of  those  who  knelt  at  his  feet  would  be  ready, 
should  the  occasion  arise  and  should  they  see  their 
own  profit  in  doing  so,  to  turn  on  him  and  rend 
him.  He  was  deeply  impressed  with  the  fact 
that  he  owed  his  position  to  British  interference. 
He  recognised  his  weakness,  and  he  knew  that, 
should  he  ever  incur  the  serious  displeasure  of 
England,  that  two-handed  engine  at  the  door,  in  the 
shape  of  the  British  fleet  and  the  British  army, 
stood  ready  to  strike  once  and  strike  no  more. 
Thus,  though  he  would  coquette  with  those  who 
urged  him  to  oppose  the  English,  he  never  allowed 
himself  to  be  pushed  too  far  in  this  direction.  I 
once  had  to  remind  him  that  Ismail  Pasha  was  on 
the  shores  of  the  Bosphorus,  and  that  his  return 
to  Cairo  was  not  altogether  outside  the  verge  of 
practical  politics,  upon  which  Tewfik  Pasha  made 
the  significant  remark:  "Un  JSIinistre  on  pent 
toujours  changer,  mais  le  Khedive — c'est  autre 
chose."  A  change  of  INlinistry  shortly  afterwards 
occurred,  for  Tewfik  Pasha  was  wise  enough  never 
to  identify  himself  fully  with  the  policy  of  any 
Minister.  He  knew  that  a  change  of  JNIinistry  was 
an  admirable  political  safety-valve,  and  when  he 
felt  his  own  ])osition  in  any  danger,  he  very  wisely 
did  not  hesitate  to  send  a  ministerial  scapegoat 
into  the  wilderness. 

I  bear  Tewfik's  name  in  kindly  and  respectful 
remembrance,  for  thougli  I  daresay  he  winced  under 
the  pressure,  which  I  occasionally  brought  to  bear 
on  him,  my  relations  with  him  were  very  pleasant 
and  friendly,  neither  did  tliey  in  any  way  redound 
to  his  discredit.    The  idea,  which  under  the  influence 


cH.  xLiii  THE  WORKERS  333 

of  the  Anglophobe  party  took  some  root  in  Egypt, 
to  the  effect  that  he  was  a  mere  tool  in  my  hands, 
is  wholly  untrue  and  most  unjust  to  his  memory. 
I  used  to  discuss  matters  with  him.  When  any 
difference  of  opinion  occurred,  I  yielded  to  him 
quite  as  often — indeed,  I  think  more  often — than 
he  yielded  to  me.  We  generally  came  to  some 
equitable  compromise  between  our  conflicting 
views. 

When  he  died,  he  was  just  beginning  to  reap 
the  fruits  of  the  reforming  policy.  He  had  become 
popular  by  reason  of  the  reforms,  although,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  he  had  not  taken  any  leading  part 
in  effecting  them.  He  acquiesced  in  them  of  his 
own  free  will,  but  sometimes  with  an  unwilling 
mind, — eK^v  aeKovri  ye  Ovfxw.  His  death  was  a 
great  loss  to  Egypt.  Whatever  may  have  been 
his  faults,  he  deserves  a  somewhat  prominent  niche 
in  the  Valhalla  of  Oriental  potentates.  Posterity 
will  be  unjust  if  they  forget  that  it  was  during  the 
reign  of  Tewfik  Pasha  that  Egypt  was  first  started 
on  the  road  to  prosperity,  and  that  he  took  not, 
indeed,  the  most  leading  part  in  the  rehabilita- 
tion of  his  country,  but  still  ii  part  of  which  his 
descendants  may  well  be  proud  ;  for,  without  his 
abstention  from  opposition,  and  without  his  sup- 
port, albeit  it  was  at  times  rather  lukewarm,  the 
efforts  of  the  British  reformer  would  have  been  far 
less  productive  of  result  than  has  actually  been  the 
case.  Had  he  been  a  man  of  stronger  character 
and  more  marked  individuahty,  it  is  possible  that 
his  country  would  have  progressed  less  rapidly.  He 
should  be  remembered  as  the  Khedive  who  allowed 
Egyj)t  to  be  reformed  in  spite  of  the  Egyptians. 

The  leading  personage  in  the  Egyptian  political 
world  is  the  Khedive.  The  Prime  JNIinister,  how- 
ever, also  occupies  a  position  of  great  import- 
ance.    After  the  bombardment  of  Alexandria  in 


334  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

1882,  Cherif  Pasha  was  named  to  this  office.  In 
January  1884,  he  was  succeeded  by  Nubar  Pasha, 
who  remained  in  office  till  June  1888.  On 
Nubar  Pasha's  fall,  Riaz  Pasha  became  Prime 
Minister.  His  INIinistry  lasted  till  May  1891. 
His  successor  was  Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi.  On 
January  7,  1892,  Tewhk  Pasha  died.  His  son 
and  successor,  Abbas  Pasha,  kept  Mustapha  Pasha 
Fehmi  in  office  till  January  1893,  when  he  was 
succeeded  by  Riaz  Pasha,  who,  again,  in  April 
1894,  was  succeeded  by  Nubar  Pasha.  In  the 
autumn  of  1895,  Nubar  Pasha's  failing  health 
obliged  him  to  quit  office.  He  was  succeeded  by 
Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi. 

Of  Cherif  Pasha  little  need  be  said.  He  was 
a  Minister  of  the  pre  -  occupation  days  rather 
than  of  the  occupation.  His  character  is  almost 
sufficiently  described  in  the  narrative  given  in  a 
previous  portion  of  this  work.  To  what  has  been 
already  said  it  is  only  necessary  to  add  that  Cherif 
Paslia  was  the  least  Egyptian  of  any  of  the  Moslem 
Prime  Ministers  of  recent  times.  He  was  a  pure 
Turk  who,  in  early  life,  had  come  from  Constanti- 
nople. The  ordinary  Turco-Egyptian  is  generally 
more  Egyptian  than  Turk.  Cherif  Pasha,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  a  Turco-Egyptian  in  the  first  stage 
of  Egyptianisation.  It  is  true  that  he  favoured 
Egyptian  semi -autonomy,  and  that  he  viewed 
with  dislike  any  increased  interference  by  the 
Sultan  in  Egyptian  affiiirs ;  but  he  was  out  of 
sympathy  with  the  pure  Egyptians,  whom  he 
regarded  as  a  conquered  race ;  he  was,  in  fact, 
the  incarnation  of  the  ])olicy  of  "  Egypt  for  the 
Turco- Egyptians."  Whatever  was  not  Turkish 
in  his  character,  was  French.  He  had  assimilated 
a  good  deal  of  the  bonhomie  which  sometimes,  and 
of  the  keen  sense  of  the  ridiculous  which  more 
frequently  is  to  be  found  amongst  the  French,  but 


CH.XLIII  THE   WORKERS  335 

tie  never  lost  the  predominant  characteristics  of  a 
Turkish  aristocrat.  He  was  proud,  courageous, 
honest  after  his  way,  and,  in  his  public  life,  always 
negligent  of  detail  and  sometimes  of  principle. 
Occasionally,  he  would  emit  flashes  of  true  states- 
manship, but  he  was  too  careless,  too  apathetic, 
and  too  wanting  in  persistence  to  carry  out  his 
own  principles  in  practice.  With  all  his  faults,  he 
was,  on  the  whole,  one  of  the  most  sympathetic 
figures  on  the  political  stage  of  Egypt  during 
recent  times. 

Nubar  Pasha  was  by  far  the  most  interesting  of 
latter-day  Egyptian  politicians.  Intellectually,  he 
towered  above  his  competitors.  Bearing  in  mind, 
however,  the  intellectual  calibre  of  those  com- 
petitors, he  deserves  more  than  such  faint  praise 
as  this.  He  was,  indeed,  a  bad  administrator,  and 
this  defect  detracted  from  his  political  usefulness, 
more  especially  by  reason  of  the  fact  that,  according 
to  his  own  admission,^  Egypt  stood  in  need  of 
administrators  rather  than  of  statesmen.  Never- 
theless, even  in  Egypt  some  statesmanlike  qualities 
are  demanded  from  those  who  are  at  the  head  of 
affairs,  and  Nubar  Pasha  could  unquestionably  lay 
claim  to  the  possession  of  qualities,  which  can  be 
characterised  as  statesmanlike. 

He  was  a  thorough  Oriental,  but,  unlike  many 
Orientals,  his  foreign  education  had  not  resulted  in 
his  assimilating  the  bad  and  discarding  the  more 
worthy  portions  of  European  civilisation.  He 
was  far  too  great  a  man  to  be  atti-acted  by  all  tlie 
flimsy  tinsel  and  moral  obliquity  which  lie  on  the 
surface  of  European  civilisation,  that  is  to  say, 
the  civilisation  of  the  Paris  Boulevards,  whose 
principal  apostles  are  usually  European  or  Levant- 
ine adventurers.  He  saw  all  these  things,  but 
unlike  the  Gallicised  Egyptian,  who  is  too  often 

»  Vide  ante,  p.  262. 


336  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  it 

lured  to  his  moral  destruction  by  them,  the  only 
effect  which  they  produced  on  his  more  elevated 
mind  was  to  make  him  ask  himself — how  can  I 
protect  my  country  of  adoption  against  the  inroads 
of  the  quick-witted  but  unscrupulous  European  ? 
It  is  clear  that  Egypt  is  to  be  Europeanised  ;  how 
can  this  process  best  be  effected  ? 

The  answer  which  Nubar  Pasha  gave  to  these 
questions  was  worthy  of  a  statesman.  He  rightly 
differentiated  the  divergences  between  Eastern 
and  Western  systems  of  government.  Personal 
rule,  he  said  to  himself,  must  give  way  before  a 
reign  of  law.  The  Egyptians  must  learn  from 
Europe  how  to  protect  themselves  both  against 
the  arbitrary  caprices  of  their  rulers,  and  against 
the  advancing  and  somewhat  turbid  tide  of  Euro- 
peans with  whom  they  are  destined  to  be  associated. 
They  can  only  do  so  by  assimilating  that  respect 
for  the  law  which  forms  the  keystone  of  the  arch 
on  which  European  systems  of  government  rest. 
It  cannot  be  contended  that  this  idea  was  very 
original,  or  that  any  great  mental  effort  was 
required  for  its  conception.  But  to  Nubar  Pasha 
belongs  the  credit  tliat  he  was  the  first  Egyptian 
statesman  who  conceived  it,  or,  at  all  events,  who 
endeavoured  to  carry  it  into  practice.  Whatever 
may  have  been  the  blemishes  in  Nubar  Pasha's 
character,  and  whatever  may  be  the  defects  in  the 
judicial  institutions  which  he  created,  it  should 
never  be  forgotten  that  he  first  endeavoured  to 
bring  home  to  the  Egyptian  governing  class  and  to 
the  Egyptian  people  that,  whereas  might,  whether 
in  the  person  of  despotic  Khedives  or  dictatorial 
di])lomatists,  had  heretofore  been  right  in  Egypt, 
the  foundation  of  good  government  in  any  com- 
munity pretending  to  call  itself  civilised  is  that  the 
maxim  should  be  reversed,  and  that  might  should 
yield  to  right. 


CH.XLIII  THE  WORKERS  887 

Nubar  Pasha  had,  therefore,  no  difficulty  m 
grasping  a  European  principle.  Indeed,  the  wider 
the  principle,  the  more  readily  he  grasped  it, 
for  he  dearly  loved  dealing  in  generalities.  His 
defect  was  that,  having  once  got  hold  of  a  sound 
principle,  he  would  not  unfrequently  ride  it  to 
death.  He  did  not  sufficiently  adapt  it  to  the 
circumstances  with  which  he  had  to  deal.  Or, 
again,  he  would  sometimes  think  that,  having 
enunciated  the  principle,  he  had  done  all  that  was 
required  of  him.  He  rarely  endeavoured  to  acquaint 
himself  thoroughly  with  facts,  or  to  see  that  the 
practice  was  made  to  conform  with  the  principle 
which  he  had  adopted.  Moreover,  he  would  some- 
times readily  assent  to  some  wide  general  principle 
without  any  serious  intention  of  applying  it  at  all, 
and  he  was  led  to  do  this  all  the  more  because 
his  subtle  intellect  was  not  slow  to  perceive  that 
Europeans,  and  especially  Englishmen,  are  liable 
to  be  soothed  by  plausible,  albeit  often  fallacious 
generalities. 

Nubar  Pasha  was  a  brilliant  conversationalist. 
He  possessed  a  marvellous  power  of  imparting  a 
character  of  perfect  verisimilitude  to  the  series  of 
half-truths,  bordering  on  fiction,  which  he  was 
wont  to  pour  into  the  ears  of  his  interested  listener. 
The  educated  European  was  struck  by  his  ap- 
parently wide  grasp  and  bold  generalisations,  the 
fallacies  of  which  could  often  only  be  detected  by 
those  who  had  a  perfect  acquaintance  with  the 
facts.  The  European  would  readily  fall  a  victim 
to  the  fascinating  manners,  the  graceful  diction, 
the  subtle  reasoning,  and  deferential  deportment, 
which  distinguish  the  peculiar  type  of  Oriental 
of  whom  Nubar  Pasha  was  perhaps  the  most 
typical  representative.  It  was  only  after  experi- 
ence and  reflection  that  he  would  perceive  that, 
the  premises  being  hicorrect,  the  conclusions  of  his 

VOL.  II  z 


338  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

teacher  in  Egyptian  affairs  were  often  erroneous, 
and  tliat  the  broad  enunciations  of  principle  with 
which  he  had  been  charmed  were  intended  more 
for  academic  discussion  in  the  closet  than  for 
practical  decision  in  the  Council  Chamber. 

Nubar  Pasha's  readiness,  his  versatility,  the 
audacity  with  which  he  would  defend  the  most 
glaring  fallacies,  and  his  great  command  of 
language,  acquired  for  him  some  reputation  as  a 
diplomatist.  To  a  certain  extent,  this  reputation 
was  well  deserved.  On  many  occasions,  he  showed 
himself  to  be  a  skilful  negotiator.  He  was  especi- 
ally skilful  in  throwing  a  cloud  of  ambiguity  over 
his  meaning  and  his  intentions.  He  was  a  master 
of  the  French  language,  and  one  of  the  peculiarities 
of  that  language  is  that,  although  it  is  eminently 
precise  when  the  writer  or  speaker  wishes  to  give 
precision  to  his  thoughts,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
is  full  of  ambiguous  expressions,  which  afford  a 
powerful  help  to  a  diplomatist  who  wishes  to  leave 
open  some  back  door  through  which  to  retreat 
from  the  engagements  which  he  is  apparently 
taking,  and  this  was  not  unfrequently  Nubar 
Pasha's  case.  He  would  probably  have  been  more 
successful  as  a  diplomatist  in  the  eighteenth  than 
in  the  nineteenth  century.  Modern  diplomacy  is 
not  mere  jugglery,  neither  is  the  most  successful 
diplomatist  he  who  can  best  throw  dust  in  the  eyes 
of  his  opponent.  Under  the  influence  of  publicity, 
and  perhaps  to  some  extent  of  Prince  Bismarck, 
the  whole  art,  if  diplomacy  can  be  dignified  by 
such  a  name,  has  been  simplified ;  perhaps  some, 
including  Nubar  Pasha  himself,  would  say  that  it 
has  been  brutalised.  The  affairs  between  nation 
and  nation  are  now  conducted  on  more  business-like 
principles  than  heretofore.  A  plain  answer  is 
required  to  a  plain  question,  and  although  some 
tricks  of  the  trade  still  survive,  they  are,  by  com- 


CH.  xLiii  THE  WORKERS  339 

parison  with  the  past,  of  little  practical  utility.  It 
was  Nubar  Pasha's  misfortune  that,  during  the 
latter  part  of  his  career,  he  had  to  deal  princi- 
pally with  a  European  nation  whose  members  are 
distinguished  for  their  straightforward  mode  of 
conducting  business.  In  a  way,  he  understood 
the  English  character.  He  once  made  a  signi- 
ficant and  characteristic  remark.  **  L'Anglais," 
he  said,  "  est  tres  naif,  mais  lorsqu'on  pense  qu'on 
I'a  tromp4  tout  d'un  coup  il  se  tourne  et  il  vous 
flanque  un  terrible  coup  de  pied  quelque  part." 
But  although  he  knew  that  intrigue  was  of  little 
real  use  against  the  Englishman,  he  could  not 
resist  the  temptation  of  intriguing.  He  could 
not  abandon  his  favourite  weapon  of  offence 
and  defence.  The  natural  result  ensued.  In 
spite  of  his  real  talents,  his  suavity,  his  earnest 
devotion  to  civilised  principles  of  government,  and 
his  profuse  professions  of  friendship  and  esteem, 
he  inspired  but  little  confidence  amongst  those 
Englishmen  with  whom  he  was  brought  in  con- 
tact. They  mistrusted  him,  perhaps  more  than  he 
deserved  to  be  mistrusted.  He  could  never  under- 
stand the  feelings  which  his  behaviour  excited 
in  the  minds  of  Englishmen.  He  went  to  his 
grave  with  a  hardy  and  unimpaired  belief  in  the 
political  virtues  of  finesse  bordering  on  duplicity. 

Nubar  Pasha's  political  views  during  the  early 
period  of  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt  were 
characteristic.  He  was  in  favour  of  the  occupa- 
tion. He  saw  that  a  British  garrison  was  necessary 
to  maintain  order.  '*  If,"  he  frequently  said,  *'  the 
British  troops  are  withdrawn,  I  shall  leave  Egypt 
with  the  last  battalion."  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
he  was  opposed  to  what  he  termed  the  "adminis- 
trative occupation."  In  other  words,  what  he 
wanted  was  a  military  force,  in  whom  perfect 
reliance  could  be  placed,  to  keep  him  in  power, 


340  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

whilst  he  was  to  be  allowed  a  free  hand  in  every- 
thing connected  with  the  civil  administration  of 
the  country.  Hence  his  extreme  civility  to  all 
British  military  officers,  whose  praises  he  was 
never  weary  of  singing.  AVhat,  indeed,  for  all 
the  purposes  which  he  had  at  heart,  could  be 
more  perfect  than  the  presence  in  Egypt  of  a 
thoroughly  disciplined  force,  commanded  by  young 
men  who  took  no  interest  in  local  politics,  and 
who  occupied  themselves  exclusively  with  polo 
and  cricket  ?  Hence,  also,  his  constant  opposition 
during  his  first  period  of  office  (1884-88)  to  the 
British  civilians  in  the  Egyptian  service  and  to 
myself,  as  the  British  diplomatic  representative 
who  supported  them.  Our  action  jarred  terribly  with 
the  Nubarian  programme.  It  is  strange  that  a  really 
able  man,  such  as  Nubar  Pasha,  should  have  thought 
his  programme  capable  of  realisation,  and  that  he 
should  not  have  seen  the  impossibility  of  the  British 
Government  looking  on  as  passive  spectators  whilst 
a  British  force  was  in  Egypt,  and  allowing  the 
maladministration  of  the  Egyptian  Pashas  to  remain 
practically  unchecked.  And  this  would  certainly 
have  been  the  result  of  acquiescence  in  Nubar 
Pasha's  system  of  government.^ 

With  any  ordinary  degree  of  prudence,  Nubar 
Pasha  could  have  remained  Prime  Minister  for 
an  indefinite  period,  and  it  is  a  pity  that  he  did 
not  do  so,  for  his  talents  were  far  superior  to  those 
of  his  competitors.  His  fall  in  1888  came  about  in 
this  fashion.  For  some  four  years,  I  got  on  fairly 
well  with  liim.  On  many  occasions,  I  afforded 
him  strong  support.  I  shut  my  eyes  to  a  good 
deal  of  intrigue,  which  I  knew  was  going  on 
around  me.     In  an  evil  moment  for  himself,  Nubar 

^  In  illustration  of  the  truth  of  this  remark,  I  may  refer  to  what 
happened  about  the  Commissions  of  Brigandage  {vide  ante,  p.  289  and 
infra,  p.  405). 


CH.XLIII  THE  WORKERS  341 

Pasha  went  to  England.  He  had  an  interview 
with  Lord  Salisbury  at  wliich  I  was  present.  To 
my  surprise,  for  he  liad  not  giv^en  me  any  warning 
of  his  intentions,  he  burst  out  into  a  violent  tirade 
against  the  British  officials  in  Egypt  in  general, 
and  against  Sir  Edgar  Vincent  and  myself  in 
particular.  All  this  produced  very  little  effect  on 
Lord  Salisbury,  but  the  ultimate  result — for  this 
was  only  the  beginning  of  a  breach  which  sub- 
sequently widened  —  was  such  as  Nubar  Pasha 
hardly  anticipated.  He  thought  he  was'  doing  a 
clever  stroke  of  business.  What  he  really  did 
was  to  bring  about  his  own  downfall.  He  thought 
to  pose  as  the  defender  of  Egyptian  rights  against 
British  aggression,  and  thus  to  mitigate  the  pre- 
judices entertained  against  him  by  the  JMohammedan 
population  by  reason  of  his  race  and  creed.  What 
he  really  did  was  to  open  the  mouths  of  all  his 
numerous  enemies  in  Egypt,  who  had  only  remained 
silent  because  they  thought  that,  strong  in  the 
support  of  England,  his  position  was  unassailable. 
Nubar  Pasha  failed  to  see  that  which  was  apparent 
to  others  possessed  of  none  of  his  intellectual 
subtlety,  namely,  that  the  English  were  his  natural 
allies,  and  that  directly  he  broke  up  the  alliance 
his  fall  was  inevitable.  When  once  it  became 
apparent  that  he  could  no  longer  rely  on  British 
support,  Tewfik  Pasha  seized  on  some  trivial 
pretext  for  dismissing  him.^ 

*  I  did  nothing  to  hasten  the  downfall  of  Nubar  Pasha.  The 
European  situation  was  at  that  time  (1888)  somewhat  critical.  Lord 
Salisbury,  who  was  then  in  office,  was,  therefore,  rather  desirous  of 
postponing  any  crisis  in  Egyptian  affairs.  On  February  17,  1888,  he 
wrote  to  me  :  ''I  have  asked  you  by  telegraph  to  try  and  manage  to 
postpone  any  breach  with  Nubar  to  a  more  convenient  season.  ...  I 
believe  you  are  right  in  this  controversy,  but  if  I  thought  you  wrong, 
I  should  still  think  it  impossible  to  retreat  before  Nubar  in  the  face 
of  the  whole  East.  It  is  not,  therefore,  from  any  doubt  about  support- 
ing you  that  1  urge  you  to  keep  the  peace  for  the  present,  but  because 
I  do  not  wish  our  administration  in  Egypt  to  be  the  cause  to  which  the 
long  European  war  is  to  be  ascribed  by  the  future  historian." 


342  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

I  really  believe  that  I  regretted  Nubar  Pasha's 
fall  more  than  he  did  himself.  His  Protean  changes, 
his  emotional  character,  and  his  ignorance  of  the 
rudiments  of  many  of  the  administrative  questions 
with  which  he  had  to  deal,  were  at  times  exasper- 
ating. Nevertheless,  I  could  not  help  liking  him. 
It  was  pleasant  to  have  to  deal  with  a  man  of  real 
ability,  who  could  converse  rationally  and  who,  if 
he  did  not  understand  much  which  should  be 
familiar  to  any  politician  and  administrator,  could 
at  all  events  grasp  the  main  lines  of  action  which 
should  guide  the  Government  of  a  civilised  com- 
munity. Moreover,  there  was  an  indescribable 
charm  about  Nubar  Pasha  which  was  almost 
irresistible.  I  have  never  known  any  one  more 
persuasive,  or  more  skilled  in  the  art  of  making  the 
worse  appear  the  better  reason.  I  used  often  to 
half  believe  him,  when  I  knew  full  well  that  he  was 
trying  to  dupe  me.  I  felt  towards  him  much  what 
Shakespeare  felt  towards  his  faithless  mistress  : — 

When  my  love  swears  that  she  is  made  of  truth, 
I  do  believe  her,  though  I  know  she  lies. 

I  admired  his  talents,  and  I  never  could  forget 
that,  in  spite  of  his  defects,  he  possessed  some 
unquestionably  statesmanlike  qualities.  If  he  had 
only  recognised  the  fact  that  in  the  government  of 
the  world  mere  intellectual  gifts  are  not  all-powerful, 
and  that  high  character  and  reputation  also  exercise 
a  potent  influence  over  mankind,  he  would  have 
been  a  really  great  man. 

I  find  some  difficulty  in  writing  about  Kiaz 
Pasha,  not  only  because,  I  am  glad  to  say  (1907), 
he  is  still  living,  but  also  because  he  is  a 
personal  friend  for  whom  I  entertain  the  highest 
regard  and  esteem.  I  may  say,  however,  that 
Nubar  Pasha  and  Riaz  Pasha  were  the  Egyptian 
representatives  of  two  wilely  different  schools  of 


CH.  xLiii  THE  WORKERS  343 

political  and  social  thought.  Nubar  Pasha  recognised 
the  fact  that  there  was  only  one  true  civilisation  in 
the  world,  and  that  was  the  civilisation  of  Europe. 
Accordingly,  he  set  to  work  to  Europeanise  the 
main  framework  of  Egyptian  institutions  by  means 
which  were  sometimes  wise,  and  sometimes,  possibly, 
the  reverse,  but  he  never  entertained  any  doubt  as 
to  the  nature  of  the  object  to  be  attained.  Riaz 
Pasha,  on  the  other  hand,  represented  the  apotheosis 
of  Islamism.  AVhy,  he  thought,  should  not  the 
Saturnia  regna,  when  Moslems  were  really  great, 
return  ?  He  would  barely  recognise  the  necessity 
of  the  least  European  assistance  in  the  process 
of  Egyptian  regeneration.  "  Seul,"  he  said  to 
himself,  "je  ferai  le  bonheur  de  mon  peuple." 
He  held  that  Mohammedans  and  Mohammedanism 
contain  within  themselves  all  that  is  needed  for 
their  own  regeneration.  It  would  be  both  unjust 
and  ungenerous  not  to  extend  some  sympathy  to 
views  of  this  sort.  It  would  be  too  much  to  expect 
that  a  fervid  Moslem  and  a  sincere  Egyptian 
patriot — and  Riaz  Pasha  answers  both  of  these 
descriptions — should  readily  accept  the  facts,  which 
are  almost  certainly  true,  namely,  that  Islamism 
as  a  social  and  political  system — though  not  as  a 
religion — is  moribund,  that  the  judicial  and  admin- 
istrative procedures  common  amongst  Moslems  are 
so  closely  interwoven  with  their  religion  as  to  be 
almost  inseparable  the  one  from  the  other,  and  that 
for  many  a  long  year  to  come  the  Egyptians  will 
be  incapable  of  governing  themselves  on  civilised 
principles. 

Riaz  Pasha's  political  life  may  be  divided  into 
four  different  phases ;  first,  as  a  INIinister  and  as 
a  Commissioner  of  Inquiry  under  Ismail  Pasha; 
secondly,  as  Prime  Minister  under  Tewfik  Pasha 
during  the  period  of  the  Anglo-French  Control ; 
thirdly,  as   Prime   Minister    under   Tewfik   Pasha 


344  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  iv 

during  the  time  of  the  British  occupation;  and, 
fourthly,  as  Prime  Minister  under  Abbas  II. 

He  appeared  to  most  advantage  in  the  first 
phase.  He  was  indignant  at  the  ruin  which  Ismail 
Pasha  brought  on  his  country.  He  stood  out 
boldly  as  a  reformer  at  a  time  when  a  reforming 
Egyptian  could  not  state  his  true  opinions  without 
risk  to  his  life  and  property.  Whatever  faults  Riaz 
Pasha  may  have  subsequently  committed,  it  should 
never  be  forgotten  that  during  this  phase  of  his 
career  he  showed  a  great  deal  of  real  courage  and 
foresight.^ 

In  the  early  portions  of  the  second  phase,  that 
is  to  say,  the  period  of  the  Anglo-French  Control, 
Riaz  Pasha  also  showed  to  advantage.  He  was 
placed  in  such  a  position  that  his  dislike  to 
European  interference  was  of  necessity  tempered 
by  the  consideration  that  the  Europeans,  with 
whom  he  was  principally  associated,  were  very 
useful.  The  Controllers  stood  between  him  and 
the  hungry  creditors  of  the  Egyptian  Government, 
and  Riaz  Pasha  was  aware  that  he  did  not  possess 
sufficient  technical  knowledge  to  evolve  order  out 
of  the  existing  financial  chaos  without  European 
assistance.  During  the  later  portion  of  the  Control 
period,  he  had  to  deal  with  a  question  which  possibly 
required  higher  qualities,  and  a  greater  degree  of 
political  insight,  tlian  any  that  he  possessed.  He 
was  swept  off  his  legs  by  the  Arabi  movement,  of 
which  he  failed  to  see  the  importance  until  too  late. 

The  third  phase  of  Riaz  Pasha's  political  career 
was  when,  in  succession  to  Nubar  Pasha,  he  was 
made  Prime  Minister  by  Tewfik  during  the  period 
of  the  British  occupation.  At  first  matters  went 
fairly  well.  Riaz  had  some  advantages  over  Nubar 
Pasha.  He  was  by  far  the  better  administrator  of 
the  two.     He  knew  Egypt  well ;  lie  was  himself  a 

*   Vide  utile,  vol.  i.  p.  45. 


CH.XLIII  THE  WORKERS  345 

first-rate  practical  agriculturist,  and  could  discuss  all 
matters  bearing  on  tiie  condition  of  the  agricultural 
classes  with  a  thorough  knowledge  of  his  subject. 
He  exercised  great  authority  over  the  Egyptian 
officials.  The  fact  that  a  devout  JMohammedan  was 
at  the  head  of  affairs  produced  a  tranquillising 
effect  on  Mohammedan  public  opinion.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  was  too  inelastic  to  manage  so 
delicate  a  machine  as  the  government  of  Egypt 
during  the  occupation  period.  He  did  not  altogether 
appreciate  the  change  which  time  and  the  political 
situation  of  the  day  had  effected  in  the  system  of 
governing  the  country.  He  failed  to  see  that, 
under  a  reign  of  law,  he  could  not  always  have 
his  own  way,  for  Riaz  Pasha,  although  he  had  a 
certain  rough  idea  of  justice,  had  but  little  respect 
for  the  law.  He  thought  that  when  laws  or 
regulations  clashed  with  his  ideas  of  what  was 
right  and  wrong,  they  should  be  broken.  The 
result  of  his  peculiar  temperament  and  habits 
of  thought  was  that,  after  a  while,  he  quarrelled 
with  almost  every  one,  European  and  Egyptian,  and 
produced  a  state  of  administrative  friction,  which 
rendered  his  retirement  frcmi  office  inevitable. 

The  fourth  phase  of  Riaz's  career  was  when  he 
was  Minister  under  Abbas  II. — a  period  with  the 
history  of  which  I  am  not  attempting  to  deal  in 
the  present  work. 

To  sum  up,  Riaz  Pasha  is  a  staunch  Moslem, 
possessed  of  intellectual  qualities  which  are  certainly 
equal,  and  of  moral  qualities  which  are  decidedly 
superior  to  those  of  the  class  to  which  he  belongs. 
Notably,  his  physical  and  moral  fearlessness  deserve 
high  commendation.  It  were  well  for  the  cause  of 
Egyptian  patriotism,  if  there  were  more  ]Kitriots 
endowed  with  the  sterling  qualities  which  are 
cons})icuous  in  Riaz  Paslia's  rugged,  yet  very 
sympathetic  character. 


346  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  iv 

The  simplicity  of  Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi's 
character  renders  it  unnecessary  to  allude  to  him 
at  any  length.  Loyal,  thoroughly  honest,  truthful, 
and  courteous,  he  possesses  all  the  qualities  which 
Englishmen  usually  associate  with  the  word  gentle- 
man. He  has  been  statesmanlike  enough  to  see 
that  the  interests  of  his  country  would  best  be 
served  by  working  loyally  with  the  British  officials, 
instead  of  opposing  them.  During  his  tenure  of 
office,  Egypt  has  made  greater  progress,  both  moral 
and  material,  than  at  any  previous  period. 

Having  now  described  the  machinery  of  the 
Government,  and  the  principal  individuals  who 
were  entrusted  with  its  working,  it  would  appear 
logical  to  deal  with  the  work  whic^)  the  machine 
produced.  Before,  however,  describing  what  the 
English  did  in  Egypt,  it  will  be  as  well  to  say 
something  of  what  they  wished  to  do.  The  next 
chapters  will,  therefore,  be  devoted  to  describing 
that  strange  phantom  which,  under  the  name  of 
British  Policy  in  Egypt,  was  constantly  eluding  the 
grasp  both  of  those  to  whom  it  owed  its  being  and 
of  others  who  endeavoured,  from  time  to  time,  to 
understand  its  true  significance.  It  was  not  until 
1904  that  this  phantom  disappeared,  and  that  a 
more  substantial  political  creation  was  substituted 
in  its  place. 


PART  V 
BRITISH   POLICY   IN   EGYPT 


We  trust  it  may  he  granted  to  tis  to  lahoiirfor  maintaining 
the  interests  of  the  Empire,  foi'  pj'omoting  the  welfare  of  the 
Egyptian  people^  and  for  doing  honest  work  towards  the 
establishment  of  the  peace  and  order  of  the  world. 

Speech  of  Mr.  Gladstone  in  the  House  of  Commons^ 
July  27,  1882. 


847 


CHAPTER    XLIV 

THE   STRUGGLE   FOR   A    POLICY 

1882-1883 

Intentions  of  the  British  Government — Proposal  to  reduce  the  garrison 
— Sir  Edward  Malet's  opinion — Difficulty  of  combining  reform 
and  evacuation — I  recommend  reduction  and  concentration  at 
Alexandria — The  Government  approve  of  this  recommendation — 
The  reduction  is  countermanded. 

It  is  probable  that,  if  any  one  had  told  Lord  Gran- 
ville on  the  morrow  of  the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir 
that  twenty-five  years  later  a  British  force  would 
still  be  garrisoned  in  Egypt,  and  that  for  twenty- 
two  out  of  those  twenty -five  years  the  Egyptian 
question,  in  its  political  aspects,  would  remain 
unsettled,  he  would  have  ridiculed  the  idea.  For, 
in  truth,  in  1882  the  British  Government  had  a 
tolerably  clear  policy.  Its  execution  was  very 
difficult,  but  at  the  time  the  difficulties  did  not 
appear  absolutely  insurmountable.  Their  policy 
was  to  restore  order,  to  introduce  some  elementary 
reforms,  and  then  to  withdraw  the  British  troops. 
The  sound  of  the  guns  at  Tel-el-Kebir  had  scarcely 
died  away,  when  Lord  Granville  requested  Sir 
Edward  INIalet  to  send  "  as  soon  as  possible,  sugges- 
tions as  to  the  army,  finances,  and  the  administration 
for  the  future."  At  tliat  time,  "Her  JNLijesty's 
Government  contemplated  shortly  commencing 
the  withdrawal  of  tlie  British  troops  from  Egypt." 
During  the  summer  of  1883,  the  British  force 

349 


350  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  v 

numbered  about  7000  men.  On  August  25,  1883, 
Chdrif  Pasha  addressed  a  Memorandum  to  Sir 
Edward  Malet  urging,  on  grounds  of  economy, 
that  the  force  should  be  reduced  to  2000  men. 
Sir  Edward  Malet  agreed  that  there  could  be  no 
doubt  as  to  the  necessity  of  economy.  "The 
question,"  he  added,  "which  unfortunately  presents 
itself,  and  to  which  there  can  be  no  decisive  answer, 
is  whether  the  existing  tranquillity  is  not  mainly 
due  to  the  presence  of  the  troops."  He  was  unable 
to  recommend  so  large  a  reduction  as  that  proposed 
by  Cherif  Pasha.  "An  immediate  reduction  of 
2000  men  was,"  he  thought,  "  the  most  that  should 
be  effected." 

On  September  6,  Lord  Granville  wrote  me  a 
despatch,  which  reached  Cairo  simultaneously  with 
my  arrival  from  India.  In  this  despatch,  after 
alluding  to  Sir  Edward  Malet's  communication, 
which  is  quoted  above,  he  went  on  to  say : — 

"  Her  Majesty's  Government  entirely  concur  in 
the  desire  to  reduce  the  force  as  far  as  is  consistent 
with  the  preservation  of  public  order,  but  they 
have  been  unwilling  to  take  any  fresh  step  for  the 
purpose  until  they  could  have  the  advantage  of 
your  opinion.  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  has  expressed  to 
me  personally  his  belief  that  the  British  garrison 
might  be  entirely  withdrawn  from  Cairo  without 
disadvantage.  The  number  of  troops  to  be  retained 
elsewliere  and  their  disposition,  would  be  matter 
for  careful  consideration.  I  have  to  request  that 
you  will  consult  the  military  authorities,  and  report 
fully  to  me  on  the  subject." 

From  recollection,  and  from  a  perusal  of  con- 
temporaneous despatches  and  private  letters,  I  am 
able  to  give  an  accurate  account  of  my  frame  of 
mind  at  this  time.  I  was  deeply  penetrated  with 
the  importance  of  the  step  taken  by  the  British 
Government  in  sending  a  military  force  to  Egypt, 


LH.XLIV     STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY      351 

and  I  doubted  whether  the  Ministers  themselves 
fully  realised  its  gravity.     They  saw,  indeed,  the 
obvious  objections  to  a  permanent   occupation  of 
Egypt ;  they  held  to  the  broad  lines  of  Lord  Palmer- 
ston's  policy ;  ^  but  they  underrated  the  difficulties 
of  getting  out  of  the  country.      Nevertheless,  all 
history  was  there  to  prove  that  when  once  a  civilised 
Power  lays  its  hand  on  a  weak  State  in  a  barbarous 
or   semi-civilised    condition,    it   rarely   relaxes    its 
grasp.     I  was  in  favour  of  the  policy  of  evacua- 
tion, and  I  saw  that,  if  the  British  troops  were  to 
be  withdrawn,  no   long  delay  should   be  allowed 
to  ensue ;   otherwise,  the  occupation   might   drift 
insensibly  into  a  condition  of  permanency.     Total 
and  immediate  evacuation  was,  indeed,  impossible 
for  the  reason  given  by  Sir  Edward  Malet,  that  is 
to  say,  that  by  the  adoption  of  such  a  measure, 
public   tranquillity    would    be   endangered.      But 
although   the    maintenance    of  public  tranquillity 
stood  first  in  the  order  of  importance,  the  question 
of  the  withdrawal   of  the  garrison  could  not   be 
decided  with  reference  to  a  consideration  of  this 
point  alone.     The  question  had  to  be  considered 
in  another   aspect.      What   would    be   the    effect 
of  the  withdrawal  on  the  ftiture  of  the  country  ? 
What    prospect   was    there    of    Lord    Duffigrin's 
programme  being  carried  out  if  the  British  troops 
were  withdrawn  ?     I  did  not  see  so  clearly  as  at  a 
later  period  that  the  alternative  policies  of  reform 
and  evacuation  were  absolutely  irreconcilable,  but 
I  had  some  fairly  clear  perception  of  the  fact,     I 
saw  that  the  system  of  government  in  Egypt  had 
been  shaken  to  its  base,  and  that,  if  once  the  British 
troops  were  withdrawn,  it  would  be  necessary  to  leave 
to  the  Khedive  a  tolerably  free  hand  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  country.     I  saw  more  esi)ecially  that 
the  Egyptian  Government  should  be  allowed  full 

*  Vide  ante,  vol.  i.  p.  92. 


352  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  v 

freedom  in  the  direction  of  suppressing  any  attempt 
to  disturb  public  tranquillity.  AVhat  at  the  time 
I  most  feared  was  that  the  British  Government, 
under  the  influence  of  public  opinion  in  England, 
would  first  withdraw  their  troops  and  then  cry  out 
if  the  use  of  the  courbash  increased,  and,  generally, 
if  the  rough-and-ready  means  dear  to  the  hearts  of 
Oriental  rulers  were  employed  for  the  maintenance 
of  public  order.  I  wished  to  warn  the  Government 
that  if  they  decided  on  a  policy  of  evacuation,  they 
must  be  prepared  to  turn  a  deaf  ear  to  the  cries, 
which  would,  without  doubt,  be  raised  both  in 
Parliament  and  in  the  press,  when  the  Egyptian 
Government  proceeded  to  govern  according  to  their 
own  lights. 

It  was  with  these  feelings  uppermost  in  my  mind 
that  on  October  9,  that  is  to  say,  about  a  month 
after  my  arrival  in  Cairo,  I  answered  the  question 
which  Lord  Granville  had  addiessed  to  me  on  Sep- 
tember 6.  I  began  by  stating  that,  after  consultation 
with  Sir  Frederick  Stephenson,  I  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  British  garrison  could  safely 
be  withdrawn  from  Cairo,  and  that  the  total  force 
in  Egypt  might  be  reduced  to  about  3000  men, 
who  should  be  concentrated  at  Alexandria.  I  did 
not  express  any  opinion  on  the  question  of  when  it 
would  be  possible  to  withdraw  the  whole  of  the 
garrison,  but  in  a  private  telegram  to  Lord  Gran- 
ville, dated  October  8,  I  told  him  that  "for  the 
present  there  could  be  no  question  of  total  with- 
drawal from  Egypt."  I  dwelt  at  some  length  on 
the  state  of  the  country,  and,  writing  with  a  view  to 
ultimate  publication,  I  indicated  in  a  manner  which 
was  sufficiently  clear  that,  if  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment were  to  be  left  to  themselves,  they  must  be 
allowed  to  maintain  order  in  their  own  way. 

When  my  despatch  reached  London,  it  created 
a  considerable  stir  in  official  circles.      It  became 


CH.XLIV     STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY      353 

apparent  that,  although  perhaps  the  Ministers  were 
themselves  aware  that  they  could  not  attain  two 
irreconcilable  objects,  they  thought  it  undesirable 
to  place  this  view  of  the  case  before  the  public. 
Lord  Granville  telegraphed  to  me  asking  that  my 
despatch  should  be  divided  into  two,  and  that 
the  portion  which  spoke  of  non-interference  with 
vigorous  measures  after  the  withdrawal  of  the 
British  garrison  should  be  treated  separately  and 
confidentially. 

I  accordingly  wrote  two  despatches.  The  first, 
which  was  very  short,  dealt  with  the  proposed 
reduction  of  the  garrison  and  the  withdrawal  of 
the  troops  from  Cairo.  This  was  published.^  The 
second,  which  was  longer,  dealt  with  the  probable 
consequences  of  withdrawal.  This  was  not 
published.  It  is,  from  a  historical  point  of  view, 
a  document  of  some  interest.  It  is  reproduced 
in  an  Appendix  to  this  chapter. 

On  November  1,  Lord  Granville  wrote  to  me 
that  the  British  Government  approved  of  my 
recommendation  that  the  British  force  in  Egypt 
should  be  reduced  to  3000  men,  who  were  to  be 
concentrated  at  Alexandria.  "The  British  garrison 
being  thus  withdrawn  from  Cairo,"  it  was  added, 
*'the  main  responsibility  for  preserving  order 
throughout  Egypt  will,  as  you  point  out,  devolve 
upon  the  Government  of  the  Khedive,  and  in  the 
execution  of  that  task  they  may  rely  upon  the  full 
moral  support  of  Her  JNIajesty's  Government." 

Three  weeks  later,  and  before  any  practical 
steps  had  been  taken  to  withdraw  the  garrison 
from  Cairo,  news  arrived  of  the  annihilation  of 
General  Hicks's  army.  Lord  Granville  telegraphed 
on  November  22  directing  me,  after  consultation 
with  Sir  Frederick  Steplienson  and  Sir  Evelyn 
Wood,  to  state  my  opinion  as  to  whether  the  existing 

»  See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1884,  pp.  60-51. 
VOL.  II  2  A 


854  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  ^ 

state  of  affairs  in  the  Soudan  was  a  cause  of  danger 
to  Egypt.  In  that  case,  I  was  requested  to  state  my 
views  as  to  what  measures  were  desirable.  In  my 
reply,  dated  November  24,  I  said  that  Sir  Frederick 
Stephenson,  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  and  myself  were  of 
opinion  that  *'  the  recent  success  of  the  Mahdi  was 
a  source  of  danger  to  Egypt,"  that  the  withdrawal 
of  the  garrison  from  Cairo  should  be  postponed, 
and  that  for  the  time  being  no  reduction  should  be 
made  in  the  strength  of  the  British  force.  On 
November  25,  Lord  Granville  telegraphed  that 
"the  preliminary  steps  for  the  withdrawal  of  the 
British  troops  were  to  be  postponed."  The  post- 
ponement has  lasted  until  the  day  on  which  I  am 
writing. 

It  will  be  observed  that  during  all  this  time  there 
was  no  question  of  total  and  immediate  evacuation. 
Every  responsible  authority  on  the  spot  was  opposed 
to  any  such  measure,  and  the  Government,  although 
anxious  to  withdraw  entirely,  saw  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  carry  the  policy  of  total  withdrawal 
into  execution  at  once.  The  only  question 
under  discussion  was  whether  the  garrison  should 
be  reduced  and  the  British  force  concentrated  at 
Alexandria  with  a  view  to  eventual  withdrawal 
at  no  remote  period.  It  may  be  doubted  whether, 
even  if  the  Hicks  disaster  had  not  occurred,  it 
would  have  been  possible  within  a  short  while  to 
have  withdrawn  the  whole  of  the  British  troops. 
This,  however,  is  mere  conjecture.  What  is  more 
certain  is  that,  when  the  military  power  of  Egypt 
in  the  Soudan  was  crushed,  the  last  chance  of 
immediate,  or  nearly  immediate,  evacuation  dis- 
appeared. Moreover,  it  is  historically  interesting 
to  note  that  the  deathblow  to  the  policy  of  speedy 
evacuation  was  dealt  by  a  statesman  who  was 
earnestly  desirous  to  withdraw  the  British  troops. 
If  Lord    Granville    had    not    been    so    fearful    of 


CH 


xLiv     STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY      355 


incurring  any  responsibility  in  respect  to  the 
Soudan  on  the  oround  that,  in  doing  so,  he  might 
prolong  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt,  and  if  he 
had  placed  a  veto  on  the  Hicks  expedition,  it  is 
conceivable  that  the  British  garrison  might  have 
been  withdrawn  after  a  short  time.  As  it  was. 
Lord  Granville,  in  his  desire  to  shorten  the  occupa- 
tion, contributed  by  his  action  to  its  prolongation. 

Before  leaving  this  branch  of  my  subject,  I 
should  mention  that  on  October  28,  that  is,  between 
the  time  when  I  recommended  the  concentration 
at  Alexandria,  and  the  arrival  of  the  news  of  the 
Hicks  disaster,  I  again  urged  on  Lord  Granville, 
in  a  private  letter,  the  impossibility  of  reconciling 
the  two  policies  of  speedy  evacuation  and  reform. 
I  reproduce  the  whole  of  this  letter.  It  was  as 
follows : — 

"  I  have  now  been  here  long  enough  to  take 
stock  of  the  main  elements  of  the  situation.  There 
is  an  immense  deal  to  be  done,  and  there  are  many 
difficult  questions  to  be  solved.  Looking  at  these 
questions  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  intrinsic 
merits,  there  is  no  reason  why  most  of  them,  at  all 
events,  should  not  be  solved  within  a  reasonable 
period.  But  there  is  one  obstacle  which  stands  in 
the  way  of  almost  every  move  forward,  and  that  is 
the  necessity  of  consulting  every  Power  in  Europe 
before  any  important  steps  can  be  taken. 

"To  take  a  single  instance,  the  Blue  Book  on 
the  appointment  of  the  Indemnity  Commission 
last  year  is  a  positive  curiosity  in  its  way.  This 
question  was  so  simple  that  three  or  four  people 
sitting  round  a  table  ought  to  have  been  able  to 
settle  it  in  half  an  hour.  Yet  a  voluminous  corre- 
spondence ensued,  and  endless  delays  occurred 
before  Stockholm,  Brussels,  etc.,  could  be  got  to 
agree. 

"As  matters  stand,  it  will  be  scarcely  possible 


856  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.t 

to  carry  out  the  whole  of  our  programme.  On  the 
one  hand,  we  are  bound  before  we  go  to  start 
Egypt  on  the  high  road  to  good  government.  We 
ought  not  to  leave  the  Egyptian  Government  in 
such  a  position  as  that  they  may  plead  as  an  excuse 
for  future  bad  government  that  their  hands  are  so 
tied  as  to  render  them  powerless  to  execute  reforms. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  must  not,  for  European, 
Egyptian,  and  purely  English  reasons,  stay  too 
long. 

"  Under  present  conditions,  it  is  scarcely  con- 
ceivable that  both  of  these  objects  should  be 
attained.  In  fact,  the  one  is  almost  a  contradiction 
in  terms  to  the  other.  If  we  are  to  wait  until  all 
the  essential  reforms  have  been  carried  out  by  the 
slow  process  of  consulting  each  Power  separately 
on  every  question  of  detail,  we  shall  wait  a  very 
long  time,  and  there  will  be  danger  of  drifting  into 
a  policy  of  annexation,  or  something  tantamount 
to  it. 

"  If  we  cut  the  knot  by  withdrawing  without 
having  done  our  work,  and  leaving  Egypt  to  stew 
in  its  own  juice  of  administrative,  financial,  and 
economic  anarchy,  there  will  be  a  very  considerable 
risk  that  something  will  occur  before  our  backs 
have  long  been  turned,  which  will  raise  up  the 
whole  Egyptian  question  again.  I  confess  I  do 
not  see  my  way  out  of  this  dilemma. 

"We  may,  indeed,  before  long  retire  without 
any  absolute  danger  to  public  order  and  tranquillity 
in  the  immediate  future.  But  surely  more  than 
this  is,  under  all  the  circumstances,  expected  of  us 
both  by  Europe  and  by  English  public  opinion.  If 
we  leave  a  crop  of  unsettled  burning  questions 
behind  us,  we  can  never  feel  any  confidence  that 
our  hands  will  not  be  forced,  that  is  to  say,  that  we 
may  again  find  ourselves  in  the  position  of  being 
obliged  to  interfere  or  stand   aside  whilst  others. 


CH.  xLiv     STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY      357 

probably  the  French,  take  up  the  work  which  we, 
as  it  would  then  appear,  had  failed  to  acconi])lish. 

"  Getting  out  of  Egypt  is  a  very  different 
problem  from  getting  out  of  Afghanistan.  In  the 
latter  case,  we  had  to  deal  with  a  country  in  whose 
internal  administration  no  one  but  the  Afghans 
was,  to  any  very  considerable  extent,  concerned. 
There  was  no  very  great  difficulty  in  leaving  this 
quasi-barbarous  people  to  be  governed  after  their 
own  fashion  by  their  quasi-barbarous  Governors. 
Here  the  foundations  of  the  edifice,  which  are  to 
be  found  in  the  moral  and  material  condition  of 
the  people,  are  scarcely  less  barbarous  than  in 
Afghanistan.  But,  on  these  foundations  is  built 
a  top-heavy  and  exotic  superstructure,  such  as 
an  enormous  external  debt,  Western  law-courts, 
complete  liberty  of  contract,  and,  in  fact,  all  the 
paraphernalia  of  European  civilisation  with  some 
of  its  worst  and  not  many  of  its  best  features.  I 
do  not  suppose  that  Europe  will  stand  by  and  let 
this  superstructure  fall  to  pieces. 

*'  We  are  making  very  fair  progress  in  all  matters 
which  fall  within  the  competence  of  the  Egyptian 
Government,  such  as  prison  reform,  local  tribunals, 
etc. 

"  But  as  regards  international  subjects — and  all 
the  most  important  subjects  are  international — we 
are  almost  at  an  absolute  standstill. 

"In  spite  of  every  effort,  we  have  not  yet 
succeeded  in  getting  the  house  tax  through.  After 
the  house  tax,  comes  the  professional  tax  and  the 
stamp  duty,  each  with  its  own  peculiar  difficulties. 

"  The  reforms  in  the  Mixed  Tribunals  and  the 
abolition  of  the  Consular  jurisdiction  in  criminal 
cases,  will  probably  involve  interminable  negotia- 
tions. 

"  Then  there  is  the  great  question  of  the  Law 
of  Liquidation,    with    all   its   attendant    political 


358  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  v 

difficulties.  There  is  not,  I  fear,  the  least  chance 
of  our  being  able  to  regulate  the  financial  situation 
without  modifying  that  law.  I  thought  at  one 
time  we  might  manage  to  arrange  matters  by 
getting  the  consent  of  the  Commissioners  of  the 
Debt,  but  the  political  objections  to  the  adoption 
of  this  course  are  scarcely  less  great  than  if  we  tried 
to  get  the  Powers  to  consent  to  alter  the  law  itself. 

"  The  question  of  the  debts  of  the  fellaheen 
cannot  be  settled  without  going  to  the  Powers,  for 
whatever  is  done  will  almost  certainly  hivolve  some 
changes  in  the  code  administered  by  the  Mixed 
Tribunals.^ 

'*  There  are  several  questions  connected  with 
the  Daira  Sanieh  and  the  Domains  which  ought  to 
be  settled,  but  here  again  the  international  difficulty 
bars  the  way. 

"Even  some  subjects  which  have  no  direct 
international  character,  depend  indirectly  upon  the 
concord  of  the  Powers.  Thus,  a  considerable  capital 
expenditure  on  irrigation  is  almost  a  necessity  ;  so 
also  is  the  Soudan  Railway.  But  for  both  of  these 
money  is  wanted,  and  it  will  be  very  difficult  to 
find  any  money  until  the  financial  situation  is  placed 
on  a  sound  footing. 

"  You  may  well  ask  me  why  I  say  all  this,  which 
you  already  know,  INly  reason  is  to  ask  you  to 
consider  whether  it  is  not  possible  to  apply  some 
remedy  to  this  state  of  things.  Would  it  not  be 
possible  to  issue  a  Circular  to  the  Powers  explaining 
our  difficulties,  and  saying  that  we  did  not  propose 
to  consult  them  any  more  on  each  detail,  but  that, 
when  we  had  put  matters  straight,  we  should  ask 
them  to  accept  the  settlement  eii  bloc,  and  that  we 
should  then  at  once  withdraw  our  troops  ? 

^  This  question  was,  many  years  subsequently,  settled  without 
reference  to  the  Powers.  An  Agricultural  Bank  was  established  (see 
p.  452).  In  18y3j  it  would  have  been  scarcely  possible  to  have  called 
such  an  institution  into  existence. 


cH.xLiv     STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY      359 

"  Give  me  2000  men  and  power  to  settle  matters 
between  the  English  and  Egyptian  Governments, 
and  I  will  guarantee  that  in  twelve  months  there 
sliall  not  be  a  British  soldier  in  Egypt,  and  that  tlie 
country  is  put  in  such  a  position  as  to  render  it 
very  improbable  that  any  Egyptian  question  will 
be  raised  again  for  many  years  to  come  at  all 
events.^  But  if  we  adhere  to  our  present  procedure, 
I  really  despair  of  doing  much  within  any  reasonable 
time — I  mean,  of  course,  as  regards  international 
questions.  As  regards  purely  Egyptian  questions, 
there  are  plenty  of  difficulties,  but  they  are  not 
insurmountable. 

"  I  put  forward  this  suggestion  with  much 
hesitation.  I  am  aware  that  the  matter  cannot 
be  regarded  wholly  from  the  point  of  view  of 
Egyptian  internal  reform.  The  general  political 
situation  has  to  be  considered,  and  from  this  point 
of  view  there  may  be  insuperable  obstacles  to  the 
adoption  of  any  course  such  as  that  which  I 
suggest.  Anyhow,  I  think  it  right  to  submit  to 
you  the  aspect  of  the  case  which  I  have  set  forth 
in  this  letter.  Your  wider  knowledjxe  and 
experience  may  possibly  be  able  to  hit  upon 
some  other  plan  superior  to  my — possibly  crude — 
suggestion. 

"  I  may  add  that  I  am  confident  that  I  could,  by 
developing  the  arguments  I  have  briefly  stated 
here,  make  out  a  very  strong  case  for  taking  a  new 
point  of  departure,  but  it  would,  of  course,  be 
useless  for  me  to  write  a  public  despatch  in  this 
sense,  unless  I  thought  that  some  practical  good 
might  come  out  of  it." 

In  other  words,  what  I  proposed  amounted  to 
the  temporary  assumption  on  the  part  of  England 
of  the  task  of  governing  Egypt.     On  November  9, 

*  This  forecast  of  what  was  possible  was  unquestionably  much  too 
Banguiue. 


360  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  v 

Lord  Granville  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  this 
letter.  "It  would  require,"  he  said,  "some  time 
to  consider  and  answer  your  powerful  but  gloomy 
view  of  the  situation  in  Egypt.  I  am  afraid  the 
remedy  you  suggest  is  too  drastic,  but  I  will  reflect 
over  what  you  say,  and  let  you  know  my  impres- 
sions, and  those  of  others.  I  have  escaped  the 
Lord  Mayor's  dinner.  Gladstone  will  speak 
sliortly,  and  will  only  deal  with  generalities  on 
Egyptian  questions." 

On  November  14,  Lord  Granville  again  wrote 
to  me  as  follows  :  "  I  go  to  Stratton  ^  on  Saturday, 
when  I  hope  to  talk  over  with  Gladstone  and 
Northbrook  your  very  important  letter  of,  I  think, 
the  24th  October.  I  hope  you  will  think  what 
Gladstone  said  in  concert  with  me  about  Egypt  at 
the  Mansion  House  was  harmless." 

Finally,  on  November  30,  Lord  Granville 
wrote :  "  I  have  talked  over  your  views  on  the 
Liquidation  Law  with  Gladstone  and  with  North - 
brook.  We  do  not  see  our  way  to  acting  en  bloc, 
but  it  might  be  possible,  particularly  after  recent 
events,  for  you  to  perfect  a  scheme  on  any  of 
the  most  important  subjects,  with  a  view  to  our 
getting  the  consent  of  the  Powers." 

This  was,  of  course,  tantamount  to  a  rejection  of 
my  proposal.  I  did  not  for  many  years  make  any 
other  having  for  its  object  a  radical  change  in  the 
political  status  of  Great  Britain  in  Egypt.  Hence- 
forward, I  devoted  myself  entirely  to  the  task  of 
evolving  order  out  of  chaos,  under  such  political 
and  administrative  conditions  as  existed  at  the  time 
when  the  occupation  took  place.  It  was  not  tor 
some  years  that  I  felt  at  all  sanguine  of  success. 

From  the  time  when  the  orders  for  concen- 
tration at  Alexandria  were  countermanded,  all 
idea  of  s})eedy  evacuation   was   abandoned.     Tiie 

*  Lord  Norllibrook's  country  seat  iu  Hampshire. 


CH.XLIV     STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY      361 

attention  of  the  British  and  Egyptian  Govern- 
ments was  for  the  next  two  years  almost  wholly 
directed  to  the  affairs  of  the  Soudan.  During 
this  period,  the  British  officials  in  Cairo  were  slowly 
and  laboriously  taking  some  tentative  steps  in  the 
direction  of  reducing  the  Egyptian  administrative 
chaos  into  order.  By  the  time  the  Soudan  question 
had  passed  out  of  an  acute  stage,  Egypt  had  been 
fairly  launched  on  the  path  of  reform.  The  policy, 
which  as  a  pis  aller  I  had  suggested  as  possible  in 
1883,  of  allowing  the  Khedive  and  the  Turco- 
Egyptians  to  govern  after  their  own  fashion,  had 
become  more  than  ever  difficult  of  execution,  for 
the  country  had  advanced,  whilst  the  intelligence 
and  governing  capacity  of  the  ruling  classes  had 
almost  stood  still.  The  Turco  -  Egyptians,  who 
might  perhaps  have  been  able  to  govern  the  country 
after  a  rude  fashion  in  1883,  were  incapable  of  doing 
so  when  once  the  full  tide  of  civilisation  had  set 
strongly  in.  Before  long,  we  had  drifted  into  a 
position  which  necessitated  the  presence  of  a  Britisli 
garrison,  not  in  order  to  admit  of  reforms  being 
initiated  and  carried  out,  but  in  order  to  prevent  a 
relapse  into  the  confusion  which  existed  in  the  pre- 
reforming  days.  That  is  the  present  stage  of  the 
Egyptian  question. 

Two  efforts  were  made  subsequent  to  1883,  one 
by  Mr.  Gladstone's  Government,  and  the  other  by 
the  Government  of  Lord  Salisbury,  to  deal  with 
the  larger  aspects  of  the  Egyptian  question.  To 
these  reference  will  now  be  made. 


362  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.v 


APPENDIX 

Despatch  from  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  to  Earl  Granville 

Cairo,  October  9,  1883. 

My  Lord — It  may  be  advisable  that  in  a  separate 
despatch  I  should  offer  some  further  observations  on  the 
question  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  British  troops  from  Egypt 
beyond  those  which  are  contained  in  my  separate  despatch 
of  this  day"'s  date.^ 

I  propose,  in  the  first  instance,  to  make  some  remarks 
upon  the  question  of  the  total  withdrawal  of  the  Army  of 
Occupation.  The  frequent  declarations  which  have  been 
made  by  Her  Majesty's  Ministers  on  this  subject,  have 
weakened,  but  have  not  altogether  eradicated  the  belief 
entertained  by  some  sections  of  the  community  in  Egypt 
that  the  country  will  be  permanently  occupied  by  British 
troops.  I  have  lost  no  opportunity  of  stating  that  there  is 
no  intention  whatever  of  departing  from  the  policy  in  pur- 
suance of  which  the  whole  of  the  British  troops  will  eventu- 
ally be  withdrawn  from  Egypt.  In  spite,  however,  of  the 
very  cordial  sympathy  with  which  I  regard  that  policy,  1 
regret  that  I  am  at  present  unable  to  recommend  the  total 
withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  Occupation.  I  consider  that  it 
would  be  at  present  premature  to  discuss  the  question. 
Under  these  circumstances,  the  only  practical  questions  to 
be  considered  are  those  which  are  discussed  in  my  separate 
despatch.  In  making  the  proposals  contained  in  that 
despatch,  it  may  be  desirable  that  I  should  add  some 
observations  of  a  general  nature  on  the  political  situation  of 
the  moment. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  conceive  of  the  existence  of  a 
worse  Government  than  that  of  the  late  Khedive,  Ismail 
Pasha.  But  that  Government  possessed  one  single  merit — it 
preserved  order.  The  methods  by  which  it  preserved  order 
were  cruel  and  oppressive  in  the  highest  degree,  but  the  general 

*  This  was  the  despatch  to  which  allusion  is  made  on  pp.  352-353, 
and  in  which  it  was  recommended  that  the  British  garrison  should  be 
reduced  and  the  troops  concentrated  at  Alexandria. 


CH.XLIV    STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY      363 

result  was  that  life  and  property  were  secure  from  all  attacks 
save  those  dictated  by  the  action  of  the  Government  them- 
selves. Recent  events  have  completely  shattered  the  system 
of  government  which  prevailed  under  Ismail  Pasha  and  his 
predecessors.  The  use  of  the  "  courbash  "  has  been  nearly,  if 
not  completely,  abolished.  Measures  are  being  taken  under 
which  it  may  be  reasonably  hoped  that  arbitrary  arrest  and 
imprisonment  will  no  longer  be  possible.  Properly  con- 
stituted tribunals  are  about  to  be  established,  under  whose 
jurisdiction  it  may  be  hoped  that  but  few  persons  will  suffer 
for  crimes  of  which  they  are  innocent,  although  possibly  in 
the  first  instance  some  guilty  persons  may  escape  punishment. 
In  a  word,  a  reign  of  law  is  being  introduced. 

The  period  of  transition  from  the  old  to  the  new  order  of 
things  would,  under  any  circumstances,  have  been  somewhat 
critical.  It  is  rendered  more  so  from  the  fact  that  recent 
events  must  have  imbued  the  people  with  the  idea,  hereto- 
fore unfamiliar  to  them,  that  properly  constituted  authority 
may,  for  a  time  at  least,  be  successfully  resisted. 

The  present  position  of  the  country  is  that  the  old  order 
of  things  has  either  passed  or  is  rapidly  passing  away. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  new  systems  of  administration  or 
of  judicial  procedure  are  either  in  process  of  organisation,  or 
have  not  yet  acquired  the  stability  which  time  alone  can 
give  to  them. 

I  believe  His  Highness  the  Khedive  and  his  Ministers  to 
be  sincerely  desirous  of  introducing  the  reforms,  whose  main 
features  were  set  forth  in  Lord  Dufferin's  report,  and  of 
which  the  country  stands  so  much  in  need.  But  the  intro- 
duction of  those  reforms  must  necessarily  occupy  some  time. 
During  the  period  of  their  introduction  it  may  be  anticipated 
that  many  persons,  imperfectly  appreciating  the  difficulties 
of  the  situation,  may  be  impatient  that  more  rapid  progress 
is  not  made.  On  the  other  hand,  the  turbulent  and  lawless 
portion  of  the  community  may  not  improbably  learn  to  dis- 
respect a  Government  which  does  not  manifest  its  authority, 
or  impose  its  legitimate  orders,  by  the  use  of  those  arbitrary 
methods  to  which  the  country  has  for  generations  been 
accustomed.  If  the  system  of  government  in  Egypt  is  to 
be  reformed,  it  is  above  all  things  necessary  that  order  should 
be  preserved  during  the  process  of  reformation,  and  that  any 
changes,  whether  in  the  existing  laws  or  in  the  form  of 
government  or  in  the  composition  of  the  ministry,  should  be 
effected  by  legal  and  constitutional  methods.     Force  should 


364  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  v 

be  put  down  by  force,  and  inasmuch  as  the  lesson  has  scarcely 
yet  been  learnt  in  Egypt  that  the  arm  of  the  law  is  as  strong 
as  that  of  arbitrary  and  capricious  power,  it  might,  under 
certain  circumstances,  become  desirable  in  the  interests  of 
the  country  that  a  greater  degree  of  severity  should  be 
exercised  in  the  suppression  of  disturbance  than  would  be 
necessary  amongst  a  population  which  had  for  long  been 
accustomed  to  a  law-abiding  and  orderly  system  of  govern- 
ment. 

The  main  responsibility  for  preserving  order  throughout 
Egypt  will,  as  I  have  said  in  my  separate  despatch,  devolve 
on  the  Egyptian  Government.  Under  these  circumstances, 
I  venture  to  think  that,  within  any  reasonable  limits,  full 
freedom  should  be  left  to  the  Egyptian  Government  in  the 
exercise  of  that  power,  the  possession  of  which  is  a  necessary 
condition  to  the  assumption  of  responsibility. 

I  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that,  should  any  disturbance 
occur  at  Cairo  or  elsewhere,  the  Egyptian  Government  would 
be  disposed  to  use  excessive  or  unnecessary  severity  in  its 
suppression.  The  personal  character  of  the  Khedive  is, 
indeed,  of  itself  almost  a  sufficient  guarantee  that  no  such 
tendency  exists.  At  the  same  time,  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
the  events  of  the  last  few  years  have  shaken  the  authority  of 
the  Government  in  Egypt,  a  result  which  is  not,  I  believe, 
due  to  any  change  in  the  personal  character  of  the  individuals 
who  compose  the  Government,  but  to  the  change  of  system, 
which,  most  fortunately  for  the  country,  has  been  in 
course  of  progress  since  the  abdication  of  Ismail  Pasha. 

In  order  to  reassert  that  authority,  the  existence  of  which 
is  essential  to  the  progress  of  orderly  reform,  it  might  be 
deemed  necessary  by  the  Egyptian  Government  to  exercise  a 
degree  of  severity  in  the  suppression  of  disturbance  which 
might  possibly  not  commend  itself  to  public  opinion  in 
England. 

Under  these  circumstances,  I  venture  to  think  that  it 
would  be  desirable  that  both  the  Egyptian  Government  and 
the  public  in  Egypt  should  fully  understand  that,  whilst 
Her  Majesty's  Government  would  view  with  serious  dis- 
pleasure any  attempt  to  return  to  the  system  of  government 
which  prevailed  in  the  past,  they  would  not,  save  in  some 
very  exceptional  case,  be  inclined  to  interfere  with  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  Egyptian  Government  in  the  adoption  of  such 
measures  as  the  latter  might  consider  desirable  for  the  pre- 
servation of  public  order  and  tranquillity. 


CH.  xLiv    STRUGGLE  FOR  A  POLICY      365 

I  make  these  observations  not  because  I  have  any  reason 
to  suppose  that  any  disturbance  is  likely  to  ensue  upon  the 
partial  withdrawal  of  the  British  force,  but  because  it 
appears  to  me  desirable  that,  before  the  British  garrison 
is  reduced,  the  responsibility  and  the  power  of  the  Egyptian 
Government  should  alike  be  somewhat  clearly  defined. 

The  considerations  which  I  have  thus  ventured  to  lay 
before  your  Lordship  will,  of  course,  apply  with  even  greater 
force  when  the  time  eventually  arrives  for  dealing  with  the 
question  of  the  total  withdrawal  of  the  British  garrison. — I 
have,  etc.,  E.  Baring. 


CHAPTER    XLV 

THE    NORTHBROOK    MISSION 
September-November  1884 

It  is  decided  to  send  a  Special  Commissioner  to  Cairo — The  policy  of 

reporting — Lord  Nortlihrook  arrives  in  Egypt — His  financial  pro- 
posals— His  General  Report — The  Government  reject  his  proposals. 

The  difficulties  and  complications  of  the  Egyptian 
question  were,  of  course,  greatly  increased  by  the 
events  in  the  Soudan.  Amongst  other  causes  for 
anxiety,  the  bankruptcy  of  tlie  Egyptian  Treasury 
appeared  imminent.  A  Conference  of  the  Powers 
assembled  in  London  in  the  summer  of  1884  to 
consider  the  financial  situation,  but  separated  with- 
out arriving  at  any  practical  conclusions.^  Under 
the  circumstances,  what  was  a  well  -  intentioned 
Government,  which  had  drifted  into  a  position 
which  it  very  imperfectly  understood,  to  do  ? 
Undoubtedly,  the  question  was  difficult  to  answer. 
After  a  short  period  of  hesitation,  Mr.  Gladstone 
resorted  to  his  favourite  device.  He  determined 
to  send  to  Cairo  a  Special  Commissioner  to  *'  report 
and  advise  Her  Majesty's  Government  touching 
the  counsel  wliich  it  might  be  fitting  to  offisr  the 
Egyptian  Government  in  the  present  situation  of 
affairs   in   Egypt,   and  as  to  the  measures  which 

*  Subsequently,  some  decisions  were  taken  as  regards  the  matters 
discussed  at  the  Conference.  They  were  embodied  in  an  Agreement 
signed  in  London  by  the  reprosentatives  of  all  the  Great  Powers  ou 
March  17,  1B85.      See  Egypt,  No.  G  of  1886. 

366 


CH.XLV  THE  NORTHBROOK  MISSION    367 

should  be  taken  in  connection  with  them."  The 
Commissioner's  special  attention  was  to  be  directed 
to  the  '*  present  exigencies  of  Egyptian  finance." 

There  was  really  little  about  which  to  report. 
The  main  facts  with  which  the  Government  had 
to  deal  were  patent  to  all  the  world.  Only  a  year 
previously,  a  Special  Commissioner  of  great  ex- 
perience and  ability  had  compiled  an  elaborate 
Report  on  the  condition  of  Egypt.  Since  then,  a 
detailed  Report  on  the  financial  situation  had  been 
prepared  by  a  Committee  of  experts  sitting  in 
London.  The  subject  had  also  been  thorouglily 
discussed  at  the  Conference.  No  further  collection 
of  facts  was,  therefore,  required.  Any  detailed 
information  which  might  have  been  necessary 
before  deciding  on  what  policy  to  adopt,  could 
easily  have  been  furnished  by  the  various  authorities 
on  the  spot.  What  was  required  was  the  decision 
of  character  necessary  to  arrive  at  a  definite  con- 
clusion, when  once  the  facts  had  been  collected. 

Lord  Northbrook  was  designated  as  the  Special 
Commissioner.  A  better  choice  could  not  have 
been  made.  His  high  character,  his  wide  adminis- 
trative experience,  the  knowledge  of  the  East 
which  he  had  gained  as  Viceroy  of  India,  his 
power  of  rapidly  acquiring  a  mastery  over  com- 
plicated financial  questions,  and  the  breadth  and 
statesmanlike  nature  of  his  views — all  pointed  him 
out  as  exceptionally  qualified  to  fulfil  the  duties 
entrusted  to  him.  To  myself,  the  appointment 
was  especially  pleasing.  The  relationship  between 
Lord  Northbrook  and  myself,  and  the  mutual 
esteem  and  affection  which  we  entertained  for  each 
other,  were  of  themselves  a  sufficient  guarantee 
that  we  should  work  cordially  together.  It  was, 
without  doubt,  the  knowledge  that  the  ap})oint- 
ment  would  not  be  displeasing  to  me  whicli  to 
some     extent     led     Lord     Granville,     with     that 


368  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.> 

courteous   consideration    for    others   which   nevei 
failed  him,  to  nominate  Lord  Northbrook. 

Lord  Northbrook  possessed  another,  and  very 
important  quahfication  for  successfully  carrying  out 
the  duties  assigrned  to  him.  He  did  not  blind  him- 
self  to  facts.  He  had  the  courage  of  his  opinions. 
When  he  had  studied  his  facts  and  come  to  some 
definite  conclusions,  he  was  in  the  habit  of  stating 
them  without  reference  to  whether  they  harmonised 
with  any  preconceived  theories. 

The  policy  of  reporting,  which  was  so  dear  to 
Mr.  Gladstone's  Government,  appears  always  to 
have  brought  about  results  which  were  in  each 
case  somewhat  similar.  Under  the  graceful  diction 
of  Lord  Dufferin's  Report,  in  spite  of  the  apparent 
ease  with  which  the  skilled  diplomatist  glided  over 
difficulties  and  eluded  burning  questions,  it  was  easy 
to  observe  that  the  main  facts  of  the  situation  did 
not  escape  the  statesmanlike  eye  of  the  author,  and 
that  he  in  reality  expected  the  Government  to 
recognise  them.  Connected,  as  I  was,  by  general 
political  sympathy  with  a  Liberal  Government, 
and  by  ties  of  long-standing  family  friendship  and 
relationship  with  some  members  qf  Mr.  Gladstone's 
Cabinet,  I  came  to  Egypt  with  a  hearty  desire  to 
aid  to  the  best  of  my  ability  in  the  successful 
execution  of  his  Egyptian  policy.  I  thought  I 
understood  that  policy,  and,  if  I  understood  it 
rightly,  I  felt  sure  that  it  met  with  my  general 
concurrence.  I  soon  found,  however,  that  I  was 
pursuing  a  phantom  which  constantly  eluded  my 
grasp,  and  that,  even  when  I  understood  something 
of  the  general  principles  which  were  guiding  the 
action  of  the  Government,  the  vacillation  shown 
in  the  execution  of  the  detail  was  simply  heart- 
breaking. I  could  not  blind  myself  to  facts  to 
please  ISIr.  Gladstone,  and  directly  I  stated  the 
facts  and  pointed  out  the  inevitable  conclusions  to 


CH.XLV   THE  NORTHBROOK  MISSION    3G9 

be  drawn  from  them,  I  found  that,  however  clear 
they  might  be,  they  were  ignored.  To  cite  another 
instance,  General  Gordon  was  sent  to  the  Soudan, 
not  to  act,  but  to  report.  General  Gordon  had 
failed  to  recognise  the  real  facts  in  connection  with 
the  Soudan  when  he  undertook  his  mission.  After 
his  arrival  at  Khartoum,  he  recognised  them,  but 
he  could  not  enforce  their  recognition  on  Mr. 
Gladstone ;  the  latter's  blindness  to  facts,  which 
were  patent  to  all  the  world,  eventually  resulted  in 
the  death  of  General  Gordon,  of  Colonel  Stewart, 
and  of  many  other  brave  men.  Every  one  knows 
the  reluctance  which  many  men  feel  about  making 
a  will.  Inability  to  recognise  that  death  is  the 
common  lot  of  all  has  from  time  immemorial  formed 
the  text  alike  of  the  divine  and  the  satirist.  Mr. 
Gladstone  appears  to  have  lain  under  a  similar  dis- 
ability in  dealing  with  Egyptian  affairs.  He  ignored 
all  unpleasant  facts.  Lord  Northbrook's  fate  was 
to  be  that  of  his  predecessors.  He  was  asked  to 
"  report  and  advise."  It  was  almost  certain,  before 
he  began  his  work,  that  his  report  would  pass 
unheeded  and  that  Mr.  Gladstone  would  turn  a 
deaf  ear  to  his  advice,  unless,  which  was  improbable, 
it  happened  to  be  such  as  he  had  wished  to  receive 
at  the  time  when,  ex  hypothesis  the  Government 
were  in  partial  ignorance  of  the  facts. 

Lord  Northbrook  arrived  in  Egypt  on  September 
9,  1884.  He  remained  in  the  country  about  six 
weeks,  during  which  time  he  laboured  strenuously 
to  master  all  the  complicated  facts  connected  with 
the  situation.  Before  he  left  Cairo  he  prepared 
the  draft  of  his  report,  but,  inasmuch  as  when  he 
arrived  in  London,  it  appeared  that  his  views  were 
distasteful  to  Mr.  Gladstone,  his  proposals  were 
modified  before  they  assumed  their  final  shape. 
Eventually,  he  sent  in  two  reports,  both  dated 
November  20, 1884.    One  of  these  dealt  exclusively 

VOL.  II  2  b 


370  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  v 

with  the  financial  situation.  The  other  'was  of  a 
more  general  nature. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  at  length  on  Lord 
Northbvook's  financial  proposals.  It  will  be  suffi- 
cient to  say  that  they  involved :  (1)  adequate 
provision  being  made  for  the  improvement  and 
extension  of  the  system  of  irrigation  ;  (2)  a  prospect 
of  the  abolition  of  the  corvee;  (3)  the  acquisition 
by  the  Egyptian  Government  of  greater  freedom 
in  the  matter  of  imposing  taxes  on  foreigners ; 
(4)  the  abolition  of  the  dual  administration  of  the 
Daira,  Domains,  and  Railways  ;  (5)  a  reduction  of 
the  land-tax,  and  of  the  taxes  on  the  export  and 
transit  of  produce;  and  (6)  the  issue  of  a  loan  for 
about  £9,000,000,  the  interest  of  which  was  to  be 
guaranteed  by  the  British  Government. 

"  The  effect  of  the  proy)osals  which  I  have 
made,"  Lord  Northbrook  said  in  concluding  his 
report,  '*will  undoubtedly  be  to  substitute  the 
financial  control  of  England  for  the  international 
control  which  was  proposed  by  the  Conference ; 
but  the  alteration  seems  to  me  to  be  an  advantage 
both  to  the  Egyptian  and  to  the  English  Govern- 
ments. Nor  do  I  see  what  objections  the  other 
Powers  of  Europe  can  entertain  to  this  control 
being  exercised  by  Great  Britain  after  the  sacrifices 
which  have  been  made  in  maintaining  the  peace 
and  safety  of  Egypt,  and  the  financial  liability 
which  has  now  to  be  undertaken." 

In  his  general  report,  after  dwelling  on  the 
reforms  which  had  already  been  accomplished. 
Lord  Northbrook  added  :  "  The  progress,  in  order 
to  be  solid,  nuist  necessarily  be  gradual  in  a  country 
where  the  people  have  had  to  be  taught  to  compre- 
hend the  first  elements  of  decent  government.  .  .  , 

"  I  cannot  recommend  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment to  fix  any  date  at  wliich  the  British  troops 
serving   in   Egypt   shall   be   withdrawn.      In   my 


OH.XLV   THE  NORTHBROOK  MISSION    371 

report,  I  have  stated  my  reasons  for  anticipating 
that  their  strength  may  be  reduced  before  long  to 
about  4000  men,  b  it  it  is  my  duty  to  express  my 
decided  opinion  that  it  would  not  be  safe  or  wise 
to  fix  any  definite  time  for  their  entire  withdrawal, 
because  the  safety  of  such  a  step  must  depend  on 
the  internal  state  of  the  country,  and  upon  the 
political  position  of  Egypt,  which  has  been  left  in 
uncertainty  in  consequence  of  the  failure  of  the 
Conference  of  London." 

It  will  be  seen  that  Lord  Northbrook  did  not 
attempt  to  solve  the  Egyptian  question  in  so  far  as 
its  solution  depended  on  the  continuance  of  the 
British  occupation.  He  expressed  a  strong  opinion 
that  the  garrison  could  not  be  at  once  withdrawn 
from  Egypt,  and  there  he  left  the  matter.  But  he 
made  some  excellent  proposals  in  respect  to  the 
finances  of  the  country.  Had  these  proposals  been 
accepted  by  the  Cabhiet  and  carried  into  execution, 
internationalism,  which  has  been  the  bane  of 
Egypt,  would  have  received  a  heavy  blow,  and  the 
paramount  power  of  Great  Britain,  as  the  guide  and 
protector  of  Egypt,  would  have  been  asserted. 

Lord  Northbrook's  views  were,  however,  too 
thoroughgoing  for  INlr.  Gladstone,  who  was  not 
prepared  to  guarantee  the  interest  on  an  Egyptian 
loan.  The  proposals  also  did  not  receive  the 
support  which  they  deserved  from  the  English 
press.  The  result  was  that  nothing  was  done 
in  the  direction  of  carrying  Lord  Northbrook's 
policy  into  execution.     His  mission  was  a  failure. 

Mr.  Gladstone's  Government,  which  fell  in  June 
1885,  made  no  subsequent  attempt  to  settle  the 
Egyptian  question  in  its  larger  aspects.  It  is  now 
necessary  to  deal  with  an  endeavour  to  arrive  at 
a  solution  which  was  made  under  the  auspices  of 
Mr.  Gladstone's  successor.  Lord  Salisbury. 


CHAPTER   XLVI 

THE    WOLFF   CONVENTION 
August  1885-October  1887 

Sir  Henry  Wolff  appointed  Special  Commissioner — Convention  of 
October  24,  1885— Moukhtar  Pasha— Convention  of  May  22,  1887 
— Comparison  of  the  two  Conventions — Frontier  aiFairs — The 
army — Civil  reforms — Evacuation — France  and  Russia  oppose  the 
Convention — The  Sultan  refuses  to  ratify  it — Moukhtar  Pasha 
permanently  located  iu  Egypt — Results  of  the  Wolff  mission. 

It  might  have  been  thought  that  a  sufficient 
number  of  Special  Commissioners,  diplomatists, 
and  others  had  already  reported  on  the  affairs  of 
Egypt.  Such,  however,  was  not  the  view  of  the 
British  Government.  Lord  Salisbury  determined 
to  take  a  leaf  out  of  the  book  of  his  predecessors. 
It  was  decided  to  send  Sir  Henry  Wolff,  who  had 
been  a  prominent  member  of  what  was  then  known 
as  the  Fourth  Party,  and  who  had  lost  his  seat  in 
Parliament  at  the  General  Election  which  had 
recently  taken  place,  on  a  mission  to  Constantinople 
and  Cairo.  He  was  given  a  sort  of  general  com- 
mission to  examine  into  Egyptian  affairs.  He  was 
to  invite  the  co-operation  of  the  Sultan  in  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Egyptian  question  ;  more  especially  it 
was  thought  that  it  was  "  in  His  Majesty's  power 
to  contribute  materially  to  the  establishment 
of  settled  order  and  good  government"  in  the 
Soudan. 

Sir  Henry  Wolff  arrived  in  Constantinople  on 

372 


CH.XLVI     THE  WOLFF  CONVENTION      373 

August  22,  1885.  On  October  24,  he  signed  a 
Convention  with  the  Turkish  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  All  that  this  first  Convention  settled  was 
the  nature  of  the  subjects  which  were  to  be  discussed. 
It  provided  that  the  British  and  Turkish  Govern- 
ments were  each  to  send  a  Special  Commissioner 
to  Egypt,  where  the  Ottoman  Commissioner  was 
to  consult  with  the  Khedive  "  upon  the  best  means 
of  tranquillising  the  Soudan  by  pacific  means." 
The  two  Commissioners,  in  concert  with  the 
Khedive,  were  to  reorganise  the  Egyptian  army, 
and  also  to  "examine  all  the  branches  of  the 
Egyptian  administration,  and  introduce  into  them 
the  modifications  which  they  considered  necessary, 
within  the  limits  of  the  Imperial  Firmans."  The 
sixth  and  most  important  article  of  the  Convention 
was  couched  in  the  following  terms  :  "  So  soon  as 
the  two  High  Commissioners  shall  have  established 
that  the  security  of  the  frontiers  and  the  good 
working  and  stability  of  the  Egyptian  Government 
are  assured,  they  shall  present  a  Report  to  their 
respective  Governments,  who  will  consult  as  to 
the  conclusion  of  a  Convention  regulating  the 
withdrawal  of  the  British  troops  from  Egypt  in  a 
convenient  period." 

In  a  despatch,  dated  October  24,  Sir  Henry 
Wolff  pointed  out  the  advantages  which,  he 
thought,  had  accrued,  or  were  likely  to  accrue, 
from  the  signature  of  this  Convention.  "The 
conclusion  of  an  arrangement,"  he  said,  "  of  any 
kind  has  done  much  to  allay  the  irritation  that  has 
existed  for  some  time  in  the  minds  of  the  Turks 
towards  England.  .  .  .  The  experience  of  the 
Sultan's  Commissioner,  if  wisely  chosen,  will  be 
useful  in  the  elaboration  of  institutions  which  must 
combine  both  Eastern  and  Western  elements.  The 
same  reason  will  hold  good  with  respect  to  the 
regulations  in    the    Soudan.      It   mvist,  doubtless. 


374  MODERN  EGYPT  pt  v 

have  been  very  difficult  for  English  gentlemen, 
however  able  and  conciliatory,  to  come  to  terms 
with  races  who  had  suffered  so  severely  at  our 
hands.  The  regulations  which  are  to  be  under- 
taken, with  our  assent  and  countenance,  but 
between  the  Khalif  and  those  who  recognise  his 
autliority,  are  more  likely  to  lead  to  a  rapid  and 
satisfactory  result." 

Sir  Henry  Wolff  arrived  in  Cairo  on  October  29. 
The  departure  from  Constantinople  of  Ghazi 
Moukhtar  Pasha,  a  distinguished  soldier,  who  was 
named  Turkish  Commissioner,  was  delayed;  he  did 
not  arrive  in  Cairo  till  December  27. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  the  lengthy  negotia- 
tions which  ensued.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say 
that,  after  eighteen  months  of  discussion,  a  further 
Convention  was  signed  at  Constantinople,  on  May 
22,  1887,  between  Sir  Henry  Wolff  and  two 
Turkish  Plenipotentiaries  acting  on  behalf  of  the 
Sultan. 

The  two  Conventions  may  now  be  compared 
with  a  view  to  ascertaining  how  far  the  latter 
accomplished  the  objects  proposed  by  the  former. 

As  regards  the  tranquillisation  of  the  Soudan, 
Sir  Henry  Wolff's  efforts  were  foredoomed  to 
failure  from  the  commencement.  He  spoke  of 
negotiations  being  undertaken  *'  between  the 
Khalif  and  those  who  recognised  his  authority." 
Moukhtar  Pasha  and  other  Turks  were  naturally 
slow  to  believe  that  any  JNIohammedans  refused  to 
recognise  the  authority  of  the  Sultan  as  Khalif. 
But  every  one  in  Egypt  knew  that  tlie  Mahdi  con- 
founded Christians  and  Turks  alike  in  one  common 
anathema,  and  that  the  idea  of  conjuring  witli  the 
Sultan's  name  in  the  Soudan  was  a  dehision. 

On  this  particular  point,  therefore,  the  negotia- 
tions conducted  by  Sir  Henry  Wolff  and  Moukhtar 
Pasha  ended  in  failure.      It  was  reserved  for  Sir 


CH.XLVI     THE  WOLFF  CONVENTION      375 

Francis  Grenfell  and  Colonel  Wodehouse  to  arrive 
at  some  settlement  of  the  frontier  question  by 
methods  which  were  efficacious  because  they  were 
based  on  the  true  facts  of  the  case,  and  not  on  the 
imaginary  facts  evolved  from  the  brains  of  Turkish 
diplomatists.  The  defeats  which  the  Dervishes  sus- 
tained at  Arguin  and  Toski  in  the  summer  of  1889, 
gave  peace  to  the  frontier.  Powder  and  shot  proved 
more  effective  agents  than  the  "authority  of  the 
Khalif" 

Much  discussion  took  place  about  the  reorganisa- 
tion of  the  Egyptian  army.  At  one  time,  a 
proposal  was  put  forward  to  recruit  troops  in 
Turkey,  an  idea  which  did  not  find  favour  with  the 
Sultan.  At  another  time,  the  notion  of  importing 
a  number  of  Turkish  officers  into  Egypt  was 
started.  Eventually,  however,  nothing  was  done. 
The  British  officers  were  fortunately  left  to  re- 
organise the  Egyptian  army  after  their  own 
fashion.  On  this  point  also,  therefore,  the  Con- 
vention of  October  24,  1885,  was  unproductive  of 
result. 

Much  the  same  may  be  said  as  regards  admin- 
istrative reforms.  A  Protocol  annexed  to  the 
Convention  of  May  22,  1887,  provided  that  the 
British  and  Ottoman  Governments  should  jointly 
address  the  Powers  with  a  view  to  modifying  the 
Capitulations  in  the  sense  of  bringing  all  residents 
of  Egypt  "under  a  local  and  uniform  jurisdiction 
and  legislation."  A  second  Protocol  provided  that 
joint  representations  should  be  made  to  the  Powers 
with  a  view  to  reforming  tlie  administrations  of 
the  Domains,  Daira,  and  Railways,  defining  the 
powers  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt,  and 
enacting  laws  relative  to  the  press  and  to  quarantine. 
But  beyond  making  an  enumeration  of  the  points 
which  required  the  attention  of  the  reformer, 
nothing  was  done. 


376  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.v 

There  remains  to  be  considered  the  sixth  and 
most  important  article  of  the  Convention  of 
October  24,  1885,  namely,  that  which  provided 
that  the  Commissioners  should  discuss  the  ques- 
tion of  the  withdrawal  of  the  British  garrison  from 
Egypt.  It  was  perhaps  rather  a  bold  flight  of  the 
official  imagination  to  indulge  in  the  hope  that  any 
possible  steps  taken  by  the  two  Commissioners 
would  assure  "the  good  working  and  stability  of 
the  Egyptian  Government."  The  good  working 
and  stability  of  that  Government  are  still  assured 
by  the  presence  of  the  garrison  whose  speedy 
withdrawal  from  Egypt  formed  the  main  subject 
of  the  discussions  which  took  place  in  1885-87. 
Too  much  attention  should  not,  however,  be 
attached   to   the   wordinor   of  the    Convention   of 

o 

October  1885.  Diplomatic  instruments  of  this 
sort  usually  abound  hi  euphemisms  and  picturesque 
conventionalities.  In  plain  English,  the  first  Con- 
vention signed  by  Sir  Henry  Wolff  meant  that 
England  and  Turkey  were  to  endeavour  to  come 
to  terms  over  the  Egyptian  question,  and,  although 
nothing  practical  came  of  the  endeavour,  some 
cautious  and  intelligent  steps  were  taken  in  the 
direction  intended. 

Article  V.  of  the  Convention  of  May  22,  1887, 
laid  down  that  "at  the  expiration  of  three  years 
from  the  date  of  the  present  Convention,  Her 
Britannic  Majesty's  Government  will  withdraw  its 
troops  from  Egypt."  This  clause  seemed  explicit 
enough,  but  it  was  followed  by  another  clause, 
under  the  provisions  of  which  the  British  troops 
were  not  to  withdraw  at  the  end  of  three  years 
if  there  was  any  "appearance  of  danger  in  the 
interior  or  from  without."  It  was  not  specifically 
stated  who  was  to  judge  whether  the  internal  or 
external  danger  was  sufficient  to  justify  the  reten- 
tion of  the  British  garrison  in  Egypt,  but  in  the 


CH.XLVI     THE  WOLFF  CONVENTION      377 

absence  of  any  specific  arrangement  on  this  point, 
it  was  obvious  that  the  decision  rested  with  the 
British  Government.  One  important  definition 
was,  however,  given  to  the  words  "  danger  from 
without."  Article  VI.  of  the  Convention  laid  down 
that,  after  the  ratification  by  England  and  Turkey, 
the  Powers,  who  were  parties  to  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin,  should  be  invited  to  adhere  to  it.  The 
ultimate  execution  of  the  Convention  depended,  in 
fact,  on  its  acceptance  by  the  Powers.  In  a  letter 
attached  to  the  Convention,  which  was  addressed 
by  Sir  Henry  Wolff  to  the  Turkish  Plenipoten- 
tiaries, he  said  :  "  If,  at  the  expiration  of  the  three 
years  stipulated  in  the  Convention  of  this  day  for  the 
withdrawal  of  the  British  troops  from  Egypt,  one 
of  the  Great  Mediterranean  Powers  shall  not  have 
accepted  it.  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government 
would  consider  this  refusal  as  the  appearance  of  a 
danger  from  without,  provided  against  by  Article 
V.  of  the  Convention,  and  the  means  of  executing 
the  aforesaid  Convention  shall  be  again  discussed 
and  settled  between  the  Imperial  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment and  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government." 

More  than  this,  Article  V.  provided  that  if,  at 
any  time  subsequent  to  the  evacuation,  "  order  and 
security  in  the  interior  were  disturbed,  or  if  the 
Khedivate  of  Egypt  refused  to  execute  its  duties 
towards  the  Sovereign  Court,  or  its  international 
obligations,"  both  the  Ottoman  and  British  Govern- 
ments would  have  the  right  to  occupy  the  country 
with  troops,  and,  moreover,  that  if,  "by  reason  of 
hindrances,"  the  Sultan  did  not  avail  himself  of 
his  right  of  occupation,  the  British  Government 
could  none  the  less  take  military  action  on  their 
own  account,  and  that,  in  that  case,  the  Sultan 
would  "send  a  Commissioner  to  remain  durin<r  the 
period  of  the  sojourn  of  the  British  troops  with  their 
Commander." 


378  MODERN  EGYPT  px.t 

So  long  as  the  negotiations  which  were  pre- 
Hminary  to  the  signature  of  the  Convention  were 
going  on,  the  embers  of  diplomatic  opposition 
smouldered.  Directly  it  was  signed,  they  burst 
into  a  flame.  M.  de  Nelidoff,  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  Constantinople,  at  once  *'  sent  to  the 
Palace  his  remonstrances,  and  reproached  the 
Grand  Vizier  with  having  gratuitously  sacrificed 
the  rights  of  the  Sultan  to  England."  "  Similar 
language,"  Sir  Henry  Wolff  reported  on  May  27, 
"had  been  used  to  the  Turkish  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg  by  M.  de  Giers,  who  said  that  Russia 
would  probably  refuse  her  adhesion,  and  thus  act 
in  the  interests  of  the  Sultan." 

The  French  Government  also  took  strong  excep- 
tion to  the  right  of  re-entry  into  Egypt,  which  the 
Convention  conferred  on  England.  On  June  7, 
the  Count  de  Montebello,  who  represented  France 
at  Constantinople,  addressed  a  minatory  letter  to 
the  Sultan  in  which  he  stated  that  the  "  French 
Government  had  definitely  decided  not  to  accept 
the  situation  which  would  result  from  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  Egyptian  Convention." 

The  Sultan  was  perplexed.  On  July  9,  the 
Turkish  Plenipotentiaries  called  on  Sir  Henry 
Wolff.  "They  said  that  the  recent  language  of 
the  French  and  Russian  Ambassadors,  both  at  the 
Palace  and  the  Porte,  had  much  disturbed  the 
Sultan.  His  INIajesty  had  been  told  that  if  he 
ratified  the  Convention,  France  and  Russia  would 
thereby  be  given  the  right  to  occupy  provinces  of 
the  Empire,  and  to  leave  only  after  a  similar  Con- 
vention had  been  concluded.  France  might  do  so 
in  Syria,  and  Russia  in  Armenia.  Religious  feel- 
ing had  also  been  excited  in  the  same  direction." 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  was  asked,  could 
not  Sir  Henry  Wolff  "  advise  as  to  some  formula 
by  which  these  difficulties  might  be   met  ? "     Sir 


CH.XLVI     THE  WOLFF  CONVENTION      379 

Henry  could  not  advise  the  distracted  Plenipo- 
tentiaries as  to  any  formula.  He  "had  exhausted 
his  powers  of  reference  "  to  Lord  Salisbury.  What 
was  an  unfortunate  ruler  who  was  torn  hither  and 
thither  by  rival  diplomatists  to  do  ?  He  could  at 
all  events  fall  back  upon  his  favourite  device  and 
try  to  gain  time.  Under  Article  VH.  of  the 
Convention  the  ratifications  were  to  be  exchanged 
within  one  month  of  the  date  on  which  the  Con- 
vention was  signed.  The  British  Government  were 
implored  to  prolong  this  period.  On  June  26,  that 
is  to  say  four  days  after  the  prescribed  period  of 
a  month  had  expired,  the  Turkish  Ambassador 
represented  to  Lord  Salisbury  that  "the  Sultan 
was  much  fatigued  after  Bairam,"  and  wanted  time 
to  consider  the  whole  question.  A  short  delay 
was  granted,  but  the  Sultan  was  still  unable  to 
make  up  his  mind  as  to  whether  he  would  or 
would  not  ratify  the  Convention.  Sir  Henry 
Wolff  then  announced  his  intention  of  leaving 
Constantinople.  He  at  once  received  a  letter 
from  the  Sultan's  Grand  JNIaster  of  the  Cere- 
monies which  was  to  the  following  effect :  "  His 
Majesty  is  at  this  moment  occupied  with  questions 
of  the  greatest  importance  for  his  Empire.  In 
view  of  these  occupations,  which  will  last  all  next 
week,  he  is  anxious  tliat  you  should  remain  at 
Constantinople  until  Friday,  July  15."  Sir  Henry 
Wolff's  departure  was  according' y  fixed  for  July 
15.  At  8.30  P.M.  of  that  day  he  telegraphed  to 
Lord  Salisbury:  "Just  as  I  am  leaving,  Artin 
EfFendi  has  come  with  a  personal  message  from  the 
Sultan  urgently  pressing  me  to  stay.  I  have  told 
him  that  this  is  quite  impossible."  At  midnight 
on  July  15,  Sir  Henry  Wolff  left  Constantinople. 

Shortly  after  he  left,  the  Sultan,  through  his 
Ambassador  in  London,  made  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  to  renew  the  negotiations  with  the  British 


380  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  ▼ 

Government.  He  was  informed  by  Lord  Salis- 
bury "that  so  long  as  the  Sultan  was  so  much 
under  the  influence  of  other  advisers  as  to  repudi- 
ate an  agreement  which  he  had  himself  so  recently 
sanctioned,  any  fresh  agreement  would  obviously 
be  liable  to  meet  with  the  same  fate  as  the  late 
Convention." 

It  should  be  added  that  one  practical  conse- 
quence of  an  unfortunate  nature  resulted  from  the 
Wolff  mission.  Before  that  time,  the  Egyptian 
administrative  machine  was  sufficiently  compli- 
cated. Henceforth,  an  additional  complication 
was  added.  A  Turkish  Commissioner  was  left 
in  Egypt.  When  once  the  negotiations  had  broken 
down,  there  was  no  plausible  excuse  for  the  con- 
tinued presence  in  Egypt  of  a  high  Turkish  official, 
whose  functions  could  not  be  defined,  whose  presence 
would  naturally  be  resented  by  the  Khedive,  and 
who  at  any  moment  might  become  the  centre  of 
intrigue.  JNIoukhtar  Pasha  was,  however,  allowed 
to  remain.  In  spite  of  his  high  personal  character, 
the  presence  of  a  Turkish  Commissioner  in  Egypt 
has  served  no  useful  purpose,  and  has  at  times 
caused  some  trouble. 

Although  the  negotiations  conducted  by  Sir 
Henry  AVolff  failed  to  effect  their  object,  the 
British  Government  were  in  a  better  diplomatic 
position  at  their  close  than  they  had  been  at  their 
commencement.  They  could  henceforth  point  to 
the  fact  that  they  had  made  an  endeavour  to  come 
to  terms  with  the  Sultan  on  the  Egyptian  ques- 
tion ;  that  they  had,  moreover,  succeeded  in  their 
endeavour ;  and  that  it  was  no  fault  of  theirs  if 
the  Sultan,  under  the  pressure  of  France  and 
Russia,  had  refused  to  ratify  an  arrangement  to 
which  at  one  time  he  had  agreed.  Strong  in  this 
argument,  the  British  Government  could  feel  that 
the  Wolff  negotiations,  although  for  the  time  being 


ciLXLvi    THE  WOLFF  CONVENTION      881 

unproductive  of  result,  had  fortified  their  posi- 
tion as  against  both  Mohammedan  and  European 
critics. 

The  neutralisation  of  the  Suez  Canal,  to  which 
allusion  was  made  in  Article  III.  of  the  Convention 
of  May  22,  1887,  formed  the  subject  of  further 
discussion,  with  results  which  will  now  be 
described. 


CHAPTER  XLVII 

THE    NEUTRALISATION    OF   THE    SUEZ    CANAL* 

Neutralisation  of  Egypt  —  Neutralisation  of  the  Canal  —  The  word 
neutrality — Circular  of  January  3,  1883 — The  Suez  Canal  Com- 
mission of  1885  —  The  Commission  dissolved  —  The  Wolif  Con- 
vention— Signature  of  the  Canal  Convention — Its  application. 

At  one  time,  politicians  in  search  of  an  idea 
flattered  themselves  with  the  belief  that  the 
solution  of  the  Egyptian  question  was  to  be  found 
in  neutralising  Egypt.  Why,  it  was  sometimes 
asked,  should  not  Egypt  become  an  "  Oriental 
Belgium "  ?  A  point  is  already  gained  by  the 
advocates  of  any  political  idea  when  they  can  label 
their  pet  theory  with  an  epigrammatic  ticket  of 
this  sort.  The  mere  appellation  gives  their  ])ro- 
posal  the  appearance  of  involving  some  sound 
and  statesmanlike  principle.  Catchpenny  phrases 
exercise  a  good  deal  of  influence  in  tlie  government 
of  the  world.  In  the  Sturiri  und  Drang  of  public 
life  in  this  busy  century,  large  numbers  of  people 
who  are  engaged  in  politics  are  often  too  much 
occupied  with  other  matters  to  inquire  carefully 
whether  the  particular  phrase  in  question  embodies, 
as  may  at  first  sight  appear,  the  elements  of  a 
sound  policy  based  on  the  true  facts  of  the  situation, 
or  whether,  as  is  not  unfrequently  the  case,  it  is  a 
mere  tinsel  covering  beneath  which  some  glaring 
fallacy  may  lurk 

^  See  further  remarks  on  this  subject  on  p.  66& 
882 


CH.  xLvii  SUEZ  CANAL  383 

The  proposal  to  neutralise  Egypt  belongs  to 
the  latter  of  these  two  categories.  Its  tinsel 
covering  consists  of  an  argument,  which  may 
conveniently  be  stated  in  the  form  of  a  syllogism 
thus :  The  most  serious  aspect  of  the  Egyptian 
question  is  that  it  may,  under  contingencies  which 
are  easily  conceivable,  bring  about  a  rupture 
between  France  and  England.  The  principal 
element  of  danger  consists  in  the  two  facts  that 
England  would  resent  a  French  occupation,  whilst 
France  resents  a  British  occupation  of  the  country. 
Therefore,  the  danger  will  be  removed  and  all  risk  of 
a  rupture  will  disappear  if  both  France  and  England 
agree  that  neither  of  them  shall  occupy  Egypt. 

This  appears  at  first  sight  a  compact  and 
plausible  chain  of  argument.  Unfortunately,  it  is 
fallacious,  for  the  main  question  to  be  decided  is 
not  whether  both  England  and  France  shall 
abstain  from  occupying  the  country,  but  whether, 
inasmuch  as  some  foreign  occupation  is  necessary, 
the  occupiers  shall  be  French  or  British.  The 
analogy  between  Belgium  and  Egypt  breaks  down 
on  this  essential  point,  that  whereas  Belgium  is 
inhabited  by  a  highly  civilised  population  capable 
of  self-government,  the  population  of  Egypt  is 
for  the  present  incapable  of  governing  itself 
on  principles  which  would  commend  themselves 
to  the  civilised  world.  This  bald  fact,  namely, 
that  a  foreign  occupation  was,  and  still  is  neces- 
sary in  order  to  prevent  anarchy  in  Egypt,  and, 
therefore,  in  order  to  obviate  the  resuscitation  of 
an  Egyptian  question  which  would  be  a  source  of 
constant  trouble  to  Europe,  has  been  frequently 
forgotten  by  those  who  have  from  time  to  time 
discussed  Egyptian  affairs.  Nevertheless,  I  am 
convinced  that  it  is  true,  and,  moreover,  that  it  is 
of  a  nature  to  quash  all  ideas  of  neutralisation. 
Oriental  Belgiums,  and  similar  phantasies. 


384  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.v 

Most  responsible  and  impartial  authorities  who 
have  studied  the  Egyptian  question  appear  so  far 
to  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion  stated  above.  It 
is  true  that  Article  V.  of  the  Convention  of 
May  22,  1887,  provided  that  the  Great  Powers 
were  to  be  '*  invited  to  sign  an  Act  recoo-nisinsr 
and  guaranteeing  the  inviolability  of  Egyptian 
territory  " ;  but  this  was  immediately  followed  by 
a  provision  which  enabled  Turkey  and  England  to 
occupy  the  country  in  case  any  foreign  occupation 
should  become  necessary.  For  all  practical  purposes, 
it  may,  therefore,  be  said  that  the  idea  of  neutral- 
ising Egypt,  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  has  never 
got  beyond  the  stage  of  academic  discussion. 

It  has  been  otherwise  with  the  question  of 
neutralising  the  Suez  Canal.  This  subject  attracted 
the  attention  of  the  Powers  of  Europe  in  1882, 
notice  having  been  more  particularly  drawn  to  it 
by  the  fact  that,  during  the  period  which  preceded 
the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir,  Lord  Wolseley  used  the 
Canal  as  his  base  of  operations.  Before  proceeding 
to  state  what  was  done  in  this  matter,  it  may  be  as 
well  to  describe  what,  in  this  particular  instance, 
was  meant  by  the  word  neutrality. 

In  the  words  of  Lord  Pauncefote,  an  excellent 
authority  on  this  subject,  the  word  as  applied  to 
the  proposals  made  in  connection  with  the  Suez 
Canal,  "  had  reference  only  to  the  neutrality  which 
attaches  by  international  law  to  the  territorial 
waters  of  a  neutral  state,  in  which  a  right  of 
innocent  passage  for  belligerent  vessels  exists,  but 
no  right  to  commit  any  act  of  hostility." 

The  definition  of  the  term  is  important.  Lord 
Granville  was  evidently  apprehensive  lest  the  mere 
use  of  the  word  "neutrality"  should  carry  him 
farther  than  he  intended.  With  commendable 
prudence,  therefore,  he  directed  that,  in  dealing 
with   this  subject,  its  use  should   be  avoided  and 


CH.XLVII  SUEZ  CANAL  385 

that   the   words  "freedom"  or  "free   navigation" 
should  be  substituted  in  its  place. 

Some  three  months  after  the  battle  of  Tel- 
el -Kebir,  Lord  Granville  addressed  a  Circular  to 
the  Powers  in  order  to  give  them  "  full  information 
on  all  matters,  which  were  immediately  connected 
with  the  peace,  security,  and  social  order  of  Egypt, 
and  on  which,  accordingly,  they  {i.e.  the  British 
Government)  had  thought  it  their  duty  to  advise 
the  Khedive  as  to  the  best  mode  of  exercising  his 
governing  power." 

In  this  Circular,  a  prominent  place  was  given  to 
the  arrangements  which  it  was  proposed  should  for 
the  future  be  adopted  in  connection  with  the  free 
navigation  of  the  Suez  Canal. 

The  question  was  then  allowed  to  sleep  till 
early  in  1885,  when,  at  the  instance  of  the  French 
Government,  it  was  decided  to  assemble  a  Com- 
mission in  Paris  composed  of  representatives  of  the 
Great  Powers,  as  well  as  of  Spain  and  Holland,  in 
order  to  discuss  the  question  of  neutralising  the 
Canal.  The  British  Government  would  have 
preferred  "that  all  the  Maritime  Powers  who 
applied  should  be  permitted  to  send  delegates," 
but  to  this  proposal  the  French  objected.  The 
purpose  for  which  the  Commission  was  convoked 
was  to  "  establish  by  a  conventional  act  a  definite 
system  for  guaranteeing  at  all  times  and  to  all 
Powers  the  free  use  of  the  Suez  Canal." 

The  first  meeting  was  held  on  March  30,  1885, 
the  proceedings  being  opened  by  M.  Jules  Ferry, 
the  French  Prime  Minister. 

M.  Billot,  the  Director- General  of  the  French 
Foreign  Office,  then  assumed  the  presidency  of  the 
Commission,  but  the  real  work  was  delegated  to 
a  Sub -Commission,  over  which  M.  Barrere,  the 
second  French  representative,  presided. 

It  is  needless  to  describe  the  proceedings  of  the 

VOL.  II  2  c 


386  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  v 

Commission  in  detail.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say 
that  the  object  of  the  majority  of  the  Powers  was 
to  internationalise  rather  than  to  neutralise  the 
Canal,  and  that  the  British  Government  were 
opposed  to  the  adoption  of  this  course. 

The  British  delegates  were  obliged  to  fight  the 
ground  inch  by  inch.  Although  they  made  some 
concessions,  they  were  unable  to  come  to  terms 
with  their  adversaries.  Eventually,  after  some  ten 
weeks  of  wearisome  discussion,  a  draft  Treaty 
was  drawn  up  representing  the  views  of  the 
majority.  It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  in  detail 
on  the  points  at  issue  between  France  and  her 
allies  on  the  one  side,  and  England,  supported  to 
a  certain  extent  by  Italy,  on  the  other.  It  will 
be  sufficient  to  say  that  they  were  of  a  nature  to 
exclude,  for  the  time  being,  the  possibility  of  any 
common  understanding. 

On  June  13,  the  Commission  held  its  last  sitting. 
A  few  days  later,  Mr.  Gladstone's  Ministry  fell.  The 
question  of  neutralising  the  Canal  was  again  allowed 
to  sleep  for  a  while.  Shortly  afterwards,  Sir  Henry 
Wolff  started  on  his  mission.  The  question  of  the 
free  navigation  of  the  Canal  formed  the  subject  of 
negotiation  at  Constantinople,  with  the  result  that 
an  Article  (III.)  on  this  point  was  inserted  in  the 
Convention  of  May  22,  1887.  Briefly  it  may  be 
said  that  this  Article  embodied  the  views  which 
had  been  maintained  by  the  British  delegates  in 
Paris  in  June  1885. 

Although  the  Convention  of  May  22,  1887,  was 
not  ratified  by  the  Sultan,  the  idea  of  neutralising 
the  Canal  was  not  allowed  to  drop.  It  was  one 
to  which  the  French  attached  great  importance. 
Eventually,  after  some  lengthy  negotiations,  which 
need  not  be  described  in  detail,  a  Convention,  the 
text  of  which  is  to  be  found  in  Kg^ijpt,  No.  2  of 
1889,  was  signed  on  April  29,  1888.     The  British 


CH.  xLvii  SUEZ  CANAL  387 

Government  stipulated  that  the  Convention  was 
not  to  come  into  force  so  long  as  the  British 
occupation  of  Egypt  lasted. 

Nothing  further  was  done  in  this  matter  until 
1904.  Under  the  Anglo-French  Agreement,  signed 
on  April  8  of  that  year,  the  British  Government 
agreed  to  put  the  Suez  Canal  Convention,  of  April 
29,  1888,  into  force,  with  the  exception  of  those 
portions  which  provided  that  a  Local  International 
Board  should  be  created  at  Cairo  to  watch  over 
the  execution  of  the  Convention. 

Thus,  another  important  step  was  taken  in  the 
direction  of  settling  the  Egyptian  question. 

The  actual  working  of  the  Canal  Convention 
was  put  to  the  test  during  the  Russo-Japanese 
War.  On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that  it  worked 
well,  but,  as  usually  happens  in  such  cases,  a  number 
of  questions  of  detail  arose  in  respect  to  which  the 
wording  of  the  Convention  was  wanting  in  precision. 
It  would  be  desirable  that  an  opportunity  should 
be  taken  to  revise  the  Convention  by  the  light  of 
the  experience  which  has  now  been  gained. 


CHAPTER  XLVIII 

THE    ANGLO-FRENCH    AGREEMENT    OF    1904 

Apparent  insolubility  of  the  Egyptian  question — Gradual  change  in 
public  opinion — Statement  of  Lord  Elleuborough — The  business  of 
diplomacy — The  main  facts  of  the  problem — The  events  of  1904 — 
Morocco — Signature  of  the  Anglo-French  Agreement — Remarks  on 
the  Agreement. 

For  some  years  subsequent  to  the  Wolff  nego- 
tiations, no  attempt  was  made  to  deal  with  the 
larger  aspects  of  the  Egyptian  Question.  When- 
ever the  British  Government  were  reproached  by 
the  French,  or  by  British  partisans  of  evacuation, 
with  not  having  fulfilled  their  pledge  to  evacuate, 
the  reply  persistently  given,  by  both  Conservative 
and  Liberal  statesmen,  was  that  England's  work  in 
Egypt  was  not  yet  completed.  This  reply,  though 
regarded  by  some  as  a  mere  subterfuge,  was 
perfectly  true ;  yet  it  did  not  convey  the  whole 
truth.  It  encouraged  the  inference  that  England's 
work  would  be  completed  at  some  period,  which 
would  not  be  very  remote,  whereas  not  one  of  the 
British  statesmen  wlio  gave  the  reply  had  any 
precise  idea  as  to  whether  the  period  would  be 
remote  or  proximate.  The  better  was  his  acquaint- 
ance with  the  facts,  the  stronger  would  his 
conviction  be  that  the  period  would  be  remote, 
even  to  the  extent  of  giving  a  distinctly  permanent 
character  to  the  occupation,  which  was  originally 
intended  to  be  temporary. 

888 


CH.  xLviii       AGREEMENT  OF  1904  389 

For  more  than  twenty  years,  therefore,  poU- 
ticians.  whether  professional  or  amateur,  French 
or  English,  wandered  aimlessly  in  a  labyrinth  to 
which  there  was  no  clue.  They  sought  for  the 
solution  of  a  question  which  was  in  reality 
insoluble  on  any  basis  which  had,  during  that 
period,  been  formulated.  Eventually,  Englishmen 
relaxed  their  attempts  to  make  a  pyramid  stand  on 
its  apex;  whilst  Frenchmen  gradually  recognised 
two  facts.  One  was  that  the  British  occupation 
of  Egypt  was  beneficial  rather  than  hurtful  to  the 
material  interests  of  France,  whilst  general  French 
political  interests  suffered  from  the  prolonged 
estrangement  of  the  two  countries,  which  was 
caused  by  the  Egyptian  Question.  The  other 
was  that,  unless  the  evacuation  of  Egypt  was 
to  be  made  a  casus  belli  with  England,  the  British 
view  of  the  facts  had  to  be  accepted. 

An  English  politician,  writing  in  1844,  had  said  : 
"  It  is  impossible  for  any  statesman  who  carries  his 
views  forward  a  few  years  not  to  see  that  there 
must  be  eventually  a  contest  among  European 
Powers  for  the  possession  of  Egypt."  ^ 

That  contest,  if  it  ever  came,  could  only  be 
between  England  and  France.  It  was  the  business 
of  diplomacy  to  be  on  the  watch  for  any  opportunity 
to  settle  the  question,  and  thus  avoid  any  such 
calamity  as  that  predicted  by  Lord  EUenborough. 

The  main  facts  connected  with  the  Egyptian 
Question  were  in  reality  very  simple. 

It  was  certain  that,  in  the  early  days  of  the 
occupation,  the  British  Government  stated  publicly 
their  desire  to  withdraw  the  British  garrison,  so 
soon  as  circumstances  admitted  of  the  adoption  of 
such  a  course. 

It  was  equally  certain  to  all  who  considered  the 
subject  impartially,  and  with  a  full  knowledge  of 

*  Letter  from  Lord  EUenborough,  Sir  Robert  Peel,  voL  iii.  p.  269. 


390  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.v 

the  circumstances,  that  the  British  Government 
could  not,  with  a  due  regard  to  all  the  interests 
involved,  carry  out  their  declared  intention. 

Gradually,  the  truth  of  this  latter  statement 
came  to  be  generally  recognised,  and  when  once  it 
was  recognised,  all  that  was  required  to  set  diplo- 
matic action  in  movement  was  an  opportunity  for 
negotiating  with  a  fair  prospect  of  success. 

Such  an  opportunity  occurred  in  1904.  The 
visits  of  King  Edward  VII.  to  Paris,  and  of  the 
President  of  the  French  Republic  to  London, 
prepared  the  public  opinion  of  both  countries  for 
a  general  settlement  of  all  outstanding  differences. 
Moreover,  at  this  moment  the  affairs  of  Morocco 
acquired  some  prominence. 

That  State  had  been  for  some  while  past  travers- 
ing the  various  stages  on  the  road  to  ruin,  which 
would  appear  to  be  normal  in  the  case  of  Oriental 
countries.  The  final  stage  had  nearly  been  reached. 
The  exercise  of  unbridled  personal  power  by  the 
ruler  of  the  State  led  to  misgovernment,  culminating 
in  revolution.  European  intervention  had  become 
inevitable.  The  only  practical  question  at  issue 
was  to  decide  on  the  nationality  of  the  Europeans 
who  were  to  intervene. 

The  choice  practically  lay  between  three  nations, 
Spain,  England,  and  France. 

Spain,  still  staggering  under  the  effects  of  a 
disastrous  war  with  America,  was  manifestly  in- 
capable of  assuming  the  task  of  regenerator. 

England  was  unwilling  to  add  to  her  already 
heavy  burthen  of  world-wide  responsibilities. 

The  duty  of  dealli.g  with  Morocco  devolved, 
therefore,  naturally  on  France.^     But,  in  order  that 

*  Tlie  difficulties  which  suhseciueiitly  occurred  between  France  and 
Germany,  as  also  the  proceedinjrs  of  the  Algeciras  Conference,  lie 
obviously  outside  the  sco])e  of  this  work.  Moreover,  those  dirticulliea 
did  not  arise  until  a  period  sul)so(|uent  to  the  signature  of  the  Anglo- 
French  Agreement  of  April  li,  ILIU-i. 


cH.  xLviii       AGREEMENT  OF  1904  391 

the  task  should  be  taken  in  hand  with  a  fair 
prospect  of  success,  the  goodwill  of  England  was 
necessary.  What,  therefore,  could  be  more  natural 
than  to  barter  British  support  in  Morocco  for 
French  support  in  Egypt  ? 

Negotiations  on  this  basis  were  commenced  in 
tlie  summer  of  1903,  with  the  result  that,  on 
April  8,  1904,  three  Conventions  were  signed  by 
Lord  Lansdowne,  who  then  presided  over  the 
British  Foreign  Office,  and  by  M.  Cambon,  the 
French  Ambassador  in  London. 

Two  of  these  Conventions  dealt  with  the  affairs 
of  Newfoundland,  Nigeria,  Siam,  JMadagascar,  and 
the  New  Hebrides.  The  consideration  of  these 
questions  lies  outside  the  scope  of  the  present  work. 

As  regards  Egypt,  it  has  been  already  explained 
that  the  Egyptian  Government  acquired  financial 
liberty,  and  also  that  the  British  Government 
recognised  the  Suez  Canal  Convention  of  1888. 
Further,  a  "Declaration"  made  on  April  8,  1904, 
contained  the  following  very  important  provision  : — 

*'  His  Britannic  INIajesty's  Government  declare 
that  they  have  no  intention  of  altering  the  political 
status  of  Egypt. 

"  The  Government  of  the  French  Republic,  for 
their  part,  declare  that  they  will  not  obstruct  the 
action  of  Great  Britain  in  that  country  by  asking 
that  a  limit  of  time  be  fixed  for  the  British  Occupa- 
tion or  in  any  other  manner." 

In  other  words,  the  occupation  was  recognised, 
and  the  British  Government  were  left  a  far  freer 
hand  than  formerly  to  deal  with  Egyptian  affiiirs. 

The  Governments  of  Germany,  Austria,  and 
Italy  subsequently  adhered  to  this  declaration. 

Thus,  the  '*  Egyptian  Question,"  in  the  sense  in 
which  that  phrase  had  heretofore  been  used,  was 
partially  settled.  It  is  rare  that  an  arrangement 
of  this  kind  is  of  a  nature  to  give  satisfaction  to 


392  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.v 

all  those  who  are  directly  or  indirectly  concerned. 
Such,  however,  was  the  case  as  regards  the  Anglo- 
French  Agreement. 

As  to  the  advantages  which  are  likely  to  accrue 
to  the  residents  in  Egypt,  both  European  and 
Egyptian,  there  cannot  be  a  shadow  of  doubt. 
Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  financial  restrictions, 
which  by  a  change  of  circumstances  had  become 
obsolete  and  unnecessary,  have  been  removed,  it  is 
to  be  observed  that  Egyptian  progress  will  now,  it 
may  be  hoped,  continue  to  advance  without  being 
hampered  by  that  somewhat  acute  stage  of  inter- 
national rivalry  which  has  been  productive  of  so 
much  harm  in  the  past. 

Both  England  and  France  gained  in  the  removal 
of  a  difference  of  opinion  which  had  for  long 
embittered  the  relations  of  two  nations  whose 
common  interest  it  is  to  strengthen  the  bonds  of 
close  friendship. 

England  gained  by  obtaining  a  practically  valid 
sanction  to  a  position  which  was  previously,  to 
some  extent,  irregular.  I  had  for  long  been 
convinced  that  the  early  withdrawal  of  the  British 
garrison  from  Egypt  was  quite  impossible,  but 
I  never  regarded  lightly  the  non-fulfilment  of  the 
engagement  to  withdraw.  Neither  did  I  ever 
think  that  a  good  deal  of  provocation  in  local 
matters  constituted  a  sufficient  plea  to  justify  the 
annulment  of  that  engagement.  It  is  a  distinct 
advantage  for  a  nation,  which  is  bound  to  a 
scrupulous  respect  of  international  obligations  by 
every  consideration  of  public  morality  and  self- 
interest,  that  it  can  no  longer  be  accused  of  any 
apparent  disregard  of  those  obligations. 

France  also  gained.  The  large  French  interests 
at  stake  in  Egypt  are  secured  by  specific  engage- 
ments, and  are  still  more  am})ly  secured  by  the 
traditional    character    of    British     predominance. 


CH.XLVIII       AGREEMENT  OF  1904  393 

wherever  it  has  been  acquired.  On  the  other 
hand,  any  apparent  loss  of  French  political 
influence  in  Egypt  received  compensation  else- 
where. 

Lastly,  the  civilised  world — whose  principal 
interest  I  conceive  to  be  the  maintenance  of  peace 
— gained  by  the  re-establishment  of  very  friendly 
relations  between  two  of  the  most  important 
members  of  the  European  family. 

Such,  therefore,  is  the  view  I  venture  to  submit 
of  this  very  important  and  auspicious  transaction. 
I  began  my  connection  with  Egypt  twenty-eight 
years  previous  to  the  signature  of  the  Anglo-French 
Agreement,  when  England  and  France  moved 
hand  in  hand  together  in  that  country.  I  rejoice 
that  my  connection  lasted  long  enough  to  enable 
me  to  see  the  friendly  relations  of  the  past 
re-established  after  an  interlude  of  misunder- 
standing which  was  detrimental  alike  to  British, 
French,  and  Egyptian  interests. 

A  further  Egyptian  Question  remains  behind. 
It  consists  in  gradually  adapting  the  institutions 
of  the  country  to  the  growing  needs  of  the  popu- 
lation. Possibly,  time  will  also  solve  that  problem, 
but,  unless  disaster  is  to  ensue,  it  must  be  a  long 
timCi 


PART  VI 
THE    REFORMS 


In  the  Edsty  toe  are  attemj)tmg  to  put  new  wine  into  old 
bottles,  to  pour  what  ice  can  of  a  civilisation  whose  spirit  is 
progress  into  the  Jbrm  of  a  civilisation  whose  spirit  is  fixity ; 
and  whether  we  succeed  or  not  is  perhaps  the  most  interesting 
question  in  an  age  abounding  almost  beyond  example  in 
guestions  of  political  interest. 

Bagehot,  Physics  and  Politics. 


896 


CHAPTER  XLIX 


THE    COURBASH 


CTniTersal    use  of  the  courbash — Lord   Dufferin's  Circular — It  was 
partially  inoperative — Final  abolition  of  the  courbash. 

Reforms  in  all  countries,  which  are  in  a  backward 
state  of  civilisation,  can  be  divided  into  two 
categories,  namely,  first,  those  which  are  manifestly 
possible  if  the  reformer  is  provided  with  the  money 
and  the  administrative  agency  necessary  to  their 
execution ;  secondly,  those  dealing  with  long- 
standing abuses  or  faulty  habits  of  thought,  which 
are  ingrained  to  such  an  extent  into  the  minds  of 
the  population  as  to  require  a  social  almost  as 
much  as  an  administrative  revolution  in  order  to 
ensure  their  eradication. 

The  present  and  the  two  succeeding  chapters 
will  deal  with  the  most  prominent  instances  of 
Egyptian  reforms  belonging  to  the  second  of  these 
categories.  These  are  the  three  C's — the  Courbash, 
the  Corvee,  and  Corruption. 

It  was  formerly  the  custom  of  the  governing 
classes  in  Egypt  to  practise  many  cruel  forms  of 
torture  on  the  population.  One  case  which  came 
under  my  personal  notice  may  be  mentioned  as  an 
example  of  the  perverse  ingenuity  which  was 
occasionally  exhibited  in  discovering  recondite 
means  for  the  infliction  of  bodily  pain.  A  Moudir 
was  in  the  habit  of  causing  a  burning  rag  steeped  in 
spirits  of  wine  to  be  held  close  to  the  mouth  of  any 

397 


398  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.vi 

recalcitrant  taxpayer,  who  then  received  a  blow  on 
the  chest,  the  consequence  of  which  was  that,  the 
air  being  expelled  from  his  lungs,  he  was  obliged 
to  take  a  deep  breath  to  refill  them.  The  flame 
was  thus  drawn  into  his  mouth.  The  official  who 
was  guilty  of  this  particular  act  of  barbarity  was 
by  no  means  a  bad  specimen  of  his  class.  He 
simply  followed  certain  caste  traditions,  which  led 
him  to  be  callous  to  the  pain  inflicted  on  a  fellow- 
creature.  It  was  with  the  aid  of  administrative 
material  such  as  this  JNIoudir  that  the  English  had, 
in  the  first  instance,  to  create  the  New  Egypt. 

Refined  forms  of  torture  were,  however,  com- 
paratively rare.  On  the  other  hand,  the  use  of  the 
courbash,  a  strip  of  hippopotamus  hide  tapering  at 
tiie  end,  was  universal.  When  such  a  simple  and 
effective  form  of  torture  as  flogging  with  this  imple- 
ment could  readily  be  applied,  there  was,  indeed, 
no  need  for  refinements  in  cruelty.  The  courbash 
was  employed  on  every  occasion  when  coercion  or 
punishment  was  required,  but  notably  for  the  col- 
lection of  taxes  and  for  extracting  either  the 
evidence  of  witnesses  or  the  confession  of  persons 
accused  of  crime. 

Confession  forms  an  important  part  of  the 
Mohammedan  law  of  evidence.  If,  the  Moham- 
medan lawgiver  argued,  a  man  confesses  his  crime, 
he  must  surely  be  guilty.  What,  then,  added  the 
Turco- Egyptian  I'asha  with  medigeval  logic  and 
assurance,  can  be  more  just  and  natural  than  that 
when  I  see  that  he  will  not  inculpate  himself,  and 
when  I  know  that  either  he  or  some  one  else  must 
be  guilty,  I  should  flog  him  to  see  if  he  will  con- 
fess ?  It  is  true  that  he  may  afterwards  retract  his 
confession,  but  no  im])ortance  can  be  attached  to 
his  retractation  ;  for,  if  he  is  not  guilty,  why  did  he, 
ni  the  first  instance,  confess  his  crime  ?  Moreover, 
if  some  glimmering  of  doubt  entered  into  the  mind 


OH.XLIX  THE  COURBASH  899 

of  the  old-fashioned  Pasha  as  to  the  soundness  of  this 
process  of  reasoning,  he  would  change  his  tactics.  He 
would  bid  avaunt  to  the  argumentative  subtleties 
of  the  Frank,  and  would  triumphantly  point  out 
that,  even  supposing  the  confession  to  have  been 
made  in  order  to  obtain  relief  from  bodily  pain, 
no  injustice  was  committed,  for,  ere  one  stroke  of 
the  courbash  had  been  administered,  he,  the 
Pasha,  knew  that  the  man  was  guilty,  and  that 
the  flogging  was,  therefore,  a  mere  formality  in 
order  to  obtain  the  confession  necessary  to  give 
legal  sanction  to  the  punishment,  which  the  criminal 
had  richly  deserved.  The  Pasha,  having  complied 
with  the  text  of  the  law,  to  which,  oblivious  of  its 
spirit,  he  attached  the  utmost  importance,  no  valid 
complaint  could  be  made ;  nor,  indeed,  was  it 
necessary  to  ask  any  useless  questions  as  regards 
the  method  adopted  to  ensure  compliance.^ 

When  Lord  Dufferin  came  to  Cairo,  one  of  his 
first  resolves  was  of  a  negative  nature.  It  was  not 
at  that  time  clear  how  Egypt  was  to  be  governed 
for  the  future,  but  Lord  Dufferin  determined  that 
in  any  case  the  country  should  not,  if  he  could 
prevent  it,  be  ruled  by  an  indiscriminate  use  of 
the  whip.  Under  his  auspices,  a  Circular  was 
issued  forbidding  the  use  of  the  courbash.  It  was 
signed  by  Ismail  Pasha  Eyoub,  who  was  then 
Minister  of  the  Interior,  and  is  a  curious  and  very 
characteristic  document.  Like  many  Oriental 
state-papers,  it  assumed  a  condition  of  things 
which  was  wholly  at  variance  with  the  reality. 
Any  one  unacquainted  with  the  ways  of  the  East 
might,  on  reading  it,  suppose  that  the  rulers  of 
Egypt  had  on  frequent  occasions  used  their  utmost 

*  I  wish  to  explain  that  here,  and  elsewhere,  I  am  speaking  of  the 
''old-fashioned  Pasha,"  that  is  to  say,  the  Pasha  who  existed  some 
twenty-five  years  ago.  This  type  has  now  almost  entirely  disappeared. 
The  modern  Pasha  may  have  his  defects,  but  he  is  generally  au 
educated  and  enlightened  geutleniau. 


400  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  vi 

endeavours  to  suppress  the  use  of  the  courbash, 
and  that  they  were  scandaUsed  to  learn  that,  in 
spite  of  all  their  humane  efforts,  that  implement 
was  still  very  generally  employed.  Any  such  con- 
clusion would  have  been  wholly  erroneous.  No 
real  effort  had  ever  been  made  by  the  Egyptian 
portion  of  the  administration  to  abolish  torture. 

It  is,  however,  proverbially  unnecessary  to  look 
a  gift  horse  in  the  mouth.  If  the  thistles  of 
Pashadom  could,  under  pressure,  be  made  to  pro- 
duce figs,  the  business  of  the  British  statesman  was 
to  make  the  most  of  the  figs,  and  not  to  dwell  on 
the  circumstances  by  which  the  change  of  produc- 
tion had  been  effected.  Whatever  Ismail  Pasha 
Eyoub  and  his  coadjutors  may  have  thought  on  the 
subject  of  government  by  torture,  their  sentiments, 
as  expressed  in  the  Circular,  were  unimpeacbably 
orthodox  when  judged  by  the  standard  of  modern 
civilisation.  It  was  stated,  in  terms  of  indignant 
remonstrance,  that,  in  spite  of  reiterated  Circulars 
in  past  days,  the  JNIinister  of  the  Interior  had  heard, 
to  his  unspeakable  regret,  that  recourse  was  still 
had  by  some  perverse  officials  to  the  "repre- 
hensible use  of  the  bastinado."  This  practice 
was  denounced  as  "horrible  and  infamous."  It 
"degraded  humanity,  and  violated  in  the  gravest 
manner  the  principles  of  social  rights."  Further,  it 
was  "absolutely  useless  and  witliout  justification," 
for  the  Minister,  who  here  indulged  to  a  certain 
extent  in  a  flight  of  his  imagination,  pointed  out 
that  the  Government  had  instituted  law-courts, 
whose  business  it  was  to  deal  with  all  litigious 
affairs,  both  civil  and  criminal.  As  to  the  collec- 
tion of  the  taxes,  what  need  could  there  be  of  the 
whip  when  the  series  of  Decrees  issued  by  the 
Government  laid  down  with  commendable  precision 
the  nature  of  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  ensure 
their  payment  ?     The  various  officials  were,  there- 


CH.XLIX  THE  COURBASH  401 

fore,  solemnly  warned  that  "the  only  object  of 
their  mission  was  to  secure,  as  much  as  possible, 
the  welfare  of  the  people,  their  prosperity,  and 
their  moral  and  material  development,  by  dispensing 
to  individuals  equality  of  justice  whilst  defendhig 
them  against  all  aggression  and  protecting  their 
interests  and  their  rights."  They  were  all,  down 
to  the  lowest  village  Sheikh,  who  was  sometimes 
courbashed  and  sometimes  courbashed  others,  ad- 
jured in  language  which,  to  those  acquainted  with 
the  peculiar  ways  of  the  Pashadom  of  the  time,  is 
almost  comic  in  its  deceptive  pathos,  to  abstain 
in  the  future  from  the  abominable  and  barbarous 
practice  of  flogging. 

Ismail  Pasha  Eyoub  probably  stated  the  truth 
when  he  said  that  on  previous  occasions  orders  had 
been  issued  prohibiting  the  use  of  the  courbash. 
It  is  needless  to  inquire  into  this  point,  for,  if  any 
such  orders  were  issued,  no  adequate  steps  were 
taken  to  enforce  obedience  to  them.  But  when 
the  Circular  of  Ismail  Pasha  Eyoub  was  published, 
the  population  of  Egypt,  and  more  especially  that 
portion  of  it  which  was  in  the  habit  of  being  flogged, 
woke  up  to  the  fact  that  they  no  longer  had  to  deal 
with  a  few  meaningless  platitudes  intended  to  throw 
dust  in  the  eyes  of  humanitarians.  It  was  felt  that, 
although  the  signature  to  the  Circular  might  be 
that  of  an  oflScial  who  had  little  real  sympathy 
with  its  spirit,  the  contents  of  that  document  had 
been  dictated  by  the  British  Envoy,  who  meant 
what  he  said,  and  who,  moreover,  possessed  both 
the  will  and  the  power  to  enforce,  his  behests. 
One  instance  will  suffice  to  show  the  spirit  which 
the  new  order  evoked.  A  British  officer  was 
present,  shortly  after  the  issue  of  the  order,  when  a 
man  who  was  accused  of  some  crime  was  brought 
before  the  Moudir  of  the  pro\ince.  The  man 
declined  to  answer  the  questions  which  were  put 

VOL.  n  2d 


402  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

to  him.  The  Moudir  directed  that  he  should  be 
flogged.  All  the  steps  which  were  usually  pre- 
liminary to  the  infliction  of  flogging  were  taken. 
The  man,  however,  was  in  no  way  impressed. 
"The  English  are  here,"  he  said  to  the  Moudir; 
"you  know  that  you  cannot  flog  me."  And 
accordingly,  he  was  not  flogged.  It  may  well  have 
been  that  the  unwonted  audacity  displayed  in  this 
case  was  due  to  the  presence  of  an  Englishman. 
Nevertheless,  the  mere  fact  that  an  Egyptian  fellah 
should  have  dared  to  assert  his  right  not  to  be 
flogged  was  a  striking  innovation.  A  reflective 
Pasha  would  have  noted  that  a  new  spirit  was 
abroad. 

Lord  Dufl*erin's  Circular  constitutes  a  land- 
mark in  the  administrative  history  of  Egypt.  To 
him  belongs  the  credit  of  having  dealt  the  first 
decisive  blow  to  the  system  of  government  by 
flogging.  He  has,  however,  often  been  criticised 
for  his  action  in  this  matter.  The  people  of  Egypt, 
it  has  been  said,  had  from  time  immemorial  been 
governed  by  the  whip.  Was  it  safe  to  abolish  this 
system  by  a  stroke  of  the  pen,  without  substituting 
anything  in  its  place  ?  The  reign  of  law,  which 
Lord  Dufferin  held  should  take  the  place  of  the 
courbash,  would  necessarily  be  a  work  of  slow 
creation.  A  month  after  the  issue  of  the  Circular 
he  himself  wrote :  "  At  this  moment,  there  is  no 
real  justice  in  this  country.  What  passes  under 
that  name  is  a  mockery."  Would  it  not  have  been 
wiser  to  have  accepted  the  facts  of  the  situation,  to 
have  aimed  at  the  gradual  abolition  of  the  courbash, 
and  to  have  postponed  its  total  suppression  until 
some  progress  had  been  made  in  the  direction  of 
establishing  properly  constituted  law-courts  ? 

These  criticisms  are  perhaps,  to  some  extent, 
justified.  There  need  have  been  no  hesitation  in 
abolishing  at  once  the  system  of  flogging  in  so  far 


CH.XLIX  THE  COURBASH  403 

as  the  collection  of  taxes  was  concerned.  That 
system  had  been  shaken  by  the  reforms  introduced 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Dual  Control.  The 
burthen  of  taxation,  though  still  heavy,  had  been 
alleviated,  and  the  legal  process  for  the  recovery 
of  taxes,  being  a  matter  in  which  the  governing 
body  was  directly  interested,  was  in  sufficiently 
good  order  to  ensure  the  Treasury  against  serious 
loss.  It  was,  however,  otherwise  in  respect  to  the 
procedure  of  the  law-courts.  The  principle  on 
which  the  Government  had  heretofore  acted  a\:is 
to  mete  out  punishment  without  entering  into 
any  fine  discrimination  as  to  whether  those  who 
incurred  the  punishment  were  guilty  or  innocent 
of  the  crimes  laid  to  their  charge.  The  confessions 
extracted  under  torture,  though  often  false,  were 
sometimes  true.  The  idea  that  any  witness  would 
voluntarily  appear  to  give  evidence  was  foreign  to 
the  habits  of  the  Egyptian  people.  Justice,  such 
as  it  was,  was  almost  as  much  a  terror  to  the 
innocent  witness  as  to  the  accused  person  against 
whom  testimony  was  borne.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, there  was,  without  doubt,  a  risk  that  as  a 
result  of  the  sudden  and  complete  abolition  of  tlie 
courbash,  crime  and  lawlessness  would  be  inade- 
quately checked,  and  that  Egyptian  society  in 
general  would  be  in  danger  of  dissolution. 

It  is  probable,  indeed,  that  when  Lord  Dufferin 
decided  that  the  use  of  the  courbash  in  Egypt 
should  suddenly  cease,  he  did  not  fully  realise  the 
importance  of  the  step  which  he  was  taking.  This 
view  is  confirmed  by  a  perusal  of  the  despatch 
which  he  wrote  to  Lord  Granville  forwarding  the 
Circular.  It  was  very  brief.  It  did  not  contain 
anything  from  which  it  can  be  inferred  that  I^ord 
Dufferin  realised  that  he  had  initiated  a  social  and 
administrative  revolution.  **  The  new  Minister  of 
the  Interior,  Ismail  Pasha  Eyoub,"  Lord  Dufferin 


404  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

wrote,  "has  signalised  his  entry  into  office  by 
peremptorily  forbidding  the  application  of  tliis 
instrument  of  chastisement  {i.e.  the  courbash). 
I  cannot  but  regard  such  an  act  as  significant 
of  the  introduction  of  a  more  humane  and  civil- 
ised spirit  into  the  civil  administration  of  the 
country." 

In  other  words,  when  Lord  Dufferin  came  to 
Egypt  he  found  that  the  poorer  classes  of  the  popu- 
lation were  habitually  flogged  by  the  agents  of  the 
Government.  He  naturally  thought  that  they 
ought  not  to  be  flogged.  What,  therefore,  could 
be  simpler  than  to  issue  an  order  that  flogging 
should  cease,  and  to  insist  on  the  execution  of  the 
order?  There  is  a  "  scorn  of  consequence"  and  a 
breezy  light heartedness  in  the  conduct  of  the 
courageous  Irishman  which  excites  alike  admira- 
tion  and  amusement.  It  is  probable,  however, 
that,  after  all  that  can  be  said,  he  was  quite 
right.  The  action  of  any  one  who  knew  Egypt 
well  would  perhaps  have  been  more  cautious,  but 
it  might  not  improbably  have  been  less  effective. 
Lord  Dufferin  threw  the  Egyptian  administrator 
into  the  water  and  called  out  to  him  from  the 
bank  that  he  must  learn  to  swim  as  well  as  he  could 
without  the  help  of  his  time-honoured  support. 

Did  the  Egyptian  administrator  at  once  learn 
to  swim  ?  He  did  not.  In  fact,  the  main  reason 
why  no  dissolution  of  provincial  society  took  place 
in  consequence  of  the  Circular  was  that  it  was 
partially  inoperative.  Lord  Dufferin  dealt  a 
staggering  blow  to  the  use  of  the  courbash ; 
nevertheless,  that  implement  was  plentifully  used 
for  some  years  after  the  issue  of  his  epoch-making 
Circular.  In  the  early  days  of  the  British  occupa- 
tion, crime  increased  to  sucli  an  extent  that  Nubar 
Pasha  thought  it  necessary  to  create  the  Com- 
missions of  Brigandage  to  which  allusion  has  been 


CH.XLIX  THE  COURBASH  405 

already  made.^  These  Commissions  virtually  took 
the  place  of  the  ordinary  Tribunals.  Recourse  was 
had  to  the  old  system  of  torture.  To  quote  one 
out  of  many  passages  which  occur  in  a  report  pre- 
pared by  M.  Le  Grelle,  the  Procureur-G^neral  of 
the  Native  Courts,  dated  April  6,  1889 : — 

"En  Septembre,  1888,  un  acte  de  brigandage  se 
commit  a  Manchite  Gouzour  (Menoufieh).  Une 
enquete  amena  I'arrestation  d'une  serie  de  prdvenus. 
Quatre  firent  des  aveux.  Sur  les  ordres  reiteres 
d'un  Mouavin  du  Minist^re  de  I'lnterieur  venu  a 
Chibin-el-Kom,  la  torture  fut  employee  pendant 
six  jours  de  suite,  en  pleine  seance  de  la  Commis- 
sion Criminelle,  devant  le  Moudir,  le  Juge,  et  le 
Substitut  du  Parquet.  Les  malheureux  etaient 
frappes  jusqu'au  moment  ou  ils  avouaient  ou 
satisfaisaient  par  leurs  reponses  les  enqueteurs. 
Parmi  les  tortures,  figurait  une  femme  appel^e 
Fatmah." 

Eventually,  the  Commissions  were  abolished  and, 
at  the  same  time.  Sir  John  Scott  was  named 
Judicial  Adviser  to  the  Egyptian  Government. 
Then  the  work,  which  Lord  13  ufFerin  commenced, 
was  completed.     Torture  ceased. 

»  Vide  ante,  p.  289. 


CHAPTER    L 

THE    CORVEE 

Connection  between  the  courbash  and  the  corvee — Merits  and  demerits 
of  the  corvee  system — The  corvee  law — Dredging  the  canals — 
Proposed  reduction  of  the  land-tax  —  Proposal  to  abolish  the 
corvee  instead  of  reducing  the  land-tax — The  Powers  object — 
Action  of  the  British  Government — The  corvee  is  not  called  out — 
A  Decree  is  issued  partially  abolishing  the  corvee — Final  settle- 
ment of  the  question  in  1892. 

The  gods,  we  know,  are  just,  and  of  our  vices, 
pleasant  or  otherwise,  make  instruments  to  scourge 
us.  The  Egyptian  Government,  not  only  that  of 
the  Pashas  who  ruled  the  country  in  these  latter 
days  of  which  this  history  treats,  but  that  of  their 
predecessors  from  the  days  of  the  Pharaohs  onwards, 
was  vicious  in  this  respect,  that  it  had  held  that  the 
only  way  to  govern  the  Egyptians  was  perpetually 
to  flog  them.^  This  special  form  of  administrative 
vice  was  suddenly  arrested.  A  superior  authority 
decreed  that  flogging  was  to  cease.  Then  the 
scourge  of  the  gods,  whose  time  for  avenging  past 
misdeeds  had  come,  was  at  once  applied  in  the 
following  practical  shape.  The  people  of  Egypt 
could  not  live  unless  they  were  supplied  with 
water  to  irrigate  their  flelds.  The  water  could 
not  be  placed  on  the  fields  unless  the  mud,  which 

'  The  employment  of  the  corve'e  dates  from  very  ancient  times. 
See,  for  instance,  the  description  of  Solomon's  "  bond -service"  in 
1  Kings  ix.  16-22. 

It  is  said  that  100,000  men  were  made  to  work  three  months  in  the 
year  for  eighteen  years  to  build  the  great  Pyramid. 

406 


CH.L  THE  CORVEE  407 

the  rise  of  the  Nile  leaves  at  the  bottom  of  the 
canals,  was  annually  removed.  It  was  in  the 
interests  of  the  people  themselves  that  the  nmd 
should  be  removed  in  due  time  and  season.  But 
the  majority  of  the  people  were  blind  to  their  own 
interests.  They  had  always  been  accustomed  to 
coercion.  For  centuries  past,  the  practice  had 
been  to  call  on  them  to  work  in  order  to  remove 
the  mud,  and,  in  case  of  need,  to  flog  them  unless 
they  responded  to  the  call.  They  now  learnt  that 
they  were  not,  under  any  circumstances,  to  be 
flogged.  In  that  case,  they  said,  we  need  not, 
and  we  will  not  remove  the  mud.  "  The  Ministry 
of  Public  Works,"  Sir  Colin  Scott-Moncrieff'  wrote 
on  January  14,  1885,  "finds  by  certain  indications 
that  the  corvee  system,  which  was  enforced  by 
the  courbash,  is  becoming  no  longer  possible 
under  a  milder  regime.  The  peasantry  refuse  to 
go  to  the  works  at  the  bidding  of  the  Moudirs,  and 
they  can  no  longer  be  compelled.  The  result  is 
that  the  clearance  of  the  canals  is  imperfectly 
performed." 

Clearly,  some  means  other  than  flogging  had 
to  be  found  in  order  to  get  the  mud  removed. 
That  was  one  of  the  first  problems  which  had 
to  be  solved  by  the  British  administrators  of 
Egypt,  and  a  very  difficult  problem  it  was.  How 
was  a  torpid,  semi-civilised  Government  to  get  on 
when,  being  suddenly  overtaken  by  the  rush  of 
an  imperious  civilisation,  it  was  deprived  of  the 
use  of  the  only  implement  by  which  the  people 
had  heretofore  been  governed  ?  The  dilenuna  was 
one  which  might  well  have  puzzled  more  capable 
men  than  these  bewildered  Egyptian  Ministers 
who,  by  no  fault  of  their  own,  were  the  last 
inheritors  of  the  administrative  vices  bequeathed 
to  them  by  their  political  ancestors.  Indeed,  it 
may  be  doubted  whether  the  British  Envoy,  when 


408  MODERN  EGYPT  fi-.vi 

he  dictated  the  order  that  flogging  was  to  cease, 
reaUsed  the  fact  that  it  might  become  necessary 
to  flog  the  Egyptian  people  in  order  to  prevent 
them  from  starving.  Yet  it  is  a  fact  that  humani- 
tarian diplomacy  nearly  received  a  severe  check 
owing  to  the  difficulty  of  getting  a  certain  quantity 
of  mud  lifted  from  the  bottom  of  a  number  of 
ditches  and  deposited  on  their  banks. 

It  is  in  some  respects  unfortunate  that  the 
word  "corvee"  has  been  incorporated  into  the 
English  language.  The  Arabic  word  is  somewhat 
eupliemistic ;  it  is  "Aouna,"  signifying  "assist- 
ance which  is  compulsorily  rendered."  The  word 
corvee  conjures  up  ideas  based  on  the  condition  of 
the  French  peasantry,  who  were  *'  corveable,  tail- 
lable  et  tuable  a  volonte  "  in  the  pre-revolutionary 
days.  It  is,  indeed,  difficult  to  get  Englishmen 
to  believe  that  anything  can  be  said  in  favour  of 
a  system  with  which  such  pitiful  tales  of  suffering 
are  associated. 

From  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  however,  the 
system  of  forced  labour  is  capable  of  defence  as 
one,  amongst  several  forms  of  taxation.  More- 
over, from  a  practical  point  of  view,  it  admits  in 
some  cases  of  justification.  It  may  be  that  a 
country  is  so  exceptionally  situated  that  the 
interests  of  the  community  oblige  the  governing 
body  to  force  a  certain  number  of  its  citizens  to 
fulfil  their  duties  of  citizenship  by  giving  manual 
labour  rather  than  money  payments  to  the  State. 
The  existence  of  Holland  depends  on  the  dykes 
being  kept  in  proper  order.  So  also,  the  material 
prosperity  of  Egypt  may  be  said  to  depend  on  the 
clearing  of  the  canals  in  due  season  and  on  adequate 
steps  being  taken  to  guard  against  inundation.^ 

*  In  the  seventeenth  century,  tlie  corvee  existed  in  England. 
Macaulay  says  :  "  Every  parish  was  bound  to  repair  the  highways 
which  passed  through  it.  The  ])e;isaiitry  were  forced  to  give  their 
gratuitous  labour  six  days  in  the  year"  (IV'o/A-*,  vol.  L  p.  293).     A 


CH.L  THE  CORVEE  409 

Although,  however,  recourse  may  justifiably  be 
had  to  the  corvee  under  certain  exceptional  circum- 
stances, the  system  of  exacting  taxes  in  the  form 
of  manual  labour  is  a  bad  one  in  this  respect,  that 
it  is  singularly  liable  to  abuse. 

The  abuses  to  which  it  gave  rise  in  Egypt  were 
very  similar  to  those  which  existed  in  France  at 
the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century.^  When  Sir 
Colin  Scott-Moncrieff  first  examined  this  question, 
he  found  that  the  annual  clearing  of  the  canals 
required  the  work  of  one-eighth  of  the  popula- 
tion during  ninety  days.  "  This  number,"  he  wrote 
on  January  14,  1885,  "would  be  amply  sufficient, 
but  owing  to  the  fact  that  a  large  proportion  of 
the  agricultural  population  sends  not  a  man  to 
the  corvde,  the  burden  falls  on  the  remainder 
with  extreme  severity.  Instead  of  one-eighth  of 
the  whole  population  working  for  ninety  days,  a 
much  larger  proportion  from  certain  poor  districts 
is  employed  for  180  days."  For  instance,  in  the 
province  of  Gharbieh,  "  the  Wakfs,  which  own 
19,024  acres  with  a  population  of  4000  men,  and 
the  large  proprietors,  who  own  83,200  acres  with 
17,000  men,  send  no  men  to  the  corvee,  and  pay 
no  ransom  money." 

A  well-intentioned  but  unsuccessful  effort  was 
made  under  the  auspices  of  the  Dual  Control  to 
deal  with  the  corvee  question.  A  Decree  was 
issued  on  January  25,  1881,  under  which  every 
inhabitant  of  Egypt,  with  a  few  perfectly  legiti- 
mate exceptions,  was  rendered  liable  to  be  called 
out  for  corvde  work.  In  certain  cases,  a  money 
payment  was  accepted  in  lieu  of  personal  service. 
This  law  was  evaded  by  the  rich,  and  rigorously 
enforced  on  the  poor. 

Scotch  law  to  a  similar  effect  was  passed  in  1719  (Social  Life  in  Scotland, 
Graham,  i.  167).  To  this  day,  the  corvee  is  used  for  the  maintenaucfl 
of  rural  roads  in  France. 

*  Arthur  Young's  Travels  in  France,  1787-89,  p.  46. 


410  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.vi 

During  the  first  two  years  of  the  British 
occupation,  great  difficulty  was  encountered  in 
getting  the  canals  cleared  out.  It  was,  however, 
found  that  scientific  knowledge  could,  in  some 
degree,  serve  as  a  substitute  for  labour.  By 
skilful  treatment,  a  portion  of  the  alluvial  deposit 
of  the  Nile  was  floated  on  to  the  fields  and 
prevented  from  settling  at  the  bottom  of  the 
canals.  "By  a  little  manoeuvring  of  the  water 
during  the  flood,"  Sir  Colin  Scott- Moncrieff 
wrote  on  January  31,  1885,  "INIr.  (afterwards  Sir 
William)  Willcocks  has  got  a  depth  of  '80  metres 
to  take  out  of  a  canal  this  year,  where  last  year 
more  than  two  metres  had  to  be  cleared.  In 
Major  Ross's  hands  this  year,  the  clearance  of 
the  Ismailieh  Canal  (done  by  dredging,  not  by 
corvee)  will  cost  not  more,  I  hope,  than  £3000. 
Last  year,  it  cost  about  £15,000.  By  the  use  of 
the  'Barrage'  we  raise  the  water  surface  in  the 
canals,  and  they  will  not  require  to  be  cleared  so 
deep." 

It  was,  however,  obviously  impossible  to  substi- 
tute free  for  forced  labour  unless  money  was  forth- 
coming to  pay  the  labourers.  A  sum  of  about 
£400,000  annually  would,  it  was  estimated,  be 
required  in  order  to  ensure  the  total  abolition  of 
the  corvde  in  so  far  as  removing  the  deposit  from 
the  bottom  of  the  canals  was  concerned.  It  was 
not  until  the  summer  of  1885,  that  there  appeared 
any  prospect  of  being  able  to  obtahi  even  a  moiety 
of  this  sum.  Lord  Northbrook,  in  November  1884, 
recommended  that  the  land-tax  should  be  reduced 
by  £450,000  a  year.  A  budget  framed  on  this 
basis  was  communicated  to  the  Powers  by  the 
British  Government  on  December  6,  1884.  After 
some  diplomatic  wrangling,  a  Khedivial  Decree,  to 
which  the  Powers  had  assented,  was  eventually 
signed  on  July  27,  1885.     This  Decree  indirectly 


CH.L  THE  CORVEE  411 

involved   sanction   to    the    proposed    relief    from 
taxation. 

I  have  already  mentioned  that,  dealing  with 
Egyptian  affairs,  appearances  are  often  deceptive. 
I  have  now  to  explain  a  remarkable  instance  of 
financial  and  political  mirage.  Under  the  arrange- 
ment made  with  the  Powers,  it  appeared  that  a 
relief  of  taxation  to  the  extent  of  £450,000  a 
year  would  be  afforded  to  the  Egyptian  taxpayers. 
When,  however,  the  question  of  carrying  out  the 
provisions  of  the  Decree  of  July  27,  1885,  arose,  it 
was  found  that  the  boon,  which  in  appearance  was 
conferred  on  the  people  of  Egypt,  was  to  a 
great  extent  illusory.  The  figures  had  been  so 
manipulated  that  a  large  portion  of  the  money, 
which  the  Powers  appeared  to  give  with  one  hand, 
was  taken  away  with  the  other.  On  October  1, 
1885,  Sir  Edgar  Vincent  pointed  out  that  the 
deficit  of  the  Domains  had  been  underestimated 
by  £100,000,  that  certain  taxes  on  Europeans,  to 
which  the  Powers  had  agreed  in  principle  and 
which  were  calculated  to  yield  £100,000  a  year, 
had  not  yet  been  imposed,  and  that  a  further 
margin  of  £100,000  should  be  left  to  allow  for 
unpaid  land-tax,  for  which  credit  had  been  taken 
in  the  estimates,  but  which  it  would  not  be 
possible  to  collect.  He  estimated  the  sum  avail- 
able for  the  relief  of  taxation,  not  at  £450,000, 
but  at  £150,000. 

Apart  from  the  question  of  the  amount  of 
money  really  available,  another  question  now  arose, 
namely,  in  what  form  should  relief  be  afforded  to 
the  taxpayers  ?  The  Powers  had  contemplated  a 
reduction  of  the  land-tax.  Nubar  Pasha,  supported 
by  his  British  advisers,  now  urged  that,  instead  of 
this  reduction,  relief  should  be  afforded  by  devoting 
the  available  money  to  the  partial  abolition  of  the 
corvee.     The  proposal  was,  in  fact,  most  reasonable. 


412  MODERN  EGYPT  it.vi 

The  abolition  of  the  corvee  had  become  almost  a 
practical  necessity,  and  the  only  possible  method  of 
abolishing  it  was  to  throw  the  charge  of  providing 
free  labour  on  the  land.  It  would  have  been 
absurd  to  reduce  the  land-tax,  and,  almost  in  the 
same  breath,  to  reimpose  a  fresh  tax  in  order  to 
enable  the  corvee  to  be  abolished.  The  Egyptian 
Government,  therefore,  issued  a  Circular  to  the 
Powers  in  which  it  was  requested  that,  instead  of 
applying  the  whole  of  the  £450,000 — to  the 
nebulous  existence  of  which  no  allusion  was  made 
— to  the  reduction  of  the  land-tax,  a  sum  of 
£250,000  should  be  applied  to  the  partial  abolition 
of  the  corvee,  and  the  balance  used  in  reducing  the 
land-tax.  This  proposal  was  supported  by  the 
British  Government,  who  "  could  not  conceive  that 
there  was  any  doubt  as  to  its  acceptance  by  the 
Powers."     It  was,  however,  not  accepted. 

The  next  six  months  were  spent  in  international 
borrowings  of  various  sorts.  The  Commissioners 
of  the  Debt  were  eventually  consulted,  and  on 
July  6,  1886,  a  Decree  was  submitted  to  the  Powers 
under  tlie  provisions  of  which  permission  was  given 
to  add  £250,000,  which  was  to  be  applied  to  the 
partial  abolition  of  the  corvc^e,  to  the  limit  of 
the  recognised  administrative  expenditure  of  the 
Egyptian  Government. 

In  the  meanwhile,  Sir  Colin  Scott- IMoncrieff 
and  his  coadjutors  had  been  abolishing  the  corvee 
without  awaiting  the  decision  of  the  Powers.  In 
July  188G,  Sir  Colin  Scott- JNIoncrieff  reported  that 
the  £250,000  devoted  to  the  reduction  of  the  corvee 
had  enabled  the  number  of  men  called  out  to  work 
for  100  days  to  be  reduced  from  234,153  (the 
average  of  the  previous  three  years)  to  102,507,  a 
reduction  of  56  per  cent.  It  appeared,  therefore, 
that  whilst  the  diplomatic  agents  had  been  discuss- 
ing whether    the  £250,000    should    be   spent,   the 


CH.L  THE  CORVEE  413 

practical  Scotchman  bad  to  a  great  extent  solved 
the  question  by  spending  the  money.  The  result, 
I  remarked  in  writing  to  Lord  Rosebery,  was 
"  most  2:ratif\  inff,"  and  an  echo  of  satisfaction  was 
at  once  wafted  back  from  the  Foreign  Office. 

Here,  then,  was  a  solid  fact.  It  was  felt  that, 
if  once  the  fellah  was  relieved  from  the  obligation 
of  scooping  up  mud  with  his  fingers  from  the 
bottom  of  a  clay  drain,  under  penalty  of  being 
flogged  if  he  refused  to  scoop,  it  would  be  difficult 
for  the  united  Powers  of  Europe  to  make  him 
resume  his  former  task. 

In  the  meanwhile,  regardless  of  facts,  the  inter- 
national mill  was  grinding  slowly  on.  It  might 
have  been  thought  that,  as  the  Powers  had  made 
consultation  with  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt 
a  condition  of  their  acceptance  of  the  corvee 
Decree,  and  as  the  Commissioners  had  agreed  to 
the  Decree,  the  goal  was  not  far  distant.  In  reality, 
it  was  as  yet  scarcely  in  sight. 

A  pause  then  ensued.  At  one  moment,  it 
looked  as  if  one  of  two  courses  was  unavoidable — 
either  to  call  out  the  corvee  and  thus  plunge  Egypt 
back  again  into  the  slough  of  the  old  administrative 
processes  from  which  the  country  was  just  begin- 
ning to  emerge,  or  to  go  on  employing  free  labour 
and  incur  a  serious  risk  that  bankruptcy  would 
ensue.  It  was  questionable  which  was  the  worst 
of  these  two  evils.  There  was,  however,  this  much 
to  be  said  in  favour  of  the  adoption  of  the  first 
course,  that  a  public  declaration  to  the  effect  that 
the  corvee  was  to  be  called  out  might  perhaps 
shame  the  opposition  into  agreement,  and,  further, 
that  it  might  stimulate  the  British  Government  to 
afford  assistance.  It  was,  therefore,  decided  to  call 
out  the  corvee.  A  public  notice  to  that  effect  was 
issued.  The  result  was  that  public  opinion,  both 
in  England  and  Egypt,  was  moved.     A  fortnight 


414  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.vi 

later  (February  15),  the  French  Government 
intimated  their  acceptance  of  the  corvee  Decree  on 
condition  that  a  clause  should  be  inserted  which 
virtually  placed  the  whole  of  the  Public  Works 
expenditure  under  the  control  of  the  Commissioners 
of  the  Debt.  The  British  Government  were  con- 
sulted by  telegraph,  and  declined  to  accept  the 
French  proposal. 

The  situation  was,  at  this  moment,  very  embar- 
rassing. Besides  the  corvee  difficulty,  the  British 
Treasury  was  pressing  for  large  military  payments 
due  by  the  Egyptian  Government.  Sir  Colin 
Scott- Moncrieff,  maddened  by  the  opposition  he 
encountered  at  every  turn,  resigned  his  post, 
but  subsequently  withdrew  his  resignation.  Little 
confidence  could  be  placed  in  the  co-operation  of 
the  Egyptians,  in  whose  interests  the  British 
Government  and  the  British  officials  in  Egypt 
were  working.  Nubar  Pasha  saw  the  interest 
Egypt  had  in  avoiding  the  appointment  of  an  Inter- 
national Commission  to  deal  with  the  financial  situa- 
tion, but  the  Khedive  and  other  leading  Egyptians 
were  indifferent  on  the  subject  Some  would  even 
have  preferred  a  Commission  in  order  to  break  the 
exclusive  influence  of  England,  and  others,  for  small 
local  reasons,  would  not  make  any  serious  efforts 
to  avoid  one.  It  would,  however,  have  been  a  stain 
on  the  reputation  of  England  if  the  corvde  system 
had  been  re-established.  A  strong  plea  for  British 
assistance  was,  therefore,  telegraphed  to  London. 
In  reply,  I  received  the  following  communication 
from  Lord  Salisbury  : — 

**  If  you  will  indicate  in  what  way  Her  Majesty's 
(rovernment  can  assist  in  extricating  the  Egyptian 
Government  from  the  embarrassments  now  caused, 
they  are  willing  to  consider  your  suggestions  in  the 
most  friendly  spirit. 

"  The  suspension  of  the  measures  for  the  aboli- 


CH.L  THE  CORVEE  415 

tion  of  the  corvee  would  be  so  disastrous  to  the 
well-being  of  the  fellaheen  and  the  general  pros- 
perity of  the  country  that  it  must  if  possible  be 
avoided,  and  Her  Majesty's  Government  will  give 
their  best  attention  to  any  proposals  that  may  be  sub- 
mitted to  them  for  tiding  over  the  present  difficulties, 
by  any  temporary  measure,  or  by  other  means." 

After  some  further  communications  had  passed, 
it  was  agreed  that,  in  case  of  need,  the  payment  of 
the  money  due  to  the  British  Government  on 
account  of  interest  on  the  Suez  Canal  shares  should 
be  postponed  in  order  to  provide  the  funds  neces- 
t5ary  for  dispensing  with  corvee  labour.  The 
following  public  notification  was  then  issued  : — 

"L'adhesion  de  certaines  Puissances  au  projet 
de  Ddcret  sur  la  corvde  ayant  ^te  subordonnee  k 
des  modifications  consid^rees  comme  inadmissibles, 
le  Gouvernement  Egyptien  s'est  vu  dans  la  n^ces- 
sit^  d'abandonner  ce  projet.  Mais  le  Gouverne- 
ment de  Son  Altesse,  consid^rant  la  suppression  de 
la  corvee  comme  une  mesure  a  laquelle  sont  attaches 
le  bien-etre  et  la  prosp^ritd  du  pays,  a  consults  le 
Gouvernement  Britannique,  qui  partage  enti^re- 
ment  I'opinion  du  Gouvernement  Egyptien  k  ce 
sujet. 

**  A  la  suite  de  cet  ^change  de  vues,  des  arrange- 
ments ont  ^t^  pris  qui  permettent  I'emploi  du 
travail  r^munerd  La  decision  du  Conseil  des 
Ministres  contenue  dans  ^I'Officiel'  du  5  de  ce 
mois  a  dt4  par  consequent,  rapportde  ^  et  le  Ministre 
des  Travaux  Publics  a  ^t^  invito  k  sanctionner  les 
contrats  d'entreprises  qui  avaient  ^t^  suspendus." 

There  are  a  few  important  landmarks  in  the 
history  of  Egyptian  administration,  and  this  is  one 
of  them.  As  the  Circular  issued  under  Lord 
Dufferin's  auspices  gave  a  death-blow  to  the  use 
of  the  courbash,  so  the  notification  quoted  above 

'  This  decision  was  the  notification  calling  out  the  corvde. 


416  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

sealed  the  doom  of  the  corvee  system.  Although 
the  battle  was  not  yet  over,  there  could  hence- 
forward be  no  doubt  as  to  the  side  which  would 
ultimately  gain  the  victory.  The  fellaheen  were  no 
longer  to  be  flogged  unless  they  scooped  up  mud 
with  their  fingers  from  the  bottom  of  a  deep  ditch. 
The  British  Government  had  practically  pledged 
their  word  that  this  particular  Egyptian  abomi- 
nation should  cease.  Retractation  was  no  longer 
possible.  Nubar  Pasha  understood  the  importance 
of  the  step,  and  in  words  suitable  to  the  occasion 
expressed  the  feelings  of  the  Egyptian  people. 

*' L'abolition  de  la  corvee,  vous  le  savez,  M. 
le  Ministre,"  he  wrote,  *'a  et^  un  but  que  le 
Gouvernement  de  Son  Altesse  a  vise  depuis  long- 
temps,  et  vers  lequel  ont  constamment  tendu  tous 
ses  voeux ;  aussi,  me  fais-je  un  devoir  de  vous  prier 
de  transmettre  au  Gouvernement  Britannique 
I'expression  de  la  reconnaissance  de  toute  I'Egypte 
pour  le  concours  qu'elle  a  trouve  aupres  du 
Gouvernement  Britannique  dans  la  realisation 
partielle  d'une  mesure  a  laquelle  sont  attaches  le 
bien-etre  et  la  prosperite  du  pays." 

Egyptian  gratitude  is  perhaps  not  always  very 
heartfelt  or  very  long-lived,  but  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  debt  of  gratitude  Avas  really  due. 
Moreover,  thanks — "  Ever  more  tlianks,  the  ex- 
chequer of  the  poor  " — was  all  the  Egyptians  had 
to  give. 

Amongst  the  many  achievements  which  England 
has  accomplislied  in  the  cause  of  suffering  humanity, 
not  the  least  praiseworthy  is  this  act,  that  in  the 
teeth  of  strong  opposition,  the  Anglo-Saxon  race 
insisted  that  the  Egyptian  labourer  sliould  be  paid 
for  his  work,  and  that  he  should  not  be  flogged  if 
he  did  not  wish  to  work. 

As  yet,  however,  the  victory  was  not  complete. 
It  has  been  already  stated  that  an  annual  sum  of 


CH.L  THE  CORVEE  417 

about  £400,000  was  required  to  abolish  the  corvde 
system  in  so  far  as  the  clearing  out  of  the  canals 
was  concerned.  With  infinite  trouble,  £250,000  a 
year  had  been  obtained.  This  enabled  the  system 
of  forced  labour  to  be  partially  abolished.  In 
1883,  the  number  of  men  called  out  for  100  days 
was  202,650.  In  1886,  the  number  fell  to  95,093. 
In  1887,  only  87,120  men  Avere  called  out.  The 
corvee  system  having  been  virtually  doomed,  the 
question  naturally  arose  of  how  to  dispense  with 
the  enforced  services  of  the  remaining  87,000  men. 
To  complete  the  reform,  a  further  expenditure  of 
£150,000  a  year  was  required.  The  Egyptian 
Government  wished  that  this  sum  should  be  added 
to  the  amount  of  the  administrative  expenditure 
authorised  by  the  Powers.  This  proposal  was 
not,  in  the  first  instance,  accepted. 

It  would  serve  no  useful  purpose  to  narrate  in 
detail  the  history  of  the  tedious  and,  at  times, 
somewhat  angry  negotiations  which  then  ensued. 
They  may  well  be  buried  in  oblivion.  It  will  be 
sufficient  to  say  that,  as  time  went  on  and  the 
financial  position  improved,  an  immediate  settle- 
ment became  a  matter  of  less  urgency.  Eventually, 
the  death  of  Tewfik  Pasha,  in  January  1892, 
afforded  an  unexpected  opportunity  for  settling 
the  question.  The  Egyptian  Government,  insti- 
gated by  their  British  advisers,  wished  to  signalise 
the  accession  of  the  young  Khedive  by  the  adop- 
tion of  some  measures  which  would  be  of  general 
benefit  to  the  population.  They  proposed  to 
devote  a  portion  of  the  economies  resulting  from 
the  recent  conversion  of  the  Preference  debt  from 
a  5  per  cent  to  a  3j  per  cent  stock,  to  the  abolition 
of  the  corvee,  and  at  the  same  time  to  reduce  the 
salt  tax  by  40  per  cent.  The  French  Government 
would  not  agree  to  any  proposals  which  involved 
touching  the  economies.     On  the  other  hand,  they 

vol,.  II  2  E 


418  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

were  unwilling  to  stand  in  the  way  of  a  reduction 
of  the  salt  tax.  But  they  coupled  a  condition 
with  their  acceptance  of  the  Egyptian  proposal. 

The  London  Conference  of  1884  had  agreed  in 
principle  that  Europeans  in  Egypt  should  pay  the 
professional  tax,  which  had  heretofore  been  only 
paid  by  Egyptians.  After  some  tedious  negotia- 
tions, a  law  applicable  to  all  residents  in  Egypt, 
whether  European  or  Egyptian,  had  been  accepted 
by  the  Powers.  At  the  time  of  Tewfik  Pasha's 
death,  the  tax  was,  for  the  first  time,  about  to  be 
levied  on  Europeans,  amongst  whom  it  was  naturally 
very  unpopular.  The  French  Government  decided 
to  make  their  assent  to  the  Egyptian  proposal 
relative  to  the  reduction  of  the  salt  tax  and  the 
abolition  of  the  corvee  conditional  on  the  abolition 
of  the  professional  tax.  Ultimately,  it  was  arranged 
tliat  the  salt  tax  should  be  reduced ;  that  the  pro- 
fessional tax  should  be  abolished  both  in  respect  to 
Europeans  and  Egyptians  ;  and  that  the  recognised 
limit  of  the  administrative  expenditure  of  the 
Egyptian  Government  should  be  increased  by 
£150,000  a  year,  thus  enabling  money  to  be  found 
to  pay  for  the  free  labour  which  had  taken  the 
place  of  the  corvee. 

Thus,  after  a  struggle  which  lasted  for  eight  years, 
this  great  reform  was  eventually  accomplished. 
Begun  when  Egypt  was  in  the  throes  of  national 
bankruptcy,  it  was  continued  through  a  long  period 
of  diplomatic  bickerings,  which  sometimes  assumed 
an  acute  form  and  at  other  times  lapsed  into  a 
chronic  state  of  acerbity,  and  was  at  last  concluded 
by  the  fortuitous  circumstance  that  it  became 
possible  to  drive  a  bargain  over  the  grave  of  the 
dead  Khedive.  To  Tewfik  Pasha  may  be  accorded 
the  posthumous  merit  of  having  by  his  death 
overcome  to  some  slight  and  temporary  extent  the 
demon    of  international  jealousy,  and    of  having 


CH.L  THE  CORVEE  419 

thus  given  a  final  blow  to  the  hateful  system  of 
forced  labour  which  had  existed  in  the  country 
over  which  he  ruled  since  the  days  of  his  Pharaonic 
predecessors. 

So  far  allusion  has  only  been  made  to  the  forced 
labour  which  used  to  be  employed  in  the  work 
of  clearing  out  the  canals  during  the  period  of 
low  Nile.  The  corvee  has,  however,  from  time 
immemorial  been  employed  in  Egypt  to  attain 
another  object,  namely,  to  guard  the  banks  of  the 
river  during  the  period  of  high  Nile  and  thus 
obviate  any  risk  of  inundation.  It  is  essential  to 
the  well-being  and  safety  of  the  country  that  this 
work  should  be  performed.  It  has  not  as  yet 
been  found  possible  to  abolish  completely  this 
description  of  corvee,  but  the  number  of  men 
employed  every  year  is  small,  and  is  steadily 
diminishing. 


CHAPTER    LI 

CORRUPTION 

Universality  of   corruption — Steps  taken   to   arrest  it — Example  of 
British  officials — Diminution  of  corrupt  practices. 

In  no  country  probably  has  corruption — the  canker 
which  eats  away  the  heart  of  most  Eastern  govern- 
ments— been  more  universal  than  it  was  in  Egypt 
during  the  reign  of  Ismail  Pasha.  Ismail  had 
inherited  from  his  predecessors  an  administrative 
system  steeped  in  corruption.  By  his  own  action, 
he  made  this  system  doubly  corrupt.  He  believed 
in  bribery,  if  not  as  the  only,  at  all  events  as  the 
most  effective  system  of  government.  Every  man, 
he  thought,  had  his  price.  He  put  into  practice 
the  principles  of  which  Byron,  in  one  of  his  cynical 
moods,  has  given  us  a  description  : — 

'Tis  pleasant  purchasing  our  fellow-creatures. 
And  all  are  to  be  sold,  if  you  consider 
Their  passions,  and  are  dext'rous  ;  some  by  features 
Are  bought  up,  others  by  a  warlike  leader ; 
Some  by  a  })lace,  as  tend  their  years  or  natures ; 
The  most  by  ready  cash — but  all  have  prices. 
From  crowns  to  kicks,  according  to  their  vices. 

Ismail  Pasha's  subjects  followed  humbly  in  the 
footsteps  of  their  master.  They  took  and  they 
paid  bribes.  From  the  half- naked  donkey -boy, 
who  in  shrill  tones  demanded  "  bakhshish  "  to  the 
extent  of  a  piastre  or  two  from  the  winter  tourist, 

420 


CH.LI  CORRUPTION  421 

to  the  highly-placed  Pasha,  whose  assistance  could 
only  be  obtained  by  the  payment  of  more  sub- 
stantial sums,  all,  or  nearly  all,  were  venal.  The 
contractor  bribed  the  Minister  to  obtain  a  contract 
on  terms  unduly  advantageous  to  himself,  and 
would  then  bribe  the  Clerk  of  the  Works  in  order 
that  he  should  not  inquire  too  carefully  as  to 
whether  the  terms  of  the  contract  had  or  had  not 
been  strictly  executed.  The  subordinate  official 
bribed  his  superior  in  order  to  get  promotion. 
The  landowner  bribed  the  engineer  in  order  that 
he  should  obtain  more  water  for  his  fields  than  was 
his  due.  The  Kadis  were  paid  by  both  the  plaintiff 
and  the  defendant  to  any  suit,  the  decision  being 
usually  given  in  favour  of  the  highest  bidder.  The 
Government  surveyors  were  bribed  to  make  false 
measurements  of  land.  The  village  Sheikhs  were 
bribed  to  accord  exemption  from  the  corvee  and 
from  military  service.  The  Police  were  bribed  by 
everybody  who  had  the  misfortune  to  be  brought 
in  contact  with  them.  The  passenger  by  railway 
found  it  cheaper  to  give  "  bakhshish  "  to  the  guard 
or  to  the  ticket-collector  than  to  pay  for  a  ticket. 
As  a  preliminary  to  bribing  a  Moudir  to  inquire 
into  any  alleged  grievance,  it  was  necessary  for  the 
petitioner  to  bribe  the  hungry  satellites,  who  hang 
about  the  office  of  the  Moudirieh,  before  the  great 
man  could  be  personally  informed  that  any  petition 
had  been  presented.  The  ramifications  of  the 
system  were,  in  fact,  endless.  Egyptian  official 
and  social  life  was  saturated  with  the  idea  that  in 
Egypt  personal  claims  and  interests,  however  just 
on  their  own  merits,  could  never  be  advanced 
without  the  payment  of  '•  bakhshish." 

It  was  from  the  first  manifest  that  the  adoption 
of  more  healthy  ideas  by  an  administrative  service 
and  by  a  society  so  thoroughly  diseased  as  that 
described  above,  would  be  a  work  of  time.     One  of 


422  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

the  main  safeguards  against  corruption  in  civilised 
countries  is  that  society  condemns  venality.  The 
act  of  offering  or  of  taking  a  bribe  is  considered 
dishonourable.  The  offender,  if  discovered,  is 
visited  by  a  social  punishment  often  more  severe 
than  any  which  the  law  can  inflict  on  him.  In 
Egypt,  no  restraining  public  opinion  existed,  even 
if  it  now  exists,  on  this  subject.  Bribery  was  con- 
sidered a  venial  offence.  Habits  of  thought  of 
this  kind  cannot  be  changed  of  a  sudden.  They 
are  but  little  affected  by  the  passing  of  laws  and 
regulations.  Nevertheless,  it  was  possible  to 
adopt  certain  administrative  measures  calculated 
to  diminish  the  temptation  to  accept  bribes,  and 
thus  both  render  it  less  probable  that  bribery  would 
obtain  the  objects  for  which  money  had  heretofore 
been  paid,  and  also  facilitate  the  discovery  of  the 
guilty  parties.  Measures  of  this  sort  were  initiated 
in  Egypt  during  the  period  of  the  Dual  Control, 
and  were  subsequently  perfected  during  that  of 
the  British  occupation. 

In  the  first  place,  the  inauguration  of  a  proper 
system  of  accounts  and  of  audit  did  a  good  deal 
towards  putting  a  check  on  the  malversation  of  funds 
belonging  to  the  State.  Vouchers  were  required 
for  all  expenditure.  Officials  were  called  upon  to 
render  strict  account  of  all  monies  which  had  passed 
through  their  hands.  It  was  no  longer  possible  for 
public  money  to  disappear  as  if  by  enchantment. 

This  reform  was  excellent  in  its  way.  It  is, 
however,  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  accountant 
or  the  auditor  can  alone  put  a  stop  to  the  corru})t 
dealings  of  dishonest  officials.  A  hundred  ways 
exist  for  eluding  their  vigilance.  To  quote  a  single 
instance,  a  high  Egyptian  official  was,  on  one 
occasion,  charged  with  the  sale  of  certain  lands 
belonging  to  the  Government.  Adjoining  these 
lands,  were  others,  which  were  liis  private  property. 


CH.  LI  CORRUPTION  423 

He  sold  the  two  lots  together  to  the  same 
purchaser.  They  were  of  precisely  the  same  quaHty, 
but  the  price  obtained  for  the  Government  was 
very  low,  whilst  that  obtained  by  the  official  acting 
in  his  private  capacity  was  very  high.  Thus, 
a  considerable  part  of  the  money,  which  should 
have  been  paid  into  the  Treasury,  found  its  way 
into  the  pockets  of  the  official  who  was  specially 
charged  to  look  after  the  interests  of  the  Govern- 
ment. No  system  of  audit  would  have  succeeded 
in  preventing  a  fraud  of  this  description.  It 
could  only  have  been  discovered  by  some  one  who 
happened  to  know  that  the  market  value  of  the 
land  sold  by  the  Government  was  in  excess  of  the 
sum  which  the  Government  received. 

In  the  second  place,  the  regular  payment  of  the 
salaries  due  to  Government  officials  has  done  much 
to  free  them  from  the  temptation  to  take  bribes. 
Also,  in  many  cases  the  salaries  of  the  lowest 
classes  have  been  raised.  So  long  as  the  Govern- 
ment allowed  inadequate  salaries  to  their  servants, 
or,  as  in  the  days  of  Ismail  Pasha,  often  left  them 
for  months  without  paying  them  at  all,  it  is  obvious 
that  the  temptation  of  the  latter  to  increase  their 
incomes  by  illicit  means  must  have  been  strong.^ 

In  the  third  place,  the  system  of  inviting  tenders 
for  most  public  works  and  for  the  supply  of  Govern- 
ment stores,  struck  a  blow  in  that  quarter  where 
corruption  on  a  large  scale  was  heretofore  most 
prevalent. 

In  the  fourth  place,  the  creation  of  an  improved 
judicature,  the  careful  choice  of  judges,  and  the 
more  vigilant  control  which  has  been  exercised  over 
their  conduct,  have  purified  the  law-courts. 

In  the  fifth  place,   with   the   abolition   of  the 

'  It  was  by  raising  the  salaries  of  officials  that  Lord  Cornwallis  put 
a  stop  to  the  corruption  which  existed  in  India  towards  the  close  of  the 
eighteenth  century. 


424  JNIODERN  EGYPT  pt.vi 

greater  part  of  the  corvee,  and  the  regulation  of 
whatever  remains  of  the  system  of  forced  labour, 
the  necessity  for  paying  the  village  Sheikhs  in  order 
to  be  exempted  from  the  obligation  to  labour  dis- 
appeared. 

In  the  sixth  place,  the  organisation  of  a  proper 
recruiting  service  swept  away  a  whole  nest  of 
corrupt  practices. 

Lastly,  the  employment  of  a  number  of  honour- 
able and  capable  British  officials  has  probably  done 
more  than  anything  else  to  check  corruption. 
Their  mere  example  has  counted  for  much.  The 
Egyptians  pay  an  unconscious  compliment  to 
English  integrity  by  very  rarely  offering  bribes  to 
British  officials.^ 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  these  measures  have 
been  effective  in  checking  corruption.  Broadly 
speaking,  it  may  be  said  that  most  branches  of  the 
central  administration  of  the  Egyptian  Government 
and  the  law-courts  are  now  little,  if  at  all,  tainted 
with  venality.  It  is  not,  however,  on  this  account 
to  be  supposed  that  the  "  bakhshish  "  system  is  de- 
funct. It  is,  of  course,  im})ossible  to  state  with  any 
degree  of  confidence  to  what  extent  it  still  exists,  for 
the  people,  in  spite  of  every  encouragement  given  to 
them  by  the  superior  officials  of  the  Government, 
are  generally  reluctant  to  complain  of  illegal  exac- 
tions, whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  the  corrupt  Egyptian 
official  displays  such  a  singular  degree  of  perverted 
ingenuity  in  the  perpetration  of  fraud  as  to  baffle  the 
efforts  of  those  whose  wish  it  is  to  track  him  down. 
On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that  although  cor- 
ruption is  no  longer  practised  on  any  large  scale, 
it  cannot  be  doubted  that  in  the  provincial  admin- 
istrations, as  also,  I  fear,  in  some  branches  of  the 

*  As  a  general  rule,  the  integrity  of  the  British  officials  in  Egypt 
has  been  absolutely  unimpeachable.  There  have,  however,  I  regret  to 
say,  been  a  very  few  cases  of  corruptiou  and  dishonesty  amongst  the 
subordinates. 


CH.LI  CORRUPTION  425 

Public  Works  Department,  there  is  still  a  good 
deal  of  bribery.  It  will  be  long  before  all  this 
disappears,  more  especially  in  view  of  the  extreme 
difficulty  of  obtaining  evidence  against  corrupt 
officials.^  In  the  meanwhile,  it  can  be  stated 
with  confidence  that  at  no  previous  period  in 
Egyptian  history  has  so  little  "  bakhshish "  been 
paid  or  received  as  at  present. 

These,  therefore,  were  the  first-fruits  of  British 
interference  in  the  country.  Torture  and  the  use 
of  the  courbash  ceased.  The  corvee  system  was 
practically  abolished.  Administrative  corruption 
was  greatly  diminished. 

How  was  it  that,  in  these  three  cases,  the 
efforts  of  the  British  officials  in  the  service  of  the 
Egyptian  Government  were  crowned  with  such 
signal  success  ?  It  was  because  they  were  either 
free  to  act,  or  because,  as  in  the  matter  of  the 
corvee,  they  were  able,  after  a  sharp  struggle,  to 
throw  off  the  international  shackles  by  which  they 
were  bound.  The  more  the  history  of  Egyptian 
reform  is  examined,  the  more  will  it  be  seen  that 
in  most  cases  success  was  in  direct  proportion  to 
the  freedom  of  action  of  the  Egyptian  Government, 
acting  under  British  control  and  advice,  ^^^here 
no  such  freedom  exists,  the  result  has  usually  been 
either  failure,  or,  at  best,  a  modified  success. 

^  It  cannot  be  too  clearly  understood  that  fear  of  each  other  has,  in 
the  minds  of  the  mass  of  the  Egyptian  population,  largely  taken  the 
place  of  the  fear  of  the  Government,  which  formerly  existed.  U'his  is 
a  very  important  feature  in  the  administration  of  the  country.  The 
latter  of  these  two  sentiments  tended,  at  all  events,  towards  the 
maintenance  of  public  tranquillity.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fear  tliat 
vengeance  will,  in  some  form  or  another,  be  wreaked  by  any  one  of 
whose  conduct  a  complaint  is  made,  or  against  whom  evidence  is 
tendered  in  a  law-court,  manifestly  operates  in  an  exactly  opposite 
direction.  Mr.  Machell,  the  present  Adviser  of  the  Interior,  has,  in 
his  Annua'.  Reports,  given  freijuent  and  very  striking  illustrations  in 
support  or  tliis  view.  As  regards  the  jealousy  often  entertjiined 
amongst  the  fellaheen  for  each  other,  see  kgypt,  No.  1,  1905,  p.  46. 


CHAPTER   LII 

EUROPEAN   PBIVILEGE 

Origin  of  the  Capitulations — DiflFerence  between  Turkey  and  Egypt- 
Abuse  of  the  Capitulations — Raison  d'etre  of  European  privilege — 
Anomaly  of  the  British  position — Impossibility  of  arriving  at  any 
general  solution — Minor  changes — The  right  to  enact  by-laws — 
The  House  Tax — The  Professional  Tax — Proposal  to  create  a  local 
legislatu  re — Internationalism. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  enter  into  any  technical  dis- 
cussion on  the  rights  conferred  by  virtue  of  the 
Capitulations  upon  Europeans  resident  in  Egypt. 
The  subject  is  complicated,  more  especially  as  some 
of  those  rights  rest  on  the  text  of  international 
instruments,  whilst  the  precise  nature  of  others, 
which  have  been  acquired  by  custom,  is  still  a 
constant  source  of  dispute.  Historically  speaking, 
it  is,  indeed,  incorrect  in  this  connection  to  employ 
the  term  "rights."  The  Capitulations  were  origin- 
ally "letters  of  privilege,  or,  according  to  the 
Oriental  expression,  imperial  diplomas  containing 
sworn  promises,"^  which  were  delivered  by  the 
Sultans  of  Turkey,  as  also  by  their  Byzantine  pre- 
decessors, to  Europeans  who  wished  to  reside  and  to 
acquire  real  property  in  their  dominions.  A  legal 
fiction  had  to  be  created  in  order  to  afford  a  justifica- 
tion to  strict  Moslems,  who  were  guided  solely  by 
Koranic  principles,  for  dealing  with  Christians  on 
a  basis  of  equality.  Christians  were  theoretically 
deemed  perpetual  enemies  and,  as  such,  unworthy 
of  peace  unless  they  either  embraced  Islam  or  paid 

*  Van  Dyck,  Ottoman  Capitulations,  p.  12. 
426 


CH.LII        EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  427 

tribute  to  their  Moslem  conquerors.  With  un- 
behevers,  "  treaties "  were  impossible,  and  indeed 
impious,  but  it  was  conceivable  that  the  Com- 
mander of  the  Faithful  might,  of  his  grace,  con- 
descend to  grant  them  *'  privileges."  The  Moslem, 
unaware  that  his  inelastic  faith  contained  within 
itself  the  seeds  of  his  own  political  decadence,  may 
well  have  thought  that  the  bestowal  of  these 
"  privileges "  would  not  undermine  his  system  of 
government.  In  this,  he  was  mistaken.  As  the 
power  of  the  Crescent  waned  before  that  of  the 
Cross,  the  Frank  was  graduaHy  transformed  from 
being  a  humble  receiver  of  "privileges"  into  an 
imperious  possessor  of  "rights."  These  rights 
were  to  form  a  potent  instrument  for  good  and 
also  for  evil,  both  to  their  possessors  and  to  those 
by  whom  they  were  originally  conferred.  They 
were  notably  to  contribute,  as  they  are  still  con- 
tributing, to  shatter  the  political  and  social  systems 
of  those  who  hold  to  the  faith  of  Islam. 

The  rights  which  have  been  conferred  by,  or 
which  have  grown  out  of  the  Capitulations  are  not 
the  same  in  Egypt  and  in  other  parts  of  the  Otto- 
man dominions.  The  Turkish  Government  have 
been  watchful  of  European  encroachment,  and 
have,  relatively  speaking,  been  powerful  to  resist 
it.  The  Khedives  of  Egypt,  on  the  other  hand, 
being  wanting  in  vigilance,  allowed  a  plentiful  crop 
of  European  privileges,  which  are  not  sanctioned 
by  treaty,  to  be  drifted  on  the  wave  of  custom  into 
the  position  of  acquired  rights,  and  if,  as  at  times 
occurred,  they  tardily  awoke  to  the  consequences 
of  their  own  heedlessness,  they  were  either  too 
weak  to  offer  resistance,  or  the  impecuniosity, 
which  was  the  result  of  reckless  extravagance, 
rendered  them  willing  to  barter  a  portion  of  their 
political  birthright  for  the  sake  of  some  temporary 
concession.    Thus  it  came  about  that  the  European, 


428  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.vi 

who  is  privileged  in  Turkey,  is  ultra-privileged  in 
Egypt.  Abuse  of  privilege  follows  in  the  train 
of  privilege  itself.  It  happened,  therefore,  that  in 
that  part  of  the  Ottoman  dominions  which,  more 
than  any  other,  has  of  late  years  been  subject  to 
the  direct  control  of  a  European  Power,  and  in 
which,  consequently,  the  concession  of  privilege 
has  been  least  of  all  necessary  and  its  abuse  most 
of  all  baneful  to  the  cause  of  progress,  the  degree 
of  privilege  granted  has  been  greater,  and  its  abuse 
more  pronounced,  than  in  any  other  portion  of  the 
territories  of  the  Sultan. 

Although,  however,  nothing  can  be  said  in  favour 
of  the  abuse,  many  valid  arguments  may  be  advanced 
in  defence  of  the  use  of  the  Capitulations.  At  first 
sight,  it  appears  monstrous  that  the  smuggler  should 
carry  on  his  illicit  trade  under  the  eyes  of  the 
Custom-house  authorities  because  treaty  engage- 
ments forbid  any  prompt  and  effective  action  being 
taken  against  him.  Those  engagements  have  also 
been  turned  to  such  base  uses  that  they  have 
protected  the  keeper  of  the  gambling  hell,  the 
vendor  of  adulterated  drinks,  the  receiver  of  stolen 
goods,  and  the  careless  apothecary  who  supplies  his 
customer  with  poison  in  the  place  of  some  healing 
drug.  But  when  all  this,  and  a  great  deal  more 
of  the  same  description  of  argument  has  been 
stated,  there  still  remains  the  unquestionable 
fact  that  the  smuggler,  the  keeper  of  a  gambling- 
hell,  the  receiver  of  stolen  goods,  and  the  retailer 
of  adulterated  spirits,  represent  certain  prin- 
ciples. They,  and  their  contemptible  brethren, 
notably  represent  these  principles,  that  so  long  as 
they  have  not  been  proved  to  commit  an  offence 
at  law  ^  they  have  a  right  to  continue  without  hin- 

^  It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that,  before  any  European  can  be 
adeijuately  punished,  he  must  be  proved  to  have  committed  an  offence 
not  against  Egyptian  law,  but  against  the  law  of  his  country  of  origin. 


CH.  m         EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  429 

drance  in  the  exercise  of  their  callings,  and  that 
before  they  undergo  punishment  or  molestation  of 
any  kind,  it  must  be  shown  to  the  satisfaction 
of  some  properly  constituted  and  trustworthy 
authority  that  they  have  transgressed  the  law. 
One  of  the  great  battles  in  the  history  of  English 
constitutional  liberty  was  fought  over  the  person 
of  the  disreputable  Wilkes.  Lord  Palmerston's 
treatment  of  the  Don  Pacifico  case  is  another 
instance  in  point.  So  likewise,  paradoxical  as  it  may 
appear,  the  cause  of  European  civilisation  in  Egypt 
is  to  some  extent  unavoidably  identified  with  the 
treatment  of  European  ruffians.  For,  in  fact,  it 
is  often  difficult  to  do  anything  towards  sweeping 
away  the  abuse  of  privilege  without  incurring  a 
considerable  risk  that  other  equally  objectionable 
abuses  may  be  created  in  the  process  of  reform. 
It  is  reasonable  that  the  Egyptian  custom-house 
official  should  search  the  ship  of  the  smuggler  for 
tobacco  or  hashish,  but  what  guarantee  is  there 
that  the  same  official  will  not,  in  disregard  of  the 
spirit  if  not  of  the  text  of  the  law,  subject  the 
captain  of  a  vessel  engaged  in  legitimate  trade 
to  endless  vexations  ?  Inviolability  of  domicile  is 
one  of  the  corner-stones  of  European  privilege 
in  the  East.  It  is  well  that  the  Police  should 
be  able  to  penetrate  into  a  gambling-hell  and  stop 
an  infamous  trade,  but  what  guarantee  is  there 
that,  under  the  orders  of  an  official  incapable  of 
any  fine  discrimination  of  character  or  of  circum- 
stances, these  same  Police  will  not  invade  the  house 
of  some  individual  who  never  in  the  course  of  his 
life  held  a  playing-card  or  a  dice-box  in  his  hand  ? 
The  careless  apothecary  should,  in  the  interests 
of  the  public,  be  prevented  from  poisoning  his 
customers,  but  his  more  careful  rival  in  trade 
naturally  requires  some  valid  assurance  that  he 
will  not  be  subjected  to  unnecessary  annoyances 


430  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.vi 

in  the  exercise  of  his  profession.  Endless  illustra- 
tions of  the  same  sort  might  be  adduced.  When- 
ever the  question  of  modifying  tlie  Capitulations 
has  been  broached,  the  contending  parties  have 
always  used  the  same  arguments.  On  the  one 
side,  stood  the  reformer  rightly  clamouring  against 
the  abuse  of  privilege  which  impeded  his  progress. 
On  the  other  side,  stood  the  European  who,  if 
he  was  politically  unbiassed,  expressed  his  willing- 
ness to  aid  in  checking  the  abuse  and  in  furthering 
the  progress  of  reform,  but  who,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  profound  and,  to  some  extent,  justifiable 
mistrust  of  Oriental  legal  and  administrative 
processes,  demanded  guarantees  against  an  abuse 
of  power  before  he  would  agree  to  curtail  the  privi- 
leges of  his  countrymen.  The  guarantees  which 
were  demanded  were  often  excessive,  and  more- 
over, they  generally  took  a  form  which  involved 
an  extension  of  the  international  system  of  govern- 
ment. The  Egyptian  Government  either  would 
not  or  could  not  grant  them.  Hence,  not  unfre- 
quently  arose  a  deadlock. 

When  the  British  occupation  took  place,  the 
question  of  the  rig! its  conferred  on  Europeans  by 
the  Capitulations  entered  into  a  new  and  singular 
phase.  The  English  took  Egyptian  reform  in  hand. 
They  found  themselves  hampered  at  every  turn  by 
the  privileges  which  they,  in  common  with  other 
foreign  nations,  enjoyed.  The  English  reformer  was 
able  to  plead  that,  under  his  civilised  auspices,  there 
would  be  no  longer  any  danger  of  an  abuse  of 
power,  and  that,  therefore,  greater  freedom  of 
action  could  properly  be  accorded  to  an  Anglo- 
Egyptian  than  to  a  purely  Egyptian  Government. 
In  the  early  days  of  the  occupation,  this  argument 
availed  him  but  little  either  with  his  friends  or 
with  his  foes.  His  foes  scoffed  at  it.  It  is  true, 
they  said,  that  you  are  here,  but  you  have  no  right 


CH.LII        EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  431 

to  stay.  Even  supposing  the  paramount  influence 
of  England  to  constitute  a  valid  guarantee  against 
abuse,  which  we  doubt,  what  is  to  become  of  the 
guarantee  when  you  leave  the  country,  as  you  have 
promised  to  do?  JNIore  than  this,  are  we  to  abandon 
our  rights  merely  to  facilitate  the  work  of  our 
rivals,  who  have  outwitted  us  ?  Heaven  forbid. 
We  will  not  even  make  those  concessions  to  an 
Anglo -Egyptian  Government  which  we  might 
perhaps  have  made  to  an  Egyptian  Government, 
pure  and  simple. 

The  friends  of  the  English  reformer  came  to 
much  tl>e  same  conclusion  as  his  foes,  but  by  a 
different  process  of  reasoning.  If,  they  said,  you 
would  declare  your  intention  to  remain  permanently 
in  Egypt  and  to  undertake  the  administration  of 
the  country,  we  should  not  be  unwilling  to  concede 
our  privileges,  for  we  should  then  have  some  solid 
guarantee  against  an  abuse  of  power.  But  as 
you  are  constantly  asseverating  that  you  are  but 
sojourners  in  the  land,  and"  that  your  occupation  is 
only  temporary,  we  fail  to  see  what  guarantees 
against  abuse  will  exist  when  you  carry  out  your 
declared  intentions.  There  could  be  no  question  as 
to  the  validity  of  this  argument.  JNIoreover,  it  was 
one  which  the  British  Government  were  themselves 
obliged  to  recognise  and  adopt.  Hence,  the  British 
nation  had  characteristically  placed  itself  in  tliis 
illogical  position — that  whilst  its  official  repre- 
sentative was  obliged  at  times  to  maintain  privilege 
in  British  interests  for  fear  of  eventual  abuse  by 
the  Egyptians,  he  was  also  called  upon  by  the 
British  reformer  to  aid  in  the  abolition  of  ])rivilege 
in  order  to  further  that  work  of  reform  in  which 
th,e  Government  and  people  of  England  were 
deeply  interested.  The  creation  of  this  singular 
position  may  be  regarded  as  a  triumph  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  inconsistency.      "England,"  iMontalembcrt 


432  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

once  said,  "  fortunately  for  herself,  is  not  the 
pedantic  slave  of  logic."  Fully  as  I  recognise  the 
value  of  this  encomium,  I  have  sometimes,  as  a 
humble  agent  charged  with  the  execution  of 
British  policy,  wished  that  that  policy  was  a  little 
more  logical. 

Under  all  these  circumstances,  only  one  solution 
was  for  many  years  possible.  It  was  that,  in  so 
far  as  the  main  issues  were  concerned,  there  should 
be  no  solution  at  all.  Unless  the  British  Govern- 
ment were  prepared  to  assume  permanently  the 
responsibility  of  governing  Egypt,  it  was  neither 
possible  nor  desirable  to  assimilate  the  legal  status 
of  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  country.  It  was, 
indeed,  painful  enough  to  see  the  parasitic  and 
ignoble  growths  which  clung  round  European 
civilisation,  but  as  Egypt  was  to  be  civilised  on  a 
European  model  without  being  formally  placed 
under  a  European  Government,  it  was  inevitable 
that,  together  with  many  blessings,  some  of  the 
curses  of  civilisation  should  devolve  on  the  country. 
Apart  from  the  practical  and  political  difficulties 
which  stood  in  the  way  of  radical  reform,  it  was  to 
be  observed  that,  looking  at  the  matter  broadly, 
the  blessings  greatly  predominated  over  the  curses. 
The  material  prosperity  of  Egypt  depended  in  no 
small  degree  on  the  presence  of  a  numerous 
European  colony,  and  on  the  attractions  for  the 
investment  of  European  capital.  The  European 
would  not  reside  in  Egypt  unless  he  could  make 
money  by  doing  so,  and  he  could  not  make  money 
unles's  his  life  and  property  were  guaranteed  against 
the  arbitrary  pioceedings  of  a  Government  which 
but  recently  was  very  bad,  and  which,  as  he  rightly 
thought,  would  probably  relapse  into  its  former 
condition  if  the  controlling  hand  of  England  were 
withdrawn. 

Broadly    speaking,    therefore,    the   question    of 


CH.LII        EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  433 

European  privilege  stood,  up  to  1904,  in  much  the 
same  position  as  it  did  in  1882.  Nevertheless,  if 
we  descend  from  general  principles  to  detail,  it  will 
be  found  that  a  few  minor  reforms  were  undertaken 
of  a  nature  to  mitigate  some  of  the  worst  abuses  of 
the  system  which  the  English  found  in  existence 
when  they  took  Egyptian  affairs  seriously  in  hand. 

The  main  blot  in  the  system  under  which  Egypt 
was,  and,  unfortunately,  still  is  governed,  is  the 
absence  of  any  legislative  machinery  capable  of 
passing  laws  binding  on  all  the  inhabitants  of  the 
country.  As  the  absence  of  any  properly  con- 
stituted Tribunals  created,  to  use  Nubar  Pasha's 
expressive  phrase,  a  "judicial  Babel,"  so  the 
absence  of  any  supreme  legislature  creates  a 
"legislative  Babel."  History  affords  abundant 
examples  of  countries  whose  systems  of  legislation 
have  been  bad.  Egypt  affords  a  unique  example 
of  a  country  well  advanced  on  the  road  to  civilisa- 
tion which,  for  all  practical  purposes,  may  be  said 
to  possess  no  general  legislative  system  whatsoever. 

Although,  however,  the  system  of  legislation  by 
diplomacy,  in  so  far  as  its  main  features  are  con- 
cerned, still  holds  the  field,  and  although  it  is  true 
that  the  continuance  of  this  system  involves  an 
almost  complete  legislative  deadlock,  nevertheless, 
after  vast  travail,  the  diplomatic  mountain  did  at 
last  bring  forth  a  small  but  not  altogether  ridiculous 
mouse,  which  in  some  degree  mitigated  the  evils 
necessarily  attendant  on  legislative  impotence. 
Nubar  Pasha,  to  whom  must  be  attributed  the 
merit  of  the  innovation  about  to  be  described, 
pointed  out  that,  apart  from  questions  of  the  first 
importance,  such  as  criminal  jurisdiction  and  the 
right  of  taxing  Europeans,  there  remained  a 
considerable  field  of  petty  but  not  unimportant 
legislation  on  matters  relating  to  what  he  termed 
"la  vie  journaliere  de  la  population."     Questions 

VOL.  II  2  F 


A34  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  vi 

were  frequently  arising  as  to  the  extent  to  which 
Europeans  were  subject  to  regulations  edicted  by 
the  Egyptian  Government  on  such  matters  as  the 
maintenance  of  dykes  and  canals,  the  establishment 
of  drinking-shops  and  places  of  amusement,  the 
right  to  carry  arms,  and  a  host  of  other  minor 
subjects,  which  in  Europe  are  often  treated  by 
by-laws  framed  by  some  subordinate  legislative 
authority,  to  whom  power  has  been  delegated  by 
the  supreme  legislature.  After  some  discussion, 
the  Powers  ag-reed  to  confer  leoislative  rijrhts  on 
the  Egyptian  Government  in  respect  to  these 
matters,  subject  to  the  condition  that  the  Egyptian 
proposals,  before  acquiring  the  force  of  law,  should 
receive  the  approval  of  the  General  Assembly  of 
the  INIixed  Tribunals.  It  was  provided  that  no 
greater  punishment  than  a  fine  of  £l  or  seven  days' 
imprisonment  could  be  incurred  for  infringing  these 
by-laws.^  The  Decree  introducing  these  changes, 
which  is  dated  January  31,  1889,  is  a  document  of 
some  importance  in  so  far  as  it  represents  the  first 
faltering  steps  taken  in  the  direction  of  a  real 
Egyptian  legislative  autonomy. 

The  arrangement  is  obviously  open  to  some 
objections  in  principle.  It  is  unusual  that  judges 
should  frame  the  laws,  which  they  have  to 
administer.  But  the  necessities  of  the  case  were 
such  as  to  render  it  impossible  to  attach  much 
weight  to  objections  based  on  the  undesirability  of 
amalgamating  legislative  and  judicial  functions. 
In  Egypt,  legislators  have  to  be  caught  wherever 
they  can  be  found.  As  a  legislative  machinery 
composed     of   judges    was    ready    to    hand,    that 

1  In  very  nimuMoiis  cases,  Uie  penalty  for  infring^in^  the  law  is 
altogether  insufliciont  to  ensure  general  respect  heiug  paid  to  its  provi- 
sions. Moreover,  the  procedure  of  tlie  law-courts  is  often  complicated 
and  unduly  slow  in  action.  These  defects  have  become  notably 
apparent  in  dealing  with  the  illicit  sale  of  Hashish,  the  use  of  which  is 
a  fertile  source  of  lunacy  in  Kgypt.     See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  lUOG,  p.  64. 


CH.  Lii        EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  435 

machinery  had  to  be  utilised  in  default  of  anything 
better. 

The  fundamental  idea  of  the  Decree  of  January 
31,  1889,  was,  therefore,  to  transfer  a  certain 
portion  of  the  legislative  functions,  heretofore 
exercised  collectively  by  the  Powers,  to  the  judges 
of  the  Mixed  Tribunals.  Some  beneficent  measures 
have  been  enacted  under  its  provisions.  To  quote  a 
single  instance,  the  Egyptian  Government  have  been 
enabled  to  control  the  sale  of  liquor  in  the  agri- 
cultural districts,  and  have  thus  placed  some  sort  of 
check  on  the  demoralisation  which  the  foreign  pur- 
veyor of  alcoholic  and  often  adulterated  drinks 
spreads  around  him.^ 

Passing  to  another  reform,  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  when  the  British  occupation  took  place, 
certain  direct  taxes  were  paid  by  Egyptians,  but 
not  by  Europeans.  These  were  the  house  tax  and 
the  professional  tax.  No  valid  arguments  could 
be  adduced  in  favour  of  exempting  Europeans 
from  the  payment  of  these  taxes.  The  reason  why 
they  did  not  pay  them  was  because  they  did  not 
like  paying  them.  Secure  in  the  support  of  their 
diplomatic  representatives,  they  had  succeeded  in 
maintaining  their  fiscal  privileges  intact.  The 
injustice  was  so  glaring  that  the  Powers  were 
forced  into  applying  a  remedy.  On  March  17, 
1885,  they  went  so  far,  at  the  instance  of  the 
British  Government,  as  to  sign  a  Declaration  stating 
that  they  "recognised  the  justice  of  making  their 
subjects  in  Egypt  liable  to  the  same  taxes  as  the 
natives."  They  agreed  in  principle  to  a  Decree 
under  the  terms  of  which  Europeans  were  rendered 
liable  to  the  payment  of  the  house  tax ;  tliey 
'equally  declared  that  they  accepted  the  appli- 
cation to  their  subjects,  in  the  same  manner  as  to 

*  For  further  remarks  on  this  very  importaut  subject,  see,  inter  alia, 
Egypt,  No.  1  of  li)07,  pp.  73-7G. 


436  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

the  natives,  of  the  stamp  tax  and  Ucence  tax  ;  and 
they  engaged  to  undertake  immediately,  in  concert 
with  the  Egyptian  Government,  the  study  of  the 
draft  laws  establishing  these  two  taxes." 

Both  before  and  after  the  signing  of  this  Declara- 
tion, the  usual  unedifying  and  wearisome  wrangling 
took  place.  It  was  not  till  April  15,  1886,  that  a 
Decree  was  at  last  issued  which  rendered  Europeans 
liable  to  the  payment  of  the  house  tax. 

Although  the  Powers  undertook,  on  March  17, 
1885,  to  study  "  immediately "  the  draft  laws 
necessary  for  the  imposition  of  the  licence  or 
professional  tax  on  Europeans,  it  is  to  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  word  "  immediate  "  is,  in  diplomatic 
phraseology,  a  relative  term.  Six  years  elapsed 
before,  on  March  8,  1891,  a  Decree  was  issued, 
under  which  Europeans  were  rendered  liable  to 
the  payment  of  the  professional  tax.  The  law  had 
not,  however,  been  put  in  operation  when,  in 
connection  with  the  corvee  negotiations,^  the 
French  Government  pressed  for  its  repeal.  There 
was  a  ofood  deal  to  be  said  in  favour  of  abolishing 
the  tax.  In  spite  of  the  prolonged  study  which 
preceded  the  issue  of  the  Decree,  many  of  its  details 
were  faulty.  JNIoreover,  in  an  Oriental  country,  a 
direct  tax  is  always  liable  to  abuse  by  reason  of 
the  untrustworthy  nature  of  the  agency  employed 
in  its  assessment  and  collection.  The  Egyptian 
Government  and  their  British  advisers,  therefore, 
decided  to  rest  content  with  the  victory  which  had 
been  already  gained.  By  dint  of  strenuous  per- 
severance, they  had  remedied  an  injustice  ;  they 
had  asserted  the  principle  that  in  fiscal  matters 
Europeans  and  Egyptians  were  to  be  treated  on  a 
footing  of  equality  ;  there  could  be  no  objection  to 
a  relief  of  taxation  which  would  be  applied  to 
Europeans  and  Egyptians  alike.     The  professional 

»  Vide  ante,  p.  418. 


CH.  Lii        EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  437 

tax  was,  therefore,  abolished  by  a  Decree  issued  on 
January  28,  1892. 

To  sum  up.  The  results  of  British  intervention 
in  Egypt,  in  so  far  as  European  privilege  is  con- 
cerned, have  up  to  the  present  time  been  as 
follows  : — 

1.  A  slight  advance  has  been  made  in  the 
direction  of  Egyptian  legislative  autonomy. 

2.  Europeans  and  Egyptians  have  been  placed  on 
a  basis  of  equality  in  so  far  as  taxation  is  concerned. 

With  the  signature  of  the  Anglo-French  Con- 
vention in  1904,  the  question  of  dealing  with  the 
Capitulations  entered  into  a  new  phase.  The 
prospects  of  reform  brightened.  It  became  possible 
to  discuss  the  subject  on  its  own  merits  without 
the  introduction  of  irrelevant  issues. 

I  have  already  stated  that  the  main  object  of 
this  work  is  to  narrate  the  history  of  the  past, 
rather  than  to  discuss  questions  which  now  occupy 
public  attention.  Acting  on  this  principle,  I 
abstain  from  entering  fully  into  a  discussion  of  the 
method  under  which  the  existing  regime  of  the 
Capitulations  might  advantageously  be  modified. 
In  my  Annual  Report  for  the  year  1905  ^  I  dwelt  on 
this  subject,  and  in  my  Report  for  the  following 
year,^  I  sketched  out  the  broad  features  of  a  plan, 
having  for  its  object  the  creation  in  Egypt  of 
a  Council  invested  with  powers  to  enact  laws 
binding  on  all  Europeans  resident  in  Egypt.  I 
concluded  with  the  following  remarks : — 

"  I  am  well  aware  of  the  danger  of  making 
Constitutions  which  may  look  well  on  paper,  but 
which  will  not  work  in  practice.  It  is  one  against 
which  Lord  Dufferin  very  wisely  uttered  a  note 
of  warning  when  he  was  framing  proposals  for  the 
creation  of  an  Egyptian  Legislative  Assembly.     I 


»  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1906,  pp.  1-8. 
>  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  pp.  10-26. 


438  MODERN  EGYPT  tt.yi 

have  endeavoured,  to  the  best  of  my  abihty,  to 
avoid  this  danger.  INIy  wish  has  been  to  create  an 
institution  which,  albeit  it  will  not  be  free  from 
anomalies,  and  may  possess  many  theoretical 
imperfections,  will,  on  the  whole,  be  suited  to  the 
present  practical  requirements  of  Egyptian  political 
and  administrative  life.  I  have  more  particularly 
endeavoured  to  utilise  such  elements  as  are  avail- 
able, in  order  to  guard,  so  far  as  is  possible,  against 
that  danger  to  which,  possibly,  Egypt  is  somewhat 
specially  exposed — I  mean  the  danger  of  making 
what  Burke  once  called  *  a  stock -jobbing  Con- 
stitution.' I  am  far  from  saying  that  I  have 
altogether  succeeded,  but  I  trust  that  what  I  have 
proposed  may  form  the  basis  for  further  discussion, 
with  the  result  that  any  defects  which  may  be 
discovered  in  the  scheme  set  forth  in  this  Report 
may  be  remedied. 

"Much  will  depend  upon  the  views  taken  by 
the  natural  leaders  of  public  opinion  in  Egypt. 
To  the  Egyptians,  I  would  say  that  some  plan 
based  on  the  broad  features  of  that  which  I  have 
sketched  out  is,  I  am  convinced,  the  only  method 
by  which  they  can,  within  any  period  which  it  is 
now  possible  to  foresee,  be  relieved  of  those 
portions  of  the  Capitulations  which  retard  the 
progress  of  their  country,  and  of  which  they  so 
frequently,  and,  I  should  add,  so  legitimately, 
complain.  To  the  Europeans  who  have  made 
Egypt  their  home,  I  would  say  that,  in  my  desire 
to  guard  against  any  reappearance  of  the  arbitrary 
methods  of  government  against  which  the  Capitu- 
lations were  intended  to  protect  them,  I  am  no 
less  European  than  they ;  that  though  the  rights 
and  privileges  which  they  very  naturally  prize  are 
taken  away  in  one  form,  they  are  simultaneously 
granted  in  another  form  of  equal  and  far  less 
objectionable  efficacy ;   and   that,  in  addition,  the 


CH.LII        EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  439 

inestimable  privilege  will  be  granted  to  them  of 
making  their  own  laws,  instead  of  being  dependent 
on  the  vicissitudes  of  European  politics  and  on  the 
views  taken  in  fifteen  different  capitals  of  the 
world  by  others,  who,  however  much  they  may 
be  animated  by  good  intentions,  must  necessarily 
be  ignorant  of  local  requirements.  It  is  only  in 
the  *Land  of  Paradox'  that  the  bestowal  on  a 
whole  community  of  the  right  to  manage  its  own 
affairs  could  be  regarded  as  the  destruction  of  a 
privilege. 

"Before  moving  any  further  in  the  matter,  I 
ask  the  leading  Europeans  resident  in  Egypt 
whether  they  wish  to  support  an  archaic  system 
of  government  which  has  outlived  its  time,  and 
which  acts  as  a  clog  to  all  real  progress,  or  whether 
they  would  not  rather  prefer  to  assist  in  reforming 
that  system  in  order  to  ilneet  the  altered  conditions 
of  the  country,  and  thus  lay  the  foundation-stone 
of  an  Egyptian  nationality  in  the  best  and  only 
practicable  sense  of  that  much-abused  term." 

I  have  now  only  to  express  an  earnest  hope 
that  this  question  will  not  be  allowed  to  drop.  By 
far  the  most  important  reform  now  required  in 
Egypt  is  to  devise  some  plan  which  will  enable 
laws  binding  on  Europeans  resident  in  the  country 
to  be  enacted.  Until  this  is  done,  progress  in 
many  directions,  where  reform  is  urgently  required, 
will  be  barred.  I  would  add  that  the  mere  transfer 
of  criminal  jurisdiction  over  Europeans  from  the 
Consular  to  the  Mixed  Courts — a  project  which 
nnds  support  in  some  quarters — altogether  fails  to 
meet  the  requirements  of  the  situation.  The  main 
reform  required  is  legislative,  not  judicial.^ 

The  abolition  of  indefensible  privileges  is  part 
and  parcel  of  the  work  of  modern  progress.      In 

*  Some  further  remarks  on  this  subject  will  be  found  on  p.  668. 


440  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

the  West,  the  work  of  destroyhig  privilege  is  well- 
nigh  complete,  and  the  next  generation  will 
probably  see  democracy  pass  from  the  destructive, 
and  enter  upon  the  constructive  phase  of  its 
existence,  with  what  result  we  cannot  now  foretell. 
The  backward  East  is  still  in  the  stage  in  which 
a  privilege  destroyed,  whether  it  be  of  a  Western 
or  of  an  Eastern  type,  may  be  regarded  as  a  battle 
won.  The  constructive  period  of  Eastern  political 
existence  is  as  yet  afar,  neither  can  any  one  of  the 
present  generation  hope  to  see  what  will  eventually 
happen  to  the  curious  amalgam  of  fanaticism  and 
agnosticism,  of  old-world  despotism  and  latter-day 
republicanism,  which  in  Egypt,  as  in  other  Oriental 
countries,  is  now  laid  on  the  anvil,  and  which 
receives  blows  from  all  quarters  of  such  diverse 
strength  as  to  render  it  a  matter  of  haphazard 
conjecture  to  foretell  what  will  be  the  shape 
which  it  will  ultimately  assume.  In  the  mean- 
while, assuming  the  abolition  of  such  privileges 
as  those  enjoyed  by  Europeans  in  Egypt  to  be 
an  advantage,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  Egyptian 
Government,  under  British  auspices,  made  one 
considerable  step  forward.  They  placed  all  the 
residents  in  Egypt,  whether  European  or  Egyptian, 
on  a  footing  of  fiscal  equality.  But  they  have  so  far 
been  unable  seriously  to  attack  the  Capitulations, 
which  constitute  the  main  citadel  of  privilege. 
These,  as  in  the  days  prior  to  the  British  occupation, 
remain  for  the  present  inviolate.  Why  was  this  ? 
It  was  because  the  international  system  of  govern- 
ment barred  the  way  to  advance. 

This  work  has  been  written  to  little  purpose 
if  it  has  not  shown  the  radical  defects  of  inter- 
nationalism, considered  as  a  machinery  for  adminis- 
tration and  legislation.  In  making  this  remark, 
however,  I  must  carefully  guard  against  being 
misunderstood.      In  condemning  executive  action 


CH.  Lii        EUROPEAN  PRIVILEGE  441 

through  international  agency,  I  do  not  in  any 
degree  wish  to  deprecate  the  employment  of 
officials  of  various  nationalities  in  certain  executive 
functions.  The  system  which  I  wish  to  condemn 
is  that  under  which  executive  officials  are  practically 
nominated  by  foreign  Governments  and  become,  as 
experience  in  Egypt  has  abundantly  proved,  the 
political  agents  of  their  countries  of  orighi.  Not 
only  is  there  no  objection  to  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment being  free  to  choose  their  European  officials 
from  any  country  in  Europe,  but  great  advantage 
is  to  be  derived  from  the  adoption  of  this  system. 
Some  solid  guarantee  is  thus  afforded  that  the 
individuals  nominated  will  be  chosen  solely  by 
reason  of  their  professional  merits,  and  that  they 
will  not  be  moved  by  political  considerations  to 
overstep  the  limit  of  the  functions  assigned  to 
them.  The  same  remark  applies,  even  to  a  greater 
extent,  to  the  case  of  those  in  judicial  employment. 
European  judges  for  the  Egyptian  law-courts 
should  continue,  as  at  present,  to  be  chosen  from 
various  nationalities. 

The  case  of  legislative  internationalism  is  some- 
what different.  Egypt  is  essentially  a  cosmopolitan 
country.  It  follows,  therefore,  as  a  •  matter  of 
course,  that  if  any  local  legislature  is  created,  it 
must,  if  it  is  to  be  truly  representative,  be  cosmo- 
politan in  character. 

The  internationalism  which  I  wish  to  condemn 
is,  therefore,  confined  to  what  may  be  termed 
political  internationalism,  that  is  to  say,  the  system 
which  admits  of  the  employment  of  political 
agents,  who,  acting  under  whatever  instructions 
they  may  receive  from  their  several  Foreign  Offices, 
are  prone  to  introduce  into  the  discussion  of 
some  purely  local  question,  considerations  based 
on  the  friendliness  or  hostility,  in  other  parts  of 
the  world,  of  their  countries  of  origin.     Political 


442  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

passions  are — or,  at  any  moment  may  become — too 
strong  to  allow  of  an  international  system  of  this 
latter  type  working  smoothly.  "The  principles 
of  true  politics,"  Burke  once  said,  "are  those  of 
morality  enlarged,  and  I  neither  now  do,  nor 
ever  will,  admit  of  any  other."  An  influential 
school  of  English  politicians  have  been  zealous 
in  supporting  the  principle  of  action  thus  advocated 
by  Burke.  "I  would  not,"  Mr.  Bright  said  in 
1877,  "dissociate  what  is  true  in  morals  from  what 
is  true  in  statesmanship."  Few  persons  would 
wish  to  speak  in  disparaging  terms  of  these  noble 
principles.  They  certainly  command  my  full 
assent,  and,  I  may  add,  that  during  a  long 
diplomatic  career,  I  have  persistently  acted  upon 
them  to  the  best  of  my  ability.  But,  whilst  our 
principles  may  be  elevated,  our  application  of 
them  must  be  subordinated  to  the  facts  with  which 
we  have  to  deal.  Do  not  let  us  imagine  that 
nations  and  Governments  in  general  are  prepared 
altogether  to  assimilate  public  and  private  morality. 
Mr.  Lecky  says  with  truth  :  "  Nothing  is  more 
calamitous  than  the  divorce  of  politics  from  morals, 
but  in  practical  politics  public  and  private  morals  will 
never  absolutely  correspond."  ^  Internationalism, 
in  spite  of  its  fair  exterior,  which  proclaims  equality 
of  governing  power  and  equitable  treatment 
towards  subject  races,  means  but  too  often  in 
practice  political  egotism,  a  disregard  of  the  rights 
of  subject  races,  and,  in  the  case  now  under 
discussion,  a  decadence  in  the  authority  of  that 
European  Power  on  the  maintenance  of  whose 
paramount  influence  the  advance  of  true  civilisation 
in  Egypt  depends.     That  Power  is  Great  Britain. 

»  Map  o/Life,  p.  18L 


CHAPTER  LIII 

FINANCE 

The  first  bankruptcy  of  Egypt — Risk  of  a  second  bankruptcy — The 
Race  against  Bankruptcy — The  era  of  reform — Fiscal  relief — 
Reduction  of  taxation  —  Increase  of  revenue — Expenditure — 
Aggregate  surplus  since  1888 — The  indebtedness  of  the  fellaheen 
— Distribution  of  land — Importance  of  the  financial  question. 

"Great,"  says  Carlyle,  "is  Bankruptcy.  .  .  . 
Honour  to  Bankruptcy  ;  ever  righteous  on  the  great 
scale,  though  in  detail  it  is  so  cruel.  Under  all 
falsehoods  it  works  unweariedly  mining.  No  false- 
hood, did  it  rise  heaven  high  and  cover  the  world, 
but  Bankruptcy,  one  day,  will  sweep  it  down  and 
make  us  free  of  it."  ^ 

In  Egypt,  bankruptcy,  of  a  truth,  destroyed 
many  false  gods  and  pricked  many  bubbles. 
Notably,  it  dashed  down  Ismail  Pasha,  the  great 
high- priest  of  Sham,  from  that  false  eminence 
which  he  had  attained,  .and  allowed  him  to  be 
pulverised  by  the  adventurers  who  were  his  former 
worshippers.  More  than  this,  bankruptcy,  riding 
roughshod  over  all  who  would  not  recognise  the 
irresistible  nature  of  its  action,  brought  home  to 
the  minds  of  a  reluctant  Egyptian  Ministry  that 
they  must  needs  abandon  the  Soudan,  at  all  events 
for  a  time,  because  they  could  not  afford  to  stay 
there.  These  and  many  other  benefits  did  bank- 
ruptcy, in  its  ruthlessness,  confer  on  a  land  whose 

*  French  Revolution,  Book  iii.  c.  i. 
443 


444  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  vi 

government  had  for  many  years  been  one  gigantic 
falsehood. 

When  the  British  troops  occupied  Egypt  in 
1882,  one  act  of  bankruptcy  had  ah*eady  been 
committed.  In  1879,  the  Government  of  Egypt 
declared  themselves  insolvent.  In  1880,  a  composi- 
tion with  their  creditors  was  effected.  Nevertheless, 
under  the  combined  influences  of  the  Arabi  re- 
bellion and  the  cataclysm  in  the  Soudan,  the 
Treasury  was  again  on  the  high  road,  to  another 
act  of  bankruptcy.  There  was,  however,  this 
difference  between  the  financial  chaos  of  1878-79 
and  that  of  1882-83.  During  the  earlier  of  these 
two  periods,  the  hopes  of  every  well-wisher  to 
Egypt  were  based  on  a  declaration  of  bank- 
ruptcy. It  was  impossible  to  apply  a  remedy  until 
the  true  facts  of  the  case  were  recognised.  In 
1882-83,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  in  the  true 
interest  of  every  Egyptian,  and  of  every  sympathiser 
with  Egypt,  to  stave  off"  bankruptcy,  for  the  remedy 
which  would  certainly  have  been  applied,  had  a 
condition  of  bankruptcy  been  declared,  was  almost 
as  bad  as  the  disease.  That  remedy  was  inter- 
national government  in  excelsis.  Hence,  the 
Egyptian  Government  had  to  enter  upon  what 
Lord  Milner  has  aptly  termed  "  The  Race  against 
Bankruptcy." 

The  struggle  was  long  and  arduous.  For  some 
while,  the  issue  seemed  doubtful.  The  final  result 
was  a  complete  triumph.  It  may  be  said  that  the 
period  of  doubt  lasted  till  1888.  By  that  time,  the 
race  had  been  virtually  won. 

So  long  as  the  Egyptian  Government  and  their 
British  advisers  were  in  constant  danger  of  being 
throttled  by  bankruptcy,  it  was  hopeless  to  think 
seriously  of  fiscal  reform.  More  than  this,  any 
improvement  in  the  administrative  system  which 
involved  an  increase  of  expenditure — and  it  may 


cH.  Liii  FINANCE  445 

be  said  that  practically  every  improvement  required 
money — had  to  be  set  aside.  Attention  was  con- 
centrated on  one  object,  and  that  was  how  to  make 
both  ends  meet.  But  when  financial  equilibrium 
was  assured,  the  aspect  of  affairs  changed. 

When  it  became  known  that  the  Egyptian 
Treasury  was  in  possession  of  a  surplus,  all  the 
various  interests  concerned  clamoured  for  the 
redress  of  long-standing  and  often  very  legitimate 
grievances.  The  inhabitant  of  the  country  pleaded 
that  his  land-tax  was  too  high,  and  pointed  with 
justice  to  the  fall  in  the  price  of  agricultural  pro- 
duce as  a  reason  for  affording  him  relief.  The 
inhabitant  of  the  town  complained  of  the  oppres- 
sive nature  of  the  octroi  duty.  The  population  in 
general  urged  that  the  price  of  salt  was  excessive. 
The  possessor  of  live  stock  asked  why  he  should 
pay  a  tax  for  every  sheep  or  goat,  on  his  farm.  The 
seller  of  produce  at  every  market  or  fair  dwelt  on 
the  fact  that  his  goods  had  to  be  weighed  by  a 
Government  official  who  charged  a  fee  for  the 
Treasury  and  another  fee  for  himself.  Why,  again, 
it  was  urged,  should  railway,  postal,  and  telegraph 
rates  be  higher  in  Egypt  than  elsewhere  ?  Why 
should  a  boat  passing  under  a  bridge  pay  a  toll,  whilst 
a  passenger  going  over  the  bridge  paid  nothing  ? 
These,  and  a  hundred  other  arguments  and  proposals, 
were  put  forward  by  the  advocates  of  fiscal  reform. 

On  the  other  hand,  each  zealous  official,  anxious 
to  improve  the  administration  of  his  own  Depart- 
ment, hurled  in  demands  for  money  on  a  poverty- 
stricken  Treasury.  The  soldier  wanted  more 
troops,  and  painted  in  gloomy  colours  the  dangers 
to  which  the  frontier  was  exposed  by  reason  of  the 
proximity  of  the  Dervishes.  The  Police  officer 
wanted  more  policemen  to  assist  in  the  capture  of 
brigands.  The  jurist  urged  that,  without  well-paid 
judges,  it  was  impossible  to  establish  a  pure  system 


446  MODERN  EGYPT  rr.  vi 

of  justice.  The  educationalist  pointed  out  with 
great  truth  that,  unless  the  sums  placed  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  Department  of  Pubhc  Instruction 
were  greatly  increased,  the  execution  of  the  policy 
of  employing  Egyptian  rather  than  European 
agency  in  the  administration  of  the  country  would 
have  to  be  indefinitely  postponed.  The  soldier, 
the  policeman,  the  jurist,  the  director  of  prisons, 
and  the  schoolmaster  all  joined  in  asking  for  the 
construction  of  expensive  buildings.  The  medical 
authorities  clamoured  for  hospitals,  and  pointed 
out  that,  without  improved  sanitation,  which  was 
a  bottomless  financial  abyss,  there  could  be  no 
guarantee  against  epidemic  disease.  The  engineer 
showed  that  it  was  false  economy  not  to  extend  the 
system  of  irrigation,  to  drain  the  fields,  to  make 
roads,  and  to  develop  railway  communication. 
Following  on  the  larger  demands,  came  every  species 
of  minor  proposal.  Would  it  not  be  an  attraction 
to  the  tourists,  who  spent  so  much  money  in  Egypt, 
if  a  theatrical  company  visited  Cairo  in  the  winter  ? 
How  could  this  be  managed  unless  the  Government 
gave  a  subvention  to  the  theatre  ?  Was  it  not  a 
scandal,  now  that  a  civilised  Power  was  virtually 
governing  Egypt,  that  more  was  not  done  to  pro- 
tect the  ancient  monuments  of  the  country  from 
injury  ?  What  report  would  the  winter  visitors  to 
Egypt  make  when  they  returned  to  Europe,  if,  in 
driving  to  the  Pyramids,  they  were  bumped  over 
a  road  which  had  not  been  repaired  since  the 
Empress  Eugenie  drove  over  it  some  twenty  years 
previously  ?  These,  and  scores  of  other  questions, 
were  asked,  in  tones  of  more  or  less  indignant 
remonstrance,  by  individuals  who  realised  the 
desirability  of  paying  attention  to  some  one  or 
other  subject  in  which  they  were  interested,  but 
who  had  no  clear  perception  of  the  financial 
situation  considered  as  a  whole. 


cH.  Liii  FINANCE  447 

Under  all  these  circumstances,  it  behoved  those 
who  were  responsible  for  the  financial  guidance  of 
the  Egyptian  Government  to  act  with  great  caution. 
It  was  clear  that,  as  a  wave  of  European  civilisa- 
tion was  to  sweep  over  the  land,  all  the  parapher- 
nalia of  civilisation — that  is  to  say,  its  judges  and 
law-courts,  its  hospitals,  its  schools,  its  reforma- 
tories for  juvenile  offenders,  and  so  on — would, 
sooner  or  later,  have  to  be  introduced ;  but  the 
main  point  to  be  borne  in  mind  was  this :  that,  in 
introducing  all  these  reforms,  Egypt  should  not  be 
allowed  to  slip  back  into  the  slough  of  bankruptcy 
from  which  it  had  been  so  hardly  and  so  recently 
rescued.  The  principal  difficulty  was  to  decide 
which  were  the  most  pressing  amongst  the  many 
points  requiring  attention.  It  was  thought  that, 
before  the  sick  man  was  provided  with  a  comfort- 
able hospital,  before  the  criminal  was  lodged  in  a 
prison  built  on  improved  penological  principles, 
before  schools  w^ere  provided,  and  even  before  rival 
litigants  could  be  provided  with  an  adequate 
number  of  honest  and  capable  judges,  or  before 
the  judges  could  be  located  in  suitable  buildings, 
it  was  essential  to  alleviate  the  burthens  which 
weighed  on  the  mass  of  the  population.  Fiscal 
relief  had  a  prior  claim  to  administrative  reform. 
It  was,  therefore,  decided  that,  whilst  penuri- 
ously  doling  out  grants  to  the  spending  Depart- 
ments, the  principal  eff()rts  of  the  Government 
should  be  devoted  to  devising  means  for  the  relief 
of  taxation. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  I  should  give  in  detail 
the  fiscal  history  of  Egypt  since  the  British 
occupation.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  say  that 
direct  taxation  has  been  reduced  by  little  less  than 
£2,000,000  a  year.  In  the  domain  of  indirect 
taxation,  the  Salt  Tax,  the  collection  of  which  was 
attended  with  great  hardship  to  the  poorest  classes 


448  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

of  the  population,^  the  octroi  duties,  the  bridge 
and  lock  dues  on  the  Nile,^  and  the  tax  both  on 
river  boats  and  on  sea  fishing -boats  have  been 
wholly  abolished.  The  Registration  dues  on  the  sale 
of  land  have  been  reduced  from  5  to  2  per  cent.  The 
Light  dues  have  been  greatly  diminished  in  amount. 
So  also  has  the  tax  on  ferries.  The  Customs  duties 
on  coal,  liquid  fuel,  charcoal,  firewood,  timber  for 
building  purposes,  petroleum,  live  stock,  and  dead 
meat  have  been  reduced  from  8  to  4  per  cent. 
The  inland  fishery  industry  has  been  relieved 
from  the  vexatious  and  onerous  restrictions  which 
were  formerly  imposed  on  it.  The  Postal,  Tele- 
graph, and  Railway  rates  have  been  largely  reduced. 
The  only  increase  in  taxation  has  been  in  the 
tobacco  duty,  which  has  been  raised  from  P.T.  14 
to  P.T.  20  per  kilogramme.  There  cannot  be  a 
doubt  that  the  whole  Egyptian  population  is  now 
very  lightly  taxed.  The  taxation  is,  however,  still 
unequally  distributed.  The  urban  population  do 
not  bear  their  fair  share  of  the  public  burdens.  In 
this,  as  in  so  many  other  matters,  the  Capitulations 
bar  the  way  to  reform. 

In  spite  of  these  large  reductions  of  taxation, 
the  revenue  has  grown  from  £E.8,935,000  in  1883 
to  £E.15,337,000  in  1906 — an  increase  of  no  less 
than  £E.6,402,000. 

The  expenditure  has,  of  course,  increased  with 
the  growing  revenue,  but  it  lias  been  carefully 
controlled.  In  1883,  it  amounted  to  £E.8,554,000, 
and  in  1906  to  £E.12,393,000''— an  increase  of 
£E.3,839,000. 

»  See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1906,  p.  33,  and  No.  1  of  1906,  p.  191. 

^  The  development  of  Nile  traffic  has  been  very  remarkable.  I  give 
a  single  instance.  The  number  of  boats  passing  the  Atfeh  lock,  which 
connects  the  Mahmoudieh  Canal  and  the  Nile,  in  1900  —  the  year 
before  the  abolition  of  the  toll — was  only  4564.  In  1905,  nearly  22,000 
passed. 

3  These  figures  are  exclusive  of  £E.  1,238,000  debited  to  Special 
Funds  in  1883,  and  of  £E.  769,000  similarly  debited  in  1906. 


CH.  LIII 


FINANCE  449 


The  following  three  facts  will  perhaps  bring 
clearly  home  to  the  mind  of  the  reader  the  general 
nature  of  the  results  obtained  by  the  financial 
administration  of  Egypt  since  the  British  occu- 
pation in  1882. 

In  the  first  place,  I  have  to  record  that,  up  to 
1888,  either  a  deficit  was  annually  incurred,  or  else 
financial  equilibrium  was  preserved  with  the  utmost 
difficulty.  Then  the  tide  turned.  During  the 
eighteen  years  from  1889  to  1906,  both  inclusive, 
the  aggregate  surplus  realised  by  the  Egyptian 
Treasury  amounted  to  more  than  27^  millions 
sterling. 

The  second  fact  which  I  have  to  record  is  no 
less  striking.  During  the  twenty  years  preceding 
December  31,  1906,  extraordinary  expenditure  to 
the  extent  of  £E.  19,303,000  was  incurred  on  rail- 
ways, canals,  and  public  buildings.  Of  this  large 
sum,  only  £E. 3,6 10,000  was  borrowed.  The 
remainder  was  provided  out  of  revenue.  More- 
over, on  December  30,  1906,  a  Reserve  Fund  of 
£E.3,050,000  stood  to  the  credit  of  the  Commis- 
sioners of  the  Debt.  The  Reserve  Fund  of  the 
Egyptian  Government  amounted  on  the  same  date 
to  £E.ll, 055,000,  of  which  only  £E.2,353,000  had 
at  that  date  been  engaged  for  capital  expenditure. 
Both  of  these  Funds,  amounting  in  the  aggregate 
to  £E.14,105,000,  were  provided  out  of  revenue. 

In  the  third  place,  I  wish  to  draw  attention  to 
the  facts  and  figures  relating  to  the  indebtedness 
of  Egypt.  In  1883,  the  capital  of  the  Debt,  which 
was  then  held  exclusively  by  the  public,  amounted 
to  £96,457,000,  and  the  charge  on  account  of 
interest  and  sinking  fund  to  £4,208,000.  Since 
then,  the  Guaranteed  Loan,  which  amounted  to 
£9,424,000,  has  been  issued  ;  £4,882,000  has  been 
borrowed  for  the  execution  of  public  works,  and  for 
the  commutation  of  pensions  and  of  allocations  to 
VOL.  II  2  o 


450  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

the  Khedivial  family.  The  conversion  operation 
of  1890  added  £3,904,000  to  the  nominal  capital  of 
the  Debt.  In  all,  £18,210,000  has  been  added  to 
the  capital  of  the  Debt.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Daira  Loan,  which  in  1883  amounted  to  £9,009,000, 
has  been  entirely  paid  off.  The  Domains  Loan, 
which  in  1883  amounted  to  £8,255,000,  has  been 
reduced  to  £1,316,000.  The  Guaranteed  Loan 
has  been  reduced  to  £7,765,000,  a  reduction 
of  £1,659,000  from  the  original  amount.  On 
December  28,  1906,  the  outstanding  capital  of 
the  Debt  in  the  hands  of  the  public  amounted  to 
£87,416,000.^  The  charge  on  account  of  interest 
and  sinking  fund  borne  by  the  taxpayers  was 
£3,368,000.  There  has,  therefore,  in  twenty-three 
years  been  a  reduction  of  £9,041,000  in  the  capital 
of  the  Debt,  and  of  £900,000  in  the  charge  on 
account  of  interest  and  sinking  fund. 

These  facts  and  figures  speak  for  themselves. 
Considerations  of  space  preclude  me  from  de- 
scribing in  detail  the  beneficial  results  which  have 
accrued  to  the  population  of  Egypt  in  every 
direction  from  the  substitution  of  a  sound  fiscal 
policy  for  the  oppressive  and  ruinous  system  of 
government  to  which  they  were  formerly  subjected. 
I  may,  however,  allude  to  one  point  of  special 
importance. 

Lord  Dufferin,  writing  in  1883,  alluded  to  "the 
encumbered  condition  of  a  considerable  proportion 
of  the  fellaheen  lands "  as  "  one  of  the  most  dis- 
tressing subjects  connected  with  the  present  social 
condition  of  the  country."  There  was  a  tendency, 
he  added,  "  for  the  land  to  pass  out  of  tlie  hands  of 
the  present  owners  into  those  of  foreign  creditors." 

1  In  addition  to  this,  stock  to  the  amount  of  £8,700,000  was  held  by 
the  Egyptian  Treasury  and  the  Commissioners  of  the  Debt.  'I'his 
stock  will  be  gradually  sold,  and  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  expended  on 
remunerative  public  works.  In  the  meanwhile,  the  interest  is,  of  course, 
credited  to  the  Egyptian  Government. 


cHLin  FINANCE  451 

There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  very  great  im- 
portance of  the  question  to  which  Lord  DufFerin 
drew  attention.  In  the  first  place,  as  Lord 
Dufferin  very  truly  remarked,  a  transfer  on  a 
huge  scale  of  the  landed  property  of  the  country 
to  foreign  creditors  "  could  scarcely  take  place 
without  producing  an  agrarian  crisis  (Lord  Dufferin 
might  also  have  added,  a  political  crisis)  which 
would  prove  equally  disastrous  to  the  creditors, 
the  debtors,  and  the  Government."  Then,  again, 
the  arguments  in  favour  of  small  holdings  apply 
with  somewhat  special  force  in  Egypt.  Owing  to 
the  fact  that  there  is  not  generally  any  serious 
congestion  of  the  population,  competition  rents 
have  not  as  yet  resulted  in  any  grave  strife  between 
landlords  and  tenants.  Nevertheless,  as  the  popula- 
tion increases,  and  the  area  of  cultivable  but 
uncultivated  land  diminishes,  there  will  be,  to  say 
the  least,  a  risk  that  issues  will  eventually  arise 
between  landlords  and  tenants,  somewhat  similar 
to  those  which  have  caused  so  much  trouble  in 
other  countries — notably  in  India  and  in  Ireland. 
The  best  way  to  postpone  this  strife,  as  also  to 
mitigate  its  intensity  should  it  eventually  prove 
to  be  inevitable,  will  be  to  avoid  the  adoption  of 
any  measures  which  will  tend  towards  the  dis- 
appearance of  the  small  proprietors. 

The  political  arguments  in  favour  of  this  policy 
are  no  less  strong  than  those  of  a  purely  economic 
character.  I  know  of  no  measure  more  calculated 
to  destroy  any  hopes  that  the  Egyptians  will 
eventually  become  really  autonomous,  and  that 
they  will  exercise  whatever  self-governing  powers 
they  may  some  day  acquire  in  the  interests  of  the 
whole  community,  than  the  displacement  of  the 
small  proprietors,  more  especially  if  the  large 
landowners,  who  would  take  their  places,  were, 
to  any  excessive  degree,  of  European  nationality. 


452  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

The  policy  which  has  been  persistently  pursued 
by  the  Egyptian  Government  of  recent  years  has, 
therefore,  been  to  endeavour,  by  a  variety  of 
indirect  but  perfectly  legitimate  means,  to  main- 
tain the  small  proprietors  in  the  possession  of 
their  holdings,  and,  whilst  affording  all  reasonable 
facilities  for  the  employment  of  European  capital 
in  land  development,  to  do  nothing  which  would 
tend  towards  ousting  Egyptian  proprietors  and 
substituting  Europeans  in  their  places. 

Of  these  means,  the  improvement  in  the  system 
of  irrigation  has  perhaps  been  the  most  important 
and  the  most  productive  of  result.  The  establish- 
ment of  an  Agricultural  Bank,  which  has  ad- 
vanced sums  amounting  in  the  aggregate  to  about 
£9,000,000  in  small  sums  to  the  fellaheen,  and  of 
Agricultural  and  Horticultural  Societies,  which 
have  been  the  means  of  spreading  a  knowledge  of 
scientific  agriculture  and  horticulture,  and  have 
also  facilitated  the  purchase  by  the  cultivators  of 
good  seed  and  of  manure,  have  also  been  potent 
influences  acting  in  the  same  direction.^ 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  these  efforts  have 
been  crowned  with  success.  On  January  1,  1907, 
only  665,226  acres  were  held  by  6021  foreign 
landowners,^  as  against  4,765,546  acres  held  by 
1,224,560  Egyptian  proprietors.  Of  the  latter, 
the  holdings  of  1,081,348  proprietors  were  of  less 
than  5  acres  in  extent ;  the  holdings  of  132,198 
varied  from   5   to    50   acres,    thus   leaving  11,054 

*  Full  descriptions  of  the  creation  and  working  both  of  the  Agri- 
cultural Bank  and  of  the  Agricultural  and  Horticultural  Societies 
are  given  in  the  Annual  Reports  which  have  been  laid  before 
Parliament. 

2  For  further  details  up  to  December  31, 1906  see  Egypt,  No.  1  of 
1907,  p.  60.  A  great  deal  of  the  laud  now  held  by  foreigners  belongs 
to  Land  Companies.  It  will  eventually  be  sold.  One  of  the  highest 
authorities  on  this  subject  in  Kgypt  (the  late  iM.  Felix  Suares)  assured 
me  that  he  was  convinced  that,  before  many  years  had  passed,  almost 
the  whole  of  the  laud  in  Fgypt  would  be  in  the  hands  of  Egyptians. 


cii.  Liii  FINANCE  453 

proprietors  of  more  than  50  acres.  It  may,  I  think, 
be  confidently  stated  that  the  danger,  which  Lord 
Duiferin  apprehended,  has  been  averted. 

Finance  is  often  considered  a  repellent  subject, 
and,  because  it  is  repellent,  it  has  gained  a  reputa- 
tion for  being  more  difficult  to  understand  than  is 
really  the  case.  There  are,  indeed,  some  few 
economic  and  currency  questions  which  are  abstruse, 
but  the  difficulty  of  understanding  even  these  has 
been  in  no  small  degree  increased  by  the  cloud  of 
words  with  which  writers  on  subjects  of  this  sort 
often  surround  issues  in  themselves  simple.  One 
merit  of  the  Egyptian  financial  situation  was  this, 
that  no  semi -insoluble  economic  problem  lurked 
between  the  leaves  of  the  Budget.  The  Finance 
Minister  had  not,  as  in  India,  to  deal  with  a 
congested  population,  of  whom  a  large  percentage 
were  in  normal  times  living  on  the  verge  of  starva- 
tion. He  never  had  to  refer  to  the  pages  of 
Malthus  or  Mill,  of  Ricardo  or  Bastiat.  The 
complications  arising  from  a  bewilderhig  political 
situation  had  done  a  good  deal  to  obscure  the 
problems  which  he  had  to  solve,  and  to  hinder  their 
solution.  But,  in  truth,  all  that  was  required  in 
Egypt,  in  order  to  understand  the  situation,  was  a 
knowledge  of  arithmetic,  patience  to  uinavel  the 
cumbersome  system  of  accounts  which  was  the 
offspring  of  internationalism,  and  a  sturdy  recogni- 
tion of  the  fact  that  neither  an  individual  nor  a 
State  can  with  impunity  go  on  living  for  an  indefinite 
period  above  his  or  its  income. 

The  main  facts  relating  to  Egyptian  finance, 
when  once  the  thread  of  the  international  labyrinth 
had  ^  been  found,  were,  in  fact,  very  simple ;  when 

^  I  use  the  past  tense  because,  witli  the  practical  abolition  of  the 
Caisse  de  la  Dette,  the  financial  situation,  and  notably  the  system  of 
accounts,  has  been  very  greatly  simplified. 


454  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

they  were  understood,  they  were  not  uninteresting. 
"Nothing,"  as  Lord  JNlihier  truly  says,  "in  tliis 
strange  land  is  commonplace."  The  subject  cannot 
surely  be  devoid  of  interest  when  it  is  remembered 
that  the  difference  between  the  magic  words  surplus 
and  deficit  meant  whether  the  Egyptian  cultivator 
was,  or  was  not,  to  be  allowed  to  reap  the  fruits  of 
his  labour ;  whether,  after  supplying  the  wants  of 
the  State,  he  was  to  be  left  with  barely  enough  to 
keep  body  and  soul  together,  or  whether  he  was  to 
enjoy  some  degree  of  rustic  ease ;  whether  he  was 
to  be  eternally  condemned  to  live  in  a  wretched 
mud  hut,  or  whether  he  might  have  an  opportunity 
given  to  him  of  improving  his  dwelling-house; 
whether  he  should  or  should  not  have  water 
supplied  to  his  fields  in  due  season ;  whether  his 
disputes  with  his  neighbours  should  be  settled  by  a 
judge  who  decided  them  on  principles  of  law,  or 
whether  he  should  be  left  to  the  callous  caprice  of 
some  individual  ignorant  of  law  and  cognisant  only 
of  bakhshish  ;  whether,  if  he  were  ill,  he  should  be 
able  to  go  to  a  well-kept  hospital,  or  whether  he 
should  be  unable  to  obtain  any  better  medical 
assistance  than  that  which  could  be  given  to  his 
watch-dog  or  his  donkey;  whether  a  school,  in 
which  something  useful  could  be  learnt,  should  be 
provided  for  his  children,  or  whether  they  should  be 
left  in  the  hands  of  teachers  whose  highest  know- 
ledge consisted  in  being  able  to  intone  a  few  texts, 
which  they  themselves  only  half  understood,  from 
the  Koran ;  whether,  if  he  suffered  from  mental  aber- 
ration, he  should  be  properly  treated  in  a  well-kept 
Lunatic  Asylum,  or  whether  he  should  be  chained 
to  a  post  and  undergo  the  treatment  of  a  wild 
beast ;  whether  he  could  travel  from  one  part  of 
the  country  to  another,  or  communicate  with  his 
friends  by  post  or  telegraph,  at  a  reasonable  or  only 
at  a  prohibitive  cost ;  in  fact,  whether  he,  and  the 


CH.  Liii  FINANCE  455 

ten  millions  of  Egyptians  who  were  like  him,  were 
or  were  not  to  have  a  chance  afforded  to  them  of 
taking  a  few  steps  upwards  on  the  ladder  of  moral 
and  material  improvement. 

This,  and  much  more,  is  implied  when  it  is  stated 
that  the  British  and  Egyptian  financiers  arrested 
bankruptcy,  turned  a  deficit  into  a  surplus,  relieved 
taxation,  increased  the  revenue,  controlled  the  ex- 
penditure, and  raised  Egyptian  credit  to  a  level  only 
second  to  that  of  France  and  England.  All  the 
other  reforms  which  were  effected  flow  from  this  one 
fact,  that  the  financial  administration  of  Egypt  has 
been  honest,  and  that  the  country,  being  by  nature 
endowed  with  great  recuperative  power,  and  being 
inhabited  by  an  industrious  population,  responded 
to  the  honesty  of  its  rulers.  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  in  any  other  country  such  a  remarkable 
transformation  has  been  made  in  so  short  a  time. 


CHAPTER   LIV 


IRRIGATION 


Nature's  bounty  to  Egypt  —  The  work  of  the  Pharaohs  —  Turkish 
neglect — Progress  under  British  guidance — Programme  of  the 
future  —  Causes  of  the  progress  —  Qualifications  of  the  officers 
selected — Absence  of  international  obstruction — Loan  of  £1,800,000 
— Support  of  the  public — Importance  of  the  work. 

"  If  you  dispute  Providence  and  Destiny,**  says  an 
ancient  author,  "you  can  find  many  things  in 
human  affairs  and  nature  that  you  would  suppose 
might  be  much  better  performed  in  this  or  that 
way;  as,  for  instance,  that  Egypt  should  have 
plenty  of  rain  of  its  o^vn  without  being  irrigated 
from  the  land  of  Ethiopia."  ^  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  nowadays  any  one  would  be  inclined  to 
dispute  Providence  and  Destiny  on  this  ground. 
Indeed,  the  extraordinary  fertility  for  which  Egypt 
has  from  time  immemorial  been  famous,  which 
made  Homer  apply  to  it  the  epithet  of  fe/S^po?,  and 
which  led  Juvenal  to  sing  of  the  divitis  ostia  N^ili, 
is  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  its  fields  are  not 
irrigated  by  the  rain  which  falls  within  its  own 
confines,  but  by  the  vast  stores  of  water  which 
sweep  down  the  Nile  from  the  centre  of  Africa. 
In  no  other  country  in  the  world  may  the  agri- 
culturist be  so  surely  guaranteed  against  the 
accidents  and  vicissitudes  of  the  seasons.  It  is 
true  that  if  the  Nile  is  unusually  high  or  low,  the 

'  Strabo,  Book  iv.  c  i. 
456 


CH.  Liv  IRRIGATION  457 

cultivator  is  or,  at  all  events,  was  exposed,  in  the 
one  case,  to  the  evils  of  inundation,  and  in  the  other 
case,  to  those  of  drought.  But  there  is  this  notable 
difference  between  risks  of  this  nature  and  those 
incidental  to  the  cultivation  of  the  fields  in  countries 
which  depend  for  their  water-supply  on  their  own 
rainfall,  namely,  that  whereas  no  human  effort  can 
increase  or  diminish  the  quantity  of  rain  which  falls 
from  the  clouds,  it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  within  the 
resources  of  human  skill  to  so  regulate  the  water 
of  the  Nile  flood  as  to  mitigate,  if  not  altogether 
to  obviate,  any  dangers  arising  from  an  insufficient 
or  an  excessive  supply  of  water.  In  this  highly 
favoured  country,  Nature  seems  to  have  said  to 
Man  :  I  grant  you  the  most  favourable  conditions 
possible  under  which  to  till  the  soil, — a  genial 
climate,  an  assured  supply  of  water,  and  a  natural 
fertilising  element,  which,  with  scarcely  an  effort 
of  your  own,  will  every  year  recuperate  the  pro- 
ductive powers  of  the  soil ;  it  is  for  you  to  turn  to 
advantage  the  gifts  which  I  have  lavished  on  you. 

How  did  Man  utilise  his  advantages  ?  In  the 
early  days  of  Egyptian  civilisation,  he  made  great 
and  creditable  eiibrts  to  turn  them  to  account. 
*'It  is  certain,"  says  Colonel  Ross,  "that  in  old 
days,  there  must  have  been  native  engineering 
talent  of  the  very  highest  order,  and  when  we 
read  of  such  and  such  a  King  restoring  public 
works  in  a  long  and  glorious  reign,  there  must 
have  existed  a  continuous  supply  of  good  engineer- 
ing talent  which  had  carte  blanche  from  the  ruler 
of  the  day."  ^ 

The  Pharaohs,  it  would  thus  appear,  used  their 
talent  according  to  the  best  of  their  lights.  The 
Turks,  who  ultimately  succeeded  them,  hid  theirs 
in  a  napkin,  with  the  result  that  Nature,  indignant 
at  the  treatment  accorded  to  her,  minimised  the 

*  Colonel  Ross's  Introduction  to  \Villcocks'  Egyptian  Irrigation,  p.  vL 


458  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

value  of  her  gifts  and  exacted  penalties  for  the 
neglect  of  her  laws.  In  later  Mohammedan  times, 
no  serious  efforts  were  made  to  avert  drought  or 
inundation.  The  general  condition  of  Egyptian 
irrigation  at  the  time  when  England  took  the 
affairs  of  the  country  in  hand,  was  thus  described 
by  Colonel  Ross  : — 

"There  can  be  no  manner  of  doubt  that,  up 
to  1882,  Egyptian  irrigation  was  going  downhill. 
Every  year,  some  false  step  was  taken  in  spite  of 
the  engineer.  Every  year,  the  corvee  lost  ground 
in  its  out-turn  of  work,  drains  were  abandoned  or 
became  useless,  and  canals  became  less  of  artificial 
and  more  of  natural  channels  wholly  influenced  by 
the  natural  rise  and  fall  of  the  Nile.  .  .  .  Owing 
to  many  causes,  the  native  talent  has  sunk  so  low 
that,  without  modern  scientific  aid,  the  Egyptians 
could  not  work  their  own  canals.  They  have  sunk 
into  a  dead  conservatism.  .  .  .  The  absence  of 
repairs,  so  common  to  all  JNIohammedan  countries, 
and  the  existence  of  the  corvee,  or  forced  labour, 
have  also  largely  contributed  to  the  lowering  of  the 
standard  of  Egyptian  engineers'  design  and  method." 

Here  was  a  grand  opportunity  for  the  English- 
man, and  nobly  did  he  avail  himself  of  it.  Con- 
sidering the  importance  of  the  subject,  and  the 
pride  which  every  Englishman  must  feel  at  the 
splendid  results  obtained  by  those  of  his  countrymen 
whom  Lord  INIilner  rightly  terms  "the  saviours  of 
Egyptian  irrigation,"  a  sore  temptation  exists  to 
deal  with  this  matter  in  some  detail.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  desirable  to  abridge  this  work ; 
moreover,  the  subject  has  been  already  treated  by 
a  highly  qualified  writer.  The  lassitude  wliicli 
pervades  both  man  and  beast  in  Egypt  during  the 
hot  months,  when  the  land  is  baked  by  the  fiery 
African  sun  and  windswept  by  the  scorching 
khamsin ;  the  general  relief  experienced  when  the 


CH.  Liv  IRRIGATION  459 

Nile  begins  to  rise ;  the  anxiety  to  know  whether 
the  water  will  pass  the  level  of  those  "low  cubits" 
which,  it  is  said,  were  designated  by  the  Arabs 
"the  angels  of  death  "  ;^  the  fear  lest  Nature  should 
be  too  prodigal  of  her  gifts  and  destroy  by  excess 
what,  it  was  hoped,  she  would  have  bestowed  by 
moderation  ;  the  revival  of  the  whole  country  when 
the  waters  retire  and  the  earth  begins  to  yield  forth 
her  increase ;  all  these  things  have  been  admirably 
related  by  Lord  Milner  in  a  chapter  of  his  work, 
entitled  TJie  Struggle  for  Water.  He  has  also 
described  the  care,  the  watchfulness,  and  the  un- 
tiring energy  displayed  by  the  British  engineers 
in  their  endeavours  to  direct  and  bridle  the  forces 
of  Nature.  At  one  time,  water  had  to  be  economised 
and  hydraulic  skill  exercised  to  make  the  most  of 
a  scanty  supply.  Again,  at  other  times,  constant 
vigilance  was  required  to  guard  against  inundation. 
During  the  season  of  low  Nile,  a  system  of  rotations 
was  adopted,  under  which  the  limited  supply  of 
water  was  turned  to  the  best  advantage  in  the 
interests  of  the  entire  population.  The  privileged 
classes  learnt  to  their  dismay  that  the  rights  of 
their  humble  neighbours  must  be  respected.  The 
Barrage  —  a  work  which  owed  its  origin  to  the 
genius  of  a  French  engineer  —  was,  in  spite  of 
strong  opposition,  repaired  and  rendered  capable 
of   doing    excellent    service.^      New    canals    were 

*  "  With  good  reason  the  Arabs  desig-nate  the  low  cubits  by  the 
name  of  the  "angels  of  death,"  for,  if  the  river  does  not  reach  its  full 
height,  famine  and  destruction  come  upon  the  whole  land  of  Egypt." 
— Mommsen's  Provinces  of  the  Roman  Empire,  vol.  ii.  p.  252. 

2  When  the  works  at  the  Barrage  were  in  course  of  construction, 
I  visited  them  in  company  with  Ali  Pasha  Moubarek.  He  was  at  that 
time  Minister  of  Public  W^orks,  and  had  passed  many  years  of  his  life 
in  the  service  of  that  Department.  He  strongly  opposed  Sir  Colin  Scott- 
MoncriefF's  plan  for  repairing  the  Barrage,  and  was  in  favour  of  the 
costly  and  wasteful  alternative  of  erecting  huge  pumps.  He  remarked 
to  me  casually  on  his  way  down  the  river  that  he  had  not  visited  the 
Barrage  for  twenty-seven  years.  He  was  quite  unconscious  of  the 
criticism  on  his  own  conduct  which  this  admission  involved. 


460  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

dug.  A  variety  of  useful  works  were  executed 
in  Upper  Egypt  to  guard  against  the  effects  of  a 
low  Nile.  Drainage  went  hand  in  hand  with 
irrigation.  Before  the  British  engineers  had  been 
at  work  ten  years,  the  cotton  crop  was  trebled,  the 
sugar  crop  more  than  trebled,  and  the  country  was 
being  gradually  covered  with  a  network  of  light 
railways  and  agricultural  roads  in  order  to  enable 
the  produce  to  be  brought  to  market. 

Much,  however,  as  the  British  engineer  has  done 
for  Egypt,  his  work  is  not  yet  complete.  The 
whole  of  the  cultivable  lands  in  Egypt  are  not  as 
yet  brought  under  cultivation.^  In  order  to  attain 
this  object,  it  is  estimated  that  it  will  be  necessary 
to  store  about  four  million  cubic  metres  of  water. 
The  magnificent  dam  constructed  at  Assouan, 
which  has  already  rendered  invaluable  service  to 
the  country,^  is  capable  of  storing  one  million  cubic 
metres.  Works  are  now  in  course  of  execution 
which  will  increase  its  storage  capacity  to  about 
2j  millions  of  cubic  metres.  It  is  not  as  yet  decided 
how  any  further  supply  will  be  obtained,  but  a 
general  sketch  of  the  projects  which  are  worthy 
of  consideration  has  been  given  in  Sir  William 
Garstin's  masterly  report  of  JNIarch  1904.^  Prob- 
ably, I  shall  not  be  far  from  the  mark  if  I  say 
that,  in  the  course  of  the  next  fifteen  or  twenty 
years,  some  twenty  millions  sterling  may  profit- 
ably be  spent  in  improving  the  Egyptian  and 
Soudanese  systems  of  irrigation. 

*  The  question  of  the  extent  to  which  the  area  of  cotton-bearing  land 
is  capable  of  increase  was  examined  iu  some  detail  in  my  Report  for  the 
year  1900.     See  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  pp.  45-47. 

'^  To  g'ive  one  example^  it  is  estimcated  that  the  conversion,  which  ia 
now  nearly  complete,  of  404,470  acres  of  land  in  Middle  Egypt  from 
a  system  of  basin  to  one  of  perennial  irrigation  will  increase  the  rental 
value  of  those  lands  by  no  less  tlian  £'E.2,()22,.'3.50,  and  the  sale  value 
by  £E.28,312,900. —^nnua/  Report  of  the  Irrigation  Department,  1906, 
p.  178. 

8  See  Egypt,  No.  2  of  1904. 


CH.  Liv  IRRIGATION  461 

When,  eventually,  the  waters  of  the  Nile,  from 
the  I^akes  to  tlie  sea,  are  brought  fully  under 
control,  it  will  be  possible  to  boast  that  Man — in 
this  case,  the  Englishman — has  turned  the  gifts  of 
Nature  to  the  best  possible  advantage. 

Tlie  operations  of  the  Irrigation  Department 
have,  in  fact,  been  singularly  successful,  perhaps 
more  so  than  those  of  any  other  Department  of  the 
Government.  To  what  causes  may  this  success  be 
attributed  ? 

It  has,  in  the  first  place,  been  due  to  the  high 
character  and  marked  capacity  of  the  British 
engineers,  who  were  chosen  with  the  utmost  care. 
The  superior  officials  of  the  Irrigation  Department 
came  from  India,  a  country  which  affords  an 
excellent  training  for  the  hydraulic  engineer. 
Armed  with  the  previous  knowledge  which  they 
had  acquired,  they  studied  the  various  problems 
which  Egyptian  irrigation  presented  for  solution, 
and  proposed  nothing  until  they  had  obtained  a 
thorough  mastery  of  the  facts  with  which  they  had 
to  deal.  So  far  as  I  know,  they  have  never  yet 
made  a  serious  mistake. 

But  the  qualifications  of  the  individuals,  high 
though  they  were,  would  have  availed  but  little 
had  not  their  labours  been  exerted  in  a  sphere 
where  adventitious  circumstances  were  favourable 
to  success. 

The  first  of  these  circumstances  was  that,  rela- 
tively to  some  other  branches  of  the  Egyptian 
service,  the  Public  Works  Department  was  from 
the  first  freed  from  the  incubus  of  internationalism. 
It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  actions  of  the 
British  engineers  were  not  in  some  degree  hampered 
by  the  meshes  which  an  obstructive  diplomacy 
had,  with  perverse  ingenuity,  flung  over  the  whole 
governmental  machine  of  Egypt.  Any  such 
supposition  would  be  erroneous.     Ubiquitous  inter- 


462  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  vi 

nationalism,  by  imposing  a  fantastic  financial 
system  on  the  country,  and  by  secreting  for  many 
years  the  economies  resulting  from  the  partial  con- 
version of  the  Debt,  limited  the  funds  which  it 
was  possible  to  place  at  the  disposal  of  the  British 
engineers,  and  thus  diminished  their  power  of 
doing  good.  More  than  this,  that  duality,  which 
was  the  bane  of  the  Egyptian  administrative 
system,  existed  at  one  time  in  the  heart  of  the 
Public  Works  Department,  but  fortunately  in  a 
relatively  innocuous  form.  This  duality  was,  how- 
ever, abolished  at  an  early  period  of  the  occupation. 
It  was  felt  that,  in  view  of  the  importance  of  the 
Irrigation  Department,  it  should  be  exclusively  in 
British  hands.  "  It  is  evident,"  Lord  Dufferin 
wrote  in  1883,  "  that  the  present  irrigation  service 
of  Egypt  is  wanting  in  intelligent  direction  and 
honest  and  efficient  inspection.  .  .  .  Egypt  is  so 
similar  to  many  of  the  irrigated  districts  in  India 
that  it  is  only  natural  to  turn  to  that  country  for 
advice." 

Thus,  the  British  engineers  were  left  free  to  design 
and  to  execute  their  own  plans  for  the  canalisation 
of  the  country.  They  were  spared  the  calamity 
of  having  to  deal  with  an  International  Board. 
They  could  decide  on  the  construction  of  a  canal 
without  having  to  consider  whether  the  policy  of 
Great  Britain  in  the  Pacific  or  Indian  Oceans  was 
viewed  with  favour  at  Berlin  or  Paris.  This  was 
a  great  negative  advantage.  The  comparative 
freedom  of  action  accorded  to  the  British  engineers 
contributed  in  no  small  degree  to  the  success  which 
attended  their  operations. 

In  one  other  respect,  the  British  engineers  were 
fortunate.  However  remarkable  may  have  been 
their  professional  skill,  and  however  sound  their 
plans,  it  is  obvious  that  they  could  have  done 
nothing  without  money.     Funds  were  fortunately 


CH.  Liv  IRRIGATION  463 

provided  for  them.  When  the  London  Confer- 
ence on  the  financial  affairs  of  E<4ypt  took  place 
in  1884,  it  was  proposed  to  borrow  £1,000,000,  to 
be  applied  to  the  improvement  of  tlie  irrigation 
system  of  the  country.  The  proposal  met  with 
a  good  deal  of  opposition.  Doubts  were  at  the 
time  expressed  by  competent  British  authorities 
as  to  the  wisdom  of  adopting  this  course.  Those 
doubts  were  based  on  reasonable  grounds.  Exces- 
sive borrowing  had  brought  Egypt  to  the  verge  of 
ruin,  and  it  was  pointed  out  that  to  increase  the 
debt  of  a  State  which  was  then  in  a  well-nigh 
bankrupt  condition  was,  at  best,  a  hazardous 
experiment.  Others,  who  had  more  confidence  in 
the  future  of  Egypt  and  in  the  elasticity  of  its 
resources,  were  in  favour  of  a  bolder  policy.  They 
supported  the  view  which,  it  must  be  admitted, 
at  the  time  appeared  somewhat  paradoxical,  that 
the  best  way  to  relieve  the  country  from  the 
burthen  of  a  crushing  debt  resulting  from  loans, 
the  proceeds  of  which  had  been  to  a  large 
extent  squandered,  would  be  to  contract  a  further 
loan,  and  to  apply  tlie  money  thus  obtained  to 
developing  the  resources  of  the  country.  After  a 
sharp  struggle,  this  latter  view  prevailed.  A  sum 
of  £1,000,000  for  irrigation  purposes  was  included 
in  the  loan  contracted  for  the  payment  of  the 
Alexandria  indemnities  and  otiier  purposes.  In 
1890,  an  additional  sum  of  £800,000  was  phiced  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Public  Works  Department  for 
irrigation  and  drainage  works. 

In  my  Report  for  1891,  after  describing  the  ex- 
tent to  w  Inch  the  productive  powers  of  the  country 
had  been  increased  by  irrigation,  I  added  : — 

"  The  policy  of  increasing  the  debt  of  Egypt, 
which  was  adopted  seven  years  ago,  has  been 
amply  justified.  I  should  be  the  last  to  wish  that 
the  facts  which   I  have  narrated  above  should  be 


464  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

used  as  a  justification  for  reckless  borrowino-,  but 
they  certainly  do  show  that  cases  may  arise  in 
which  a  quasi-bankrupt  State,  if  it  be  possessed  of 
great  natural  resources,  may  be  placed  in  a  position 
of  solvency  by  adding  to  its  debt,  provided  always 
that  the  money  borrowed  be  judiciously  applied. 
In  cases  of  this  sort,  the  main  difficulty  generally 
is  to  ensure  the  execution  of  the  proviso.  So  far 
as  Egypt  is  concerned,  I  have  no  hesitation  in  say- 
ing that  the  expenditure  of  this  £1,800,000  on 
irrigation  and  drainage  has  contributed  probably 
more  than  any  one  cause  to  the  comparative  pros- 
perity that  the  country  now  enjoys.  It  ensured 
the  solvency  of  the  Egyptian  Treasury,  and  until 
this  was  done,  no  very  serious  effort  was  possible 
in  the  direction  of  moral  and  material  progress." 

Lastly,  when  once  his  value  had  been  recognised 
— that  is  to  say,  in  a  very  sliort  space  of  time — the 
British  engineer  secured  tlie  support  of  Egyptian 
public  opinion.  The  facts  were,  indeed,  so  strong 
as  to  bring  conviction  to  the  minds  of  the  most 
prejudiced  and  sceptical.  The  fellah  might  fail 
to  realise  the  utility  and  insignificance  of  some 
of  the  reforms  instituted  under  British  tutelage, 
but  he  knew  the  value  of  water  to  an  extent  which 
can  perhaps  scarcely  be  appreciated  by  inhabitants 
of  northern  countries.  No  amount  of  misrepre- 
sentation could  persuade  him  that  the  man  who 
brought  to  his  fields,  in  a  measure  surpassing 
his  wildest  expectations,  the  element  for  which  he 
thirsted,  was  not  his  benefactor. 

Till  taught  by  pain, 
Men  really  know  not  what  good  water's  worth. ^ 

The  British  engineer,  in  fact,  unconsciously 
accomplished  a  feat  which,  in  the  eyes  of  a 
politician,  is  perhaps  even  more   remarkable  than 

'   Don  Juan,  ii.  84. 


CH.  Liv  IRRIGATION  465 

that  of  controlling  the  refractory  waters  of  the- 
Nile.  He  justified  Western  methods  to  Eastern 
minds.  He  inculcated,  in  a  manner  which  arrested 
and  captivated  even  the  blurred  intellect  and  way- 
ward imagination  of  the  poor,  ignorant  Egyptian 
fellah,  the  lesson  that  the  usurer  and  the  retailer 
of  adulterated  drinks  are  not  the  sole  products  of 
European  civilisation  ;  and,  inasmuch  as  he  achieved 
this  object,  he  deserves  the  gratitude  not  only  of 
all  intelligent  Asiatics,  but  also  of  all  Europeans — 
of  the  rulers  of  Algiers  and  of  Tunis  as  well  as 
those  of  India. 


VOL.  II  2  H 


CHAPTER  LV 

THE   army' 

Disbandment  of  the  army  in  1882 — History  of  the  army — Mehemot 
All's  Syrian  campaio'ns — Ismail  Pasha — The  AbJ^ssinian  campaign 
— Tel-el-Kebir — It  is  decided  to  form  a  fellaheen  army  officered 
by  Englishmen — The  black  battalions — Will  the  army  fight? — 
Reasons  why  the  reorganisation  has  been  successfully  conducted. 

In  leaving  the  work  of  the  civilian  for  that  of  the 
soldier,  we  at  once  seem  to  pass  from  the  involved 
and  cautious  language  of  diplomacy  to  the  out- 
spoken behests  of  the  barrack-yard.  One  of  the 
first  points  which  had  to  be  considered  after  the 
battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir  had  been  fought  and  won 
was  what  should  be  done  with  the  Egyptian  army. 
The  soldier  advisers  of  the  British  and  Egyptian 
Governments  answered  this  question  with  military 
frankness.  The  Egyptian  army,  as  then  consti- 
tuted, was  worse  than  useless.  It  had  proved 
itself  a  danger  to  the  State.  It  could  mutiny,  but  it 
could  not,  or  would  not  fight.  The  logical  conclu- 
sion to  be  drawn  from  this  statement  of  facts  was 
that  the  existing  army  should  be  disbanded,  and 
another  army  created  in  its  place.  Accordingly, 
on  September  19,  1882,  that  is  to  say,  six  days 
after  the  battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir  had  been  fought, 
the  following  laconic  Decree  appeared  in  the  Official 
Journal : — 

*  In  the  preparation  of  this  chapter,  I  have  been  materially  aided  by 
Sir  Reginald  VVingate. 

466 


CH.LY  THE  ARMY  467 

"  Nous,  Khddive  d'Egypte,  considdrant  la  rebellion 
militaire, 

D^CR^TONS 

Art.  1. 

L'armde  Egyptienne  est  dissoute. 

(Signe)         Mehemet  Tewfik.* 

Out  of  what  material  was  a  new  army  to 
be  formed  ?  Could  the  fellaheen,  who  had  but 
recently  shown  themselves  so  destitute  of  military 
qualities,  be  made  into  good  soldiers  ?  It  was  im- 
possible at  the  time  to  answer  this  latter  question 
confidently  in  the  affirmative.  Nevertheless,  the 
past  history  of  Egypt  was  there  to  show  that  the 
behaviour  of  the  troops  at  Tel-el-Kebir  did  not 
constitute  a  sufficient  proof  that  the  answer  should 
be  a  decided  negative.  For  centuries  past,  Egypt 
had  been  ruled  by  foreign  conquerors,  who  intro- 
duced their  own  or  mercenary  troops  in  order  to 
maintain  their  authority.  The  Egyptian  fellah 
had  inherited  no  warlike  attributes  ;  rather  was  he 
the  outcome  of  a  system  of  serfdom  and  slavery 
well  calculated  to  stifle  all  military  instincts. 

It  has  been  the  custom  to  give  JNlehemet  Ali 
the  credit  of  having  been  the  first  to  realise  that 
Egypt  had  ready  to  hand  in  the  fellaheen  the  raw 
material  out  of  which  a  national  army  could  be 
formed.  The  defeats  which  he  inflicted  on  the 
Turkish  armies  in  Syria  are  adduced  in  proof  of 
the  success  of  his  military  policy.  To  a  certain 
extent,  the  praise  bestowed  on  Mehemet  Ali  in 
this  connection  is  justified.  What  he  did  was 
briefly  this.  His  early  campaigns  against  the 
Wahabis  (1811-18),  and  his  campaigns  in  Nubia 
and  Sennar  (1820-22)  were  conducted  with  mer- 
cenary troops.  Subsequently,  that  is  to  say,  in 
1822-24,  being  carried  away  by  the  regnandi  dira 


468  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  vi 

cupido,  he  required  a  larger  army.  It  was  not 
possible  to  obtain  an  adequate  supply  of  Albanians 
or  Circassians.  An  attempt  made  to  utilise 
the  blacks  of  the  Soudan  resulted  in  failure,  by 
reason  of  the  mortality  which  prevailed  amongst 
them  when  they  were  transported  from  tropical 
Afi'ica  to  the  relatively  cold  climate  of  Egypt. 
Mehemet  Ali  had,  therefore,  to  fall  back  on  the 
Egyptian  peasantry. 

The  experiment  was  crowned  with  some  measure 
of  success.  The  fellah  is  hardy  and  robust.  He 
soon  proved  himself  to  be  a  docile  soldier.  In 
1824,  a  battalion  of  Egyptians  was  sent  to  Arabia, 
another  to  Sennar,  and  four  battalions  were  de- 
spatched to  the  Morea,  under  the  celebrated 
Ibrahim  Pasha.  Then  came  the  first  Syrian  war, 
when  the  veteran  ranks  were  swelled  by  crowds  of 
fellaheen  raised  under  the  most  tyrannous  of  con- 
scriptions.^ Yet  this  force  carried  all  before  it. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that,  had  not  European 
diplomacy  intervened,  Ibrahim  Pasha  might,  after 
the  battle  of  Konia,  have  marched  to  Constantinople 
with  little  or  no  opposition.  It  was  this  success, 
followed  by  the  victory  at  Nezib  over  the  Turkish 
troops  in  the  second  Syrian  war  of  1839,  which  had 
the  effect  of  raising  the  Egyptian  soldiery  to  a 
position  of  some  celebrity  as  a  force  of  acknow- 
ledged value. 

o 

Prior  to  the  battle  of  Konia,  the  strength  of  the 
Egyptian  army  and  navy,  the  former  of  which  had 
been  organised  by  French  officers,  consisted,  accord- 
ing to  Clot  Bey,'  of  277,000  men,  of  whom  130,000 
were  regular  troops.  Of  the  regular  troops,  the 
bulk  of  the  infantry  was  nominally  composed  of 

*  "  Women  were  hunja^  up  by  the  hair  of  the  head  and  vvliipped 
till  they  disclosed  tlieir  sons'  ]ii(lini,'--p]aces.  Those  that  were  taken 
were  never  seen  again.  Once  a  soldier  always  a  soldier,  in  Ibrahim 
Pasha'a  jirmy." — Life  and  Letters  of  Lady  Ilenter  Stanhopef  p.  2G3. 

'^  AperfU  sur  fEyypte,  vol.  ii.  p.  2.35. 


ch.lv  the  AKMY  469 

fellaheen,  but  the  system  under  which  they  were 
recruited  leaves  little  doubt  that  there  was  a  con- 
siderable foreign  element  in  the  ranks.  Not  only 
the  officers,  but  also  a  large  proportion  of  the  non- 
commissioned officers  were  Turks,  Albanians,  etc. 
It  is  said  that,  as  the  result  of  Ibrahim  Pasha's 
experience  in  Arabia,  it  was  decided  never  to  pro- 
mote an  Egyptian  above  the  rank  of  sergeant.  As 
regards  the  composition  of  the  other  arms,  it  is  not 
possible  to  obtain  accurate  statistics,  but  during 
the  early  years  of  the  British,  occupation  tliere  were 
still  many  living  who  could  remember  that  a  large 
proportion  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  cavalry  were 
Turks  and  Circassians,  whilst  in  the  artillery  the 
proportion  of  the  latter  was  still  greater.  It  is  to 
be  remembered  that  when,  in  1826,  Sultan  JNIah- 
moud  ordered  the  massacre  of  the  Janissaries,  a 
large  number  of  the  survivors  fled  to  Egypt,  where 
they  accepted  service  in  the  newly  organised  army. 
Again,  during  Ibrahim  Pasha's  campaign  in  Syria, 
he  increased  his  strength  by  recruiting  locally  from 
the  mountain  tribes  and  Bedouins.  It  is  clear, 
therefore,  that  the  army  with  which  Ibrahim  Pasha 
won  his  victories  was  not,  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
term,  a  purely  national  army.  A  strong  foreign 
element  existed,  not  only  amongst  the  officers  and 
non-commissioned  officers,  but  also  amongst  the 
rank  and  file. 

Moreover,  in  judging  of  the  importance  to  be 
attached  to  the  military  prowess  of  the  Egyptian 
troops  in  the  days  of  Mehemet  Ali,  account  has  to 
be  taken  of  the  state  of  the  Turkish  army.  Prior 
to  1826,  the  armed  forces  of  Turkey  consisted  of 
the  Janissaries.  After  their  destruction  and  dis- 
bandment,  there  was,  in  point  of  fact,  no  disciplined 
Turkish  military  force  left.  The  disaster  of 
Navarino,  followed  by  the  Ilusso- Turkish  war 
of  1828-29,  left  Sultan  JNIahmoud  in  the  position 


470  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

of  having  to  send  against  Ibrahim  "disaffected 
armies  of  raw  recruits,  badly  officered  and  worse 
generalled."  ^  In  comparison  with  these  raw  levies, 
the  Egyptian  army  represented  a  well-organised  and 
well -disciplined  force,  trained  by  able  foreign 
officers  on  Eiu'opean  principles,  and,  moreover, 
leavened  with  a  considerable  proportion  of  veteran 
troops  who  had  had  experience  of  actual  war  in 
the  Morea,  Arabia,  and  elsewhere.  More  than  this, 
they  had  in  Ibrahim  Pasha  a  leader  possessed  of 
undoubted  military  genius,  whose  actions  bore  the 
stamp  of  energy,  foresight,  and  skill. 

Ibrahim  Pashas  successes  in  Syria  afford, 
therefore,  ample  proof  that  a  well -disciplined  and 
well-led  force  will  almost  invariably  defeat  badly 
disciplined  and  untrained  levies,  however  superior 
be  the  numbers  of  the  latter.  But  to  say  more 
than  this  would  exceed  the  limits  of  justifiable 
deduction.  To  make  tlie  result  of  the  Syrian 
battles  the  standard  by  which  to  gauge  the  per- 
manent fighting  value  of  the  Egyptians  would 
involve  a  generalisation  of  too  hasty  and  too 
sweeping  a  character.  Mr.  William  Dye,  an 
American  officer  formerly  in  the  Egyptian  service, 
after  reviewing  the  military  history  of  Egypt,  says  : 
'*  Ibrahim's  successes  at  Konia  and  elsewhere  were 
due  to  his  generalship,  certainly  not  to  any  peculiar 
qualities  that  the  fellah  may  have  possessed  as 
a  soldier."  The  fact  that  under  Abbas  I.  the 
Egyptians  were  driven  from  Nejd,  and  that  the 
Wahabite  State  regained  its  independence,  con- 
firms the  correctness  of  this  opinion. 

Said  Pasha,  the  successor  of  Abbas  I.,  at  first 
played  with  his  soldiers,  and  then  disbanded  the 
greater  part  of  the  army.  In  1863,  it  consisted  of 
only  3000  men.  The  personnel  was  disorganised 
and  the  material  defective. 

*  Creasy's  History  of  the  Ottoman  Turks,  vol.  ii.  p.  437. 


CH.  Lv  THE  ARMY  471 

On  Ismail's  accession,  his  first  care  was  to 
increase  the  military  power  of  the  State.  He 
believed,  or,  at  all  events,  he  acted  as  if  he  believed 
in  the  fighting  qualities  of  the  fellaheen.  Said 
Pasha  had  been  the  first  to  employ  men  of  fellah 
extraction  as  officers,  but  he  did  not  allow  them  to 
be  promoted  above  the  rank  of  captain.  Ismail 
Pasha  made  an  important  and  hazardous  innovation. 
He  allowed  Egyptians  to  be  promoted  to  the 
rank  of  colonel. 

The  first  opportunity  of  testing  the  value  of 
Ismail  Pasha's  army  occurred  in  1874,  when  a 
rebellion  broke  out  in  Darfour.  It  was  suppressed 
by  General  Gordon,  who  discarded  his  Egyptian 
soldiers  and  mainly  employed  troops  raised  on  the 
spot.  "  The  officers  and  men,"  he  wrote,  "  are  a 
cowardly  set.  They  are  good  marchers,  and  bear 
privation  well,  but  that  is  all  I  can  say  in  their 
favour.  ...  I  have  not  the  least  confidence  in  my 
officers  and  men.  ...  I  cannot  bear  these  Egyptian 
officers.  Tliey  have  no  good  quality.  I  like  the 
blacks ;  now,  these  black  soldiers  are  the  only 
troops  in  the  Egyptian  service  worth  anything."^ 

Then  came  the  disastrous  Abyssinian  campaign 
of  1876,  when  the  Egyptians  were,  on  several 
occasions,  routed  with  heavy  loss.  Mr.  Dye,  in 
criticising  these  operations,  says :  '*  There  was  no 
unity  of  command,  there  was  no  cohesion  among 
the  parts  of  the  army.  This  was  due  to  the  want 
of  individual  interest  among  the  men  in  the 
campaign,  a  general  need  of  good  officers  and  a 
lack  of  discipline,  and  of  any  equitable  system  of 
rewards  and  punishments." 

That  the  Egyptian  army  did  not  suffer  any 
further  reverses  during  Ismail  Pasha's  reign  is 
probably  due  to  the  fact  that  it  was  not  again 
seriously  involved  in  warlike  operations.      Ismail 

*  General  Gordon  in  Central  Africa,  p   161. 


472  IMODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

was  assuredly  more  successful,  during  the  latter 
years  of  his  reign,  in  disorganising,  than  he  had 
been,  during  his  earlier  years,  in  organising  an 
army.  It  has  been  shown  in  the  course  of  this 
narrative  how  the  son  reaped,  in  the  shape  of  overt 
mutiny,  the  whirlwind  which  the  father  had  sown. 
It  is  impossible  for  an  army  to  mutiny  without 
its  value  as  a  fighting- machine  being  impaired. 
We  are,  indeed,  so  accustomed  to  connect  military 
efficiency  with  military  subordination  that  it  is 
well-nigh  impossible  to  dissociate  the  two  ideas. 
Nevertheless,  the  greater  or  less  degree  of  harm 
inflicted  on  military  efficiency  by  any  mutiny 
must  depend  in  some  measure  on  the  causes  and 
circumstances  of  the  mutiny  itself.  If,  as  happened 
in  India  in  1857,  the  rank  and  file  rebel  against 
their  officers,  the  mutineers  must  of  necessity  take 
the  field  under  circumstances  of  great  disadvantage 
to  themselves.  The  men  are  suddenly  deprived  of 
the  leaders  to  whom  they  have  been  accustomed  to 
yield  implicit  obedience.  The  case  of  Arabics  army 
was  different.  The  men  did  not  mutiny  against 
their  officers ;  it  was  the  officers  who  mutinied 
against  the  Khedive,  and  who  carried  the  rank  and 
file  with  them.  It  may  be  said  that  practically 
the  army  rebelled  en  bloc.  It  is  true  that  a  few 
Turkish  and  Circassian  officers  disappeared,  the 
Arabi  movement  having  been  primarily  directed 
against  them.  But  their  numbers  were  not 
sufficient  to  dislocate  the  military  machine.  INIore- 
over,  their  disa])pearance  only  enhanced  the  lesson, 
wliich  was  rudely  inculcated  by  Lord  AVolseley, 
as  to  the  fighting  value  of  an  Egyptian  army 
led  by  Egyptian  officers.  Arabi's  soldiers  had,  in 
fact,  every  inducement  to  fight,  and  every  oppor- 
tunity of  showing  what  they  could  do  in  the  way 
of  fighting.  They  represented,  or,  at  all  events, 
they  purported  to  represent,  the  forces  of  indignant 


ch.lv  the  army  473 

patriotism  calling  on  the  sons  of  the  soil  to  repel 
a  foreiijn  foe.  Their  cause  was  that  of  the  INIoslem 
against  the  Christian,  of  the  native  Egyptian 
against  the  upholders  of  Turkish  tyranny.  They 
fought  under  local  conditions  of  great  advantage. 
Arabi  occupied  at  Tel-el-Kebir  an  entrenched 
position  of  great  strength.  The  attacking  force, 
which  had  to  advance  up  a  "  glacis-like  slope,"  was 
numerically  only  one-half  as  strong  as  the  defenders. 
Yet  within  twenty  minutes  of  the  first  shot  being 
fired,  the  Egyptian  force  was  in  full  retreat  with  a 
loss  of  upwards  of  2000  killed,  whilst  the  British 
force,  which  delivered  a  frontal  attack,  only  lost 
459  men  killed  and  wounded.  Manifestly,  Arabi's 
force  was,  in  Dryden's  oft-quoted  words,  nothing 
but  a  rude  militia, 

In  peace  a  charge,  in  war  a  weak  defence. 

Europe  was  astonished,  and  some  hostile  critics, 
being  unable  to  show  that  Arabi  had  in  reality  been 
a  victor  in  the  fray,  found  consolation  in  the  fiction 
that  the  battle  had  been  won  by  British  gold. 

The  subsequent  history  of  the  Soudan  confirmed 
the  lesson  which  was  to  be  derived  from  the  experi- 
ence of  Tel-el-Kebir.  Everywhere  the  Dervishes 
drove  the  fellaheen  soldiers  before  them. 

Such  were  the  historical  facts  with  which  Lord 
Dufferin  and  his  military  advisers  had  to  deal  in 
1882.  They  all  pointed  to  one  inevitable  con- 
clusion. It  was  that  an  Egyptian  army  officered 
by  native  Egyptians  was  worse  than  useless.  The 
question  of  employing  mercenary  soldiers  was  dis- 
cussed. Lord  Dufferin  wisely  decided  to  put 
aside  all  idea  of  enrolling  Albanians,  Circassians,  or 
other  waifs  and  strays  of  the  JNIediterranean.  He 
laid  it  down  as  a  principle  that  the  army  "should 
be  essentially  composed  of  native  Egyptians.  .  .  . 
Egypt  has  had  enough  of  Mamelukes  and  their 


474  MODERN  EGYPT  rr.  vi 

congeners.**  The  officers  were  to  be  supplied  from 
England.  An  experiment  was  to  be  made  with  a 
view  to  ascertaining  whether  what  Lord  Dufferin 
termed  "the  metamorphic  spirit  of  the  age" — 
aided  by  a  certain  number  of  British  officers  and 
drill-sergeants — could  achieve  the  remarkable  feat 
of  turning  the  fellah  into  an  efficient  soldier. 

Sir  Evelyn  Wood — who  was  subsequently 
succeeded,  first,  by  Lord  Grenfell,  and,  later,  by 
Lord  Kitchener  and  Sir  Reginald  Wingate — was 
appointed  to  command  the  army.  The  cadres  of 
battalions  were  formed  by  carefully  selecting  from 
the  debris  of  Arabi's  army  the  requisite  number  of 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers.  The  rank 
and  file  were  taken  straight  from  the  plough. 

The  British  officers  had  an  arduous  task  to 
perform.  Not  only  had  every  branch  of  the 
military  administrative  machine  to  be  created 
afresh ;  not  only  had  the  oppressive  recruiting 
System,  which  formerly  existed,  to  be  swept 
away  and  an  improved  system  put  in  its  place ; 
not  only  had  the  Englishman  to  wage  unremit- 
ting war  against  corruption  and  against  the  other 
chronic  diseases  of  Egyptian  administration  and 
society ;  but,  in  reversing  the  old,  and  entering 
upon  the  new  order  of  things,  it  was  necessary 
to  implant  in  the  minds  of  the  fellaheen  the 
fact  that  discipline  could  be  strict  without  being 
oppressive ;  that  the  ])eriod  of  service  for  which 
they  had  been  enrolled  would  not  be  prolonged 
beyond  that  prescribed  by  law ;  that  they  would 
receive  their  pay  and  their  food  regularly ;  that 
the  former  would  never  be  stopped  except  for 
misconduct ;  that  they  would  no  longer  be 
subjected  to  brutal  treatment  at  the  hands  of  their 
officers ;  that  any  complaints  which  they  might  make 
would  be  impartially  investigated,  and  that,  if  they 
committed  any  crime,  they  would  be  fairly  tried  and 


ch.lv  the  army  475 

would  only  receive  punishment  in  proportion  to  the 
gravity  of  the  offence.  All  these  difficulties  were 
overcome.  Professional  skill  was  brought  to  bear 
on  all  administrative  questions.  High  character 
and  integrity  gradually  weaned  the  fellaheen  soldiers 
from  the  idea  that  the  exercise  of  authority  was 
synonymous  with  the  committal  of  injustice. 
Indeed,  the  moral  reforms  which  the  British 
officers  achieved  rank  even  higher  than  their 
administrative  successes,  albeit  these  latter  were 
also  remarkable.  Looking  to  the  past  history 
and  actual  condition  of  Egypt  in  1882,  it  might 
well  have  been  thought  that  confidence  in  those 
placed  in  authority  over  him  would  be  a  plant 
of  very  slow  growth  in  the  mind  of  the  Egyptian 
fellah.  Yet,  the  British  officers  of  the  Egyptian 
army  speedily  accomplished  the  remarkable  feat 
of  obtaining  the  complete  confidence  of  their 
men.  Not  only,  moreover,  does  this  spirit  of 
confidence  now  pervade  all  ranks  of  the  army, 
but  it  extends  to  every  family  in  the  country.  The 
relations  of  the  soldiers  understand  the  altered  con- 
ditions under  which  conscription  is  conducted,  and 
the  regulations  of  the  army  enforced.  "  The  re- 
appearance of  the  fellah  soldier,"  Lord  Milner 
says,  **in  his  native  village  after  an  absence  of  a 
year  in  the  barracks — not  crawling  back  mutilated, 
or  smitten  by  some  foul  disease,  but  simply  walk- 
ing in  as  a  visitor,  healthy,  well-dressed,  and  with 
some  money  in  his  pocket — was  like  the  vision  of 
a  man  risen  from  the  dead."^ 

Thus,  the  reconstituted  army  consisted,  in  the 
first  instance,  only  of  fellaheen.  About  6000  men 
were  raised.  These  were  formed  into  two  brigades, 
one  of  which  was  commanded  by  British  and  the 
other  by  Egyptian  officers.  It  was  intended  that 
this   force   should   mainly   be   used   as  an  aid  to 

*  England  in  Egypt,  p.  176. 


476  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

the  constabulary  in  the  nmiiiteiiance  of  internal 
tranquillity.  The  soldiers  were  to  "prevent  the 
Bedouins  from  causino;  trouble  along;  the  desert 
border."  They  were  to  suppress  "  small  local 
insurrections."^  It  was  not  contemplated  at  the 
time  that  they  would  ever  be  employed  in  the 
Soudan.  As,  however,  events  in  the  Soudan  de- 
veloped and  the  power  of  the  Mahdi  grew,  it  became 
evident  that  the  southern  frontier  of  Egypt  would 
either  have  to  be  permanently  defended  by  British 
troops,  or  that  the  Egyptian  army  would  have 
to  be  increased  and  improved  to  such  an  extent 
as  to  render  it  possible  to  dispense  with  British 
aid.  To  have  relied  wholly  on  fellaheen  troops 
would  manifestly  have  been  dangerous.  The 
necessity  of  stiffening  what  Lord  Dufferin  called 
"  the  invertebrate  ranks  of  the  fellaheen  soldiery  " 
had  arisen.  An  unsuccessful  attempt  was  made 
to  raise  a  brigade  of  Turks.  The  nucleus  of 
a  battalion  of  Albanians  was  formed.  They 
mutinied,  and  were  disbanded  in  a  few  weeks. 
It  was  then  decided  to  ftiU  back  on  the  blacks 
of  the  Soudan.  Thus,  Lord  Dufferin's  fellaheen 
army  was  eventually  converted  into  a  combined 
force  of  fellaheen  and  blacks. 

The  blacks,  who  join  as  volunteers,  belong  for 
the  most  part  to  the  tribes  who  are  found  on 
the  Upper  Nile  from  near  Kodok  to  the  Equatorial 
Province ;  others  come  from  the  west  beyond 
Kordofan,  and  even  from  as  far  as  Wadai  and 
Bornou.  JNIany  of  them  are  little  better  than 
savages.  They  are  difficult  to  control,  and  are 
as  thoughtless,  capricious,  and  wanting  in  fore- 
sight as  children.  They  are  not  quick  at  drill, 
nor  are  they  fond  of  it,  affording  in  this  respect 

*  Some  authorities  went  so  far  in  1882-83  as  to  hold  that  no 
Eg'yptian  army  was  required.  Lord  Duft'erin  wisely  rejected  this 
extreme  view. 


CH.  LV 


THE  ARMY  477 


a  contrast  to  the  fellah,  who,  true  to  his  national 
characteristics,  is  an  admirable  automaton.  The 
blacks  are  very  excitable.  On  the  other  hand, 
their  initiative,  dash,  and  instincts  of  self-defence 
make  them  invaluable  as  fighting  troops. 

Before  the  British  officers  had  been  long  at 
work,  it  was  clear  that  they  had  created  a  small 
army  superior  in  quality  to  anything  which  Egypt 
had  heretofore  possessed.  That  army  was  endowed 
with  all  those  outward  and  visible  signs  of  efficiency 
of  which  note  can  be  taken  in  time  of  peace. 
Would  it,  however,  fight?  That  was  a  question 
which  for  some  while  remained  doubtful.  But 
all  doubts  have  now  been  removed.  The  history 
of  the  Soudan,  which  has  been  narrated  in  this 
work,  enables  the  question  to  be  confidently 
answered  in  the  affirmative. 

The  reasons  why  the  endeavours  to  form  an 
efficient  military  force  in  Egypt  have  been  crowned 
with  success  are  clear.  The  British  officer  has 
been  allowed  a  free  hand ;  he  has  had  even  greater 
liberty  of  action  than  the  British  engineer.  Even 
a  devotee  of  cosmopolitan  principles  would  hesitate 
to  subject  the  command  of  an  armed  force  to  the 
disintegrating  process  of  internationalism.  In  spite, 
however,  of  the  success  which  has  so  far  attended 
the  efforts  of  military  reformers  in  Egypt,  it 
should  never  be  forgotten  that  an  army  composed 
of  Moslems  and  officered  to  a  considerable  extent 
by  Christians  is  a  singularly  delicate  machine,  which 
requires  most  careful  handling. 


CHAPTER   LVl 

THE    INTERIOR 

Uncertainty  of  British  policy — Difficulties  of  administrative  reform — 
Lord  Dufferin's  Police  proposals — Mr,  Clifford  Lloyd — Chanp;e8 
made  in  the  Police  organisation — Nubar  Pasha's  conflict  with 
Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd — The  latter  resigns — Friction  in  the  Interior — 
Appointment  of  an  Adviser — And  of  Inspectors — Difficulties  of  the 
present  moment. 

Cases  have  so  far  been  discussed  in  which  the 
reformer  was,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  crippled 
by  internationalism,  or  hampered  by  the  anomalous 
nature  of  an  official  position  in  which  he  was 
expected  to  fulfil  many  of  the  functions  of  a 
Minister  without  possessing  ministerial  rank  or 
authority.  It  is  now  necessary  to  deal  with  a 
case  in  which  the  evils  arising  from  the  uncer- 
tainty, which  for  many  years  hung  over  the 
future  of  British  policy  in  Egypt,  come  into 
special  prominence.  Whether  the  British  occupa- 
tion was  to  be  temporary  or  permanent,  there 
could  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  desirability  of  relieving 
taxation,  digging  canals,  and  creating  a  well- 
disciplined  army  which  would  be  able  to  repel 
Dervish  invasion.  The  financier,  the  engineer,  and 
the  soldier  might,  indeed,  think  that  the  edifice 
which  each  had  reared  would  either  collapse  at 
once,  should  British  influence  cease  to  be  para- 
mount, or  gradually  decay  when  exposed  to  the 
dry-rot  of  unchecked  Pasliadom.  But  however 
that  might  be,  there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  tlie 

478 


CH.LVI  THE  INTERIOR  479 

kind  of  edifice  which  liad  to  be  constructed ;  its 
nature  was,  indeed,  indicated  by  certain  well- 
recognised  professional  canons. 

The  case  of  internal  administrative  reform  was 
different.  It  might  have  been  thought  that  the 
work  of  organising  the  Department  of  the  Interior 
would,  relatively  to  other  Departments,  have 
presented  but  little  difficulty  to  the  Englishman, 
with  his  law  -  abiding  tendencies,  his  practical 
common  sense,  and  his  freedom  from  bureaucratic 
formalism.  The  main  thing  was  to  organise  a 
Police  force,  to  appoint  a  few  Police  Magistrates, 
and  to  lay  down  a  few  simple  rules  for  the  relations 
which  were  to  exist  between  the  judicial  and 
executive  authorities.  Work  of  this  sort  could 
not  surely  present  any  insuperable  difficulties  to  a 
nation  whose  dominion  was  world-wide,  and  who 
had  shown  a  special  genius  for  the  government  of 
subject  races. 

Conclusions  drawn  from  general  arguments  of 
this  nature  are  often  liable  to  error  from  foro-etful- 
ness  of  the  fact  that  certain  combinations  will  not 
bring  about  certain  anticipated  results  unless  it  be 
ascertained  that  no  link  is  wanting  in  the  chain  of 
circumstances  necessary  to  fulfil  the  conditions  of 
the  required  combination.  Even  Euclid  had  to 
assume  the  truth  of  his  postulates.  There  can 
be  little  doubt  that  if  the  conditions  under  which 
the  work  of  Egyptian  administrative  reform  was 
undertaken  had  been  favourable,  a  success  equal 
to  that  of  which  the  British  administrative  reformer 
may  boast  in  India  and  elsewhere  would  speedily 
have  been  achieved.  But  the  conditions  were  not 
only  less  favourable  than  in  other  countries,  they 
were  unfavourable  even  when  judged  by  the 
standard  of  Egyptian  intricacy.  It  was  not  only 
that  the  British  reformer  was  deprived  of  liberty 
of  action  to  such  an  extent  as  to  be  unable  to 


180  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.vi 

2xecute  his  own  plans.  It  was  not  only  that  he 
had  to  pose  as  a  subordinate  and,  at  the  same 
time,  to  act  in  a  great  measure  as  a  superior. 
Ditficulties  even  more  formidable  than  these 
had  to  be  encountered.  He  was  in  the  position 
of  an  architect  who  was  told  to  design  a  house 
without  any  indication  as  to  whether  the  build- 
ing was  to  be  a  king's  palace  or  the  cottage  of  a 
peasant.  No  one  could  tell  him  precisely  what 
was  required  of  him.  Was  he  to  allow  the 
abominable  Police  system  which  he  found  in 
existence  to  remain  in  force  with  merely  some 
slight  modifications  ?  Certainly  not.  He  was 
expected  to  reform,  and  he  was  well  aware  that  he 
could  not  make  a  silk  purse  out  of  a  sow's  ear.  Was 
he  to  take  the  matter  vigorously  in  hand,  employ 
agents  on  whom  he  could  thoroughly  rely,  and  intro- 
duce a  rational  system  based  partly  on  the  experience 
gained  in  other  countries,  and  partly  on  the  special 
requirements  of  Egypt  ?  From  many  points  of 
view  this  would  unquestionably  have  been  the  best 
course  to  pursue,  but  he  had  to  remember — and 
here  the  most  important  link  in  the  chain  of 
circumstances  necessary  to  ensure  success  snapped 
in  twain — that  the  British  occupation  was  only 
temporary,  that  the  authority  of  the  native  rulers 
must  not  be  impaired,  and  that  it  was  useless  to 
begin  the  construction  of  a  system  which  could 
not  be  completed  in  the  limited  time  at  his 
disposal,  and  which  would  of  a  surety  fall  to 
pieces  directly  the  Englishman  turned  his  back. 
For,  indeed,  a  severe  relapse  could,  in  this  instance, 
be  predicted  with  absolute  certainty.  Tliere 
might  be  some  faint  hope  that,  if  the  occupa- 
tion ceased,  self-interest  would  lead  the  rulers 
of  Egypt  to  employ  British  engineers  to  su])ervise 
the  supply  and  distribution  of  water.  It  was  con- 
ceivable, though  improbable,  that  the  first  outcome 


CH.LVI  THE  INTERIOR  481 

of  the  withdrawal  of  effective  British  control  would 
not  be  the  reproduction  of  financial  chaos.  But  it 
was  altogether  inconceivable  tliat  the  cause  of  in- 
ternal  administrative  reform  should  prosper  in  the 
hands  of  the  Egyptian  governing  classes,  if  they 
were  left  entirely  to  their  own  devices.  P'or,  in  fact, 
the  centre  of  gravity  of  Egyptian  misgovernment  lay 
in  the  Department  of  the  Interior.  That  Depart- 
ment was  the  very  citadel  of  corruption,  the 
headquarters  of  nepotism,  the  cynosure  of  all 
that  numerous  class  who  hoped  to  gain  an  easy,  if 
illicit,  livelihood  by  robbing  either  the  Treasury  or 
the  taxpayers,  or,  if  both  these  courses  were 
impossible,  by  obtaining  some  well-paid  sinecure. 
Every  vested  interest  in  the  country  was  sure  to 
be  against  the  reformer,  who  at  each  step  would 
find  that  his  views  clashed  with  long-standing 
abuses,  perverted  morals,  and  habits  of  thought 
with  which  he  was  unfamiliar.  Neither  could  he 
hope  to  gain  that  degree  of  support  from  local 
public  opinion  which  was,  however  grudgingly, 
accorded  to  the  engineer.  He  would  be  unable 
to  produce  material  proofs,  which  could  be  visible 
to  the  eye  or  palpable  to  the  touch,  of  the  good 
work  he  was  doing.  In  order  to  succeed,  he 
would  have  to  be  a  moral,  even  more  than  an 
administrative  reformer.  He  would  have  to  be 
engaged  in  a  succession  of  conflicts  on  matters  of 
detail,  the  mass  of  which,  taken  collectively,  were 
indeed  of  great  importance,  but  which,  taken 
separately,  were  little  calculated  to  arouse  en- 
thusiasm or  sympathy  on  his  behalf. 

Moreover,  besides  these  general  causes,  other 
special  hindrances  stood  in  the  way  of  the  internal 
reformer.  It  was  no  easy  matter  to  sweep  away 
the  abuses  of  the  ancient  village  system  of  govern- 
ment, without  wrecking  the  system  itself.  Still 
less  easy  was  it  to  establish  a  modus  vivendi  between 

VOL.  II  2  I 


482  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

British  ideas  of  Police  duties  and  Franco-Egyptian 
ideas  of  judicial  functions.  The  regime  of  the 
Capitulations  also  barred  the  way  to  many  useful 
reforms. 

The  work  of  internal  reform  presented,  therefore, 
difficulties  of  a  very  peculiar  character.  They  were 
the  result  partly  of  the  actual  circumstances  with 
which  the  reformer  had  to  deal,  but  still  more  of  the 
want  of  reality  which  attended  the  whole  system  of 
government  by  reason  of  the  uncertainty  of  British 
policy  in  connection  with  Egypt. 

The  question  of  the  organisation  of  the  Police 
force  naturally  attracted  the  attention  of  Lord 
DufFerin.  He  dwelt  on  the  necessity  of  forming 
"an  intelligent,  active,  and  ubiquitous  provincial 
constabulary,"  which  was  to  partake  of  a  civil 
rather  than  of  a  military  character.  The  force  of 
provincial  and  urban  constabulary,  including  two 
reserve  battalions  of  500  men  each,  was  to  consist 
of  6500  men.  They  were  to  be  under  a  European 
Inspector  -  General,  who  was  to  act  under  the 
control  of  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  General 
V^alentine  Baker  was  appointed  to  this  post ;  a  few 
European  officers  were  nominated  to  act  as  his 
subordinates. 

When  I  arrived  in  Egypt  in  September  1883,  I 
found  that  ]Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  was  in  Cairo.  He 
had  come  on  a  vague  roving  commission  to 
"  superintend  internal  reforms."  Even  in  Egypt, 
the  chosen  home  of  lax  official  nomenclature,  it 
was  found  that  this  definition  of  Mr.  Cliffi)rd 
Lloyd's  functions  was  wanting  in  precision.  In 
January  1884,  he  was,  therefore,  appointed  Under- 
Secretary  to  the  Department  of  the  Interior. 

I  have  rarely  come  across  any  man  who,  on  first 
acquaintance,  created  such  a  favourable  impression 
as  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd.  His  appearance  and  de- 
meanour, his  singularly  sympathetic  features  and 


CH.  Lvi  THE  INTERIOR  483 

clear  blue  eyes,  his  courteous  manner,  and  the  rare 
mixture  of  decision  and  moderation  with  which  he 
was  wont  to  expound  his  opinions,  all  bespoke  a 
man  of  strong  will,  who  could  assert  his  authority 
without  bluster,  and  who  could  be  firm  witliout 
being  unconciliatory.  Neither  was  this  first  im- 
pression erroneous.  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  possessed 
many  remarkable  qualities.  In  spite  of  some 
obvious  defects  of  character,  this  straightforward, 
honourable,  courageous  English  gentleman  was 
always  to  me  a  very  attractive  figure.  In  a  dis- 
turbed district  of  India  or  Ireland,  he  would  have 
been  an  ideal  Government  official.  But  he  had 
not  the  versatility  and  tact  necessary  for  the 
work  he  had  in  hand  in  Egypt.  He  was  unable 
to  adapt  himself  to  local  circumstances.  More- 
over, he  wished  not  only  to  do  the  work,  but  to 
let  all  the  world  know  that  he  was  doing  it.  To 
quote  a  single  instance  of  how  little  careful  he 
was  to  avoid  wounding  native  susceptibilities,  he 
would  not  adopt  the  ordinary  Egyptian  custom 
of  stamping  his  letters  with  a  seal  on  which  his 
signature  in  Arabic  was  engraved.  He  insisted  on 
signing  his  name  in  English  to  all  the  letters  he 
wrote  to  Egyptian  officials.  Moreover,  he  had 
never  been  behind  the  scenes  of  a  central  adminis- 
tration, with  the  result  that  he  had  no  experience 
of  how  work  at  the  headquarters  of  government 
is  really  carried  on.  These  defects  were  sufficient 
to  mar  his  finer  qualities,  and  to  detract  from  his 
usefulness  as  a  Government  official. 

One  of  the  first  results  of  his  appointment  was 
the  issue  of  a  Decree,  on  December  31, 1883,  laying 
down  the  nature  of  the  relations  which  were  to 
exist  between  the  Police  and  the  Moudirs.  Egypt 
was,  for  Police  purposes,  divided  into  three  circles, 
to  each  of  which  a  European  Inspector,  who  was 
to  be  the  delegate  of  the  Inspector-General,  was 


484  INIODERN  EGYPT  pt.  n 

appointed.  European  Inspectors  were  also  to  be 
employed  in  the  principal  towns.  The  Inspector 
was  to  be  the  intermediary  between  the  Police  and 
the  MoLidir.  The  investigation  of  crime  was  to 
be  conducted  by  the  Police,  independently  of  the 
Parquet. 

The  adoption  of  these  measures  gave  rise  to  a 
feud  which  lasted  somewhat  longer  than  the  siege 
of  Troy. 

On  the  one  side  it  was  urged,  more  especially 
by  Nubar  Pasha,  who  succeeded  to  office  immedi- 
ately after  the  issue  of  the  Decree  of  December  31, 
1883,  that  whenever  a  European  was  placed  under 
an  Egyptian,  the  former  would  usurp  the  functions 
of  the  latter.  There  can,  in  fact,  be  little  doubt 
that  the  European  Inspectors  looked  more  to  the 
orders  of  the  Inspector-General  than  to  those  of  the 
INIoudirs,  although  the  latter  were  nominally  their 
official  superiors.  No  one,  therefore,  knew  who  was 
really  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  public 
tranquillity.  Nubar  Pasha  was  never  tired  of 
complaining  of  what  he  called  "  la  duality  dans  les 
provinces."  The  authority  of  the  Moudirs  had, 
in  fact,  been  impaired,  and  nothing  sufficiently 
definite  had  been  substituted  in  its  place.  They 
were  not  allowed  to  rule  according  to  their  own 
rude  lights.  On  the  other  hand,  they  could  not, 
or  would  not  assist  in  ruling  according  to  the  new 
methods  which  found  favour  with  their  English 
coadjutors.  Under  these  circumstances,  although 
they  were  powerless  to  prevent  the  change  of 
system,  they  were  sufficiently  strong  to  counteract 
any  beneficial  results  which  might  have  accrued 
from  its  adoption.  They  fell  back  on  the  arm  in 
the  use  of  which  the  Oriental  excels.  They 
adopted  a  system  of  passive  obstruction. 

On  the  other  side,  it  was  urged,  with  much 
force,  that  unless  the  Moudirs  were  placed  under 


CH.  Lvi  THE  INTERIOR  485 

some  European  control,  all  the  abuses  of  the  past 
would  reappear.  When  complaints  were  made 
that  the  people  no  longer  respected  the  Moudirs, 
it  was  replied — in  the  words  of  Sir  Benson 
]M  ax  well,  who  was  then  Procureur- General — that 
the  old  respect  "was  merely  the  offspring  of 
the  terror  felt  by  the  helpless  inhabitants  in  the 
presence  of  the  officer  who  was  armed  with  the 
courbash  and  the  keys  of  the  gaol.  If  the  restora- 
tion of  the  power  was  not  accompanied  by  fresh 
abuses,  tlie  respect  would  not  revive,  since  the  fear 
on  which  it  rested  would  not." 

If  Nubar  Pasha  had  been  prepared  to  accept  a 
certain  limited  amount  of  European  co-operation 
and  inspection,  both  at  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior 
and  in  the  provinces,  a  compromise  might  have 
been  effected.  But,  although  at  first  inclined  to 
entertain  proposals  of  this  nature,  he  subsequently 
rejected  them. 

Apart,  however,  from  the  merits  or  demerits  of 
the  new  Police  system,  it  soon  became  clear  that 
two  men  so  dissimilar  in  character  as  Nubar  Pasha 
and  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  could  not  work  together 
for  long.  Early  in  April  1884,  the  first  of  a  suc- 
cession of  petty  crises  arose.  The  points  at  issue 
were  laid  before  Lord  Granville.  "The  real 
question,"  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  said,  "is  whether 
Her  Majesty's  Government  will  now  face  the 
inevitable  and  appoint  an  English  President  of  the 
Council,  or  by  withdrawing  me  deal  a  death-blow 
to  reformation  in  this  country." 

Now,  if  there  was  one  thing  in  the  world  which 
Lord  Granville  disliked,  it  was  "facing  the  in- 
evitable." He  was  constitutionally  averse  to  any 
line  of  policy  which,  in  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd's  words, 
was  intended  to  "  clear  the  way  for  all  that  had  to 
be  done,  once  and  for  all."  Moreover,  in  this  particu- 
lar instance,  he  could  give  some  very  valid  reasons 


486  MODERN  EGYPT  rtw 

for  declining  to  act  on  the  advice  of  his  masterful 
subordinate.  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  had  been  sent  to 
Egypt,  not  to  initiate  a  new  Egyptian  policy,  but 
to  do  the  best  he  could  under  the  difficult  and 
abnormal  circumstances  of  the  situation.  Of 
course,  if  an  English  President  of  the  Council  had 
been  appointed — in  other  words,  if  England  had 
assumed  the  direct  government  of  Egypt — all 
administrative  difficulties  would  have  been  solved. 
Any  one,  as  has  truly  been  said,  can  govern  in  a 
state  of  siege.  But  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  had  not  been 
asked  to  govern,  neither  had  he  been  commissioned 
to  introduce  such  radical  changes  as  would  neces- 
sarily involve  a  complete  change  of  governors.  His 
task  was,  partly  by  persuasion,  and  partly  by  a 
moderate  amount  of  diplomatic  support,  to  intro- 
duce such  partial  reforms  in  the  existing  system  of 
administration  as  were  possible  without  shattering 
the  flimsy  political  fabric  with  which  he  had  to 
deal.  He  was  constitutionally  unsuited  for  the 
performance  of  this  delicate  task.  He  could  not 
understand  half  measures.  JVil  actum  credens,  dum 
quid  super esset  agendum,  was  his  motto.  Never, 
probably,  did  he  show  his  want  of  discernment 
more  conspicuously  than  when  he  exhorted  a 
Minister,  who  was  pre-eminently  opportunist,  to 
resort  to  heroic  measures.  Lord  Granville  was 
equal  to  the  occasion.  He  could  elude  the 
point  of  the  ra])ier  even  when  the  hilt  was 
held  by  a  skilled  diplomatist  and  dialectician ; 
how  much  more,  therefore,  could  he  escape  from 
the  sledge-hammer  blows  and  wild  tlirusts  of  this 
blunt,  outspoken  tyro  in  official  life.  Acting  under 
Lord  Granville's  instructions,  I  ])atched  up  a  truce 
between  Nubar  Pasha  and  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd,  but 
the  feud  soon  broke  out  again.  Eventually,  towards 
the  end  of  May  1884,  Mr.  CHfford  Lloyd  resigned 
his  appointment  and  left  Egypt. 


CH.  Lvi  THE  INTERIOR  487 

It  was  a  misfortune  that  his  mission  did  not 
prove  successful.  Had  he  managed  to  acquire 
a  commanding  influence  over  the  affairs  of  the 
Interior,  not  only  would  much  good  have  accrued 
to  Egypt,  but  a  great  deal  of  friction,  which  sub- 
sequently ensued,  would  have  been  avoided. 

I  have  often  asked  myself  whether,  had  I 
supported  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  more  strongly,  a 
more  favourable  result  might  have  been  obtained. 
If  the  circumstances  of  the  time  had  been  different, 
and  if  I  had  been  able  to  devote  myself  more  ex- 
clusively to  the  solution  of  this  particular  diffi- 
culty, it  is  possible  that  the  conflict  between 
Nubar  Pasha  and  Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  might  not 
have  become  so  acute  as  was  actually  the  case. 
But  the  circumstances  of  the  time  were  ab- 
normal. General  Gordon  was  inundating  me 
with  violent  and  contradictory  telegrams  from 
Khartoum.  Whatever  time  could  be  spared  from 
Soudan  affairs,  had  mainly  to  be  devoted  to  finance, 
which  was  then  the  burning  question  of  the  day. 
The  representatives  of  almost  every  Power  in 
Europe  were  banded  together  in  opposition  to 
England,  and  to  every  proposal  emanating  from 
a  British  source.  On  the  other  hand,  Nubar  Pasha 
jauntily  threw  off  all  responsibility  for  Soudanese 
or  financial  affairs,  and  concentrated  all  the  efforts 
of  his  astute  mind  on  an  endeavour  to  upset  the 
Clifford  Lloyd  combination,  and  to  free  the  Egyptian 
Government  from  all  European  control  in  so  far  as 
the  affairs  of  the  Interior  were  concerned.  Under 
circumstances  such  as  these,  the  result  of  the 
struggle  was  almost  a  foregone  conclusion. 

Even,  however,  without  the  special  circum- 
stances existing  at  the  moment,  I  do  not  think  that 
Mr.  Clifford  Lloyd  could  have  remained  for  long 
in  Egypt.  Despite  his  high  character  and  un- 
questionable ability,  he  was  not  the  right  man  in 


488  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

the  right  place.  He  was  not  fitted  for  the  delicate 
work  of  Egyptian  administration.  As  well  might 
it  be  expected  that  a  brawny  navvy  should  be  able 
to  mend  a  Geneva  watch  with  a  pickaxe. 

It  would,  of  course,  have  been  possible  to  have 
appointed  an  English  successor  to  INIr.  Clifford 
Lloyd,  but  at  that  time  the  difficulties  of  the 
situation  were  so  great,  and  the  work  was  so 
heavy,  that  it  was  desirable  to  throw  a  certain 
amount  of  cargo  overboard  in  order  to  lighten 
the  ship.  INIr.  Clifford  Lloyd's  place  was,  there- 
fore, filled  by  an  Egyptian. 

It  is  needless  to  describe  the  minor  changes 
which  the  Police  organisation  underwent  during 
the  next  ten  years.  It  will  suffice  to  say  that  the 
system  did  not  work  smootlily.  The  old  cause  of 
complaint  always  existed,  namely,  that  the  presence 
of  European  Police  officers  in  the  provinces  dimin- 
ished the  authority  of  the  Moudirs.  One  Egyp- 
tian JNIinister  succeeded  another,  but  all  adopted 
an  attitude  of  hostility  to,  or  at  best  of  surly 
acquiescence  with  the  new  system. 

At  last,  as  generally  happens  in  such  cases,  an 
opportunity  came  of  settling  the  question.  When 
Nubar  Pasha  assumed  office  in  the  summer  of  1894, 
he  at  once  took  up  the  matter.  A  j)lan,  having  for 
its  object  the  decentralisation  of  the  Police,  which 
was  to  be  left  in  Egyptian  hands,  coupled  with  the 
establishment  of  an  efficient  Euro})ean  control  at 
the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  was  elaborated  and 
eventually  accepted.  An  English  "Adviser"  was 
appointed,  whose  functions  were  to  co-operate 
with  the  Minister  in  charge  of  the  Department. 
Subsequently,  a  very  few  young  Englishmen,  who 
had  been  specially  trained  for  Egyptian  service, 
were  appointed  to  be  Ins])ectors. 

Since  the  change  in  1894,  a  great  improvement 
has  unquestionably  taken  place  in  the  Administra- 


CH.  Lvi  THE  INTERIOR  489 

tioii  of  the  Interior.  Nevertheless,  the  old  difficulty 
still  remains.  The  presence  of  British  Inspectors 
in  the  Provinces  tends  to  weaken  the  authority 
and  to  diminish  the  sense  of  responsibility  of  the 
Moudirs.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  certain  that 
the  total  withdrawal  of  the  Inspectors  from  the 
provinces  would  be  attended  with  a  serious  risk 
that  many  of  the  abuses  of  the  past  would  re- 
appear, and,  generally,  that  great  administrative 
confusion  would  arise.  It  is,  in  fact,  impossible  to 
avoid  altoorether  the  disadvanta":es  of  over -inter- 
ference,  without  incurring  the  evils  which  would 
result  from  total  non-interference.  The  most  that 
can  be  done  is  to  effect  the  best  compromise  of 
which  the  circumstances  admit.  But,  in  working 
a  system  where  so  much  depends  upon  the 
characters  and  idiosyncrasies  of  the  individuals 
concerned,  it  is  inconceivable  that  complete 
success  can  be  attained. 

A  heroic  remedy,  which  has  occasionally  been 
suggested,  would  be  to  appoint  British  Moudirs. 
I  greatly  deprecate  the  adoption  of  this  measure. 
It  would  be  a  very  distinct  step  backwards  in  the 
direction  of  dissociating  the  Egyptians  from  the 
government  of  their  own  country.  Moreover, 
although  I  do  not  mean*  to  say  that  all  the  In- 
spectors are  equally  tactful  and  efficient,  or  that 
all  the  Moudirs  possess  every  qualification  which 
could  be  wished,  I  am  convinced  that  the  former 
are  steadily  gaining  knowledge  and  experience  of 
the  country,  and  that  the  latter  are  generally  far 
more  efficient  than  their  predecessors  of  a  few 
years  ago.  If  this  be  so,  and  if,  as  I  hold,  a 
policy  of  complete  non  -  interference  is  not  only 
open  to  great  objections,  but  would  also  be  very 
unpopular  with  the  mass  of  the  population,  tliere 
is  nothing  for  it  but  to  continue  to  work  on  the 
broad   lines   of   the   present    system,   with   all    its 


490  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

recoofnised  defects.  All  that  can  be  done  is  to 
watch  its  operation,  to  choose  the  Moudirs  with  the 
utmost  care,  to  constantly  impress  on  the  European 
Inspectors  the  necessity  of  dealing  in  a  spirit  of 
friendliness  and  sympathy  with  the  Egyptian 
authorities,  and  to  move — whenever  this  can 
prudently  be  done — in  the  direction  of  diminishing 
rather  than  of  enhancing  the  degree  of  British 
interference  in  the  details  of  the  administration.* 

*  I  must  refer  those  who  wish  for  more  detailed  information  as 
regards  the  work  of  the  Interior,  in  connection  with  village  organiaa- 
tion  and  other  matters,  to  my  Annual  Reports. 


CHAPTER    LVII 

SUB-DEPARTMENTS   OF   THE    INTERIOR 

!•  Prisons — State  of  the  prisons  in  1882 — Reform — 2.  Slavery — The 
Slave  Trade  and  slavery — The  Convention  of  1877 — The  Slave 
Home — Change  of  opinion  in  Egypt — Success  of  the  Convention — 
3.  Medical  and  Sanitary  Axuuinistration — Egyptian  superstitions 
— Clot  Bey — State  of  things  in  1883 — Improvements  effected — 
Sanitary  reform  —  Impediments  to  progress  —  Treatment  of 
epidemics 

1.  Prisons, 

Those  who  have  only  a  slight  acquaintance  with 
the  ways  of  Eastern  Governments  may  perhaps 
be  astonished  to  learn  of  the  existence  of  a  Turkish 
Habeas  Corpus  Act.  In  reality,  however,  this  is 
no  cause  for  surprise.  Contact  with  Europe  has 
led  to  the  adoption  of  the  forms  and  the  incorpora- 
tion of  much  of  the  jargon  of  Western  civilisation, 
but  has  been  powerless  to  make  the  East  imbibe 
its  spirit.  Oriental  rulers  have,  indeed,  discovered 
a  plan,  by  the  adoption  of  which,  as  they  think, 
they  can  satisfy  European  reformers  without  in- 
curring all  the  consequences  which  would  result 
from  the  execution  of  a  reforming  policy.  Broadly 
speaking,  this  plan  consists  in  passing  a  law,  and 
then  acting  as  if  the  law  had  never  been  passed.^ 

*  ''No  reform  is  clamoured  for  which  does  not  already  figure  in  the 
statute-book ;  no  complaint  is  made  which  cannot  be  disproved  by 
statistics.  .  .  .  Eastern  peoples,  not  only  in  Turkey  but  in  many 
other  countries,  form  a  solid  national  conspiracy  against  foreign  anil 
Christian  influences.     They  know  wlien  their  Government  is  forced  to 

491 


492  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

According  to  Ottoman  law,  an  accused  person 
must  be  examined  within  twenty-four  hours  of  his 
arrest  by  competent  officials ;  when  the  charge 
against  him  is  formulated,  the  conditions  under 
which  he  may  be  admitted  to  bail  are  clearly  laid 
down. 

So  much  for  the  theory.  The  practice  is 
different.  Sir  Herbert  Chermside  and  Mr. 
Beaman,  who  were  deputed  by  Lord  Dufferin 
to  inquire  into  the  state  of  the  Egyptian  prisons 
in  1882,  wrote :  "  It  is  impossible,  in  the  face  of 
the  deluge  of  complaints  as  to  no  examination  or 
trial  during  months  and  years  of  confinement, 
which  has  met  us,  to  avoid  concluding  that  the 
present  system  of  arrest  and  sending  to  trial  is, 
in  practice,  a  flagrant  injustice,  and  aggravated  by 
venality,  tyranny,  and  personal  vindictiveness." 

Two  causes  were  at  work  during  the  pre- 
occupation days,  one  of  which  tended  unduly  to 
deplete,  and  the  other  unduly  to  crowd  the  prisons. 
On  the  one  hand,  a  number  of  offences  were 
committed  for  which  no  one  was  ever  punished. 
This  immunity  from  punishment  tended  to  keep 
the  prisons  empty.  On  the  other  hand,  when 
the  authorities  took  cognisance  of  an  offence,  it 
was  their  practice  to  arrest  not  only  every  one  who 
might  possibly  have  been  implicated  in  it,  but  also 
a  number  of  their  relations,  as  well  as  all  the 
witnesses,  whether  they  were  on  the  side  of  the 
prosecution  or  of  the  defence.  The  result  of  this 
twofold  injustice  was  that,  whilst  a  number  of 
persons  were  free  who  siiould  have  been  in  prison, 
at  the  same  time  a  number  of   persons  were  in 

give  way  af!:ainst  its  will ;  tliey  know  when  orders  are  meant  to  be 
obeyed,  and  answer  the  rein  in  a  moment ;  they  also  know  when  tliey 
are  not  meant  to  be  obeyed^  but  are  what  are  called  '  watery  commands,' 
and  then  they  do  not  obey  them.  ...  In  the  end,  this  national  con- 
spiracy, tliis  '  invincible  inertia,'  nearly  always  wins  the  day." — Turkey 
in  Kuroj/r,  p.  1.'j8. 


CH.  Lvii  THE  INTERIOR  493 

prison  who  should  have  been  free;'  and,  once  in 
prison,  no  distinction  was  made  between  those  who 
had  been  convicted,  those  who  were  awaiting  trial, 
and  others,  such  as  witnesses,  who  were  detained, 
not  for  any  offence,  but  because  it  was  more  con- 
venient to  keep  them  in  prison,  in  case  they  were 
wanted,  than  to  set  them  at  liberty.  "  In  the 
East,"  Sir  Herbert  Chermside  wrote,  "  every  man 
is  treated  as  if  guilty  of  tlie  offence  of  which  he  is 
accused  until  he  has  established  his  innocence." 

The  condition  of  the  prisons  was  horrible  in  the 
extreme.  "No  report,"  Mr.  Beaman  said,  "can 
convey  the  feeblest  impression  of  the  helpless 
misery  of  the  prisoners,  who  live  for  months,  like 
wild  beasts,  without  change  of  clothing,  half- 
starved,  ignorant  of  the  fate  of  their  families  and 
bewailing  their  own.  They  only  look  forward  to 
the  day  of  their  trial  as  synonymous  with  the 
day  of  their  release,  but  the  prospect  of  its 
advent  is  too  uncertain  to  lend  much  hope  to  their 
wretchedness.  From  the  moment  of  entering  the 
prison,  even  on  the  most  trifling  charge,  they 
consider  themselves  lost.  It  is  impossible  for  them 
to  guess  at  the  time  when  a  new  official  may  begin 
to  clear  off  the  cases  in  his  district,  or  when  the 
slow  march  of  the  administration  may  reach  them. 
It  may  be  weeks,  it  may  be  months,  and  it  may  be 
years  ;  many  of  them  have  long  since  ceased  to  care 
which." 

In  those  days,  the  only  hope  of  the  Egyptian 
prisoner  lay  in  the  possession  of  money.  A 
moderate  bribe  to  the  gaoler  would  insure  relatively 
good  treatment  in  prison.  A  further  sum  to  the 
judge  might  hasten  the  trial.  The  tariff  for  an 
acquittal  was  naturally  somewhat  higher. 

'  "  It  is  esteemed  an  act  of  Imperial  clemency  when  the  Sultan 
orders  the  release  from  prison  of '  all  persons  against  whom  there  is  no 
charge.'  " — Turkey  in  Europe,  p.  140. 


494  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

There  is,  however,  nothing  surprising  in  all  this. 
The  state  of  the  Egyptian  prisons  in  1882  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  much  worse  than  that  of 
the  prisons  in  England  before  those  reforms  were 
undertaken  which  have  made  the  name  of  John 
Howard  for  ever  famous. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  describe  in  detail  the  series 
of  reforms  in  this  Department  which  have  been 
effected  since  1882.  It  will  suffice  to  say  that, 
here  as  elsewhere,  order  and  justice  have  taken 
the  place  of  confusion  and  tyranny.  The  old 
prisons  have  been  improved  and  placed  in  a  sanitary 
condition.  Large  sums  have  been  spent  in  the  con- 
struction of  new  prisons.  Special  prisons  have  been 
constructed  for  women.  Reformatories  for  juvenile 
offenders  have  been  instituted.  The  prisoners 
have  been  provided  with  proper  food  and  clothing. 
Many  of  them  are  taught  trades.  These  reforms 
took  time.  Even  now  (1907)  the  prison  accom- 
modation can  scarcely  be  said  to  be  adequate  to 
meet  all  the  requirements  of  the  country. 

The  only  criticism  now  directed  against  the 
Prison  Administration  is — to  quote  the  words  of 
Coles  Pasha,  to  whom  the  credit  of  reforming  this 
branch  of  the  Public  Service  is  mainly  due — that, 
in  the  eyes  of  many  "  prison  life  is  not  sufficiently 
deterrent,  and  that  the  swing  of  the  pendulum  has 
carried  the  Administration  too  far  in  the  direction 
of  humanity,  if  not  of  luxury."  There  may 
possibly  be  some  truth  in  this  criticism,  but  there 
can,  of  course,  be  no  question  of  reverting  to  tlie 
brutal  methods  of  the  past  in  order  to  make  punish- 
ment more  deterrent.  In  Egypt,  as  elsewhere,  tlie 
tendency  of  the  best  qualified  penological  experts 
is  to  move  in  the  direction  of  reforming  rather  tlian 
in  that  of  administering  very  seveie  punishment  to 
criminals. 


CH.LVU  THE  INTERIOR  495 

2.  Slavery. 

There  is  an  obvious  distinction  between  the 
Slave  Trade  and  Slavery.  Both  are  bad ;  but, 
whereas  nothing  can  be  said  in  defence  of  the  Slave 
Trade,  some  mitigating  pleas  may  be  advanced  as 
regards  domestic  slavery,  which,  although  they  in 
no  degree  justify  the  existence  of  the  institution, 
are  of  a  nature  to  temper  the  zeal  of  the  reformer 
who  aspires  towards  its  immediate  abolition. 

Most  Englishmen  have  been  made  familiar  with 
the  horrors  of  the  Slave  Trade.  They  have  been 
told  how  peaceable  villages  in  Central  Africa  have 
been  invaded  by  parties  of  ruffianly  Arab  raiders ; 
how  the  older  inhabitants,  male  and  female,  have 
been  shot  down  without  mercy  ;  how  the  girls  and 
boys — the  latter  after  undergoing  the  most  cruel 
process  of  mutilation  to  which  any  man  can  be 
subjected  ^  —  have  been  marched  long  distances 
down  to  the  coast;  how  numbers  died  of  exhaustion 
on  the  way ;  and  how  eventually  the  survivors 
were  sold  to  be  the  household  servants  of  the 
Turkish  and  Egyptian  Pashas.^  Some  arguments, 
more  or  less  specious,  can  generally  be  found  to 
defend  most  of  the  worst  abuses  which  exist,  or  at 
times  have  existed  in  the  world.  The  Slave  Trade 
stands  alone  as  an  abomination  which  is  incapable 
of  any  defence  whatsoever,  unless  it  be  the  vicious 
plea  that  Pashas  require  servants,  and  that  they  are 
unable  to  obtain  them  in  sufficient  numbers,  or  at 

*  The  high  price  paid  for  these  unfortunate  boys  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  a  large  proportion  of  them  die  under  the  process  of  mutilation. 
The  operation  is  performed  in  the  most  ruthless  and  barbarous  manner 
by  persons  devoid  of  any  surgical  skill. 

2  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  black  girls  from  Central  Africa 
always  become  the  concubines  of  their  masters.  It  would  be  an  exagger- 
ation to  say  that  cases  of  this  sort  never  occur,  but  they  are  rare.  'ITie 
wives  and  concubines  of  the  Pashas  come  almost  exclusively  from 
Circassia  and  Abyssinia.  The  blacks  are  almost  always  bought  with 
the  object  of  being  employed  as  household  servants. 


496  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

a  sufficiently  low  price,  by  any  other  means  than 
those  to  which  allusion  is  made  above. 

The  case  of  domestic  slavery,  considered  inde- 
pendently of  the  Slave  Trade,  is  different.  A  slave 
in  the  Ottoman  dominions  lies  under  certain  civil 
disabilities  which  shock  the  European's  sense  of 
justice;  nevertheless,  in  practice,  the  disabihties 
in  question  lie  lightly  on  the  slaves  themselves. 
Moreover,  under  unreformed  Ottoman  law,  the 
slave  is  not  free  to  carry  his  labour  to  any  market 
which  he  chooses.  This  is  unjust.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  a  general  rule,  slaves  are  well  treated ;  ^ 
they  lead  an  easy  life  and  are  not  overworked. 
On  the  whole,  save  that  the  stigma  of  slavery  is 
attached  to  them — a  consideration  which  is  all-im- 
portant from  the  European,  but  relatively  unim- 
portant from  the  Eastern  point  of  view  ^ — it  may 
be  doubted  whether  in  the  majority  of  cases  the 
lot  of  slaves  in  Egypt  is,  in  its  material  aspects, 
harder  than,  or  even  as  hard  as  that  of  many 
domestic  servants  in  Europe.  Indeed,  from  one 
point  of  view,  the  Eastern  slave  is  in  a  better  posi- 
tion than  the  Western  servant.  The  latter  can  be 
thrown  out  of  employment  at  any  moment.  In 
Egypt,  on  the  other  hand,  although  under  the 
existing  law,  which  is  the  outcome  of  contact  with 

*  There  are,  however,  exceptions.  I  remember  a  case  wliich 
occurred  early  in  1885.  It  was  brought  to  my  notice  that  a  white 
slave  girl  in  the  harem  of  a  lady  of  high  social  position  in  Cairo  was 
very  badly  treated,  and  tliat  she  wished  to  escape."  With  some  diffi- 
culty, I  obtained  an  interview  with  her  at  my  house.  She  declared  to 
me  most  positively  that  she  was  very  well  treated,  and  that  she  wished 
to  return  to  the  harem.  I  had  no  alternative  but  to  comply  witli  her 
reijuest.  Shortly  afterwards,  I  went  to  England.  On  my  return,  tlie 
girl  had  disappeared.  There  were  good  reasons  for  believing  that  the 
statement  she  made  to  me  was  untrue,  that  she  had  been  promised  a 
large  sura  of  money  if  she  made  it,  that  she  was  never  paid  the  money, 
and  that,  on  my  departure  from  Egypt,  she  was  beaten  to  death.  But 
in  cases  of  this  sort  it  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  obtain  positive  proof. 

^  Many  Egyptians  of  the  highest  social  classes  are  the  sons  of  slave 
mothers,  who  are  often  married  to  their  masters  after  having  borne  a 
child. 


CH.  Lvu  THE  INTERIOR  497 

the  West,  the  slave  can,  if  he  chooses,  free  himself 
from  his  master,  no  provision  is  made  for  the  con- 
verse case  of  a  master  who  wishes  to  get  rid  of  a 
slave.  Custom,  based  on  religious  law,  obliges  him 
to  support  his  slave.  Cases  are  frequent  of  masters 
who  would  be  glad  to  get  rid  of  their  slaves,  but 
who  are  unable  to  do  so  because  the  latter  will  not 
accept  the  gift  of  liberty.  A  moral  obligation, 
which  is  universally  recognised,  rests  on  all  masters 
to  support  aged  and  infirm  slaves  till  they  die ; 
this  obligation  is  often  onerous  in  the  case  of  those 
who  have  inherited  slaves  from  their  parents  or 
other  relatives. 

On  these  grounds,  therefore,  some  distinction 
must  be  drawn  between  the  Slave  Trade  and 
Slavery.  It  is,  however,  none  the  less  true  that 
the  one  is  intimately  connected  with  the  other. 
Where  there  is  a  demand,  a  supply  will  follow.  If 
the  institution  of  slavery  did  not  exist,  the  Slave 
Trade  would  perish.  In  order  to  check  the  Slave 
Trade,  if  for  no  other  reason,  it  is  necessary  to  do 
all  that  is  possible  to  discourage  slavery.  The 
object  of  the  English  reformer  has,  therefore,  been 
twofold.  In  the  first  place,  he  has  endeavoured  to 
prevent  slaves  from  being  brought  into  the  country, 
and  has  thus  to  some  extent  cut  off  the  supply. 
In  the  second  place,  he  has  endeavoured  to  wean 
the  slave-owning  classes  from  their  ancient  habits, 
and  has  thus  done  much  to  diminish  the  demand. 

Whether  Ismail  Pasha  was  moved  by  a  sincere 
desire  to  abolish  an  infamous  traffic,  or  whether  he 
merely  wished  to  throw  dust  in  the  eyes  of  humani- 
tarian Europe,  it  is  certain  that  to  him  belongs  the 
credit  of  having  given  the  first  blow  to  the  institu- 
tion of  slavery  in  Egypt.  In  August  1877,  a 
Convention  was  signed  between  the  Egyptian 
Government  and  Lord  Vivian,  acting  on  behalf  of 
the  British  Government.     Under  the  terms  of  this 

VOL.  II  2  k 


498  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

Convention  and  the  annexes  attached  to  it,  the 
Slave  Trade  was  formally  forbidden  on  Egyptian 
territory.  Slave  dealers  were  to  be  tried  by  court 
martial,  and  were  rendered  liable  to  severe  penalties. 
The  sale  of  slaves  from  family  to  family  was  to 
be  tolerated  until  August  1884,  after  which  time 
it  was  declared  illegal.  Any  slave  who  chose  to 
claim  his  or  her  liberty  could  obtain  it  on  applica- 
tion to  certain  Bureaux  of  Manumission  which 
were  specially  created. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  explain  a  point  in  con- 
nection with  the  institution  of  slavery  in  Egypt, 
the  importance  of  which  is  often  insufficiently  re- 
cognised by  those  who  are  specially  interested  in 
this  subject.  On  February  6,  1883,  Lord  Dufferin 
wrote  : — 

"  Slavery  might  be  abolished  by  Khedivial  Decree, 
but  a  Convention  is  so  much  more  formal  and 
binding  that  it  would  seem  preferable.  I  would, 
therefore,  propose  that  a  new  Convention  be  entered 
into  between  Great  Britain  and  Egypt,  by  which 
slavery  would  entirely  cease  in  Egypt  and  its 
Dependencies  seven  years  after  the  date  of  signa- 
ture." 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  Lord  Dufferin 
fully  realised  the  obstacles  which  must  have  been 
encountered  had  any  endeavour  been  made  to  give 
effect  to  his  proposal.  In  1883,  those  obstacles 
were  practically  insurmountable.  Slavery  in  the 
East  does  not  exist  by  virtue  of  any  special  Decree 
or  law  emanating  either  from  the  executive  govern- 
ments or  from  the  legislatures  under  which  Eastern 
countries  are  governed.  It  exists  because  its 
existence  is  authorised  by  the  Sacred  Law  of  Islam, 
which  is  as  immutable  as  were  the  laws  of  the 
Medes  and  Persians.  That  law  cannot  be  abro- 
gated by  any  Khedivial  Decree,  and  still  less  by 
any  Convention   signed   with  a    Christian   Power, 


CH.  Lvii  THE  INTERIOR  499 

Kadis,  Muftis,  and  Ulema  would  regard  Decrees 
and  Conventions,  which  infringed  the  fundamental 
religious  law  of  Islam,  much  as  devout  French 
Catholics  must  have  regarded  the  attempts  of 
Anacharsis  Clootz  and  other  maniacs  of  the,  French 
revolution  to  effect  the  legal  abolition  of  •  the 
Christian  religion.  They  would  altogether  decline 
to  recognise  the  validity  of  a  law  which,  inasmuch 
as  it  altered  the  Sheriat,  would  in  their  eyes  be 
considered  as  an  attempt  to  justify  sacrilege. 

It  is  true  that,  some  fifty  years  ago,  tlie  rulers 
of  India  ignored  the  Mohammedan  relioious  law. 
In  1843,  an  Act  was  passed  by  the  Indian  legislature, 
which  provided  that  the  status  of  slavery  should 
not  be  recognised  by  any  law-court  in  the  country, 
criminal  or  civil.  But,  although  in  the  abstract,  the 
Sheriat  may  be  as  inviolable  at  Calcutta  as  it  is  at 
Cairo,  the  question  of  the  total  and  immediate 
abolition  of  slavery  presented  itself,  from  a  practical 
point  of  view,  in  a  very  different  aspect  in  Egypt 
under  Lord  Dufferin  from  that  which  obtained  under 
Lord  Ellenborough  in  India.  In  1843,  the  English 
had  been  for  half  a  century  in  India.  They  were 
the  absolute  rulers  of  the  country.  The  law-courts, 
which  they  had  established,  inspired  confidence. 
Moreover,  they  had  to  deal,  not  with  one  compact 
body  of  JNIohammedans,  but  with  a  Mohammedan 
population  which,  though  numerous,  possessed 
little  or  no  cohesion,  owing  to  the  fact  that  it  was 
merged  amongst  the  members  of  a  more  numerous 
And  more  tolerant  creed.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, a  radical  reform,  such  as  that  effected  in 
1843,  becomes  possible.  Under  the  political  con- 
ditions which  prevailed  in  Egypt  in  1883,  it  would 
have  been  impossible,  or  at  all  events  in  the  highest 
degree  imprudent,  to  have  attempted  to  follow  the 
Indian  precedent. 

Under   the   Sheriat,  a  slave   cannot   marry   or 


500  MODERN  EGYPT  ft  vi 

inherit  property  without  the  consent  of  his  master. 
When,  therefore,  it  is  said  that,  under  the  Con- 
vention of  1877,  any  slave  was  able  to  obtain  his 
or  her  liberty  on  application  to  a  Manumission 
Bureau,  it  is  to  be  understood  that  the  term 
"liberty"  is  used  in  a  restricted  sense.  The 
Convention  gave  to  the  slave  the  right  to  go 
wherever  he  pleased,  and  to  work  or  remain  idle 
as  he  pleased.  But  it  did  not  allow  him  to  marry 
or  to  inherit  property  without  the  consent  of  his 
master.  To  this  extent,  in  spite  of  nineteenth- 
century  intervention,  Islam  of  the  seventh  century 
still  held  the  manumitted  slave  in  its  grip. 

It  was  inevitable  that  the  British  occupation 
should  give  a  fresh  stimulus  to  the  work  of 
emancipation  which  was  begun  in  1877.  One 
important  consideration,  however,  tempered  the 
zeal  of  the  reformer.  Almost  all  the  slaves  in 
Egypt  were  women.  When  they  left  the  harems, 
having  no  means  of  support,  they  either  starved 
or  fell  into  a  life  of  vice.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, those  who  were  desirous  of  hastening  the 
work  of  emancipation  hesitated  to  act  for  fear 
of  producing  evils  as  bad  as,  if  not  worse  than 
slavery.  To  remedy  this  defect,  money  was 
subscribed  in  England  with  the  help  of  the  Anti- 
Slavery  Society,  who,  in  this  connection,  did  some 
excellent  work.  With  the  money  thus  obtained, 
which  was  supplemented  by  a  grant  from  the  Egyp- 
tian Treasury,  a  Home  for  Freed  Female  Slaves 
was  established  at  Cairo.  The  manumitted  slaves 
are  now  housed  and  fed  in  this  Home  until  employ- 
ment can  be  obtained  for  them.^  This  system  has 
worked  well.  Respectable  Mohammedans  con- 
stantly apply  to  the  Home  for  domestic  servants. 

1  So  few  slaves  now  apply  to  the  Mainimissioii  Bureaux  that  it  will 
proliably  soon  become  a  <|uestion  wliethcr  the  Home  for  Freed  Slaves 
need  be  auy  longer  maintained. 


CH.  Lvii  THE  INTERIOR  501 

It  would  be  probably  an  exaggeration  to  say 
that  any  public  opinion  adverse  to  slavery  has  been 
evoked  in  Egypt.  The  purchase  and  employment 
of  slaves  is  not  generally  regarded  with  any  moral 
reprobation,  neither,  under  all  the  circumstances 
which  exist,  would  it  be  reasonable  to  expect  any 
such  reprobation.  In  1894,  no  less  a  person  than 
the  President  of  the  Legislative  Council,  who  was 
a  Turco-Egyptian,  was  arraigned  before  a  Court- 
martial  for  purchasing  slaves,  and  only  escaped 
imprisonment  on  account  of  his  bad  health  and 
advanced  years.  Nevertheless,  the  slavery  reforms 
instituted  under  British  auspices  have  produced  a 
notable  change  in  the  behaviour,  if  not  in  the 
opinions,  of  the  slave-owning  classes  in  Egypt. 
There  are  no  longer  any  slave -markets.  The 
purchase  of  a  slave  is  a  criminal  offence  attended 
with  danger  both  to  the  buyer  and  to  the  seller. 
The  slave  routes  are  carefully  watched.  It  is 
only  with  great  difficulty  that  a  few  slaves  are 
occasionally  smuggled  into  the  country.  The 
result  of  these  measures  has  been,  not  only  that 
it  has  become  year  by  year  more  difficult  to  obtain 
slaves,  but  that  also,  when  any  clandestine  purchase 
is  effected,  a  price  considerably  higher  than  that 
which  formerly  ruled  has  to  be  paid.  The  slave- 
owner is,  therefore,  beginning  to  ask  himself 
whether  slave  labour  is  not,  after  all,  more  ex- 
pensive as  well  as  more  troublesome  than  free 
labour,  and  whether  it  is  worth  while,  besides  com- 
mitting a  criminal  act  for  which  he  may  be  severely 
punished,  to  pay  a  considerable  sum  for  a  slave  girl 
who  can,  on  tlie  morrow  of  her  purchase,  walk  out 
of  the  harem  and  obtain,  not  only  her  freedom, 
but  also  the  strong  support  of  the  British  repre- 
sentative if  any  attempt  is  made  to  tamper  with  her 
liberty  of  action. 

Thousands  of  slaves  have,  during  the  last  few 


502  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

years,  been  granted  their  certificates  of  freedom. 
Those  who  remain  in  the  harems  know  that  they 
can  obtain  their  liberty  if  they  choose  to  ask  for  it. 
In  the  meanwhile,  as  very  few  fresh  slaves  are 
imported,  and  as  the  numbers  born  in  slavery 
must  certainly  be  inconsiderable  in  proportion  to 
the  number  of  those  who  have  been  manumitted, 
the  supply  of  slaves  is  gradually  falling  short  of 
the  demand.  Very  few  eunuchs  are  now  to  be 
found  in  Egypt.  The  objections  to  their  employ- 
ment from  the  Egyptian  point  of  view  are  that 
a  very  high  price  has  to  be  paid  for  them  ;  that, 
on  account  of  their  bad  physique,  they  are  use- 
less as  servants  ;  and  that  they  are  liable  to  die 
of  consumption.  It  may  safely  be  asserted  that 
slavery  in  Egypt,  although  it  will  take  a  long 
time  to  die  out  completely,  is  moribund.  It 
may  be  asserted  with  an  almost  equal  degree  of 
confidence  that  both  the  Slave  Trade  and  slavery 
would  revive  if  vigilance  were  relaxed. 

From  one  point  of  view,  the  particular  reform 
of  the  Egyptian  social  and  administrative  system 
now  under  discussion  is  remarkable.  In  view  of 
the  state  of  the  JNIohammedan  law,  of  the  fact  that 
slavery,  although  discouraged  by  the  founder  of 
the  Mohammedan  religion,  has,  by  a  perverted  view 
of  his  original  preaching,  become  associated  with 
the  disthictive  features  of  the  JNIohammedan  faith  ; 
and  of  the  further  fact  that  material  interests  of 
some  importance  were  involved  in  the  abolition  of 
slavery — it  might  well  have  been  thought  that  the 
introduction  of  Western  ideas  in  connection  with 
this  subject  would  have  encountered  o})position  of 
a  somewhat  specially  strong  description.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  opposition  has  been  mild,  and 
has  been  easily  overcome.  A  great  change  has 
been  going  on  insensibly.  It  has,  indeed,  been 
almost  imperceptible  to  tnose  who,   it  might  be 


CH.  Lvii  THE  INTERIOR  503 

thought,  were  most  interested  in  the  maintenance 
of  the  existing  abuse.  No  lieroic  measures  have 
been  adopted.  Nothing  has  been  done  to  clash 
with  Mohammedan  opinions  and  prejudices.  Never- 
theless, a  considerable  measure  of  success  has  been 
attained.  This  result  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
Convention  of  1877  was  admirably  adapted  to 
achieve,  in  a  prudent  and  unostentatious  manner, 
the  object  for  which  it  was  intended.  The  late 
Lord  Vivian's  name  is  rarely,  if  ever,  mentioned  as 
one  of  the  chief  initiators  of  Egyptian  reform. 
Yet  it  is  due  to  the  wise  moderation  of  the 
Convention  which  he  negotiated  that  slavery  has 
been  gradually  disappearing  from  Egypt.  At  the 
commencement  of  this  work,  some  words  of  Bacon 
were  quoted  as  an  example  of  the  general  principles 
which  should  guide  the  reformer  in  an  Eastern 
country  :  '*  It  were  good  that  men  in  their 
innovations  would  follow  the  example  of  Time 
itself,  which,  indeed,  innovateth  greatly,  but 
quietly  and  by  degrees  scarce  to  be  perceived." 
That  is  the  principle  which  has  been  adopted  in 
connection  witli  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  Egypt. 
Lord  Vivian's  action  in  this  matter  was  based  on 
strictly  Baconian  principles. 

In  1895,  a  fresh  Slavery  Convention  was  signed 
between  the  British  and  Egyptian  Governments. 
It  gave  precision  to  the  existing  law,  and  in  some 
respects  altered  the  procedure.  INIoreover,  it  pro- 
vided that  it  was  a  criminal  offence  to  interfere 
in  any  way  with  the  full  liberty  of  action  of  an 
enfi-anchised  slave.  This  change  is  important.  It 
practically  effects  by  a  side  wind  all  that  was  done 
by  the  Indian  Act  of  1843.  Any  one  in  Egypt 
who  prevents  a  freed  slave  from  marrying  or  from 
inheriting  property  is  now  liable  to  imprisonment. 

A  scholarly  writer,  who  has  paid  special  atten- 
tion to  this  subject,  calls  slavery  the  "  Nemesis  of 


504  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

Nations."  "Civilisation,"  he  says,  "begins  with 
the  crack  of  the  slave  whip."^  It  may  be  placed 
to  the  credit  of  latter-day  civilisation  that  the 
crack  of  that  whip  can  no  longer  be  heard  in 
Egypt 

3.  Medical  and  Sanitary  Administration, 

Whatever  may  be  the  case  at  present,  it  is 
certain  that  but  a  few  years  ago  the  lowest  classes 
in  Egypt  rarely  souglit  for  medical  aid  until  the 
patient  was  well-nigh  moribund.  The  recipes  of 
village  barbers  and  of  the  old  women,  who  were 
sometimes  called  in  to  attend  the  sick,  as  often 
as  not  aggravated  the  condition  of  the  patient.^ 
Great  faith  was  entertained  in  the  healing  properties 
of  written  charms.  These  generally  consisted  of 
passages  of  the  Koran  for  Mohammedans,  or  from 
the  Psalms  and  Gospels  for  Copts,  which  were  inter- 
mingled with  numerical  combinations,  diagrams, 
and  symbols.  Persons  of  all  creeds,  being  possessed 
of  evil  spirits,  were  said  to  be  cured  at  certain  Coptic 
convents,  notably  at  the  convent  of  St.  Damianus^ 
near  Mansourah,  and  at  that  of  St.  Michael  near 
Birket-el-Sab. 

An  operation  which  was  "warranted  to  cure  all 
diseases  which  were  not  fatal,"  could  be  performed 
if  the  sick  person  was  fortunate  enough  to  become 

*  Paterson's  Nemesis  of  Nations,  p.  63. 

•  The  instances  of  superstition  in  this  chapter  are  mainly  taken  from 
a  pamphlet  entitled  Medical  Matters  in  Egypt,  written  liy  Or.  F.  M. 
Sandwith  in  August  1884.  Dr.  Sandvvith's  researches  revealed  a  stajj^e 
of  medical  knowledge  amongst  the  poorer  classes  not  materially  in 
advance  of  that  reached  in  I'liaraonic  times.  M.  Maspero  {Causeries 
d'Egypte,  p.  313)  says  that  an  ancient  Egyptian  medical  practitioner 
was  obliged  to  be  "aussi  expert  en  exorcismes  qu'en  formules  de 
phannacie." 

'  St.  Damianus  and  his  brother  St.  Cosmos  were  both  doctors. 
They  underwent  martyrdom  during  the  persecution  of  Diocletian, 
about  A.D.  303.  Pope  Felix  IV.  built  a  Basilica  ia  their  honour  at 
Rome. 


CH.  Lvii  THE  INTERIOR  505 

possessed  of  a  brass  bowl,  made  in  a  peculiar  fashion, 
and  to  the  rim  of  which  forty-one  oblong  strips  of 
brass  were  attached.  On  each  of  these  strips  the 
words  "  In  the  name  of  the  most  merciful  God," 
were  inscribed.  This  bowl  had  to  be  filled  on  a 
Friday  night  with  Nile  water,  into  which  some 
drugs  and  nuts  were  thrown.  The  sick  person 
was  instructed  to  stand  in  a  basin  of  water  before 
sunrise  on  the  following  morning,  to  drink  out  of 
the  bowl,  and  to  eat  the  nuts,  throwing  the  shells 
behind  his  back.  This  operation  had  to  be  repeated 
on  three  consecutive  Fridays. 

It  was,  and  perhaps  still  is  a  common  practice 
amongst  both  Copts  and  Mohammedans  to  wear 
about  their  persons  a  bone  taken  from  the  body 
of  a  polytheist  or  of  a  Jew.  This  was  supposed 
to  afford  immunity  from  all  sorts  of  fevers.  A 
bone  taken  from  any  ancient  Egyptian  mummy 
was  often  worn. 

The  remedy  for  sterility  was  for  the  woman  who 
wished  to  become  a  mother  to  step  over  the  corpse 
of  an  executed  criminal,  or  into  a  basin  of  water 
which  had  been  used  to  wash  his  corpse,  or  to  tread 
on  a  human  skull,  or  walk  between  the  tombs  of 
a  cemetery,  or  step  over  some  antique  resemblance 
of  a  cat  or  other  relic  of  old  Egypt. 

The  cure  for  a  stye  in  the  eye  was  to  eat  bread 
obtained  from  seven  different  women,  each  called 
Fatma,  the  name  of  the  Prophet's  daughter. 

Headache  was  cured  by  driving  a  nail  into  one 
of  the  gates  of  Cairo,  called  the  Bab-el-Zueilah. 
For  toothache,  it  was  considered  necessary  to  extract 
the  tooth,  and  deposit  it  in  a  crevice  of  the  same 
gate.  The  latter  part  of  this  operation  was  supposed 
to  prevent  other  teeth  from  aching. 

One  of  the  most  frequent  antidotes  for  poison 
was  to  write  certain  texts  of  the  Koran  on  slips 
of  paper,  which   were  then  thrown  into  a  dish  of 


506  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

water.  The  water  was  stirred  and  the  solution 
drunk. 

Innumerable  remedies  existed,  and  probably  still 
exist,  to  counteract  the  dreaded  effects  of  the  Evil 
Eye,  belief  in  which  has  existed  from  time  im- 
memorial in  Egypt. ^  The  most  efficacious  is  to 
steal  a  piece  of  the  dress  of  the  supposed  envier,  burn 
it,  and  fumigate  the  envied  person  with  it.  Another 
common  practice  is  to  heat  some  alum,  and  to 
prick  one  of  the  water  bubbles,  saying  at  the  same 
time  :  "  I  prick  the  eye  of  the  envier."  Cornelian 
and  charcoal  are  worn  on  the  forehead  by  Moslem 
children  for  the  same  purpose.  Parents  also  some- 
times keep  a  monkey  or  a  gazelle  in  the  house  in 
order  to  avert  the  Evil  Eye. 

I  may  here  mention  a  curious  case  of  super- 
stition which  came  under  my  personal  notice.  Some 
years  ago,  my  eldest  son  was  dangerously  ill  with 
typhoid  fever  at  Cairo.  A  short  time  before  his 
illness,  he  had  been  given  a  black  dog,  which  used 
to  live  in  the  house.  The  pattering  of  the  dog's 
footsteps  on  the  floor  of  the  room  disturbed  the 
patient's  rest.  The  dog  was,  therefore,  sent  out  of 
the  house.  I  afterwards  learnt  that  my  Egyptian 
servants  looked  on  the  dog  as  an  *'  Afrit "  (devil), 
that  they  considered  the  case  hopeless  so  long  as 
the  dog  remained  in  the  house,  but  entertained  no 
doubt  of  ultimate  recovery  directly  the  animal  was 
removed.  In  this  particular  instance,  as  my  son 
recovered,  their  belief  in  the  power  of  "Afrits" 
must  have  been  strengthened. 

In  the  instances  so  far  given,  the  fantastic 
remedies  applied  in   cases  of  sickness  have  their 

*  "Abundant  testimony  exists  in  the  oldest  monuments  in  the 
world  that  among  the  ancient  Ejjyptians  belief  in  and  dread  of  the  Evil 
Eye  were  ever  present ;  their  efforts  to  avert  or  to  bailie  it,  both  as 
regarded  the  living  and  the  dead,  who  they  knew  would  live  again, 
were  perhaps  the  most  constant  and  elaborate  of  any,  of  which  we  can 
now  decipher  the  traces." — Elworthy's  Tlie  Evil  Eye,  p.  6. 


CH.  Lvii  THE  INTERIOR  507 

origin  in  superstition.  Instances  of  prescribed  cures 
based  on  complete  ignorance  of  medical  science 
and  dissociated  from  any  religious  belief,  however 
perverted,  might  readily  be  added.  Thus,  Dr, 
Sandwith  tells  of  a  Coptic  bone-setter  of  celebrity, 
who  was  called  in  to  attend  a  woman  with  a  dis- 
located hip.  He  "gave  instructions  that  the 
woman's  hip  should  be  tightly  bound  to  a  half- 
starved  cow,  and  that  the  cow  should  then  be  fed 
until  the  rapid  swelling  of  the  animal  had  caused 
the  reduction  of  the  dislocation."^ 

The  credit  of  having  first  brought  true  know- 
ledge to  bear  on  all  this  mass  of  ignorance  and 
credulity  belongs  to  an  eminent  Frenchman.  Dr. 
Clot  Bey,  who  was  the  father  of  Egyptian  medical 
reform,  was  summoned  to  Egypt  by  Mehemet  Ali. 
Under  his  auspices,  a  School  of  Medicine  and 
Pharmacy,  as  well  as  a  Maternity  Hospital  for  the 
instruction  of  mid  wives,  were  created ;  a  sanitary 
service  for  the  interior  of  the  country  was  also 
organised.  A  European  doctor  and  apothecary, 
who  were  aided  by  Egyptian  medical  men  and 
women,  were  appointed  to  every  province  in  Lower 
Egypt.  Under  the  intelligent  stimulus  thus  afforded, 
considerable  progress  was  made  in  the  direction  of 
medical  and  sanitary  reform.  All  the  superior 
officers  possessed  a  European  diploma. 

At  a  later  period,   Egyptians,   possessing  only 

*  The  state  of  things  described  above  was  but  little,  if  at  all,  worse  than 
that  which  existed  in  England  and  Scotland  so  late  as  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury. During  the  first  half  of  that  century  "  medicines  in  common  use 
contained  brains  of  hares  and  foxes,  snails  burnt  in  the  shell,  powder  of 
human  skull  and  Egyptian  mummy,  burnt  hoofs  of  horses,  calcined 
cockle-shells,  pigeon's  blood,  ashes  of  little  frogs — like  to  the  diabolical 
contents  of  the  witches'  cauldron  in  Macbeth  "  (Graham's  Social  Life  in 
Scotland  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  vol.  i.  p.  51).  The  Poor  Man's 
Physician,  written  by  the  "famous  John  Moncrieff  of  Tippermalloch," 
prescribes  the  following  as  a  cure  for  whitlow  :  "Stop  the  finger  with 
a  cat's  ear,  and  it  will  be  whole  in  half  an  hour."  In  1744,  Mrs. 
Delany  sent  to  her  nephew,  as  an  infallible  cure  for  ague,  "a  spider 
put  into  a  goosequill,  well  sealed  and  secured^  and  hui^g  about  the 
child's  neck." — Mrs.  Delany's  Memoirs,  p.  138. 


508  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

certificates  issued  locally,  were  nominated  to  high 
posts.  European  control  was  relaxed.  The  re- 
forms, which  had  begun  to  blossom,  withered  under 
the  misrule  of  Ismail.  The  shadow  of  approach- 
ing bankruptcy  fell  upon  the  land.  Useful 
expenditure  was  everywhere  cut  down  with  an 
unsparing  hand  in  order  to  compensate  for  the 
financial  vagaries  of  a  spendthrift  Khedive.  "  At 
the  end  of  1878,"  Dr.  Sandwith  says,  "all  sanitary, 
quarantine,  and  hospital  buildings  had  fallen  into 
ruin  for  want  of  funds,  and  the  provincial  hospitals 
naturally  suffered  to  a  greater  degree  than  others." 

By  the  time  the  British  occupied  the  country 
in  1882,  three-fourths  of  the  good  effects  of  Clot 
Bey's  reforms  had  been  obliterated.  The  School 
of  Medicine  still  existed,  but  the  instruction 
afforded  to  the  students  was  very  defective.  The 
greater  number  of  the  medical  officers  serving  under 
the  Egyptian  Government  were  ignorant  and  in- 
competent. They  were  also  underpaid,  with  the 
natural  result  that  they  used  the  numerous  oppor- 
tunities afforded  to  them  in  the  exercise  of  their 
official  functions  to  increase  their  incomes  by  illicit 
means.^  The  state  of  the  hospitals  was  deplorable. 
Nothing  could  be  worse  than  the  general  adminis- 
tration of  the  Medical  Department.  Sir  Guyer 
Hunter,  who  was  sent  to  Egypt  in  1883  to  report 
on  the  cholera  epidemic  which  then  prevailed, 
wrote : 

"  The  hospitals,  as  a  rule,  are  in  a  more  or  less 
tumble  -  down,  dirty  condition,   impregnated  with 

*  "A  dishonest  man  may  occasionally  threaten  to  cause  some 
sweeping  reform  to  be  carried  out  in  a  village,  unless  a  sum  of  money 
is  immediately  collected  for  him  by  the  headman,  or  money  may  be 
obtained  from  a  private  individual  by  threatening  to  perform  an 
autopsy  on  the  dead  body  of  his  relative,  on  the  plea  that  there  is 
some  suspicion  of  foul  play.  To  the  uneducated  Musulman,  who 
believes  that  the  dead  can  feel  and  should  be  treated  with  a  respect 
similar  to  the  living,  this  idea  is  naturally  repugnant." — Sandwith, 
Medical  Mutters  in  Egypt,  p.  7- 


CH.LVII  THE  INTERIOR  509 

foul  odours,  and  containing  beds  filthy  in  the  ex- 
treme ;  they  are,  in  fact,  noisome  places,  utterly 
unfit  for  the  reception  of  human  beings.  .  .  .  The 
medical  administration  is  simply  deplorable.  I 
took  the  opportunity  of  examining  the  hospital 
registers.  Here,  as  in  everything  else  wliich  met 
my  observation  under  this  administration,  matters 
were  as  bad  as  bad  could  be." 

As  to  the  Lunatic  Asylum  in  Cairo,  an  English 
doctor,  who  visiter!  this  institution  in  1877,  wrote: 

"  The  whole  place  is  so  utterly  beyond  the  ken 
of  civilisation  that  it  remains  as  hideous  a  blot  on 
the  earth's  surface  as  is  to  be  found  even  in  the 
Dark  Continent." 

The  veterinary  art  is  of  special  importance  in 
Egypt  owing  to  the  ravages  which  have  at  times 
been  made  by  the  cattle  disease.  The  veterinary 
surgeons,  however.  Dr.  Sandwith,  speaking  of  the 
early  days  of  the  occupation,  said,  "  may  be  fairly 
passed  over  with  the  remark  that  they  are  more 
ignorant,  and  not  more  honest,  than  their  medical 
brethren." 

It  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work,  and 
moreover,  would  be  of  little  interest  to  the  general 
reader,  were  an  attempt  made  to  give  the  details 
connected  with  the  work  of  reform  accomplished 
as  regards  the  subject  now  under  discussion.  The 
results  may,  however,  be  briefly  summarised. 

Modern  medicine  and  surgery  are  essentially 
European  sciences.  The  superiority  of  Western  over 
Eastern  therapeutic  methods;  the  cosmopolitan  char- 
acter of  the  work  performed  by  the  physician  and 
the  surgeon  ;  the  dissociation  which  exists,  or  which 
at  all  events  should  exist  between  the  art  of  healing 
the  sick  and  political,  racial,  or  religious  rivalry  ; 
and  the  manifest  benefits  which  the  Egyptian 
people,  whether  as  doctors  or  patients,  are  capable 
of  receiving  from  European  guidance  and  tuition — 


510  MODERN  EGYPT  ii.yi 

are  all  so  clear  that  it  might  well  have  been  thought 
that,  in  this  instance  at  all  events,  the  beneficent 
co-operation  of  the  Eng-lishman  would  not  only 
have  been  accepted  without  demur,  but  would  even 
have  been  invited  and  welcomed.  Such,  however, 
was  unfortunately  not  the  case.  The  best,  and, 
indeed,  the  only  method  of  providing  for  the 
medical  wants  of  Egypt  without  flooding  the 
country  with  European  doctors,  was  to  take  in 
hand  the  work  of  medical  education.  It  was  from 
the  first  evident  that  a  few  qualified  Englishmen 
at  the  School  of  JNIedicine  would,  through  the 
influence  of  teaching,  be  able  in  a  few  years  to 
spread  the  light  of  \A^estern  science  throughout  the 
country.  A  cruel  fate,  however,  ordained  that,  by 
a  fortuitous  and  most  unfortunate  combination 
of  circumstances,  which  are  not  worth  relating  in 
detail,  the  School  of  JNIedicine  was  for  some  while 
a  hotbed  of  ultra-JNIohammedan  and  anti-European 
feeling.  This  obstacle,  though  sufficient  to  retard, 
was  powerless  to  arrest  the  progress  of  medical 
instruction.  With  characteristic  Anglo-Saxon 
energy,  the  Englishman  set  to  work  to  make 
the  Egyptian  "  un  medecin  malgre  lui."  His  per- 
severance was  rewarded.  The  School  of  Medicine 
at  Cairo  was  eventually,  in  spite  of  much  opposi- 
tion, put  on  a  sound  footing.  A  capable  staff  of 
Egyptian  doctors,  some  of  whom  have  European 
diplomas,  is  being  gradually  created. 

The  hospitals,  the  number  of  which  has  been 
largely  increased,  are  now  clean,  properly  equipped 
with  beds,  bedding,  and  clothing,  and  supplied  with 
medicines,  ap])liances,  and  instruments.  The  pre- 
judice, which  formerly  existed,  against  being  treated 
in  a  hospital,  is  gradually  disappearing.  About 
31,000  in-patients  and  118,000  out-patients  were 
treated  in  the  Government  Hospitals  during  1906. 
The  number  both  of  in-  and  out-patients  is  steadily 


CH.  Lvn  THE  INTERIOR  511 

increasing  every  year.  A  staff  of  trained  English 
nurses  has  been  attached  to  the  principal  hospital 
in  Cairo,  to  the  great  benefit  of  the  Egyptian 
nurses  and  pupils,  whom  they  train  and  educate 
by  precept  and  example.  Dispensaries,  where  the 
poor  can  obtain  gratuitous  treatment,  have  been 
opened  in  several  towns. 

Vaccination  has  been  carried  out  on  a  large 
scale  amongst  the  Egyptian  population,  though 
the  Capitulations  hinder  its  extension  amongst 
Europeans.^ 

A  vigorous  campaign,  initiated  in  the  first 
instance  by  the  munificence  of  Sir  Ernest  Cassel, 
has  been  commenced  against  ophthalmia,  which 
vjas  formerly  the  curse  of  Egypt.^ 

A  Foundling  Hospital  has  been  erected  by  private 
subscription  in  memory  of  a  European  lady  who 
had  endeared  herself  to  the  whole  population. 

The  Lunatic  Asylum  at  Cairo,  which  has  been 
placed  in  charge  of  an  English  specialist,  is  now 
in  perfect  order.  Another  large  Asylum  is  in 
course  of  construction. 

Considerable  progress  has  also  been  made  in  the 
Veterinary  Department  since  1886,  when  it  was 
put  under  the  control  of  an  English  veterinary 
surgeon.     The  butchers'  shops,  dairies,  slaughter- 

*  "  Half  the  cases  of  small-pox  notified  occurred  among'  Europeans, 
a  proportion  which  is  extremely  heavy  when  we  consider  the  pre- 
ponderance of  the  natives  in  Cairo,  and  was,  no  doubt,  due  to  non- 
vaccination,  many  of  the  lower-class  Europeans  neglecting  to  have  their 
children  vaccinated.  Though  vaccination  is  compulsory  on  all  persons 
residing  in  Egypt,  the  law  is  evaded  by  some  of  the  Europeans  from 
the  fact  that  the  births  among  this  class  of  the  population  are  not 
notified  at  the  Public  Health  Ofliice,  but  at  the  respective  Consulates, 
and  the  Consuls  in  many  cases  do  not  send  in  the  notifications  to  this 
Department,  and  the  Government  are  unable  to  enforce  the  law  on  the 
parents." — Report  of  the  Public  Health  Department  for  1905. 

2  Not  very  long  ago  Mrs.  Ross,  the  daugliter  of  Lady  Duff  Gordon, 
visited  Egypt.  Forty  years  previously,  she  had  had  peculiar  facilities 
for  observing  the  condition  of  the  people.  1  asked  her  what  was  the 
change  which  struck  her  most.  I  was  pleased,  and  also  surprised  at  her 
reply.     She  said,  "The  marked  decrease  in  ophthalmia." 


512  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

houses,  cattle-sheds,  etc.,  have  been  regularly- 
inspected  and  controlled,  their  owners  being  in- 
duced or  compelled  to  maintain  them  in  a  satis- 
factory sanitary  condition.  Several  outbreaks  of 
pleuro-pneumonia  and  other  epizootic  diseases  have 
been  stamped  out.  A  Veterinary  College,  as  also 
an  Anti-Rabic  Institute,  have  been  established. 

On  the  whole,  although  of  course  much  remains 
to  be  done,  it  may  be  said  that,  in  so  far  as  medical 
instruction  and  organisation,  veterinary  administra- 
tion, and  the  proper  maintenance  of  hospitals,  dis- 
pensaries, and  lunatic  asylums  are  concerned,  an 
amount  of  progress  has  been  realised  which  is  as 
great  as  could  reasonably  be  expected.  The  very 
capable  Englishmen  who  have  devoted  their 
energies  to  the  work  of  this  Department,  and 
who,  like  all  other  British  officials  in  Egypt,  have 
had  great  obstacles  to  encounter,  have  at  all  events 
succeeded  in  introducing  the  first  commonplace 
elements  of  Western  order  and  civilisation  into  the 
country. 

Sanitary  reform  has,  of  course,  progressed  less 
rapidly  than  improvements  in  the  medical  service. 
In  the  former  case,  the  conservative  instincts  of 
the  people,  and  their  indifference  to  sanitation, 
constitute  an  almost  insuperable  barrier  to  rapid 
progress.  At  the  same  time,  much  has  already 
been  done.  The  water-supply  of  the  principal 
towns  has  been  taken  in  hand.  The  Mosque 
latrines  are  no  longer  drained  into  the  Nile  or 
the  canals,  and  in  most  of  the  towns  the  JNIosques 
themselves  have  been  put  in  a  satisfactory  sanitary 
condition.  Authority  has  been  obtained  to  remove 
cemeteries  pronounced  to  be  a  danger  to  public 
health.  A  commencement  has  been  made  in 
filling  up  the  highly  insanitary  pools  which  are 
to  be  found  hi  close  proximity  to  most  Egyptian 
villages.     As  funds  become  available,  it  cannot  be 


CH.  Lvii  THE  INTERIOR  513 

doubted  that  sanitary  reform  will,  year  by  year, 
occupy  a  more  prominent  place  in  the  Government 
programme. 

Before  leaving  this  branch  of  my  subject,  some 
brief  allusion  must  be  made  to  the  eminent  services 
rendered  by  the  Sanitary  Department  in  arresting 
the  progress  of  the  various  epidemics  which  have 
visited  Egypt  of  late  years.  In  the  cholera  epi- 
demic of  1883,  58,369  deaths  from  this  disease  were 
registered,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  real  number 
was  far  in  excess  of  this  figure.  In  1896,  another 
severe  epidemic  of  cholera  visited  the  country. 
The  number  of  deaths  was  limited  to  18,105.  It 
cannot  be  doubted  that  the  reduced  mortality  was, 
in  a  great  measure,  due  to  the  improved  efficiency  of 
the  Sanitary  Department,  under  the  auspices  of 
Sir  John  Rogers  and  Sir  Horace  Pinching.  This 
Department  also  dealt  successfully  with  the  cholera 
epidemic  of  1902,  and,  moreover,  gained  well- 
deserved  laurels  in  its  treatment  of  the  epidemic 
of  plague  in  1898  and  subsequent  years. 

Some  interesting  statistics  have  been  drawn  up, 
showing  the  relative  number  of  deaths  in  Alex- 
andria from  the  plague  epidemic  which  lasted  from 
1834  to  1843,  as  compared  with  those  for  the  years 
1899  to  1905.  The  number  of  deaths  in  the  former 
period  of  ten  years  was  12,380.  The  number  in 
the  latter  period  of  seven  years  was  647.  The 
statistics  of  the  earlier  period  are  probably  very 
imperfect.  At  the  same  time,  they  are  sufficient 
to  show  the  effisct  produced  by  the  more  stringent 
measures  recently  taken  to  check  the  disease,  as 
compared  with  the  results  obtained  by  the  methods 
adopted  during  the  earlier  of  the  two  epidemics. 


VOL.  II  2  L 


CHAPTER   LVIII 

JUSTICE 

Sir  Edward  Malet's  opinion — The  Mixed  and  Consular  Courts — The 
Kadis'  Courts — The  Native  Tribunals — Justice  prior  to  1883 — The 
French  system  taken  as  a  model  —  Tiie  judicial  machinery — 
Reforms  instituted  by  Sir  John  Scott  and  Sir  Malcolm  Mcllwraith 
— Opposition  to  these  reforms — The  personnel  of  the  Courts — 
Result  of  the  reforms. 

When  Sir  Edward  Malet  left  Egypt  in  1883,  he 
declared  that  the  first  requirement  of  the  Egyp- 
tian population  was  justice.  In  the  present  chapter, 
an  endeavour  will  be  made  to  state  very  briefly 
how  far  this  requirement  has  been  met. 

It  has  been  already  explained  ^  that  the  Mixed 
Tribunals  deal  with  all  civil  cases,  in  which  Euro- 
peans are  concerned,  and  the  Consular  Courts  with 
all  criminal  cases  in  which  Europeans  are  the 
accused  parties.  The  latter  Courts  apply  their 
national  laws.  Of  these  institutions,  no  more  need 
be  said.  Up  to  the  present  time  (1907)  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Consular  Courts  remains  unchanged. 
The  law  administered  by  the  Mixed  Tribunals  has 
merely  undergone  some  minor  modifications.  In 
each  of  these  cases,  the  reasons  for  this  long 
immunity  from  change  have,  broadly  speaking, 
been  twofold.  The  first  is  that  neither  the  Mixed 
nor  the  Consular  Courts  stood  nearly  so  much  in 
need  of  reform  as  the  Egyptian  portions  of  the 

>  See  Chapter  XLII. 
514 


CH.  Lviii  JUSTICE  515 

judicial  system.  The  second  is  that,  hedged  behind 
the  ahnost  impenetrable  barrier  of  internationalism, 
both  of  these  jurisdictions  have  so  far  been  able  to 
defy  the  efforts  of  the  reformer. 

Neither  need  much  be  said  about  the  Kadis' 
Courts.  These  Courts  deal  with  all  questions 
affecting  the  personal  status  of  Moslems.  If  they 
are  ever  to  be  improved,  the  movement  in  favour 
of  reform  must  come  from  within.  It  must  be 
initiated  by  the  Egyptians  themselves.  Any  serious 
attempt  to  impose  reforms  by  pressure  from  without 
would  be  extremely  impolitic,  and,  moreover,  would 
probably  result  in  failure.  The  British  reformer, 
therefore,  being  partly  convinced  of  the  uselessness 
of  attack  and  partly  impelled  by  political  neces- 
sity, turned  aside  from  ^lohammedan  law-reform. 
Although  he  made  some  faltering  steps  in  the 
direction  of  improving  the  Kadis'  Courts,  his 
energies  were  mainly  applied  in  other  directions, 
where  better  results  were  to  be  obtained. 

There  remain  the  Native  Tribunals  instituted 
in  1883.  These  deal  with  all  civil  cases  in  which 
both  parties  are  Ottoman  subjects,  and  with  all 
criminal  cases  in  which  an  Ottoman  subject  is  the 
accused  party.  It  can  scarcely  be  said  that  these 
Courts  took  the  place  of  any  existing  institutions. 
They  were  new  creations.  The  judges  were  the 
instruments  who  gave  expression  to  a  phase  of 
thought  which  had  been  hitherto  unfamiliar  to 
the  Egyptian  mind.  Prior  to  1883,  a  system  of 
punishment  existed,  or  it  would  be  perhaps  more 
correct  to  say  that  a  method  was  in  force  by  which 
occasionally  somebody  was  punished  for  an  offence 
which  as  often  as  not  he  had  never  committed, 
whilst  not  unfrequently  others  were  punished 
without  any  offence  at  law  having  been  committed 
at  all.  Moreover,  the  existence  of  some  rude  code 
of  Civil  Law  was  so  far  recognised  as  to  enable  the 


516  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

worst  illegalities  to  be  hallowed  by  legal  sanction. 
For  instance,  when  Ismail  Pasha  confiscated  the 
vineyard  of  some  Naboth  among  his  subjects,  the 
transfer  was  always  effected  in  accordance  with 
strictly  legal  forms.  But  any  system  of  justice,  pro- 
perly so  called,  was  unknown  in  the  country.  The 
divorce  between  law,  such  as  it  was,  and  justice 
was  absolute.  It  has  been  already  explained  ^  how, 
in  1883,  the  Department  of  Justice  was,  to  some 
extent,  placed  under  British  management ;  how, 
during  the  storm  and  stress  of  the  years  1884-85, 
when  the  Anglo-Egyptian  bark  was  being  tossed 
hither  and  thither  by  the  waves  of  Soudanese 
troubles,  bankruptcy,  and  international  rivalry,  this 
Department,  as  well  as  that  of  the  Interior,  were 
confided  to  Egyptian  hands ;  how  the  experiment, 
which  was  then  tried,  resulted  in  complete  failure ; 
and  how  eventually,  with  the  nomination  of  Sir 
John  Scott  to  the  post  of  Judicial  Adviser,  an  era 
of  real  reform  commenced. 

It  is  true  that,  prior  to  1883,  no  system  of 
justice  existed  in  Egypt.  It  is  not,  however,  on 
that  account  to  be  supposed  that  the  English  were 
free  to  introduce  into  the  country  any  system  which 
they  preferred.  Such  was  far  from  being  the  case. 
French  law  and  procedure  had  already  taken  root 
in  Egypt.  The  codes  administered  by  the  Mixed 
Tribunals  were  French.  All  the  young  Egyptians 
who  had  received  any  legal  training  had  been 
educated  in  France.  It  was,  therefore,  inevit- 
able that  the  new  Tribunals  should  be  based  on 
a  French  rather  than  on  an  English  model. 
The  necessity  was  regrettable,  for  a  simple  code 
of  law  and  procedure,  somewhat  similar  to 
that  which  was  subsequently  introduced  into 
the  Soudan,  would — more  especially  in  criminal 
matters — have  probably  been  more  suited  to  the 

1   Vide  ante,  pp.  288-90. 


CH.  LVIII 


JUSTICE  517 


requirements  of  the  country  than  that  which  was 
actually  adopted.^ 

Proposals  have  frequently  been  made  to  sweep 
away  the  system  of  criminal  justice  inaugurated 
shortly  after  the  British  occupation  took  place,  and 
to  substitute  something  else  in  its  place.  Apart 
from  other  and  very  valid  objections  to  the  adoption 
of  this  course,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  those  who 
have  urged  this  radical  treatment  of  the  question 
have  not,  perhaps,  sufficiently  realised  that,  although 
the  system  is,  indeed,  by  no  means  perfect,  the 
main  difficulties  which  have  to  be  encountered  in 
introducing  any  improvements  are  inherent  in  the 
situation,  and  cannot  be  removed  by  any  mere  change 
of  system.  They  arise  from  the  character  of  the 
people,  from  the  impossibility  of  creating  rapidly  a 
competent  judiciary  calculated  to  inspire  confidence 
and  respect,  and,  generally,  from  the  circumstances 
which  are  the  necessary  accompaniment  of  a  tran- 
sition ary  period  from  arbitrary  government  to  a 
reign  of  law.  It  was,  therefore,  decided  to  make 
no  radical  changes,  but  to  remedy  the  defects  which 
existed  by  gradually  introducing  such  minor  reforms 
as  experience  showed  were  calculated  to  adapt  the 
system  more  fully  to  the  requirements  of  the 
country. 

It  is  unnecessary  that  I  should  describe  in  detail 
the  nature  of  the  changes  which,  from  time  to 
time,  have  been  carried  out  under  the  auspices  of 

*  The  danger  of  making  too  faithful  a  copy  of  European  judicial 
institutions  is  fully  recognised  by  the  best  French  authorities  on  colonial 
affairs.  In  an  interesting  article,  written  by  M.  de  Lavigne  Sainte- 
Suzanne,  and  entitled  "  La  Justice  Indigene  aux  Colonies,"  which 
appeared  in  the  Revue  Diplomatique,  the  following  passage  occurs  : — 

'*  C'est  surtout  dans  I'organisation  de  la  justice  indigene  que  r&- 
trouve  son  application  cette  formule  qui  devrait  servir  de  base  a  tout 
le  programme  du  droit  colonial  :  pas  d'assimilation.  S'il  est  absurde 
de  transporter  chez  des  peuples  encore  primitifs  tous  les  rouages 
administratifs  en  usage  dans  la  vieille  Europe,  il  devient  dangereux  et 
inique  d'imposer  aux  indigenes  notre  legislation  et  notre  organisation 
judiciaire." 


518  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.vi 

successive  Egyptian  Ministers  of  Justice  aided  by 
Sir  John  Scott,  and  his  successor,  Sir  Malcolm 
Mcllwraith.  The  most  important  of  these  have 
been  the  establishment  of  a  Committee  of  Surveil- 
lance who,  without  possessing  any  power  to  upset 
or  revise  judgments  already  delivered,  watch  over 
the  proceedings  of  the  Courts  of  First  Instance ; 
the  partial  decentralisation,  first  of  Civil,  and 
subsequently  of  Criminal  justice;  the  revision  of 
the  Criminal  Codes  with  the  object  of  freeing  them 
from  useless  formalism ;  and  the  establishment  of 
Assize  Courts  whose  judgments,  save  on  points  of 
law,  are  final. 

These  reforms  followed  what  may  be  considered 
the  normal  course  of  all  administrative  change  in 
Egypt.  When  any  new  measure  is  proposed,  a 
certain  amount  of  opposition  is  sure  to  be 
encountered.  This  opposition  will  sometimes  be 
based  on  the  conservative  tendencies  of  the  more 
old-fashioned  class  of  Egyptians,  who  look  askance 
at  any  one  who  aspires  to  moUri  res  novas ;  or,  it 
may  be  based  on  the  mental  inelasticity  of  the 
Egyptian  reformer,  who,  albeit  somewhat  prone  to 
radical  change,  finds  it  difficult  to  get  out  of  the 
special  groove  into  which,  by  the  accident  of  educa- 
tion and  association,  his  intellectual  forces  have 
been  directed.  When  the  reform  is  eventually 
accomplished,  it  is  discovered  that  the  fears  of  the 
opposition  were  groundless,  and  that  the  measure, 
so  far  from  having  done  harm,  has  done  much  good. 
This  experience  will  in  no  degree  act  as  a  pre- 
ventive to  a  repetition  of  similar  tactics  on  some 
future  occasion ;  but  it  is  a  point  which  the 
European  reformer  should  bear  in  mind  that,  pro- 
vided always  that  his  proposals  be  reasonable,  they 
will  generally,  after  a  certain  amount  of  murmur- 
ing, be  accepted.  All  Easterns  carry  fatalism  into 
the  practical  aflkirs  of  life  ;  they  readily  bow  before 


CH.  Lviii  JUSTICE  519 

an  accomplished  fact.  In  the  particular  cases 
described  above,  the  somewhat  fictitious  opposition, 
which  was  at  one  time  excited  against  Sir  John 
Scott's  and  Sir  Malcolm  Mcllwraith's  proposals,  died 
an  unusually  speedy  death.  The  benefits  derived 
from  the  reforms  were,  in  fact,  too  manifest  to 
admit  of  doubt.  Experience  soon  pricked  the 
theoretical  bubbles  of  which  the  opponents  of 
practical  reforms  in  Egypt  are  at  times  prodigal.^ 

So  far,  the  main  features  of  the  judicial  system 
which  were  introduced  have  been  described.  The 
chief  difficulty  in  this,  as  in  so  many  other  cases, 
has,  however,  been  not  to  devise  a  system,  but  to 
find  men  capable  of  working  it.  Sir  John  Scott, 
writing  in  the  early  part  of  1894,  said  : 

" '  Tant  valent  les  juges,  tant  valent  les  lois,' 
is  a  principle  which  had  been  overlooked  before 
1890 ;  and  judges  had  been  named  in  Appeal,  as 
well  as  in  First  Instance,  who  were  far  from 
possessing  the  necessary  qualifications." 

In  point  of  fact,  when  the  Tribunals  were  first 
instituted  in  1883,  few  Egyptians  were  to  be  found 
who  were  capable  of  exercising  judicial  functions. 
Moreover,  amongst  those  few,  the  best  men  were 
frequently  not  selected.  The  appointments  were 
jobbed.  Gradually,  the  least  capable  men  have 
been  weeded  out.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 
standard  of  efficiency  in  the  law-courts  is  steadily 
improving.     I  should  add  that  the  personnel  of  the 

*  Perhaps  the  most  striking  instance  of  the  collapse  of  opposition 
was  in  the  case  of  the  Assize  Courts.  Few  measures  have  heen  more 
violently  or  more  universally  condemned.  Yet,  very  shortly  after  the 
change  of  system  had  been  eflPected,  one  of  the  most  competent  of  the 
Egyptian  judicial  officials  was  able  to  write  :  "  Nothing  sliovvs  more 
clearly  the  efficiency  and  excellency  of  the  new  system  tlian  the  absence 
of  all  criticisms  upon  the  results  obtained  by  its  adoption,  especially 
when  it  is  remembered  tliat,  when  the  project  was  under  consideration, 
it  gave  rise  to  much  difference  of  opinion,  and  to  fears  as  to  the  con- 
sequence which  would  be  entailed  from  the  point  of  view  of  justice." 
The  establishment  of  these  Courts  has,  inter  alia,  rendered  justice  much 
more  expeditious  than  formerly. 


520  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

Judicial  Department  is  almost  wholly  Egyptian. 
Out  of  a  total  staff  of  1600,  only  36  are  Europeans. 

Have  the  changes,  whose  main  features  have 
thus  been  briefly  described,  given  to  the  population 
of  Egypt  a  sound  system  of  justice,  on  the  neces- 
sity of  which  Sir  Edward  Malet  insisted  in  1883  ? 

In  a  sense,  this  question  may  unhesitatingly  be 
answered  in  the  affirmative.  The  system,  which 
I  do  not  doubt  Sir  Edward  Malet  wished  to  advo- 
cate, was  one  under  which  law-courts  should  be 
placed  in  a  position  to  protect  the  most  humble 
individual  of  the  community  against  the  caprices 
of  his  ruler  and  of  the  Government  agents,  of 
whose  malpractices  Sir  Edward  Malet  had  been  a 
scandalised  witness.  Law-courts  possessing  both 
the  power  and  the  will  to  attain  this  object  have 
been  created.  Not  only  are  the  judges  indepen- 
dent of  the  Government,  but  they  are  in  the 
highest  degree  sensitive  of  any  words  or  deeds 
calculated  to  call  their  independence  in  question. 
Justice  is  no  longer  bought  and  sold.  It  may  be 
dilatory,  and,  as  in  other  countries,  it  may  occasion- 
ally err.  It  may  perhaps  be  that,  where  racial  or 
religious  feelings  are  evoked,  some — probably  un- 
conscious— bias  may  be  discerned.  But  no  more 
grave  accusation  than  this  can  be  brought  against 
the  Egyptian  law  courts.  So  early  as  March  9, 
1893,  I  was  able  to  write  to  Lord  Rosebery  :  '*It 
can  now  be  said  that  justice  in  Egypt  is  adminis- 
tered on  fixed  princi})les  and,  with  occasional 
exceptions,  the  decisions  are  just."  The  fact  that 
no  more  than  ten  years  after  the  British  occupa- 
tion commenced  a  statement  of  this  sort  could  be 
recorded  reflects  great  credit,  not  only  on  the 
Ministers  and  their  Judicial  Advisers,  who  have 
guided  the  work  of  reform  in  this  Department, 
but  also  on  the  European  and  Egyptian  judges 
and  other  officials  who  have  co-operated  with  them. 


CH.  Lviii  JUSTICE  521 

The  Anglo-Saxon  race  have  broad  shoulders.  They 
may  well  pardon  a  little  pedantry,  as  well  as  the 
Anglophobia  which  the  Egyptian  judges  have  at 
times  displayed,  and  which  is  to  a  great  extent  the 
result  of  ignorance  and  misguidance,  if,  in  dealing 
with  the  litigious  affairs  of  their  own  countrymen, 
their  "  decisions  are  just." 

The  protection  of  the  weak  against  the  strong 
is,  however,  not  the  sole  function  of  justice.  It 
should  also  be  able  to  protect  society  against  evil- 
doers. That  this  protection  has,  of  late  years, 
been  inadequate  in  Egypt,  can  scarcely  be  doubted. 
It  is  easy  to  indicate  the  main  reason  for  this 
state  of  things.  On  the  one  hand,  civilisation 
insists  on  the  cardinal  principle  that  no  man  is  to 
be  punished  for  any  offence  unless  he  is  clearly 
proved  to  have  committed  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  peculiar  conditions  of  Egyptian  society  render 
it  often  a  matter  of  extreme  difficulty  to  obtain 
evidence  of  guilt  sufficient  to  warrant  a  conviction. 
In  the  last  report  which  I  wrote  from  Egypt 
before  tendering  tlie  resignation  of  my  appoint- 
ment, I  made  the  following  remarks,  to  which  I 
have  nothing  to  add  : — 

"  I  have  no  hesitation  in  stating  that  the  increase 
of  crime,  to  which  I  have  frequently  alluded  in 
former  Reports,  is  the  most  unsatisfactory  feature 
in  the  whole  Egyptian  situation.  The  Govern- 
ment are  frequently  being  pressed  to  examine  into 
the  causes  which  have  led  to  the  increase,  and  to 
look  to  the  removal  of  those  causes,  rather  tlian 
to  the  punishment  of  the  offenders,  as  the  true 
remedy  for  the  existing  state  of  affairs.  As  a 
matter  of  general  principle,  I  entirely  agree  tliat 
when,  in  any  country,  it  is  found  that  the  number 
of  crimes  is  increasing',  it  is  most  necessarv  to 
inquire  into  the  cause,  but  the  possibility  of  apply- 
ing  any  remedy  other   than   that   of  punishment 


522  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

must  obviously  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the 
cause  when  once  it  has  been  ascertained.  It  gener- 
ally happens  that  increasing  poverty  is  the  parent 
of  increasing  crime.  No  one  with  the  least  know- 
ledge of  the  country  will  think  that  the  recent  in- 
crease of  crime  in  Egypt  is  due  to  poverty.  There 
must  be  some  other  cause,  and,  in  my  opinion, 
it  is  not  far  to  seek.  It  is,  I  think,  to  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  the  law  does  not  inspire  sufficient 
terror  to  evildoers.  Only  43*5  per  cent  of  the 
crimes  committed  last  year  (1906)  were  punished. 
In  the  remaining  56'5  per  cent,  it  was  found  im- 
possible to  discover  the  criminals,  or,  if  they  were 
discovered,  to  prove  their  guilt.  I  was  talking  a 
short  time  ago  to  a  distinguished  Frenchman  who 
was  well  acquainted  with  the  affiiirs  of  Algeria. 
He  explained  to  me  that  certain  districts  lying  in 
the  Algerian  Hinterland,  where  military  law  used 
to  be  applied,  had  recently  been  brought  under  the 
ordinary  criminal  codes.  The  comment  of  one  of 
the  principal  Algerian  Sheikhs  on  this  change  was 
curious.  'Then,'  he  said,  *  there  will  be  no  justice. 
Witnesses  will  be  required.'  I  commend  this 
remark  to  those  who  are  in  a  hurry  to  apply 
Western  methods  in  their  entirety  to  a  backward 
Eastern  population.  The  Sheikh  was  not  in  the 
least  struck  with  the  fact  that,  in  the  absence 
of  witnesses,  an  innocent  man  might  possibly  be 
condemned.  What  struck  him  was  that,  as  no 
one  could  be  condemned  without  witnesses,  guilty 
people  would  generally  escape  punishment.  This 
is  precisely  what  is  happening  in  Egypt.  I  have 
said  over  and  over  again,  and  I  now  repeat,  that 
I  strongly  deprecate  any  resort  to  heroic  remedies 
in  dealing  witli  this  question.  There  must  be  no 
radical  change  of  system.  But  there  should  be 
no  delusion  as  to  the  time  which  will  be  required, 
or  the  difficulties  which  have  still  to  be  encoun- 


CH.  Lviu  JUSTICE  523 

tered,  before  a  well-established  reign  of  law  can 
take  the  place  of  the  arbitrary  system  under  which, 
until  recently,  the  Egyptians  were  governed.  In 
the  meanwhile,  let  us  by  all  means  do  everything 
that  is  possible,  not  merely  to  improve  the  Police 
and  the  judicial  systems,  but  also,  by  indirect 
means,  such  as  education  and  the  establishment 
of  adult  reformatories,  to  diminish  crime  and  check 
criminal  tendencies.  But,  simultaneously  with  all 
this,  I  trust  that  criminals  will  receive  adequate 
punishment  when  their  guilt  has  been  brought 
home  to  them.  I  deprecate  the  false  sentiment 
which  expends  all  its  sympathy  on  the  criminal 
and  reserves  none  for  his  victims.  I  at  times 
observe  symptoms  which  lead  me  to  believe  that 
this  sentiment  prevails  to  a  somewhat  excessive 
degree  in  Egypt"  ^ 

»  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1907,  p.  86. 


CHAPTER   LIX 

EDUCATION 

Eiducational   policy — Obstacles    to    progress — Want    of   money — ^Th© 

Pashas — Intellectual  awakening  of  Egypt — The  Mosque  schools — 
Primary  and  Secondary  education — Progress  made  in  forming  the 
characters  of  the  Egyptians — Female  education. 

The  subjects  which  have  so  far  been  treated  fall 
within  the  domain  of  material  or  administrative 
progress.  What,  however,  has  been  done  in  the 
direction  of  moral  and  intellectual  progress  ?  Have 
the  English  made  any  endeavour  to  educate  the 
Egyptians  ?  "  Egypt,"  a  high  authority  on  Eastern 
affairs  has  said,  "has  always  been  the  servant  of 
nations."^  Have  the  English,  as  some  critics  of 
the  baser  sort  aver,  viewed  this  condition  of  politi- 
cal degradation  with  ill-disouised  favour  ? ^  Have 
they  discouraged  the  acquisition  of  knowledge, 
with  a  view  to  keeping  the  Egyptians  in  a  position 
of  servitude  to  the  British  nation  ?  Or  has  a  more 
noble  policy  been  adopted  ?  Have  the  English,  cast- 
ing aside  all  feelings  based  on  a  mistaken  and  ignoble 
egotism,  endeavoured  to  educate  the  Egyptians 
and  to  lead  them,  so  far  as  was  possible,  along  the 
path  which  may  possibly  end  in  self-government  ? 

1  Muir,  The  Caliphate,  p.  1G8. 

2  It  was  not  only  with  surprise,  but  also  with  a  feeling  of  keen  dis- 
appointment, that  I  read  in  a  work  written  by  M.  de  Guerville  a  letter 
from  Sheikh  Mohammed  Abdou,  in  which  that  eminent  man  appeared  to 
give  the  weight  of  his  name  to  iiisinuatiou.s  of  tliis  sort.  He  must  have 
known  perfectly  well  that  they  were  wholly  devoid  of  foundation.  I 
had  hoped  for  better  things  of  him. 

.    524 


cii.  Lix  EDUCATION  525 

In  the  present  chapter  an  attempt  will  be  made 
to  answer  these  questions.  They  are  of  vital  im- 
portance, not  only  to  the  Egyptians  themselves, 
but  also  to  all  Europe,  and  more  especially  to 
England.  The  reason  why  they  are  so  important 
is  that  if  ever  the  Egyptians  learn  to  govern 
themselves  —  if,  in  other  words,  the  full  execu- 
tion of  the  policy  of  "  Egypt  for  the  Egyptians " 
becomes  feasible — the  Egyptian  question  will,  it 
may  be  hoped  and  presumed,  finally  cease  to  be  a 
cause  of  trouble  to  Europe,  and  the  British  nation 
will  be  relieved  of  an  onerous  responsibility. 

Many  years  ago.  Lord  Macaulay  asked  a  perti- 
nent question  in  connection  with  the  system  under 
which  India  should  be  governed.  "Are  we,"  he 
said,  *'to  keep  the  people  of  India  ignorant  in  order 
that  we  may  keep  them  submissive  ? "  His  reply 
was  an  indignant  negative.  "  Governments,  like 
men,"  he  said,  "may  buy  existence  too  dear.  Propter 
vitam  Vivendi  perdere  caicsas  is  a  despicable  policy 
both  in  individuals  and  in  States."^ 

The  English  in  Egypt  have  acted  on  the  prin- 
ciple advocated  by  Macaulay.  They  may  repel, 
with  equal  truth  and  scorn,  the  insinuation  that, 
for  political  reasons,  they  have  fostered  Egyptian 
ignorance  and  subserviency.  If  a  race  of  Egyptians 
capable  of  governing  the  country  without  foreign 
aid  has  not  as  yet  been  formed,  the  fault  does  not 
lie  with  the  English.  It  must  be  sought  elsewhere, 
neither  need  any  impartial  person  go  far  afield  to 
find  where  it  lies.  It  lies  mainly  in  the  fact  that 
two  decades  are  but  a  short  time  in  the  life  of  a 
nation.  Material  progress  may,  under  certain  con- 
ditions, be  rapid.  Moral  and  intellectual  progress 
must  of  necessity  always  be  a  plant  of  slow  growth. 
It  takes  more  time  to  form  the  mind  of  a  states- 
man, or  even  to  train  a  competent  administrator, 

*  Speech  in  the  Flouse  of  Commons^  July  10,  1833. 


526  MODERN  EGYPT  pr.  vi 

than  it  does  to  dig  a  canal  or  to  construct  a  rail- 
way. Wlien  the  unpromising  nature  of  the  raw 
material  on  which  the  English  had  to  work  is  con- 
sidered, when  it  is  remembered  that  for  centuries 
prior  to  the  British  occupation  the  Egyptians 
were  governed  under  a  system  eminently  calcu- 
lated to  paralyse  their  intellectual  and  warp  their 
moral  faculties,  and  when  it  is  further  borne  in 
mind  that  the  circumstances  under  which  reform 
was  undertaken  were  of  an  exceptionally  difficult 
and  complicated  nature,  it  may  well  be  a  matter 
for  surprise,  not  tliat  so  little,  but  that  so  much 
progress  in  the  direction  of  a  real  Egyptian 
autonomy  has  been  made  in  so  short  a  time. 

Consider  what  is  generally  meant  by  Europeans 
when  they  talk  of  Egyptian  self-government.  If 
they  meant  that  the  Egyptians  should  be  allowed 
to  o;overn  themselves  accordin^T  to  their  own  rude 
lights,  the  task  of  educating  them  in  the  art  of 
self-government  would  not  merely  have  been  easy  ; 
there  would  have  been  no  necessity  that  it  should 
have  been  undertaken.  The  indigenous  art  of  self- 
government  had  already  been  acquired  in  1882, 
and  we  know  with  what  results ;  no  European 
instruction  would  have  been  able  to  improve  on  its 
recognised  canons.  What  Europeans  mean  when 
they  talk  of  Egyptian  self-government  is  that  the 
Egyptians,  far  from  being  allowed  to  follow^  the 
bent  of  tlieir  own  unreformed  propensities,  should 
only  be  permitted  to  govern  themselves  after  the 
fashion  in  which  Europeans  think  they  ought  to  be 
governed. 

I  am  not  one  of  those  who  think  that  "any 
State  can  be  saved,  and  any  political  problem 
solved,  by  enlightened  administration."^     At  the 

*  This  was  the  view  held  by  Pereo:rino  Rossi,  who  was  subsequently 
assassinated,  during  the  early  strue:gles  for  Italian  unity. — Trevelyan'i 
Garibaldi's  D^ence  of  the  Roman  Republic,  p.  74. 


CH.  Lix  EDUCATION  527 

same  time,  looking  to  the  magnitude  of  all  the 
interests  involved  in  Egypt,  there  is  a  limit  to  the 
defjree  of  maladministration  which  can  be  tolerated 
in  order  to  ensure  all  the  advantao-es  of  self-(yovern- 
ment.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  that  limit  would 
be  passed,  if  complete  autonomy  were  suddenly 
bestowed  on  the  Egyptians. 

To  suppose  that  the  characters  and  intellects  of 
even  a  small  number  of  Egyptians  can  in  a  few 
years  be  trained  to  such  an  extent  as  to  admit  of 
their  undertaking  the  sole  direction  of  one  of  the 
most  complicated  political  and  administrative 
machines  which  the  world  has  ever  known,  and 
of  guiding  such  a  machine  along  the  path  of  even 
fairly  good  government,  is  a  sheer  absurdity.  I 
must  apologise  to  those  of  my  readers  who  have 
any  real  acquaintance  with  Egyptian  affairs  for 
indulging  in  platitudes  of  this  description.  If  I 
do  so,  it  is  because  it  would  appear  that  the  race 
of  those  who  dream  dreams  of  real  autonomy  in 
the  very  near  future  is  not  yet  extinct. 

The  main  reason  why  it  is  hopeless  to  expect 
that  any  immediate  and  important  political  fruit 
can  be  gathered  from  the  tree  of  educational 
progress  in  Egypt  has  been  already  indicated.  It 
is  now  necessary  to  explain  the  further  obstacles 
which  have  stood  in  the  way  of  rapid  progress  in 
the  work  of  education.     They  were  mainly  twofold. 

The  first  and  principal  obstacle  has  been  want  of 
money.  In  1877  and  1878 — that  is  to  say,  during 
the  worst  periods  of  the  financial  chaos  created  by 
Ismail  Pasha  —  the  Government  expenditure  on 
education  only  amounted  to  the  paltry  sum  of 
£E.29,000  a  year.  Under  the  Dual  Control,  the 
grant  was  raised  to  about  £E. 70,000  a  year. 
During  the  eazly  days  of  the  British  occupation, 
that  is  to  say,  whilst  the  issue  of  the  "Race 
against     Bankruptcy"     was     still     doubtful,    the 


528  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

utmost  economy  had  to  be  practised ;  and  even 
when  the  race  was  won,  it  was  felt  that,  however 
necessary  it  might  be  to  provide  schools  for 
Egyptian  children,  it  was  still  more  necessary 
to  limit  the  excessive  demands  which  the  tax- 
gatherer  had  heretofore  made  on  their  parents. 
Fiscal  relief,  therefore,  took  precedence  of  every- 
thing. It  was  not  until  1890  that  the  Financial 
Department  found  itself  in  a  position  to  increase 
the  sum  of  money  spent  by  the  State  on  education 
to  £E.81,000.  Since  then,  it  has  been  steadily 
increasing  in  amount.^  It  would  long  since  have 
been  largely  increased  had  not  internationalism, 
by  depriving  the  Egyptian  Government  of  the 
free  use  of  their  own  resources,  barred  the  way. 

Want  of  money,  therefore,  was  the  first  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  rapid  progress.  The  idiosyncrasies 
of  Pashadom  constituted  the  second.  It  was  not 
that  the  Pashas  did  not  wish  to  advance  the  cause 
of  education  in  Egypt.  Far  from  it.  JNIany  of 
them  yearned  —  and  very  naturally  and  rightly 
yearned — for  educational  progress.  They  recog- 
nised that  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  was  the 
sole  instrument  by  the  use  of  which  Egypt  might 
perhaps  eventually  be  freed  from  foreign  control. 
But  they  were  themselves  too  ignorant  of  educa- 
tional administration  to  be  able  to  initiate  the  only 
measures  which  would  have  satisfied  their  very 
legitimate  yearnings.  The  execution  of  their  own 
policy  was  perpetually  leading  them  to  conclusions 
which  their  prejudices  forced  them  to  reject  The 
natural  result  ensued.  The  policy  of  Pashadom 
was   a   mass   of    inconsistencies.      INIoreover,    the 

*  £E.305,000  was  expended  on  education  in  1906.  The  provision  made 
in  the  estimates  for  1907  amounted  to  £'E.374,000,  and  this  amount  haa 
been  increased  to  £E. 450,450  in  tlie  estimates  for  1908.  These  figures 
represent  only  "ordinary"  expenditure.  They  do  not  include  the 
8[)ecial  credits  for  the  construction  and  maiuteuauce  of  school  build' 
ings. 


CH.  ux  EDUCATION  529 

evil  effects  of  those  inconsistencies  were  enhanced 
by  the  fact  that,  at  every  turn  of  the  wheel  of 
nepotism,  some  fresh  individual  was,  during  the 
early  years  of  the  occupation,  appointed  to  direct 
the  affairs  of  the  Department  of  Public  Instruc- 
tion. "The  frequent  changes  in  educational  policy 
during  past  years,"  I  wrote  in  1892,  "  have  proved 
a  great  obstacle  to  educational  progress  in  Egypt. 
During  the  past  twenty-nine  years,  the  Minister 
(or  Director- General)  of  Public  Instruction  has 
been  changed  twenty-nine  times.  At  each  change, 
the  schools  have  for  a  time  been  more  or 
less  completely  upset  and  demoralised,  as  it  has 
been  the  prevailing  tendency  of  the  Minister  to 
reverse  the  administrative  methods  of  his  pre- 
decessor." 

At  one  moment,  recourse  has  been  had  to  the 
usual  remedy  of  the  Egyptian  reformer.  A  ser- 
vile copy  was  made  of  some  foreign  institution. 
"On  s'etait  content^,"  says  Yacoub  Artin  Pasha, 
who  is  by  far  the  highest  Egyptian  authority  on 
educational  matters  in  Egypt,  "  de  copier  les 
programmes  des  ecoles  de  France,  et  sans  se 
donner  la  peine  de  chercher  a  les  modifier  selon 
les  besoins  du  pays  et  de  notre  culture  future."^ 
At  the  next  moment,  the  undisciplined  mind  of 
the  old-fashioned  Pasha,  with  characteristic  want 
of  moderation,  would  spring  at  a  bound  to  the 
opposite  extreme  of  anti-European  sentiment.  He 
might  own  that  European  knowledge  was  good, 
but  he  refused  to  accept  the  inevitable  conclusion 
that,  at  all  events  until  a  capable  staff  of  Egyptian 
teachers  had  been  trained,  Europeans  alone  could 
impart  it.  Sciences  cannot  be  learnt  save  in  those 
languages  which  possess  a  scientific  literature  and 
vocabulary.  Yet  the  Pasha,  under  the  infiuence 
of  prejudices  which  his  powers  of  reasoning  were 

*  Considerations  sur  I' Instruction  Publique  en  Egypte,  p.  116. 
VOL.  II  2  M 


530  MODERN  EGYPT  ft  vi 

too  feeble  to  stem,  declared  that  a  science  which 
could  not  be  taught  in  Arabic,  should  not  be 
taught  at  all.  There  was  one  thing  which  the 
Pasha  could  do,  and  which,  in  fact,  he  did.  He 
could  multiply  schools  and  scholars  without  any 
regard  to  the  qualifications  of  the  professors,  to 
the  value  of  the  instruction  imparted,  or  to  the 
schoolroom  accommodation  which  was  available. 
He  could  thus  practise  his  favourite  art  of  self- 
deception.  He  could  give  statistical  proof  that  he 
was  moving  rapidly  forward,  whilst  all  the  time 
he  was  in  reality  stationary,  if,  indeed,  his  move- 
ments were  not  retrograde.  On  the  whole,  it  may  be 
said  that  one  of  the  chief  obstacles  to  the  adoption 
of  an  enlightened  educational  policy  in  Egypt  in 
the  early  days  of  the  occupation  was  the  presence 
of  a  few  leading  Pashas  who,  in  theory  at  all 
events,  favoured  educational  progress.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that,  if  the  English  had  from  the  first 
had  a  free  hand  in  this  matter,  greater  progress 
would  have  been  made  than  has  actually  been  the 
case. 

From  one  point  of  view,  however,  the  English 
took  in  hand  the  work  of  educating  the  Egyptians  at 
a  propitious  moment.  Almost  simultaneously  with 
the  occurrence  of  the  British  occupation,  the  country 
underwent  an  intellectual  awakening.  The  people 
of  Egypt  had,  in  fact,  slumbered  since  the  days  of 
Mehemet  Ali.  One  of  the  most  singular  traits  in 
that  remarkable  man's  character  was  that,  although 
he  was  himself  uneducated,  although  he  could  never 
write,  and  did  not  learn  to  read  till  he  was  forty- 
seven  years  old,  and  then  imperfectly,  he  placed  a 
high  value  on  European  knowledge.^  He  establislied 
schools  in  the  towns  and  large  villages.  JNIehemet 
Ali  was,  however,  in  some  respects,  in  advance  of 

*  See  M.  de  Lesseps'  remarks  to  Mr.   .Senior,  Conversations,  etc., 
p.  129. 


CH.  Lix  EDUCATION  531 

his  time.  "Knowledge  was  then  so  unpopular 
that  mothers  bhnded  their  children  to  keep  them 
from  school."^  JNIore  than  half  a  century  later, 
the  population  generally  appreciated  the  value  of 
education  almost  as  little  as  they  did  in  the  days 
of  Mehemet  Ali.  Writing  in  1894,  Yacoub  Artin 
Pasha  said : — 

"  II  n'y  a  pas  une  dizaine  d'ann^es  que  le  public 
en  general,  non  seulement  ne  s'int^ressait  pas  k 
I'instruction  de  ses  enfants,  main  encore  y  ^tait 
oppose,  quoique  dans  une  moindre  mesure  qu'il  y  a 
soixante  ans." 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  Egyptians 
were  suddenly  inspired  with  a  thirst  for  know- 
ledge for  its  own  sake,  or  that  they  awoke  to  a 
keen  sense  of  shame  at  their  own  ignorance.  The 
new  spirit  was,  at  all  events  in  the  first  instance, 
rather  to  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that,  in  a  country 
where  a  large  section  of  the  upper  and  middle 
classes  of  society  depends  on  Government  employ- 
ment, parents  suddenly  realised  that,  unless  their 
children  were  sent  to  school,  they  would  probably 
not  be  able  to  gain  their  livelihood.  Contact  with 
the  West,  the  partial  Europeanisation  of  the  ad- 
ministrative services,  and  the  emulation  inspired 
by  the  presence  of  European,  Levantine,  and 
Syrian  competitors,  produced,  therefore,  at  least 
one  beneficial  result. 

But  whatever  be  the  cause,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  of  the  fact.  The  best  test  of  whether  the 
Egyptians  really  desire  to  be  educated  is  to  ascer- 
tain whether  they  are  prepared  to  pay  for  education. 
On  this  point,  the  evidence  is  conclusive.  In  the 
early  days  of  the  British  occupation,  nearly  all 
the  pupils  who  attended  the  Government  schools 
were  taught  gratuitously.     Before  many  years  had 

*  See  M.  de  Lesseps*  remarks  to  Mr.  Senior,  Conversations,  etc. 
p.  130. 


532  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

passed,  by  far  the  greater  proportion  paid  for  their 
instruction.^ 

In  1889,  I  visited  many  remote  vilhiges  of 
Upper  Egypt  in  which  the  face  of  a  European 
is  rarely  seen.  No  request  was  more  frequently 
made  to  me  than  that  I  should  urge  the  Govern- 
ment to  establish  a  school  in  the  village.  "De 
differents  cotes,"  Yacoub  Artin  Pasha  wrote  at 
about  this  period,  "  on  demande  des  ecoles,  et  la  ou 
il  en  existe  deja  on  demande  quelquefois  leur  de- 
veloppement,  sans  se  rendre  bien  compte,  il  est 
vrai,  de  ce  que  Ton  demande."  The  Egyptians 
have,  in  fact,  made  one  great  step  forward  in  the 
race  for  a  national  existence.  They  have  learnt 
that  they  are  ignorant.     They  wish  to  be  taught. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  explain  what  measures 
were  adopted  for  teaching  them. 

'*  The  chief  aim  and  object  of  education  in 
Islam,"  JNlr.  Hughes  says,  "is  to  obtain  a  know- 
ledge of  the  religion  of  Mohammed,  and  anything 
beyond  this  is  considered  superfluous  and  even 
dangerous."^  Under  these  circumstances,  it  was 
clear  to  the  British  reformer  that  the  education 
imparted  at  the  famous  University  of  El-Azhar 
could  not  be  utilised  to  raise  the  general  standard 
of  education  in  Egypt  He,  therefore,  left  that 
institution  alone. 

The  El-Azhar  University  stands  at  the  summit 

*  The  policy  which  has  of  late  years  been  pursued  in  connection 
with  the  matter  to  which  allusion  is  here  made,  has  been  vigorously 
attacked.  The  grounds  on  which,  as  it  appears  to  me,  it  may  be 
successfully  defended  are  stated  at  some  length  in  Egypt,  No.  1  of  1006, 
pp.  82-81). 

In  this  work,  I  have  merely  endeavoured  to  give  a  general  sketch 
of  the  progress  which  has  been  made  in  the  various  brandies  of  the 
administration.  It  would  lead  me  to  too  great  length  were  1  to 
attempt  to  answer  all  tlie  criticisms  wliich  have,  from  time  to  time, 
been  made  on  the  working  of  tlie  various  Departments.  'Ihis  remark 
applies  with  special  force  to  the  work  of  the  Department  of  Public 
Instruction.  It  has  formed  the  subject  of  a  great  deal  of  yery  unjust 
animadversion. 

*  Hughes's  Dictionary  of  Islam,  p.  106. 


CH.  Lix  EDUCATION  533 

of  the  purely  Moslem  educational  system  of  Eg}'pt. 
The  village  schools  (Kuttabs),  which  are  attached 
to  most  of  the  JNIosques  in  the  country,  stand  at 
the  base  of  that  system.  As  regards  the  quality 
of  the  instruction  afforded  in  these  schools,  JMr. 
Hughes  makes  the  following  remarks  : — 

"The  child  who  attends  these  seminaries 'is  first 
taught  his  alphabet,  which  he  learns  from  a  small 
board  on  which  the  letters  are  written  by  the 
teacher.  He  then  becomes  acquainted  with  the 
numerical  value  of  each  letter.  After  this,  he 
learns  to  write  down  the  ninety-nine  names  of 
God,  and  other  simple  words  taken  from  the 
Koran.  When  he  has  mastered  the  spelling  of 
words,  he  proceeds  to  learn  the  first  chapter  of 
the  Koran,  then  the  last  chapter,  and  gradually 
reads  through  the  whole  Koran  in  Arabic,  which 
he  usually  does  without  understanding  a  word  of  it. 
Having  finished  the  Koran,  which  is  considered 
an  incumbent  religious  duty,  the  pupil  is  instructed 
in  the  elements  of  grammar,  and  perhaps  a  few 
simple  rules  of  arithmetic.  .  .  .  The  ordinary  school- 
master is  generally  a  man  of  little  learning." 

It  would  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  these 
Mosque  schools  are  absolutely  useless.  Through 
their  instrumentality,  a  certain  number  of  children 
are  taught  to  read  and  write.  Organised  as  they 
were  at  the  time  the  British  occupation  com- 
menced, they  were,  however,  as  nearly  useless  as 
any  educational  establishments  could  be.  Want 
of  funds  at  first  stood  in  the  way  of  any  attempt 
to  reform  them,  but  about  1897  the  matter  was 
taken  in  hand.  A  reasonable  curriculum,  based 
on  the  teaching  of  the  three  Il's,  was  adopted. 
The  teaching  of  any  foreign  language  was 
rigorously  excluded.  Since  1898,  the  number  of 
village  schools  under  Government  supervision  has 
increased  year  by  year. 


534  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  vi 

In  1906,  4554  village  schools  were  either  directly 
under  Government  control  or  under  departmental 
inspection  for  grants-in-aid.  They  gave  instruction 
to  165,000  pupils,  of  whom  nearly  13,000  were  girls. 

It  is  on  every  ground  of  the  highest  importance 
that  a  sustained  effort  should  be  made  to  place 
elementary  education  in  Egypt  on  a  sound  footing. 
The  schoolmaster  is  abroad  in  the  land.  We  may 
wish  him  well,  but  no  one  who  is  interested  in  the 
future  of  the  country  should  blind  himself  to  the 
fact  that  his  successful  advance  carries  with  it 
certain  unavoidable  disadvantages.  The  process 
of  manufacturing  demagogues  has,  in  fact,  not 
only  already  begun,  but  may  be  said  to  be  well 
advanced.  The  intellectual  phase  through  which 
India  is  now  passing  stands  before  the  world  as 
a  warning  that  it  is  unwise,  even  if  it  be  not 
dangerous,  to  create  too  wide  a  gap  between  the 
state  of  education  of  the  higher  and  of  the  lower 
classes  in  an  Oriental  country  governed  under 
the  inspiration  of  a  Western  democracy.  High 
education  cannot  and  ought  not  to  be  checked  or 
discouraged.  The  policy  advocated  by  Macaulay 
is  sound.  Moreover,  it  is  the  only  policy  worthy 
of  a  civilised  nation.  But  if  it  is  to  be  carried 
out  without  danger  to  the  State,  the  ignorance 
of  the  masses  should  be  tempered  paii  passu 
with  the  intellectual  advance  of  those  who  are 
destined  to  be  their  leaders.  It  is  neither  wise  nor 
just  that  the  people  should  be  left  intellectually 
defenceless  in  the  presence  of  the  hare-brahied  and 
empirical  projects  which  the  political  charlatan, 
himself  but  half-educated,  will  not  fail  to  pour 
into  their  credulous  ears.  In  this  early  part  of 
the  twentieth  century,  there  is  no  possible  general 
remedy  agahist  the  demagogue  except  that  which 
consists  in  educating  those  who  are  his  natural  prey 
to  such  an  extent  that  they  may,   at  all  events. 


CH.LIX  EDUCATION  535 

have  some  chance  of  discerning  the  imposture 
which  but  too  often  lurks  beneath  his  perfervid 
eloquence  and  political  quackery. 

Considerations  of  space  render  it  necessary  that 
I  should  abstain — albeit  somewhat  reluctantly — 
from  giving  a  description  of  the  progress  made 
of  late  years  in  Egypt  in  the  direction  of  Primary 
and  Secondary  education.  For  the  same  reason, 
I  do  not  deal  with  the  very  important  question 
of  Technical  education.^  I  must,  therefore,  confine 
myself  to  stating  the  bald  fact  that,  in  1906,  505 
educational  establishments,  exclusive  of  village 
schools,  existed  in  the  country.  These  gave 
employment  to  4341  teachers,  and  instruction  to 
about  92,000  pupils,  of  whom  about  20,000  were 
girls.  Under  the  enlightened  administration  of 
the  present  Minister,  Saad  Pasha  Zagloul,  and 
of  his  Adviser,  Mr.  Dunlop,  education  of  every 
description  is  making  rapid  strides  in  advance. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  quality  of  the 
instruction  afforded  at  the  Government  schools 
has  of  late  years  been  greatly  improved.  The 
skilful  methods  and  direct  personal  influence  of  the 

*  Very  full  explanations  have  been  given  on  all  these  subjects  in 
my  successive  Annual  Reports. 

The  following  remarks  made  by  Mr.  Lecky  {Democracy  and  Liberty, 
vol.  ii.  p.  6)  apply,  with  great  force,  to  the  Egyptian  educational  system  : 
"The  great  mistake  in  the  education  of  the  poor  has  in  general  been 
that  it  has  been  too  largely  and  too  ambitiously  literary.  Primary 
education  should  .  .  .  teach  the  poor  to  write  well  and  to  count  well ; 
but,  for  the  rest,  it  should  be  much  more  technical  and  industrial  than 
literary,  and  should  be  more  concerned  with  the  observation  of  facts 
than  with  any  form  of  speculative  reasoning  or  opinions.  There  is 
much  evidence  to  support  the  conclusion  that  the  kinds  of  popular 
education  which  have  proved  morally,  as  well  as  intellectually,  the 
most  beneficial  have  been  those  in  which  a  very  moderate  amount  of 
purely  mental  instruction  has  been  combined  with  physical  or  industrial 
training." 

In  a  very  interesting  article  published  in  the  Edinburgh  Review 
for  October  1907,  and  entitled  "Signs  of  the  Times  in  India,"  tho 
disastrous  results  which  have  ensued  from  unduly  encouraging  a  purely 
literary  education  in  that  country  to  the  neglect  of  scientific  and 
technical  training  are  very  clearly  indicated. 


536  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

new  European  teachers,  wlio  have  been  introduced 
into  the  Department  of  Education,  have  been 
steadily  raishig  the  general  level  of  the  schools, 
in  spite  of  the  numerous  obstacles  encountered. 
W^hilst  there  has  been  an  increasingly  strict  super- 
vision of  the  teaching  of  Arabic  and  the  Koran, 
the  study  of  European  languages  has  been  placed 
on  a  new  basis.  Previously,  pupils  were  allowed 
to  waste  their  time  and  addle  their  brains  by 
attem])ting  the  study  of  an  impossible  number  of 
languages.  It  was  a  great  step  in  advance  when 
the  time-honoured  methods  adopted  in  Egypt  of 
loading  the  memory  without  exercising  the  mind 
were  abandoned.  English  and  French  are  now 
no  longer  merely  treated  as  additional  subjects  of 
linguistic  study.  Either  of  these  languages  is 
used  as  the  medium  of  instruction  in  certain 
subjects,  such  as  history,  science,  etc.  In  course 
of  time,  as  the  number  of  highly  trained  Egyptian 
teachers  increases,  instruction  will,  without  doubt, 
be  given  in  Arabic  to  a  much  greater  extent  than 
heretofore.^ 

From  the  political  point  of  view,  the  most 
important  educational  question  is  this :  Do  the 
educated  Egyptians,  whose  number  is  now  rapidly 
increasing,  possess  the  qualities  and  characteristics 
of  potentially  self-governing  Egyptians  ?  To  put 
the  same  question  in  another  way,  if  we  speak  of 
education  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  term — that 
is  to  say,  if  we  include  the  formation,  not  only  of  the 
intellect,  but  also  of  the  character — if,  in  a  word, 

^  That  the  absence  of  an  adequate  staff  of  trained  E^ryptian  teachers 
has  greatly  retarded  the  progress  of  education  both  in  Kgypt  and  in  tlie 
Soudan  cannot  be  doubted.  In  my  Annual  Reports,  I  have  frequently 
alluded  to  this  imi)ortaiit  subject.  The  cause  has  been  the  same  as 
tliat  which  has  operated  in  other  Departments  of  the  State,  viz.  want 
of  money.  It  is  only  since  tlie  Anglo-French  Convention  was  signed 
that  it  has  bec-ome  possible  to  take  seriously  in  hand  the  question  of 
rendering  the  profession  of  teaching  attractive  by  iuci'easiug  the 
salaries  of  the  teachers. 


CH.  Lix  EDUCATION  537 

we  comprise  all  those  manifold  mental  and  moral 
influences  which  tend  towards  pre])ari!ig  a  boy  or 
girl  for  a  career  of  usefulness  in  after  life,  has  any 
substantial  progress  been  made  ? 

It  is  obviously  impossible  to  give  more  than  a 
conjectural  answer  to  this  question.  Nevertheless, 
although  no  positive  proof  can  be  adduced  that 
such  an  opinion  is  correct,  it  may  be  stated  with  a 
fair  amount  of  confidence  that  something  has  been 
done  towards  forming  and  elevating  the  characters 
of  the  Egyptians.  The  mere  acquisition  of  the 
linguistic  knowledge,  which  has  enabled  a  certain 
number  of  young  Egyptians  to  study  the  literature 
and  sciences  of  Europe,  must  surely  have  tended 
in  some  degree  to  engender  that  accurate  habit  of 
thought  which  is  the  main  characteristic  of  the 
Western  as  opposed  to  the  Eastern  mind  ;  whilst  it 
is  difficult  to  believe  that  constant  contact  with  a 
number  of  high-minded  Europeans,  the  example 
afforded  by  the  elevated  standard  of  thought  from 
which  all  social  and  administrative  questions  have 
for  some  years  past  been  approached,  the  aboli- 
tion of  barbarous  punishments,  the  suppression  of 
forced  labour  and  of  torture,  the  introduction  of 
the  new  ideas  that  the  rights  of  property  are 
sacred  and  that  all  men  are  equal  in  the  eyes  of  the 
law,  the  practical  abolition  of  slavery,  the  dis- 
couragement of  nepotism,  the  stigma  attached  to 
the  worst  kinds  of  vice,  and,  generally,  the  fact  that 
the  Egyptian  social  and  political  atmosphere  has 
for  some  years  been  heavily  charged  with  ideas 
which  should  act  as  antidotes  against  moral 
degradation — have  not  in  some  degree  contributed 
to  a  partial  assimilation  of  the  best  European  code 
of  morals,  in  spite  of  the  adverse  intluence  exercised 
by  the  immoral  or  dishonest  acts  of  individual 
Europeans.  Whilst,  however,  it  may  reasonably 
be   held   that   something    has   been   done   in    the 


538  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  v\ 

direction  of  imparting  rectitude,  virility,  and  moral 
equipoise  to  the  Egyptian  character,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  there  is  still  abundant  room  for 
improvement  in  all  these  directions.  If  the  moral 
influences  to  which  the  Egyptians  are  now  exposed 
were  withdrawn,  or  even  weakened,  a  relapse  would 
inevitably  ensue. 

Let  any  one  who  is  inclined  to  take  a  sanguine 
view  of  this  subject  cast,  for  a  moment,  all  details 
aside,  and  consider  the  general  nature  of  the  problem 
which  presents  itself  for  solution.  It  is  nothing 
less  than  this,  that  the  new  generation  of  Egyptians 
has  to  be  persuaded  or  forced  into  imbibing  the 
true  spirit  of  Western  civilisation.  Although 
Europe  was  Christianised  first  and  civilised  after- 
wards, it  may  perhaps  be  argued  with  some  degree 
of  plausibility — more  especially  with  the  example 
of  Japan  before  us — that  the  post  hoc  ergo  propter 
hoc  fallacy  would  be  involved  if  it  were  held  that 
Christianity  is  the  necessary  handmaid  of  European 
civilisation,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  assimilate 
the  true  spirit  of  that  civilisation  without  adopting 
the  Christian  faith.  I  am  insufficiently  acquainted 
with  the  state  of  Japan  to  draw  any  precise 
inferences  from  its  recent  history.  I  confine 
myself,  therefore,  to  arguments  derived  from  facts 
and  subjects  which  have  come  under  my  personal 
observation,  merely  observing  that  both  the  religion 
and  the  social  system  of  Buddhism,  and,  I  believe, 
of  Shintoism,  present  greater  possibilities  for  the 
assimilation  of  exotic  secular  ideas  and  forms  of 
government  than  any  which  can  be  claimed  for 
rigid  Islamism.  Looking  then  solely  to  the 
possibility  of  reforming  those  countries  which  have 
adopted  the  faith  of  Islam,  it  may  be  asked 
whether  any  one  can  conceive  the  existence  of 
true  European  civilisation  on  the  assumption  that 
the  position  which  women   occupy  in   Europe   is 


CH.  Lix  EDUCATION  539 

abstracted  from  the  general  plan  ?  As  well  can 
a  man  blind  from  his  birth  be  made  to  conceive 
the  existence  of  colour.  Change  the  position  of 
women,  and  one  of  the  main  pillars,  not  only  of 
European  civilisation,  but  at  all  events  of  the 
moral  code  based  on  the  Christian  religion,  if  not 
of  Christianity  itself,  falls  to  the  ground.  The 
position  of  women  in  Egypt,  and  in  Mohammedan 
countries  generally,  is,  therefore,  a  fatal  obstacle 
to  the  attainment  of  that  elevation  of  thought  and 
character  which  should  accompany  the  introduction 
of  European  civilisation,  if  that  civilisation  is  to 
produce  its  full  measure  of  beneficial  effect. 

The  obvious  remedy  would  appear  to  be  to 
educate  the  women.  The  remarkable  and  con- 
tinuous progress  of  female  education  in  Egypt 
within  the  last  few  years  marks,  in  fact,  very  clearly 
the  changes  of  custom  and  alteration  of  ideas  which 
are  taking  place  in  the  country.  When  the  first 
efforts  to  promote  female  education  were  made, 
they  met  with  little  sympathy  from  the  population 
in  general.  When,  many  years  ago,  this  matter 
was  first  taken  in  hand,  Yacoub  Pasha  Artin  was 
the  only  Egyptian  who  took  the  least  interest  in  it. 
More  than  this,  most  of  the  upper-class  Egyptians 
were  not  merely  indifferent  to  female  education  ; 
they  were  absolutely  opposed  to  it.  They  did  not 
want  the  women  to  be  educated.  Even  when  girls' 
schools  were,  with  much  difficulty,  established, 
parents,  in  the  first  instance,  sent  their  daughters 
to  school  reluctantly,  and  took  them  away  early. 
In  order  to  encourage  the  education  of  girls,  it  was 
necessary  to  admit  a  large  number  of  free  pupils. 
Most  of  these  came  from  the  poorer  classes,  and 
left  early,  either  to  be  married  or  because  it  was 
thought  unbecoming  for  a  girl  to  attend  school 
after  she  had  passed  the  earliest  years  of  childliood. 
All  this  has  now  been  changed.     The  reluctance  of 


540  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

parents  to  send  their  daughters  to  school  has  been 
largely  overcome.  Free  education  in  the  Govern- 
ment Primary  Schools  has  been  practically 
abrlished.  Demands  are  frequently  made  for  the 
estabhshment  of  other  schools  in  different  parts  of 
the  country.  The  number  of  private  schools  for 
girls  has  also  greatly  increased  of  late  years. 
Further,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  steady  output 
of  boys  from  the  Secondary  Schools  and  Higher 
Colleges  has  indirectly  stimulated  the  movement 
in  favour  of  female  education.  The  younger 
generation  are  beginning  to  demand  that  their 
wives  should  possess  some  qualifications  other  than 
those  which  can  be  secured  in  the  seclusion  of  the 
harem.  The  interaction  of  the  two  branches  of 
education  does  not  stop  here,  for  not  only  has  the 
growth  of  education  among  boys  stimulated  the 
desire  for  instruction  to  girls,  but  it  has  also  tended 
to  improve  the  quality  of  the  education  given 
to  girls  by  prolonging  the  period  of  instruction. 
There  appears  good  reason  for  supposing  that, 
where  education  has  made  progress,  the  age  of 
marriage  has  risen,  and  that,  in  consequence,  the 
girls  are  allowed  to  remain  longer  than  heretofore 
at  school.  The  prospects  of  the  future  are,  there- 
fore, distinctly  bright  in  connection  with  this  all- 
important  question. 

It,  of  course,  remains  an  open  question  whether, 
when  the  Egyptian  women  are  educated,  they  will 
exercise  a  healthy  and  elevating  influence  over  the 
men.  The  few  INIoslem  women  hi  Egypt  who  have, 
up  to  the  present  time,  received  a  European  educa- 
tion are,  with  some  very  rare  exceptions,  strictly 
secluded.  It  is  difficult,  therefore,  to  form  any 
matured  opinion  as  to  the  results  so  far  obtained. 

In  Christian  Europe,  the  religious  faith  of 
women  is  generally  stronger  than  that  of  men. 
The   woman  feels   and   trusts,    the   man   reasons. 


cH.  Lix  EDUCATION  541 

The  faith  of  ^loslem  women,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  probably  rather  less  strong  than  that  of  Moslem 
men.  Neither  need  this  be  any  matter  for 
surprise.  It  is  not  merely  due  to  the  curious 
impulse  which  appears  almost  invariably  to  drive 
the  East  and  the  West  in  opposite  directions. 
It  is  a  consequence  of  the  fundamental  differ- 
ences which  separate  Christianity  from  Islamism. 
Although  it  is  an  error  to  suppose  that  Mohammed's 
general  plan  did  not  involve  a  future  life  for 
women/  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  not  only  did 
he,  by  precept  and  example,  relegate  women  to  a 
position  in  this  world  inferior  to  that  of  men,  but 
also  that  the  religion  which  he  founded  is  euiinently 
one  conceived  by  the  genius  of  a  man  and  intended 
for  men.  It  is,  therefore,  natural  that  women 
should  generally  be  less  fervent  Moslems  than  men. 
But  the  Moslem  woman  is,  after  all,  a  woman 
first  and  a  Moslem  afterwards.  She  would  belie 
her  sex  if  she  were  not  impulsive  and  inclined,  even 
more  than  the  men,  to  run  to  extremes.  Although, 
therefore,  the  faith  of  the  INIoslem  woman  may 
perhaps  be  comparatively  weak,  her  prejudices  in 
respect  to  all  the  customs  and  habits  of  thought 
which  cluster  round  Islamism  are  as  strong  as, 
if  not  stronger  than  those  of  the  men.  A 
Europeanised  Egyptian  man  usually  becomes  an 
Agnostic,  and  often  assimilates  many  of  the  least 
worthy  portions  of  European  civilisation.  Is 
there  any  reason  why  European  education  should 
not  produce  the  same  effect  on  the  Eurojiennised 
Egyptian  woman  ?  I  know  of  none.  Indeed,  in 
so  far  as  the  Agnosticism  is  concerned,  the  woman, 
on  the  assumption  that  her  faith  is  relatively  luke- 
warm, would  probably  find  less  difficulty  than  the 

^  Surah  III,,  verse  193,  r.ml  Surah  IV.,  verse  123,  of  the  Koran  are 
conclusive  as  to  Mohammed's  teacliing'  on  this  subject.  Tliere  can  he 
no  doubt  that  all  devout  Moslems  believe  that  a  future  life  is  resej\  ed 
for  women. 


542  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

man  in  shaking  herself  free  from  the  ideas  and 
associations  which  have  surrounded  her  from  her 
cradle. 

It  would  obviously  be  neither  safe  nor  just 
to  draw  any  general  conclusion  in  connection 
with  this  subject  from  such  a  limited  number  of 
facts  and  examples  as  can  at  present  be  adduced. 
If  it  be  once  admitted  that  no  good  moral  results 
will  accrue  from  female  education  in  Egypt, 
then,  indeed,  the  reformer  may  well  despair  of 
the  cause  of  Egyptian  education  generally  in  the 
highest  sense  of  the  word.  The  experiment  of 
female  education  should  certainly  be  continued 
with  vigour.  Few  people  now  living  can  hope  to 
see  its  results.  All  that  can  at  present  be  said  is 
that  those  results  must  necessarily  be  uncertain. 
But  whatever  they  may  eventually  be,  this  much 
is  well-nigh  certain — that  the  European  reformer 
may  mstruct,  he  may  explain,  he  may  argue,  he 
may  devise  the  most  ingenious  methods  for  the 
moral  and  material  development  of  the  people, 
he  may  use  his  best  endeavours  to  "cut  blocks 
with  a  razor"  and  to  graft  true  civilisation  on 
a  society  which  is  but  just  emerging  from 
barbarism,  but  unless  he  proves  himself  able,  not 
only  to  educate,  but  to  elevate  the  Egyptian 
woman,  he  will  never  succeed  in  affording  to  the 
Egyptian  man,  in  any  thorough  degree,  the  only 
European  education  which  is  worthy  of  Europe. 

What  the  Egyptian  man  most  requires  is  the 
acquisition  of  all  those  qualities  comprised  in  the 
expressive  Greek  term  alSax;  —  poorly  translated 
by  the  English  word  "self-respect" — and  those 
qualities  he  can  never  fully  acquire  unless,  like  the 
Christian  European,  he  becomes  monogamous,  and 
thus  learns  to  honour  the  one  woman  whom  he  will 
also  have  sworn  to  love  and  to  cherish  until  the 
hand  of  death  parts  him  from  his  life-long  helpmate. 


CHAPTER    LX 

THE    SOUDAN 

Tfce  nature  of  the  Soudan  problem — Extent — Population — Results 
obtained  by  the  Convention  of  1899 — Executive  agency — Finance 
— Railways — Slavery. 

Having  dealt  with  the  affairs  of  Egypt,  I  now 
propose  to  give  a  very  brief  sketch  of  the  progress 
of  administrative  reform  in  the  Soudan.^ 

The  problems  with  which  the  Government  has 
to  deal  in  the  Soudan  are  not  only  very  different, 
but  also,  for  the  time  being,  far  more  simple  than 
those  which  await  solution  in  Egypt.  This  latter 
country  has  advanced  half-way — perhaps  many 
would  think  more  than  half-way — on  the  road 
towards  Western  civilisation.  It  has  certainly 
passed  beyond  the  stage  in  which  the  undivided 
attention  of  the  reformer  may  be  devoted  to 
financial  and  administrative  questions.  It  has 
entered  on  a  phase  where,  unless  I  am  much  mis- 
taken, it  will  year  by  year  become  more  apparent 
to  all  but  very  superficial  observers  that  the  further 
adaptation  and  effective  assimilation  of  Western 
ideas  is  quite  as  much  a  social  as  a  political  or 
administrative  question.  The  really  vital  issues 
which  the  future  has  reserved  for  Egypt  are  not 
how  exotic  political  institutions  can  be  forced  to 
take  root  in  a  soil  which  is  uncongenial  to  their 

*  Most  of  the  remarks  contained    in  this    chapter    have    already 
appeared  in  my  Annual  Reports  from  the  year  1890  onwards. 

648 


544  MODERN  EGYPT  tt.vi 

JTowth,  but  how  the  relations  of  the  sexes  can  be 
brought  into  conformity  with  modern  ideas,  how 
the  moral  code  on  which  the  laws  of  all  civilised 
countries  are  based  can  be  made  to  penetrate  into 
the  daily  life  and  manners  and  customs  of  the 
people,  and  how,  without  shattering  all  that  is 
worthy  and  noble  in  the  Moslem  religion,  the 
quasi-religious  institutions  of  the  country  can  be 
reformed  to  such  an  extent  as  no  longer  to  con- 
stitute an  insuperable  barrier  to  progress.  The 
Government  have  sometimes  been  accused  of 
moving  too  slowly  in  Egypt.  Does  any  one  who 
has  reflected  on  the  problems  which  I  have  briefly 
indicated  above,  and  who  really  understands  the 
facts  connected  with  them,  consider  it  possible 
that  they  can  be  solved  with  rapidity  ?  If  so,  he 
must  be  imbued  with  an  optimism  which  I  am 
unable  to  share.  Nevertheless,  until  they  are 
solved,  the  aspirations  of  the  irresponsible  advocate 
of  reforms  must  always  be  tinged  with  a  certain 
degree  of  unreality,  whilst  some  disappointment 
must  inevitably  await  the  well-intentioned  efforts 
of  the  responsible  man  of  action. 

The  case  of  the  Soudan  is,  for  the  present,  wholly 
different.  Even  the  most  advanced  portions  of  that 
country  are  still  in  a  very  backward  condition.  For 
at  least  a  generation  to  come,  no  complex  question 
of  how  Western  methods  may  best  be  adapted  to 
Eastern  minds  will  probably  arise.  Political  issues 
are  few  in  number  and  relatively  simple  in  character. 
The  most  important,  probably,  is  how  slavery  may 
be  completely  abolished  without  causing  serious 
disorder.  The  rise  and  fall  of  some  religious  im- 
postor may  cause  some  temporary  trouble,  but  the 
methods  for  dealing  with  cases  of  this  sort  com- 
mand the  assent  alike  of  Westerns  and  of  educated 
Orientals.  Any  danger  from  religious  fanaticism 
may  be  mitigated,  and  perhaps  altogether  averted, 


CH.LX  THE  SOUDAN  545 

by  imposing  some  reasonable  and  salutary  checks 
on  the  freedom  of  action  of  missionary  bodies. 
Whatever  may  be  the  case  in  Egypt,  there  can  be 
no  question  that  what  the  Soudanese  now  most  of 
all  require  is,  not  national  government,  but  good 
government.  Hence,  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  and 
his  very  capable  staff  will  be  able  for  the  present 
to  devote  their  entire  attention  to  overcoming  the 
physical  difficulties  with  which  they  have  to  deal, 
and  to  the  introduction  of  administrative,  judicial, 
and  financial  measures  suitable  to  the  requirements 
of  the  primitive  society  whose  interests  are  entrusted 
to  their  care. 

The  Anglo-Egyptian  Soudan  covers  an  area  of 
950,000  square  miles.  By  far  the  greater  portion 
of  this  large  territory  consists  of  what  the  late 
Lord  Salisbury  once  termed  "light  sandy  soil." 
The  area  under  cultivation  has  been  steadily  in- 
creasing of  late  years.  Nevertheless,  at  the  close 
of  1906,  only  about  1576  square  miles  were  culti- 
vated. The  remainder  consisted  of  desert,  swamp, 
and  primeeval  forest. 

The  researches  made  by  Sir  Reginald  Wingate 
into  the  past  and  present  population  of  the  Soudan, 
bring  into  strong  relief  the  terrible  results  which 
ensued  from  Dervish  misrule.  It  is  estimated  that, 
prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  Mahdi's  power, 
the  population  of  the  Soudan  was  about  S^  millions, 
that  of  these  about  3J  millions  were  swept  away 
by  famine^  and  by  disease,  notably  by  small-pox,  and 
that  S^  millions  were  killed  either  in  the  engage- 
ments with  the  British  and  Egyptian  troops,  or  in 
inter- tribal  wars.  The  latter  of  these  two  causes 
accounted  for  by  far  the  greater  portion  ot  the 
terrible  mortality  in  warfare.  Several  tribes 
opposed    to    the   Baggara,    who    constituted    the 

*  The  Dervish  soldiery  used  to  rob  the  inhabitants  of  their  grain 
reserves,  with  the  result  that  large  numbers  died  of  starvation. 
VOL.  II  2  N 


546  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

mainstay  of  the  Dervish  power,  were  well-nigh 
obliterated.  These  figures,  Sir  Reginald  Wingate 
remarked,  "seem  almost  incredible."  Nevertheless, 
he  considered  them  substantially  correct.  He 
cited  a  fact,  which  came  under  his  personal 
observation,  in  support  of  their  correctness.  Prior 
to  1882,  the  district  lying  along  the  banks  of  the 
rivers  Rahad  and  Dinder  contained  upwards  of 
800  villages.  When  Sir  Reginald  Wingate  visited 
this  district  in  1902,  "not  a  village  remained."  In 
an  official  report  prepared  on  the  Berber  district 
towards  the  close  of  1903,  it  was  stated  that 
"villages,  which  used  to  produce  500  fighting  men, 
have  now  only  fifty  to  sixty  adults,  and  in  some 
cases  even  less."  My  personal  experience  is  of 
a  nature  to  confirm  this  testimony.  Shortly  after 
the  battle  of  Omdurman,  I  visited  INIetemmeh,  a 
town  formerly  inhabited  by  the  Jaalin,  and  situated 
on  the  Nile  between  Berber  and  Khartoum.  It 
was  clear  from  the  buildings  which  remained  that 
it  had  formerly  contained  a  large  population.  At 
the  time  of  my  visit,  the  inhabitants  numbered 
about  1300,  of  whom  all  but  150  were  women  and 
children.  The  men  had  almost  all  been  killed  by 
the  Dervishes. 

During  the  last  few  years,  the  population  has 
been  increasing,  but  it  is  probable  that  it  does  not 
now  exceed  two  millions. 

The  Convention  between  the  British  and 
Egyptian  Governments,  signed  on  January  19, 
1899,  of  which  a  general  description  has  already 
been  given,^  may  be  termed  the  Constitutional 
Charter  of  the  Soudan.  In  spite  of  many  anomalies, 
which  were  mevitable  under  all  the  circumstances 
of  the  case,  it  has  conferred  an  immense  boon, 
both  on  the  people  of  the  Soudan,  and  on  the 
Egyptians,  who,  whatever  some  of  them  may   at 

*   Vide  ante,  Chapter  XXXllI. 


CH,LX  THE  SOUDAN  547 

present  think,  are,  and  must  always  be  deeply 
interested  in  the  development  and  good  govern- 
ment of  that  country.  The  Convention  freed  the 
Soudan  from  the  incubus  of  the  Capitulations,  and  it 
also  obviated  the  very  serious  risks  which  would 
certainly  have  been  incurred  had  the  adoption  of  a 
highly  civilised  system  of  government  been  forced 
prematurely  on  the  country.  I  do  not  suppose 
that  the  most  ardent  advocate,  whether  of  inter- 
nationalism or  of  equality  of  treatment  to  all 
creeds  and  races,  would  seriously  contend  that  it 
would  have  been  possible  in  practice  to  have 
worked  a  system  under  which  Kwat  Wad 
Awaibung,  a  Shillouk  who  murdered  Ajak  Wad 
Deng  because  the  latter  bewitched  his  son,  and 
caused  him  to  be  eaten  by  a  crocodile,^  would  have 
been  tried  by  a  procedure  closely  resembling  that 
followed  at  Paris  or  Berlin,  which  would  have 
necessitated  a  civil  action  brought  by  some  chance 
European,  resident  on  the  upper  waters  of  the 
Blue  Nile,  being  tried  by  a  body  of  Judges  sitting 
at  Cairo  or  Alexandria,  and  which  would  not  have 
allowed  the  executive  Government  to  close  a 
liquor  shop  belonging  to  a  Greek  subject  at  El- 
Obeid  or  Mongalla  without  the  presence  of  a 
Consular  janissary. 

I  need  not  describe  in    detail    the    executive 
agency  through  which  effect  has  been  given  to  the 

^  A  Shillouk  named  Kwat  Wad  Awaibung'  was  tried  on  the  char^j^e 
of  murdering  Ajak  Wad  Deng.  He  pleaded  guilty,  and  made  the 
following  statement :  "  The  murdered  Ajak  ^Vad  Deng  owed  me  a 
sheep,  but  would  not  pay  me.  He  said  he  would  show  me  his  work, 
and  next  day  my  son  was  eaten  by  a  crocodile,  which  was,  of  course, 
the  work  of  Ajak  Wad  Deng,  and  for  that  reason  1  killed  him.  We 
had  had  a  feud  for  years,  as  1  was  a  more  successful  hippopotamus- 
hunter  than  he  was,  and  for  that  reason  he  was  practising  witchery 
over  me  and  my  family."  Mr.  Bonham  Carter,  the  Legal  Secretary 
of  the  Soudan  Government,  in  reporting  on  this  case,  said  :  "The 
accused's  belief  that  the  crocodile  was  acting  as  agent  of  the  murdered 
man  in  killing  the  accused's  son  was  supported  by  several  other 
witnesses,  and  represents  a  common  local  belief." 


548  MODERN  EGYPT  rr.vi 

principles  embodied  in  the  Convention  of  1899.  I 
content  myself  with  saying  tliat  the  country  was, 
in  the  first  instance,  divided  into  districts,  each  of 
which  was  placed  under  the  control  of  a  military 
officer.  It  would,  however,  be  an  entire  mistake 
to  suppose  that  the  country  is  under  a  military 
government  in  the  ordinary  acceptation  of  that 
term.  The  Government,  in  all  its  more  important 
features,  is  essentially  civil,  although  the  Governor- 
General  and  many  of  his  principal  subordinates 
are  military  officers.  I  have  frequently  rendered 
testimony  to  the  very  valuable  services  performed  by 
these  military  officers.  I  need  here  only  add  that  the 
system  of  education  adopted  at  our  Public  Schools 
and  INIilitary  Colleges  is  of  a  nature  to  turn  out  a 
number  of  young  men  who  are  admirable  agents  in 
the  execution  of  an  Imperial  policy.  The  German, 
the  Frenchman,  and  others  may  be,  and  sometimes 
are  better  educated,  but  any  defects  on  the  score 
of  technical  knowledge  are  amply  compensated  by 
the  governing  powers,  the  willingness  to  assume 
responsibility,  and  the  versatility  under  strange 
circumstances  in  which  the  Anglo-Saxon,  trained 
in  the  free  atmosphere  which  develops  individ- 
ualism, excels  beyond  all  other  nations. 

I  know  of  only  one  disadvantage  in  employing 
military  officers,  and  that  is,  tl.at  they  are  liable  to 
be  removed  for  service  elsewhere,  more  especially 
in  times  of  national  emergency.  A  Civil  service  is, 
therefore,  being  formed,  composed  of  young  men 
taken  from  the  British  Universities.  These  will 
gradually  take  the  place  of  the  military  officers 
now  employed. 

I  do  not  propose  to  dwell  on  the  progress 
made  in  education,  the  establishment  of  a  judicial 
system,  the  preservation  of  forests,  and  other 
administrative  matters.  Full  details  on  these 
subjects  will    be   found    in   my  Annual    Reports. 


cH.  Lx  THE  SOUDAN  549 

I    confine  my  remarks  to   one   or  two  points  of 
special  importance. 

Finance  is,  of  course,  ttie  keystone  of  the 
situation.  It  was  felt  from  the  first  that  in  the 
Soudan,  as  in  Egypt,  a  sound  financial  position 
was  the  source  from  which  all  other  reforms  and 
improvements  would  have  to  flow.  In  the  first 
instance,  the  situation  certainly  did  not  look 
promising.  Those  who  had  had  most  experience 
of  the  country  had  declared  that  the  Soudan  was, 
and  was  likely  always  to  remain,  a  "useless 
possession."  The  ravages  committed  by  the 
Dervishes  deepened  the  sense  of  its  inutility.  The 
population  had,  as  I  have  already  shown,  been 
more  than  decimated.  Flocks  and  herds  had  been 
destroyed.  Date- trees,  which  constitute  one  of 
the  principal  products  of  the  country,  had  been 
hewn  down  in  large  numbers.  Neither  life  nor 
property  had,  for  many  years,  been  secure.  Under 
these  discouraging  auspices,  the  Soudan  revenue 
for  1898  was  estimated  at  the  very  modest  figure 
of  £E.8000.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  revenue  of 
£E. 35,000  was  collected.  The  expenditure  was 
£E.235,000,  thus  leaving  a  deficit  of  £E. 200,000, 
which  had  to  be  made  good  by  the  Egyptian 
Treasury.  Eight  years  later,  in  1906,  the  revenue 
was  £E.804,000,  and  the  net  charge  on  the  Egyptian 
Treasury,  exclusive  of  interest  on  3^  millions 
advanced  for  capital  expenditure,  amounted  to 
only  about  £E.30,000.  Inclusive  of  interest  at  the 
rate  of  3  per  cent  on  the  capital  advanced,  the 
charge  which  had  to  be  borne  by  the  Egyptian 
Treasury,  in  1906,  was  only  £E.  130,000.'  The 
amount  is  trifling  in  comparison  to  the  unquestion- 
able advantages  derived  by  Egypt  from  the  mainten- 
ance of  a  settled  government  in  the  Soudan,  and 

1  From  January  1,  1908,  the  Soudan  Government  will  commence  to 
pay  interest  on  a  portion  of  the  capital  advanced. 


550  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

from  the  assured  possession  of  the  Nile  Valley.  I 
should  add  that,  at  the  close  of  the  year  1906,  a 
Reserve  Fund,  amounting  to  over  £E.  31 5,000, 
had  accumulated  in  the  hands  of  the  Soudan 
Government. 

Thus,  a  very  great  and  rapid  improvement  has 
taken  place.  ^loreover,  it  has  been  effected  with- 
out increasing  the  burden  of  taxation.  The  fiscal 
legislation  of  the  Soudan  has  been  based  on  the 
unquestionably  sound  principle  that,  in  the  assess- 
ment and  collection  of  the  taxes,  no  innovation, 
based  on  Western  ideas,  should  be  introduced 
unless  its  introduction  is  altogether  unavoidable. 
The  main  fault  of  Oriental  fiscal  administration 
has  generally  been,  not  so  much  that  the  principles 
on  which  the  taxation  is  based  are  unsound,  as 
that  the  method  of  applying  them  has  been  very 
defective.  On  going  through  the  list  of  the  taxes 
which  were  collected  under  the  Khalifa's  rule,  it  was 
found  that,  although  the  manner  in  which  they  had 
been  levied  had  been  cruel  and  extortionate  to  the 
last  degree,  they  were  based  on  principles  which 
are  generally  recognised  in  all  Moslem  countries. 
No  radical  change  of  system  was,  therefore, 
necessary.  Broadly  speaking,  all  that  was  required 
was  that  the  rates  of  taxation  should  in  each  case 
be  fixed  by  law ;  that  the  taxes  should  be  moderate 
in  amount,  and  that  every  care  should  be  taken 
that  no  demands  were  made  on  the  taxpayers  save 
those  which  the  law  allowed. 

With  every  desire,  however,  to  avoid  the 
premature  introduction  of  Western  methods  of 
administration  into  the  Soudan,  it  was  found 
practically  impossible  to  devise  any  proper  system 
for  the  recovery  of  taxes  without  having  recourse 
to  some  of  the  principles  on  which  European 
procedure  in  such  matters  is  based.  The  Dervish 
svstem  consisted  in  practice  in  taking  as  much  as 


CH.  Lx  THE  SOUDAN  551 

the  taxpayers  could  pay.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
the  land  yielded  no  crop,  the  tax  collector  recog- 
nised the  futility  of  making  any  demands  on  the 
cultivator/  The  experience  of  other  Eastern 
countries  has  shown  that  the  elasticity  thus 
obtained  goes  a  long  way  to  mitigate  the  rigour 
even  of  the  worst  fiscal  systems. 

The  European  administrator,  who  has  to  look 
to  financial  equilibrium,  naturally  desires  to  intro- 
duce a  system  which  will  enable  him  to  know, 
with  tolerable  accuracy,  the  amount  of  revenue  on 
which  he  can  count,  not  only  for  a  single  year,  but 
for  a  series  of  years.  It  is  comparatively  easy  for 
him  to  rectify  the  main  defect  of  the  Oriental 
system.  He  can  substitute  a  fixed  and  moderate 
demand  for  one  which  was  capricious  and  generally 
exorbitant.  It  is  far  less  easy  to  obviate  the 
rigidity  which  is,  in  some  degree,  an  ahnost 
unavoidable  accompaniment  of  the  change  of 
system.  Notably,  it  is  impossible  to  dispense 
altogether  with  the  system  of  legal  expropriation 
in  cases  of  default,  albeit  this  practice  is  wholly 
foreign  to  the  ideas  of  a  backward  Oriental  popula- 
tion. Sometliing,  however,  may  be  done  to  temper 
the  comparative  rigidity  of  European  modes  of 
procedure.  Thus,  in  Egypt,  although  for  many 
years  past  expropriation  has  been  legalised,  the 
best  part  of  the  Oriental  fiscal  system  has  been 
preserved.  It  has  never  been  the  practice,  after 
imposing  a  fixed  rate  on  land,  to  exact  the 
amount  of  the  taxes  in  good  and  bad  years  alike. 
Liberal  concessions  have  been  made  to  the  holders 

*  The  execution  of  a  system  under  which  the  tax  is  made  pro- 
portionate to  the  crop  of  the  year  is,  of  course,  iu  some  degree 
facilitated  by  the  practice,  common  iu  all  Moslem  countries,  of  taking 
payment  in  kind.  It  has  been  found  necessary  to  continue  this 
practice  in  some  parts  of  the  Soudan.  But  it  is  one  which  leads  to 
numerous  abuses,  and  it  will  be  desirable  to  abolish  it  as  soou  M 
possible.     It  was  abolished  in  Egypt  some  twenty  years  ago. 


552  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  v\ 

of  Sharaki,  or  uiiirrigated  land.  In  the  Soudan, 
an  attempt  has  been  made  to  carry  this  principle 
somewhat  further.  It  has  been  laid  down  that, 
when  a  summons  is  taken  out  against  any  man  for 
non-payment  of  tlie  land  tax,  the  INIagistrate,  "  if 
he  is  satisfied  that  the  crop  upon  the  land  has 
failed  through  no  fault  of  the  owner  or  cultivator, 
and  that  the  tax  cannot  be  paid  without  depriving 
the  owner  of  the  means  of  earning  his  living  as 
an  agriculturist,"  may  adjourn  the  summons,  and 
report  the  case  to  the  Governor- General.  The 
latter  can  then,  if  he  thinks  fit,  remit  the  tax. 

The  clothing  of  the  owner  and  that  of  his  wife 
and  children,  the  tools  of  an  artisan  or  the 
implements  of  a  cultivator,  as  well  as  cattle 
ordinarily  employed  in  agriculture,  are  exempted 
from  seizure.  Further,  the  process  for  the  recovery 
of  taxes,  though  it  may  perhaps  be  criticised  on 
the  ground  of  being  somewhat  too  elaborate,  is 
manifestly  devised  with  the  express  object  of 
obviating  a  resort  to  expropriation,  save  in  cases  of 
absolute  necessity. 

I  make  these  remarks  because  the  points  here 
discussed  are,  in  my  opinion,  of  vital  importance 
in  the  administration  of  all  Eastern  countries. 

I  explained  in  a  former  part  of  this  narrative^ 
that,  at  a  moment  when  reckless  borrowing  had 
brought  Egypt  to  the  verge  of  ruin,  resort  was 
had  to  what  at  that  time  appeared  the  bold 
expedient  of  contracting  a  fresh  loan.  The  causes 
which  had  led  to  the  creation  of  a  situation  in 
the  Soudan  which,  at  one  time,  seemed  almost 
desperate,  were  different  from  those  which  had 
operated  in  Egypt,  but  the  remedy  adopted  was, 
in  principle,  the  same.  The  country  was  prac- 
tically isolated.  It  was  cut  off  from  the  world  by 
a  waste  of  burning  and  almost  waterless  desert. 

o 
>  Vide  ante,  pp.  462-64. 


OH.  Lx  THE  SOUDAN  553 

Manifestly,  the  first  thing  to  do  was  to  establish 
the  link  through  whose  agency  civilisation  could 
gradually  be  introduced  into  the  country.  Scarcely 
had  the  sound  of  the  guns  of  the  battle  of  Omdurman 
died  away,  when  works  were  commenced  with  a 
view  to  extending  the  Nile  railway,  which  then 
extended  only  to  the  Atbara,  to  Halfaya,  opposite 
Khartoum.  It  was,  however,  obvious  that  some 
port  on  the  Red  Sea  coast  constituted  the  natural 
outlet  for  the  trade  of  the  Soudan.  After  a  full 
examination  of  the  various  alternatives  which  were 
available,  it  was  decided  to  create  such  a  port  at  a 
spot,  now  named  Port  Soudan,  a  short  distance 
north  of  Suakin,  and  to  connect  it  by  railway  with 
the  Nile  Valley.  By  January  1906,  the  railway 
works  were  completed.  The  harbour  works  are 
still  in  course  of  progress.  Thus,  the  connection 
between  the  Soudan  and  the  rest  of  the  world  was 
established. 

There  is  only  one  further  point  of  special 
importance  to  which  I  need  allude  in  connection 
with  the  administration  of  the  Soudan.  What  has 
been  done  to  remove  the  plague-spot  of  slavery  ? 

The  Soudan,  of  course,  no  longer  constitutes  the 
happy  hunting-ground  of  the  Arab  slave-hunter. 
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  every  effort,  the  Slave 
Trade  has  not,  as  yet,  been  wholly  suppressed. 
Slave  raids  are  still,  at  times,  made,  more  especially 
along  the  Abyssinian  frontier.  A  recent  report 
from  Captain  McMurdo,  the  head  of  the  Depart- 
ment for  the  Suppression  of  Slavery,  contains  the 
following  passage :  "  Speaking  generally  of  the 
repression  of  slavery  in  the  Soudan,  I  venture  to 
state  that  progress  is  steadily  being  made,  and  that 
slavery  has  turned  the  corner  into  tlie  high  road  of 
abolition,  but  it  is  a  very  long  road,  and  it  will  take 
years  to  get  to  the  end  of  it.  It  is  not  in  nature 
that  customs  which  have  existed  for  centuries  can 


554  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  v 

be  at  once  put  aside.  It  is  only  by  bringing  to 
bear  a  steady  pressure  on  slave  -  traffickers  that 
abolition  will  be  obtained." 

Domestic  slavery  in  the  Soudan  itself  is 
gradually  dying  a  natural  deatli.  On  this  subject 
Sir  Reginald  Wingate  wrote  some  two  years  ago  : 
"  By  carefully  protecting  the  interests  of  those  who 
were  previously  slaves,  and  at  the  same  time 
gradually  employing  them  on  renumerative  work 
in  other  capacities — should  they  be  unwilling  to 
return  to  their  masters  as  ordinary  servants — we 
shall  eventually,  with  the  concurrence  and  assist- 
ance of  the  inhabitants  themselves,  gradually 
transform  the  status  of  slavery,  and  substitute  for 
it  a  system  of  paid  labour,  which  will  probably  be 
acceptable  to  master  and  servant  alike.'* 

Thus,  the  Soudan  has  been  launched  on  the 
path  which  leads  to  moral  and  material  progress. 
With  reasonable  prudence  in  the  management  of 
its  affairs,  it  should  continue,  year  by  year,  to 
advance  in  prosperity. 


CHAPTER   LXI 


CONCLUSION 


Summary  of  this  work — Changes  since  the  time  of  Ismail — The  British 
reformers — Their  Egyptian  allies — Stability  of  the  reforms 

A  SHORT  account  has  thus  been  given  of  the  reforms 
which,  during  the  last  few  years,  have  been  carried 
out  in  all  the  more  important  branches  of  the 
Egyptian  and  Soudanese  State  administrations. 
The  description  given  of  those  reforms  is,  indeed, 
defective.  Several  important  subjects  have  not 
been  even  mentioned.  No  allusion  has  been  made 
to  the  services  of  many  officials  who  have  done 
excellent  work  in  their  special  spheres  of  action/ 
All  that  has  been  attempted  is  to  give  a  general 
sketch  of  the  progress  of  Egyptian  reform.  Even 
this  imperfect  sketch  may,  however,  suffice  to 
indicate  the  main  features  of  the  work  which  has 
been  accomplished.  It  has  been  shown  how  the 
extravagance  and  maladministration  of  Ismail 
Pasha  led  to  his  own  downfall,  and  to  the  im- 
position of  a  qualified  European  tutelage  on  the 
Egyptian  Government ;  how,  at  the  moment  when 
that    tutelage   was    beginning    to    produce    some 

*  I  take  this  opportunity  of  testifying:  to  the  excellent  services 
rendered  by  the  first  Secretaries  in  the  Diplomatic  Service  who  acted 
for  me  during  my  temporary  absences  from  Egypt.  These  were  Sir 
Gerald  Portal,  whose  premature  death  was  a  great  loss  to  his  country, 
Sir  Arthur  Hardinge,  Sir  Rennell  Rodd,  and  Mr.  Findlay.  I  cannot 
speak  too  highly  of  the  invaluable  assistance  I  received  from  all  of  these 
gentlemen. 

655 


556  MODERN  EGYPT  tt.y\ 

beneficial  results,  the  country  was  thrown  back 
mto  disorder  by  a  military  mutiny,  the  offspring 
of  Ismail's  reckless  conduct,  and  by  the  growth  of 
national  aspirations  in  a  form  which  rendered  them 
incapable  of  realisation  ;  and  how  England  finally 
intervened  and  bade  disorder  and  administrative 
chaos  cease.  The  readers  of  this  book  have  been 
conducted,  subject  by  subject,  through  the  compli- 
cated mazes  of  the  Egyptian  administrative  system. 
The  degree  of  progress  which  has  been  made  in  the 
direction  of  introducing  Western  civilisation  into 
the  country  has  been  described  in  some  detail. 

No  one  can  fully  realise  the  extent  of  the  change 
which  has  come  over  Egypt  since  the  British 
occupation  took  place  unless  he  is  in  some  degree 
familiar  with  the  system  under  which  the  country 
was  governed  in  the  days  of  Ismail  Pasha.  The 
contrast  between  now  and  then  is,  indeed,  remark- 
able. A  new  spirit  has  been  instilled  into  the 
population  of  Egypt.  Even  the  peasant  has  learnt 
to  scan  his  rights.  Even  the  Pasha  has  learnt 
that  others  besides  himself  have  rights  which  must 
be  respected.  The  courbash  may  hang  on  the 
walls  of  the  Moudirieh,  but  the  JNIoudir  no  longer 
dares  to  employ  it  on  the  backs  of  the  fellaheen. 
For  all  practical  purposes,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
hateful  corvee  system  has  disappeared.  Slavery 
has  virtually  ceased  to  exist.  The  halcyon  days 
of  the  adventurer  and  the  usurer  are  past.  Fiscal 
burthens  have  been  greatly  relieved.  Everywhere 
law  reigns  supreme.  Justice  is  no  longer  bought 
and  sold.  Nature,  mstead  of  being  spurned  and 
neglected,  has  been  wooed  to  bestow  her  gifts  on 
mankind.  She  has  responded  to  the  appeal.  The 
waters  of  the  Nile  are  now  utilised  in  an  intelli- 
gent manner.  Means  of  locomotion  have  been 
improved  and  extended.  The  soldier  has  acquired 
some  pride  in  the  uniform  which  he  wears.     He 


CH.  Lxi  CONCLUSION  557 

has  fought  as  he  never  fought  before.  The  sick 
man  can  be  nursed  in  a  well-managed  hospital. 
The  lunatic  is  no  longer  treated  like  a  wild  beast. 
The  punishment  awarded  to  the  worst  criminal  is 
no  longer  barbarous.  Lastly,  the  schoolmaster  is 
abroad,  with  results  which  are  as  yet  uncertain, 
but  which  cannot  fail  to  be  important. 

All  these  things  have  been  accomplished  by  the 
small  body  of  Englishmen  who,  in  various  capaci- 
ties, and  with  but  little  direct  support  or  assistance 
from  their  Government  or  its  representative,  have 
of  late  years  devoted  their  energies  to  the  work  of 
Egyptian  regeneration.  They  have  had  many 
obstacles  to  encounter.  Internationalism  and 
Pashadom  have  stood  in  the  path  at  every  turn. 
But  these  forces,  though  they  could  retard,  have 
failed  to  arrest  the  progress  of  the  British  reformer. 
The  opposition  which  he  has  had  to  encounter, 
albeit  very  embarrassing,  merely  acted  on  his 
system  as  a  healthy  tonic.  An  eminent  French 
literary  critic^  has  said  that  the  end  of  a  book 
should  recall  its  commencement  to  the  mind  of 
the  reader.  Acting  on  this  principle,  I  may 
remind  those  who  have  perused  these  pages  that  I 
began  this  work  by  stating  that,  although  possibly 
counterparts  to  all  the  abuses  which  existed,  and 
which  to  some  extent  still  exist  in  Egypt,  may  be 
found  in  other  countries,  the  conditions  under 
which  the  work  of  Egyptian  reform  has  been 
undertaken  were  very  peculiar.^  The  special  diffi- 
culties which  have  resulted  from  those  conditions 
have  but  served  to  bring;  out  in  strono;  relief  one  of 
the  mam  characteristics  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race. 
Other  nations  might  have  equally  well  conceived 
the  reforms  which  were  necessary.  It  required 
the  singular  political  adaptability  of  Englishmen 
to  execute  them.     A  country  and  a  nation  have 

*  Joubert.  2  yjdg  ^nte,  vol.  i.  p.  6. 


558  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vi 

been  partially  regenerated,  in  spite  of  a  perverse 
system  of  government  which  might  well  have 
seemed  to  render  regeneration  almost  impossible. 

Yet,  when  it  is  said  that  all  these  things  were 
accomplished  by  the  Englishmen  who  have  served 
the  Egyptian  Government,  one  qualifying  remark 
should  in  justice  be  made.  It  should  never  be 
forgotten  that  many  Egyptians  have  themselves 
borne  a  very  honourable  and  useful  part  in  the 
work  of  Egyptian  regeneration. 

Is  the  skilled  labour,  the  energy,  the  persever- 
ance, and  the  patient  toil  of  the  English  reformers 
and  their  Egyptian  allies  to  be  thrown  away  ?  Is 
Egypt  again  to  relapse  into  a  semi  -  barbarous 
condition  ?  Will  posterity  declare  that  this  noble 
effort  to  elevate  a  whole  nation  ended  in  ultimate 
failure  ? 

I  cannot  say  what  will  be  the  future  of  Egypt, 
but  I  hope  and  believe  that  these  questions  may  be 
answered  in  the  negative. 

According  to  the  Eastern  adage,  the  grass  never 
grows  again  where  once  the  hoof  of  the  Sultan's 
horse  has  trod.  In  the  sorely  tried  country  of 
which  this  history  treats,  the  hoof  of  the  Turkish 
horse,  whether  the  rider  were  Sultan  or  Khedive, 
has,  indeed,  left  a  deep  imprint.  Nevertheless,  I 
would  fain  hope  it  is  not  indelible.  We  are  justi- 
fied in  substituting  a  sanguine  in  the  place  of  a 
despondent  metaphor.  Where  once  the  seeds  of 
true  Western  civilisation  have  taken  root  so  deeply 
as  is  now  the  case  in  Egypt,  no  retrograde  forces, 
however  malignant  they  may  be,  will  in  the  end  be 
able  to  check  germination  and  ultimate  growth. 
The  seeds  which  Ismail  Pasha  and  his  predecessors 
planted  produced  little  but  rank  weeds.  The  seeds 
which  have  now  been  planted  are  those  of  true 
civilisation.  They  will  assuredly  bring  forth  fruit 
in  due  season.     Interested  antagonism,  ignorance. 


CH.  Lxi  CONCLUSION  559 

religious  prejudice,  and  all  the  forces  which  cluster 
round  an  archaic  and  corrupt  social  system,  may 
do  their  worst.  They  will  not  succeed.  We  have 
dealt  a  blow  to  the  forces  of  reaction  in  Egypt 
from  which  they  can  never  recover,  and  from 
which,  if  England  does  her  duty  towards  herself, 
towards  the  Egyptian  people,  and  towards  the 
civilised  world,  they  will  never  have  a  chance  of 
recovering. 


PART  VII 
THE    FUTURE    OF   EGYPT 


Nullum  numen  abest,  si  sit  p-ude)itia  ;  nos  te, 
NosJucirnuSf  FortunUy  Deam  coeloque  locamus. 

Juvenal,  Sat.  x.  365. 


The  essential  qtialities  of  national  greatness  are  morale  not 
material. 

Lecky''s  History  of  England,  vol.  i.  p.  490. 


VOL.  H  Nl  2  O 


CHAPTER  LXII 


THE   FUTURE   OF   EGYPT 


Quo  Vadisf — The  question  of  the  occupation — Its  duration — Egyptian 
autonomy — The  Capitulations — Desirability  of  training  the  Egyp- 
tians— Importance  of  finance — Display  of  sympathy — Conclusion. 

It  is  probable  that  few  Englishmen  ever  ask  them- 
selves seriously  the  question  of  Quo  Vadis  in  con- 
nection with  either  Indian  or  Egyptian  affairs. 
Even  fewer  are  tempted  to  hazard  any  confident 
answer  to  this  crucial  question. 

The  practical  instincts  of  our  race  lead  us  to 
deal  with  whatever  affairs  we  have  in  hand  for  the 
moment,  and  to  discard  any  attempt  to  peer  too 
curiously  into  the  remote  future.  That  instinct 
seems  to  me  to  be  eminently  wise.  Whether, 
however,  it  be  wise  or  unwise,  it  certainly  exercises 
so  powerful  an  influence  over  my  mind  as  to  pre- 
clude me  from  endeavouring  to  forecast  what  will 
be  the  ultimate  solution  of  the  Egyptian  Question. 
That  solution,  moreover,  depends,  in  no  small 
degree,  on  a  factor  which  is  at  present  both 
unknown  and  uncertain,  viz.,  the  conduct  of  the 
Egyptians  themselves.  We  cannot  as  yet  predict 
with  any  degree  of  assurance  the  moral,  intellectual, 
and  political  results  likely  to  be  obtained  by  the 
transformation  which  is  at  present  taking  place  in 
the  Egyptian  national  character. 

Although,  however,  I  will  not  venture  to  pre- 
dict the  goal  which  will  eventually  be  reached,  I 

663 


564  MODERN  EGYPT  ft.  vii 

have  no  hesitation  in  expressing  an  opinion  as  to 
that  which  we  should  seek  to  attain.  So  far  as 
can  at  present  be  judged,  only  two  alternative 
courses  are  possible.  Egypt  must  eventually  either 
become  autonomous,  or  it  must  be  incorporated 
into  the  British  Empire.  Personally,  I  am  de- 
cidedly in  favour  of  moving  in  the  direction  of  the 
former  of  these  alternatives. 

As  a  mere  academic  question,  I  never  have  been, 
neither  am  I  now  in  favour  of  the  British  occupa- 
tion of  Egypt.  Looking  at  the  matter  from  a 
purely  British  point  of  view,  I  believe  that  the 
opinion  enunciated  by  Lord  Palmerston  in  1857^ 
still  holds  good.  More  than  this,  however  much  I 
should  regret  to  see  the  noble  work  of  Egyptian 
reform  checked,  1  am  quite  prepared  to  admit  that, 
if  it  be  in  the  interests  of  England  to  evacuate 
Egypt,  we  need  not  be  deterred  from  doing  so  by 
the  consideration  that  it  is  in  the  moral  and  material 
interests  of  the  Egyptians,  however  little  some  few 
of  them  may  recognise  the  fact,  that  we  should  con- 
tinue our  occupation  of  the  country.  It  does  not 
appear  to  me  that  we  need  stay  in  Egypt  merely  to 
carry  out  certain  administrative  reforms,  however 
desirable  they  may  be,  unless  those  reforms  are  so 
essential  that  their  non-execution  would  contribute 
to  produce  serious  political  or  financial  complica- 
tions after  the  British  garrison  is  withdrawn.  All 
that  we  have  to  do  is  to  leave  behnid  us  a  fairly 
good,  strong,  and — above  all  things — stable  Govern- 
ment, which  will  obviate  anarchy  and  bankruptcy, 
and  will  thus  prevent  the  Egyptian  Question  from 
again  becoming  a  serious  cause  of  trouble  to 
Europe.  We  need  not  inquire  too  minutely  into 
the  acts  of  such  a  Government.  In  order  to  ensure 
its  stability,  it  should  possess  a  certain  liberty  of 
action,  even  although  it  may  use  that  liberty  in  a 

*  Vide  ante,  vol.  i.  p.  92. 


OttLxn     THE  FUTURE  OF  EGYPT  565 

manner  wliich  would  not  always  be  in  accordance 
with  our  views.  But  it  is  essential  that,  subse- 
quent to  the  evacuation,  the  Government  should, 
broadly  speaking,  act  on  principles  which  will  be 
in  conformity  with  the  commonplace  requirements 
of  Western  civilisation.  The  idea,  which  at  one 
time  found  favour  with  a  section  of  the  British 
public,  that  Egypt  may  be  left  to  "  stew  in  its  own 
juice,"  and  that,  however  great  may  be  the  con- 
fusion and  internal  disorder  which  is  created,  no 
necessity  for  European  interference  will  arise,  may 
at  once  be  set  aside  as  wholly  impracticable.  It  is 
absurd  to  suppose  that  Europe  will  look  on  as  a 
passive  spectator  whilst  a  retrograde  government, 
based  on  purely  Mohammedan  principles  and  obsolete 
Oriental  ideas,  is  established  in  Egypt.  The  material 
interests  at  stake  are  too  important,  and  the  degree 
of  civilisation  to  which  Egypt  has  attained  is  too 
advanced,  to  admit  of  such  a  line  of  conduct  being 
adopted.  Public  opinion  would  force  the  most 
sluggish  Government  into  action.  If  England  did 
not  interfere,  some  other  Power  would  do  so.  Of 
the  many  delusions  which  at  one  time  existed  about 
Egypt,  the  greatest  of  all  is  the  idea  that  England 
can  shake  herself  free  of  the  Egyptian  Question 
merely  by  withdrawing  the  British  garrison,  and 
then  declaring  to  the  world  that  the  Egyptians 
must  get  on  as  well  as  they  can  by  themselves. 
Lord  Granville  pursued  a  policy  of  this  sort  in 
dealing  with  the  affairs  of  the  Soudan,  and  we 
know  with  what  result. 

It  has  sometimes  been  argued  that,  even  if  mis- 
government  were  again  allowed  to  reign  supreme 
in  Egypt,  British  interests  would  be  sufficiently 
secured  if  all  danger  of  occupation  by  any  other 
foreign  Power  were  averted.  I  have  already^ 
alluded  to  this  aspect  of  the  question,  but  the  point 

>  Vide  ante,  p.  383. 


566  MODERN  EGYPT  PT.vn 

is  one  of  so  much  importance  that  I  need  make  no 
apology  for  reverting  to  it. 

It  cannot  be  too  clearly  understood  that  neutral- 
isation, under  whatsoever  conditions,  wholly  fails  to 
solve  the  Egyptian  Question.  The  solution  of  that 
question  would  be  little,  if  at  all,  advanced  by 
merely  obtaining  guarantees  against  foreign  inter- 
ference in  Egypt.  The  main  difficulty  would 
remain  untouched.  That  difficulty  is  to  decide 
who  is  to  interfere,  on  the  assumption  that  some 
foreign  interference  is  indispensable.  If  it  were 
thought  desirable  to  prevent  competition  and 
rivalry  amongst  the  different  offices  of  the  Metro- 
politan Fire  Brigade,  the  object  might  readily  be 
obtained  by  forbidding  any  one  of  them  to  aid  in 
extinguishing  a  fire.  The  practical  result  would 
hardly  be  considered  satisfactory.  This,  however, 
is  the  political  system  which  would  be  involved 
in  the  neutralisation  of  Egypt.  Each  member  of 
the  European  Fire  Brigade  would  be  under  an 
obligation  not  to  turn  his  hose  on  to  an  Egyptian 
conflagration,  in  order  to  avoid  wounding  the 
susceptibilities  of  his  neighbours.  In  the  mean- 
while, the  whole  edifice  of  Egyptian  civilisation 
might,  and  probably  would  be  destroyed,  to  the 
infinite  detriment  not  only  of  the  indigenous  in- 
habitants of  Egypt,  but  also  of  the  large  number 
of  Europeans  who  would  be  ruined  if  the  country 
were  allowed  to  relapse  into  anarchy  and  barbarism. 
The  failure  of  international  action  to  deal  effectively 
with  misgovernment  in  other  parts  of  the  Ottoman 
dominions  serves  as  a  warning  in  dealing  with  Egypt. 

Is  it,  however,  possible  to  ensure  the  existence 
of  a  fairly  good  and  stable  government  in  Egypt 
if  the  British  garrison  were  withdrawn  ?  That  is 
the  main  question  which  has  to  be  answered. 

I  make  no  pretension  to  the  gift  of  political 
prophecy.     I  can  only  state  my  deliberate  opinion. 


CH.  Lxii     THE  FUTURE  OF  EGYPT  567 

formed  after  many  years  of  Egyptian  experience 
and  in  the  face  of  a  decided  predisposition  to  favour 
the  policy  of  evacuation,  that  at  present,  and  for  a 
long  time  to  come,  the  results  of  executing  such  a 
policy  would  be  disastrous.  Looking  to  the  special 
intricacies  of  the  Egyptian  system  of  government, 
to  the  licence  of  the  local  press,  to  the  ignorance 
and  credulity  of  the  mass  of  the  Egyptian  popula- 
tion, to  the  absence  of  Egyptian  statesmen  capable 
of  controlling  Egyptian  society  and  of  guiding  the 
very  complicated  machine  of  government,  to  the 
diminution  of  the  influence  exercised  by  the  British 
officials  and  by  the  diplomatic  Representative  of 
England  in  Egypt  which  would  inevitably  result 
from  the  evacuation,  and  to  the  proved  impotence 
of  international  action  in  administrative  matters 
— it  appears  to  me  impossible  to  blind  oneself  to 
the  fact  that,  if  the  British  garrison  were  now 
withdrawn,  a  complete  upset  would  most  probably 
ensue.  It  has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Egypt 
of  to-day  is  very  different  from  the  Egypt  of  the 
pre-occupation  days.  A  return  to  personal  rule  of 
the  Oriental  type — and  it  is  in  this  direction  that 
events  would  probably  trend  —  would  create  a 
revolution.  A  transfer  of  power  to  the  present 
race  of  Europeanised  Egyptians  would,  to  say  the 
least,  be  an  extremely  hazardous  experiment,  so 
hazardous,  indeed,  that  I  am  very  decidedly  of 
opinion  that  it  would  be  wholly  unjustifiable  to 
attempt  it. 

It  may  be  that  at  some  future  period  the 
Egyptians  may  be  rendered  capable  of  governing 
themselves  without  the  ])resence  of  a  foreign  army 
in  their  midst,  and  without  foreign  guidance  in 
civil  and  military  affairs ;  but  that  period  is  far 
distant.  One  or  more  generations  must,  in  my 
opinion,  pass  away  before  the  question  can  be  even 
usefully  discussed. 


568  MODERN   EGYPT  pt.  vn 

The  fact,  however,  that  the  occupation  must 
last  for  a  ])eriod  which  cannot  now  be  defined, 
need  not  stand  in  the  way  of  a  gradual  movement 
in  the  direction  of  autonomy  in  the  sense  in  which 
I  understand  that  term  as  applied  to  the  special 
case  of  Egypt.  The  mere  withdrawal  of  the 
British  garrison  would  not  render  E^ypt  autono- 
mous ;  on  the  contrary,  it  would  diminish  the 
prospect  of  eventual  autonomy.  It  is  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms  to  describe  a  country  as  self- 
governing  when  all  its  most  important  laws  are 
passed,  not  by  any  of  its  inhabitants  or  by  any 
institutions  existing  within  its  own  confines,  but 
by  the  Governments  and  legislative  institutions  of 
sixteen  foreign  Powers.^  Such,  however,  will  be 
the  condition  of  Egypt  until  the  existing  regime 
of  the  Capitulations  is  altered.  There  are,  so 
far  as  I  know,  only  two  methods  for  effecting  a 
radical  alteration  of  that  regime.  One  is  that 
Egypt  should  cease  to  form  part  of  the  Ottoman 
dominions  and  should  be  annexed  by  some  foreign 
Power — a  solution  which  1  discard.  The  other  is 
that  means  should  be  devised  for  establishing  a 
local  legislature  competent  to  deal  with  all  local 
matters.  The  only  real  Egyptian  autonomy,  there- 
fore, which  I  am  able  to  conceive  as  either  practic- 
able or  capable  of  realisation  without  serious  injury 
to  all  the  various  interests  involved,  is  one  which 
will  enable  all  the  dwellers  in  cosmopolitan  Egypt, 
be  they  Moslem  or  Christian,  European,  Asiatic,  or 
African,  to  be  fused  into  one  self-governing  body. 
That  it  may  take  years — possibly  generations — to 

'  It  has  also  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  unanimity  amongst  all  the 
foreign  Powers  is  necessary  before  any  law  can  come  into  force.  Prior 
to  1867,  the  German  ZoUverein  was  constituted  on  a  somewhat  similar 
basis.  Every  state  of  the  union  bad  an  absolute  right  of  veto  on  any 
proposal  submitted  for  its  consideration.  The  system,  Mr.  Percy 
Ashley  says  {Modem  Tariff  History,  p.  49),  caused  "  innumerable 
difficulties  and  delays."     It  has,  of  course,  long  since  ceased  to  exist. 


CH.LXII     THE  FUTURE  OF  EGYPT  569 

achieve  this  object  is  more  than  probable,  but  unless 
it  can  be  achieved,  any  idea  of  autonomy,  in  the  true 
sense  of  the  term,  will,  in  my  opinion,  have  to 
be  aband  jned.  I  stated  in  the  last  Report  I  wrote 
from  Egypt  that  it  is  well  for  every  individual  and 
every  nation  to  have  an  ideal.  The  ideal  of  the 
Moslem  patriot  is,  in  my  opinion,  incapable  of 
realisation.  The  ideal  which  I  substitute  in  its 
place  is  extremely  difficult  of  attainment,  but  if 
the  Egyptians  of  the  rising  generation  will  have 
the  wisdom  and  foresight  to  work  cordially  and 
patiently,  in  co-operation  witli  European  sympa- 
thisers, to  attain  it,  it  may  possibly  in  time  be 
found  capable  of  realisation. 

In  the  meanwhile,  no  effort  should  be  spared  to 
render  the  native  Egyptians  capable  of  eventually 
taking  their  share  in  the  government  of  a  really 
autonomous  community.  Much  has  already  been 
done  in  this  direction,  and  it  may  be  confidently 
anticipated,  now  that  the  finances  of  the  country  are 
established  on  a  sound  footing  and  the  most  press- 
ing demands  necessary  to  ensure  material  prosperity 
have  been  met,  that  intellectual,  and  perhaps  moral 
progress  will  proceed  more  rapidly  during  the  next 
quarter  of  a  century  than  during  that  which  has 
now  terminated.  Only,  it  should  never  be  forgotten 
that  the  rapidity  of  the  progress  must  be  made 
contingent  on  the  means  available  for  ensuring  it. 
"  Sound  finance,"  as  has  been  most  truly  said,  "  is 
the  foundation  of  the  independence  of  States."  ^ 
Nothing  caj.  compensate  the  Egyptians  for  a 
financial  relapse. 

Lastly,  it  should  never  be  forgotten  that,  in 
default  of  community  of  race,  religion,  language, 
and  habits  of  thought,  which  ordinarily  constitute 
the  main  bonds  of  union  between  the  rulers  and 
the  ruled,  we  must  endeavour  to  forge  such  artificial 

*  Oliver's  Alexander  Haniilton,  p.  304. 


570  MODERN  EGYPT  pt.  vii 

bonds  between  the  Englishman  and  the  Egyptian 
as  the  circumstances  of  the  case  render  available. 

One  of  the  most  important  of  these  bonds 
must  always  be  the  exhibition  of  reasonable  and 
disciplined  sympathy  for  the  Egyptians,  not  merely 
by  the  British  Government,  but  by  every  individual 
Englishman  engaged  in  the  work  of  Egyptian 
administration.  This  sympathy  is  a  quality,  the 
possession  or  absence  of  which  is  displayed  by 
Englishmen  in  very  various  degrees  when  they  are 
brought  in  contact  with  Asiatic  or  African  races. 
Some  go  to  the  extreme  of  almost  brutal  antipathy, 
whilst  others  display  their  ill-regulated  sympathy  in 
forms  which  are  exaggerated  and  even  mischievous. 
The  Egyptians  rightly  resent  the  .conduct  of  the 
one  class,  and  ridicule  that  of  the  other.  A  middle 
course,  based  on  accurate  information  and  on  a 
careful  study  of  Egyptian  facts  and  of  the  Egyptian 
character,  will  be  found  more  productive  of  result 
than  either  extreme. 

Another  bond  may,  to  some  extent,  be  forged 
by  appealing  to  the  person  or  the  pocket.  A 
proper  system  of  justice  and  of  police  can  protect 
the  former.  Material  interests  can  be  served  by 
various  means,  the  most  effective  of  which  is  to 
keep  taxation  low.  Do  not  let  us,  however,  imagine 
that,  under  any  circumstances,  we  can  ever  create 
a  feeling  of  loyalty  in  the  breasts  of  the  Egyptians 
akin  to  that  felt  by  a  self-governing  people  for  in- 
digenous rulers  if,  besides  being  indigenous,  they 
are  also  beneficent.  Neither  by  the  display  of 
sympathy,  nor  by  good  government,  can  we  forge 
bonds  which  will  be  other  than  brittle.  Sir  Herbert 
Edwards,  writing  to  Lord  Lawrence  a  few  years 
after  the  annexation  of  the  Punjab,  said  :  "  We 
are  not  liked  anywhere.  .  .  .  The  people  hailed 
us  as  deliverers  from  Sikh  maladministration,  and 
we  were  popular  so  long  as  we  were  plaistering 


CH.  Lxii     THE  FUTURE  OF  EGYPT  571 

wounds.  But  the  patient  is  well  now,  and  he 
finds  the  doctor  a  bore.  There  is  no  getting  over 
the  fact  that  we  are  not  Mahommedans,  that  we 
neither  eat,  drink,  nor  intermarry  witli  them."^ 

The  present  situation  in  Egypt  is  very  similar 
to  that  which  existed  in  the  Punjab  when  Sir 
Herbert  Edwards  wrote  these  lines.  The  want 
of  gratitude  displayed  by  a  nation  to  its  alien 
benefactors  is  almost  as  old  as  history  itself^  In 
whatever  degree  ingratitude  may  exist,  it  would  be 
unjust  to  blame  the  Egyptians  for  following  the 
dictates  of  human  nature.  In  any  case,  whatever 
be  the  moral  harvest  we  may  reap,  we  must 
continue  to  do  our  duty,  and  our  duty  has  been 
indicated  to  us  by  the  Apostle  St.  Paul.  We  must 
not  be  "weary  in  well-doing." 

I  take  leave  of  a  country  with  which  I  have 
been  so  long  associated  with  the  expression  of  an 
earnest  hope  that,  in  the  future,  as  in  the  recent 
past,  Egypt  will  continue  to  be  governed  in  the 
interests  of  the  Egyptians,  and  I  commend  to  my 
own  countrymen  the  advice  which  was  given  to 
Rome  by  one  of  the  later  Latin  poets  :  ^ 

Quod  regnas  minus  est  quam  quod  regnare  mereris. 

^  Life  of  Lord  Lawrence,  vol.  ii.  p.  20. 

2  Gre^orovius  {Rome  in  the  Middle  Ages,  i.  323)  says,  speaking  of 
the  rule  of  Theodorie  in  Italy  :  "The  unhappy  King  now  learnt  by 
experience  that  not  even  the  wisest  and  most  liumane  of  princes,  if  he 
be  an  ah  en  in  race,  in  customs,  and  religion,  can  ever  win  the  hearts  of 
the  people." 

*  RutiliuB. 


APPENDIIX 


KHEDIVES  OF  EGYPT 


Name. 

Born. 

Died. 

Reigned. 

Mehemet  Ali 

1769 

1849 

1811-1848 

Ibrahim 

1789 

1848 

1  S48  (June-Nov.) 

Abbas  I. 

1813 

1854 

1848-1854 

Said     . 

1822 

1863 

1854-1863 

Ismail .         .         , 

1830 

1895 

1863-1879 

Tewfik           .          , 

1852 

1892 

1879-1892 

Abbas  II.      . 

1874 

... 

1892- 

BRITISH  SECRETARIES  OF  STATE  FOR 
FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 


Name. 

From. 

To. 

Earl  of  Derby 

February  21,  1874 

April  2,  1878 

Marquess  of  Salisbury  . 

April  2,  1878 

April  28,  1880 

Earl  Granville 

April  28,  1880 

June  24,  1885 

Marquess  of  Salisbury  . 

June  24,  1885 

February  6,  1886 

Earl  of  Rosebery  . 

Februaiy  6,  1886 

August  3,  1886 

Earl  of  Iddesleigh 

August  3,  1886 

January  14,  1887 

Marquess  of  Salisbury  . 

January  14,  1887 

August  18,  189ii 

Earl  of  Rosebery  . 

August  18,  1892 

March  11,  1894 

Earl  of  Kimberley 

March  11,  1894 

June  29,  1895 

Marquess  of  Salisbury  . 

June  29,  1895 

November  12,  1900 

1  Marquess  of  Lansdowne 

November  12,  190( 

)     December  11,  1905 

1  Sir  Edward  Grey  . 

1 

December  11,  I90. 

5 

678 


574 


MODERN  EGYPT 


BRITISH  AGENTS  AND  CONSULS-GENERAL 
IN  EGYPT 


Name. 

From. 

To. 

Lord  Vivian 

May  10,  1876 

March  20,  1879 

Sir  Frank  Lascelles    . 

March  20,  1879       . 

October  10,  1879 

Sir  Edward  Malet      . 

October  10,  1879    . 

September  11,  1883 

Earl  of  Cromer  . 

September  11,  1883 

May  6,  1907 

Sir  Eldon  Gorst 

May  6,  1907  . 

^ 

CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE   OF   EVENTS 


1875- 

\dhesion   of  the   British   Government  to  the 
International  Law  Courts  .... 


July  SI. 


1876 

Mr.  Cave  reports  on  the  Finances  of  Egypt        .  March  23. 
The  Khedive  suspends  payment  of  his  Treasury 

Bills April  8. 

Creation  of  the  Commission  of  the  Public  Debt  May  2. 

Issue  of  the  Goschen-Joubert  Decree         .         .  November  18. 

Appointment  of  English  and  French  Controllers 

(Mr.  Romaine  and  Baron  de  Malaret)  .  December  25. 

1877 

An  English  Commissioner  (Sir  Evelyn  Baring) 

appointed  to  the  Commission  of  the  Debt     .     March  2. 

Signature  of  the  Anti-Slavery  Convention  be- 
tween the  British  and  Egyptian  Govern- 
ments          August  4. 


1878 

The  Khedive  consents  to  a  full  inquiry  into  the 

financial  position  of  Egypt  .         .         .     April  4. 

Treaty  of  Berlin         ......     August  S. 

First  Report  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry         .     August  19. 

The  principle  of  Ministerial  responsibility  is  re- 
cognised. Nubar  Pasha  charged  with  the 
formation  of  a  Ministry.  Suspension  of  the 
Dual  Control.  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  and  M.  de 
Bligni^res  appointed  Ministers  of  Finance 
and  Public  Works  respectively   .         .         ,     August  28. 

Issue  of  the  Domains  Loan  of  £8,500,000  .         .    October  29 

675 


576 


MODERN  EGYPT 


1879 

Nubar  Pasha  and  Sir  Rivers  Wilson  assaulted  by 

a  crowd  of  Egyptian  officers        .         .         .  February  18. 

Resignation  of  Nubar  Pasha      '.         .         .         .  February  Ip. 

Prince  Tewfik  appointed  Prime  Minister  .         .  March  10. 
Dismissal  of  the  European   Ministers.      Ch^rif 

Pasha  appointed  Prime  Minister  .         .  April  7. 

Second  Report  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry, 

and  resignation  of  the  Commissioners  .  April  10. 

The  Sultan  deposes  the  Khedive        .         .         .  Jiuie  26. 

Ismail  Pasha  leaves  Egypt  ....  June  30. 

Chdrif  Pasha  resigns  office  ....  August  18. 

The  Dual  Control  revived.     M.  de   Bligni^res 

and  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  appointed  Controllers  September  4. 

Riaz  Pasha  forms  a  Ministry      .         .         •         •  September  22> 

1880 

Repeal  of  the  Law  of  the  Moukabala  ,         •  January  6. 

Appointment  of  a  Commission  of  Liquidation     .  April  2. 
Sir   Auckland    Colvin   appointed    Controller  in 

succession  to  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  .         .  Jiuie  23. 

Promulgation  of  the  Law  of  Liquidation    •         •  July  17. 

1881 

Mutiny  of  the  Egyptian  Army.     The  Minister 

of  War  is  dismissed    .....     February  1. 

The  Egyptian  Army  again  mutinies.  Fall  of 
the  Riaz  Ministry.  Ch^rif  Pasha  becomes 
Prime  Minister  ......     September  9. 

The  Sultan  sends  two  Commissioners  to  Egypt       October  6. 

At  the  instance  of  the  French  and  British 
Governments,  the  Turkish  Commissioners 
leave  Egypt        ......     October  19- 

M.  Gambetta  assumes  office       .         •         •         •    November  12. 


1882 

The  British  and  French  Governments  address  a 

Joint  Note  to  the  Khedive  .         .         .    January  8. 

M.  Gambetta  resigns  office.     He  is  succeeded 

by  M.  de  Freycinet    .....     January  31. 

Ch^rif  Pasha  is  dismissed  from  office.  Mahmoud 
Pasha  Sami  api)ointcd  Prime  Minister,  with 
Arabi  as  Minister  of  War   ....     February  5- 


TABLE  OF  EVENTS 


577 


M.  de  Bligni^res  resigns  his  appointment  of  Con- 
troller-General ......     March. 

The  Arabist  Ministers  resign,  but  are  reinstated 

in  office      ...  ...     May  23. 

The  British  and  French  Consuls-General  demand 
that  Arabi  should  leave  the  country.  The 
Arabist  Ministry  again  resigns    .         .  .     May  27. 

The  Arabist  Ministry  is  again  reinstated    .         .     May  28. 

The  Sultan  sends  Dervish  Pasha  as  Special  Com- 
missioner to  Egypt     .....     June  4. 

A  serious  riot,  attended  with  loss  of  life,  occurs 

at  Alexandria     .         .         .         .         .         .     June  11. 

Ragheb  Pasha  is  named  Prime  Minister,  with 

Arabi  as  Minister  of  War   ....    Jmie  1 7. 

A  Conference,  in  which  Turkey  refuses  to  take 

part,  meets  at  Constantinople      .         .         .     June  23. 

Bombardment  of  Alexandria.     The  Ar^bists  set 

fire  to  the  town  .....    July  1 1. 

On  the  motion  of  M.  Clemenceau,  the  French 
Chamber  passes  a  vote  adverse  to  the 
Ministry.  M.  de  Freycinet  resigns.  M. 
Duclerc  forms  a  Ministry   ....     August  1. 

Battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir September  IS. 

Cairo    occupied    by   British   troops.      Ardbi   is 

arrested      .......     September  15. 

The  Egyptian  Army  is  disbanded       .         .         .     September  19. 

Lord  Dufferin  instructed  to  go  to  Egypt    .         .     October  29. 

Arabi  condemned  to  exile  ....     December  3. 

It  is  decided  not  to  re-establish  the  Dual  Control     December. 

Death  of  M.  Gambetta December  31. 


1883 

Issue  of  a  Circular  prohibiting  the  use  of  the 

courbash    .......  January  l6. 

Capitulation  of  El-Obeid   .....  Januaiy  19. 

Sir  Auckland  Colvin  appointed  Financial  Adviser  February  4. 

Promulgation  of  the  Organic  Law      .         .         .  May  1 . 

General  Hicks's  army  leaves  Duem  .         .         .  September  8. 

Massacre  of  Egyptian  reinforcements  sent  from 

Suakin  to  Sinkat         .....  October  l6. 

Sir  Evelyn  Baring  appointed  Agent  and  Consul- 

General     . September  11, 

The  British  Government  agree  to  the  reduction 
of  the   garrison  and   the  concentration  of 

British  troops  at  Alexandria        .         .         .  November  1. 

Sir  Edgar  Vincent  appointed  Financial  Adviser  November  4. 
VOL.  II  2  P 


578 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Total  defeat  of  the  Egyptian  troops  sent   to 

the   relief  of  Tokar.      Death   of  Captain 

MoncriefF,  R.N.  .         .         .         .         .     November  4. 

News  of  the  annihilation  of  General  Hicks's 

army  arrives  at  Cairo  ....     November  18. 

Sir  Evelyn  Baring  recommends  the  abandonment 

of  the  Soudan    ......     November  19. 

The  British  Government  agree  to  the  policy  of 

abandoning  the  Soudan      ....     November  20. 
The  reduction  of  the  British  garrison  in  Egypt 

countermanded  .....     November  25. 

Defeat  of  the  Egyptians  at  Tamanieb         .         .     December  2. 
Fall    of   Dara.     Slatin    Bey   is   taken    prisoner. 

The  Province  of  Darfour  falls  into  the  power 

of  the  Mahdi ,     December  23. 


1884 

Ch«irif  Pasha  resigns  office.     Nubar  Pasha  forms 

a  Ministry  ......     January  8. 

General  Gordon  and  Colonel  Stewart  leave  Cairo 

for  Khartoum     ......     January  26. 

Defeat  of  General  Baker's  force  at  El  Teb         .     February  4. 
Annihilation  of  the  Sinkat  garrison    .  .         .     February  8. 

General  Gordon  arrives  at  Berber      .         .  .     February  11. 

General  Gordon  arrives  at  Khartoum  .  .     February  18. 

Sir  Gerald  Graham  defeats  the   Dervishes   at 

El  Teb February  29. 

The  British  Government  finally  refuse  to  employ 

Zobeir  Pasha  in  the  Soudan         .         .  .     March  5. 

Sir  Gerald  Graham  defeats    the    Dervishes  at 

Tamai March  13. 

The  British  Government  refuse  to  send  troops 

from  Suakin  to  Berber         ....     March  25. 
Fall  of  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  Province  .  .  .     April  9. 

All  communication  with  Khartoum  is  cut  off      .     April  19. 

Fall  of  Berber May  19. 

First    Meeting  of  the   London  Conference  on 

Egyptian  Finance        .....     June  28. 
Last  Meeting  of  the  London  Conference  .     August  2. 

The  British  Government  obtain  a  vote  of  credit 

in  the  House  of  Commons  on  account  of  the 

Soudan  Expedition August  8. 

Zeyla  occupied  by  British  troops         .  .  .     August  24. 

Lord  Wolseley  appointed   to   the   command   of 

the  Soudan  Expedition        ....     August  26. 
Murder  of  Colonel  Stewart  and  Mr,  Power  .     September  18. 


TABLE  OF  EVENTS 


579 


Berbera  occupied  by  British  troops    .         .         .     September  24. 
Lord  Northbrook  reports  on  the  Egyptian  situa- 
tion     November  20. 


1885 

Battle  of  Abu  Klea 

Sir  Herbert  Stewart  is  mortally  wounded.  The 
Desert  Column  arrives  at  Gubat 

Sir  Charles  Wilson  leaves  Gubat  for  Khartoum  . 

Fall  of  Khartoum  and  death  of  General  Gordon 

The  Italians  occupy  Massowah  .... 

Action  of  Kirbekan.     Death  of  General  Earle    . 

An  Egyptian  loan  of  £9,000,000  is  guaranteed 
by  the  Powers    ...... 

Action  at  Hashin  (Eastern  Soudan)   .         . 

Action  of  Tofrik  (Eastern  Soudan)     . 

Sir  Francis  Grenfell  appointed  to  command  the 
Egyptian  Army  ..... 

Evacuation  of  Harrar  ..... 

The  British  troops  retire  from  Dongola      .         . 

Death  of  the  Mahdi 

Capitulation  of  Sennar       ..... 

Capitulation  of  Kassala      ..... 

Convention  signed  at  Constantinople  under  which 
Sir  Henry  Wolff  and  Moukhtar  Pasha  pro- 
ceed as  Joint-Commissioners  to  Egypt 

Battle  of  Ginniss       .*.... 


January  17. 

January  19. 
January  24. 
January  26. 
February  5. 
February  10. 

March  18. 
March  20. 
March  22. 

April  19. 
April  26. 
June  13. 
June  22. 
August  19. 
September  30. 


October  24. 
December  30. 


1886 

The  last  of  the  British  troops  leave  Suakin         .    January  26. 
Europeans  resident  in  Egypt  are  rendered  liable 

to  the  payment  of  the  House  Tax       .         .     April  15. 


1887 

Signature  of  the  Wolff  Convention 

The  Sultan  having  refused  to  ratify  the  Wolff 
Convention,  Sir  Henry  Wolff  leaves  Con- 
stantinople ...... 

Sir  Gerald  Portal's  mission  to  Abyssinia     . 


May  28. 


July  15. 
October  12. 


1888 

Issue  of  a  Decree  partially  abolishing  the  corvee    April  2. 
The  Suez  Canal  Convention  is  signed,  but  not 


made  operative 


April  29. 


580 


MODERN  EGYPT 

Riaz    Pasha    forms   a 


Fall   of  Nubar   Pasha. 

Ministry     .......    June  9. 

Decree  issued  constituting  a  Reserve  Fund  of 

£2,000,000 July  12. 

Action  of  Gemaizeh.     The  Dervishes  are  driven 

from  the  neighbourhood  of  Suakin      .         .    December  20. 


1889 

The  power  of  making  by-laws  applicable  to 
Europeans  is  conferred  on  the  Egyptian 
Government        ......     January  31. 

Stanley  and  Emin  Pasha  meet  at  Kavalli  .         .     February  17. 

Sir    Evelyn    Baring    reports   that    the   "  Race 

against  Bankruptcy"  is  pi-actically  won       .     February  18. 

Battle  between  the  Abyssinians  and  the  Der- 
vishes.    Death  of  King  John      .         .         .     March  9. 

Abolition  of  the  Commissions  of  Brigandage       .     July. 

Colonel  Wodehouse   defeats  the    Dervishes   at 

Arguin July  2. 

Sir   Francis   Grenfell  defeats   the   Dervishes  at 

Toski.     Death  of  Wad-el-Nejumi        .  .     August  3. 

Sir  Elwin  Palmer  is  appointed  Financial  Adviser 

in  succession  to  Sir  Edgar  Vincent     .         .     October  23. 


1890 

The  repairs  to  the  Barrage  are  completed  .  June. 

Issue  of  a  Decree   converting  the   Preference 

Stock         .......  June  7. 

Issue  of  a  Decree  converting  the  Daira  Stock    .  July  5, 


1891 

Appointment  of  Sir  John  Scott  to  be  Judicial 

Adviser      .......     February  15. 

The  Dervishes  are  defeated,  and  the  Province  of 

Tokar  is  reoccupied    .....     February  19. 

Fall   of  Riaz   Pasha.       Mustapha   Pasha   Fehmi 

forms  a  Ministry         .....     May  14. 


1892 

Death  of  the  Khedive  Tewfik    ....     January  7. 

Total  aboHtion  of  the  corvee  for  dredging  pur- 
poses. Reduction  of  the  Salt  Tax.  Aboli- 
tion of  the  Professional  Tax         .  .  .     January  28. 


TABLE  OF  EVENTS 


581 


Sir   Herbert    Kitchener   succeeds    Sir    Francis 

Grenfell  in  command  of  the  Egyptian  Army    April  9. 

1893 

Dismissal  of  Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi  .         .  January  15. 

Riaz  Pasha  forms  a  Ministry       ....  January  18. 
The  Dervishes  are  defeated  by  the  Italians  at 

Agordat December  4. 

1894 

Resignation  of  Riaz  Pasha.     Nubar  Pasha  forms 

a  Ministry  ......     April  14. 

Kassala  captured  by  the  Italians         .         •         ,     July  17. 

Appointment  of  Sir  Eldon  Gorst  to  be  Adviser 

to  the  Department  of  the  Interior      .         .    November  2. 


1895 

Nubar  Pasha  resigns.     Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi 
is  appointed  Prime  Minister        .         . 


November  11. 


1896 

Defeat  of  the  Italian  Army  at  Adua  .         .         .     March  I. 

The  British  Government   decide  to  recapture 

Dongola March  12. 

The  Caisse  de  la  Dette  advances  £500,000  to 

the  Egyptian  Government  .         .         .     March  26. 

Battle  of  Firket June  7. 

Dongola  occupied      ......     September  23, 

The  Court  of  Appeal  order  the  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment to  refund  the  money  advanced  by  the 
Caisse  de  la  Dette December  2. 

The  money  is  repaid December  6. 


1897 

Capture  of  Rejaf  by  the  Belgians       .         ,         .  February  7. 

British  mission  despatched  to  Abyssinia     .         .  March  10. 

Abu  Hamed  captured         .....  August  7. 

Berber  occupied August  31. 

Suakin-Berber  road  opened         ....  October  18. 
Railway  from  Wadi  Haifa  to  Abu  Hamed  com- 
pleted           October  3h 

Kassala  reoccupied  by  Egyptian  troops       .  .  December  26. 


582 


MODERN  EGYPT 


1898 

National  Bank  created  with  authority  to  issue 

promissory  notes         .....     June  25. 

Signature  of  the  contract  for  the  construction 

of  the  Nile  Reservoirs         ....     February  20. 

Battle  of  the  Atbara April  8. 

Signature  of  the  contract  for  selling  the  Daira 

property     .......    June  21. 

The  French  arrive  at  Fashoda   ....     July  10. 

Battle  of  Omdurman  .....     September  2. 

Sir    Malcolm    Mcllwraith    appointed    Judicial 

Adviser      . October  20. 

Sir  Eldon  Gorst  appointed  Financial  Adviser, 
and  Mr.  Machell  appointed  Adviser  to  the 
Interior October  20. 

The  French  evacuate  Fashoda  .        •        •         .    December  11. 


1899 

Lord  Cromer's  speech  at  Omdurman  .         .     January  4. 

Death  of  Nubar  Pasha        .....     January  14. 
Signature  of  the  Soudan  Gjnvention  .  .     January  19. 

Destruction  of  the   Khalifa's  army.     Death  of 

the  Khalifa  and  his  leading  Emirs.      The 

Soudan  declared  open  to  trade  .         .         .     November  24. 
Lord    Kitchener   leaves   Egypt.     Sir    Reginald 

Wingate  assumes  command  of  the  Egyptian 

army  .......     December  21. 

Soudan  railway  opened  to  Halfaya     .         .         .     December  30. 


1900 

Post-Office  Savings  Banks  established 
Navigation  dues  on  the  Nile  abolished 


January  1. 
November  29. 


1902 

Creation  of  an  Agricultural  Bank       .         .  .  June  1. 

Commercial  Convention  signed  with  France  .  November  26. 

Inauguration  of  the  Nile  Reservoirs  .         .  .  December  10. 


1903 


Octroi  duties  abolished 


January  1. 


TABLE  OF  EVENTS 


583 


1904 

Sir  William  Garstin's  report  on  the  Nile    .         ,  March  ]  2. 
Signature  of  the  Anglo-French  Agreement         .  April  8. 
Sir  Vincent  Corbett  appointed  Financial  Adviser  April  12. 
Issue  of  a  Decree  giving  effect  to  the  Anglo- 
French  Agreement     .....  November  28. 

1905 
Daira  debt  paid  off  •        .         .        •        .        ,    October  15. 


1906 

The  Salt  Monopoly  abolished    ....    January  1. 

The  Nile- Red  Sea  Railway  opened    .         .         .     January  27. 

Mr.  Dunlop  named  Adviser  to  the  Department 

of  Public  Instruction  ....     March  24. 

Sir  Nicholas  O'Conor  addresses  a  note  to  the 
Porte  which  terminates  the  "  Sinai  Penin- 
sula" incident    ......     May  15. 

Liquidation  of  the  affairs  of  the  Daira         .         .     October. 

Appointment    of    Saad    Pasha    Zagloul    to   be 

Minister  of  Education         ....     October  29. 


1907 
He  is  succeeded 


Lord  Cromer  leaves  Egypt. 

by  Sir  Eldon  Gorst     . 
Mr.  Harvey  appointed  Financial  Adviser 


May  6. 
October  9. 


on:  Macmillan  ScCo.Ltd. 


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!^SJ7S7!SSSVS!8S?S?T 


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I 


INDEX 


Abbas  I.,  career  and  character,  i. 

19-20 
Abdul  Halim,  Prince,  i.  136 
Abdul-Kader  Pasha,  i.  366-7 
Abdul-Shakour,  Emir,  i.  453 
Abyssinia,  Kin^  of,  treaty  with, 
re  frontier  garrisons,  ii.  48 
Abyssinian  frontier  garrisons,  ii. 

47-9 
Accounts  Department,  Egyptian, 
Sir  Gerald  Fitzgerald  head 
of,  i.  28 
Administration,  the — 
Of  Interior,  ii.  478-513 

difficulties     of     reform,.  U. 

478-82 
police  reform,  ii.  482-90' 
prisons,  ii.  491-4 
slavery,  ii.  496-504 
medical     and     sanitary,     ii. 
504-13 
Of  Justice,  ii.  614-23 
Committee  of  Surveillance,  ii. 

618 
Lord  Cromer's  advice  on  re- 
form of,  ii.  521 
Of  Education,  ii.  524-42 
lack  of  money  for,  ii.  627 
Pashadom  and,  ii.  628-9 
public  desire  for  schools,  iL 

532 
religious  instruction,  ii.  633 
elementary  education,  ii.  533 
pupils  and  teachers,  ii.  635 
value  of  ed  ucating  the  women, 
ii.  639-42 
Of  the  Soudan,  ii.  643-64 
general  system,  ii.  643-8 
finance,  ii.  649 
taxes,  ii.  650-2 
slavery,  ii.  653 


Airolles,  M.  Liron  d'.  Secretary  of 
Commission  of  Inquiry,  i. 
45 
Ala-el-Din  Pasha,  i.  359 
Alcester,  Lord  {also  see  Sir  Beau- 
champ   Seymour),  instruc- 
tions to,  i.  294 
Alexandria  («eea/*o  Bombardment), 
Arabi's    responsibility    for 
burning,  i.  297 
Anglo-French  Agreement,  1904, 

ii.  388-93 
Annexation,    the    question    of,   L 
93 
'  Annexation  ofSoudan  by  England, 
its- inadvisability,  ii.  113 
Anti-Slavery     Society     and     the 
Soudan,  i.  403,  617,  ii.  60 
'Arabi,  Ahmed,  Pasha — 
mutinies,  i.  176-86 
summons  Notables,  i.  187 
motives  of,  i.  190-3,  208-9 
and  Sultan,  i.  194,  198,  272 
Minister  for  War,  i.  243 
the  Arabi  Ministry,  i.  254-78 
resignation    and    reinstatement 

of,  i.  274-8 
and  slaughter  of  Christians,  L 

288 
dismissal  of,  i.  300 
surrender,   trial,    and  exile,   L 

828,  886 
returns  to  Egypt,  i.  337 
Armenians,  the,  ii.  219 
Army,  British  (in  Egypt) — 
in  1884,  i.  420-1 
Lord  Nortli brook  on  withdrawal 

of,  ii.  870 
Wolff  Convention  on  withdrawal 

of,  ii.  376-81 
comment  on  withdrawal  of,  ii.380 


686 


586 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Army,  the  Egyptian — 
recruitments  for,  i.  60 
mutiny  of  officers,  1879,  i.  74 
petition  of  Arabi,  i.  176-7 
second  mutiny  of  officers,  i.  179 
mutiny    and     F'rench    Consul- 

General,  i.  180 
third  mutiny,  i.  192,  212 
Military  Budget,  1882,  i.  225 
condition  of,  in  Soudan,  1882, 

i.  363 
defence  of  Egypt  devolves   on, 

ii.  60 
British   Commanders-in-Chief, 

ii.  474 
summary  of  facts,  ii.  466-77 
Assize  Courts,  ii.  618 
Assouan  Reservoir,  the,  ii.  82 
Asylums,  ii.  511 
Atbara,  battle  of,  ii.  98-102 
Austria   aarrees    to   bombardment 
of  Alexandria,  i.  296 

Bahr-el-Ghazal  under  the  Mahdi, 

ii.  41-3 
Baird,  Sir  Alexander,  i.  34,  35 
Baker,  Sir  Samuel — 

on  the  Soudan  in  1870,  i.  349 
on  Gordon,  i.  562 
Baker,  General  Valentine,  i.  362, 
ii.  482 
on   evacuation    of    Soudan,    i. 

376-7 
despatched  to  Suakin,  comment 

on,  i.  400 
instructions  to,  i.  401 
his  defeat,  comment,  i.  404-9 
Bank,  Egyptian  National — 
proposed  creation  of,  i.  12 
created  1898,  ii.  582 
Baravelli,    M.,   appointed    Italian 
Commissioner  of  Debt,  i.  12 
Baring,    Sir   Evelyn.       See   Lord 
Cromer,  a/so  under  British 
Government's        Egyptian 
Policy 
Beaman,  Mr.,  ii.  493 
Bedouins,  the,  ii.  198-9 
Beit-el-mal,  i.  53 

Belgians,    King   of  the,    Gordon 
and    Equatorial  Provinces, 
i.  464-6 
Berber     Expedition,    the    corre- 
spondence re,  i.  637 


Berbera,  condition  of,  ii.  49 

taken  by  Great  Britain,  ii.  61 
Beresford,  Lord  Charles,  ii.  9 
Billot,  M.,  ii.  385 
Bismarck,  Prince — 
on  the  claims  of  Egypt's  credi< 

tors,  i.  33,  132 
epigram,  i.  131 

on  proposed  Conference,  i.  284 
on  Arabi's  power,  i.  293 
on    international    mandate,    i. 

803 
his  hostility  to  England,  1883- 

1884,  i'.  419 
Black  troops  in  Egyptian  Army, 

ii.  476 
Blignieres,  M.  de — 

French  Commissioner  of  Debt, 

i.  12 
his  character,  i.  40 
succeeded  by  M.  de  Bughas,  L 

103 
Minister  of  Public  Works,   i. 

63 
dismissed  by  Ismail,  i.  77 
French   Controller  of  Finance, 

i.  159 
resigns,  i.  257 
Blum  Pasha,  i.  103,  ii.  291 
Blunt,  \Vilfrid,  i.  235 

his  Arabist  sjTnpathies,  i.  255 
employed   as    intermediary,    i. 

256 
relations  with  Mr.    Gladstone, 

i.  279-80 
Secret    History,     I     286,    287, 

297,  323,  335 
Bombardment      of      Alexandria, 

the— 
negotiations  prior  to,  i.  267-76 
British  Fleet  arrives,  i.  277 
batteries  raised  at  Alexandria, 

i.  293 
Lord  Alcester  instructed  to  stop 

work  on  them,  i.  294 
French  opinion  on,  i.  294 
Austrian  opinion  on,  i.  295 
Turkish  opinion  on,  i.  296 
tlie  bombardment,  i.  296-7 
Bondholders,  the — 
point  of  view  of  the  British,  L 

41 
point  of  view  of  the  French,  L 

42 


INDEX 


587 


Bordeini,  Bey,  ii.  12,  13 
Boutros  Pasha  Ghali,  ii.  211 
Bowring,  Sir  John — 

on  the  Copts,  ii.  205-8-13 
Reports    to    Lord    Palmerston 
on — 
Europeans  in  Egypt,  i.  17 
Osmanlis  in  Egypt,  i.  175 
Brackenbury,  General,  ii.  24,  60 
Bright,  John,  i.  299 
British    Government's     Egyptian 
policy — 
Lord     Beaconsfield's     Govern- 
ment, 1874-1880— 
(Foreign      Secretary,      Lord 
Derby) — 
declines  to   appoint    Debt 

Commissioner,  i.  12 
correspondence  with   Lord 
Vivian  re  Egyptian  Debt 
and  Taxes,  i.  32 
(Foreign      Secretary,      Lord 

Salisbury) — 
(British  Agent  in  Egypt,  Lord 
Vivian) — 
instructs    Lord    Vivian    to 
act  with    French   repre- 
sentative, i.  37 
correspondence  with    Lord 
Vivian  re  Nubar  Minis- 
try, i.  66,  87-8 
(British    Agent,    Sir    Frank 
Lascelles) — 
correspondence     with     Sir 
Frank  Lascelles  re  Prince 
Tewfik's  Ministry,  i.  99 
correspondence  with  Sir  F. 
Lascelles  re  Ismail's  en- 
gagements, i.  132-41 
correspondence     with     Sir 
F.    Lascelles    re   Tewfik 
Pasha's  policy,  i.  152-7 
Mr.    Gladstone's    Government, 
1880-1885— 
(Foreign      Secretary,      Lord 

Granville) — 
(British  Agent,   Sir  Edward 
Malet)— 
correspondence    with    Am- 
bassador in  Turkey  dur- 
ing   Arabi's    mutiny,    i. 
196-9 
general  policy  of,  i.  200-5 
correspondence    with     M. 


Crambetta  and  Sir  Edward 
Malet  re  Joint  Note,  i. 
214-29 

correspondence  with  M. 
Gambetta  and  Sir  Edward 
Malet  re  effects  of  Joint 
Note,  i.  237-46 

correspondence  with  M. 
Freycinet  and  Sir  E. 
Malet  during  Arabi's 
ministry,  i.  254-77 

correspondence  with  Sir  E. 
Malet  and  Lord  Dufferin 
re  Conference  of  Powers, 
i.  283-96 

correspondence  with  Lord 
Dufferin  re  Turkish 
troops  for  Egypt,  i. 
310-21 

was  a  national  Government 
possible  at  time  of  Arabi's 
rebellion,  i.  323 

correspondence  with  Lord 
Dufferin  re  Arabi's  trial, 
i.  337-45 

correspondence  with  Sir  E. 

Malet  re  the  Soudan,  i. 

364-7 

(British    Agent,    Sir    Evelyn 

Baring  (Lord  Cromer)) — 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  Eng- 
lish troops  for  Soudan, 
i.  372-3,  376-84 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  and  mili- 
tary chiefs  re  campaign 
in  Eastern  Soudan,  i. 
399-416 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  em- 
ployment of  General 
Gordon,  i.  423-7 

General  Gordon  appointed 
to  evacuate  Soudan,  i. 
427 

reasons  for  and  against  his 
appointnu-nt,  i.  427-39 

correeoondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  Gor- 
don's instructions,  i. 
440-52 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn   Baring   re   Gor- 


588 


MODERN  EGYPT 


don's  slavery  proclama- 
tion, i.  474 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  em- 
ployment of  Zobeir 
Pasha,  i.  482-9,  494- 
629 

reasons  for  and  against 
Zobeir's  appointment,  i. 
629-34 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  Berber 
Expedition,  i.  637  -  9, 
642-6 

reasons  for  and  against 
Expedition,  i.  646-8 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  re  em- 
ployment of  Turkish 
troops  in  Soudan,  i. 
649-52 

Sir  Evelyn  Baring  points 
out  seriousness  of  Gor- 
don's position,  i.  556 

did   Gordon   endeavour  to 
carry  out  Government's 
policy  ?  i.  559-74 
(Mr.     Egerton,     Temporary 
Agent) — 

correspondence  with  Mr. 
Egerton  re  relief  of 
Berber,  i.  574-7 

correspondence  re  relief  of 
Gordon  (Lord  ^V^olseley 
and  Lord  Hartington),  i. 
679-80 
(British  Agent,  Sir  Evelyn 
Baring  (Lord  Cromer)) — 

comment  on  Government's 
delay,  i.  582-92 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  on  fall 
of  Khartoum,  ii.  19 

correspondence  with  Sir 
Evelyn  Baring  and  Lord 
Wolseley  re  evacuation 
of  Soudan,  ii.  20-9 
Lord  Salisbury's  Governments, 
1885-1886,  1886-1892— 
(Foreign      Secretary,      Lord 

Salisbury) — 
(British   Agent,    Sir    Evelyn 
Baring  (Lord  Cromer)) — 

Lord  Wolseley  informed  the 


Soudan  to  be  evacuated, 
ii.  29 
comment    on      policy     of 

evacuation,  ii.  29-34,  78 
correspondence     with     Sir 
Evelyn    Baring    re    ad- 
vance on  Tokar,  ii.  76-6 
(British  Agent,  Lord  Cromer)- 
correspondence  with,  re  re- 
conquest  of  Soudan,  ii. 
82 
analysis  of  Government's  policy, 

1882-1883,  ii.  349-65 
the    Northbrook     Mission,    ii. 

366-71 
the  WolflF  Convention,  ii.  372- 

81 
neutralisation  of  the  Suez  Canal, 

ii.  382-7 
the  Anglo-French  Agreement, 
ii.  388-93 
British   Secretaries  of   State   for 

Foreign  Affairs,  ii.  673 
Broadley,  Mr.,  i.  297 
Budgets — 

Budget  of  Commissioners,  1879, 

i.  123 
Budget  of  Khedive,  1879,  i.  125 
Bughas,  M.  Bellaigues  de — 
Commissioner  of  Debt  in  succes- 
sion to   M.  de   Blignieres, 
i.  103 
Buller,  Sir  iledvers,  ii.  18-19 
Burnaby,  Colonel,  death  of,  IL  7 
Burton,  Sir  Richard — 

advises  occupation  of  Berbera, 

ii.  50 
in  Harrar,  ii.  61 
Butler,  Sir  William,  L  44,  441, 
447 

Cadastral  Survey,  i.  65,  104,  115 

Camel  Corps,  Egyptian,  ii.  60 

Cameron,  Mr.,  on  Mehemet  All's 
policy,  i.  16 

Canal,  the  Suez,  measures  for 
protecting,  after  bombard- 
ment of  Alexandria,  i.  303 

Capitulations,  use  of,  i.  326,  ii. 
428 

Carter,  Mr.  Howard,  reports  a 
case  of  torture,  i.  60 

Cartwright,  Mr.,  i.  289,  292, 
293-4 


INDEX 


589 


Cave,  Mr.  Stephen — 

Financial  Report  of,  1876,  i.  4 
comments    on    Balance   Sheet, 

1864-75,  i.  11 
comments  on  law  of  the  Mouka- 

bala,  i.  30 
comments  uu  £gyptiau  officials, 
i.  30-1 
Cherif     Pasha     {see    also    under 
Egyptian  Ministries) — 
summoned      before       Commis- 
sioners, i.  47 
his  policy,  i.  153,  197-213 
and  Arabi's  mutiny,  i.  187 
on  Dual  Control,  i.  189 
and  National  party  and  army, 

i.  206 
suggests  Turkish  intervention, 

i.  244 
his  character,  ii.  334 
Chermside,  Sir  Herbert,  i.  637 
Christianity  and  the  £uropeanised 

Egyptian,  ii.  230 
Christians,  attacks  on— 
slaughter  of,  i.  287 
flight  of,  i.  289 
Christians,  the  Egyptian,  ii.  201- 

227 
Chronological  Table  of  Events,  ii. 

575-83 
Churchill,  Lord  Randolph,  i.  339 
Civil  Service,  Egyptian,  ii.  298-9 
Clemenceau,  M.,  on  F'rench  inter- 
ference in  Egypt,  i.  303,  305 
Clot  Bey,  Dr.,  ii.  607 
Coetlogon,  Colonel,  i.  376,  644, 

672 
Coles  Pasha  on  prisons,  ii.  494 
Colleges,  English  military,  value 
of  training  for  official  life, 
ii.  548 
Colville,   Colonel,   on  Nile  Cam- 
paign, ii.  4 
Colvin,    Sir   Auckland,    head    of 
Cadastral  Survey — 
resigns,  i.  104 

succeeds  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  as 

Debt  Commissioner,  i,  127 

succeeds  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  as 

Controller-General,  i.  173 
his  action  during  Arabi's  mutiny, 

i.  183-6 
on     situation,    September    19, 
1881,  i.  206-7 


his     memorandum,     December 

1881,  i.  222-34 
his  despatch  re  state  of  parties 
in  Egypt  in  December  1881, 
i.  218-22 
on  evacuating  Soudan,  i.  389 
Commission  of  Debt  instituted,  i. 
12,  ii.  305 
objects,    working,    and    altera- 
tions of,  ii.  304-10 
{See  also  Debt) 
Commission  of  Inquiry  into  Egyp- 
tian Finances,  i.  46 
work  of,  i.  47-63 
limitation  of  power  of,  i.  64 
report  of,  i.  124 
resignation  of,  i.  124 
Commission  of  Liquidation,  1880, 

i.  162 
Commission      (International)     to 
assess    claims    re    Alexan- 
drian destruction,  i.  339 
Commissions  of  Brigandage,  ii.  289 
Conference,     International,    pro- 
posed    by     England     and 
France,  i.  283 
meets  at  Constantinople,  i.  291 
Conference  suspended,  i.  312-13 
Consular  Courts,  ii.  319,  514 
Consul  -  General,      the      British, 

duties  of,  ii.  321-7 
Controllers-General  of  Finances, 
1879— 
division  of  work,  i.  161-2 
their  power  disappears,  i.  267 
Cookson,  Sir  Charles,  L  184,  186, 

257,  281,  287 
Copts,  the,  ii.  201-13 
Corbett,  Sir  Vincent,  ii.  287 
Corruption  in  the  public  services, 

ii.  420-6 
Corvee,  the,  i.  60,  ii.  405-19 
the  need  for  forced  labour,  iL 

409 
financial  aspect  of,  ii.  410,  417 
abolition  of,  ii.  419 
Courbash,  the,   ii.  397-406.     See 

also  Corve'e 
Cromer,    Lord   (Sir  Evelyn  Bar- 
ing)— 
{See  also  under  British  Govern- 
ment's Policy) 
appointed  British  Commissioner 
of  Debt,  i.  16 


590 


MODERN  EGYPT 


inquires  into  outstanding  claims, 

i.  60-4 
on  the  necessary  reforms,  i.  65- 

62 
on  the  Nubar  ministry,  i.  71 
on     differences    between     Lord 

V'ivian  and  Sir  Rivers  A\'il- 

son,  i.  94-5 
on    Report   of    Commission    of 

Inquiry,  i.  122-7 
resigns     Commissionership      of 

■^Debt,  i.  127 
appointed    English    Controller- 
^  General,  i.  159 

worl^  of  Controller-General,  i. 

1G5-73 
resigns  Controllership,  L  173 
returns    to    Egypt    as    British 

representative,  i.  346 
his  speech  at  Omdurmau,  ii.  115 
letter   from    Slieikh   to    Sheikh 

referring  to   "  Baring  and 

his  English,"  ii.  200 
his  despatch  to  Lord  Granville 

on   withdrawal    of  British 

troops,  ii.  362 
Customs,  control  of,  ii.  292 

Daira  Debt,  i.  13 
Daira  Khassa  loan,  i.  123 
Daira  Sanieh  loan,  i.  123,  ii.  313-14 
Daoud  Pasha,  i.  182 
Darfur   during    the    Mahdi's   re- 
hellion,  ii.  36-41 
Debt,  the  Egyptian  Public — 
in  18G3and  1876,  i.  11 
Commission    of    Debt,    i.     12, 

ii.  304-10 
Lord  Goschen  and  M.  Joubert's 

arrangement  of,  i.  13 

Sir    Evelyn    Baring    appointed 

British  Commissioner,  i.  16 

Funded  Debt  in  1877-78,  i.  33-6 

France  and  Great  Britain  act  in 

concert,  i.  37 
Commission  of  Inquiry,  i.  45-63 
addition  to  Funded  Debt,  i.  64 
interest  on  Debt,  i.  65,  98 
Report  of  Commission   of    In- 
quiry, i.  110-27 
resignation   of    Commission   of 

Inquir}',  i.  124 
Commissioners     of    Debt     Bue 
Government,  i.  126 


Sir  Evelyn  Baring  resigns,  i.  127 

Sir  Auckland  Colvin  appointed 

Debt  Commissioner,  i.  127 

Commission  of  Liquidation,  i. 

162 
Law  of  Liquidation,  ii.  305 
changes    in    functions   of  Debt 

Commission,  ii.  310 
reduction  of  debt,  ii.  460 
Decrees,  tlie,  of  1876,  i.  12, 13,  14 
Derby,  Lord,  declines  to  nominate 
Comm.issioner,  i.  12 
on  General    Baker's   defeat,    i. 
405 
Dervish  Pasha,  i.  284,  286,  288-89 
Dilke,  Sir  Charles,  i.  235 
Domains,  the,  administration  of, 

i.  63,  ii.  315 
Dongola  Expedition,  ii.  86 
financial  difficulties,  ii.  86,  91 
battle  at  Firket,  ii.  90 
Dongola  taken,  ii.  91 
*' Droits  de  voirie,"  i.  122 
Dual  Control,  the,  i.  93, 169,  161, 
164-78 
Che'rif  Pasha  on,  i.  189 
abolition  of,  i.  340 
Duclerc,     M.,    succeeds     M.     de 

Freycinet,  i.  305 
Dues  on  stamping   mats  and  on 

sale  of  cattle,  i.  122 
Dufferin,  Lord,  i.  196,  270,  310 
negotiates   military  convention 

with  Turkey,  i.  312-21 
his  mission  to  Egypt,  i.  336 
his  report,  comment  on,  i.  341- 

45 
and  the  Organic  Law,  ii.  271-79 
and  the  courbash,  ii.  399 
on  slavery,  ii.  498 
Dunlop,  M.',  ii.  636 

Earle,    General,    tribute     to,     L 

421,  ii.  18,  24 
Education.     See  Administration 
Education   Department,    Dunlop, 

Mr.,  Adviser  to,  ii.  293 
Egerton,  Sir  Edwin,  i.  432,  668 
"Egypt     for     the     Egyptians," 

fallacies  of  such  a  policy, 

i.  327,  ii.  625-6 
Egypt,  Modern — 

Before  British  Occupation- 
extent  of,  i.  349 


ITsDEX 


591 


■tate  of,  1S7G,  i.  29 
distribution   of  power   in,  i. 

176 
condition    of,    1882,    i.    212, 

323-30 
condition  in  1884,  L  417-23 
Since  occupation — 
extent  of,  ii.  126 
population,  ii.  129 
races  in,  ii.  127-8 
ruling  classes,  ii.  131-2 
Islamism,  ii.  132-49 
women,  position  of,  ii.  166 
family  life,  ii.  160 
law,  ii.  162 

Moslems,  the,  ii.  168-99 
village,  the,  in,  ii.  189 
Christians,  the,  ii.  201-27 
Europeanised     Egyptian,    ii. 

228-44 
Europeans  in,  ii.  246-59 
Government,  the,  ii.  260-79 
(See    also     under     Army,     Ad- 
ministration,       Ministries, 
British  Government,  Debt, 
Finance,  etc.) 
El  Obeid,  fall  of,  i.  367 
El  Teb,  battle  of,  i.  414 
Emin   Pasha  (Governor  of  Equa- 

toria),  ii.  43-6 
*'  Emprunt  Rouznanieli,"the,  i.  53 
English,  the  (in  Egypt),  ii.  252-5 
their  friends  and  foes,  ii.  256-9 
Equatoria  under  Emin  Pasha,  ii. 
43-6 
leased  to  Congo  State,  ii.  46 
Essad  Effcndi,  i.  272,  285,  289 
Europeanised      Egyptians,      the, 

anglophobia  of,  ii.  244 
Europeans  in  Egypt — 

summoned  by  Mehemet  All,  i. 

16 
summoned  by  Ismail,  i.  23 
bad  name  acquired  by,  i.  23 
character  of  official,  i.  24 
first  European  Ministers,  i.  63 
agitation  against  Ministers,  i.  99 
European  intervention,  i.  323-30 
census  of,  ii.  245 
orientalisation  of,  ii.  247 
and  British  officials,  ii.  255-6 
privileges  of,  ii.  426-42 

Famine  of  1878,  i.  34 


Farrer,  Lord,  Report  on  Railways, 

ii.  311 
Fehmi,  Ali  Bey,  i.  176 
Fellaheen,  the,  ii.  192-8 
Finances   (see   also   under   Public 
Debt)— 

in  1876,  i.  27 

Lord  Vivian's  report  on,  i.  26 

taxes  and  collection  in  1876, 
i.  30-2 

taxes  and  collection  in  1878, 
i.  38 

Commission  of  Inquiry  in 
Finances,  1878,  i.  45 

work  of  Commission  of  Inquiry 
in  Finances,  i.  47-63 

administration  of,  before  1878, 
i.  48 

outstanding  claims  and  deficits, 
1878,  i.  54 

recommendations  of  Commis- 
sion, i.  55 

credit  and  Oriental  view  of,  L 
58 

revenue  returns,  1878,  i.  66 

meetings  between  Sir  Riverg 
Wilson,  M.  de  Blignieres, 
and  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  j-e 
financial  position,  i.  88 

report  of  Commission  of  In- 
quiry, i.  110-27 

condition  of  finances  on  acces- 
sion of  Tewiik  Pasha,  i. 
149 

Khedive's  right  to  contract 
loans  withdrawn,  i.  158 

Controllers-General  appointed, 
i.  159 

Commission  of  Liquidation,  i. 
162,  172-3 

reform  of  taxation,  1880,  i.  168- 
171 

Chamber  of  Notables  claims  to 
vote  Budget,  i.  242 

financial  position  of  Soudan, 
1882,  i.  364 

conference  on  financial  situa- 
tion, 1884,  i.  658 

Lord  Northbrook's  proposals, 
ii.  370 

summary  of  facts,  ii.  443-66 
Financial  advisers,  ii.  287 
Financial  secretaries,  ii.  291 
Findlay,  Mr.,  ii.  666 


592 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Fitzgerald,  Sir  Gerald — 

head  of  Accounts  Department, 

i.  26 
his  work  and  its  results,  i.  28 
he  resigns,  i.  103 
Flogging.        See     Courbash     and 

Corvee 
Forced  labour.     See  Corve'e 
Forster,  Mr.,  on  Soudan  I'olicy  of 

Government,  i.  410 
Freethinker,  the  Egyptian,  ii.  232 
French  civilisation — 
its  attractiveness  to  Asiatics,  ii. 

236 
contrasted  with  English  civilisa- 
tion, ii.  238,  240 
French  policy  (Egyptian) — 
towards  bondholders,  i.  35-7 
genei'al  policy  in   1879,  i.  91-3, 

130-1 
in  respect  to  Arabi's  mutiny,  i. 

180,  196 
in  respect  to  British  occupation, 

i.  204-5 
proposed  Anglo-French  military 

control,  i.  214 
towards  Turkish   intervention, 

i.  155-6,  2(59,  275 
subsequent  to  bombardment  of 

Alexandria,  i.  302,  305-6 
in  respect  to  Wolff  Convention, 

ii.  372-81 
in  1904,  ii.  388 
Freycinet,  M.  de — 

succeeds  M.  Gambetta,  i.  247 
suggests   deposing  Khedive,   i. 

260 
suggests   sending  squadron,  i. 

266 
suggests  conference  of  Powers, 
i.  283,  291 
Future  of  Egypt,  the,  suggestions 
and  warnings,  ii.  563-71 

Gambetta,  M. — 

urges  united  action  by  England 

and  France,  i.  216,  217 
his  policy,  i.  216 
prepares    Draft  Joint  Note,   i. 

223 
negotiations  with  F^ord  Granville, 

i.  237-46 
hit  influence  on  the  course  of 

Egyptian  history,  i.  247-53 


on    the   British    occupation,  i. 
302 
Garstin,  Sir  William,  ii.  291 
Gatacre,  General,  ii.  101 
(Jermany's    policy    in    respect   to 

Egypt— 

in  1879,  i.  131,  136 

in  1882,  i.  292 

in  1904,  ii.  391 
Ghazi,  Moukhtar  Pasha,  ii.  374 
Giers,  M.  de — 

protests    against    WolflF    Con- 
vention, ii.  378 
Ginniss,  battle  at,  ii.  30 
Gladstone,    Mr.    {see    also    under 
British  Government) — 

on  responsibility  for  British 
occupation,  i.  160 

denies  existence  of  National 
Party  in  Egypt,  i.  226 

relations  with  Mr.  Wilfrid 
Blunt,  i.  279-80 

his  objection  to  landing  troops 
after  bombardment  of 
Alexandra,  i.  298 

on  military  pacification  of 
EiTvpt,  i.  301 

on  Baker  Pasha's  defeat,  i. 
405 

on  Gordon's  Soudan  policy,  i. 
478 

in  favour  of  Zobeir's  appoint>- 
meut,  i.  531 

on  unpopularity  of  Zobeir's 
appointment,  i.  533 

on  difficulties  of  Egyptian 
affairs,  i.  582 

comment  on  his  responsibility 
for  delay  in  relieving 
Gordon,  i.  682-92 

responsibility  for  fall  of  Khar- 
toum, ii.  17 

his  phantom  policy,  ii.  368-9 
Godeaux,  M.,  succeeds  Baron  des 
Michels   as  French  Diplo- 
matic Representative,  i.  66 
Gordon,   General  {see  also  under 
British  Government) — 

invited  to  inquire  into  finances, 
i.  44 

on  value  of  Soudan,  i.  390 

his  mission,  i.  417-39 

his  instructions,  i.  390,  443-6 

popularity  of,  i.  427-31 


INDEX 


593 


his   appointment  a  mistake,   i. 

438-9 
in  Cairo,  i.  440 
his  policy,  i.  442 
Governor   of    Soudan,    i.    446, 

450-2 
and  Zobeir  Pasha,  i.  454-60,  480 
leaves  for  Soudan,  i.  460-2 
further  instructions,  i.  464-6 
his  proclamations,  i.  470 
on  slavery,  i.  471-4 
at  Khartoum,  i.  475 
his  policy,  i.  476-7 
Precis        of        correspondence 

between        him.      Colonel 

Stewart,    Lord     Granville, 

and     Sir   Evelyn    Baring, 

1.  480-534 
comment  on  his  policy,  1884,  i. 

660-74 
letters   from,   via    Dongola,    L 

677-8 
relief  expedition,  i.  674-82 
comment  on  delay,  i.  581-2 
Khedive's  telegram  to,  i,  693 
expedition,  ii.  6 
battles     at      Abu      Klea     and 

Metemmeh,  ii.  6-8 
Journal,  and  letters  from,  ii.  8 
death  of,  ii.  9-17 
Gorst,  Sir  Eldon,  ii.  287,  292 
Goschen,  Lord — 

his  mission  to  Egypt,  1876,  i. 

13-14 
he  appoints   Sir  Evelyn  Baring 

Commissioner  of  Debt,  i.  15 
Government  of  Egypt,  ii.  260- 

279 
Graham,      Major  -  General      Sir 

Gerald,  i.  410,  637,  538 
Granville,    Lord    (see   also    under 

British  Government) — 
his  lack  of  initiative,  i.  216 
and  Egyptian  Constitutionalism, 

i.  238 
his  policy  previous  to  occupa- 
tion  compared    with    Lord 

Salisbury's,  i.  252-3 
personal  notes  on,  i.  392,  420 
his  optimism,  i.  476 
Greeks,  the,  ii.  250-1 
Grelle,  M.  Le,  ii.  288-9 
Grenfell,  Sir  Francis — 

Commander  -  in  -  Chief    of   the 
VOL.  II 


Egyptian  army,  ii.  63,  64, 
69,  72 
Gre'vy,  M. — 

on  British  military  preparations, 

1882,  i.  305 

Hake,  Mr.  Egmont,  i.  447 

Halim  Pasha,  i.  196 

Harbour  works,  Alexandria,  their 

cost,  i.  51 
Hardinge,  Sir  Arthur,  ii.  555 
Harrar  annexed  by  Ismail,  ii.  62 

taken  by  King  Menelek,  ii.  63 
Hartington,  Lord,  i.  411,  680-1  ; 

ii.  21,  29 
Harvey,  Mr.,  ii.  287 
Hassan,  Prince,  i.  78 
Herbin,  M.,  ii.  3 
Hewett,  Admiral,  i.  409 
Hicks,  General — 

appointed     to     Soudan     army, 

1883,  i.  354 

complains  of    his    position,    i. 

361 
appointed  Commander-in-Chief, 

i.  361 
his  optimism,  i.  361-3 
his  army  destroyed,  i.  368 
Colonel  Colville  on  disaster,  L 

368 
Sir  Reginald  Wingate  on  battle- 
field, i.  369 
Hicks-Beach,  Sir  Michael,  ii.  94 
Hoskins,     Admiral,    and    French 
Admiral   at    Port   Said,    L 
303 
Hospitals,  ii.  510-11 
Hunter,  General,  ii.  100-1 
Hussein  Pasha  Khalifa,  i.  467 

Ibrahim,  his  career  and  character, 

i.  18-19 
Indian  troops  for  Suakin,  ii.  88 
Interior,   the,   administration   of. 

See  Administration 
International   administrations,   ii. 

304-15 
Internationalism,    in   theory  and 

practice,  ii.  301-15 
Irrigation  (see  also  under  Corvee) — • 
under  the  Pharaohs  and  Turks, 

ii.  457 
Lord    Milner   on   improved,  ii. 

458-9 

2q 


594 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Lord    Cromer's   report   on,   ii. 

463 
Ismail  Pasha — 
aud  Public  Debt,  i.  11 
and  European  civilisation,  i.  23 
his  extravagance,  i.  61-2 
his  power,  i.  56-9 
cedes  his  estates,  i,  61 
aud  Nubar-Wilson  Ministry,  i. 

66-7 
his  exclusion  from  Council  dis- 
cussed, i.  69-70 
Sir   Evelyn    Baring's   views   on 

exclusion,  i.  71-2 
and  officers'  mutiny,  i.  76-81 
and  constitutionalism,  i.  83 
and  foreign  interference,  i.  83-4 
excluded  from  Council,  i.  89-90 
and    his   Foreign    Ministers,   i. 

99-100 
his  policy,  i.  105-9,  143-6 
advised  to  abdicate,  i.  135-9 
leaves  Egypt,  i.  141-2 
Ismail  Pasha  Eyoub,  on  the  cour- 

bash,  ii.  399 
Ismail    Pasha    Sadik,    his    exac- 
tions, i.  26 
Italy- 
Egyptian  policy  of,  i.    131,  ii. 

391 
invited  to  co-operate  with  Eng- 
land, i.  308 
takes  Massowah,  ii.  67 
and  Abyssinia,  ii.  83 

James,  Mr.  F,  L.,  in  Somaliland, 

ii.  49 
Jebel  Kirbekan,  battle  at,  ii.  23 
Joint  Note  of  1882,  i.  214 
its  terms,  i.  223 
local  situation  when  presented, 

i.  224 
presented,  i.  227 
summary    of   views   on    the,    i. 

229-35 
effects  of,  i.  236-53 
Joubert,  M.,  associated  with  Lord 

Gosthen,  i.  13 
Judicial  Advisers,  ii.  290 
Judicial  system,  ii.  316-20 
Justice.     See  Administration 

Kadi,  the,  legal  functions  of,ii.  320 
courts  of,  ii.  515 


Kalnoky,  Count,  i.  296 

Kassala,  during  Mahdi's  rebellion, 

ii.  47 
Khalifa,       the      (Abdullah  -  el  - 
Taashi) — 
succeeds  Mahdi,  ii.  30 
battle  at  Ginniss,  effect  of,  ii.  30 
letter  to  Queen  Victoria,  ii.  62 
battle  of  Toski,  effect  of,  ii.  72 
death  of,  ii.  105 
Kbaradji  lands,  i.  114,  121 
Khartoum — 
fall  of,  ii.  9-17 
retaken,  ii.  105 
Khartoum  Campaign,  ii.  79-110 
cost  of,  ii.  105-6 
conduct  of,  ii.  106-9 
Khedives  of  Egypt,  ii.  573 
the  powers  of,  ii.  269-70 
{See   altio   under  Meliemet   Ali, 
Ibrahim,    Abbas    I.,    Said, 
Ismail,  Tewfik) 
Kinglake,  i.  130,  323,  331 
Kitchener,  Major,  i.  540,  678 
Kitchener,  Sir  Herbert — 
to  command    Soudan  force,  ii. 

86 
his  qualities   for  command,  ii. 

87-9 
Khartoum  Campaign,  ii.  89-109 
Kremer,  Herr  von.  Commissioner 
of  Debt,  i.  12 

Land,  tenure  and  taxation — 
held  by  Khedive,  1876,  i.  29 
Law  of  the  Moukabala,  i.  29 
ceded  by  Ismail,  i.  61-3 
Ouchouri  and  Kbaradji   landg, 
i.  114-22 
Lands,  cultivable,  ii.  460 
Lascelles,  Sir  Frank — 
British  Representative  in  Egypt, 

i.  96 
reports  agitation,  April  1,  1879, 
against  European  Ministry, 
i.  99 
Lesseps,  M.   Ferdinand  de.  Presi- 
dent of  Commission  of  In- 
quiry, i.  45,  323 
Levantine,  the,  ii.   246-7,  249 
Liglitliouses,  control  of,  ii.  292 
Li(|ui(lation,  Law  of,  i.  162,  ii.  305 
Lloyd,  Mr.  Clifford,  i.  378,  419, 
ii.  482-8 


INDEX 


595 


Lupton,  Mr.  Frank,  ii.  42 
Lyall,  Sir  Alfred,  i.  562,  ii.  231 
Lyons,  Lord,  i.  199 

MacDonald,  Major,  i.  338 
Mcllwraith,  Sir  Malcolm,  ii.  290, 

618 
McMurdo,  Captain,  ii.  653 
McNeill,  Sir  John,  ii.  25 
Machell,  Mr.,  ii.  292 
Mahdi,  the— 

of  tradition,  i.  351-2 
Mohammed    Ahmed    proclaims 

himself,  i.  352 
rebellion  of,    comment  on,   L 

356 
Hicks's   army  destroyed  by,  i. 

368 
letter  to  Gordon,  i.  470 
Lord    Wolseley    on   power   of, 

ii.  22 
death  of,  ii.  30 

Bucceeded     by     Khalifa.       See 
Khalifa 
Mahdiism,  comment  on,  ii.  63-4 
Mahmoud  Pasha  Baroudi,  i.  179 
Mahmoud     Pasha   Sami,    i.    243, 

257 
Malaret,   Baron    de,    Controller- 
General    of    Expenditure, 
i.  14 
Malet,  Sir  Edward  {see  also  under 
British     Government),     i. 
164,  181 
on  mutinous  army,  i.  182 
on  Khedive's  view  of  mutiny,  i. 

205-6 
on  effect  of  Joint  Note,  i.  228-9 
protest    to    Lord   Granville,    i. 

269 
on  slaughter   of  Christians,  L 

288 
his  illness,  i.  289 
on  funds  for    Soudan  army,  i. 

359 
leaves  Egypt,  i.  345 
Mallet,  Sir  Louis,  i.  16 
Marindin,    Colonel,    Report     on 

Railways,  ii.  311 
Marriott,    General,    President   of 

Railway  Board,  i.  14 
Massowah,  and  Italy,  ii.  55-8 
Maxwell,  Sir  Benson,  ii.  288 
Medical  reform,  ii,  604 


Medicine,  School  of,  ii.  508 
Mehemet  Ali — 

his  career  and  character,  i.  16- 

18 
if  his   general    principles    had 

been  adopted,  i.  22 
and  education,  ii.  530 
Menelek,  King,  ii.  53,  83 
Michels,  Baron  des — 

French      diplomatic     represen- 
tative, i.  37 
succeeded   by   M.   Godeauz,   L 
66 
Milner,  Lord,  ii.  291-2,  459 
Ministers,      Egyptian,      the,     iL 

270-1 
Ministries  (Egyptian) — 

Nubar  Pasha's  (Sir  Rivers  Wilson 

and     M.     de     Bliguieres, 

members  of),  i.  64-81,  384, 

ii.  581 

Cherif  Pasha's,  i.  103, 104,  188- 

90,  300 
Riaz  Pasha's,  i.  153-4,  ii.  343,  681 
"  Arabi's,"  i.  254-78 
Mustapha    Pasha    Fehmi's,    iL 
346,  580,  581 
Mixed  Courts,  i.  33,  419,  ii.  316 
Moberly  Bell,  Mr.,  i.  515 
Mohammed  Ahmed.     See  Mahdi, 

the 
Mohammed  Tahir,  i.  467 
Moncrieff,  Captain,  i.  398 
Monogamy   and    family    life,    ii. 

157 
Montebello,    Count    de,    protests 
against  Wolff  Convention, 
ii.  378 
Morley,  Mr.  John — 
on  Joint  Note,  i.  227 
on    M.    Gambetta's    policy,    L 

250 
on    Zobeir'a    appointment,    L 
631 
Morocco,    Anglo  -  French    agree- 
ment, ii.  391 
Moslem  sects,  the,  ii.  36,  37 
Moslems  in  Egypt,  ii.  168-99 
Moudirs,  the,  i.  48,  258,  ii.  484-6 
Moukabala,  law  of  the,  i.  29,  98, 
99,  115,  117,  118,  121 
Mr.  Stephen  Cave  on,  i.  30 
repeal  of,  i.  168 
Moukhtar  Pasha,  ii.  380 


596 


Mustapha  Pasha  Fehmi,  i.  265,  ii. 

Musurus  Pasha,  i.  199,  284,  288 

Napoleon    III.    and    partition    of 

North  Africa,  i.  91 
National  Movement,  Sir  Auckland 
Colvin's  Memorandum  on, 
i.  219-21 
National     Party     in     Egypt,    its 

existence,  i.  226 
Native  tribunals,  ii.  287-9 
Nejumi,  W  ad-el-,  ii.  64-71 
Nekib-el-Ashraf,  i.  99 
Nelidoff,  M.  de,  protests  against 

WoliF  Convention,  ii.  378 
Neutralisation  of  Egypt,  comment 

on,  ii.  383 
Nile  Campaign,  ii.  4,  6 
Northbrook,  Lord — 

on  General  Gordon,  i.  429,  491-2 
on  Zobeir  Paslia,  i.  530 
his  mission  to  Egypt,  ii.  366-71 
Northcote,  Sir  Stafford,  i.  472 
Notables,  Chamber  of,  the,  i.  68, 
254,  266 
convoked  by  Ismail,  i.  68,  73 
protest  of,  i.  101 
summoned  by  Arabi,  187 
at   the   time   of  Joint  Note,  i. 

224 
claim  to  vote  the  Budget,  i.  237> 
242 
Nubar  Pasha — 

his   relations    with    Ibrahim,   i. 

19 
on  Said's  policy,  i.  21 
his  Ministry,  1878-1879,  i.  64- 

81 
his   aims  and  character,  i.   70, 

ii.  335-42 
his  unpopularity,  i.  72 
assaulted  by  officers,  i.  74 
he  resigns,  i.  77 
his  Ministry,  1884,  i.  384 

Occupation,  the  British — 

analysis  of  causes  leading  to,  i. 

252-3 
French  opinion,  1882,  i.  305-6 
the  Temps  on,  i.  306 
Italian  opinion,  i.  807-9 
Turkish  opinion,  i.  309 
preferability  of,  i.  328-30 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Octroi  dues,  i.  122 

partly  abolished,  i.  168 
Officials,  British,  ii.  280-300 
qualifications  of  ideal  official,  iL 

281 
their  position,  ii.  282 
the  need  for,  ii.  293-8 
their  numbers,  ii.  298-9 
Omar  Pasha  Lutfi,  i.  105 
Omdehs,  the,  ii.  186 
Omdurman,  battle  of,  ii.  104 
Organic   law,    the,    proposed    re- 
vision, i.  254,  ii.  271-9 
Osman  Digna — 

the  Mahdi's  Emir,  i.  396 

his  campaign  in  Eastern  Soudan, 

i.  396-9 
his  hold  on  Eastern  Soudan,  ii. 
63 
Osman  Pasha  Rifki,  i.  176,  262-3 
Ouchouri  land-tax,  the,  i.  68,  99, 
114,  121 
increased,  i.  168 

Paget,  Sir  Augustus,  i.  307 

Pall  Mall  Gazette,  i.  389,  424,  427, 

434,  474,  477,  532 
Palmer,  Sir  Elwin,  ii.  287 
Palmerston,  Lord,  i.  10,  83,  84,  92 
Pauncefote,  Lord,  ii.  384 
Pickthall,    Mr.   (Folk-Lore  of  the 

Holy  Land),  i.  19 
Pinching,  Sir  Horace,  ii.  613 
Plague,  the,  ii.  513 
Police — 
Adviser  to  Minister  of  Interior 

appointed,  ii.  292 
reforms,  ii.  478-82 
Poll-tax,  i.  122 
Polygamy,  effects  of,  ii.  167 
Portal,  Sir  Gerald,  ii.  555 
Post  Office,  control  of,  ii.  292 

statistics  of,  ii.  313 
Power,  Mr.,  i.  358,  ii.  3 
Prisons — 

Sir     Herbert     Chermside     and 
Mr.  Beaman  report  on,  ii. 
492-3 
reform  of,  ii.  494 
Press,  the — 

vernacular  Press  attacks  Euro- 
peans, i.  211 
retorts   of   European    Press,   L 
211 


INDEX 


597 


Prime  Minister,  the  Eg-yptian,  bis 

importance,  ii.  333 
Prime    Ministers   from    1882,   ii. 

334 
Privilege,  European,  ii.  426 
its  interference  with  reform,  ii. 

431 
reforms  of,  ii.  437 
Lord   Cromer's    report   on,    ii. 

437 
Protectorate,  British,   petition  in 

favour  of,  i.  331 
Public  School,  tlie  English,  value 

of  training  for  official  life, 

ii.  548 
Public    Works    Department,    iL 

290-1 

Queen  Victoria — 

and    Zobeir's    appointment,    i. 

631 
and  fall  of  Khartoum,  iL   15- 
16 

Ragheb,  Paslia,  i.  293 
Railways,  Egyptian  — 

falsification  of  accounts,  i.  27 
constructed   during    Khartoum 

Campaign,  ii.  90 
administration,  ii.  810-13 
in  Soudan,  ii.  653 
Reinacb,  M.  Joseph,  on  M.  Gam- 
betta's  Egyptian  policy,  i. 
247-53 
Riaz,      Pasha      {see    also     under 
Ministries,  Egyptian) — 
Vice  -  President  Commission  of 

Inquiry,  i.  45 
Minister  of  Interior  and  Justice, 

i.  90-1 
denounced  as  friend  of  Chris- 
tians, i.  99 
relations  with  M.  de  Blignieres, 

i.  182 
Minister  of  Interior,  i.  300 
his  aims  and  worl<,  ii.  842-6 
Ring,  Baron  de,  i.  180,  295 
Ilodd,  Sir  Rennell,  ii.  555 
Rogers,  Sir  John,  ii.  613 
Romaine,  Mr. ,  Coutrollei'-General 

of  Revenue,  i.  14 
Rosebery,  Lord,  ii.  413 
Rothscliild,  Messrs. — 
loan,  1878,  i.  63,  66 


loan   to   pay  mutinous    officers, 
i.  78 
Rouznameh  loan,  i.  53,  114-16 
Rundle,  Major,  i.  540 
Russia's  policy  in  respect  to  Egypt, 
i.  131 

Saba  Paslia,  ii.  292 

Said  I'aslia,  his  career  and  charac- 
ter, i.  20 

St.    Hilaire,    M.    Bartbelemy,    I. 
199 

Salisbury,    Lord,    {see  also  under 
British  Government) — 
criticises    Government    action, 

1881,  i.  201 
his  policy  previous   to  occupa- 
tion  compared    with    Lord 
Granville's,  i.  252-3 
on  Hicks  expedition,  i,  367 
moves  vote  of  censure,  i.  384 
on  soldier's  advice  on  strategic 

points,  ii.  76 
on  public  indiil'erence,  ii.  77 

Salt  Tax,  i.  169 

Sanitary  Department,  iL  613 

Sanitiiry  reform,  ii.  604 

Sartorius,  Colonel  and  Mrs.,  I. 
397 

Schoolmasters,  native  and  foreign, 
ii.  293 

Schools,  village,  iL  634 

Schvveinfurth,  Dr.,  i.  266 

Scott,  Sir  John,  ii.  290,  618 

Scott-Moncrieff,  Sir  Colin,  ii.  290-1 

Scotter,  Sir  Charles,  Report  on 
Railways,  ii.  312 

Senior,  Mr.  {Conversations  and 
Journals  in  Egypt),  i.  21 

Sennar  during  Mahdi's  rebellion, 
ii.  46 

Senoussi  movement,  the,  ii.  39 

Seymour,  Admiral  Sir  Beauchamp, 
arrives  at  Alexandria,  L 
277 

Shahin  Pasha,  i.  106 

Sheikh-el-Bekri,  L  99 

Slieikli-el-Obeid,  i.  518 

Slieikh-el-Senoussi,  ii.  37 

his  relations  with  Mahdi,  ii.  38* 
39 

Sheikli  Mohammed  Abdu,  ii.  179 

Sheikli  Mohammed  Beyrain,  ii. 
181 


598 


MODERN  EGYPT 


Sheikh    Mohammed-el-Saadat,  ii. 

177 
Sheikhs  of  villages,  the,  i.  48,  ii. 
186 
their  views  of  the  English,  ii. 
191 
Sienkiewicz,  M.,  i.  197,  198,  224, 

228,  272,  276 
Sirdar,  the,  position  of,  ii.  283 
Slatin  Bey,  i.  357,  ii.  36 
Slave  Trade,  the,  ii.  74,  495 
Slavery — 

in  Soudan,  i.  350 
General  Gordon  on,  i.  471-2 
position  of  the  slave,  ii.  496-7 
Lord  Dufferiu  on,  ii.  498 
disappearing,  ii.  499-504 
Soudan,  the  {see  also  under  British 
Government) — 
extent  of,  January  1883,  i.  349 
Sir  Samuel  Baker  on,  i.  349 
Colonel  Stewart  on,  i.  350-9 
financial  position  of,  1882,  i.  354 
Grant  for  army,  1883,  i.  355 
the  Mahdi,  i.  856 
Mr.  Power  and    Lord  Dufferin 

on  army,  i.  3-58 
General  Hicks  in,  i.  360-8 
Osman  Digna,  i.  397-8,  415 
Colonel    Baker    at  Suakin,    i. 

400-5 
Sir  Gerald    Graham  at  Tokar, 

i.  411-14 
Battle  of  El-Teb,  i.  414 
comment  on  expedition,  i.  414 
the  Berber  Expedition,  i.  536-58 
Battles    at     Abu      Klea    and 

Metemmeh,  ii.  6-8 
fall  of  Khartoum,  ii.  9 
evacuation  of,  ii.  27-29 
fate  of  Provinces  of,  ii.  35-69 
comment     on     evacuation,    ii. 

29-34 
reconquest  of,  ii.  79-110 
Atbara,  ii.  98-102 
Omdurnian,  ii.  104 
Khartoum  occupied,  ii.  105 
political  status  of  new  Soudan, 

ii.  116-19 
size  of  new  Soudan,  ii.  545 
administration  of.    (See  Adminis- 
tration 
Stephenson,  Sir  Frederick,  i.  376, 
421,  548,  579,  ii.  30 


Stewart,  Sir  Herbert,  ii.  6-7 

Stewart,  Colonel — 

on  the  Soudan,  i.  350,  363-4-7- 

8-60 
with  Gordon,  i.  427,  433 
contrasted  with  Gordon,  i.  434 
his   reports,  etc.,  on  route   to 

Khartoum,  i.  466-9 
on  Gordon's  policy  in  Soudan,  i. 

482-4 
on  value  of  Soudan,  i.  603 
death  of,  ii.  3 

Sturge,  Mr.,  i.  617 

Suakin — 

suggested  Turkish   troops  for, 

i.  381 
Dervish  victories  near,  i.  396-7 
General  Graham  at,  i.  544 
Colonel  HoUed  Smith  at,  ii.  76 
Indian  troops  for,  ii.  88 

Succession,  the  Egyptian  Law  of, 
i.  136,  155 

Suez  Canal — 

Credit  Bill,  i.  304 
neutralisation  of,  ii.  382-7 
Commission  to  discuss,  ii.  386 
Convention  put  in  force,  ii.  387 

Suleiman  Pasha,  i.  361 

Sultan  Pasha,  i.  265 

Sultan,     the,     (see     also      under 
Turkey) — 
his  relations  with  the  Khedive, 
ii.  264-9 

Superstitions,  ii.  505-6 

Syrians,  the  (Christian),  ii.  213-19 

Tajourrah    annexed    by    France, 

ii.  54 
Tamai,  battle  at,  i.  416 
Taxes.     See  Finances 
Tel-el-Kebir,  battle  of,  i.  323 
Tewfik  Bey,  i.  397 
Tewfik  Pasha — 

President  of  Council,  i.  89-90, 

100 
proclaimed  Khedive,  i.  141 
condition  of  Egypt  at  accession, 

i.  149-51 
and    Arabi,    i.    176-93,    254-78, 

335 
Sir  Edward  Malet's  defence  of, 

i.  2(51 
and  slaughter  OJ  Christians,  L 
288 


INDEX 


599 


and  Gordon,  i.  441,  693 
his  character,  ii.  827-33 
Tigrane  Pasha,  ii.  221-6 
Times,  The,  i.  515 
Tissot,  M.,  i.  283 
Tokar,  Sir  Evelyn  Baring  advises 
occupation  of,  ii.  74 
Sir  Francis  Grenfell  on,  ii.  76 
Colonel    HoUed    Smith    takes, 
ii.  77 
Toski,  battle  of,  ii.  64-9 
Toulba  Pasha,  i.  275 
Trade,  Egyptian,    French  capital 

employed  in,  i.  303 
Trescow,  M.  de,  i.  162 
Tribunals,      InternationaL        See 

Mixed  Courts 
Tribunals,  native,  ii.  319-20 
Tunis,  French  Protectorate  over, 

i.  332 
Turco- Egyptian,    the,  character- 
istics of,  ii.  169-73 
Turkey's  Egyptian  Policy — 

proposal  tliat  Sir  Evelyn  Baring 
should  he  Minister  of  Fin- 
ance to  Sultan  of,  i.  69 
re   Ismail's    deposition,  i.    129, 

140 
Bubsequent  to   Ismail's   deposi- 
tion, i.  154-5 
French    and     British    Govern- 
ments,    traditional    policy 
towards,  i.  155-6 
during  Arabi's  mutiny,  i.  194 
France  and  England  and,  i.  196 
Turkish  envoys  in  Cairo,  i.  199 
re  Joint  Note,  i.  258-9 
and  the  Powers,  1882,  i.  282-5 
after   slaughter    of  Christians, 

i.  288 
and    Military  Convention  with 

Great  Britain,  i.  308-21 
relations  between  Khedive  and 

Sultan  of,  ii.  264-9 
and  Woltf  Convention,  ii.  372- 

81 
Turkish  Commissioner  in  Egypt, 
ii.  380 

Ulema,    the,     characteristics    of, 

ii.  173-86 
Ulemas,  i.  99 
Unified  Debt,  i.  13 
University  of  El-Azhar,  ii.  532 


Veterinary  College,  ii.  512 
Vincent,    Sir    Edgar    Vincent,   L 

422 
value  of  his  work,  ii.  287 
Vivian,     Lord     {see    also     under 

British  Governments) — 
British  Representative  in  Egypt, 

i.  14 
Reports   on  Finances,   1876,  L 

27,  36 
on  funded  debt,  1877,  i.  33-4 
on  Ismail's  hostility  to  Nubar, 

i.  67-8 
his   disagreement  with    Sir   R. 

Wilson,  i.  95 
succeeded  bv  Sir  Frank  Lascelles, 

i.  96 

Waddington,  M.,  i.  36 
Wakfs,  the,  i.  53,  ii.  409 
Wallace,  Sir  Donald  Mackenzie, 

i.  324 
Walne,  Mr.,  on  Said's  policy,  L 

21 
Weighing  dues,  i.  122 
West,  Sir  Raymond,  ii.  288 
Wilson,   Sir  Charles  W.,  i.  368, 

ii.  8 
Wilson,  Sir  Rivers — 

Vice-President  of  Commission  of 

Inquiry,  i.  45 
appointed  Minister  of  Finance, 

i.  63 
assaulted  by  officers,  i.  74 
on   reinstatement  of  Nubar,  L 

88 
his    disagreement     with     Lord 

Vivian,  i.  95 
President     of    Commission    of 

Liquidation,  i.  162 
references  to,  i.  78-9,  88,  91-6-8, 
100-2-3,  172 
Wiiigate,  Sir  Reginald — 

on  witiidrawn  Soudan  garrisons, 

ii.  31 
Sirdar,  ii.  105 
on  Soudan,  ii.  545-6,  554 
reference  to,  ii.  66-8,  70 
Wodehouse,  Colonel,  ii.  67 
Wolff,  Sir  Henry,  Convention  with 

Turkey,  ii.  372-81 
Wolseley,  Lord,  i.  301,  323,  581 
marches  to  relieve  (Joidon,  ii.  6 
correspondence     with      British 


600 


MODERN  EGVrT 


Government    after    fall    of 
Khartoum,  ii.  20-29 
AVomen,  Egyptian,  importance  of 

educating,  ii.  539-42 
Wood,     Sir    Evelyn,     commands 
Egyptian  army,  i.  372,  399 
on    evacuation    of    Soudan,    L 

376-7 
references  to,  i.  422,  648 

Young  Egypt,  ii.  228-43 


Zeyla — 

farmed  to  Ismail,  ii.  63 
taken  by  Great  Britain,  ii.  64 
Zobeir  Pasha — 

proposed  despatch  to  Soudan,  i. 

402 
his    relations   with   Gordon,   i. 

454-60 
on    proposed    appointment    in 

Soudan,  i.  480-534 
his  return  to  Soudan,  i.  529 


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